St. Louis Post-Dispatch
February 8, 1903
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SP I ree ee ee eee ee SN Se a ae * 9 * Ter: een ee id rn ea eS Uhh POMPE E CIRCLE SECTION - * Aas D Out Next Sunday. : 12 — — _ VOL. 655. NO. 171. 1 f * Problems That Confront Officials in the Army and Navy Departments Although No War Is Expected There Is as Much Hustle and Stir All Along the Line as if It Were Really in Pros- pect---Our Available Fighting Strength Now | at Sea Is: 104 Fighting Ships, Which Could Be Made Ready Within Sixty Days---These Would Be Manned By 28,712 Men. ON LAND 10,853,399. SOLDIERS COULD BE QUICKLY MOBILIZED POST-DISPATCH BUREAU, g 1345 Pennsylvania avenue. Prepared Expressly for and Telegraph ed to the Post-Dispatch. WASHINGTON, Feb. 7.—suppose Germany or England or both declared war on the United States on Monday or in 30 days or in 60 days? ‘ Then what? President Roosevelt and Secretary Root and Secretary Moody and Gen. Corbin have been asking themselves that question seriously for weeks. They do not anticipate such a declaration. They know that even if Germany is determined to fight this country, which is not at all probable, although some of the softer heads of the ad- ministration forces think such a contingency quite possible, there would not be a declaration of war for months and possibly for a year or more. | Still, cutting out all theories and possibilities, suppose again that Germany or England or both declared war on the United States on Monday or in 30 days or in 60 days? * Here is the situation we would find ourselves in, founded on the exact figures of the great war-making divisions of the government—the army and the navy. Here is what the United States could do, without theoretical comparisons with the forces of other powers or any speculation as to what the result would be if certain ships of this country met certain ships of other countries or certain land forces of this country met certain land forces of the enemy, beyond the broad general statement, that, man for man, the American is a better soldier and better sailor than either the Englishman or the German. A better marksman on land, a better gunner on sea. The navy could have 104 fighting ships ready, for battle in either the Atlantic or a month would fall only a few short of this. nam: This official estimate. of-the avail- >> marine boats. . Some of the ships are — repairs or are not yet completed, but only those which could be made ready for active duty from within 30 to 60 days are included in the list. Colliers and supply ships are not aken into account. Every one of the 104 ships would be prepared to do nothing but fight. * SHIPS AND GUNS AND THE MEN WHO.FIGHT THE BATTLES The United States has but ten first-class battleships. Three of these—the Oregon, the battleships, three armored cruisers and six protected cruisers, Caribbean waters within 60 days. The naval force that could be assembled within ae within a week or 10 days. Kentucky and the Wisconsin are on the Pacific station. There are building in Various yards in the country nine more first-class battleships. Of these the Mis- uri is 83 per cent completed, the Ohio 69 per cent completed and the others all less than quarter done. There are six armored cruisers building and nine protected cruis- ers. The naval bill that will pass at thas - gession of Congress will provide for three more first-class battleships and one first- class armored cruiser. Germany has 12 first-class battleships ready for business. two armored cruisers and 17 protected crulsers. England has 12 first-class battleships, 14 armored cruis 109 protected cruisers in commission. Fagland is building 12 bat- tléships, 20 Armored cruisers and eight protected cruisers. Germany is building six The naval strength of a nation lies in its battle line. When the present ships are completed our naval prowess would lie ad- most entirely in our 19 battleships, eight armored cruisers and 21 protected cruisers. These ships will not all be completed for some years. They are ter future wars. If there was to be a war beyinning on (say on next Monday) the fighting would be done with the ships enumerated. There is plenty of power on hand. The gun- shops are somewhat behind on orders, but three shifts have recently gone to work. The sailors of the navy are well drilled. The admiral! is a great fighting man. The exact co of the navy in en- listed mer is 27,010. Congress is expected to pass a special act making 3000 more men immediately avallable and they will be en- listed as rapidly as possible. THE MEN WHO WOULD MAN FORTS AND REPEL INVASION How would the army respond if war were to de declared suddenly. The regular army is composed today of @omething more than 60,000 men. The ex- act figures are not known, even at