St. Louis Post-Dispatch
April 28, 1918

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ee” | Text of Prince IHS ae Oe Ae AO ae OPO SP Oe Pe Lee ae OMe ee ie. Bes ages » Oe * - “ - ae ee PO OF PO PO Po #0*," 0°42 OP PO MA RO PPO PPPOE PS PPE A > ; ’ TS A Sn 6 4 6 ge “ . . BP PO a PO Oe . " ° 21,8" te OO EOP 9? 0%, #9 Pe", PO MO ae POMP OO PIP - 9 @ ee -- —_—_- VOL. 70. NO. 248. ST. LOUIS, SU Fe ae Se en a NDAY MORNING, APRIL suueee=esio 0 ee7e, , , 7 ce e ‘ Phys Brothas _ 7 * #. ee. --« re ~ « . é ~ > Pe - e a2 ir oe 4. ree 2, —— q: 4&4 ~ +e toy ee ‘ ’ @e5 cn k%** * ~ yr ae oy iy uhibe.: 4 * , ty PRINCE LICHNOWSEY. an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of in- terest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. “The British statesman, old points in dispute with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us, but to make.us in so far as possible partners in a working Just as he had succeeded concern. in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished to remove German-British difficulties, and by a net- work of treaties — which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had [ent itself to a co-operation with the En- tente, which contained a mutua!' assurance ageinst the danger of war. “This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his own words, ‘With- out infringing on the. existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves con- tained no agrressive elements and no binding obligations for § En- gland, to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Ger- many, and to bring the two groups nearer together.’ “In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the op- timists, who believed in an under- standing, and that of the pessi- mists, who considered war inevit- able sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey. Lord Haldane and most of the Ministers in the Radi- cal Cabinet, as well as leading Lib- eral organs, such as the Westmin- ster Gazette, the Manchester Guar- dian and the Daily Chronicle. “To the pessimists belong espe- cially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord. Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on ‘the writing on the wall’, and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of the Observer. During my term of office they abstained from all at- tacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. “Our naval policy and our atti- tude in the year 1905, 1908 and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and = simple-minded. latter are regarded the true prophets. as Balkan Questions. f ; ‘ g} “The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey, and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no long- er feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had 0»*no Jones ny interest in- the defini- ( tion of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peo- ple themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, there- by giving up the role of mediator. “T urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much pre- ferred the latter. The chief ques- tion was Albania. Our allies de- sired the establishment of an in- dependent state of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Va- lona or even the territory north of Corfu. “On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favored Serbian, and Krance Greek desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance and to sup- port neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an im- possibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world war would have been avoided. “France and Italy would have remained definitely divided, as to Greece, and the Italians, had thew wished to fight France alone, have been obliged to con- not would , sent to the expansion of Greece to district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and at the time of the Conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexations to Greece, “In Greece today whole groups the are Albanian, and the _ so-called Greek national dress is of Alban- ian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Isiamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solu- tion and th® most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro._His Majesty, the Kai- ser, was also in favor of this so- lution on dynastic grounds. “When [I encouraged the mon- arch by letter to this effect, I re- ceived violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Aus tria’s opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even Mirect correspondence. We had eventually, however, to ‘abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East, and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in iden- tifving ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Mag- yars in the north; for the continu- ance of that policy, which we be- gan at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the nec- essary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world war “Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confiding ourselves to economic interests in the East, whilst at the same time } ee eet a | | Nae i a alee ee ea ee i ee ee a a Ogg OO tO gO political interference, and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constanti- nople and to the Mediterranean say through Berlin. “Intead of encouraging a powerful development in the Bal- kan states, which were once free and. are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turk- ish and Magyar oppressors. “The dire migtake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia—our natural friend and best neighbor— into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asia- atic expansion, was the more evi- dent, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations. “As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alli- ance consequently was worthless. > ne 7: [ All Profit: to Austria. “economic interests, “Austria, however, needed our protection, both in war and peace, and had no other point d’appui. This dependence on us is based on political, national and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Un- der the influence of a_ properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Rus- sia, Austria-Hungary is our vas- sal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal service; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An al liance would therefore be purpose- less. “Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiser- dom, even with a Hapsburg-Lor- raine