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Case Study Learning Objectives
This case study looks inside Israel and Iran rather than at their mutual hostility. It compares how each state builds religious identity into its institutions, how each population actually divides along religious lines, and what those divisions do to domestic politics. Using a Most Different Systems Design, it shows how two very different political systems reached the same unusual outcome, in which religion is formally built into the legal and constitutional order.
By the end of this case study, you will be able to:
- Compare two ways religious identity can be embedded in state institutions.
- Distinguish religious identity from national identity where the two overlap.
- Explain why measuring religiosity is methodologically difficult, and more difficult in some states than others.
- Analyze how identity cleavages structure political competition within each society.
Introduction
Israel and Iran are frequently discussed together in the context of their mutual hostility, which has included direct military exchanges. That is not the subject of this case study. The comparison here is internal: how each state builds religious identity into its institutions, how each population actually divides along religious lines, and what those divisions do to domestic politics.
Framed that way, the two cases share an outcome that is unusual among modern states. In both, religion is not merely influential in politics but formally built into the legal and constitutional order. Yet they arrived at that outcome through entirely different designs. Israel is a parliamentary democracy that defines itself as a Jewish state and delegates significant legal authority to religious institutions. Iran is a republic in which clerical bodies hold constitutional authority over elected ones. Comparing cases that share an outcome but differ in nearly every mechanism is what Chapter 1 described as a Most Different Systems Design.
Both cases also illustrate something the concepts in this chapter make visible: religious identity and national identity can overlap so completely that separating them becomes a political question in its own right.
Israel
- Full Country Name: State of Israel
- Regime Type: Parliamentary democracy
- Head of State: President (indirectly elected, ceremonial)
- Head of Government: Prime Minister
- Legislature: Unicameral Knesset (120 seats)
- Electoral System: Nationwide proportional representation, 3.25 percent threshold
- Constitution: No single written constitution; a series of Basic Laws
- Established: 1948
- Seat of Government: Jerusalem (designation not universally recognized internationally)
- Population: approximately 10 million
Iran
- Full Country Name: Islamic Republic of Iran
- Regime Type: Theocratic republic combining elected and unelected institutions
- Head of State: Supreme Leader
- Head of Government: President (directly elected from a vetted slate)
- Legislature: Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis (290 seats)
- Candidate Vetting: Guardian Council
- Constitution: 1979, substantially amended 1989
- Established: 1979 (following revolution)
- Capital: Tehran
- Population: approximately 92 million
Two Designs for Embedding Religion in the State
Israel
Israel describes itself as a Jewish and democratic state, and much of its domestic political argument concerns how to hold those two commitments together. Several institutional features give the formulation concrete legal content.
The Law of Return, passed in 1950, grants any Jew the right to immigrate and acquire citizenship. As Section 5.5 discussed, citizenship is a legal status, and most states set criteria for acquiring it. Israel's criteria are explicitly tied to descent and religious identity, which makes the boundaries of the national community and the boundaries of a religious community substantially the same.
The Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, passed in 2018, declared national self-determination in Israel to be unique to the Jewish people and designated Hebrew as the sole official language, giving Arabic a "special status." Supporters described it as codifying what had always been implicit. Critics, including many within Israel, argued it subordinated the democratic commitment to the Jewish one, particularly for the roughly one-fifth of citizens who are Arab.
Religion also governs personal status law. Israel has no civil marriage. Marriage and divorce are administered by recognized religious authorities, with the Chief Rabbinate handling Jewish marriage and corresponding bodies handling Muslim, Christian, and Druze communities. Israelis who cannot or will not marry through these channels commonly marry abroad, and the state recognizes those marriages. This is a striking arrangement: a democracy that delegates a core civil function to clerical authority.
Finally, Israel's electoral system shapes how religious identity translates into power. Nationwide proportional representation with a low threshold produces many parties and makes coalitions necessary. Religious parties have consequently held disproportionate leverage, serving as what observers call kingmakers, because governments frequently cannot be formed without them.
Iran
Iran's 1979 constitution institutionalized clerical authority through the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, guardianship of the jurist. The result is a dual structure in which elected and unelected institutions coexist, with the unelected ones holding final authority.
Iranians directly elect a president and a parliament, and these bodies exercise real administrative and legislative functions. Above them sits the Supreme Leader, who serves without a fixed term, commands the armed forces, and appoints the head of the judiciary, the heads of state broadcasting, and half the Guardian Council. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei held the office from 1989 until 2026, when succession became a contested question following his death.
