11.2: Public Goods and the Collective Action Problem

International Relations: Politics, Power, and Global Connections · LibreTexts

0%

Contents

    Text

    Size
    100%
    Theme
    Typeface
    Line length
    Spacing

    Read aloud

    How

    Speed: 1×
    Light up
    Highlight

    Symbols: Mulberry Symbols, © 2018–2026 Steve Lee, CC BY-SA 4.0 (licence, the set), the site's own copies.

    From LibreTexts, under CC BY-NC 4.0, as the source states it; its equations are written in TeX, which the PDF shows typeset. This page at LibreTexts.

    11.2: Public Goods and the Collective Action Problem

    The Collective Action Problem

    Environmental public goods—resources like clean air and stable climate—are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, meaning everyone benefits from them, regardless of individual contribution. The preservation of these goods often encounters the collective action problem, where states have incentives to benefit from others’ efforts without actively contributing. This "free-rider" behavior is particularly problematic in global issues like climate change, where the actions of a few major polluters can affect everyone. For instance, carbon emissions from large industrial nations impact the global climate, affecting states that may not contribute as heavily to emissions.


    This page titled 11.2: Public Goods and the Collective Action Problem was last modified on Thu, 20 Aug 2026 15:51:06 GMT and is shared under a CC BY-NC 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Robert Stockwell.