at its head. They are striv- ing for an internal Austrian Fed- eration, on a national basis, a con- dition which is even less likely of realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. | : “Austro-Germans look on Ber- lin as the center of German power and kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading Power. They desire as close a con- nection as possjble with the em- pire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy. ‘We had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary, but danger- ous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The trans- formation of our alliance, with its original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to ecall forth the very state of things which the constitutional ne- gotiations were designed to pre- vent, namely, war. “The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to Le given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. Matters stocd in the same position in Serbia, where, against our own we were sup- porting an Austrian — policy of strangulation. ‘“\We had always backed horses which it was evident weuld lose, such as Kruger, Abdul A7'z, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wield, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold. “Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Friward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a [uro- pean war aevelopving Out of the Salkan war, since, at the outbreak of that war. we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the rench Government to join in a declaration ef disintefestedness and impartiality on the part of the Powers. “The British statesman main- tained from the beginning (that England had no interest ir Al- bania, and would, therefore, not £0 to war on the subject. In his role of ‘honest broker’ he would con- fine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away diffi- culties between the two groups. “He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his goud- will and powerful influence to- ward the establishment of an un- derstanding. Instead of ado -ting the English point of view, we ac- cepted that dictated to us by *i- enna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London, and I was his second. “On every point, including Al- haxhors i= the ee - ON I et it et atl gt ln tin Fl ee tO ct ON ON tt tt Nyt, ln, tn tt ill in, atl ay —_ a a i i ae ee eee eee ee Oe OE ee a ee ti, ee a ec ee ee nD cc tl OO ON ON GO Btn ay ee “The German Came Too Late and the War Destroyed the Possibility of His Catching Up.”’—Prince Lichnowsky “And what result have we to expect from the struggle of people? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America;Australia, and Oceania; - and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist. “In Asia, the Russians and Japanese will expand with their limitations and their customs, and the South will re- main to the British. “The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Rus- sian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late,-.and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a Colonial Empire.” Adriatic, Scutari, and in the defi- nition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On _ the contrary, he nearly always took our part, in order to give no pre- text for war—which was after- wards brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise’ there would have been war over this matter, as we shuuld never have dared to ask ‘our allies’ to make concessions. “Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm and tact. When a question threat- ened to become involved he pro- posed a formula, which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives. ‘Russia has been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Rus- sia. “As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. “The dissatisfaction then preva- lent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Rus- sian diplomacy. “Count Benckendorff possessed many of the qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly kKnowl- edge, experience, an agreeable per- sonality and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France. “T once said, ‘The Russia is very anti-German.’ He replied. “There are also many strong influential pro-German cir- cles there. But the people gener- ally are anti-Austrian.’ feeling in e England Conciliatory. “a _"The British Government was most accommodating in regard to our interests and wishes. Sir Ed- ward Grey wished to show us his good will, but also wished in the main to further our colonial devel- opment, the while England hoped to lead the German development of power from the North Sea and West Europe to the Atlantic and Africa. ‘We do not grudge Ger- many her colonial development,’ a member of the Cabinet said to me. The British Government's honesty in striving to respect opr rights shows itself in that Sif Edward Grey before the treaty was com- pleted and signed indicated to us English business men who were willing to invest capital in the diés- tricts conceded to us by the new wished for treaty, and thereby British support, with the remark that the treaty in question be- longed to our sphere of interest. ‘Even before his majesty, King George's visit to Berlin-—that is, in May,.1913—the treaty was prac- tically ready. Under the _ presi- dency of the Chancellor a discus- sion took place in Berlin in which I also took part, wher further re- quests were agreed to. On my return to London I suc- ceeded, with the help of Herr von Kuhlmann, who had worked out the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, to carry through our lat- est proposal, so that the whole treaty was ready to be initialed by Sir Edward Grey and myself be- fore my leave. “Rut now new difficulties arose to prevent the signing, and only “fier anmscan, hip a tN A tt, tN tt, - — —— = att cat ttn gate, tn ) On I gg gO ee . OO et \ ( ( { ( ( ; i i - all economic questions in - . fore the oubreak of war, could I receive authority finally to con- clude the treaty. It was, how- ever, never signed. Sir Edward Grey would only sign on condition that the treaty was published, to- gether with both treaties of 1898 and 1899. England has no secret treaties, and it was contrary to ex- isting principles to keep secret a treaty. He could, therefore, con- clude no treaty without publishing it. On the question of time and the manner of publication, he was also: ready to consider our wishes, on the condition that the publica- tion took place within