The Guardian Council, a twelve-member body of clerics and jurists, vets all candidates for elected office. This is the mechanism that most clearly limits competition. In recent election cycles the Council has disqualified reformist and moderate candidates on a large scale. The 2024 presidential election, called after President Ebrahim Raisi's death in a helicopter crash, was unusual in that a reformist, Masoud Pezeshkian, was permitted to run and won the runoff with about 55 percent. Turnout tells its own story: just under 40 percent in the first round, the lowest for any presidential election since 1979, rising to about 50 percent in the runoff. Parliamentary elections earlier that year drew roughly 41 percent.
Turnout in Iran functions as a form of public opinion data. Because the state has historically treated high participation as evidence of its legitimacy, declining turnout communicates something that vetted elections otherwise suppress.
Diversity Within
Neither society is religiously uniform, and the internal divisions matter more for daily politics than the official self-descriptions suggest.
Among Israeli Jews, the Pew Research Center's 2016 study identified four widely used self-descriptions: Hiloni (secular), Masorti (traditional), Dati (religious), and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox). Roughly half identified as Hiloni and just under one in ten as Haredi, with the remainder in between. Pew found these groups differed sharply on questions of religion in public life, sometimes more than Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs differed from one another on other issues. Beyond this, about 21 percent of Israeli citizens are Arab, predominantly Muslim with Christian and Druze minorities.
In Iran, Twelver Shia Islam is the official religion, but the population is ethnically varied. Persians constitute roughly three-fifths, alongside substantial Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, Baloch, and Lur populations. Some of these groups are predominantly Sunni, which places them outside the officially privileged religious category as well as outside the dominant ethnic one.
When National and Religious Identity Overlap
Section 5.6 distinguished primordialist from constructivist understandings of religious identity. Both cases illustrate why the distinction has political consequences.
In Israel, Jewish identity functions simultaneously as a religious category and a national one. A secular Israeli Jew who never attends synagogue is still Jewish in the sense the Law of Return recognizes. This overlap means that debates which appear religious are often national, and vice versa. It also means that the question of who counts as Jewish, which has generated repeated legal and political disputes, is inseparable from the question of who can become a citizen.
In Iran, national and religious identity have been in tension rather than alignment. Iran possesses a Persian civilizational heritage stretching back well before Islam, and the Pahlavi monarchy actively emphasized that pre-Islamic past as the foundation of national identity. The Islamic Republic inverted the emphasis, foregrounding Shia Islamic identity instead. Neither framing has displaced the other. Iranians can and do draw on both, and which one a person emphasizes often carries political meaning.
This is constructivism in practice: the same population, with the same history available to it, has had national identity defined in substantially different ways within living memory.
Gender as a Political Cleavage
Section 5.4 addressed gender as a dimension of political identity. It operates differently in each case, but is central to both.
In Iran, compulsory hijab laws have made women's dress a matter of state enforcement since 1979. The death in custody of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, after her detention by morality police, triggered the largest sustained protests the Islamic Republic had faced in years, organized around the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom." The protests were suppressed, but they demonstrated how a policy grounded in religious identity can generate mobilization along gender lines, and how gender, religion, and opposition to the regime became fused in a single movement.
In Israel, gender questions arise largely through the relationship between religious communities and the state, including disputes over gender-separated public spaces, women's representation in Haredi party lists, and women's standing before religious courts in divorce proceedings.
A Contemporary Dispute: Haredi Conscription in Israel
One ongoing Israeli conflict shows how religious identity, state institutions, and coalition politics intersect.
Since Israel's founding, yeshiva students have received deferrals from otherwise near-universal military conscription. The arrangement originated when preserving religious scholarship was viewed as a priority for the new state, and it expanded substantially as the Haredi population grew. In June 2024, after the statutory basis for blanket exemptions had lapsed, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the government must conscript eligible Haredi men and barred state funding for yeshivas enrolling students who were not lawfully exempt.
Implementation has been minimal. Enlistment figures have fallen far short of the targets the state presented to the court, and the dispute has continued through further rulings and legislative attempts to restore exemptions. Because Haredi parties have been essential to coalition arithmetic, the government has faced a direct conflict between judicial orders and the requirements of remaining in office.
Note how many chapter concepts converge here. A religious identity group, holding a distinct understanding of its obligations, exercises political power through an electoral system that magnifies small parties, against a judicial institution asserting equal application of law. This is identity politics operating entirely through formal institutions.
