Lecture 33 of 62week-06
Week 6: Lecture 33: Interpreting the threat equilibrium in standard normal form of the dynamic game
Prof. Ankur A. Kulkarni · IIT Bombay
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All the lectures
- Week 1: Lecture 1: Introduction, why do delays happen, contention for resources
- Week 1: Lecture 2: Performance metrics and parameters
- Week 1: Lecture 3: Introducing Queuing Systems
- Week 1: Lecture 4: Memoryless Distributions
- Week 1: Lecture 5: Operational Laws
- Week 2: Lecture 6: Aumann model of incomplete information: Definition and Examples
- Week 2: Lecture 7: Knowledge operator: Definition and Examples
- Week 2: Lecture 8: Common knowledge: Definition and Examples
- Week 2: Lecture 9: The structural theorem of common knowledge
- Week 2: Lecture 10: Proof of the structural theorem (forward direction)
- Week 2: Lecture 11: Proof of the structural theorem (backward direction)
- Week 2: Lecture 12: Aumann model of incomplete information with belief: Definition and Examples
- Week 2: Lecture 13: Aumann's agreement theorem
- Week 3: Lecture 14: Zero-sum game definition and Security strategies
- Week 3: Lecture 15: Saddle point strategies
- Week 3: Lecture 16: Further properties of saddle point strategies
- Week 3: Lecture 17: Mixed strategies
- Week 4: Lecture 18: Weirstrass lemma and existence of a mixed saddle point strategy
- Week 4: Lecture 19: Von Nuenmann minmax theorem
- Week 4: Lecture 20: Computing mixed saddle point startegy: Holmes and Moriarty
- Week 4: Lecture 21: Computing mixed strategy saddle point: 2X2 matrix game
- Week 4: Lecture 22: Computing mixed strategy saddle point: 2X3 matrix game
- Week 5: Lecture 23: Nash equilibrium of a non zero-sum game and its relation with Kakutani fixed...
- Week 5: Lecture 24: Proof: Existence of Nash equilibrium (Condition 1 of Kakutani fixed point...)
- Week 5: Lecture 25: Proof: Existence of Nash equilibrium (Condition 2 of Kakutani fixed...)
- Week 5: Lecture 26: Existence of Nash equilibrium for infinite strategy space (Using Brower's ...)
- Week 5: Lecture 27: Quantal Response: Motivation
- Week 5: Lecture 28: Quantal Response: Formal model
- Week 6: Lecture 29: Dynamic games definiton
- Week 6: Lecture 30: Solution concept in dynamic games
- Week 6: Lecture 31: Relation of the heuristic solution with the Nash equilibrium of the standard ...
- Week 6: Lecture 32: Example of a Threat equilibrium
- Week 6: Lecture 33: Interpreting the threat equilibrium in standard normal form of the dynamic game
- Week 7: Lecture 34: Extensive form games I
- Week 7: Lecture 35: Extensive form games II
- Week 7: Lecture 36: Single Act Games
- Week 7: Lecture 37: Informationally inferior games
- Week 8: Lecture 38: Information Structure in Single Act Games
- Week 8: Lecture 39: Nested and Ladder Nested Extensive form games
- Week 8: Lecture 40: Equilibrium Algorithm
- Week 8: Lecture 41: Stage-wise multi act games
- Week 8: Lecture 42: Feedback equilibrium
- Week 9: Lecture 43: Mixed and Behavioral Strategies
- Week 9: Lecture 44: Conditions for equivalence for mixed and behavioral strategies
- Week 9: Lecture 45: Kuhn's Theorem I
- Week 9: Lecture 46: Kuhn's Theorem II
- Week 9: Lecture 47: Kuhn's Theorem III
- Week 10: Lecture 48: Games of incomplete information
- Week 10: Lecture 49: Bayesian Nash equilibrium I
- Week 10: Lecture 50: Bayesian Nash equilibrium II
- Week 10: Lecture 51: Self-enforcement of Nash equilibrium
- Week 10: Lecture 52: Stackelberg game
- Week 11: Lecture 53: Principal-Agent Models I
- Week 11: Lecture 54: Principal-Agent Models II
- Week 11: Lecture 55: Moral Hazard and Adverse selection
- Week 11: Lecture 56: Games with contracts
- Week 12: Lecture 57: Correlated Equilibrium I
- Week 12: Lecture 58: Correlated Equilibrium II
- Week 12: Lecture 59: Correlated Equilibrium III
- Week 12: Lecture 60: Bayesian Game with mediated communication
- Week 12: Lecture 61: Revelation Principle
- Live Session 17-04-2024