St. Louis Post-Dispatch
May 10, 1918

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————— | : | What Experience Has Taught | the Merchants of St. Louis “Was again reflected Thursday in the number of columns of perenne they bought in the newspapers. these St. Louis advertisers. of their store-news: in St. Pure os for Thureds y, May 9: Bee as athe eichinca | gs Cols. TDIRPATCH ee ea ae. 2 Cols. e PO iT P DISPATCH reaches more than’ a iillion eieeetoad the buying public, | laced the great uis’ ‘‘One Big ‘ a — Prayer-or on 1St. Peter’ S Day for End of War Urged by Pope ROME, May 10 (By A. P.). SPECIAL prayer\for the cessation of the evils tormenting hu- manity during mass on St. Peter’s day, June 29, is urged by Pope Benedict in a special message addressed to the whole world. “The end of the fourth year approaches since Europe is in confla- gration,” says the message. “During this time the violence has never diminished, but increased, so that we never have had. moments of re- lief from ever-increasing ills and afflictions.” Continuing, the Pope says that, owing to the ministry entrusted to him by Providence and animated by the charity of Jesus Christ, nothing has been left unattempted to remedy these afflictions. The pontiff recalls the words of King Josaphat, praying: “Lord God of our fathers, Thou art God in heaven and rulest over all kingdoms and nations. In Thy hand is strength and power; none can resist Thee. We will crx to Thee in our afflictions and Thou wilt hear and save us. turn our eyes to Thee.” Our God, as we know not what to do, we can only The Pope urges the world to trust in God, who, wrathful at such persistent sins, must be placated, the pontiff urges, and humble en- treaties and persevering prayers are the best means to do this. LG IA I, I Ce PG iy ON PE Ia, both of them of vast importance and both of them practically part of the same question. Gen. Maurice stated on April 9, the Prime Minister said: “What was the position at the beginning of the battlé? Notwithstanding the heavy casualties of 1917, the army in France was considerably strong- er on Jan. 1, 1918, than on Jan. 1, 1917.” This is his comment: ‘That statement implies that Sir Douglas Haig’s fighting strength on the eve of the great battle which began March 21 had not been dimin- ished; that is not correct.” Issuc Very Clear One, Now the issue is a very clear one. I said that the fighting strength of the army had in- creased. Gen. Maurice said that it had diminished as compared with the previous year. , _ The figures I gave were taken from the official records of the War Office, which I sent for be-— fore I made the statement. If they were incorrect, Gen. Maurice was as responsible as anybody else. They were not inaccurate. I, have made inquiries since. I am not sure what he quite means. There is absolutely no doubt that there was a very considerable part of the man-power of the army at the beginning of 1918, as compared with the man-power at the beginning of 1917, in France. There was a great increase in the man-power of the British army throughout the world in 1918, as compared with 1917, and the in- crease of man-power in France in 1918, as compared with 1917, was greater than the average through- out the whole area.. You must draw a distinction between what is known as combatants and non- combatants: I am going to take that as well later on, but before I do so, let me say at once, I do not accept that distinction when you talk about fighting strength. Who are combatants and who are noncombatants? Let me first of all deal with this question. Who are the combatants? Are “those men, who stopped the ad- vance of the German army to Amiens the other day, are they combatants? They are not if you begin to draw distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Those are Gen. Carey’s forces. They would not be treated as com- batants. Are the men who are un- der fire every day making and pre- paring roads, tramroads and rail- ways and who suffer severe cas- ualties, are thease combatants or noncombatants? In most lists that are printed they are noh-combat- ants. Does anyone mean te tell me that they are not part of the fighting strength of the army? Take the men who, when the British army retreated and had to abandon trenches which took months to prepare and who im- proved defenses and gunfire to re- Heve the infantry, are these men no part of the fighting strength of an army? If you have not got them you have to take infantry out and set them to that work. As a matter of fact, one of the things I came back from France with was a demand for more of them. And they are not a part of the fighting strength of the army! I decline absolutely to accept that definition. The technical distinction be- tween the combatant and nencom- batant question was put in the House of Commons by the honor- able gentleman member for Barn- ston, eight or nine days after I de- livered my speech of April 18. This question was put: “Sir Godfrey Baring desires to ask the Prime Minister whether when he stated that the British army in France was considerably stronger on the rst of January, 1918, than on the first of January, 1917, he was in- cluding labor battalions and the other noncombatant strength of the British army was greater or léss