Measuring Religiosity: A Methodological Problem
Section 5.9 discussed the difficulties of measuring public opinion. Iran offers a case where those difficulties are acute enough to shape what anyone can claim to know.
Official Iranian figures describe the population as overwhelmingly Shia Muslim. In 2020, researchers with the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) conducted an online survey of tens of thousands of respondents and reported dramatically different results, with only about a third identifying as Shia and substantial shares identifying as non-religious, spiritual, or with other traditions (Maleki and Tamimi Arab 2020).
Which figure is closer to the truth? The honest answer is that we cannot be certain, and the reasons are instructive.
- Social desirability bias. As Section 5.9 explained, respondents give answers they believe are expected of them. In a state where religious dissent carries legal risk, a face-to-face survey asking about belief is measuring something other than belief.
- Sampling. An online survey with self-selected respondents does not produce the representative sample that valid inference requires. Iranians willing to participate anonymously online may differ systematically from those who are not.
- Conceptualization. As Section 1.4 noted, researchers must define concepts before measuring them. Identifying as Shia, believing in specific doctrines, and performing religious practice are three different things, and the four dimensions of religious identity discussed in Section 5.6 can diverge considerably within one person.
Israel presents a comparatively favorable measurement environment. Surveys can be conducted face to face, respondents face no legal consequence for their answers, and the Hiloni, Masorti, Dati, and Haredi categories are terms Israelis already use about themselves. Even so, those categories are self-assigned and contested at the boundaries.
The comparative lesson is that data quality is not uniform across states, and it tends to be worst precisely where governments have the strongest interest in controlling what is known. A researcher comparing religiosity across the two cases is not comparing two equally reliable measurements.
Comparing the Two Cases
| Feature | Israel | Iran |
|---|---|---|
| Regime type | Parliamentary democracy | Theocratic republic |
| How religion enters the state | Citizenship law, Basic Laws, personal status law, coalition politics | Constitutional clerical authority over elected institutions |
| Highest authority | Knesset; no single written constitution | Supreme Leader |
| Are candidates vetted on religious grounds? | No | Yes, by the Guardian Council |
| Religion and national identity | Largely overlapping | In tension (Persian and Islamic) |
| Principal internal religious cleavage | Degree of observance among Jewish citizens | Regime religiosity versus private belief; Shia and Sunni |
| Reliability of survey data | Comparatively high | Low; heavily contested |
Think Comparatively
- Israel has no civil marriage, delegating the matter to religious authorities. Does this make Israel less democratic, or is it a legitimate accommodation of religious identity within a democracy? What would be lost under each answer?
- Iran's 2024 presidential election had the lowest first-round turnout since 1979. What can low turnout tell a researcher that vetted election results cannot?
- In Israel, religious and national identity largely coincide; in Iran, they compete. What difference does this make for how each state defines who belongs?
- Official Iranian figures and independent survey data on religiosity differ enormously. As a researcher, how would you decide what to report, and what would you tell readers about your uncertainty?
- Haredi parties hold leverage in Israel far exceeding their share of the population. Is this a flaw in proportional representation or a feature of it? Use the material from Section 3.1.
- Both states privilege one religious tradition in law. What does each arrangement mean for citizens outside that tradition, and how do the two situations differ?
References
Freedom House. (2026). Freedom in the World 2026: Iran. Washington, DC: Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/iran/freedom-world/2026
Israel Democracy Institute. (2026). Conscription of Haredi Yeshiva Students to the IDF and the Emerging Constitutional Crisis. Jerusalem: IDI. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/63168
Maleki, Ammar, and Pooyan Tamimi Arab. (2020). Iranians' Attitudes toward Religion: A 2020 Survey Report. GAMAAN. https://gamaan.org
Pargoo, Mahmoud. (2021). Secularization of Islam in Post-Revolutionary Iran. New York: Routledge.
Pew Research Center. (2016). Israel's Religiously Divided Society. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
Saleh, Alam. (2013). Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Smooha, Sammy. (2002). “The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State.” Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 4: 475–503.
Stern, Yedidia Z. (2016). Religion, State, and the Jewish Identity Crisis in Israel. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
This page titled 5.10: Case Study - Israel and Iran was last modified on Sun, 18 Oct 2026 03:18:58 GMT and is shared under a CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Austin Minter.
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