a year of the signature. “But at the German Foreign Of- fice, where my successes in London created increasing distrust, it was stated that the publication would jeopardize our interests in the col- onies, where, further, the Portu- guese would give us no mere con- cessions. The treaty, which of- fered us exceptional advantages, the result of more than one year’s work, consequently fell through. “At the same time, I was ne- gotiating, with the effective co- operation of Herr von Kuhlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway trea- ty. This aimed, in fact, at the di- vision of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expres- sion was carefully avoided in con- sideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey declared repeat- edly that there was no agreement between England and France aim- ing at a division of Asia Minor. “In the presence of the Turk- ish representative, Hakki Pasha, connec- tion with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Band. The greatest concession Sir Ed- ward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the ter- minus of the line. By this treaty the whole of Me- sopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the dis- trict of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways. The economic territo- ries of Great Britain included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aiden Railway, those of France, Syria, and those of Russia, Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agree- ment would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the pos-° sibility of Anglo-German co- operation. an ( German Fleet Menace. ] ‘Most difficult of all, there re- mained the question of the fleet. It was never rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea, and the simultaneous development of the Continent’s most important military power into the impor- tant naval power had at least to be recognized by England as un- comfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. “To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea which Great Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and ex- penses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike develop- ments to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Mo- rocco crisis and the Bosnian ques- tion. One had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to he aaa cette tlt i ee ee ee ) ( \ ~ ( ( } ( ( ) { | a I AOI tm, — ~ | | ’ ‘ ; ’ ; f i a i i ! ) | the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. “On account of our fleet alona, however, England would no more have drawn the sword than on ac- count of our trade, which it is pre- tended called. forth her jealousy and finally brought about war. “From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that, in spite of the fleet, it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and reapproachment if we did not, propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. “T also avoided all mention of the fleet and between me and Sir Edward Grey, the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey de- clared on one occasion at a Cab- inet meeting: “The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me.’ “ Newcastle and Liverpool. ‘During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons, as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party, a one year’s pause in armaments. Officially, the sug- gestion was not supported by Sir ldward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill did so repeatedly. I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to secure eco- nomies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people. I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the work- men employed for this purpose? “How about the technical per- sonnel? Our naval program was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other purposes. I maintain that such ex- penditure would benefit home in- dustries. “Il also succeeded, in conversa- tion with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey’s private secretary, in ‘keeping away that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and preventing the Government’s pro- posal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the Goyv- ernment’s favorite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our goodwill and considerably strengthen and .in- crease the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. “But, as I have said, it was {m- possible, in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays, to come’ to an understanding. In that spirit I had carried out my miission from the beginning, and had even suc- ceeded in realizing my program, when the war broke out and de- stroyed everything. “Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances. It is a fact that German's progress as a trading country after the war of 1870 and during the following dec- ades, threatened the interests of Fritish trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the grow- ing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list of all European exporting countries—a fact I always referred to in my public .speeches—had brought to maturity the desire toe preserve good relations with En- gland’s best client and business friend, and had gradually sup- pressed all other thoughts and mo- tives. “The Englishman, asa matter of fact, adapts himself to circum- stances and does not tilt against windmills. found the greatest good-will and desire to further our common eco- nomic interests. No one there tn- terested himself in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even the French representatives, in spite of the imposing personality and po- litical success of the ‘ast named. Only the German and American Ambassadors attracted public at- tention. “In order to get in touch with the most important business cir- cles I accepted Invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, the g The Naval Holiday. = In commercial circles I: London and Bradford Chambers, ~ and those of the great cities of I had @ hearty reception everywhere. Glas- gow and Edinburgh had aleo invit- ed me, and I promised them visita. People who did not understand English conditions and did not ap- preciate the value of public din- ners, and others who disliked my success, reproached me with havy- ing done harm by my speeches. f, on the contrary, believe that my public appearanceg and my discus. sion of common economic interests contributed considerably toward 2 ey : : . a tas > Pe ° of