at the begininng of this vear than at the beginning ef last year?” * Sent Question te Maurice. My right honorable friend, whose duty it was to answer this question on behalf of the War Of- fice, sent that question to Gen. Maurice, with the answer. I am net going to read the answer which he gave because that is on the records of the House. I will give the note that came from Gen. Maurice's department. This is the actual decument: George Lambert: Is it signéd by him? Lioyd George: It is initialed by his deputy. I see that my right honorable friend, G. Lambert, is going to draw that distinction. That shows what sort of impar- tial judges the Commons affords. This-is the no Firat of all, you have got the figures inside. Of course, I cannot give those to the House, but this note is a summary. ° / France. will be seen that the combatant strength of the British army was greater on Jan.°*1, 1918, than on Jan, 1, 1917. This comes from Gen. Mau- rice’s department nine davs after I made that statement. I am not depending on the fact that all these men ruled out as noncom- batants are an essential part of the strength of the British army in I am not depending on that. As a matter of fact there was an increase as between Jan. Il, 1918, and March, but it just hap- pened. I thought I would take the first month of the year. Question of Comparison. Now I come to the_ second statement which was made by Gen. Maurice. There is a very importart question of comparison of the allied and enemy fcrces, and it has a bearing upon the question later of the extensicn of the front. I have been charged there with misleading the public to believe that at the time when the attack took place by the en- emy on the allied position ,.on the western front we had a slight su- periority in infantry; 2 considera- ble superiority, I think, in caval- ry, and,a superiority in artillery, and I also said a superiority in the air. With the exception of the air— I did not get that from Gen. Mau- rice—the whole of the figures upon which I based that statement came from Gen. Maurice. I asked for it. I-do not suggest that he was the man who worked up these fig- ures, but he was responsible for documents given out by his own department. And may I just add, Gen. Maurice has made two state- ments himself on this subject since the battle began. They have been- published, I believe, in America. I did not depend upon the Amer- ican publication. I took the trou- ble to see whether Gen. Maurice had really said so, and I find he ‘did. This is what he said on’ March 23: “ "Phere is one cardinal fact to keep in mind (this he said himself and not through officials), and that is that the forces on the whole front are as nearly equal as they can be.’ On April 3 he made this state- ment. This, also, I believe; -ap- peared in the American press: “As regards our side of the pic- ture, I need only repeat what I have already said, that on the whole front the opposing forces at the beginning of the battle Were approximately equal, and, therefore, a readjustment of the balance of the battlefield is only a matter of time.” From Official Sources. If there was anything in these figures; I got them from official sources, for which Gen. Maurice himself is responsible, and I think he might have said that in his let- ter when he was impugning the honor of Ministers. Now I come to the statement with regard to figures. I said that in Mesopotamia there is only one white division, and in Egypt and Palestine there are only three white divisions. Well, now I will give here again the source of my information. The statement about one British divi- sion is in the official record. With regard to Egypt, that statement was made at a Cabinet meeting, which was examining the posi- tion by a member of the staff. It is the custom of the Secre- tary of the War Cabinet to send these statements to all those who are present for correction, and I want the House to bear in mind that Gen. Maurice is the official who was primarily responsible for the question of the number of divisions in the various theaters of war. This statement was sent to Gen. Maurice for correction, if there was any correction to make. He telephoned to the Secretary (this is the note) that he added no re- marks. Forces in Egypt. So this statemént about there bemg 7 British divisions in Egypt Ss made in the presence of Gen, Maurice, who made no cor- rection, and I have no correction either from him or anybody else on the subject. Now I come to the next point. : This is the statement made about the extension of the front. This is not the place to enter into a discussion as to all the facts, but Hansard’s. report of the incident. includes: Mr. Pringle: Was this matter entered into at the Versailles War Council? : Mr. Bonar Law: This particu- lar matter was not dealt with at all by the Versailles War Coun- eed | was question | Then. Gen. Maurice said: at Versailles when the fake over Council, to whom it had been re- ferred.” In the first place, I think any- one reading that would come to the conclusion that Gen. Maurice Was present at the meeting. He was at Vereailles, it is true, but he was not at the meeting. I have looked at the official record since. and it confirms what I say. He was in Versailles. He was Mm a building oytgige with: several oth- ers who were there nestating - various Generals.’ He was not in the council aia. ber when the question to. which he refers was discussed. As a mat- ter of fact, the extension of tha front of Geh. Gough’s army, to which allusion has been made, was never discussed/at that coun- ceil at all. There was:a demand for a further exténsion,.but that particular place before the council had ever met. Before the council had» met. it agreed between Field Haig and Gen, Petain, and the extension was an ac- complished fact. Field Marshal Haig reported to the council that had been Marshal the extension had taken place.. There was not a single yard taken over as a result of the Versailles conference—not a single.yard of extension—and it was.Gen. Mau- rice who said he* was there, but was not, who implied that he was present when the decision had taken place. Who ventures to suggest that the extension of the front of Gen. Gough’s army was decided at Ver- sailles, when, as a matter of fact, it took place before the meeting had occurred? It is upon this cry that we are to be arraigned. Although Gen. Maurice did not say so, the real point, the one which is put by my right honor- able friend with characteristic bluntness and ness, is this: Is it the fact that when this portion of the line held by Gen. Gough's army was taken over the War Cabinet insisted upon its being taken over, and, therefore, the objections of Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig were thereby over- ruled? Will Clear It Up. That is the real point. There is not a word of truth in it. ‘I think it is time this matter should be cleared up, and, with the indul- gence of the House, I propose to do so. Of course, the Field Marshal was not anxious to extend his line. No one would be, having regard to the great accumulation of strength against him and the War Cabinet were just as reluctant. There was not a single meeting between the French Generals and ourselves when we did not state facts against the exfension, but the pressure from the French Gov- ,ernment and French army was enormous, and what was done was not done in response to pressure from the War Cabinet. It was done in response to very great }ressure which Sir Douglas Hhig could not resist and which we could not resist. We are not suggesting that our Yrench allies are asking unfairly. That is certainly not my intention. There was a considerable fer- ment in France on the subject of the length of the line held by the French army as compared with our army. The French losses had been enormous. They had prac- tically borne the brunt of the fighting for three years. There was a larger proportion of their young manhood put into the line than in any belligerent country in the world. They held 336 miles. We held a front of 100 miles. That is not the whole statement, be- cause the Germans were much more densely massed in front of ourselves. Not only that, but the line we held was much more vulnerable. Practically, the defense of Paris was left to us, and the defense of some of the most important cen- ters, but there was the fact that you had this enormous front held by the French army, as compared with what looked like the compar- atively small front of ours. In addition to that, the French army at that time was holding, I think, a two-division front on our line in order to enable us to ac- cumulate the necessary reserves for the purposes of attack in Flan- ders. That was part of the line which, I believe, was held before by the British and French. French Need on Farms. The French were pressing in order to withdraw men from the army for purposes of agriculture. I ought to explain that their agricultural output had fallen enormously, owing to the fact, that they had withdrawn a very large proportion of their men from the cultivation of the fields, and they felt it essential that they should withdraw part of their army for the purpose of cultivating the soil and they were pressing us upon these topics. The chief of the imperial gen- eral staff, Sir William Robertson, and the Cabinet, felt that it was inevitable that during the winter months there should be some ex- tension, and we acknowledged that something had to be done to meet the French demands, and to that extent we accepted the principle that there must be some extension of the line. There was no doubt in the mind of anyone that we would have to that part of the from Gen. Antoine and how far beyond that and what further extension should bé made was matter which was in doubt. I give the principles which were laid down by Gen. Sir William Robert- son and accepted by the Cabinet. We accepted, in principle, that there must be an extension of the British line in the winter months and that the time and extent must be left to the two Commanders in “army. - out his consent. extension had taken — straightforward- offensive was over and that the line to be taken over must depend upon the military policy for 1918 and upon the role assigned to each These were perfectly sound principles, and.the Cabinet accept them without any demur. I say without hesitation that the Cabi- net never swerved one iota from the principle . laid down by Sir Wittiam Robertson. _At that’time the Field Marshal was under the impression that