Learn · Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design
Lecture 40 of 62week-08
Module 40: Domain Restriction
Dr. Swaprava Nath · IIT Bombay
Credits and licence
- From
- Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design, IIT Bombay (at NPTEL)
- Licence
- CC BY-NC-SA, as NPTEL states it. Non-commercial use only.
- Attribution
- NPTEL states: "Distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike / CC BY - NC - SA", beside a BY-NC-SA badge.
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- Tweens profiles and older. How courses are placed
All the lectures
- Module 1 : Introduction: Game Theory
- Module 2: Introduction: Mechanism Design
- Module 3: The game of chess
- Module 4: Proof of the chess theorem
- Module 5: Normal form games
- Module 6: Dominance
- Module 7: Nash equilibrium
- Module 8: Maxmin strategies
- Module 9: Elimination of dominated strategies
- Module 10: Preservation of PSNE
- Module 11: Matrix games
- Module 12: Relation between Maxmin and PSNE in matrix
- Module 13: Mixed strategies
- Module 14: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE)
- Module 15: Find MSNE
- Module 16: MSNE characterization theorem proof
- Module 17: Algorithm to find MSNE
- Module 18: Correlated equilibrium (CE)
- Module 19: Computing correlated equilibrium
- Module 20: Extensive form games
- Module 21: Subgame perfection
- Module 22: Limitations of SPNE
- Module 23 : Imperfect Information Extensive Form Games (IIEFG)
- Module 24 : Strategies in IIEFGs
- Module 25 : Equivalence of Strategies in IIEFGs
- Module 26: Perfect Recall
- Module 27: Equilibrium in IIEFG
- Module 28: Game Theory in Practice: P2P file sharing
- Module 29: Bayesian Games
- Module 30: Strategy, Utility in Bayesian Games
- Module 31: Equilibrium in Bayesian Games
- Module 32: Examples of Bayesian Equilibrium
- Module 33: Introduction to Mechanism Design
- Module 34: Revelation Principle
- Module 35: Introduction to Arrow's Impossibility Result
- Module 36: Proof of Arrow's Result
- Module 37: Introduction to the Social Choice Setup
- Module 38: Introduction to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Module 39: Proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Module 40: Domain Restriction
- Module 41: Median Voting Rule
- Module 42: Median Voter Theorem - Part 1
- Module 43: Median Voter Theorem - Part 2
- Module 44: The Task Sharing Domain
- Module 45: The Uniform Rule
- Module 46: Mechanism Design with Transfers
- Module 47: Examples of Quasi-linear Preferences
- Module 48: Pareto Optimality and Groves Payments
- Module 49: Introduction to VCG Mechanism
- Module 50: VCG in Combinatorial Allocations
- Module 51: Applications to Internet Advertising
- Module 52: Slot Allocation and Payments in Position
- Module 53: Pros and Cons of VCG Mechanism
- Module 54: Affine Maximizers
- Module 55: Single Object Allocation
- Module 56: Myerson's Lemma
- Module 57: Illustration of Myerson's Lemma
- Module 58: Optimal Mechanism Design
- Module 59: Single Agent Optimal Mechanism Design
- Module 60: Multiple Agent Optimal Mechanism Design
- Module 61: Examples of Optimal Mechanisms
- Module 62: Endnotes and Summary