the de- partment, and thero may oe nearly 65,000 men under arms. In accordance with a re- cent order the army is being reduced to the peace strength of 59,000, and will soon reach that figure. There are about 13,000 sol- Gers in the Philippines, four batteries of artillery in Cuba, two in Honolulu, one in Porto Rico and a small detachment of troops in Alaska. ‘The regular force that would be immedi- 8 _ ately available, therefore, is approximately 6.0% men. War department officials have been study du the transportation problem, and oth- dern of a similar nature very carefully from the day trouble was scented in Venekuela. be They estimate that the army could be re- cruited up to the war footing of 100,000 men Many of the recruits would be men who had seen army 2 service, and it would not take long to have the increased force in shape to fight. Gen. Corbin places the enlisted militia a ptrength of the United States at 118,259 . — There are, perhaps, 20,000 more who , but who consider themselves active litia men. nag effective militia is esti- us fore 2. be mobilized in less than J plein, then than half of it could be ress int weeks, The army rifie = — 4 to the militia in place of 8 3 —— will Mig Se . the les rae — 5 re Pat . „ 2 Bieber e „ APPT EY pared for war now more easfly than one of 100,000 was in 1898. It is estimated that 100,000 could be recruited, equipped and mobilized within ninety days. After the 100,000 mark had been passed volunteers could be equipped as fast as they could be enlisted. There are thousands of men who served in the war with Spain, officers and privates, who would form the basis of a new volunteer army. The Springfeld arsenal is turning out 350 army rifies every day of eight hours. This could be more than doubled by working night and day. The Rock Island arsenal, working day and night, can turn out 6000 sets of cavalry and infantry equipment and 500 sets of horse equipments every hours. It is expected that the new army rifie pro- duced by the ordinance department will be made the regulation weapon inside of two months. When that is done the plant at Rock Island arsenal will be installed and wil turn out 250 rifles every elght hours. The plant at Springfield will be shifted and will then produce 400 guns in an elght-hour day. It wiil require nearly a year to in- stall the new plant at Rock Island and six months to change the plant at Springfield, but if war should come, the latter plant would keep on turning out the Krag rifle now in use, The commissary department is prepared to furnish supplies for any number of men on the shortest notice. It can assemble 1,000,000 rations at Boston within 4 hours and can do the same at any other large city. Gen, Weston is prepared for war at any time. When it comes there will be no scarcity of provisions. The medical, branch is equally well prepared and stores ready for a call. 8 a ey 7 * ey 1 $ SB. all . * * 8 gf i 3 3 1 n * C N T aS hr xo, ra A 2 a 2 n ese ee "a * 72 . 1 + 2 a 5 OF England and Germany Were (0 Hake | he great} WAl THE ARMY. || mobilized in go days 500,000. THE NAVY. First class battle ships, 8; torpedo boat destroyers, submarine boats, etc., 74. number of men for duty, 29,712. FIGHTING STRENGTH OF ARMY AND NAVY IF CALLED ON TO DEFEND NATION TODAY Size of regular army 60,000; could be mobilized at any point in United States in five days 45,000 strong; could be increased in ten days to 100,000. Military reserve strength in United States 118,259; equipped and mobilized in 45 days 250,000; could be recruited, equipped and Total available men in United States capable of bearing arms, 10,853,396. Total number of ships ready for battle in 30 or 60 days 104. second class battleships, I; armored cruiser, I; monitors, 7; protected cruisers, 13; unprotected cruisers, gunboats, torpedo boats, Officers on the active list, 2215; midshipmen under instructions, 497; total could be recruited, 2 e — This ts little Willie and the bird Will Wille hurf the bird 2 — 1 No! — Willie will not hurl the bird. us 00 -@— © © @ @ -@#-@ "WAR NOW 8 NOT A POSSIBILITY” SAY LORD TWcEOMOUTH AND STEA —— = The British Liberal Leader Declares the British Lion Has Its Head in a Vice, While Stead Thinks the Kaiser Will Not Trifle With the Monroe Doctrine. Special Cable to the Post-Dispatch. (Copyright, 1903, by the Press Publishing Co.) LONDON, Feb. 7.—Lord Tweedmouth, one of the most prominent and influential leaders of the Liberal party, a member of Gladstone’s last cabinet, and certainly marked out for high office in the next Liberal administration, received the Post-Dis- patch correspondent at Brook House, Park Lane, today, and gave his views on the Venezuelan situation. Lord Tweedmouth is the chief manager of the internal affairs of the Liberal party, and may be taken as representing authoritatively the views of that party. The Post- Dispatch correspondent represented to Lord Tweedmouth the growing feeling of ex- asperastion in the United States at the action of the allies in relation to Venezuela and me protraction of negotiations. “I dis'ike making ahy statement on the subject for publication, but confidentially I am not surprised at what you tell me.“ said Lord Tweedmouth. Do you believe that is a merely tang’e, or anything more serious is likely to come of It?“ asked the Post-Dispatch correspondent. Speaking with emphatic conviction Lord Tweedmouth replied: “No, that is absolutely impossible and inconcélvable. I cannot imagine anything that would more surely lead the present government to instantaneous ruin than such possibility. The people of this country would not stand it for a moment.” Government Got Its Head in Vise and Now It Can’t Get It Out. “What is particularly incomprehensible to Americans,“ said the Post-Dispatch cor- respondent, is that while the united voice of public opinion here, even in the gov- ernment organs, strongly condemns the proceedings of their government, the govern- ment, nevertheless, continues to pursue @ universally condemned policy.” “The government can't help itself,” reped Lord Tweedmouth; “it has got its head into a vice and cannot get it out. A diplomatic arrangement cannot be licht- ly shaken off. The government went into it blind; they probably never looked for any complications, the mere threat of force, it was thought, would be sufficient. They made the arrangements at the end of July, and doubtless were painfully surprised, when, climatic conditions have Decome favorable, they are called upon to carry it out in December. “Then German methods are so violent that they made the affair uglier stil. They have bound themselves to Germany and, mind you, diplomatic arrangements being what they are, if there was a change of government there tomorrow, the new admin- istration must preserve a certain continuity of policy in an affair of this kind. Doubt- less they would approach itina different spirit, but the government would be bound by the undertaking of its predecessor. “However, under no circumstances is jt conceivable that the difficulty will not not be settled by diplomatic methods, and the approaching opening of Parliament will probably accelerate the pace of the negotations. | „ wish Lord Pauncefote's vast knowledge and experience had still been at the service of our two countries, but in Sir Michael Herbert Great Britain has a repre- sentative at Washington who thoroughly represents the friendly sentiments prevail- ing here towards Americans.” — * Stead Emphatically Declares That a Rupture Is Impossible Special Cable to the Post-Dispatch. once for all of the idea that British policy| (Copyright, 1908. by the Press Publishing Co.) In Venezuela involves an —— open or 6 iy . 1 100 Ha ‘ , | aa ' nt i | W Ta et P @ eee ow ae at oe, ‘ ‘ . ; * ’ — * 1 . I d * - toa 7) ee 7 12 oF 9 ‘ ea ‘ — , „ 10 1 py * 4 if Lf . : 3 > ’ * 5 4 5 pi A ea " " 7 . 4 * 2 * ‘ 2 J So? 18h) n * Z 1 1 t * w * a 0 Pa 4 — : * * — € * 4 * 1 ; ae 4 N * * 1 * 5 ‘ ’ / x N 7 af ¢ — ‘ 47°40! + ; 1 ee ae * i + — Set eres — 2 — . a — * — 5 * — — > e¢ * — 2 : — — . * : A 2 $ — ' 3 8 7 a : ; 1 — om oR * — _ * 7 7 2 = * 11 2 ; j : 4 — 1 y > * . . fad ! — . 0 E. | os * . ef x > 2 4 * 5 7 ‘ fy» 5 1 * . ' " > — , if 1 Nee ‘An : . 5 Nil 1 3 ban ‘ * 1 — . * * | ae an * . i att — E 55 ‘ ; 17 N 9.75 0 16 * te ass. * het. ao a 4 7 * . . 4 * * f Pa 5 f 2 . * * — “ Bg Oe 1 Af. i * * — would be fired out of office in a week if the English people suspected any such scheme on their part. “The Kaiser alone presented a coalition of European powers against England over the South African war, and when he asked to be allowed to join England in this little matter of collecting debts from Venezuela England could not refuse. The cloud of } suspicion, mistrust, and now exasperation, from the German alliance, is the nemesis of the unjust South African con- flict. Bowen Is Undiplomatic. As to the latest hitch over Mr. Bowen's methods, possibly being unversed in the ceremonious punctillo of diplomacy, he act- ed unconventionally, but the proposal that the President should arbitrate on this pref- erential claims question, after he had re- fused to arbitrate the whole question, is ridiculous. It is a part of Germany's game, which all along has been to maneuver the United States into adopting a position of paramount sovereignty or virtual protec- torate in relation to the South American re- publics, and thereby take the responsibility for their laches. But at the same time it is their jealous resentment es. the United States. “A Russian publicist of wide experience said to me the other day: ‘The tmmediate object of Germany's policy is to force the hand of the United States, and lure them in- to asserting their influence and authority in South American affairs. The German calculation is that any action on the part of the United States in restraint of any South American republic would see the be- ginning of a South American league, which would have a Monroe Doctrine of s own, directed against any extension of the pow- er of the United States in South America, and which, from whatever motive, was ready to assert the principles of South American independence, as againat the pow- er of the United States.’ Germany’s Designs in South Africa. “My Russian friend may have been led astray by anti-German dias, but it is at least safe to say that if Germany has any designs on South America they might most effectually be carried out on the lines he suggested. “It is sincerely to be hoped Roosevelt wil! not arbitrate, but that it the ambassadors 4 WAR WOULD BE Ck IN A MURDEROUS NONSE — 70 „ * “Only the Most Absolute and Evident Necessity © Serve as an Excuse for It—No Such — Exists or Is in Prospect. 5 THE P.-D’S. REQUEST OF MR. In view of the uncertain state of mind in this a with * Germany's attitude toward the United States, will you consent statement for publication in he Post-Dispatch, giving your noes aah ot 0 American sentiment in various parts of this Say: "e — 8 = A, MR. SCHURZ’S RESPONSE. 3 NEW YORK, Fong; eo, 5 4 To the Editor of the Post-Dispatch: + pm In response to your letter asking me to give y * | my views about the possibilities of a war with ¢ „5 I have this to say: 3 A war between the United States and Germ would be so awful, so incalculable a calamity that on the most absolute and evident necessity could serve 3 an excuse for it. Be) ‘Not even the wildest jingo on either side will p tend that such a necessity exists or is in prospect. + | fact, there is no real question or difference between the two countries important enough to : their ancient friendship. | * A war between them would therefore not only b criminal, but idiotic—an absurd atrocity, a | nonsense. Even to suggest the possibility of s war under such circumstances and to agitate a mind by such suggéstions is a piece. of — recklessness. Truly yours, F WOULD. NOT TAK UF VENEZUELAN N . 2 8 ’ * * German Ambassador Ste ; > 1 ~~ ae The Kaiser's Mouthpiece at Washington Says His & peror Would Be the Last Person in Europe to Diss turb Sancity of the Monroe Doctrine. | SW at lb gE a oy li NEMA, WAR OE GR ert “Sternberg, I count on ygu to finish this I quickly!’’—The Kaiser. “Sternberg, I rely on you to end this mu: quickly!’’—President Roosevelt. POST-DISPATOH BUREAU, 1845 nsylivania Avenue. BY JAMES C LM AN. WASHINGTON, Feb. 7.—When the new envoy, sent to Washington by the German Emperor, declares that the Monroe doc- trine is an important guarantee of the world’s peace, and that no responsible man in Germany dreams of, German conquests or colonies in South America—that the idea is a subject of ridicule throughout the German Empire—one begins to wonder whether a large part of the American peo- ple has not mistaken the, spirit of the soldier who sits on the throne of the Great Frederick. — Baron Speck von Sternberg spoke to me with great earnestness, especially when he referred to hs conversatons wth the Emperor William just before starting for America to attempt the settlement of the Venezuelan difficulty. “Nothing could be more preposterous than the supposition that the German Emperor or his advisers are hostile to the Monroe doctrine, and it is regarded as a menace to Germany's secret ambition to colonize or establish a sphere of politcal nterest n Brazil or some other part of South Amer- joa.“ he said. The suggestion that the German nation—elther in the person of its sovereign or in its ministry or parliament, or even in its thinking people—has any ul- terior motive in protecting its honor and the lives and liberties and property of its citizens in Venezuela is utterly false. I can say that in the name of the Emperor the government and the people. It is out- rageous and contrary to common sense to suspect the pledged word of a nation and a sovereign whose most marked character- istics are candor and plain dealing. The Monroe doctrine was once looked upon by many Germans as a threat to Europe. But that idea has faded away. The Monroe Doctrine is deeply respected in Germany for it ls really a guarantee of internationl It is difficult to con of the refined, delica mental personality of this remarkable looks like a speaks like in n = and yet is, in fact, a professional representing the most warlike earth in the capitol of its most rival lishman, has the alr of a Nterary : alt | tions which Max sied would one day
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