the. Cabinet had taken a decision with- The Chief-of the Imperial Staff upon that sent the following memorandum to. the War Cabinet. I will read it; but first, with reference to the Boulogne conference I may, perhaps, say that that was the first time we had a discussion with the French Min- isters. The subject of discussion was a rather important Foreign Office. It was not summoned in the least to discuss an extension of the lines. We never knew that was to be raised. Sir William Robertson and I represented the British Gov- ernment and M. Painleve, the Prime Minister, and‘Gen. Foch represented the French Govern- ment. Memorandum to Cabinet. When Sir William Robertson discovered that the Field Marshal was under the impression that we had come to a decision without his consent, he sent the War Cab- inet a memorandum, in which he says: “At the recent Boulogne con- ference the question of extending our front was raised by the French representatives. The reply given was that while in principle we were, of course, ready to do what- ever could be done, the matter was one which could not be discussed in the absence of Sir Douglas Haig, or during the continuance of the present operations and that due regard must also be had‘to the plan of operations for next year. “It was suggested that it would be best for the Field Marshal to come to an arrangement with Gen. Pershing, when this could be done. So far as I am aware, no formal discussion has taken place and the matter cannot be regarded as de- cided. Further, I feel sure that the War Cabinet would not think of deciding such a question with- out first obtaining Sir Douglas Haig’s views. I am replying to him in the sense.” That. I think was on the 19th of October. The War Cabinet fully approved of the communication. Sir Douglas Haig communicated and said that it threw a new light on the Boulogne position. I think that we have a right to complain of the way in which it has been rumored about that Sir Douglas Haig protested. The fact that Sir William Rob- ertson had explained and Sir Douglas Haig had stated that the explanation threw new light had e never been repeated. That is how mischief is done. On Oct. 24 this question was first formally discussed by the War Cabinet. There was further pressure from the French Govern- ment, and Sir William Robertson gave his views as to the time which ’ the British Government ought to and this conselusion is re- of the War take, corded in the minute Cabinet as follows: “The War Cabinet approves of the suggestion of the Chief of the Imperial Staff that he should reply to Field Mar- shal Haig in the following gense: That the War Cabinet is of the opinion that in deciding to what extent the British troops can take over the line from the French re- gard must be had to the necessity of giving them a reasonable oppor- tunity for leave, rest and training during the winter months and to the plan of operations for the next year, and further, while the pres» ent offensive continued it will not be possible to commence taking over more line, ‘Under these circumstances the War Cabinet fears that until the policy is settled it will be Prema- ture to decide finally whether the British front is to be extended by four divisions or cag greater or lesser extent.” That résolution was communi- cated to Sir Douglas Haig by Sir William Robertson, and Ave never departed from it. After that came the Cambrai incident and the Ital- ian disaster, which necessitated our sending troops to Italy. That ‘very insistent that —— line — — ‘ In Next Sunday's Post-Dispatch St. Louis in the War— ~ rice’s action.”’ *. hem Mr. Snowden: What paper? Mr. Lloyd George: La Liberte. a The quotation proceeded: +e “No more on the left than on: the right, still less on the left than on the right, no French party = would admit that in the midst of / war a General on active service — should permit himself to raise his voice in public to contradict the 7 Government. 2m “With all respect to this Gen- — eral, what is calculated to dimin-- ish the morale of troops ds nest ; that the Ministers should, in coeds faith, have stated what ‘is not a. fact in regard to extension of the — British front, but that a chief 7 hitherto respected, shou have - thought it his duty to co an | act of indiscipline so glaring that . even in our democratic country it — would have been considered au ; scandal. ig “It is not for an officer to seck to place his duty as a citizen be 3 4 fore his duty as a soldier.” That is the view of a democratie | country like France. May I say that I wonder wheth+ — pe er it is worth my while making another appeal to all sections re this House, to all sections of the : country? These controversies af@ |” distracting. They are paralyzing, — They are rending and I do beg that - they should come to an end.. It is difficult enough for Minis- a ters to do their work. This really a is a sort of remnant of the contro- versy over individual command, which lasted practically a month. ~ Unity of command, the otionai 4 unity, is threatened. x Time to End Sniping. Our army unity is threateneicey By this controversy days have been — occupied in hunting up records, — nmtmutes, letters, proces verbals of Sa ee a 6 Ramey? Ven og - a

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