Lecture 10 of 24Lecture 10
Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
Ben Polak · Yale University
Credits and licence
- From
- Game Theory, Yale University (at Open Yale Courses)
- Licence
- CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 US, as Open Yale Courses states it. Non-commercial use only.
- Attribution
- Open Yale Courses, Yale University. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 licence; third-party material in the lectures is not.
- Who can watch
- Teens profiles and older. How courses are placed
All the lectures
- Introduction: Five First Lessons
- Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
- Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
- Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
- Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
- Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
- Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
- Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
- Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
- Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
- Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
- Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
- Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse