The New Republic: A Journal of Opinion (August 4, 1920); plus "A Test of the News" by Walter Lippmann & Charles Merz

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The Week .........cceeccccncewccnsecereesceens 263 Editorials | The Truth About the Steel Strike............. 266 OEY TOME RE: sonic cise she's dict ws we vig seo SNORE bare ai 268 To Resist the “Unthinking Drift HRY sp ek Ba RAI 269 Th ALIMEMIEUE DO EMOIUES nist vices cadeniee @Veje snes 270 m Buying off a Strike. ............0-ceeewsenees 272 General Articles _ Christensen and Back of Him...William Hard 273 NE i ik ah Sk altiiai's San eae lo Vera Gordon 276 The Orphaned West............ Walter Locke 277 Control of Industry: Whose NE eon 4 chews | SURREEE Fralee UP peed aT Gr A UP MR Aa Alvin Johnson 279 % reant Leaves (Peau) ‘ecko David Rosenthal 281 } Five NINN I Faia Siig eek este, cu dite sahara Dea Milas. oh gies ite 282 ONE oss euislen initia sinaiy sdawhieiy Wala sed odes 283 Reviews of Books | me adhe Great Steel Strike............... R. W. B. 284 OR: WCC oss v2 dine vinks 0:5 sajeiesienie o D. S. M. 285 | <A New Noyelist...... eas diab lg kde Wiehe bus H. S. 286 _. Spanish-American Literature..... Skicwke H. K. 287 F "Phe Week Tis, of course, pure coincidence that the supple- . ment in this issue should appear the week when ace breaks out between Russia and Europe. evertheless, the coincidence does emphasize the tral idea of the analysis. ‘That idea is that the porting of the Russian news has been grossly in- icient, that on the main issues of greatest practi- limportance to Americans it has been misleading, ad that the test of events has overwhelmingly smonstrated that fact. We ask our readers to amine it and to remember at the same time the pendence of public opinion on the quality of the ws. We shall, of course, welcome criticism. The udy is published for no partisan purpose of any 4 but as a protest against the invasion of news Betsanship. LOYD GEORGE tells the House of Commons fet Russia has no right to dictate to Poland t sort of government that country must have. ta little less than two years ago the Allied world s applauding President Wilson’s insistence that ; By New YorK, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1920 NUMBER 296 the Germans must first change their government if they wanted peace. Fundamentally the two cases are analogous if ever two cases were. ‘The Allies feared, and had reason to fear, a German govern- ment animated by imperialism. The Russians fear, and have reasons to fear, a Polish. government — animated by imperialism. For a year and a half Polish troops have been thrust hundreds of miles beyond the borders assigned their nation by the Peace Conference. Repudiation of the government which staged that offensive was Russia’s. first _ guarantee of future safety. The Soviets demanded that repudiation. The Poles replied by constituting anew government. Two days later the Russians opened negotiations for that armistice which a large part of the American press proclaimed they would never grant. W HETHER an armistice is negotiated, and fol- lowed by a peace of justice, depends upon various factors—among them the good faith of both Poles and Russians, the willingness of the French to let negotiations proceed, the effect—both in Russia and in Poland—of the fact that the new Polish premier while not a leader of the war party nevertheless gave it his support. Precisely where the Allied governments stand, as this is written, it is not easy to tell. The British have apparently announced that they will give no support to Poland’s demands for the frontier of 1772, and that they waive cer- tain of their first conditions since they believe Russia will grant the Poles fair terms. On the other hand, there is a report via Canadian sources that England informs Russia “all trade negotia- tions” are “definitely ended’; and a Copenhagen dispatch credits Litvinoff with agreeing that British insistence on an armistice with Poland makes further trade negotiations useless. These latter two re- ports were generally circulated in the American press. They do not fit well with the willingness of the Soviets, announced one day later, to proceed to sign an armistice.

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i “EVERY Allied capital was going to war on ‘the night before the Russian government again de- clared itself for peace. Paris feared a Russo- German alliance; London, according to the Associ- ated Press, was ‘‘disturbed” by the prospect of “another European war’’; and in Washington, said a dispatch to the New York Evening Post, “some of the highest officials in the Wilson administration are for war with the Bolshevists.” That the gov- ernment of Russia has declared itself ready for an armistice will not put an end to talk of war. And with this talk there will be a new insistence upon American participation. The Polish Legation in Washington wants President Wilson to issue a statement in moral support of the Poles; and the World says an inquiry from the Allied Govern- ments is expected within a few days, asking what we will contribute to the Polish army. Apparently we are not to be asked for soldiers; but, as the World points out, there remains something over $288,000,000 available for loans to the Allies. To _ be sure, these funds were appropriated by Congress to fight the war with Germany. But it will be in- sisted by friends of intervention that other anti- German war powers have been used to fight our undeclared and unconfessed war against the gov- ernment of Russia. DESPITE the surrender of the Polish generals a new hero is being groomed by those who will believe in Russian intervention despite its total and sensational failure. One day after the Poles sur- rendered headlines in the New York Times an- ped: “Wrangell, New Hope of Russian Loyal- ists.” According to the special Washington dis- patch which followed, Wrangel’s is “the newest hame to conjure with.” He is “now frequently and promisingly mentioned in announcements from the State Department.” Almost miraculously he has created a ‘‘well-disciplined military force of at least 40,000 men.” With it he is making great strides. “‘Considerable information” has reached Washington “which seems to open bright prospects for the future.” ‘Close observers’ are impressed. There is “the glittering possibility of another at- tempt on the part of the British government to encourage and supply a new coalition of anti- Bolshevist forces.” . . .. And so on, for three columns. It is all old stuff. Just how old, we be- lieve, will be understood by those who read the supplement we publish with this issue. And as more propaganda for the newest candidate of Rus- sian intervention fills the columns of the Times, _ we hope our readers will draw a parallel with the way that journal advertised the charms of Kolchak, Denikin and others of their company. Fa ae P EGS ¥ ~ NE Te TGA? aM = ai ag a, > T he FF FF. F Cs “How ds fic Versi treaties work bringing the world back to a peace basis? Con the present plight of Austria. There wer trian prisoners in Russia, captured by armies 0 Tsar. Austria wanted these prisoners sent | after their long years of exile; and since the. trians had no quarrel with the present Russian ernment, they entered into an agreement which parently provided for the establishment of com sions by each country, with diplomatic immut and for the observance by Austria of strict. neut ity in the wars against Soviet Russia, even to 4 extent of a prohibition upon the transport of tt and material through Austrian territory. | 4 TO prohibit or permit such transport is the pr lege of a sovereign state. But the Austrians cot not be allowed to get ahead of the game whiell rest of Europe is playing with Russia. So | treaty of St. Germain was flourished. “Forel | diplomatic experts,” said a recent Associated Pr dispatch from Vienna, look upon the present Aust tt Russian agreement “‘as a possible means of maki Vienna the headquarters for Soviet propaganda Central and Eastern Europe and paving the w. to closer negotiations.” So the experts went ahe and invoked a treaty of peace to keep Austria war. Says the Associated Press: “The Allies 0 sider Austria’s agreement. ... contrary to the pr visions of the treaty of St. Gennain. The Assoc ated Press was informed in official circles . that the Vienna government would be told th unless it carried out the treaty, credits and pr visions would be withheld.” WESTERN ASIA is today the battle-ground 9 r about as many different armies as it was when th world officially made war. Greek and Britis troops are fighting the Turks not far from Con. stantinople. Other British troops have been ordere from India into Mesopotamia. Arab bands art fighting the French, and (according to the Londo 7 Times) are “flocking to the support of Emi ty Feisal,” head of the Syrian state. The activity o : this army of Emir Feisal must outrage French | frugality as nothing else has done in recent years. For Feisal is financing his offensive on funds loaned © him by the French before they changed their minds, “The stanchest supporters of the League ofa Nations,” says a dispatch to the New York World a from London, “assert that France has violated the a Covenant of the League i in precipitating war against : the Arabs. France, it is claimed, 1s taking it upon £ ; herself to demonstrate that a mandatory power can — by military means enforce its mandate regardless 4 : of the wishes of the people.” -

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us ae Lee Pre ty oi Sal eee 3 f : ‘ 4 iene . Uy ORR aa ie 8 4 be RN i A ote YO ay I ip ‘ .. ‘ 2 ¥ Vee | 4 rh i \ Yes aes ust 4, 1920 1 , is a stake in the game scines played in West- n Asia. At present the Great Powers seem to ve reached agreement concerning their respective ares of it; the troublesome factor is the unwilling- ss of those who own the oil to give it up. That 4 the meaning of revolt, or threatened revolt, in esopotamia and in Persia. Of Mesopotamian Great Britain promises twenty-five per cent to rance—with the rest remaining in British hands. he people of Mesopotamia, however, are to have is concession made them: should the oil fields be sveloped by private companies, rather than by British government, they will be permitted to articipate to a maximum of twenty per cent in the apital of such companies. A somewhat similar greement between France and England covers ersia. The mandate, that forward-looking prin- ple evolved at Paris, is a profitable venture. NE part of the world which has been dropped y the American press is Siberia. Since the collapse f Kolchak’s army, news from that land has come nly at great intervals, and then in cryptic phrases. larly in April Premier Hara of Japan was reported $ announcing that Japanese forces would not be ithdrawn from Siberia “until the situation cleared” —which meant they would remain so long as Japan hose to have them. Then, three weeks later, came ews that the Japanese had demanded that troops Bthe Provisional Russian government “‘evacuate ‘thirty-kilometer zone wherever Japanese troops ere stationed.”” In May the Russians asked for armistice—making ‘this request of a power in- ading their own country. General Oi replied with he stock assurance that Japan had no territorial mbitions in Siberia and so forth, but suggested lat Russian troops efface themselves to a point leven hundred miles from Vladivostok. Then, ily in June, the Russians asked again for an mistice. Now, July 21st, comes a wire from Okio saying an agreement has been signed “for le establishment of a buffer state under the united overnments, which while democratic would not be mmunistic.” \ “BUF FER STATE, ” particularly when it is al- wed to have no army of its own and when the Jap- lese may have asdarge an army as they like, sounds th er like a convenient invention designed to cover ploitation. Judging from+two reports of widely ferent origin the Japanese have a perfectly de- ite plan for what amounts to annexation of the uffer state.” One report is published in the New rk Globe, an interview which Mr. Breitigam has d with Czecho-Slovak hoe oe now homeward und. “Japan,” they say, “‘is intriguing to keep THE NEW REPUBLIC 265 eastern Siberia in chaos and thereby tighten her grip on it.” The second report agrees. In this case the Manchester Guardian quotes from “Pour la Rus- sie,’’ a journal representing the Right Social Revo- lutionaries, bitter enemies of the Soviet: “Every- where Japanese garrisons; everywhere Japanese subjects buying land, forests, all sorts of enter- prises, and often receiving extraordinary conces- SIONS: 2 kas We have had to give up the struggle against the Bolsheviks because it dragged on so endlessly and contributed to the triumph of the Japanese. .... Our watchword therefore is, ‘Away with civil-war!’ ” RIOTS in Belfast, resulting in seventeen killed, had their immediate source in economic rivalry, in the opinion of a staff correspondent of the New York World. “The trouble really started July 12th,” the correspondent cables, “‘when Sir Edward Carson and bigoted speakers inflamed the Orange- men by openly indicating that they would support’ any attacks on Catholics. The trouble brewed va- cation week, and a picked group of Carsonites, operating under the name of the Belfast Protestant Association, told workmen at Harland & Wolff’s shipyards yesterday noon to go back and drive out the Catholics. ‘The workers were willing, as a thousand Catholics who came to the yards during the war still are filling positions wanted for Pro- testant ex-soldiers,.... Soldiers and police are ob- viously partial to the Orangemen and the worst riotings arose from the looting of saloons and stores owned by Catholics in Orange districts.” UNTIL recently it could at iuaiet be said that the British government had a plan for introducing some measure of peace into Ireland. It had a Home Rule bill. Our guess is that this bill would not have worked. But at any rate it represented some sort of policy. Now even this plan is abandoned— with postponement of the bill till autumn—and government policy is simply drifting. Americans make a mistake, however, if they assume no sub- stantial’ number of Englishmen are alive to the danger. “At any moment,” the Manchester Guardian warns its readers, ‘“‘the smash may startle even the jaded newspaper-readers of London..... The natural history of Irish discontent is all per- fectly obvious. We sowed it, watered it, cultivated it by every imaginable act of greed and folly, from the destruction of Ireland’s old industries in the eighteenth century and earlier centuries to the War > Office’s virtual refusal of Ireland’s offer to help in the war in 1914. Now we have got the ripe fruit. We have got to deal, solely by our own fairness, courage, and good sense, -with a mess of our own

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‘ey ’ J ame er ea A ee ee oe har Ne Ph Nee a De ak ( Meee ae Ws ee re i ’ ae _ tinued, referred to—‘we will not delegate.” such a sentence as: THE NEW | making, and deal with it at once, and it is no good sitting down and wailing that a wicked world has come up against us.”’ Mg A week ago we expressed our scepticism concern- ing a report which had appeared in some of the American newspapers, to the effect that the Mexican. government had “accepted in principle the definite proposals of the representatives of the petroleum interests.” Cabling to the New York World from Mexico City, Mr. Rowland Thomas now asserts. that “such reports are pure nonsense.” ‘There is no agreement. There is, on the contrary, ‘“‘an ab- solute deadlock.’’ The petroleum interests ask annulment of the Carranza decrees, issued in 1918, on the ground that these decrees are retroactive and illegally promulgated. “‘Againstthis contentionSecre- tary Trevino, representing the Government, urges, with some emotion, the right of a nation to its un- developed naturalwealth and its right to make such Constitutional enactments as it chooses.” The Gov- ernment has already agreed to apply no retroactive definition of Article 27 regarding subsoil rights. But with the Government’s definition of “retro- active” the oil companies take issue. — MR. HARDING'S speech of acceptance went far enough to the right to please Philander Knox, far enough to the left to satisfy Raymond Robins. But there is one critic—he remains anonymous—who points out in the New York Post that whether right. or left the Senator is no stylist. “The ferment of the world rivets our thoughts . ... .”’ asserted Mr. Harding. How, his critic asks, can a ferment rivet? “Rivets our thoughts,” Mr. Harding con- ‘on the necessity of progressive solution, else our generation will suffer the experiment which means chaos for our day to reestablish.” How can anything be reestablished in chaos? ‘There is a sanctity in that right’’—one of many different rights Query: can we or anyone else delegate a sanctity? There are other passages in like vein. ‘And the critic, taking mild objection to Mr. Harding’s use of obsolete words like “normalcy” and uninvented words like “involvement,”’ goes on to protest bitterly against ‘There is progress in the estab- lishment of official revealment of issues and con- ditions which lead to conflict, so that unerring public sentiment may speed the adjustment, but I hope for that concord of purpose, not forced, but inspired by the common weal, which will give a regulated public service the fullest guaranty of continuity.” Is it McKinley, or the Senatorial equivalent of Henry James, who addresses us from Marion? to listen to the words of a prophet, boldly challen g (hala “ % PU OA And hd. Py iy Et #» my } \ ’ " . Fs Se ie a , } arts wa a } REPUBLIC The Truth about the Stee : Strike R. Gary may not like to be called a | _ He is modest, and besides regards him as more lasting than that. Nevertheless, Mr.G i rules over a kingdom more populous, and infini q richer and more powerful than Israel when Ki Ahab did Naboth out of his vineyard, or even wi David led his hosts to victory. Mr. Gary'al z erning powers are not exactly coterminous wi those of Ahab or David, yet the analogy is” remote. The Hebrew Kings led their people. war, usually in support of the mightier powers’ Egypt or Mesopotamia or Asia Minor. Mr. Ga led his people in war, in support of the Unit States, and was not the Steel Corporation one ¢ our trustiest and most valiant allies? The King of Israel handed down decrees that raised up thei people in rejoicings or cast them down in despat So does Mr. Gary arbitrarily give his people w with to live or wherewith to languish and die. Th Kings of Israel policed their people and judge them, through officers pleasing in their own e Does not Mr. Gary's corporation have a compl cated secret service and name sheriffs and constable sometimes by surpassing grace eking out the meagl oT public salaries with private subsidies? Does it m more than occasionally draw to its aid the gre : police powers of state and nation, as the [ebre Kings sometimes drew to their aid the strong arm of Egypt or of Babylon? Mr. Gary does not p u men to death at will or sell them into slavery; bu at his word men, though free, hover before hi mouth of the fiery furnace, twelve hours, eighteer hours, even thirty-six hours without respite, clampet upright between mortal fatigue and mortal danger Mr. Gary does not confiscate vineyards or othe possessions, but at his will or whim men who hav served long and faithfully go naked and hungry inte the outer darkness. The Kings of Israel, thoug h proud at heart, were from time to time compel lec A agen her ing the beneficence of their acts. Mr. Gary, tho humble in heart, will have to listen to the words ol the Interchurch World Movement whose report 61 0 the Steel Strike is about to be published by Harcourt, Brace and Howe. Mr. Gary, like the kings of may harden his heart, may case harden it, but th report is the truth, told plainly, unfalteringly, wit h. out passion but with conviction. a We needed an impartial and expert inquiry it the facts of the Steel strike. For in no other e industrial struggle have simple issues been so co P pletely beclouded by ignorance, prejudice and pro-

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TH E NEW | anda. There is abundant proof, in the hiatus ween Mr. Gary’s testimony and the facts, that yen the head of the Steel Corporation was terribly 2 ormed as to the real state of affairs. He ught that practically all his servants were con- wnt with the workings of his rule. He was wrong. : ontent was widespread and deepseated; only ar of the Corporation's power held it under. The alled radical leadership of the strike had the t difficulty in holding back the mass move- ent ae a fair show of organization could be reated. Mr. Gary thought that the strike was merely an outcrop of Bolshevism. He was wrong. twas a simple case of traditional labor policy to jain a position powerful enough to treat for the redress of grievances. The Steel propaganda had 10 valid evidence whatever for the widely scattered tharges of Bolshevism, Were there real grievances? Mr. Gary thought here were none. But the twelve hour day, for ex- a ple, was no vain imagining. Approximately one alf of the employees in iron and steel manufactur- ing plants work under what is known as the twelve a schedule, which may be either a straight twelve hours for both night and day shifts, or it may be eleven hours and thirteen or ten and four- teen. Less than a quarter of the employees can work under sixty hours a week. Mr. Gary testified sfore the Senate Committee that the corporation mas gradually reducing hours. Wrong again. A 2 arger proportion work the twelve hour day than fen years ago, and the average working week has gained an hour in length. Now, many men may gladly work twelve hours for a time, when extra- ordinary pay is to be had or promotion in sight. But no man with the spirit becoming to an Amer- ican citizen can willingly accept a twelve hour day as a permanent routine of life. To everything T work such a man is necessarily as good as ead. Mr. Gary thought that the Steel pects ghile exacting long hours at heavy work, paid its ner munificently. Wrong. It pays some of its employees well. One solitary roller (child of or tune) received $32.66 a day. The highly skilled yorkers, as a class, are very well paid, and have glimpse of promotion before them if they stick oyally to the company and have the necessary pull. jut the common labor receives lower hourly wages han in any of the other four major Pittsburgh in- ystries. Three-fourths of the employees, for all heir inhuman hours, earn too little to maintain nal sized families in accordance with minimum merican standards of comfort. To be sure, these d workers are mostly of foreign birth. hey were assembled from all the sloughs of the st 4, 1920 Cet - Wt ist ‘ \ REPUBLIC 2.67 oppressed in Europe for the very reason that they would stand what Americans would not. But did Mr. Gary, enthusiast for Americanization, contem- — plate the creation of permanent communities of servile workers in America? That is the inevitable result, if not the inevitable intention of the wages and hours policy of the corporation. — ih Great and mighty is the Steel Corporation, as viewed from the remote New York offices of Mr. Gary. Viewed from the inside it is a super-sweat shop, where the favored few tug and haul for pro- motion and advancement and the many toil without respite and without hope, like gang slaves. We have credited Mr. Gary with ignorance of these conditions. We believe that it is fair to credit him with ignorance of them. For no absolute monarch, his intelligence smothered with courtiers’ flatteries, ever had a more inadequate system for finding out — the truth about his subjects’ condition and state of mind than Mr. Gary has. He might try walking abroad at night, like Haroun-al-Raschid. He would be more likely to gain insight and be moved to justice. _ ‘he intelligence service of Mr. Gary’s realm, ule ‘secret service, about which he did not want to be — too explicit before the Senate Committee, exists, not for the purpose of ascertaining where hard con-. ditions can be alleviated, but for the purpose of finding out those who express their discontent, in order that they may be discharged, evicted from company houses, run out of town, jailed, or best of all, thanks to the miracle of a man like Palmer | in the Attorney-General’s office, deported, His in- telligence service never conveyed to Mr. Gary that men were being fired merely for belonging to a union, or for attending a union meeting. For Mr. Gary testified that they were not, when, as the evi- dence adduced by the Interchurch repers shows, _ they were. The directors of the Steel Corporation may be assumed to be typical Americans, endowed with the © typical American sense of justice and fair play. How does it come, then, that they have permitted such a system of abominations as the Interchurch report reveals to grow up about them? ‘They set out with the theory, valid, perhaps, under primitive industrial conditions, that any interference in the direct re- lation between employer and employee is super- fluous if not mischievous. Therefore, the spread — of unionism had to be checked, and where it was established, unionism had to be dislodged, but cautiously, in view of the danger of rousing public sentiment against the corporation. : The work of dislodging the unions had ei com- — pleted before 1919. But in order that unionism might not again creep in, the world had to be

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268 ransacked for docile laborers and an active, if not intelligent espionage was instituted. Schemes for subsidizing and utilizing the local public authorities were elaborated which one would not suppose any respectable American, having the interests of our national institutions at heart, would countenance for a moment. Mr. Gary and his fellow directors may be presumed to have no more direct knowledge of the workings of the system than any antique absolute monarch had of the system by which his arbitrary power was upheld. But Mr. Gary and his associates are responsible, because they grasped at arbitrary _ power, which never can have any other solid base than oppression and under-surface outrage. Absolutism prevailed, it is true, in the strike. But the strike settled nothing. It left revolutionary radicalism where there might have been plain demo- cratic trade unionism. It left in the breasts of tens of thousands of men the definite impression that might is right in America and the government not an impartial arbiter but a tool in the hands of the stronger, For that the American people will have to pay, in increased cost of curbing unrest, while the Steel Corporation keeps for itself the dividends, if any, accruing from its vindicated sweat shop policy. That policy, however, will have to go, sooner or later. ‘There is no room in America for workers who are not Americans or Americans in the making, and American labor will not, in the long run, leave all the conditions of life to be determined arbitrarily by a little knot of Wall Street men, more expert in stock quotations than in human values. ‘The steel industry will have to become a conference industry, where both employers and employees have their say. For a brief day the autocrats may wreak their will and even win plaudits from a misinformed public. But the truth will out, as the truth about the Steel autocracy is now out. And no autocracy can sur- vive forever, in the face of the truth. Very Plural R. HARDING begins by agreeing with the President. ‘I believe in party sponsorship in government.” So did Mr. Wilson when in 1918 he appealed for-a Democratic Congress, and created a peace commission without distinguished Repub- licans. ‘There is no quarrel between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Harding on that point, except, perhaps, that the one prefers Democratic and the other Re- publican party sponsorship. They agree further. Mr. Harding believes that the Senate should par- ticipate in government. Mr. Wilson believed that until he had a Republican Senate on his hands. Mr. THE NEW. REPUBLIC August Pe Harding does not say what he would do if he h a Democratic Congress to deal with. . ’ Probably Mr. Harding iis opposed to any League of Nations endowed with powers of coercion. Prob. ably he is opposed to the present League with or without reservations. Probably Senator Johnson is right in his reading of the speech; probably r. Taft and Mr. Hoover and Mr. Wickersham and | Mr, Oscar Straus will have to vote either for Gov- ernor Cox or against the League of Nations. They, have just one loophole of escape. They can ars e that they are destined to form part of that plural leadership which Mr. Harding proposes. They did not, to be sure, form. part of it that Friday night in Chicago when the convention was plurally led, but Mr. Harding is the most modest man who ever consulted a boss. 4 He believes that “toil alone makes for accomp= lishment and advancement, and righteous possession is the reward of toil and its incentive.” This radical ul doctrine is not meant to alarm any one, for Mr, Harding is too reverent a man to question the ) righteousness of any one’s possession, or to ask whether it is the reward of toil. He is, however, firmly committed to the doctrine that labor should earn its wages. [owards conflicts of interest in ins dustry his attitude is like that of the President to - wards Huerta and Lenin. He declines to ‘ ‘TeCogs, 7 nize’ them. He believes in ‘‘understanding” and he puts the ‘human element first.”” He has count d the contents of the pay envelope. He is for holding fast and marching onward. : The Sores ~ wishes the world to know, recognizes “no group” and “‘no class.”” He does, however. He recognizes that ‘‘the railway work. men ought to be the best paid and know the best working conditions in the world.” He also recog. nizes the farmer “group or class.’ He also recog: nizes the womanhood of America. He also recog: nizes the Negro. He also recognizes the veterans. He also recognizes industries needing a tariff.. He also recognizes the immigrant. He recognizes the purchaser of liberty bonds. He vaguely recognizes organized labor and the organized employers. He recognizes the private owners and managers of rail. roads most handsomely. He recognizes American shipowners who use the Panama Canal.’ He recog. nizes the irreconcilable group on the Treaty. 7 recognizes the internationally minded group in his “association of nations.” If all these groups and classes vote for him they will not be groups an classes but Sons of Opportunity. If they vote some other way they will be an example of the ‘“‘manifes weakness in popular government”’ which “‘lies in th : temptation to es to grouped citizenship for po- litical advantage.” He himself recognizes onk hy a oS. % . "an

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Bye aes 5 SPW ar Sey ee ae? I ee tl) apah We . bee mp iS ee a ot eo (os te ‘ | eh ra ' : ures . . a i * Rete f ; , “THE: (NEW 4 st 4, 1920 out fourteen varieties of “grouped citizenship,” id consequently he is absolutely within the con- Reution. _ The whole speech is just a mosaic of appeals “for political advantage” to “grouped citizenship.” After announcing that the Constitution “broadly in- eludes all the people, with specific recognition for none” he specifically recognizes: employers of labor, organized labor, unorganized labor, railway labor, i igrants, bondholders, railway executives and stockholders, farmers, suffragists, Negroes, veter- a ns, shipping interests, tariff beneficiaries, big navy men, Mexican investors, irreconcilables, internation- alists, red hysterics, and lovers of civil liberty. There Is is something for every one, be it nothing more than an ambiguous phrase. It is not hard to imagine how the speech was put : gether. ‘The style and diction and grammar we take to have been entirely the Senator’s own. Plural I eadership never produced anything so original, so exuberantly inventive, so, may one say it, creative. I gut the ideas may be plural. We imagine the Senator consulting the voice of the people. The : yoice of the people at the time of gestation is. Mr. ill Hays, Mr. Lodge, Mr. Daugherty, Mr. Brown, Mr. Cummins and a few other plural gentle- r en. Nobody has to tell Mr, Harding that there ‘are farmers. ‘They are placed on the list without discussion. They are very numerous in Republican ‘s slates. The tariff people are elected without difh- ‘culty. Mr. Harding has always remembered them. : he rest are chosen by plural leadership. Mr. Hays, perhaps, remembers that the Liberty Bond holders are dissatisfied, and Mr. Smith recalls the y voting strength of the Negro in doubtful states, and Mr. Jones brings 1 in the veterans, and Mr. Doe a dvises against promising them anything, and Mr. Roe thinks the railwaymen in Ohio should be : nentioned especially after the Senator’s experience nthe primaries. And so the thing is put together, | pruned, cut, grafted, weaseled, painted red white and blue, and varnished with good advice. On page 283 are collated illustrations of the Belt said about them they show the quality of mind to which it is proposed in the year 1920 that the destiny of the country be entrusted. Not in this g neration has a more illiterate mind and a feebler intelligence reached so exalted a place. The man cannot think. Cover that up as much as you like with talk about modesty and reverence, the fact temains that he is the most uncouth and fumbling erson who has sought the Presidency for a very ong time. [he Republican papers know that to e the truth. Because they can think of nothing Ise to praise, they are praising Mr. Harding’s REPUBLIC More clearly than anything that can be 269 “character.”’ Don’t blame them. Like the boy scout they have to perform one kind act for the party every day, and even if they think Aunt Jemima lacking in the more obvious charms, she is one of the family and that is the end of it. But we envy no Republican editor and no Republican campaigner his work in the next three months. If this speech is a measure of the man, the Repub- licans have a job cut out for them. They do not dare let him talk much, or he will be laughed into oblivion. Should they elect him, a regency would be necessary almost immediately, if America is to preserve any dignity in the eyes of the world. | To Resist the Unthinking Drift NE of the curious things about American life is the universal fear of the word conserva- tive. Nobody seems to be willing to call himself a conservative, to defend conservatism, to think out conservative doctrine. Yet conservatism is an honorable attitude, and when coupled with intel- ligence and clarity of mind it is a permanent factor in any society. In every age there are needed men who understand so well how its institutions work that they can force the innovator to the severest test. Without able conservatives, the progressive spirit becomes flabby and wayward, and few issues are settled on their merits. Weak or furtive con- servatives' can not put progressives through a searching test; they merely loll about, confusing the issue, obstructing blindly. ‘They make the in- tellectual victory too easy and practical achieve- ment too hard. For they do not fight where the issue is really joined, on the level where ideas are tested by reason and by comparison with the facts, but on the lower level of obfuscating ideas, drag- ging red herrings across the scent, and trusting to apathy and habit to restrain their opponents. The reason for this lies in the disrepute which unhappily is attached to the name and idea of con-. servatism, Whatever they may believe, few people seem willing to call themselves anything but “liberal” or “progressive.” There is, for example, a weekly journal which exists in order to combat liberal and radical ideas. It distrusts all serious innovation. It believes that the present system of industrial relations, the present distribution of — property, the present constitutional system are wholly sound. It does not believe, of course, in gross idiocies like those of Mr. Palmer or Speaker Sweet. I[t occasionally chastises some of the crimes against the spirit and substance of existing law. But it does not believe, in fact it strenuously re-

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sents, the idea that the existing social order is a: process of development. It denies, therefore, that it is anything but meddlesome mischief to attempt to understand impending changes and to - them — consciously. If words mean anything, that is: a conservative position. ‘The paper consistently takes the con- servative position. What it will not do is to take the conservative name. It has not courage enough for that. And because it has not the courage to _ be what it is, because it wants to be conservative in fact but “liberal” in reputation, it naturally fails to rally or to inspire the forces of conservatism. There was a great place for a conservative journal in American life. There still is such a place. But it will be filled only by a journal that has the cour- age of its convictions. How would a conservative journal differ from a liberal or a radical journal? Not about the ex- istence of evils and gross injustices in the existing order. The man who denies them is not a con- servative but an ostrich. It would insist upon the evils, It would expose them relentlessly. It would be more conscious than a liberal journal, not less, of the difference between the practices of society and its ideals, Its whole aim would be to show how shortcomings are remediable by the methods and on the principles of the existing social order. To a real conservative it would be a cardinal point of honor to demonstrate week after week that the institutions he defended were so sound, so elastic, so humane that through them injustice could be undone. The editor of such a review would regard ' the oppressor, the reactionary, the witch hunter, the spy and the seeker of special privilege as his real opponents, because they undermine the moral authority of the system he is defending.’ He would hush up nothing, yield to no social pressure, ex- amine every grievance with care and sympathy. He would not be afraid to do this because he would sincerely believe that the evils are extraneous and transient, not intrinsic and central. He would set a contagious example of faith in the existing order, Knowing that until somebody has the moral stamina to disentangle conservatism from evasion, or from the defense of staring injustice, there will always remain the suspicion that the existing order cannot be defended with absolute candor. It would be a splendid thing if some one edited a journal of this kind. It would instantaneously raise the tone of public discussion. And, of course, : ‘such a journal would not lower itself by the dema- gogic use of epithets or insinuation. It would have a sporting instinct because that is inherent in the finer aspects of conservatism. It would remember _ not only the property which conservatism defends, THE NEW REPUBLIC GA) anh che NUR ytd wen ps ole ee ga UP ahs eS Ws aed 2 Si gn a ae At sesh “08 but the graces ak virtues that should go established order. It would remember s about noblesse oblige, something of chivaleill 30m thing of hospitality. It would never fawn a rich and powerful, never rush eagerly to the a sistance of the victors, never forget the unfortunat With such a journal it would be possible to debate public affairs to some useful end. _ Because it existed, liberals and radicals woul lose some of the moral authority that has acc 7 to them. They would cease to benefit by mere ¢ content, and would have to stand or fall on. constructive merits of their proposals. It is abs e that liberals should gain the strength that co: 7 from having been the first people publicly to prote E against the injustices and inefficiencies of thi Treaty, from having been the only people to rouse the conscience of America about the illegal w; and inhuman blockade against the Russian nation | from having been the leaders in resistance to the red hysteria and the unconstitutional procedaal the Federal Government. None of these iss belongs to liberalism, but to any one who uses f intelligence, studies the facts and orofelll . Americanism. 4 a” ing q A Candidate’s Prayer .@ OST of us can neither crack ourselves up © \r run ourselves down without being tiresome ; or absurd or both, Senator Harding is an excey ' tion to half of this rule. Before the campaign is over the public may learn what sort of figure h cuts as a hander of bouquets to himself. Thus far he has come only once within measurable distance of self-praise. Senators, he said in his speech of acceptance, ‘‘are the designated sentinels on the towers of Constitutional government.’’ Mr. Hard« ing is a Senator; therefore Mr. Harding is a de signated sentinel, etc. Whatever the phrase m j mean, it does not sound like an unforgivable dis. play of self-approval. Not, until he comes to ‘ other thing, to self-dispraise, does he let himsel I go. Humility is his long suit. “I would not be m natural self’’—we quote again from his speech 0 acceptance——“‘if I did not utter my consciousness ¢ my limited ability to meet your full expectation ! to realize the aspirations within my own breast, but I will gladly give all that is in me, all of heart soul and mind and abiding love of country, to s vice in our common cause. I can only pray to t he Omnipotent God that I may be as worthy in ser. vice as I know myself to be faithful in thought < ne purpose. One cannot give more. Mindful of th vast responsibilities, I must be frankly humble. .., a a oS

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“is s é . ae a ee gust 4, 1920, eS Yot awfully good, his: passage, yet it has both weetness and sincerity. Not awfully good, yet r er than most of us can do. Senator Harding er appears above the average man except when s is regretting that he is below the average, Its Bneliness makes this paradox almost interesting. Mr. Harding’ s character, so far as he has disclos- ed it, is not rich in paradox or in other rare metals. 4 _ And yet, although the passage we have quoted ; dc 2s correspond, more closely than almost any ‘other in the same speech, to a real feeling inside le speaker, there is at first sight something odd Bout the juxtaposition of Senator Harding’s hu- mility and Senator Harding’s prayer. Isn’t it ask- ing a. good deal of the Almighty to expect him to a provise, out of material so unpromising, out of sl such a mediocre nominee, a President equal to “the vast responsibilities” ? Another breed of nominee, E Theodore Roosevelt or a Woodrow Wilson, a t nan who sees himself, at the time of his nomination ‘or a little earlier, as already nearly fit to be Presi- dent, is asking very little of the Almighty when he asks Him to make him quite fit. The request is no more than a prayer for a few finishing touches. But Senator Harding’s words, if one considers them at leisure, imply a belief that in his humble case the Almighty has made a shocking bad start, that 1 Jim. Senator Harding i is virtually praying to be ade all over again and to be made different. Such | 1 criticism of his attitude towards his Creator is : tural, but is it not superficial? Must we not ithdraw it when we call to mind, as we must upon r irther reflection, Senator Harding’s probable con- ‘yiction that to Omnipotence all tasks are equally x sy? The leopard who prayed that his spots — be changed defended his unusual request on ‘the ground that all difficulties look alike to Omni- : potence. _ Senator Harding’s conception of Omnipotence; Bewever, is not definitely known to his countrymen, a * the moderation of his prayer may be more con- y niently illustrated by ideas already well-known to be his. “Lord, I am not highminded, I have no P ‘oud looks’ —when Senator Harding hears such words as these they wake, beyond question, an echo in that breast which he has called, rather daringly, edly. But so is his idea of the Presidential office. 4 functions which he calls upon the Almighty to take him, the unworthy, the incompetent, compe- nt and worthy to perform, are not in his opinion b eyond the capacity of the average man. At this D joint in his self-communion he probably notices with relief unmistakable evidences of design. The a me Power which has taken him, so unworthy and THE NEW fi nearly all the Almighty’s work still lies ahead of his own. His idea of himself is modest, undoubt- REPUBLIC of such limited abilities, and made him the man upon whose election the present odds vary be- tween 2 and 2% to 1, has made the office which he will occupy if elected completely fillable by a man of small calibre. How fortunate that success in November will not elect him head of a difficult or! The most success can do, the extremest strain it can put upon his limited ability, is only to make him President of the United States. That is all. Besides, Senator Harding has no intention of performing even a President’s modest tasks all by himself. Except in the sometimes difficult task of choosing a cabinet he will have the help of “ cabinet of highest capacity, equal to the responsi- bilities which our system contemplates.” He will have also such help, and he evidently sets a good) deal of store by it, as he can get out of. ‘‘a cordial understanding and coordinated activities with a House of Congress, voicing the convictions which members bring from direct contact with the elec- torate.”’ | he appears to prize above all other human sources of counsel and comfort, namely, ‘‘cordial coopera- tion along with the restored functions of the Sen- ate, fit to be the greatest deliberative body in the world,” whose ‘‘members are the designated sen- tinels in the towers of Constitutional government.” Vast the responsibilities of the Presidential office may be, yet they are to be shared among so many wise men that they need not appall even a candi- | date conscious of his own unwisdom. And wise men are to be found, ne end.of them. All a President need to do is to telephone to the Capitol, particularly to the proper committee rooms in the Senate wing. No, all things considered, when Senator Harding prayed to be made able to do a medium-sized job with a lot of help, he did not make an exorbitant | demand. ‘The surprise, even when we take his humility into account, is rather that he thought it necessary to pray for himself. Why not for the Republican Senators who are to show him how to run the country? ‘Theirs is to be the vast responsi- bility. Why not “pray to the Onis poten God that they may be worthy in service’’? Not long after the second battle ef Bull Run several Chicago churches sent a deputation to bee bate i a nc a gaa RR Be ae . i} ' EE Otte ys ae” Are = x oAg 271 ‘corporation or Prime Minister or Roman Emper- | He will have, furthermore, something — Washington, for the purpose of informing Presi- dent Lincoln that in God’s opinion the time had come to emancipate the slaves. Lincoln’s reply to his visitors is in all the biographies. “I am ap- proached,” he told them, “‘with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men who are equally certain that they represent the divine will. Iam sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some re-

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el as Pe 272 TH E N E Ww spects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that, if it is probable that God would reveal His will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it puare be supposed he would reveal it. directly to me.””’ This scene, if history repeats it- self with Mr. Harding as President, will have a different ending. “I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say,” so President Harding will tell his volunteer advisers, ‘that if it is probable that God would reveal His will to others, on a point so con- nected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it to the Republican leaders in the Senate.” ce Off a Strike : See United States Railway Board seems to have done a very competent and satisfactory job, within the limited scope of its powersand duties. The board had no other mandate than to arbitrate a wage controversy. It was not authorized to inves- tigate the general problem of railway labor, or to imquire into those causes of discontent which go be- yond the weekly pay envelope, It was appointed te tide over an immediate and threatening situation, growing out of the marked discrepancy between post-war wages and post-war prices, and it appears to have been successful. With minor exceptions, the unions have accepted the award, and for the present at least the general railway strike, which seemed a few months ago such a menacing probabil- ity, has again been averted. The award in itself was a substantial one, As a general rule the men receive increases of slightly more than a dollar a day, and in the case of the men whose grievances were the most pressing, the clerical workers and unskilled laborers, this repre- sents a fair percentage increase. There were other factors, however, which con- tributed to the success of the award, and which serve to throw the whole matter in a truer per- spective. Whether the award was just or unjust, the railway men’s leaders must have recognized that a strike at the present time was out of the question. strike section, the six months’ guarantee in the E'sch-Cummins law has in effect put the financial resources of the United States behind the rail- way corporations in the event of a strike. The ~ cost of a strike, today, would come out of the Unit-. The railway corporations Prob- ed States Treasury. would be protected, however great the loss. ably the union leaders are right in saying that “‘the roads want us to strike now, while they’re still un- der the government’s wing.” A strike under such conditions could not be suc- REPUBLIC Quite apart from the ambiguous anti- » August 4, 1 cessful. The true effect of the award, therefor cannot be judged until after September Ist, whe the government guarantee expires. Probably 3 about that time the whole wage controversy if begin over again. “The time for us to ie out, a brotherhood chief 1s quoted as ayn 3 the railroads don’t want us, to.” Why « shoul they not accept what they are offered, and later tT when the strategic situation has improved, come back for more? Those are the tactics which every business man pursues in selling his goods. He dea at arm’s length with his customer, and gets wha it he can out of him. So long as railway labor : mains in its present status, what incentive has i t to pursue a more enlightened course ?- 4 Last year the railway brotherhoods suggested an alternative, Give the railway workers repre- sentation in the management of the railroads. Make their earnings depend to some extent upon the suc cess of their undertaking. Admit them as part ners in transportation business. Then it will be possible to appeal to their obligation as public ser- vants, and to apply to them the basic rule of law that he who engages in a business affected with af public interest must serve the public on demand and for a reasonable compensation. 4 But the Plumb plan was contemptuously rejected | We preferred the traditional method of hostile bar-_ gain and arbitration, with its ultimate appeal to force. We preferred to deal at arms’ length with railway labor rather than admit it into partnership, 7 Having made our choice we cannot now complain - if railway labor takes us at our word, and deals” at arm’s length with us. The Brotherhoods pro- posed a cooperating alliance between labor and government. We chose the only alternative, a chronic state of war, in which the recent wage are bitration is no more than a passing truce. 4 Che New REPUBLIC A Journal of Opinion. PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1920,..N THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, |] _ INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. |] HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT; ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER |} _ _ EDITORS HERBERT CROLY CHARLES MERZ FRANCIS CRETT WALTER LIPPMANN ALVIN JOHNSON LIP LITTELL PHI SIGNE TOKSVIG, Assistant Editor YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FIVE DOLLARS IN ADVANCE, SINGLE COPIES FIFTBEN CENTS, CANADIAN SUB. SCRIPTION FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE, FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE |] _ POSTAL UNION, SIX DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE; REMIT: |} _ TANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER, || _ ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS: MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT |} THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. ¥., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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: hag | aa ust 4, 1920 HE Presidential candidate of the Farmer- Labor party is a great joiner. He was ¢ attending the convention of the Elks in ye hicago when the convention of the Forty-Eighters gan. He has been Grand Esquire—lI think it as Grand Esquire—in the Grand Lodge of the iks. In Chicago he walked over from the con- ention of the Elks and sat in the convention of he Forty-Eighters as an inconspicious delegate mtil he stood up. Then his six feet four inches and his white suit and his air of good-natured con- ident control made him at once into a notable and hen into permanent chairman of the convention’s roceedings. _ Meanwhile he was also a delegate to the conven- tion of the Labor party which was sitting in Car- men’s Hall a couple of miles away. He is also an Odd Fellow. He has to go to Buffalo pretty soon to attend some sort of ceremony as Grand ; Representative of Utah in the Grand Sovereign I odge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows. _ At Cornell, in his undergraduate days, in the Law School there, he was chairman of the Republi- ¢ an Club; and, before he went to Cornell, he was secretary of a Constitutional Convention of the ate of Utah. He had also been a County Sup- Bistendent of Schools. Returning from Cornell, he became a county p prosecuting attorney and began his relations with the labor movement by enforcing—actually enfore- 1 ing—the local eight-hour eh in mines and on municipal works. q _ A short time ago an alien is had been corraled ; for deportation in Utah appealed to Christensen to help him get a competent -hearing. Christensen a epted the case and was able to persuade .the Labor Department at Washington to make a ruling te the effect—I think—that mere membership in the I. W. W. would not be a sufficient cause for deportation, At any rate the alien won some sort | of legal victory through Christensen. Hence | Christensen’s reputation—or infamy—as ‘“‘an at- torney for. 1. Wo OWS. In Chicago Christensen became easily this : rountry’s champion chairman. I have seen many chairmen. Christensen is the perfect gentlemanly boot-and-spur chairman without fear and without ef proach. He become a Presidential nominee by ersonally quelling his fellow-man in two successive conventions without ever driving his fellow-man put of fellowship with him. _ The decisive moment come when the Forty: THE NEW REPUBLIC 273 Christensen, and Back of Him Fighters had gone over to Carmen’s Hall and had seated themselves in among the Labor party dele- gates, to make an “amalgamated” convention. The gavel was in the hands of the national chairman of the Forty-Eighters—Mr. J. A. H. Hopkins. He tapped out a little noise with it now and then while large noises resounded from every quarter of the hall in tempests of motions and counter- motions and accusations and defiances. The cloud of the Forty-Eighters had met the cloud of the Laborites and they were descending to earth to- gether in a torrent that seemed likely to sweep the whole third-party movement out of the hall and down the drain. Hopkins stood on the shore; and the torrent had ceased to notice him as it raged by. At that moment the six feet four inches and the kindly countenance of Christensen came con- scripted to the front of the platform, Delegates behind him were pushing him forward and saying: “You did it in the convention of the F orty- Kighters: now do it here.” Christensen’s father was.a “freighter.” He drove wagons of freight from the railway-terminus. in Utah up cross-country into Idaho and Montana and the Dakotas. Christensen is not at a distance from conflicts with nature and between natural men. He stretched his hand out over the assemblage, and his manner was a repetition of the remark he had made to the convention of the Forty- — Eighters: “I’m not going to be rough, but I’m going to ride this convention.” He knows he can do it, and he likes to do it. His method is really that of a sort of parliamentary orchestra leader. His gavel becomes a baton. He stretches it out encouraging to the man whom he has recognized on the floor to be the next man to suggest a tune. He stretches it out with such - emphasis and interest that everybody else becomes interested to hear what tune the man will sug- gest. Sometimes, with hand to his ear, Chris- tensen will entice several suggestions from sev- eral different performers and then himself venture to suggest that a wonderful tune could be made by combining two motions:and letting the result be played by the second violin as a committee of one. His helpfulness wins the confidence of the crowd; and pretty soon he is really the conductor of its impulses instead of only the moderator of its . violences; and in the end he seems to be doing nothing more ruthless than hushing the trombone when he pats the air over the head of a persistent riser for recognition in the pit of the hall and says:

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274 THE NEW _ “IT know. I know. You want to make a speech. So does everybody else. But your speech doesn’t fit in just now. Now listen, brother. Pay close attention to me. SIT DOWN!!” He sits, The “DOWN” is as Sst bat as the “brother” is disarming. In his little hotel room, after having ridden the human whirlwind to a dead calm, Christensen sits down, and takes off his soft collar, and gets a little metal tube out from among his belongings, and opens it, and draws some white thread off a spool _ of white thread and black thread within it, and drops a needle out of it, and threads the needle, and sews a new button on the collar, precisely and rapidly, and shamelessly. He is a bachelor, and an independent bachelor, : He 1s also a total abstainer from vinous, malt and spirituous liquors. Finally: he once did a bit of newspaper writing and, of course, being a joiner, being a fellow-man, he became a member of the organization of the trade. Here we see the class-war directly upon us. The Republicans and the Democrats nomin- ated publishers. The Farmer-Labor party straight- way went and nominated a member of the News Writers’ Union. Christensen was one of the original organizers of the Labor party in Utah. Nationally he fits the needs of the Farmer-Labor party with extra- ordinary exactness. The first need of the Farmer-Labor party is that _ its candidate shall have no personal or factional associations which will in any way impede it in accomplishing its great tasks of winning the sup- port of existing trade-organizations of wage- earners and farmers. Those organizations have to be its fighting base. The Labor party came to Chicago and started its convention in Carmen’s Hall with six hundred delegates. These delegates could be analyzed into two main groups. One: Those from trade-unions or combinations of trade-unions. Two: Those from “labor party branches.” Supporters of the Labor party who are not trade-unionists may join “labor party branches.”’ - There are state branches, and then county branches, and then city and ward and other local branches. State branches have been formally organized in Connecticut, New York, Pennsyl- vania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Utah, Wy- oming, Washington, California—fifteen states. The membership in some of these states is al- together negligible. In others—particularly in _ Jilinois—it is considerable, and_ lively. everywhere—I judge—it is today overwhelmingly REPUBLIC Almost. pea et, Ls > ’ et * August 4, 19 of trade-unionists and only scantily of other sorts of persons. 4 It does not follow, though, that the mes shi of the “labor party branches’’ is a political dus lication of the membership of the Labor par y affliated trade-unions. The unionist whose uni 1 has joined the Labor party may, perhaps, of cou: jo a “labor party branch’; but perhaps again he may not—being indifferent or being him i personally a Republican or Democrat. And _ unionist who joins a “labor party branch’ maj perhaps, of course come from an affliated union but perhaps again he may come from a union which rejegts the Labor party and all its wo : The two memberships—‘“‘branch” and “union” overlap but are not by any means the same. All “branches’’—in Illinois, at least—which i the source and center of the present Labor-pa y going eflfort— are supposed to pay regular dues at a given rate per member. So are all affiliated unions. ‘Trade-unionists are habituated to dual and the Labor party will be a rigorously dues- collecting party. The delegates of the Labor party at Chica were two-thirds of them from Illinois and Indiana. Seven other states sent delegates to the number of at least ten apiece. ‘The registration of creden- tialed delegates from these nine states were F follows: a LEMMON es ae. aS Indiana’... . ‘116 New York 36 Pennsylvania 32 SOWA: cbs ys 24. Missouri 23 LPM ear 22 Michigan .... 10 Washington Mahaee (3. | 4 There were delegates in smaller numbers from twenty-one other states. | _ Of the two main sorts of delegates—Labor-pa branch delegates and affiliated-union delegates— the latter seemed by far the more numerous. The emphatic majority of all the delegates in the Labor party convention seemed to come directly from individual trade-union locals, a It is apparently through a conquest of individual locals that the Labor party must come—if it docs come—to a conquest of the trade-union movement of America. 3 The United Mine Workers of America, in full i national convention last year, inceraneell their national officers definitely to proceed to the forma tion of a Labor party. Nevertheless, the national officers of the United Mine Workers were not present at Chicago. Many locals of the United Ww a a “, mee. Pas 1 ee O.oieg a | t re -

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ite PEO ee SS Tek ee Cour ) ee ot Bey aor ee B on, 1 * r he . \ ee a a t ust 4, 1920 B Workers were present thong delegates— t at the expense of those focals. In the Llknois legation I counted representatives from some hty miners’ locals. And there were some dis- guished leaders of miners among the delegates v Valker and McDonald of Illinois, Mitch of diana, Howatt of Kansas, Harlan of Washing- nt. But their national president and their na- 3 secretary——-Lewis and Green—were absent; the national prestige of the United. Mine 0 orkers was absent with them. From among railway workers there were re- ese ntatives of some fifty locals but no represen- tives of any national railway workers’ union adquarters. The only national union Silaiidiariets which ems to be on terms of affliated intercourse with - Labor party is that of the Clay and Brick oe exists m Chicago, I think, in the ime building with the Labor party. The rule is bat the affiliated unions of the Labor party are als of national unions, while the national officers ‘those same unions stand aloof with Mr. Gom- The Labor party is a rank-and-file movement led ya few City Federations, a few State Federations, nd a few District Councils and the like. ‘Six State Federations have hecome afhiliated— Hinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Wyoming and Washington. Among City Federations sending delegates I ot iced those of Chicago, Rockford, Detroit, St. , Aberdeen, Seattle. ; 1 Bosiced also a district council of Railway Car- en from somewhere in Missouri; and I noticed t Aa Building Trades Councils. In Chicago the | At that point it is appropriate to begin to show ptimism. Why a carpenter is predestined to be t I am voluminously informed that conservatism i carpentry have long tended to be two lobes of le same brain. I am, therefore, advised that the Mnversion of a district council of carpenters to the abor party is a straw of the first magnitude for rc nhets of wind and weather in trade-union fairs, | c am also advised that the conversion of the rgO District Council of Painters to the Labor ity is equally significant—for the precisely op- : é reason. Those painters are inclined to be Ocialists, On hearing about them, I was reminded of a th the farmers from South Dakota and who imed to be the only dues-paying Socialist left in THE NEW REPUBLIC istrict council of Carpenters has become afiliated. | conservative I have found nobody to tell me, | itor from South Dakota who came to Chicago 275 his part of the state. All the rest had become Nonpartisan Leaguers. Out of my own knowledge I will say that the © number of delegates present at Chicago from any given state must not be taken as necessarily a measure of the Labor party movement in that state. In West Virginia, for instance, I know that the Labor party movement—under the name Non- partisan League—is apparently large and vigorous. Yet from West Virginia at Chicago there was only one delegate. In any case, however, the first fight before the Farmer-Labor party is the attempt by the Labor party element in it to convince and conquer the national trade-union organizations of the United States. The next is the attempt to strengthen and enlarge the relations which at Chicago were surprisingly favorably established with groups of farmers. The third is distinctly dependent on the outcome of the first and second, but it has to be carried on simultaneously with them. It is the vitally neces- sary attempt to expand the meaning of the word “Labor” and to teach a certain great mass of salaried people that only by entering into the spirit — and into the body of Labor can they ever emanci- pate themselves from being financially the most in- sulted and morally the most abject and groveling — group in the community. Their circumstances do not incline them toward organization in trade- unions. The hope is entertained that their interests will lead them into harmony with the trade-unions through organization in Labor-party branches. Such are the necessities and such, therefore, the needs of the Farmer-Labor party. To meet them the Presidential candidate should ideally have the following qualifications, positive and negative: 1) No prominence as a leader of any trade- union faction. — | 2) No prominence as a leader of any — faction. 3) An occupation consistent with a wide meaning for the word ‘‘Labor.” 4) No personal political organization so great as to dominate and de-nature the political organi-. zation which the economic groups of wage-earners and farmers must develop out of their own re- ‘sources for their own purposes. 5) A complete loyalty to the Farmer-Labor plat- form and program. Christensen seems to possess all these qualifica- tions entire. He heads no faction of trade-unionists or of farmers. As a lawyer, he brings the word “Labor” into the professions. His personal po- litical organization is purely local to a thinly pop- ulated state. And he accepts the Farmer-Labor

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276 platform and program from beginning to end and proposes to preach it to the country in what he calls “a nation-wide, twenty-four-hour-day, seven- day-week, town-hall, street-corner and front-porch campaign.” Besides which, he likes his fellow-man, in ad- dition to desiring his welfare, and is always joining him; and, as a candidate before the people, he quite miraculously combines the two most desirable external qualities of a candidate: a grand front of body and an old-shoe simpleness of manner. So he seems at present. re WILLIAM Harp. Parallels A REINE est morte—we say, when past and future poignantly meet—la reine est morte: vive la reine! This is the message which, all un- consciously, the illustrated papers have been herald- ing abroad, as they chronicled coincidently the setting of an old star and the rising of a new one. Or should one say, the final sinking to rest of a tired, long-faded moon, as the orb of day climbs to its zenith. Within a forthnight, Eugénie, erst- while Empress of the French, is released from her long exile, and Mary, Queen of the Movies, makes her triumphal entry into London. The end of Eugénie’s career, but who would dare to say the zenith of Mary’s? Nevertheless, to be half-killed by the kindness of myriads, to collapse under the mad adoration of the largest city in the world, is at least a climactic point in her arc of glory. So we saw them side by side, Empress. and Queen, and in them an ib Gen of the old order and the new. ‘Emperor Depainon and Empress Rute” the legend runs, “at the height of their power. From a photograph taken before 1870”; and along- side, at ease with her peers, we find Mary and her consort, whose power we know too well ts caption it. “In 1870, at the height of their power,’’ would the illustrated supplements of the Sunday papers have ventured this juxtaposition of mere mummers with anointed persons? Vain question, since illus- trated supplements and Sunday papers, like movies and the Queen of Movies, were still in the limbo of things-to-be. Look at the imperial pair. They stand before a stiff, plush curtain, accurately posed. Louis Na- poleon, in his square frock-coat, immense top-hat, waxed mustachios, “Imperiale” and cane, glances at us haughtily. master, turning her beautiful profile towards us. Her two hands are meekly folded in the crook of THE NEW REPUBLIC (oh perfect symbol of the new age!), Mary sits Eugénie hangs upon her lord and s | ts oa August 4, IG his left arm, as becomes a wife, her eyes modes st downcast, as becomes a lady. Her body is swath | in shawls, her legs, from waist to carpet, festoon about with hoops and flounces, Her little bon n ; sits fashionably on the back of the sleekest imag: able head. Not the tiniest tip of the lobe of f he ear peeps. out under the shining hair—perish th thought! And as for instep or ankle, we maytf i even be aware that they exist. The polite a bound to assume that stiff-flounced pedestal, fro which not even the point of a slipper emerges, t be the sole support of the upper half of the femal body. Do we not know the battle-cry of ou grandmothers: Cover it up! Now skip these fifty years and look at Doug at an Mary. Practically every standard has been r versed—even the fashion in eyebrows. Eugéni has the drooping arch beloved of her time, Man the level line we admire. They sit at ease besid an old punt, hatless and comfortable. They face the camera as though they had just smoked their® after-breakfast cigarette and would shortly take 7 pole and meander up the river. Their only con cession to appropriateness is the hearty smile (w dare not call it a grin, though our grandmother would have blushed to show so many teeth) whick their subjects expect of them. Mary’s loose-girdle i tunic and Doug’s easy tweeds are pleasantly rum pled, and Mary’s hair has certainly felt the wind She clasps her knees, disclosing some eighteer inches of trim white shoes and stockings. Pretty as they are, we do not care—the sight of a woman: ankles has ceased to be an emotional event even to the most susceptible of senile roués. Finally, apart from Doug, secure and self-possessed. This is not a chief-and-squaw meénage, this is a free a equal partnership; and we know Mary is her own mistress as we know she is mistress of the multi tudes. : Perhaps Eugénie, also, was not wholly, as her picture would imply, the meek, devoted echo ol her husband. It was an open secret that the rathet womanish temperament of Louis Napoleon wa often overruled by her who was the power behin the throne. But this could not be recognized, x cept by those who looked for an excuse to condemi Eugénie as unwomanly. Open as it was, it mus be treated as a secret; ruler as she was, she m us remain behind the throne. The conventions mus be observed, the popular sense of fitness satished hence the elaborate pose of wifely submission. — And this, mark you, is not an elaborate, ceri monial picture, That would have involved crow and draperies, or, at the very least, a ae and a book. No, this is intended to be as info ‘ma

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og Bees, ee te PO Pe ok ead al ot sees ined eS ht vay ee Ne hoi et di ian > es a at WIGS mata! Bi ie * > oe ay A Fate, ao ‘ . t ‘ . aa L ear 4 ugust 4, 1920 THE NEW s the picture alongside. This was actually the yay they stood and moved, the way any wealthy itizen and his wife might be seen on any Sunday f the year, taking the air in town or country. Is t possible, we exclaim, that human beings could ever have cramped their minds and bodies in this way ; deformed their ribs with iron corsets and choked their very souls with iron taboos? In the name of our common humanity, can they really ave been so invulnerably righteous, so unshake- ably stiff? _ One wonders whether we of the new century can properly understand the last great age. It is still too near us; and our vision is blurred by all manner of irrelevant emotions. After all, our parents were brought up in this great Victorian tradition, and, though they were not wholly of it, they carried away enough to believe that their children should conform at least to the liberal and enlightened standards which they imagined to be theirs. So, for us, the Victorian age is inevitably associated with the injunctions and restrictions which burdened bur youth. Two generations of rebellion have I not been enough to clear the air. There is still an element of personal resentment in our appraisal of the Victorians, a jejune irreverence in our mockery | of all they held holy. But this attitude is passing, as our own youth is Basing The generation which is born, but hardly breeched, the boys and girls who, in fifteen years’ time, will be discoursing of life at colleges and universities, will see the Victorians differently. They, who have not even indirectly suffered from it, will smile pitifully, almost tenderly, at all that stolidity and stuffiness which we so bitterly satirize. They will rediscover the fundamental humanity of those laced and padded figures, in whim we can only see the bogies of our youth; they will discern, be- i d the whale-bone and horse-hair, eternal com- mon flesh and blood. Moreover, the mist of senti- ment which clothes the historic past, will have had bainly stateliness, its ceremonious frivolity, its mmazing innocence, will seem as exquisitely ro- nantic to the coming generation as the delicious ighteenth century does to us. We are, most of us present-day adults, uncom- ortably perched between the nineteenth century nd the twentieth. We wish to be disrespectful to ur grandmothers and we only succeed in being de- a We go to the movies twice a week, but we ver quite lose the feeling that we ought to explain hy. We are a little apologetic and talk abou: Boole s Art. We cannot take it for granted. lary Pickford’s triumph, however much we may Imire her acting, slightly shocks us. in e to form about the nineteenth century. Its un- We have REPUBLIC 1 he talked about the tremendous power of the movies but we have never realized intimately that what we said was true. | Royalty is melting off the earth; and modern society is so vast and complex that “‘big men” are dwarfed; yet humanity has its old craving for heroes to worship. Soon there will be only athletes. and movie stars left to enshrine in the great heart of the people. Fifty years ago Eugénie would have had the whole of that illustrated page; fifty years hence, Mary—the Mary of that day—will have it all. ‘Today, past and future stand side by side. The coming generation will wholeheartedly adore its movie stars and as wholeheartedly ignore dead queens. But we, who stand between two ages, doubtfully fumbling our rather painful way through life, we give them both alike a bittersweet, half- worshipful, half-cynical, half-serious smile. VERA GORDON. The Orphaned West N the clammy dawn of the morning after the na- tional conventions, the West is leisurely trying to find out what hit it. It is feeling itself over for broken bones and its older folk are poulticing their shattered pride with Marcus Aurelius and Emer- son. ‘The West has had an awful fall. Until four years ago, the West was incapable of such a downfall, Not having gone up, it could not come down. Experience had kept us in a state of lovable humility. We were ‘inured to seeing New York, Indiana and Ohio decide elections, and to having the nominations, platforms and legisla- tion apportioned accordingly. Our farmers gener- ously voted for higher prices for shoes and nails and other western necessaries in order that Penn- sylvania and Massachusetts and their mills might be kept safe in the Republican fold. Or else, on rare occasions, they voted little Tammanys upon themselves that New York and Indiana might be got in line for the party of Jackson and Jefferson. The West expected nothing but the privilege of carrying a torch in the procession of politics and it got nothing but that. ‘True, it had Mr. Bryan; but only in Republican years. Humble enough was the West, lowly beyond possibility of a drop, until election week of 1916. On election night New York’s voting machines — gave the count in the pivotal state before the moun- tain time country had finished its chores. Hughes — had won. In forty years no President had been — elected without New York. Of course, no Presi- dent could be. Everybody went to bed on hearing from New York and slept sweetly or otherwise ac-

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278 cording to his emotions over the Republican vic- tory. Then came morning and doubt. The west- ern returns were going strangely. When Califor- nia was in three days later, New York had been humbled by the West. It had decided an election. It was not wholly the West’s fault if its head swelled then. The country over, the West’s per- formance was acclaimed as the dawn of a new po- litical day, Politics no longer knuckled to a bal- ance of power controlled by eastern conservatism and eastern bosses. The Republican managers must now reckon with western progressiveness. The Democrats must slick up their rag-tag in order to make good with the washed and barbered West. All sections told that to the West, and the West was flattered into believing it. upon itself as the new national pacemaker. proud it was. _ Humble as it was in the old days, the West had - had its ideas about things. If it did not ask to lead anybody by the nose, neither was there a ring in its own nose. There were things a party could not do and keep the West in line. The West occasion- ally tipped off this fact in its gentle way, as when And Nebraska gave the Republican Roosevelt two and a half to one in 1904 and Democratic Wilson a plurality of 41,000 in 1916, the rest of the West pretty generally following suit. Usually one party or the other felt obliged in those days to make up its menu with some reference to the western ap- petite. The West was never so poor but that it was done that reverence. Now, after four years et pride,—but to. the story. | The West is progressive. Itself in a long stand- ing progression from sod to wood and from wood to brick and from brick to stone, standing pat ts to the West unthinkable. The West is so progres- sive that even its reactionaries call themselves pro- gressive and complain bitterly if otherwise char- acterized. The West thinks of -itself as going somewhere. It doesn’t always know just where, but it is on its way. It is interested greatly i in 1921. For 1896 it hasn’t the slightest use. ) Roosevelt was the great Republican westerner. Even if he had not lived awhile in South Dakota, ‘the Republican West would have claimed Roose- velt. Because Roosevelt frequently had his back to the past, the West recognized him as spiritually its own and followed him. When Roosevelt died and the Republican high priests who had abominat- ed him in life fell to worshipping loudly at his ‘tomb, the West was filled with complacency. At last the light of the West had penetrated the hard heads of the East. When Nicholas Murray But- - ler and Chauncey Depew and Boies Penrose wore sackcloth for Roosevelt, then was thy western ser- THE NEW REPUBLIC mourning, the West expected the Chicago cont nd as the West expected. Then came the plattorn Orit It began to look particularly Democratic bosses, entrenched them- ‘deh ries 192 vant ready to depart in peace. The West 3 aware, of course, that all this was post mor am But the West isn’t sophisticated as yet. It is still young enough to take men and faro decks for what they claim to be. In view of the badges o tion to be run by Roosevelt just as if he were Cabot, : Lodge’ s spirit control. a The speeches in adoration of Roosevelt came of it with everything reminiscent of Roosevelt snipped out and the eyes of the West widened a bit. Y¥ ‘ what’s a platform between Rooseveltians? when every candidate claiming so much as a rave ing of the Roosevelt mantle had been kicked out, and when a protegé of Roosevelt's arch-enemy, : Foraker, was nominated for President, and when the convention went clear to New England for a 7. Vice-President, the West felt for its hat. You 1g as the West is, and imperfectly baked, it knows when it is kicked downstairs, The West could live on a ticket of cold bul r wheat cakes and tallow. A people whose ancestors frequently survived on a menu of cotton-tail boiled over a twisted hay fire are not easily starved. But 7 it isn’t looking for that kind of thing, nor does it accept it without first shopping around a bit. The West laid Harding and Coolidge on the shelf for. the time being and turned confident eyes toward San. Francisco, It was western experience that it never got slapped on both cheeks the same campaign year. Surely, the corner stone of 1916 was not to be re ‘ jected by both the builders in 1920. 4 _ The Democratic West, besides being progressive, likes stirring leaders and abominates bosses. It likes Wilson and, on the whole, it likes Bryan. It isn’t tired of supermen. Such is its distaste for bosses that Bryan nearly bankrupted himself in his own Nebraska in toon by a speech in New York in which he said: “Great is Tammany and Croker is its prophet.” His opponents plastered the bill boards with that blunder and Bryan lost his home county, city and state. Besides disliking bosses, the West is dryish. This isn’t so much because the West is puritanical as because it found the liquor business furnishing a barricade behind which bosses, o, UL a selves. It burned the barricades in order to clean up the bosses. There is a strong strain among western Democrats, too, of that much deric od thing, idealism. Ancient societies east of the Ohi may scoff at President Wilson’s pretty words and at Mr. Bryan’s crosses of gold. The West takes its visions so seriously as often to vote for them a peril to its pocket. a The West was not much interested in Mi Na

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ag as THE NEW fan's liquor fight at San Francisco. That is a estion of the past to the West, hence a subject fr prompt oblivion. Long before New York dis- ered that prohibition had been put over on it ddenly and surreptitiously, the saloon had been inished from nearly every state west of the Mis- sippi. The West merely did not want the issue vit ved and was satisfied to have the Democratic attorm ignore the subject, Had the ignoring lh stopped there! ; ist 4, 1920 atic platform which should give the lie to the eaginous mess cooked up at Chicago. Ringing as to be the word. It heard Secretary Glass’s duction with eager hope. The sentences were 0 er. There was linguistically more punch. But distillate of ideas was astonishingly like that Chicago i in quality and quantity. It rang like a wwter dollar. Anyway, platforms mean only what the men on em mean. The candidate would redeem the plat- rm, perhaps. The West waited and hoped on. c n the twelfth ballot came New York, New Jer- y, Indiana and Illinois,—Murphy, Nugent, Tag- rt and the Sullivan administratorship—Blucher- g into the Cox column. “That kills Cox,’ said e West. “They wan t dare nominate a man Kd by such a crew.” But maybe Cox wasn’t sponsible for that. ‘The West is fair. Again 1 yaited. Through thirty ballots it saw that rigid ck bone of bosses hold stiff for Cox, wear down : t opposition to Cox; and on the forty-fourth put x across. The Democrats had named a candi- te in debt for his glory to a string of bosses ™, EMOCRATIC control of industry: that 3 is an idea new and dubious to the schools, —" new and abhorrent to the business man. is not after all a great many years since the lols seconded the business man in his claim to rammeled discretion in all that pertained to the ductive process. Even now, after a century of ° legislation, there is no difficulty in finding ler practical men or theorists to deny the bene- nce of laws that “‘interfere with nature” in such tters as hours and hygienic conditions of employ- t, matters plainly affected more with a public fest than with a private. Almost everyone adays admits that the public has a right to de- ‘formaldehyde or benzoate of soda, but it is The West had fondly promised itself a Demo- isn’t hungry yet. line whether or not ‘its food shall be “doped” REPUBLIC who, according to western understanding, do nothing for nobody, to running again. Flattened beneath this trium- phant procession of boss made candidate on an empty platform lay the Democratic West’s sym- bols of Democracy, Bryan and Wilson. The glory that was 1916 was faded, gone. On the shelf with the Republican buckwheats with tal- low the West now ranges the Democratic cold po- tatoes with oleo. Let them lie awhile. The West President from within a hundred miles of the centre of population where West meets East! The West wants time out to think. | Never in its short political life, had the West been without at least a stepmother. Once or twice it felt itself possessed of both parents. Now it 279. Incidentally the candidate and his makers were such as to set the liquor sore © Not even a candidate for Vice-— finds itself out on the doorstep, a one hundred per cent political orphan. In its humblest past the Re- publicans would put a tariff on the corn which the West exported at Liverpool prices. In its deepest depths the Democrats would come as far West as Illinois with a vice-presidential nomination. This year no alms, not even a smile. avenged for 1916. The men take it philosophically. The women, — not yet accustomed to political handouts, are less resigned. What the West will do it doesn’t know itself as yet. For the first part, we think, it will go fishing. Later on it will strike a balance or per- haps flip.a coin, One thing is sure. It won’t worry over the result. Why should it? WALTER LOCKE. Control of Industry: Whose Right? still apparently a minority who believe that the public might wisely inquire into the proportion of shoddy that goes into our ‘‘all wool’’ clothes. “Lais- sez faire, morbleu, laissez faire.” Let us not tug too hard at the skirts of those who are trying to make us some kind of cloth, even counterfeit, lest we find ourselves compelled to go naked. But all the argument against the familiar forms of public interference turn on the point of exped- iency. No child labor, it used to be argued, meant support of’ poor families at the public charge and dear wares besides. Could the public afford it? This new idea of democratic control of industry goes beyond expediency to fundamental rights. We had left it to the owners, or, in the corporation, to their theoretical representatives, the directors, New York is |

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280 to act according to their own discretion in all. that immediately and necessarily concerned profit and loss. It was theirs to decide whether the plan should be utilized to full capacity, or be shut down, in part or in whole, until the dearth of stocks on the merchants’ shelves cried out for more production. It was theirs to decide whether new plants should be erected or old ones dismantled. For after all, was not the capital theirs, to serve public purposes or not according as the public offered satisfactory terms as to profit? The movement for democratic control threatens this last stronghold of private business. From quar- ters so industrially diverse as the mine workers and the clothing workers you hear the demand for con- tinuous employment, year around support of the working personnel, without regard to market con- ditions. There is a rapidly growing sentiment in favor of a new scheme of industrial organization in which both the workers and the general public shall be represented in the corporation directorate and have a voice in every business decision. Think of that. You who have worked and saved to put money into a corporate investment are to see men who have put in no money at all voting you down when. you would like to play a safe or a reckless game ‘as the case might seem to you to demand. You are to see your industry operating at full time up to the very teeth of a commercial crisis, in order to obviate or postpone unemployment. Did not the sacrifice and thrift at the basis of your in- vestment entitle you to certain special rights in the matter? Of course you have special rights. There is no scheme of democratic control widely advocated that proposes to constitute a majority voting pow- er against the investor. But that the investor may properly be asked to share his control with other interests will not appear such a revolutionary pro- posal when one takes into account the methods by which most present day accumulation of capital is effected. Let us not ignore the old fashioned thrifty individual, who pares down his personal expenses and manages to get a few hundreds or thousands to put into railways or steel or the tex- tile industry. There are legions of such individuals and their merits are not to be minimized. Just the same, they are no longer even the chief accumu- lators of capital for industry. In fact, when we take into account the preference of such savers for investments of fixed income, such as government and corporation bonds, real estate mortgages, life insurance policies, interest bearing savings depos- its, etc., we are practically driven to the conclusion that the thrifty investor hardly figures at all in the creation of the industrial capital that is THE NEW REPUBLIC -sonably claim. What remained over—and it | ‘a vast sum in good years and a respectable su teen millions have been added through contributio _A corporation has, as a rule, a right to divide « : Auge .. py; now protesting SO violently against den mocr control. a Such capital arises principally out of profits ne ne} distributed in dividends, to be consumed or sav but held as surplus and reinvested, Everyone familiar with the methods by which the Steel ( C poration transmuted its original water into | gold. Out of its profits it paid interest on its bon dividends on its preferred stock and just as mu on its common stock as any stockholders could 1 even in the worst—went back into the business erect new plants and install new machinery, un its billion, mostly paper and water, became ’ more than a billion of really tangible assets. T Federal Trade Commission offers an even mi striking illustration in its history of the capital tion of Armour and Company, meat packers. — 1868 they commenced business with an investme of $160,000, which we will assume to be genui savings out of personal incomes. Since then fo from stockholders or through the sale of new stor to the public. About thirty millions have been pi out in dividends, out of earnings of $179,000,0¢ The rest of the earnings, approximating $140,00 ooo, when war taxes are deducted, have been p back into the business, and were covered in part a stock dividend of $20,000,000 in 1900 and | other of $80,000,000 in 1916. Of the present t worth of the company only ‘“‘about eight per ¢ has come from cash or property contributions: the part of the stockholders.” a I am not inveighing against the reinvestment p D cy of Armour and Company and our other gr corporations. That policy lookstome laudable, b from the business and from the social point of vi cent of its earnings in dividends. If it saw portunity for reinvestment, it might appeal to stockholders to subscribe to a new issue. Some them would respond, but few, we may safely ‘sume, would turn back the whole of their divide beyond a. fair minimum. The. Armour comp might have become great, it might even have gt up into the tens of millions, if it had pursued policy of profit distribution, It would certa never have become the power it is, for good or. A new institution, independent of private 7 : working for the corporation. And we are sill argue for the institution on the premise that nothing new. “| We have no doubt a much richer produ equipment, a much greater national industrial : er, in consequence of the practice of withho

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us fs 1920. r H E N EW plus earnings and reinvesting them. ay cor- ation which is unwilling or unable to follow this ictice is quite sure to languish. One of the chief | sons why our railway corporations have failed keep pace with the times is that under public ulation there is little or no surplus after the just im: of bondholders and stockholders have been t. If we are to win back and consolidate our old sition of primacy in railway transportation, say t railway spokesmen, we shall have to give them rate structure that allows for a comfortable bus for reinvestment. It seems to me that s argument is sound, if we must rely upon Wate capital to furnish us with transportation vice. | What this policy of surplus investment involves learly indicated in the last example. The public, a buyer of transportation, is required to furnish ¢ capital needed for improving the transportation t m. ‘That capital is to be furnished through an lition to freight and passenger charges, through i indirect tax, as it were. hed the money that displaced the water in the el Corporation’s capital. It paid a little more ‘every bit of hardware it consumed, just as it tht have done if the government had laid a sales on steel products. Each customer of Armour’s, ough fifty years, has thrown his mite into the poration’ s strong-box. He has paid a tax, ther exorbitant or not, to enable the Armour q to build up one of the most powerful eco- nic units in the world. The consumer has con- uted his eleven dollars to the Armour capital *every dollar contributed by the stockholders. d now he pays a fair return to the stockholders the whole twelve dollars, and a surplus besides aise the Armour economic power to a yet higher ency. t makes, no doubt, for ilNess efficiency, and, i tule, also for productive efficiency, to grant to vate corporations the power to aggrandize them- res and advance the interest of their stockhold- at least up to a generous limit, But it is really Posterous to assume that such self-aggrandizing hess concerns must be viewed exactly like the cerns painfully capitalized out of the meagre ing from personal income. The more nearly c ee eson process becomes institutional and -automatic, the further we recede from the lition in which the ‘“‘owner’’ may claim complete | rol, the right to do as he wills with “his own.’ Armour company is executing a common trust 2 anaging its small fraction of private savings its huge bulk of enforced public savings. Per- i is administering the trust well, as William lormandy and Henry of Navarre exercised _ Just so the public fur- f REPUBLIC 281 well the trust of absolute governmental powers they wielded. That is something that will not forever be taken for granted, in a democratic age, | | The general public will desire to know why the Armour company adopts a policy, say, which looks like a discouragement of the live stock producer and a prospect of shortages for the consumer. The working personnel will desire to know why it is necessary to pursue a policy that involves periodic crises of unemployment. And as these desires be- come more definite, it will come to. seem altogether irrational that the stockholder alone, though con- tributing only a small proportion of the capital, should try to arrogate to himself absolute power over the industry, power to save or destroy produc- er or consumer, power to make freemen or slaves of the workers who serve the public through the in- dustry. The control of industry may perhaps for convenience be entrusted yet a while longer to direc- tors who are chosen by the stockholders. That can hardly be for a very long time, unless the directors come to recognize that they represent only a part interest, perhaps only a vanishing minority interest, apart from the public out of which industrial power is generated. They must protect the stockholder’s interest, but if they conceive that to be their whole duty, they must sooner or later find that control is not to remain in their hands, but must be distrib- uted among all those who hold equitable iti in it. ALVIN Jounson. Truant-Leaves The leaves are playing truant From the nunnery of a maple tree; The stars with all their whispered epigrams Could not snare them to the hills, Nor could the twilights, Strumming frail adagios of dream, Lure them down the roads; But autumn came With a gift of wine, And dancing shoes, And mantillas, Stolen from the shoulder of some rainbow, With castanets And tambourines of wind; And now, | The leaves are pirouetting on bewildered hills Tipsy with the miracle of song, Or poising flagons of dew on their shoulders, ‘They go dancing little scherzos _ Down the roads, These pagan girls, Who once wore hoods of silence In the nunnery of a maple tree. _Davin RosENTHAL.

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THE NEW Five Months Ago AHESE excerpts from The New Republic were published in the period from October, 1919, to March, 1920: Poland’s Real Problem Domestic (The New Republic of October 1st, 1919) In a fresh appeal Premier Paderewski seeks financial. support from the United States. Amer- cans, he says, have “‘but little realization of the immensity of the problems with which we have to cope.” That statement is probably true. With an imperialist government and a discontented peasant- ry Poland has nevertheless been called upon by the French Foreign Office to put an army into the field against Russia. That the Polish government should desperately need foreign capital is in fact one in- dication of its weakness. For there are funds in Poland—if the government could get them. They belong to the wealthy landowners. But these funds the landlords are turning into francs—to be shipped to places of safety. Pogroms, for the present, satisfy the land-hunger of the peasantry. But the landlords know that this hunger may go further. 282 War Against Russia (The New Republic of December 3rd, 1919) From whatever angle the thing is studied there is no longer any doubt that the mass of the Russian people will support the Soviets against the old- regime generals and foreign bayonets. This is the truth on which our own attitude towards Russia has always rested, and we are entitled to say that the evidence has become steadily less imperfect. ~ Those who listened to Robins, Thompson, Tha- cher and Wardwell have been ever so much more nearly right than those who listened to Sack and Sazonov and Pichon. The time has come, as Mr. Lloyd George con- fesses, to liquidate the ‘Russian folly. It is a uni- ° versal disaster on all the frontiers of Russia, and would continue to be a disaster even if some gen- eral backed by tanks and gas should make a suc- cessful raid on Moscow or Petrograd. There is nothing in that policy except death and mutilation and the permanent embitterment of the Russian people. Poland on the Offensive (The New Republic of February 4th, 1920) A Warsaw report published in Copenhagen states that the Polish cabinet has ordered general mobili- zation. For what purpose? As a means of pro- tection, this report says, against Russian aggression, Poland on the defense against Soviet armies pre- SA a i v % bs Si os ah » t Se a t ’ ¢ > a 7 ; a? caw August “a " REPU BiG sents an unusual spectacle. The line of resis is not upon the generous frontiers granted wil | Peace Conference, but some two hundred kilc meters to the east of them. From the first, Fren influence has worked to keep Poland on the o fen sive. When the Polish armies have been wit drawn to within striking distance of their frontiers it will be time to. believe that Poland indeed waging defensive warfare. a The Right Policy -. (The New Republic of February 25, 1920) For the relief of the starving in the new stat 7 of Central Europe and Armenia at least $125 000,000 is imperatively needed, according to t ; most conservative expert estimates. ‘here is gra | danger that Congress will refuse to appropri this sum, or anything near it. Retreachment ; public expenditures is one of the reasons why Cor gress is reluctant to vote liberal relief funds, . another and more creditable reason is the fear th much of the relief given will be diverted, direc ctl or indirectly, to the furthering of military entel prises. The testimony of General Bliss that th Poles are holding a line from 280 to 380 kil meters east of the boundaries fixed by the Peae Conference, thus in effect inviting attack from tl Russians, dampened considerably the ardor 0 those Congressmen who favored relief for Polan General Bliss proposed that if we gave the Pole food we should require France and England 1 give them. arms; but neither was that proposal r assuring. The way out was indicated by the pr posal of Representative Green, that as a conditi of relief for Poland, the Poles should retire with their proper boundaries. | Poland Exhausted——Peace Comill (The New Republic of March 3rd, 1920) : It is as certain as any future political event ¢ be that the Allied nations will very soon negotia formal peace with Soviet Russia. .... As for | United States, it will, of course, troop obedien along well in the rear of its European associa . Peace with Russia is coming... .. The a ul nile and the situation of ‘Poland is the i immedi : fact which renders the signing of a general p inevitable. That country occupied the key post in the plans of the anti-Soviet French polit strategists. ‘The Poles were to supply the garri of the most vulnerable part of the great a Wall which French statesmen wished to bt around the Russian Revolution. In order to ca out this policy Poland has since the arm is wasted her resources, impoverished. her people, indefinitely delayed her domestic recuperation, she has now come to the end of her tether. f a mo . ea

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Fe Me ee, OT are pee pound tes pork, ser eR Cy cei ET qa k nee " gust 4, 1920 q The Bandwagon ) - EprIroRIAL By Dalisy ASHFORD. ( (The New York Evening Sun, July 20th) : “Those io have expected to sce in Senator Harding a nice tame who would play dignity and let his party do the ghting, are having the surprise of their lives. Republicans e correspondingly elated. There is no lack of dignity, it there is also plenty of punch. Marion is becoming a: mter of radiation of ideas and live wires run from it to all : of the country, shooting sparks of high intelligence id public spirit.” idida’ SAVING THE COUNTRY FROM THE Reps. “Why did you resign as Mayor of Seattle?” “Because of poverty, neuritis and dire need,” Hanson at was your salary as Mayor?” “Seventy-five hundred a year.” “What have you been doing since then?” “T’ve been lecturing on Americanism.” He added that e got $300 each for the first twenty lectures, and that so it he had received about $35,000. —New York World. a i. ' Lier tue Russian BLOCKADE ON Forps. Z: to the Church there is no factor in American life it does so much for the morals of the public as does the tomobile,”’ in the opinion of E. C. Stokes, ex-Governor [New Jersey and now president of a bank. ‘““The auto- 0 bile is of immense value to the nation as a promoter of € spirit of contentment and as an effective suppressor of s spirit of unrest. No owner of an automobile, even jough it be a pleasure car, who is able to enjoy its use for s family and friends, is likely to become a Bolshevist or Communist. He favors the continuation of things as they ¢ because he has a means of happiness in his own pos- ssion, and therefore is against any upheaval of the present cial order.”—From an interview in the New York Pri- . a 0 “4 _ Tue Court or ALLEGHENY COUNTY. “Tt is to be observed that the ordinance does not prohibit = public meetings, etc. On the contrary, it pro- les that the Mayor shall issue a permit therefor, unless tal to public interests, and of that the City of iquesne acting through and by him, is the judge. It is the cause of organized labor to which the Mayor ob- 8; it is the open discussion of such a subject. He cannot use a permit because he does not approve of the subject, t the open discussion of the subject presents to him an irely different question.”—(Commonwealth Docket, £477, 1920.) trim : Tue GRAND OLtp PARTY. We talked over the cam-} “Senator Harding has his mM generally and the issues} own views and I have mine; the country. I am|but we find that in the fun- y glad to find that we|damentals of this situation eC > over the general situa-} we are in substantial agree- d the issues.” ment.” Nichole Longworth. | Py. ail > —Raymond Robins. % ‘3 ie THE NEW REPUBLIC 283 : The Bandwagon MARION MODEL 1920 ComMMITTAL. # Our first committal is the restoration of representative popular government, under the Constitution, through the agency of the Republican Party. \ Avomrnc CHAos. Speaking our sympathies, uttering the conscience of all the people, mindful of our right to dwell amid the geod fortunes of rational, conscience-impelled advancement, we hold the majesty of righteous government with liberty under the law to be our avoidance of chaos and we call upon every citizen of the Republic to hold fast to that which made us what we are, and we will have orderly govern- ment safeguard the onward march to all we ought to be. REREVEALMENT. Appraising preserved nationality as the first essential to the continued progress of the Republic, there is linked with it the supreme necessity of the restoration—let us say the re-revealment-—of the Constitution, and our reconstruction as an industrial nation. Vox Populti. One may readily sense the conscience of our America. I am sure I understand the purpose of the dominant group of the Senate. MAKING It PeRrectty PLAIN. If men call for more specific details I remind them that moral committals are broad and all inclusive, and we are contemplating peoples in the concord of humanity’s ad- vancement. From our own viewpoint the program is spe- cifically American, and we mean to be Americans first to all the world. Q. E. D. It need not be discussed now what motives plunged the world into war, it need not be inquired whether we asked the sons of the Republic to defend our national rights, as I believe we did, or to purge the Old World of the ac- cumulated ills of rivalry and greed, the sacrifices will be in vain if we cannot acclaim a new order, with added security to civilization and peace maintained. TAKE Your CHOICE. I can hear in the call of conscience an insistent voice for the largely reduced armaments throughout the world, with attending reduction of burdens upon peace-loving humanity. We wish to give of American influence and example; we must give of American leadership to that invaluable accom- plishment. * * * * I believe in a great merchant marine—I would have this Republic the leading maritime nation of the world. ) I believe in a navy ample to protect it and able to assure us dependable defense. Tue REAL SOLUTION. I decline to recognize any conflict of interest among se participants in industry. |

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THE NEW The Great Steel Strike The Great Steel Strike, by William Z. Foster. York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc. R. FOSTER’S book is an exceedingly valuable con- tribution to our scant body of authentic documents on the labor movement. In his introduction to the volume Mr. John Fitch says that “it sets forth as no other book has, and as no other writer could, the need of the workers in this great basic industry for organization and the ex- treme difficulty of achieving this essential right.” ‘This the volume does. But it does more than this. It gives the layman, who is perpetually bewildered by his remoteness from the inner trade union councils, a unique opportunity to watch labor leaders at work, to follow a great organiz- ing campaign from its inception, to get a first hand im- pression of the methods, strategy, strength and weaknesses _of organized labor in America. | 7 It is, of course, an ex parte document. But it is candidly ex parte,—a swift, vivid, illuminating narrative of one of organized labor’s greatest “battles” by the officer in imme- diate command. If, now, we could have Mr. Gary’s story of the strike, told with equal candor, we should be on the highway to enlightenment about a situation that before the strike was a quiescent volcano and is almost certain to be a fresh source of harassment and national peril. For no one who reads Mr. Foster’s book will take lightly his prophecy that “when. the opportune time comes, which will be but shortly, the next big drive will be on—The great steel strike of 1919 will seem only a preliminary skirmish when compared with the tremendous battles that are bound to come, unless the enslaved steel workers are set free.” ‘The ability of the trade unions to mobilize almost four hundred thousand men in an industry in which every precaution had been taken by the. employers to make a strike impossible, demonstrates a vitality in their propaganda and their leadership which no single defeat, however momenta- rily crushing, can destroy. The anti-union policy of the steel industry, if consistently maintained, -is practically certain to provoke another strike. What is the public, what are the public authorities doing to avert the threatened disaster? Some readers will turn to Mr. Foster’s book to satisfy their curiosity about the personality and opinions of the man. So,far as the author can aid them, they will be satis- fied. In his concluding chapters, Mr. Foster gives a clear and convincing exposition of the philosophy of the labor movement as he sees it. ‘“ ‘A fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,’ ‘The interests of capital and labor are identical,’— They are for foreign consumption. ‘The fact that those who utter them may believe what they say does not change _ the situation a particle—The trade unions will not become 284 N ew anti-capitalistic through the conversion of their members to’ a certain point of view or by the adoption of certain pre- ambles; they are that by their very make-up and methods.” And again: “In England the turning point came ten years ago when she felt the great wave of sentiment for revolu- tionary unionism then sweeping the world. ‘The question was, whether this movement should realize its aims through the old unions or by starting new ones. ‘The existing unions were notoriously conservative. Several of our lead- ing radicals had said they were even more hopeless than our own organizations and strongly urged the formation of an English I. W. W. But, fortunately, Tom Mann and his colleagues, with a deeper knowledge of trade unionism, were able to forestall this movement and to direct the gation and publicity at least equal to those of the tional and adequate labor policy by our public authouil 1 ; REPUBLIC August 419 strong stream of propieisive thought and energy into ¢ old unions. ‘The result was magical. Within two yea the great and successful strikes of the transport worker railroaders and miners had occurred, and the renaissance : the English labor movement was sadughcs ¥ : Some readers will turn to the book in search of a thrill They will be satisfied if they. are interested in an absorb : story well told. They will be disappointed only if ‘he are looking for evidence of a ‘“‘red conspiracy.” The ih was typically American conducted for the most pare® typically American leaders. Those readers who turn to the book for evidences of enlightened capacity on the part of public officials, or fe traces of an enlightened labor policy on the part of loca state or federal authorities will be both disappointed an distressed. Here was an industrial struggle involving m lions, directly and indirectly, a struggle that for mar months unsettled one of the most basic of basic industries and yet the only serious attempi at federal intervention we the President’s abortive first Industrial Conference. Fee eral troops were mobilized in Gary, Indiana; state troor in Pennsylvania and New York. All the strike centre swarmed with federal and state detectives and_ privat under-cover men. But as for ‘any serious attempt to ge the facts at issue before the public or to devise a policy th might avert a repetition of the disaster in the future, thei was no trace. Our domestic household was permitted 1 become the scene of a ruinous struggle, while the g - public stood helplessly by. The helpless ineptitude of th public, although never explicitly mentioned, is the mo impressive fact reflected in Mr. Foster’s pages. 4 The steel industry is in a condition not unlike that! c the railroads after the great Pullman strike in the decade of the last century,—a condition even more closel analogous, perhaps, to that of the coal industry before th appointment of the Roosevelt Commission which settle the great coal strike of 1902 and brought peace to the cos fields that lasted a generation. ‘The federal administratio faced in 1919 an opportunity similar to that which Pres dent Roosevelt so effectively capitalized in the public it terest. On both the employers’ and the workers’ side, ¢ type of man was much the same; the difficulties in the wi of a satisfactory adjustment were equally great in the cases. What Roosevelt succeeded in doing, President V1 son and his administration failed to do. The steel strike not settled. Its issues are not dead. To protect the nati¢ against a more destructive conflict than that of 1919, : need a federal commission to supervise our basic industri with powers equal to those of the Interstate Commer Commission over the railroads,—or with powers of inves Commission of 1902. q Mr. Foster’s book will be read ei interest by ev student of the labor movement. It is an historical dal ment of real importance. It should be widely read by lab leaders for the significant lessons the record of the i contains for them. But it should be read and consider especially by every American citizen who believes that y in America must find some solution for our industrial pr blem other than force. For unless an enlightened p b opinion supervenes and insists upon the adoption of a Mr. Foster’s prophecy of greater battles to come will u doubtedly be fulfilled. In that case, the settlement of t issues that caused the strike will attend the arbitrame of force. R. W. B.

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wee THE NEW er ta ' i ne ss. ist 4, 1920 | Lord Fisher Le ories and Records, by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord er. New York: George H. Doran Co. have the clearest recollection of the incident .... » You took us to the rose garden... . You linked army through my wife’s and the other through mine, walked us round and round the paths and it was King thus that you made the extraordinary prophecy ] he war will come in 1914 and Jellicoe will command Grand Fleet.’” “Last night I dined with Lord ; g in detail the German submarine campaign of 1917. is the most amazing thing I have ever read; not one er only, but several. Also some astonishing remarks yours about generals who ought to man the War Of- in case of war. All men who have come to the top re your nominees. General Plumer (whom few people en about) you picked out for Quartermaster General, h this remark: ‘Every vote against Plumer is a vote t paper boots and insufficient shells’; Priceless, le thing! Neck-busy though I am, I have come to e office early to pay this tribute of my undying admira- n, and to beg you to get hold of these astounding docu- ents for your Memoirs.” ‘These are the written words, dressed to Lord Fisher, of the secretary to the War bi et, the Prime Minister’s right hand man, Sir Maur- ' Hankey. The interest of this, and ‘much more of the same defin- sort, goes quite beyond Britain, navy, history; it goes aight to the roots of that neglected, overgrown, un- tceived subject, practical logic, the logic of achievement, way to control life and affairs. People say or feel, jfe is too much for us. We live in a chaos. Who can er a life? Who can steer a state?” ‘They have some- ng to learn of Fisher. Our perfect freedom from any finite education in practical logic is shown by the com- ent that such a reference to him provokes: ‘But he was ‘Hun’! So ‘ruthless, relentless, remorseless!’ Essential- Re fighter !” As if we could not admire and learn from ; brain-grip irrespective of his character. Here is the old ‘of the human race, blundering into misery: “We will it learn from you because we do not like you.” ‘The be- ni ing of logic is to pry apart distinct ideas—such as arning and liking. We need the sword that flashes in h Shaving of Shagpat, “the sword that severs the oughts.” (Incidentally, to call Lord Fisher cruel and id is a complete misreading. It is merely that he did t talk about tenderness when he was talking about how win a battle.) We can learn how he worked although Was a genius. nt directness. ‘That at least was the quality of Lord her. He went straight to the point, and he had the rage ‘of his arithmetic. His propheci were not “in- ition’ > but calculation. The part this man has played in our time is worth alling. The navy that protected Britain and held : seas during the war was his creation. By blockading ¢ German powers it rendered possible the victory by d. When in 1904 he “turned the ‘navy inside out,” t a hundred and sixty ships on the scrap-heap, and quiet- “concentrated the British fleet in the North Sea that is battleground might be its drill-ground,” the naval thorities were against him: it was a bitter fight. He mn by carrying his appeal straight to the highest quarters c | maintaining it undiscourageably there. His reforms er. He showed me letters of yours dated 1904, de-- the Genius, said Walt Whitman, is 99 per REPUBLIC 285 were innumerable and deep-reaching. Yet he never had his way in all details. When in the first autumn of the war he sent battle-cruisers (his own creation) to “gobble up von Spee” at the Falkland Islands, with immeasurabiw results, all were against him,—even Jellicoe. His view of the whole naval situation during the war was simple and vigorous. Britain did not command the seas when she did not command the Baltic. He had a matured plan in 1914 to send six hundred and twelve vessels to the Baltic and land a Russian army on the Pomeranian coast within ninety miles of Berlin. “We can get into the Baltic whenever we like to do so. I guarantee it.” The plan had the support of Mr. Churchill, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Asquith. Accordingly Lord Fisher opposed the naval expedition to the Dardanelles; why cut at the enemy’s toe when you can strike at his heart? More- over, “Never fight a fort.” And he had an intimate ac- quaintance with the Dardanelles. With the Baltic plan was to be continued a joint operation (tavored by Lord French) by sea and land along the Belgian coast. This would have secured the Belgian submarine bases to Eng- land and averted the submarine menace which in 1917, as we now know, caused England to believe the war lost. The war would have been over in 1915. Such is the judgment of the most. unerring war-prophet of our time. The opposition of Kitchener and certain French authori- ties prevented. To the very end Lord Fisher deemed the Baltic project, in one form or another, feasible and the merely defensive attitude of the British navy (against which he cites Mahan’s principles) weak and demoral- izing. Hold out this book before high moralists or tender- hearted idealists and, they show a disposition to turn away with distaste. What had he to do with them? A fire-eater, a tiger ;—and for the rest a mere naval special- ist. In this they show how primitive our education yet re- mains. He is of the highest interest to morality and ideal- ism because he got things done, because it is the business of ° morality to get things done, to control events, to bring good out of them, to produce welfare “My dear,” says the man of action in the play, * ‘you are the incarnation of morality. Your conscience is clear and your duty done when you have called everybody names.” The morality of the fu- ture is to be made of sterner stuff. It will not be solely intent on having the right feelings, doing what is expected, and calling the right names. It will be intent on getting the right results. It will therefore give intensest study to the question, How? It will see that good works re- quire good workmanship. Its idealism will demand. real- ism, for you cannot make things what they ought to be without seeing what they are. It will therefore be interest- ed in John Fisher, and in anyone else who weds supreme will to absolute common sense. It will also be critically interested in the backward officialism that obstructed him. Morality has simply to open a new chapter, the conscience of the mind; because it is the mind alone that can trans- late “the best will in the world” into the best deeds. For instance, if it is really true, as the indications tell us, that the war could in all likelihood, by certain methods, have been concluded in 1915, then the failure to focus intel- ligence upon getting this done is what the morals of the _ future will regard as-a typical crime, measuring its mag- nitude by the immensity of the evil produced. Lord Fisher’s mental method was of the simplest. What is the end in view? Give it precedence. What are the means? Which means does experimental test pronounce .

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286 to be the best? We all know this as well as he did. The difference is that pag with stubborn — and clear- ness, has enacted it. These volumes are more than likely to ened not only the moral and idealistic, but the fastidious, amazing them by what seems the egotism, whimsical extravagance, ram- bling waywardness, typographical caprices, with which it bristles. The fastidious will be simply misreading the book. The author rambled because he resolved to pour out the books rapidly to a shorthand-writer just as if he were chatting with a friend. Ordered exposition, of which he was a master, was not required nor in his plan. He had never been “an author” and did not propose to set up for one then. His directness and brevity never fail him, every paragraph is charged with interest, and the reader’s mind easily gathers up and puts in place the material. The originalities in printing are devices of this fertile inventor ta make truths go home and lodge. They are the result of a lifelong struggle with smooth truth-shedding minds. As for the unabashed registration of the facts of his own achievement, they are also the result of a lifelong struggle and of the principle, Show me your facts. The biography of Lard Fisher without these facts would have been a hollow absurdity. He follows the frank and naive example of his worshipped model, Nelson. Whatever we -may have to say on certain points of taste, no other or more reserved author could have brought together the material that here illumines the naval history of the last decades. No other could have taught the same lesson to the existing British navy. The traditional bluff sailor, the jolly tar, the wit and raconteur are in him but the surface; but they are an entertaining surface. One can see what must have been the personal fascination of the man. “‘Asses,”’ “fools,” and “idiots” figure freely, but underneath the breezy exuberance of his vocabulary is the trained and tried discretion of a responsible official. He names living men abundantly for praise, gratitude, and affection, but the asses and the idiots remain strictly anonymous. It is probable that history will help itself to some of his pic-: tures of King Edward, and other noted figures. In spite of eccentricity we ies to say of his writing as of his lifework, vivida vis animi pervicit. D. S. M. A New Novelist Mountain, by Clement Wood. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. HIS is an uncommonly fine bit of work, for a first novel. In spite of the author’s being a poet, the purely descriptive passages have little evocative glamor; they are written rather in the crisp and accelerated idiom of the younger generation which acts as if it were a trifle ashamed in becoming anthropomorphic towards nature. Nor does the background of the story—the physical back- ground, that is—blend with the characters simply or set them off dramatically. To be sure, Mr. Wood makes a first-rate attempt to accomplish the latter, but in the re- viewer's opinion he does not quite succeed, although in a sense the fault is not his but the section of life he has chosen to describe. He tries to make his characters rooted to the soil, yet it is significant that his own title for the last part of his book is The Scattering. The Southern mining town he has selected for his locale has only the attraction of its vivid industrialism; it pulls people to THE NEW REPUBLIC _ here is perhaps insoluble. panorama of the essence of the modern industrial ¢ : . another, throughout this America of 1920. If the bo - notable. a ies Sele bh st Joie DEN eG SIA ORE Eb Gil rt al 4, U * ‘ » wn ‘ ‘ \J eee uy _' | 4 . afte ra , , ‘ ay be ol ‘ vi "i *} ’ August 4, 1 and throws them away, like sucked oranges, when its pu poses have been accomplished; there is no native beau t or long stee ing in traditions to make it pieces tractive in’ a human sense. ‘The author’s commend ab attempt to give his characters somethin, of the tang a native earthiness of a Hardy peasant runs up against ¢ stone-wall fact of the essential frivolity of contempe al American industrialism—the ne’er-do-well and rc ‘. character of those who are its chief victims. His problet On the other hand, turning | his character studies his achievement is only halting a1 fragmentary. Some of the Negro men and women, th union leaders and company thugs, are admirably dra 7 The working class type is a real one, not a caricatt Yet the chief protagonists, Pelham Judson in partict do not come into the reader’s experience with that unert finality which is always the mark of sure imag iN creation. ‘They are not inconsistent; they are plausibie they are unfailingly interesting. But they are me sketches, not realities. 3 Nevertheless, in spite of all these reservations, Mounta is a first-rate novel. Its excellence lies in a characterist that is not without significance, its balance and restraint It is finely ordered and arranged; there is true econon of means. Not once does the author drift into mentality or cant. His employment of the new Freud a insights in delineating character, although he is thorough! sophisticated here, is at no time obtrusive or exaggerate Localized in this small uncharming Southern iron cit with all its industrial and cultural backwardness and th insistent horror of its unsolved race problem unflinching pictured, Mr. Woods succeeds in giving an even objectiy eT struggle as it occurs, with local variations of one kind ¢ accomplished nothing more, this alone would make Our novels of the industrial struggle are 1 often ranting sentimentalism, with that slightly deliquesee evangelical odor that emanates from our popular magazine or mere partisan propaganda disguised as fiction. our writers become interested enough in our industrial ai economic problems to take them seriously, they sual become infected with the current moralism, and the tf sulting product not seldom is like apotheosized muc raking. It is greatly to this author’s credit that he is bo interested seriously in these problems and at the same tif able to keep that interest under some kind of artistic co trol. He is another example of the rapprochement whi is going on so rapidly today between the artist and t labor movement, a rapprochement which, perhaps, has : roots in a common revolt against artificial standards whether academic or wage or factory—for a real cxDe es si of the instinct of workmanship. “4 ‘This is a definite achievement, but it is only a step, 8 may legitimately hope from Mountain, in an a is | evolution. It is a real artistic triumph to have tra the almost inevitable partisanship of the economic strugg But although the result may be a good novel, that 1 is 1 enough to make the result a great novel. The drama nature versus man, the drama of the contemporary cle of industrial forces, are after all subsidiary to the e preoccupation of the novelist, the drama of human h acter itself. Mr. Wood has to learn to be hie merely, so to speak, to objective reality but to subje reality as well. It is only when he has so learned he can hope to transcend imaginatively this wide obj ect Be

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liam THE NEW EDUCATIONAL “Ge Baldwin School a School for Girls. re paration for Bryn Mawr, Mount Holyoke, Smith, assar and Wellesley colleges. Also a strong gen- al course. Within 27 years 291 students have at ed Bryn Mawr College. Fireproof stone build- ‘ Abundant outdoor life and athletics. _ ELIZABETH FORREST JOHNSON, A.B., Bryn Mawr, Penna. Head of the School. HILLSIDE = 45 miles from New York. Preparation for compre- hensive college examinations. Cultural Courses. ousehold Science, including actual practice in a home. Homestead and, Lodge. Schoolhouse and mnasium. Study of the individual girl. Organized. Athletics. ) Margaret A. Brendlinger, A.B., Vassar Vida Hunt Francis, B.A., Smith, Principals Inatitufe of Mustcal Art of the Cify uf New York Frank Damrosch, Director. Provides comprehensive Be usical education in all branches. Endowed. En- trance examinations beginning September 27th. Address Secretary, 120 Claremont Ave., N. Y. City hate THE MARY C. WHEELER [ TOWN AND COUNTRY SCHOOL A town school offering opportunities for country Ilife and sports. PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND. BOB-WHITE ASHLAND, MASS. Camp for boys ane girls under fourteen. and camp life. trips. Horses a po. es for riding and driving. Mts. S. B. Hayes. (\ 160 acres. ‘MASSAC SETTS, Cambritge, 48 Qumey Street, q Theological School 1886. Three eames course, College preparation desired. =he ficulum in inetudes danger study of the writir of Bmanuel borg and spiritual interpretation of the Scripture. Corres- lence courses. Catalog, WILLIAM LL. WORCESTER, Pres’t. FARM DURING YOUR VACATION AKE THE SUMMER AGRICULTURAL COURSE AT [THE NATIONAL FARM SCHOOL, BUCKS COUNTY, PA. 3 _ TUITION FREE—BOARD $15 A WEEK. APPLY INTERCOLLEGIATE ZIONIST ASSOCIATION, | 55 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY: REPUBLIC Farm | rts, swimming, hikes and camping | - EDUCATIONAL The Pennsylvania School for Social Service in cooperation with THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR ORGANIZING CHARITY and THE SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL OFFERS A FEW FELLOWSHIPS TO WELL QUALIFIED COLLEGE GRADUATES DE- SIRING TO TRAIN IN. FAMILY OR MEDICAL SOCIAL WORK. For particulars apply to 7 | Frank D. Watson, Director 1302 Pine St. Philadelphia / TRAINING IN Family Work — Child Welfare : Educational and Vocational Guidance Soctal Work in Hospitals Psychiatric Social Work Community Work Social Investigation Public Health Nursing Civic Research Employment Management For boys and girls from 2 to 11 years The aim of the school is to prepare each child for a complete life, both as an individual and as a member of the social group. All-day activities make best use of advantages of city life. Hot lunches served, Afternoon . trips in connection with school work. Athletic field; swimming; large roof playground; carpentry shop; auditorium for music and dancing, outdoor nature study; art and Indian craft work. Particular atten- tion to spoken French and Science. Write for booklet. MARGARET NAUMBURG, Director 32-34 W. 68th Street New York City | POSITION WANTED as Employment Manager; Gradu- ate Harvard nae School, Congregational Minis- ter; Chaplain VU. Army; Advisor U. S. Federal Board Vocational Eaucations State Secretary impor- tant Western State in Interchurch Cooperation. Athletic, trained in psycholo four years’ experi- ence as business manager; thivty-fi five years of age. Perfect health, established character, Address Box 59, New Republic, 42! W. 2Ist St., New York City. | _A REQUEST FOR CHANGE OF ADDRESS must reach us at least 2 weeks before the date of the issue with which it is to take effect. Duplicate copies cannot be sent to replace those undelivered thraugh failure to send this advance notice. Be sure to give your old address as well as the new one. 287

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Sat + ‘THE NEW cece d: Perhaps, the final test of the great ngialiel is his ability to be detached towards those emotions -and ex- periences which cannot be revealed through outer observ- ation but only through introspection. Here Mr. Wood has made but a beginning. One can notice the firmness of his character sketches when he is dealing with the Negroes and the union leaders—people whom Mr. Wood probably has observed rather than whose life he can have shared. ‘Through a number of minor characters can be felt the author’s note of confident objectivity. And as is so often true of young men writers—it is part of the same fact of outside observation—his women folk are first-rate; the mother, Jane Lauderdale, the wife, even the almost sensually flippant Louise. But when he comes to Pelham Judson himself (in whom, inevitably, there must be a share of autobiographical recollection), the chief figure of the book, the sureness of touch almost vanishes. He labors very hard to make Pelham a real person, real with all the angular irregularity of life. Pelham grows up on the mountain, the son of the successful exploiter of its resources in iron; goes to Yale and absorbs the conventional social ideals (including an exploit as a strikebreaker) ; in love with his mother—Freud really has much to feel responsible for—tleads an almost preposterously chaste life, which he compensates for after his marriage to Jane by a delayed affair with Louise; returning to Adamsville after gradu- ation, becomes converted to the cause of labor and socialism and is one of the leaders in the long drawn-out strike in the mines. The result of the conversion is, of course, permanent estrangement from his father and mother, the former the leader of the stand-pat forces. ‘The depiction of this strike, in fact, is as good as we have had in current American fiction, one’s recollection of it is vivid and clear. But Pelham himself does not somehow stand out from it sharply as a character. It is as if the author were pro- jecting himself imaginatively into the situation and making shrewd guesses (for it is a plausible sketch) as to what reactions would normally be felt by a person of Pelham’s type. It is not someone with a personality of his own whom the author is recording in a particular situation. Of course, this is demanding a very great deal from any novelist. But in Mountain Mr. Wood has shown himself sufficient of an artist to make that final demand relevant. H. S. 288 Spanish-American Literature Studies in Spanish-A merican Literature, by Isaac Gold- berg, Ph. D., with an introduction by Prof. J. D. M. Ford. New York: Brentano’s. HE title of Dr. Goldberg’s work gives no just idea of its content. but a unified study of the rise and flowering of the Modernista school in Spanish-American literature. ‘The names with which it deals, in fact the field itself, will sound strangely unfamiliar to North American ears. Few of us were aware that our Southern neighbors had been busy these last fifty years in producing a literature, intimately connected with the literature of the continent, which in many ways, and particularly in the field of poetry, surpassed the best that we could offer. After an opening chapter, in which he studies at length the French background and the work of the several pre- cursors of the new school, the author analyses in detail the significance of some of its typical figures: Rubén Dario, € a se OL Te ee te ls hee > eee Nil | Pts * ieee strongly. Blanco-Fombona is certainly the least attract? This is no rambling series of essays p Sg sa 8 is a eh ea ss. ae ae x Be a ugust 44 José Rariaue Rodéd, José Safitee Chasis José I ML Eguren, and Rufino Blanco-Fombona. Of these, the fi two died within the last five years; the others are st actively productive. And Dr. Goldberg has wily frained from attempting to offer any final judgments. — Of them all, Dario is unquestionably the greatest, poet and prosateur whose exquisite gifts place him . the few great writers of the last half century. Those y have delighted in his creations will readily subscribe 7 the author’s characterization: “He crystallized an ep ‘ he transformed a language; he infused new life into t Castilian muse; he retained his own personality while a sorbing all the currents that appeared during his career. . He belongs net only with the greatest poets that 1a written in the Spanish tongue, but with the masters” universal poesy.” : The Uruguayan essayist and philosopher, Rod6, belon with the intellectuals of the present generation, a a mopolitan figure in the world of thought, whose int pretation of the significance of the individual has been inspiration to his contemporaries. It is difficult to esti na the place of the others. Santos Chocano reveals a kins with the earlier poets of the nineteenth century in Span n America, especially in his ardent patriotism (his ‘ ‘patria is the New World of Spanish speech) and his love ¢ nature, which Dr. Goldberg might have stressed m0 to North Americans. And not at all because of his violet hostility to the United States, but because his sv as buckling style, his lyric indignation, and his cynicism 3 qualities which the northern races hold in slight estee It has plainly been the author’s intention to treat his subject in a sympathetic mood, quite the opposite ¢ Blanco-Fombona’s truculence. ‘The result is that he h given us a picture of this literary movement as seen throug Spanish-American rather than through North Americ eyes. This does not mean that he has merely copied th opinions of Spanish-American critics, though he is famili with their work. Rather he has absorbed and refle te their point of view. He might well have added an estin | of their worth in terms of North American criticism. ~ It is a book of pleasant reading, for Dr. Goldberg's stj is florid and, were it not for a trifle too much effort, wou be brilliant. Moreover, the work is embellished 4 number of excellent translations, most of them by Alice Stone Blackwell, who has done so much to the work of Spanish-American poets to the Americ reader. 4 The chief significance of these studies is, however, the first effort to provide a sound literary criticism of t work of South American writers. In that effort, it |! a high standard, in understanding, in form, and in sf ir and fulfills in no small measure the augury of Profes 3‘ Ford in his brief introduction: “that it will help to bre : down barriers for the maintenance of which there is just excuse of a racial, political, commercial, cultural other nature.” | H. K Contributors VERA Gordon, a graduate of Cambridge Universi fe England, has translated the memoirs of Keren Jy about to be published. 4 Watter Locke is the editor of the Nebraska State Jour- nal. P

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INTRODUCTION VI KOLOBAK 60 vas. Seah pen raat Ra arte PONG ba diss Wis dow iele ah a hse. Gaes Gosh ewieee kes OC Ee OE Fk Sk bid Wkin Ce ele ek ale ele bie T is admitted that a sound public opinion can- not exist without access to the news. -® is today a widespread and a growing doubt whether there exists such an access to the news 4 about contentious‘affairs. ‘This doubt ranges from accusations of unconscious bias to downright charges ‘of corruption, from the belief that the news is col- ored to the belief that the news is poisoned. On so Grave a matter evidence is needed.. The study which follows i is a piece of evidence. It deals with the re- porting of one great event in the recent history of the world. That event is the Russian Revolution from March, 1917, to March, 1920, The analysis covers thirty- -six months and over one thousand is- sues of a daily newspaper. The authors have ex- : ined all news items about Russia in that period 4 the newspaper selected; between three and four thousand items were noted. Little attention was paid to editorials. ; _ The New York Times was selected as the medium through which to study the news, first cause the Times, as great as any newspaper in A erica, and far greater than the majority, has - 2 ana! SE OL gh et He ee pe Sy i oi Sete and Contents | . 1. TO THE JULY OFFENSIVE.................. 4 Twe Views of Russia’s Power...... dataset sine aga 4 | Reputable and Disreputable..................... 5 = . Il, THE PRELUDE’'TO BOLSHEVISM............ 6 PAlGreeMree: | COOCEMISI ass iy Cais Sy cae hs (ae wee wen ee The Quest of a Dictator-Savior..... PER cdot 50s 7 The Bormilov. Rebelien ices ceo og eee bs 8 OU Pe OE PUOTONOEIS 65.2 bing Gaba ch vane ne hes 9 Ill. THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIA............ 10 WV OUIE CRO Dayiets Laat hs se isk 5 ain shies ane ee's eRe During the Parleys at Brest-Litovsk............. 11 | Faith in the Bolsheviks Disappears.............. 13 IV. THE APPEAL FOR INTERVENTION......... 13 RO: SECU WORE. oA AS ad Win bia ee cole phe vga if Ae. LPG MOREE OE TOURER Oss. sv cced Une deb es 15 "PRE Push FOr BOP VERets oleic ess) sis veys 15 V. THE FRONT CHANGES....... Oy Nae ia) ACSA a Pe a 16 Something to: Fight Fors. iiss decease cscs 17 PRO PR sea od Sir wien Ch ahicoe Reed Coe eh awed Saleen 18 Introduction. There | the means for securing news, second, because the a. ee of the N. ews BY WALTER LIPPMANN AND CHARLES MERZ _ THE KOLCHAK OFFENSIVE..........-005. TPR COMCIBINE BORER si ye Seiad tigre eBid o erarats 22 WL CNES ETHIMIDOENE. oe ie ean adhe eee 24 SPIO 8 kis Fiioaiy acho eek bd dae Kee whe 24: Merchant hy 6 eck hoe Sek a hae ee pens 25 The Strategic Withdrawal........ Mile Nene aoeate 26 The End of the Kolchak Myth................ 26 WEE Ess DIU LRO EER hs ans are hs hae web a odin Cane mee 27 Democracy. in. the Ukraine ....630 5006 se eee dens 27 Bee \ Peetiare Faden siiis is 3 sic tuiaece& cos eons alee 28 IX. THE DENIKIN OFFENSIVE...........-.+++: 28 EMG CREME OL TOTS .is sist whic kina opedane ere ene 29 COMORES rn ihie Wau oa Meee bp Bea eR 29 Denikin’a Farthest Nortiiin .b'sf0.6 6.638 ek ee cans 30 DEDMIN Th Retreats ook soe eee co dense oe een ee 31 Meee WOES Eh PRONE eed by scp nse vee sno eae 32 Ae: SOHNE ORCOAVE 6 6s NO A ee ie 32 The: Becond Victory. ioc ue che ikaeekieaee 33 XI.' THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST POLAND...... 34 XII. WHEN INTERVENTION FAILED........... 36 eeevneveveeevveveeveseeeeeeeeeeeee ee % @ eeeeeneeveeveereveoeeeveevrereneree ee ee eee e eee e & makeup of the news in the Times is technically ad- mirable, third, because the Times index is an enormous convenience to any student of contem- porary history, fourth, because the bound volumes are easily accessible, and fifth, because the Times is one of the really great newspapers of the world. The Russian Revolution was selected as the topic, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it has aroused the kind of passion which tests most seriously the objectivity of reporting. | _ The first question, naturally, is what constitutes the test of accuracy? A definitive account of the Russian Revolution does not exist. In all prob- ability it will never exist in this generation. After a hundred years there is no undisputed history of the French Revolution, and scholars are still de- bating the causes and the meaning of the revolt of the Gracchi, the fall of Rome, and even of the American Revolution and the American Civil War. A final history of the Russian Revolution may never be written, and even a tolerably settled account is not conceivable for a long time. It would be foot- less therefore to propose an absolute measurement of news gathered amid such excitement and con- ©

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wigs isa THE NEW fusion. It would be equally vain to accept the ac- count of one set of witnesses in preference to any + other set.’ The “whole truth” about Russia is not to be had, and consequently no attempt is made by the authors to contrast the news accounts with any other account which pretends to be the “real truth” or the “true truth.” A totally different standard of measurement is used here. The reliability of the news is tested in this study by a few definite and decisive happenings about which there is no dispute. Thus there is no dispute that the offensive of the Russian army under Kerensky in July 1917 was a disastrous. failure; no dispute that the Pro- visional Government was overthrown by the Soviet power in November 1917; no dispute that.the Soviets made a separate peace with Germany. at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918; no dispute that the campaigns of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch were a failure; no dispute that the Soviet Govern- ment was still in existence in March 1920, Against such salient facts the daily reports about Russia in this period are measured. The only question asked is whether the reader of the news was given a picture of various phases of the revolution which survived the test of events, or whether he was misled into believing that the outcome of events would be radically different from the actual out- come. | The question of atrocities and of the merits or demerits of the Soviets is not raised. Thus, for example, there was a Red Terror officially pro- claimed by the Soviet Government in the summer of 1918; and apart from the official terror, excesses occurred in many parts of Russia. No attempt is made here to sift the truth of the accounts, to de- termine whether there were exaggerations, or how _ far the White Terror equalled the Red Terror. The attempt is not made because no dependable account is available with which to measure the news reports. There was a round measure of truth in the report of terror and atrocity. For analogous reasons no discussion of the virtues and defects of the Soviet system is attempted. There are no authoritative reports. Able and disinterested ob- servers furnish contradictory evidence out of which no objective criteria emerge. Under ‘these cir- cumstances an accurate report of the Soviet Govern- ment and the Terror is no doubt more than could have been expected from a newspaper. But what might more reasonably have been ex- pected and what was more immediately important for Americans, was to know in the summer of 1917 whether the Russian army would fight, and whether the Provisional Government wouid survive. It was important to know in the winter of 1917-18 wheth- er the Soviet Government would make a separate peace. It was important to know in the spring and early summer of 1918 whether the Russian people REPUBLIC or marching to the military conquest of the world, 4 PY antec indi RS Ue et ate Ate oft TES re eh: es) a ate ke rae na as Ftatiaid VS eee HES) ie oa Sie yt y oat Uta - , ‘ Ps fo aa = Fae OR ye - Sa Basa X 4 a om Wann 4,1 19 20 would support Allied intervention. It was impo ant to know whether the Soviet Government was boun d to collapse soon under Allied pressure. It was im- portant to know whether the White Generals—_~ Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch were, or were not, winning their campaigns. It was important to know | 5 whether Poland was defending herself or invading - Russia. It was important to know the disposition — of the Soviet Government toward peace at the time © of the peace conference. It was important to know whether there was a Red Peril before Allied troops entered Russia, or whether that peril dates from the German surrender. It was important to know whether the Red regime was tottering to its fall” On each one of these questions depended some aspect of policy involving lives, trade, finance, andl national honor. It is important now to know what | was the net effect of the news on these points. | For the reader’s convenience certain tentative — conclusions from the evidence are stated here: q 1. From the overthrow of the Czar to the failure” of the Galician offensive in July 1917. | The difficulties in Russia, and especiallam in the Russian army, are not concealed — from the attentive reader, but the domi- — nant tendency of the captions and the emphasis is so optimistic as to be mis- ~ leading. (See Section I.) q 2. From the military disaster in July 1917 to q the Bolshevik revolution of November. : The difficulties of the regime play a bisa part in the news, but a misleading opti- mism still continues. In this period, the — tendency to seek a solution through a dictator-savior appears in the mistaken — hope placed upon the Kornilov ad- — venture, a hope quickly falsified by his collapse. It may fairly be said that the © . growth of the Bolshevik power from July — to November must have been seriously — underestimated in view of the success of the November coup. (See Section IL.) 9 3. From the Bolshevik revolution to the ratifi- cation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. q This period is on the whole the best in ~ the three years. Different points of view are given, and the emphasis is generally neutral. After the recovery from the shock of the second reyolution, the re= ports are inspired by an eager curiosity — about the diplomatic battle between the ~ Bolsheviks and the enemy. At the height — of this diplomatic battle the news is” handled in a rather uncritically’ pro- Bolshevik fashion, as a result of the optimistic assumption that the Soviets would refuse to make _ peace with Germany. (See Section III.) 7 ‘a Le .,

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i ais es ‘hal 7S lugust 4, 1920 THE NEW 14.F rom the ‘ratification at Brest-Litovsk, which man offensive in March 1918, to the decision for Allied intervention in August 1918. Under the stress of disappointment and danger the tone and quality of the news change radically. Organized propaganda for intervention penetrates the news. This propaganda has two phases. There is a short and intense period in late March and early April, which stops rather sud- denly with the announcement that the President has decided against interven- tion. There is a prolonged and intense period beginning about May which cul- minates in the American approval of in- 7 tervention. (See Section IV.) _ 5. The months immediately following the sign- % ing of the armistice. The Red Peril, which had hitherto played only an insignificant role, now takes precedence in the news from Russia and serves as a new motive for Allied intervention. (See Section V.) 6. The Spring, Summer and Autumn of 1919. Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenitch are heralded as dictator-saviors of Russia; for their campaigns, extravagant claims are made when they are moving for- ward; in retreat there is a steady as- , surance that a better turn is coming. (See Sections VI, VII, VIII, IX and X.) Meantime the world is warned against a Russian invasion of Poland—though Polish troops are as a matter of fact q deep in Russian soil. (See Section XI.) _ 7. The Winter of 1919-20 and the Spring of 1920. - Once more, with the failure of the White ; Armies, the Red Peril reappears. _ The news as a whole is dominated by the hopes of the men who composed the news organization. They began as passionate partisans in a great war ‘in which their own’ country’s future was at stake. ‘Until the armistice they were interested in defeat- ‘ing Germany. They hoped until they could hope “no longer that Russia would fight. When they saw ‘she could not fight, they worked for intervention as part of the war against Germany. When the ‘war with Germany was over, the intervention still existed. They found reasons then for continuing ‘the intervention. The German Peril as the reason for intervention ceased with the armistice; the Red Peril almost immediately afterwards supplanted it. The Red Peril in turn gave place to rejoicing over the hopes of the White Generals. When these lopes died, the Red Peril reappeared. In the large, he news about Russia is a case of seeing not what yas, but what men wished to see. a aa t . mR a ss) P coincided approximately with the Great Ger- REPUBLIC : 3. This deduction is more important, in the opinion of the authors, than any other. The chief censor and the chief propagandist were hope and fear in the minds of reporters and editors. They wanted to win the war; they wanted to ward off bolshevism. ‘These subjective obstacles to the free — pursuit of facts account for the tame submission of enterprising men to the objective censorship and propaganda under which they did their work. For subjective reasons they accepted and believed most of what they were told by the State Department, the so-called. Russian Embassy in Washington, the Russian Information Bureau in New York, the Russian Committee in Paris, and the agents and — adherents of the old regime all over Europe. For the same reason they endured the attention of officials at crucial points like Helsingfors, Omsk, Vladivostok, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London and Paris. For the same reason they accepted reports — of governmentally controlled news services abroad, and of correspondents who were unduly intimate with the various secret services and with members of the old Russian nobility. From the point of view of professional journal- ism the reporting of the Russian Revolution is noth- ing short of a disaster. On the essential questions the net effect was almost always misleading, and misleading news is worse than none at all. Yet on the face of the evidence there is no reason to charge a conspiracy by Americans. They can fairly be charged with boundless credulity, and an untiring readiness to be gulled, and on many occasions with a downright lack of common sense. Whether they were “giving the public what it wants” or creating a public that took what it got, is beside the point. They were performing the supreme duty in a democracy of supplying the in- formation on which public opinion feeds, and they were derelict in that duty. Their motives may have been excellent. They wanted to win the war; they wanted to save the world. They were nervously excited by exciting events. They were baffled by the complexity of affairs, and the obstacles created by war. But whatever the excuses, the apologies, and the extenuation, the fact remains that a great people in a supreme crisis could not secure the minimum of necessary information on a supremely important event. When that truth has burned it- self into men’s consciousness, they will examine the news in regard to other events, and begin a ~ searching inquiry into the sources of public opinion. That is the indispensable preliminary to a funda- mental task of the Twentieth Century: the insur- ance to a free people of such a supply of news that a free government can be successfully administered. In devoting so long a study to the work of a single newspaper the authors have proceeded with- out animus against the Times, and with much ad- miration for its many excellent qualities, They

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OLN oN RAE SoS, ah Re i ele idee Beat rina eae oe cea a ee ee Ba RT i GM RAT ALR OR RU eine VG Lod ib es BON iy ti bMS SAN oe | Mary ead ene TP oe Li MH a uit Reh ca Ae Nd ray Sh arts a1 ¢ Kiss tk i ay 4 A ey . : 1 toad aan. *y fk @ < . : ys 4 THE NEW. REPUBLIC trust that the readers of this report, among them the proprietors and editors of the ‘“Times,” will not regard it as an “exposure” of the Times, but as a piece of inductive evidence on the problem of the news. The authors do not wish to imply, because honestly they do not believe, that the less conservative press is necessarily more reliable. As _ editors of a liberal weekly journal they know from _ experience that there are large glass windows in _ their, own house, and they are keenly aware of the fact that reliability is harder to attain in the haste of a daily newspaper than in the greater delibera- tion of a periodical. If, consequently, nothing were at stake but the question of praise and blame, if To the July Offensive The Russian Revdludon occurred during the war with Germany. It was an event that affected immediately and directly the lives,. the fortunes, and the dearest hopes of all nations engaged in the war. The Revolution began during the second week of March in the year 1917. This date .is highly significant. It is about six weeks after the German Government had announced unlimited sub- marine war, and six weeks after the rupture of diplomatic relations by America. The Allies were confronted at the same moment by the uncertainty as to what Russia and what the United States would do. The United States was in the act of making up its mind to begin to fight. The question which dominated all the news out of Russia was whether the Russians would continue to fight. Thus, the circumstances of the Revolution were not such as to invite impartial inquiry. _What the reader of newspapers was chiefly concerned about was the fighting power of Russia on the great east- ern front. He could hardly have expected a cur- rent history of so vast a revolution. He did ex- pect, and he had reason to demand, reliable reports about the morale and strength of Russia’s armies. For on those reports he had to arrive at judgments of supreme practical importance. The reliability of the news for the first four months can fairly be measured by this one con- crete test: did it give a tolerably true account of Russia’s military strength? Did the news lead to correct or incorrect expectations? | The actual military power of Russia was. tested against Germany just once. In July 1917, about three and a half months after the Revolution, the army attacked on a wide front in Galicia. After a small initial success the offensive collapsed, the Germans attacked and pierced the Russian front; there were mutinies followed by a rout. The of- greater is at issue, for the reliability of the news — followed for several months. i Aue 4, 1920 oe % nothing were to be accomplished beyond a score in — the duel between liberal and conservative, then this 4 report would not have been made. Something much ~ is the premise on which democracy proceeds. . A great newspaper is a public service me stitution. It occupies a position in public life fully as important as the school system or the church — or the organs of government. It is entitled to — criticism, and subject to criticism, as they are. The value of such criticism is directly proportionate to the steadiness with which the ultimate end of a better news system is clearly and dispassion, aaa kept in mind. 2 3 ee eeny ©, . nk ain - a ~ — bos Pus DS ie are (we) ae fcial Russian Communiqué (per British Admialey | per Wireless Press, Petrograd, July 22) said of the disaster: “This is the result of the instabil- — ity of our troops, disregard for military orders, q and the propaganda of the Maximalists.”” What had the news for the weeks from March to July — been? ‘ i Two Views of Russia’s Power | 7 The Times of March 16 published the report — of the successful revolution. ‘Together with ad- | mirably full accounts of events in Petrograd, there — began a series of semi-editorial news dispatches. — Thus (special cable to the New York Times, Lon- don, March 16): . tien = eel ge in Serer ee ae Se: “ : = “As the situation is os ait to The New York a Times correspondent, the revolution simply means [italics ours] that German sympathizers within the. Russian Government have been overthrown, and that no chance remains for a separate peace being secretly a arranged with Germany. This, it is felt, is the real basis of the revolution. . . .” 4 Such was the official public British theory. In the ; f same issue Mr. Bonar Law (unidentified dispatch ~ from London, March 15*) was quoted as saying that the revolution was due to Russia’s pura pose to fight the war out. This was, of course, — not a statement of fact, but the expression of a wish. 3 f° This wish was father to much of the news which — Concurrently, there were, however, other interpretations of the Revolu- tion. On March 16 the Times published, of ¥A dispatch is called ‘‘unidentified” when it has no oer reference to source beyand place of origin and date. That — is, the carrying agent is not named. : ae

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y, August 4, 1920 ig * “course obscurely, an interview with Leon Trotzky: CALLS PEOPLE WAR WEARY “bur LEO TROTZKY SAYS THEY DO NOT WANT SEPA- a RATE PEACE Leo Trotzky, a Russian revolutionist now in America, said last night in the office of the Novy Mir... .. that the committee which has taken the _ place of the deposed Ministry in Russia did not rep- _ resent the interests or the aims of the revolutionists, _ that it would probably be short lived, and step down in favor of men who would be more sure to carry for- ward the democratization of Russia .... That the -. cause of the revolution was the unrest of the mass _ of the people who were tired of war and that the ' real object .... was to end war... . throughout _ Europe. They do not favor Germany... . but wish to stop fighting.” q Two days later, issue of March 18 (Berlin March 17, by wireless to the New York Times 4 via Tuckerton, N. J.) the Times printed a report ' saying that the general opinion in Berlin was that B the new government could not last long and that the lower classes were wishing for peace at any " price. _ There were thus two alternative theories: one _ the official Allied theory that Russia would fight; - the other, the theory of an unknown Russian revo- " lutionist in New York and of “general opinion in Berlin” that Russia would not fight. The bulk of a: ‘ " official theory. j Three and a half months elapsed to the offensive of July. The reader had by that time perused 107 issues of his paper, practically q all of them containing news. of the Rus- ‘sian Revolution. He had received hints of Bprofound economic disorder, of demoralization in the army, and of confused dissatisfaction with ‘the Allies. He was in a position to guess that the striking power of Russia was not great, if he read all the obscurely placed dispatches, read between dined to let his hopes govern his judgment. But if he read casually, and chiefly the captions Band emphasized news, the impression of hopeful- “ness, or at least of whistling to keep up hope, would “have been strong. Captions or prominent news on the following days all of them stated or implied a Russian will to fight. E March 16’, 19, 20, 21,23, 27, 28; 295 30°—9 issues, II items. the news which followed appeared to sustain the ‘the lines of the other dispatches, and sternly de- scure and the unpleasant. q B April 2) 10, 12,14; 18,::197,2207, 22,22, 247, 28, 29, 307—13 issues, 17 items. m | ; | ’ M 2 rey 73) eG OS FOS Tas Fh x8) ro 20; 217, | 23, 25, 287, 297, 31—16 issues, 19 items. THE NEW REPUBLIC 5 2, 3, 4°, 5, 6%, 7, 87, 9, II, 13%, 15, 16, 17, 187, 19, 217, 29, 23, 247, 297, ee 287, 29, 30°—24 issues, 35 items. Total 62 issues, 82 items. Thus oftener than every other day for the whole period the reader was assured that Russia would June fight, or that the Russian army was strong, or that — the difficulties were being surmounted. Ordeal by battle proved all these assurances to be false. Was a darker picture ever suggested? It was. In 49 different issues of the Times there were per- haps 66 items of pessimistic character. Numer- ically this seems to strike a tolerably even balance: Optimistic: 62 issues, 82 items. | Pessimistic: 49 issues, 66 items. Reputable and Disreputable But closer examination of what has been included under “optimistic” and “pessimistic” reveals a far greater discrepancy than the figures show. ‘Take for example the first day’ s news (March 16). We have called optimistic the unidentified London dispatch (March 15) quoting Mr. Bonar Law that the revolution was due to Russia’s purpose to fight the war out; we have also called optimistic the dispatch from London (March 16) printed on © the first page saying: | “As the situation is explained to The New York Times correspondent, the revolution simply means that German sympathizers within the Russian Gov- ernment have been overthrown... .” Compare these authoritative pronouncements with the “‘pessimistic’”’ item printed at the foot of the fifth column of the fourth page quoting Leo (sic) Trotzky from his New York office as saying that the people wished to stop fighting. Trotzky happened to be right, Mr. Bonar Law and the people who interpreted the Revolution in London to the Times correspondent happened to be dead wrong. But which interpretation was emphasized, and given the authority of the editors? The of- ficial and the optimistic, of course, against the ob- The unsatisfactory view was not suppressed, but it was ignored or played down. This is characteristic of the news of the period we are considering. ‘The values placed upon news items were wrong, wrong by the ultimate test of battle. It is easy to see how this came stiont There was an initial desire, shared by the editors and readers of the Times, to have Russia fight, to se- cure the military assistance of Russia without open- © ing up contentious questions of war aims, to smoth- er pacifist agitation. Conflicting estimates of Rus- sian strength and weakness came to the Times office. One series was optimistic. The other pessimistic. The optimistic series had the right of way. —

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7 6 re THE NEW REPUBLIC - Then, too, the sources of the optimistic reports were such as to commend themselves more readily to the credulity of men who have high respect for prestige. Out of 82 optimistic items approximately _ 49 emanated directly from official sources includ- ing the Provisional Government, the American State Department, Ambassador Francis, the Root mission, etc. The remaining 33 are from sources including 4 Reuter, 1 Harold Williams, 2 Herbert Bailey, 1 Special New York Times, 1 London Times, 5 London Daily Chronicle, 13 unidenti- fied, the rest scattering. _ When there were at least 49 official assurances and thirty odd more from sources of recognized authority in a period of 107 days it is not surpris- ing that the net tone of the news about Russia was optimistic. It is even less surprising when the character of the 66 pessimistic items is examined. If we add together the distinctly unpopular and therefore incredible sources, that is the German, the Bolshevik, the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, and the items tagged and peppered with a epithets, the total is 36. II. Misleading Optimism _ The military weakness of Russia was clear to all observers on the spot after what Kerensky calls the ““T'arnopol disgrace” of July 19.. The condition of the army was explained by the Russian official communiqué (British Admiralty per Wireless Press, Petrograd, July 22); the condition behind the lines was indicated by the abortive Bolshevik rebellion of July 16-18. The most obvious facts no longer justified the complacency which had dominated the news. “Something” had to be done by somebody. There’were, roughly speaking, three parties con- tending for power; the Left led by the Bolsheviks, the center led by Kerensky, and the Right led by someone in the role of a Dictator-Savior. The Bolshevik uprising of July was suppressed by Kerensky’s government. For the next two months the contenders, on the surface at least, are the Right and the Center parties. The Kornilov rebellion in September was the first of the many efforts of the Right to establish a Dictator-Savior. The rebellion was easily put down by Kerensky. The government had thus survived first an attack from the Left, and then an attack from the Right. But within a few days of the suppression of Kornilov there is un- _ mistakable evidence of the rise of the third power —that of the Bolsheviki. On September 19, six days after the General’s capitulation, the Petrograd Soviet passed from Menshevik and Social Revolu- The Prelude to Bolshevism first time refused a vote of confidence in the gov- national disgrace . \- e oa Bi PP 4, 192 0 Thus out of 82 optimistic items, 49 are fron friendly official sources, and the rest from respect- q able ones; out of 66 pessimistic items 36 are dis- tinctly disreputable, and of the thirty remaining — practically none contains more than a fragmentary ~ hint of the real difficulty in Russia as later revealed — by the collapse of the July offensive, the first Bol- shevik rebellion, and the ultimate fall of the Pro-— visional Government. a It remains to be noted however that the optimis- — tic items carried their own antidote to the sophisti- cated reader.. The very fact that it was necessary ~ to proclaim the solidarity and strength of Russia — every other day was a‘suspicious fact. Reiteration — emphasized doubt, and trained readers were ena- bled to reach conclusions quite opposite from those — insisted upon in the general intent of the news. But — ~what chance had they of persuading the casual — reader that Russian affairs required his earnest — attention. Was the casual reader, absorbed in ~ our own war activities, not told about every — other day that he could afford to be compla- 4 cent? a tionary control into Bolshevik hands, and the next day (September 20) the Moscow Soviet for the ernment of Kerensky. In five weeks that govern- ment had fallen. — q Every shred of justification for complacent op- — timism had ceased by July 19. The correspondents — in Russia abandoned it. Mr. Harold Williams, — in the Times of July 28, speaks of “‘this hour of “how can Russia be saved . the shameful collapse of (the) armies.’ But though the Times of July 23 had printed a thro column head saying: MUTINY ON RUSSIAN FRONT SPREADS _ WHOLE LINE GIVING WAY Nevertheless the Times of July 28 carried the following dispatch from Washington: “The State Department has advices by cable that the defeat of the Russian Army on the Galician front has hag a wholesome effect in Petrograd.” Meantime the headlines showed a continued op. timism, as the following samples show: “es July 30 ARMY NOW RECOVERING July 31° RUSSIAN ARMIES NOW STRIKING C BACK RUSSIANS THROW GERMANS BACK Aug. I

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bi ie a ae is Cg ee EOS Te te eae eee Ok eae we gray a ee 9 a i gust oe 1920 THE NEW He @ cr Aug. 2 RUSSIANS ATTACK ON GALICIAN. 4 _ FRONT Ve Ss ies MINIMIZES CABINET CRISIS . 5 ROOT HAS FAITH RUSSIA WILL STAND | TO FIGHT ON, SAYS FRANCIS NO EVIDENCE THAT RUSSIA INTENDS TO QUIT . “Aug. 7 bg SEES RUSSIA SOON AS STRONG AS | EVER . 9 WE CAN DEPEND ON RUSSIA WITH AID FROM US, ROOT SAYS "Aug. 9 RUSSIANS AGAIN ATTACK IN GALICIA Aug. 9 KORNILOV FIRM FOR WAR Aus, 14 RUSSO - RUMANIANS TAKE __ 13,100 : TEUTONS ' dug. 15 PRESS TEUTONS BACK ON RUMAN- 3 IAN FRONT dug. 15 TELLS KING GEORGE RUSSIA WILL q FIGHT ON © | Aug.18 RUSSO - RUMANIANS REPEL ALL ] “PRTEACKS | Aug.20 RUSSIANS REPULSE ATTACKS EVERY- q WHERE a Thus from the military rout in July to the verge of the Kornilov conspiracy, on the average once every other day, a certain show of optimism is _ made. It is derived from official reports of minor _ engagements, from advices to the State Department, and from the Russian Government, The persistent _ will to believe is illustrated by the Times of July 24. The captions read as follows: | RUSSIANS TAKE 1,000 PRISONERS BREAK GERMAN LINE IN VILNA REGION DESPITE DEFECTION OF SOME REGIMENTS BUT COLLAPSE IN GALICIA WHOLE FRONT DOWN TO THE CAR- | PATHIANS IN RETREAT—TARNOPOL GONE 8 ' leading optimist which regards the capture of 1,000 prisoners as of greater significance than the col- lapse of the whole front down to the Carpathians? It was not always possible, of course, to extract _ hope out of a desperate situation, but on fourteen days out of twenty-two the caption writer succeeds. On the following dates he announces reverses: July mao, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, Aug. 3, 17; 23, 24... No REPUBLIC a disaster was indisputable. q Is it not just to say that the newspaper is a mis-. PAV Og OP Vee. AR a EMT At altel yea ee RM LENSE re RTS: ye Wee onto Ee ECTS ne ttelb FNL REPD N eta ate cy Rae Ceca Oe aaa . i se doubt there were minor successes, but the net — Therefore the interlard- ing of the news of big defeats with little resistances - and verbal optimism must be described as confusing in its total effect. The presentation of news values is eccentric, and distorts the main picture. The Quest of a Dictator-Savior But parallel with all this runs a great theme of — the Russian news: the theme of the Dictator- Savior and the strong man. This quest appears many times throughout the three years of the re- volution dealt with in this study. It culminates as all the world knows, in Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch, but it emerges long before. The first choice of the correspondents, curiously enough, is Kerensky himself. The faith in Kerensky is short- lived, but strenuous while it lasts: KERENSKY MADE DICTATOR OF RUSSIA PEASANTS YEARN FOR NEW MONARCHY July 24 “Kerensky, who possesses all Peter the Great’s energy and twice his wisdom, is the national hero . - It [a new Czardom] would give the imagina- tive peasants some one in whom to place that loyalty which they could never accord with the same enthus- iasm to a blackcoated President.” (Herbert Bailey, Special to the New York Times, Petrograd, July 21.) That Kerensky did not altogether disdain the role of strong man is indicated by his interview to the Associated Press (issue of July 25) which the Times heads: -KERENSKY’S RULE TO BE MERCILESS WILL BEAT RUSSIA INTO UNITY WITH BLOOD AND IRON, IF NECESSARY, HE SAYS Mr. Harold Williams has at this time begun to cast about for a savior. Being better informed than Mr. Bailey, he has never taken very seriously the dictatorship of Kerensky. In the Times of July 26, he notes that the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates attached a string to Kerensky’ s unlimited power by demanding an accounting not less than twice a week. And two days later he is aware of “the brave commander on the southwestern front, General Kornilov.” Other correspondents present other guesses as to where the saving force is to be found. ‘Thus in the issue of August 31, the London Times cor- respondent (Moscow, August 28), makes what appears to be the first sketch of the geographical area on which the counter-revolutions of Kolchak and Denikin were later organized. Over a year — before the event he discovers that “The Knights of St. George, representing 80,000,-

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ooo acres, (sic) have combined in military leagues . There is a solid (italics ours) block far ex- ceeding in size and population the combined strength of the Central Empires. From Lake Baikal to the Dniester, from the Don to the Persian border, loyal sons of Russia are ready to rise against the forces of disintegration and defeat.” The Times heads this dispatch: GREAT NEW POWER RISING IN RUSSIA No less interesting and prophetic is the appear- ance of the first argument for external military intervention in Russia. While Messrs. Bailey and Williams and the London Times correspondent are looking for loyal Russians, the French authorities are thinking of the Japanese army. The Times of August 23, in a box on the first page, prints an unidentified dispatch from Paris, August 22, which says: “The Pivato eis asks if the moment has not ar- rived for Japan to take further steps in the war . _ The Petit Journal, in an editorial along the same .. lines... . adds that never will the Japanese troops be more needed on the Russian front than they are , today.” [Italics ours. ] | The reader will note the common inspiration of these French newspapers and the synchronism of the publication with the bad news of the German offensive against Riga. -With such estimates of the Russian problem in their minds, and with such prepossessions, it is not surprising that the news- men were completely taken in by the Kornilov fiasco. | Pie Kornilov’ Rebellien The historical evidence about the affair is still a matter of hot dispute, and there is much mystery about the role of the various personalities who figured prominently in the intrigue. This aspect of the affair the correspondents did not report at length, and could not have been expected to report. But the facts which concerned the American reader were simple. Did Kornilov represent the power of Russia? Were those who gathered about him the effective substance of the nation? . Was the, in brief, the real thing, or a flash in the pan? He was a distinguished officer of the General _ Staff, a Cossack, who had been appointed com- mander-in-chief by Kerensky himself after the de- feat of July. According to his own proclamation, * issued September 9, his purpose in rebelling against the Provisional Government of Kerensky and start- - ing to march on Petrograd, was “the preservation of a Great Russia.’’ He swore “to carry over the people, by means of a victory over the enemy, to the Constituent Assembly at which it will decide its own fate and choose the order of the new state life.” He was, in other words, to be a temporary ’¥ aii oh Rey a ails bait Heer Nos ins itat ore STA Keay the tg edt’) Pare ee ED rev Beate ee ee ra we al ea eee. ae ee 1), Pe *- a 7 a hd ee oe oh me ee ee Gls ee) ¥ pity ar bi AS Ney ACS We Te Lec ey ea: Brae? 4 ‘a * eis ie Bie 7 let asy Mad Vice at: f ees Wii : . Aen ey EN ‘ woe ‘ . Dic wine : , 2 THE NEW REPUBLIC ‘sacks, the backbone of the Russian atiap are his s * Printed in “The Prelude to Bolshevism,” by A. Fi 9; denounced him as a cauinter-revolanonnne rep- a resenting ° ‘a desire of some circles of Russian : society to take advantage of the grave condition — " of the state for the purpose of establishing i in the conquests ae the revolution.” The rebellion wal proclaimed on September 9. By September 12 the © Associated Press correspondent in Petrograd de- ~ scribed the coup as a failure. Kornilov was supa q pressed practically without bloodshed. i Nevertheless the special correspondents showell 4 their credulity about the possibilities of a military dictator. As early as July 31, the reporter of the © London Morning Post cables (New York Times ~ of August 3) that “from intimations I have re- _ ceived I gather that the fighting Generals have — placed before Kerensky what amounts to an ulti — matum from the officers of Russia’s armies.” Note _ that the soldiers of Russia’s armies do not appear. — On August 29 the Times carried, under headlines — announcing ‘“‘Hailed as Russia’s Savior,” a Mos- — cow dispatch reporting that ‘“‘at present the name _ of General Kornilov is on every tongue.’ Mr. Harold Williams, to be sure, noted in a cable pub- © lished the next day that the executives of the Coun- — cil of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates refused _ to stand or to greet Kornilov at the Moscow Con- — gress. 3 a But the bulk of the dispatches during the two ~ weeks following were highly optimistic. The ~ counter-revolutionists were described as riding on to glory. “Great New Power Rising in Russia,” said a headline in the Times, August 31. ‘“Kor- ~ niloy commands confidence in military circles,” — cabled Mr. Charles H. Grasty on September 11, ~ ‘not only on his record as an officer, but because he 4 is a Cossack, This is the tribe around which intel- — gent opinion in Western Europe has been cluster- ing hopefully for several months past.” [Italics 4 ours. | News of the actual revolt was cabled that same 4 day from London. “There is yet no indication of © General Kornilov’s intentions,” said a special dis. a patch to the Times, ‘‘but it is known that the Cos- © strong adherents.” Yet two days later the Kornilov revolt was a a confessed fiasco. ‘‘Korniloy Gives Up, Revolt ) Ends,”’ said a headline in the Times, September 14. Where, one wonders, were the Cossacks who three days hefore were “known”’ in London to be Kor- nilov’s “strong adherents” and “the backbone of — the Russian Army”? A fortnight later Mr. Har- ; old Williams, in a special to the Times from Petron Kerensky ; Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1919.

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i m ay? wa i trust and completed the work of destruction. T H E N E w B erad, dated September 26, blurted out the follow- ' ing: “The Kornilov affair has intensified mutual dis- The Government is shadowy and unreal, and what per- sonality it had has disappeared before the menace of the democratic conference. Whatever power there is, is again concentrated in the hands of the Soviets, and, as always happens when the Soviets secure a monopoly of power, the influence of the Bolsheviks has increased enormously.” [Italics ours. | So runs the obituary by a friend of the first Dictator-Savior. In view of the fact that the Soviets seized the government six weeks after this dispatch was filed, _ Mr. Williams had reported news of the first im- _ portance. Does the news for the next six weeks, the last weeks before the triumph of Bolshevism, s follow the lead given so clearly by Mr. Williams? The End of Kerensky The news out of Russia for the first ten days of October does not minimize the increasing dif_i- culties of the existing régime. But the news com- ment out of Washington on October 10 (unidenti- fied dispatch from Washington, October 9), is this: “Russian diplomats here appear to be convinced now that the Bolsheviks have been finally’ over- thrown and that Premier Kerensky is once more firmly established in the supreme power. “Tt was said at the embassy today that the Bol- sheviks were greatly discouraged by their first at- tempt to obtain control of the Government, on July 8, when disturbances caused by them were sup- pressed by the provisional authorities, and again dur- ing the Korniloy movement, when the Bolsheviks seized upon that occasion to overthrow the coalition administration. The action of the democratic con- ference in upholding the principle of a coalition Cabinet was asserted to reveal the total defeat of the extreme radicals.” Nevartheless the correspondents in Russia are agreed as to the crisis, thus: - Oct. 13 RUSSIAN CABINET IN HARD POSI- a Oct. 15 @ Oct. 28 ag ay me. ia a Nov. 2 ¢ a . TION DISORDERS GROWING AMONG THE : _ PEASANTS | ; Oct. 16 RUSSIAN FLEET 1S DEMORALIZED Bm Oct. 25 “The evening newspapers which, publish the program for the meeting of the Central Council of Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Delegates on Nov. 2 are filled with rumors of a Bolsheviki demonstra- tion and an attempt to seize the Government... .” RUSSIAN ROADS PARALIZED HANDLED LESS TRAFFIC IN SUMMER THAN THEY DID LAST WINTER This was the day on which the Times Nov. 6 REPUBLIC printed beiely Kerensky’s historic interview to the: Associated Press: (Petrograd, November 1. )* _ (The longer text was printed November Ce RUSSIA WORN OUT, ALLIES MUST TAKE UP BURDEN, KERENSKY SAYS But the State Department in Washington knew | better: It issued a statement that: “There has been absolutely nothing in the dispatches received by the Department of State from Russia, nor — in information derived from any other source what- ever, to justify the impression created by the Washing- ton Post to-day .... that Russia is out of the conflict.” ( Special to New York Times, Washing- ton, November 2.) Nov. 3 _ “Russia is not out of the war. She is to make no separate peace. The Russian Embassy and the State Department made this clear today.” Nov. 4 From London, Kerensky’s interview was deprecated. (London, November 3-) “The Petrograd correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, who is now in London, writes: ‘Premier Kerensky’s statement seems to have been taken a lit- tle too seriously in some quarters.’ ” The Graphic (London) is quoted: “We should hate to regard the statements as authentic. They have the ring of pro-German propaganda.” [Italics ours. | ly on the fourth column of the fourth page the fol- lowing news of world-wide importance: ) BOLSHEVIK PERIL ACUTE RUSSIAN RADICAL PACIFISTS EXPECT TO COME INTO POWER (London, Nov. 5). “At a meeting in Petrograd on Saturday, as reported in an Exchange Telegraph dispatch from that city, representatives of the whole Petrograd garrison passed under the guidance and — influence of the Bolsheviks. . . .” | The issues of November 7 and 8 carry the news of the Bolshevik Revolution, culminating on No- vember 9, with the six-column headline on pe: first page: REVOLUTIONISTS SEIZE PETROGRAD; KERENSKY FLEES | PLEDGE IS GIVEN TO SEEK “AN IMMEDIATE PEACE” The reader who had ignored the State Depart- | ment and the Russian Embassy for the six weeks — preceding, and had read the news dispatches from Hees . iy Russia, had no reason to be surprised. The reader — led. ' The Provisional Government having been overs) who had trusted official pronouncements was mis- On this day, the Times printed obscure- 4 thrown by the Soviets, he was concerned in the — weeks that followed, first, as to whether the — Bolsheviks would last, second, as to what they would do about the war. (:

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under its jurisdiction. gills THE NEW REPUBLIC ‘TIL. Would the Soviets Last? Naturally there was doubt as to the stability of _ this strange new regime. Russian experts in Amer- ica were at once interviewed: Nov. 9. Herman Bernstein: “Tt can’t win... . for Lenin and Trotzky are both extremely unpopular. ‘They had a better chance last July .... the popular execration directed against Lenin . . . . was such as to convince me that he will never be able to dominate the Russian people.” Mr. Alexander Sakhnovsky, Agent of Zemstvos: “A man like Prince Lvov would be considerably more useful, and I believe, from the reports I receive, that sentiment in Russia is setting in that direction. As for the Grand Duke Michael, he has always been very popular... .” the A special dispatch to the Times (Washington, November 8) declared: “No doubt was expressed in diplomatic circles that the Allied Powers would recognize any Government formed to oppose the Bolsheviki.... Moscow was regarded as the probable choice for the provisional capital, because all the elements there have been in sympathy with the Government as against the ex- | tremist Socialists. Moscow also is held to be a more purely Russian city....” _ The question of the stability of the Bobhevik regime is of course a fundamental question of the Russian news. Correct information on that point is the premise of correct information on many other great themes; the relation of Bolshevism to Germany, the value and the possibility of military ‘intervention, the prospects of the White Generals, the reality of the Red Peril, and the problem of peace. For if the regime was temporary, then its diplomacy as against Germany and the Allies was not particularly significant, the possibility of successful intervention was greater, the prospects e of the White Generals were brighter, the menace was smaller, and the problem of peace might be postponed. If on the other hand, the Soviet power was firmly rooted in the Russian people, then it was Russia, and its diplomacy mattered enormous- ly, intervention was impracticable, the prospects of the generals poor, the menace worth serious con- sideration, and peace a pressing matter. The Soviet Government was still in existence in March, 1920, when this study closes. It had lasted 29 months up to that time and had brought all of Central Russia from the Arctic Ocean to the Cau- casus, as well as Siberia, at least to Lake Baikal, Whether it was a good ‘The Withdrawal of Russia _ historic fact is that the regime did endure for the Ce Op ae pies "he seals hie. 1 1920 regime or an intolerable one is not the question, nor — in fact has it ever been the important question in ~ America’s relation to Russia. What mattered ~ fundamentally in all those months of grave de- — cision was whether it was an enduring regime. The — whole time we are now discussing. It may fall © any day; it may last for a generation. That is of ~ no consequence. News reports in 1917, 1918, 1919, and early 1920 that the Soviets are about — to collapse, or have collapsed, or will collapse ~ within a few weeks is false news, and it will not ~ be true news if the Soviet regime should collapse — late in 1920 or thereafter. a That the Soviet government could last only for the moment was one of the most insistent of all themes in the news of Russia. Within a few days after the November coup it had made its first ap- pearance. On November 13 (1917) the Times published a special dispatch from Washington, as- serting “All doubt that the Maximalists in Petrograd will be deposed has disappeared in Government and diplomatic quarters here.” It seemed only to be a question of who would fol- low next: “Officials are now debating whether Premier Ker- ensky, General Kornilov, or some other leader will take charge of the Government to rise out of the ashes of Maximalist authority. ‘The complete over- throw of the Bolsheviki is predicted.” Many times, in the months which followed, that overthrow was predicted. No other note appeared — more faithfully and with emphasis so certain. In the two years from November, 1917, to Novem- — ber, 1919, no less than ninety-one times was it _ stated that the Soviets were nearing their rope’s end, or actually had reached it. a In arriving at this computation no count is made — of the ordinary reports that Russia was in chaos— _ though such reports of course implied a weaken- — ing in the prestige and authority of the government ~ attempting to wield power. What is counted, in ~ arriving at the figure ninety-one, are reports more explicitly reporting an~early break-up. For in- ~ stance, thirty different times the power of the Sovi- ets was definitely described as being on the wane. Twenty times there was news of a serious counter- — revolutionary menace. Five times was the explicit — statement made that the regime was certain to col- — lapse, And fourteen times that collapse was said — to be in progress. Four times Lenin and Trotzky — were planning flight. Three times they had al- © ready fled. Five times the Soviets were “‘totter- — ing.” ‘Three times their. fall was “imminent.” Once

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i : ie ee are ee aa a TRS ac wg eee Ae moe | st i es : 4), oF t~ Au; rsh 4, 1920 “THE NEW Svcsertions in the Red army had reached propor- tions alarming to the government. Twice Lenin — retirement; once he had been killed; and - three times he was thrown i in prison. Insistently appearing in the news, the steady _ Tepetition in these reports left its inevitable im- _ pression on the reader. How trustworthy were the 4 sources from which this material was drawn? _ The smaller part of it came via the shortest _ route available: that is, as the observation of men - or of some group of men who, whatever their per- 4 sonal bias—even though it be the bias that might 4 accompany a salary coming from some rival Rus- 4 sian faction—were at least cited by name as au- _ thority for the news. That method accounts for _ twenty of the dispatches tallied in the present list. _ On certain other occasions there was an official or _ pseudo-official source implied. Thus we have ‘“‘ad- _ vices to the State Department,” “officials of the State Department,” and ‘“‘government and diplo- 4 matic sources in Washington’’—each quoted in one _ instance. Six more dispatches were drawn from { statements or publications credited to the Soviet 4 _ government itself. That brings the total up to | bventy-nine, all accounted for with sources possess- _ ing some measure of authority. Sixty-two are left. ' And for those sixty-two there is less that can be B said. _ The source of information, where cited, is - vague at best: “sources familiar with the Russian _ situation in its many phases” (London) ; a Stock- holm dispatch to Paris; the opinion of some man _ or group of men unnamed; “reports reaching Lon- don from Petrograd”; “Teports reaching London 4 _ from Peking and Copenhagen” ; dispatches from ~ Copenhagen to the Exchange Telegraph Company, _ London; correspondents of German newspapers, _ of Swedish papers and of Danish papers; unidenti- fied dispatches from Reval, from Geneva, from q _ Stockholm and from iielasetoes etc. Individual- yy the sending of a news dispatch based upon sec- ond-, third- or fourth-hand authority was a natural _ enough procedure. A correspondent in Copen- _ hagen, perhaps, saw in some Danish journal a re- ' port coming from Stockholm that someone else _ believed counter-revolution menaced the Soviet au- q - thority. That was “‘news,’”’ he judged, worth cab- ling to America, Collectively, however, the re- _ ports have no such incidental character. From the first days of Soviet power they have paint- 4g _ be misleading. They have prophecied what did not happen. But they have left, in the minds of those who read them, an effect of real impor- : tance. : Later themes find expression. At times the Red Peril momentarily overshadows the conception of Soviet power as an institution verging on collapse. But over a space of many months, recurring like the hee in 7 ed a picture which the event itself has proved to NOM LUG Nee Op aD Tee lh oy ANT LM peat ee pte a, | POE rma yee Seer eRe ater tag (cpr ee aN Oe Bart ta a ee q ate ee ae? : Mois SN AY at td “a5 ra eae paoye | ~ vee ae se Se ee es REPUBLIC “1 major theme in a Wagneriaropera, comes this note _ of Soviet impermanency. What its net effect has been is plain. It has nourished the policy of lais- — sez-faire. Creating the impression that a few days — more and there would be no Soviet power left to worry over, it helped postpone from month to month an insistence that in the face of definite fact the Allied statesmen must revaluate their policy of indecision, intervention and blockade. During the Parleys at Brest Litovsk The midwinter of 1917-18 is worth more de- tailed examination, because it has a character of its own. S News items suggesting that the on was tem- porary appeared as follows. This tabulation is more inclusive than that above for reasons of fair- ness which will be evident. It is more inclusive in that items merely suggesting weakness are ad- mitted, whereas they are excluded above. November 9‘, 107, 117, 12‘, 137, 16, 27, 107 December 2, 10, rt*, 12, 17, 19, 21, 24, 2%. January 9, 10. February 27, 7, 8, 9, 18?,'19, 20, 217, 23, 25, 28. Totals: Items in November .......... 20 SOE IOCRMIDEL oo eas ia cee 10 ECL PARMRTY oo Ce bees cee 2 tS So ROOTUEET YS 0c a ab ane ge 14 What strikes the eye immediately is the scarcity of the items in January, The first of the two items appeared January 9. It is a special to the New York Times from Harold Williams (Petrograd, January 6) headed: RUSSIA SEEN ON VERGE OF UTTER COL- 7 LAPSE | PETROGRAD FACES FAMINE AND PARALYSIS, WHILE ANARCHY REIGNS IN PROVINCES The second item on January 10 is a dispatch from the Petrograd correspondent of the London Times, headed: -CRIME IS RAMPANT IN PETROGRAD BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND MURDER COMMON—FOOD SUPPLY IS GIVING OUT Within a few days this picture of Russia was dis- puted. Cables from Stockholm, London and Petro- grad reported that the Soviets had put their hands on fresh stores of food from the Ukraine, that they had successfully crushed a counter-revolution, and that in the opinion of Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) Lenin was firm in the saddle, not to be overthrown for the present. The Soviets

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i ah ero ee a Se et oe ee ee ee ee, Ty he ae le. i ee ee ee ee ee eee Pee Se ee ee wy ty, Mee” St 4 res tee a yee Se ah yeas Eon ares eye ee % a Abc % Spi Gert ey “ iy : aX es Bre rf 2: ra 1s 49) ran a ve y ra teen, a 3 Me nite “ad oy) OT “y, PERG ABV OW cst NET | 7 ae ¥ , ie i. VR } atk su i 5 7] + dee “ . TOD CO aS TA Rhee Ge eee aa 5 am ae Hr Pe aot % My seemed to be gaining ground. In fact, on January 29 headlines in the Times reported ROMANOFFS AS BOLSHEVIKI PROF. ROSS HEARS EX-CZAR’S DAUGHTERS | ARE.CONVERTED TO CAUSE. And this was the word that followed: “The Bolshevist movement is sincere, Professor Ross said, springing from the heart of Russia itself and having as its object the liberation of the people, the establishment of world peace, and the institution of a system of pure industrial socialism.” Thus the two dispatches indicating serious weak- ness, are neutralized by news that the Soviets are fairly strong. November and December preceding report great weakness; so do the months following. What is there that is peculiar about the month of January, 1918? Trotzky was debating with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk and defying them; Lloyd George made his speech proposing a_ con- ciliatory peace; President Wilson announced the Fourteen Points, with a most sympathetic ref- erence to Russia. Is there any connection between these events and the rather favorable view taken in the news of Russia’s stability? Let us examine _ the manner in which the peace negotiations between Germany and Russia were handled. During November, statements by Lenin. and Trotzky appear disavowing the idea of a separ- ate peace, (November 24, 26). On the other hand Mr. Harold: Williams states categorically within three weeks of the revolution (Times of November 24, special dispatch from Petrograd, November 22, delayed) that the Russian masses were forcing the hands of the Bolsheviks by de- manding the execution of promises. In the issue of December 5 Mr. Williams says (Special to the Times from Petrograd, December 3) that: “The Bolshevist movement is by no means simple. It is a curious jumble of conflicting elements ranging from the purest idealism to German intrigue and reactionary monarchism. ‘These elements are tem- porarily agreed in a peace policy, and derive their. authority from the strong pacifist tendencies of the — soldiers and Socialists and the pacifist mood of the workmen. ... In any case, the fact must be faced that, one way or the other, Russia, despite the will. of the best elements of the population, will have to retire from the war.... We cannot contemptuously abandon this whole, great people because of a tem- porary fit of madness, the causes of which lie deep in the history of years of oppression.” (Italics ours.) Mr, Williams in subsequent dispatches emphasiz- ed the basic demoralization of Russia’s will to fight. But as the parleys at Brest-Litovsk open, hope re- vives with Trotzky i in the center of the stage. Some of the captions run as follows: “THE NEW REPUBLIC |, Dee. 27 Dec. 30 TERMS OF PEACE ROUSE THE FURY Jan. 3 RUSSIAN STAND PLEASES Jan. 7 BOLSHEVIKI’S STAND SHOCKS THE 4 oo avert. 4, 192 Dec.23 RUSSIA WON’T BOW ‘BEFORE THE KAISER, TROTZKY INSISTS Dec. 26 TROTZKY PROTESTS AGAINST GER. MANS SHIFTING TROOPS | 7 ‘REPORT LENIN GIVES GERMANS PEACE ULTIMATUM a ‘OF PAN GERMANS q LON DON RUE a Ma Jan. 4 ALLIES NOW MAY RECOGNIZE LENIN _ Jan. 5 TROTZKY OPENED EYES OF GER: | MANS 4 a) a TEUTONS Jan. 7 BOLSHEVIKI MAY HELP ALLIES BEST Jan.t1r BOLSHEVISM SEEN AS NEW RELIGION ; —_ Jan.17 GREAT BRITAIN DECIDES TO TREAT _ : ‘WITH LENIN 4 The optimistic and friendly quality of these re- . ports was no doubt a reflection of official opinion ” 4q in England, and of Trotzky’s own opinions. The : spell of Trotzky’s defiance at Brest-Litovsk per- vades the news. Even Mr. Harold Williams is temporarily under it, though he had written earlier — with hard realism that Russia would not and could — x not fight. Mr. Arthur Ransome was even more — thoroughly spell-bound. Trotzky was in good odor most of January, 1918. So good, in fact, that on January 20 the Times reported: | WHAT TROTZKY DID WHEN IN NEW YORK a INVESTIGATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FAILS ~ TO SHOW HE RECEIVED GERMAN MONEY | 6c e . . Attorney General Merton F. Lewis insti- tuted an investigation as to Trotzky’s activities dur- ing that part of 1917 when he was in New York. — The investigation was made at the request of the a ~ Department of Justice in Washington. Deputy At- torney General Alfred R. Becker was in charge, and the report of the investigation, which is now com- pleted is to the effect that no evidence was obtained to support any charge that Trotzky ever received any aS German money while in New York.” a Two days later, however, Mr. Harold Williamsl in a special dispatch from Petrograd interrupted the optimistic series by reporting that the Bolsheviks were a symbol of volcanic forces, that they were not pacifists, and that they had stopped the war with Germany only to kindle civil war. 4

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THE NEW ‘Faith in the Bolsheviks Dis- appears 4 Hove that the Bolsheviks would somehow con- _ tinue to fight faded rapidly by the end of January, pand terminated abruptly on February 12 by the q _ declaration of the Soviet government that the war was over. A new period opens almost immediate- a It is the period of the preparation for inter- _ vention. q Up to the time when Russia went out if the war _ the dominant tendency of the news is to be opti- - mistic about the government in power. In their _turn, Lvov, Milukov, Kerensky, Kornilovy and B Trotzky had been reported as favorable to the Allied cause, Even the Bolsheviks, denounced while i in opposition to Kerensky, were treated with- out obvious prejudice once they were established, Pand while they were still defying Germany. The 4 sernent of reporters and caption-writers was - governed, on the whole uniformly, by the will to believe that Russia would assist the Allies. That q the events falsified this optimism again and again shows how strongly the wish intruded upon objec- 4 tive judgment. For while reporters in Russia did _ advert on numerous occasions to the basic demoral- ization of the war-weary people, those dispatches " flickered and disappeared in the prevailing desire " to maintain an eastern front. That this motive was _ stronger initially than any hatred of Bolshevism, _any fear of the Red Peril, is shown rather emphat- ‘ ically by the very friendly character of the news during the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. The in- _ formal recognition of the Soviet Government by _ Great Britain, the idealization of Russia contained in President Wilson’s address of January 8, ela- tion over the strikes in Germany and Austria, and a y - deal of war-weariness in Western Buropt,— all coincide with news about Russia which is, to _ say the least, sympathetic to the Soviets. Se — Y ; « 4 e - , | x ie Os | IV. The Appeal _ On February 12, 1918, the Times published its obituary on Russia as a belligerent. On Feb- _ ruary 26 appeared the famous Grasty interview "with Foch. (Special to the New York a "Paris, February 25): Ag 4g “a 4 “Tf America will look ahead I am sure she will see ¥ another field in which she can render immense service ' without relaxing her efforts on the western front. She should give her attention to the Orient. “Germany is walking through Russia. America and Japan, who are in a position to do so, should go to meet her in Siberia. Both for the war and after _ America and Japan must furnish military and eco- REPUBLIC From the Revolution of March, 1917, to the final collapse of the eastern front in early Febru- ary, 1918, it is just to say that a strong bias is re- flected in the presentation of the news. bias of hope, and this bias persistently plays down — It is the news of Russia’s weakness and plays up announce- ments and events which sustain hope. ‘There were plenty of exceptions, of course, and we have tried faithfully to give them full value in what has pre- ceded. We assert nothing more than the existence of a dominant tendency in the general course of the news, a tendency contradicted by indisputable events. Up to this point at least, we do not believe that on the face of the news any case appears point- 13 ing to the existence of an organized propaganda working behind the censorship. The evidence, in our opinion, disproves such a charge, and vindi- cates the good will of those who prepared and re- ported the news. The difficulties revealed are pro- fessional: where the news is misleading in the net effect it is because the emphasis has been misplaced by the powerful passions of a great war. The period which follows the withdrawal of Russia shows a radical change in the character of the news. In order to understand that change it is necessary to recall that the final loss of Russia was a frightful disappointment, that the German of- fensive of March was the supreme military crisis — The period we are approaching now — of the war. transcends all others in its desperate significance. It begins with what looked to the western world like downright betrayal, for the Allies stood face to face with a Germany freed from Russian pressure on the eastern front. These facts bear heavily on the quality of the news which follows. .The pat- riotic men who were engaged in furnishing the news about Russia had hoped in vain through twelve anxious months, That the threshold of their credulity was almost HOH TNy lowered should surprise no one. for Intervention nomic resistance to German penetration. There - should be immediate steps in this important matter. Don’t wake ‘up after it is too late. Don’t wait until the enemy has too much of a start... .” Japanese and British marines landed at Vladi- vostok early in April, and British troops on the Murman peninsula. Czechoslovak troops in Russia were in conflict with the Soviets. In July American troops were landed in Vladivostok; in August American troops were landed in Archangel. State Department issued its famous and puzzling pronunciamento, saying: first that ‘‘military inter- : On August 4, 1918, the Towards the end of May the ~

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14 vention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it... .” Second, that ‘military action is admissible in Rus- sia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czechoslovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them,...’’ Third, “to steady any efforts at self- government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. ...” Fourth, ‘‘to guard military stores... .” Fifth, to safeguard “the country to the rear of the westward- moving Czechoslovaks... .” 7 Five and a half magnihe iGietvened between the withdrawal of Russia from the war and the formal acceptance of the policy of intervention by the American Government. As early as April there had been some intervention, but August 4 marks the public and official triumph of the idea. What was the character of the news in these months? Ignoring all editorials, magazine features, etc., of which the volume was very large, selecting ont from the news, we have noted about 285 items bearing upon the problem of intervention. We have classified the 285 items according to the theme they illustrate. Thus: German Domination of Russia...... 49 Russian Anti-Bolshevism........... 34 Japanese Intervention............. 69 weuted Intervention. 2... 6. es 48 | mmerican [ntervention;.......:.... 26 The Czechoslovaks........¢...5. qr OES Si eS | RRR ae a ook earner Pa 5 Prisoners in Siberia Peril... 3... ‘4 Bent -fOF RUSSIA. oe sw hs es es 2) weoancse IN Pern. . 2. oe es a eo oe SEIS SOLOS, os Fos ke ee 2 Anti-Intervention ..... So Pe tas eee 13 That the Red Peril should have played so in- significant a part in the news at a time when the debate about intervention in Russia’s internal af- fairs was hottest is one of the curiosities of this history. It is also one of the most significant things about it. The notion of a fundamental antagonism between the Soviet government and the American is not insisted upon until after American troops are on Russian soil. (See Section V of this re- port.) — The great reason for military action displayed in the news is the German domination of Russia. It is Foch’s reason in February; it is Senator King’s reason in his Senate resolution of June roth; it is _ Mr. Taft’s reason the same day. (Times of June 11.) The argument was simple: the eastern front is gone. Germany has an unblocked path through Russia and Siberia to the Pacific, through Russia and the Caucasus to India. Germany will organize Russian resources and perhaps Russian man power; then she will win the war. Somewhere or other an eastern front must be reestablished. THE NEW REPUBLIC the nucleus. ‘ German Peril. DP ie ATE AN 2, ole ahaa: Satta “a - ‘e es ee ae 7 Lee or} Mi Ri August | 92 The Bolsheviks will not and cannot do this. ne problem is therefore to be solved by Allied, Jap- anese, and American soldiers cooperating with Rus- sian anti-Bolsheviks. ‘The providential rebellion of the Czechoslovaks in May, June and July provides - This argument dominates the news in the Times up to August, and more or less until the armistice” with Germany. The armistice, of course, destroy- ed the argument, But the intervention continued. — After the armistice intervention is justified by the Red Peril; before the armistice it is justified by the Little fighting was done by Ameri- can troops in Russia before the armistice. These troops went to fight Germany and remained to fight Russians. The German Peril | a The news looking towards intervention is thick- est from just after Foch’s interview to just before — the great German offensive of March 21. It de- clines rather suddenly after the President had veto- — ed the idea, and then begins again strongly in May © with increasing intensity through June and July up ~ to the time of the President’s conversion. The first — unsuccessful phase in early March, 1918, is before — the fright caused by the German success. The sec- ond successful phase coincides with the farthest ad- vance of the Germans towards Paris. President — Wilson’s final decision on August 4 is four days before the day which Ludendorff calls the turning point of the war. Thus intervention was launched as part of the grand strategy of the war against — Germany. The news is all to that effect. “Sees — Russia Now as Ally of Germany’’—“Germans — Overrun Siberia”—‘Germany Boasts an Open 4 se to India’”—‘‘German Leads Bolshevist Ar- — y’—“Bolsheviki Yield Russia’s Riches to Ber- — lin” —“Russians Sell Out to the Germans’’—these are headlines typical of the items we have listed — under “German Domination of Russia,” in the months between Russia’s withdrawal from the war — and the formal acceptance of the policy of inter- — vention by the American Government. Occasionally — dispatches come through presenting another pic- — ture. It is reported, for instance (as in the Times — on June 17), that Germany is finding her Russian — venture somewhat disappointing in its results. Bute these reports are not followed up, verified, — or insisted upon. The accepted news is that Geral many is dominating Russia. Assuming the sub. stance of this news to be true, there was still a practical question. Vladivostok was 5,000 milegl from the old Russian front. The only other en- trance to Russia was on the Arctic Ocean. The © Japanese alone had an army to use, if they were willing to use it, and they were over 5,000 miles E from Germany, Archangel and Murmansk were ©

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August 4, 1920 “gates to Russia, though bad ones, but there was no “army of any size that could be diverted to that front before the armistice. All the other gates to _ Russia were blocked. _ These elementary considerations do not figure _ very much in the news. The practical difficulty is _ met, when it is met at all, by news of anti-Bolshe- " vists in Russia ready to roll up around and behind ' a small allied army. These anti-Bolshevists and _ their intentions were crucial, for unless they existed _ and wanted intervention and were ready to fight, » the meager allied forces available would be lost in '-a wilderness. What does the news say about the _ prospects of Russian support for allied interven- 4 tion? The True Vaike of Russia __ There were of course rebellions reported on the _ periphery of Central Russia. But the first serious _ news which had some stategic relation to the Jap- _ anese army appeared, we believe, April 21, 1918, - announcing from Washington the receipt of cables to the effect that the Provisional Duma of Au- tonomous Siberia requested Allied assistance in a program of self-government and resistance to Ger- man penetration, On May 5, Mr. A. J. Sack, Director of the Russian Information Bureau, issued an appeal to the American people for supplies an troops. : » ie “In the first place,” said Mr. Sack, “you must distinguish between the Bolsheviki and the Russian people.... An expedition advancing through Siberia, organizing the sound Russian elements into a great force .... could certainly count on the support of _ the Caucasian and Cossack peoples... .” Asked whether there would be armed opposition he replied: : “There would undoubtedly be opposition at first, but it is highly improbable that Germany would be able : to spare any large number of men.... If Germany were in the allied place , .. . she would have 3,000,- - 000 Russians fighting on the east front within a year.” i a a a i i A a a it i lls, _. This was the picture of Russia conveyed by the official press bureau of the so-called Russian Em- bassy in Washington. In the month of June the advocates of intervention were busy making the picture seem a true one. Lady Murial Paget, “a group of influential Russians,” Mme. Botchkarova, M. Konovalov, other interventionists, all come to Washington “to tell about Russia.” The distin- guished French philosopher, M, Henri Bergson, arrived on a mission to the White House about this - time, unrecorded so far as the Times Index shows, - or our own search of the files. There were appeals for intervention from the Far Eastern Russian Committee, from Russians in Harbin, from Ker- - ensky and from Russians of the Murmansk coast. - On June 17 the Times reported ‘‘Russian military - men in this country” as eagerly awaiting action by _ Congress. ae as a Tt ert tae ev em, TT Sey ee ee a r = roca: amid Cer, ie ae See "i ee ; a: y . a es - THE NEW REPUBLIC so) On August 22, the Allied governments issued a statement at Archangel (Times, August 26) : “The Allies, then, were called to Russia by the only legitimate and representative authority, for the purpose of military action in common aiming at the expulsion of the Germans and the complete sup- pression by force of arms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, traitorously signed by the Bolsheviki.” On September 6, intervention then being a fact, Mr. Arthur Copping says (Special to the Times, Archangel, August 16): . “The true voice of Russia, the voice of non-Bol- shevist Russia, besought the help of the Allies, and — the Allies could not’ continue deaf to that insistent appeal. . ...” ar Dany res UCN Rete! Sat cs | glee 2. oh ae WH Sie ROS ak j a One of the difficulties is that the appeal from Russia did not begin until nearly two months after the appeal from Foch on February 26, 1918. Moreover the idea of intervention had been bruited among the Allies as early as August, 1917, and perhaps earlier. The Push se Intervention Intervention was, as we have seen, based on two themes: German domination of Russia, and the readiness of anti-Bolshevik Russia to fight. Both themes were an appeal to reason, if the information they embodied was correct, correct, mind you, not incidentally, but in the true perspective of events. The German theme disappeared almost instanta- neously with the armistice. The reality of the anti- Bolshevik uprising was tested by military campaigns under Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch. ‘The news of these campaigns is discussed in sections VI to XI. : Beside the appeal to reason there was a vast amount of news directly advocating or directly fore- casting the much desired intervention. The inter- ested reader will find more than one hundred and forty news items bearing directly upon intervention in the months between February and July. All this leaves out of account the vast amount of opinion and feature material frankly aimed to per- suade the reader. It was even reported, in the guise of news, that intervention would have a quieting effect on Russian politics. Thus a dispatch from Tokio, dated August 3: | “Tt is predicted in well-informed circles here that the. present concerted action by the Allies in Siberia will act as a sedative on the situation. .. .” That the news columns in this period were used -- to persuade the readers of the wisdom of a certain — policy, held by the Times itself, will hardly be. dis- puted. Take a front page dispatch like the follow- ¥

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ing on May 20. (Special from Washington, May ~ 19.) The captions read as follows: ' WASHINGTON SEES CHANCE TO BRING = RUSSIA BACK IN WAR BUT VIEW IS TAKEN THAT IT MUST os BE SEIZED WITHOUT LOSS aa toe OF TIME 2 DELAY TO FOE’S ADVANTAGE a AND MILITARY AID TO BOLSHEVIST ZT GOVERNMENT WOULD PLAY a -GERMANY’S GAME 2 COMBINED ACTION URGED _ - NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS MIGHT BE FOSTERED BY JOINT CIVIL COMMISSION WITH MILITARY PROTECTION This in our judgment is a clear and flagrant ex- .: Why had Allied troops been sent into Russia? _ In the months preceding intervention the dominant _ reason defined by statesmen, press associations and - special correspondents was the necessity of recon- __ stituting some sort of an eastern front to face the _ Germans. As the foregoing section disclosed, in _ the five and a half months that elapsed between the __ withdrawal of Russia from the war and the formal acceptance of the policy of intefvention by the = ‘significant part in the hot discussion over interven- tion in Russia’s internal affairs. Germany had the _ front of the stage. Upon the notion of a Peril that would sweep out of Russia and attack western civilization there was practically no emphasis. ___ This continued to be the situation in the first days following the landing of Allied and American _ troops on Russian soil. There were, to be sure, a - few warnings that Lenin either had declar- ed war upon one or more members of the En- tente, or soon intended making such a declara- _ tion.* But in August, September and October— in the days immediately preceding the end of the - war—it was still the anti-German note that pre- dominated. On September 4, for instance, when _ Allied intervention had become an accomplished _ fact, the Times published an Hejdeneiied dispatch _ from London, declaring .. “It is reported here on what seems. to be good _ authority that the Germans have decided to take ____ military action in Russia against the Allies and have ___ delivered an ultimatum to the Bolshevist government demanding free passage for their troops. Official = confirmation of this is awaited.” = See, for example, the Times of August 7, 8, 9, 10 and — -23, 1918. a Sete a reo pees PERS Se ee he ON Sn a oon Seer aN én Rone a ih sb, bags THE NEW REPUBLIC. oc v. The Front Changes American government, the Red Peril played an in- ample of the invasion of the news by editorial nion. We are not overstating the matter wheal say that a great deal of the news about Russia i the period under consideration was marked by su ct propagandist methods. We grant the patriotism of the motives; we simply point out the fact, , and question the conception of journalism which it illustrates. , 4 | The tendency noted in the earlier sections, the tendency to evaluate the news on the basis of hope, degenerates after the shock of Russia’s withdrawa al and the increasing impetus of war psychology into passionate argument masquerading as news. This degeneration is noticeable from February, 1918, right up to the final quae of the White General and beyond. ~ aoe a week later, a special to the Times frog y Washington asserted a “What is regarded as closely approximating an offensive and defensive alliance between Germany and the Bolshevist Government in Russia is involved in — the treaty just negotiated between them, the first — official information concerning which reached the State Department today in a dispatch from American — Ambassador Francis at Archangel.” a It was about this time (September 15 to 21, in- clusive) that the Sisson documents were published —proving, in the eyes of the Times, that the Bol- shevists had ruled Russia ‘‘as German valets.” That was still the loud note in the news from Russiz 1 during these days when the war in Europe wa S drawing near its close. On October 20—twenty- two days before the armistice—the Times published this news in a special dispatch from Carl Acker= man, then at American Field Headquarters in Sis beria: “In Khabarovsk the Russians believe that the Bol- = shevist life is measured by the ability of Germany’s — military to hold out. With the splendid advance in the west, every foot gained is also a gain in Russia, because Germany is being weakened here, too. Once — her prestige is destroyed, the power of the Bolsheviki — will crumble.” = That was a ied: guess. But it was reinforced by propaganda coming from the ever-ready Russia Information Bureau.’’ On the very eve of the a mistice this Bureau issued a statement ( published the Times on November 5) misinforming the American public that 3 “The Bolsheviki, who rule in part of Centr : Russia by means of mass terror, are able to stay in 3 power only through German support. As soon as — SS >

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r ust 4, 1920 his support is “withdrawn the population will over- t row them.” ; Six days later the armistice was signed. German ipport was withdrawn. The Soviets stayed where hey were. But for nearly two years the ‘‘Rus- an Estevnietinr Bureau” has gone on making iS pptiecies _ Something to Fight For 3 a seems to us important, at this point, once more 0 take stock of the situation that existed on the a ay of the armistice. Interventionist statesmen and correspondents had prepared the way for in- ervention on the ground that war with Germany lemanded it. On the day of the armistice the war vith Germany was ended. Not another German oldier would march into Russian territory; Foch iad his complete surrender. There were, to be ure, still Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. And to those troops the State Department note of August ¢ had promised ‘“‘such protection and help as is jossible . .. against the armed Austrian and Ger- Man prisoners who are attacking them.” But re- yardless of the numbers of those prisoners—now, vith Austria and Germany defeated, the Allies ould have shut down upon communication between ny such armed bands and their home govern- ents. And there were, moreover, Allied and merican troops in Russia—at Archangel, for in- : ce, and at different points in Siberia—who were ot associated with the withdrawal of the Czechs, ut rather dispatched to Russia in accord with the an of reconstituting a newfront against Germany. [here was, in-addition, the question whether fur- | fer munitions and supplies should be shipped to ertain Russian factions to be used against certain ther Russian factions. Did the interventionists it once point out that with the armistice there re- Mained no possible reason for reconstructing an a stern front against Germany ?. Or did there sud- | enly appear in the post-armistice news a new em- hasis—an emphasis no longer upon Germany— | nd yet one serving equally well to justify the re- ention of Allied troops on Russian soil and the ur tnishing of aid to one Russian faction as against | nother? : Three days after the armistice (November 14) ere appeared in the Times these headlines: OLSHEVISM IS SPREADING IN EUROPE; | ALL NEUTRAL COUNTRIES NOW FEEL THE INFECTION nder these headlines there appeared a dis- : tech from London (unidentified) declaring ~The a serious question of the hour, in the opinion Boome newspapers here, is how far Europe is in- ected with Bolshevism.’ Sweden was alarmed. Newspapers in Spain, Holland, and even Norway So express apprehension over the spread of the sg = THE NEW REPUBLIC -world came more frequently over the wires. Red Flag movement. The troubles in Switzerland also cause uneasiness. A general strike began there today.” One war was done. take its place. The Red Peril, hitherto an insig- nificant item in the news as compared with the peril of a_Russia dominated by Germany, now took pre- cedence in the dispatches. Reports descriptive of Russia’s aggressive intentions upon the rest of the oy week after this first dispatch, on November 21, the Times published a special cable from Mr. Julian Grande, in Berne: “The general strike here, which lasted three days, must not be considered as a mere local disturbance, but as of international interest, because it shows the extent of the mischief which the Russian Bolsheviki have already succeeded in doing. It is now known that the Bolshevist agents in Switzerland intended to organize a sanguinary revolution, hoping to extend it to the neighboring countries, Italy and France.” Ete. That same day the Times published a dispatch from Washington, stating that while ‘‘no definite word” had been received, “recent reports from _ London have been taken by some observers to in- dicate that Great Britain may propose the sending A new one was beginning to” of additional troops into Russia to place the country . on a stable footing and eliminate the Bolsheviki.” A new note, you observe, was appearing. It was not “to establish an eastern front’ that this dis- patch suggested Great Britain might send troops into Russia: it was “to place the country on a stable footing and eliminate the Bolsheviki.”” The note was a popular one. Three days later (No- vember 24) another Washington dispatch was published in the Times, reporting that in the opinion of Prince Lvov, Premier of the first Pro- visional Government, military and economic inter- vention was “imperative to save Russia against the revolutionary element now in control of its affairs.” On December 13 the Times reported that ‘Corne- lius J. Callahan, manager of the Russian-American Company for International Trade, a subsidiary of Gaston, William and Wigmore, who left Moscow six weeks ago, said yesterday at the company’s offices, 39 Broadway, that, in his opinion, it would be necessary for the United States to send a ‘for- midable’ army into Russia to restore order.’’ And three days later there appeared an Associated Press dispatch from Constantinople, giving the opinion of Paul Milukov that “the only possible cure for the present trouble in Russia is that an Allied force be landed immediately in the south.” The follow- ing day the Times asked editorially: “Having entered Russia for a purpose, why not carry out that. purpose?’ Reconstitute an eastern front? No. ‘Start a real movement to drive the Bolsheviki out.’ ‘The presence of a foreign army is usually an irritation; the irritation is there now; we can 17) ww

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— | THE new neeentTet remove it if we reinforce our armies and do some- thing that will make it safe to withdraw them later . Unless we drive the Bolsheviki out of Petrograd and Moscow the population of the bulk of Great Russia will have a winter of starvation.” Red Peril A month after the armistice thus found editorial writer, correspondent and statesman all well on the way toward supplying for intervention a reason as compelling as that motive which the armistice had done away with. As Alarming” said a headline in the Times on December 18; and four days later an Associated Press dispatch from Berlin brought a report that Radek, on the occasion of his recent visit to that city, had “boasted that ‘the money sent to Berlin to finance the revolution was as nothing compared to the funds transmitted to New York for the pur- pose of spreading Bolshevism in the United States.’’’ ‘A military expedition starting at Odessa,”’ said the Times,,.that same day, ‘‘could even now overthrow our armed enemies at Moscow and save famine-stricken Petrograd, and then meet the little force we have put in Murmansk.” Such passages as these, from the pens of editorial writers, correspondents and Authorities on Russia, show how facile was the transition following the armistice. A few days more, and it may fairly be said that the new motive was dominant. Thus, on December 24, the Times published a special dis- patch reporting that ‘Rumors have been current in Washington that General Pershing, acting under an understanding with President Wilson, has been preparing to send forces from France to Russia.” On the same day Mr. Charles Selden cabled from Paris that to deal with ‘‘the Bolshevism that men- aces the world” Prince Lvov and his colleagues had asked for 150,000 Allied troops. (Times, December 26, 1918.) Two days later came a second cable from Mr. Selden, reporting that while there would be no Allied intervention in Russia on a large scale—because ‘no European Government at the present moment cares to risk arousing the opposition of its people to sending large bodies of | troops to Russia for a Winter campaign’’—never- theless ‘‘a strong allied expedition is about to re- inforce’ the expedition already in Southern Russia, and they will take the place of the German troops evacuating the Ukraine.” Another two days, and headlines on the first page of the Times an- nounced— : MENACE TO WORLD BY REDS IS SEEN DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS IN PARIS EXPRESS MUCH : ANXIETY OVER THE SITUATION | The dispatch which these headlines introduced was one from Mr. Walter Duranty in Paris, dated “Red Peril Pictured August 4, 1920 December 28. “A French business man, just ree turned from Moscow after three months’ imprison- ment by the Bolsheviki” had told Mr. Duranty | “You people are living in a Fool’s Paradise.” : Danish diplomat, also unnamed, had reported that ‘‘to believe that Bolshevism meant nothing but disorganization . .. was to make a mistake for : which the world might pay dearly in the near fu ture.” Moreover— A high official at the Russian Embassy, whom I saw this morning, confirmed the main points of the — ominous condition of affairs in Russia. a _ “Tt is certainly true,” he said, “that the Bolsheviki — are better organized than most persons here imagine. They have forced officers and officials of the former — régime to work for them under pain of death. Ac- — cording to the latest information we have received, they a do appear to be spreading westward, and may create a 2 grave state of affairs for Western Europe by joining — hands with the extremist party in Germany, which — seems to be getting control, at least, for a time. That day, editorially, the Times cast its die. ‘The fault which the Allies are committing” in the front of their new enemy, the Bolsheviki,” it said, ‘‘is the same they have so long committed in front of their old enemy, the German autocracy. They allowed the enemy all the advantages of the offensive, and merely resisted at whatever point the enemy chose in turn to attack... Similarly the Bolshevist assault on civiligg - tion has all the advantages of the offensive.... As for the fear that advance into Russia voi or might contaminate the soldiers of the advancing force by bringing them into contact with Bolshevi argument, that merely means only. a postponeme! 1 of the evil day, for the Bolsheviki are on the offen sive and will bring that argument home to tht West without delay, When they do they wil be stronger and more powerful than they are now The Allies can fight Bolshevism now, before its teeth have grown, and run the risk of having t th cruder minds among their soldiers debauched b the argument that ignorance should rule knowledge ge or they can wait until Bolshevism has spread thé argument through the cruder minds not only o their armies but of their whole populations, ar then fight it with their morale thus impalteaa 4 ought to be a choice easy to make.”’ 3 The front had changed. ‘Their new enemy, th th Bolsheviki’”—‘‘the Bolsheviki are on the offensiy — fillies can fight Bolshevism now,” o r wait”—‘it ought to be a choice easy ’ mak Thus by the end of 1918, seven weeks after t armistice, was the transition effected. Gone w the old enemy—Germany. In Germany’s pla demanding more cannon and platoons, stood { “new enemy’’—Soviet Russia.

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EAA Pa Ge Cee aS ete eee ¥ it ll i ty Pag eee eee > fi» : a — we ae ; * wee ‘ ‘ ~- a . ‘August 4, 1920 Kolchak was the spearhead of Russian inter- _ vention. He was not yet in power when the Allied councils determined to reconstitute the eastern front. But when the emphasis shifted, with the end of the war against Germany, he came in time to play protagonist in the new drama, Within a 7 ' few weeks after the signing of the armistice, he _ stood at the head of the “All-Russian Government ' of Omsk.” _ There had preceded Kolchak, in Siberia, a gov- _ ernment headed by Peter Vologodsky. It was a _ government (more than one correspondent in _ Siberia reported) which commanded some measure _ of popular support. An Associated Press dispatch ' from Vladivostok (September 22, 1918) asserted _ that ‘democratic organizations in Omsk and Tomsk are supporting the cabinet”; Mr. Carl W. Acker- - man cabled to the Times on November 14, “It is _ a good beginning, with popular support and good i intentions and principles’; and the Times itself _ said editorially (November 24), “The Omsk gov- : ernment was the nearest approach to a democratic government representing Russia which has been _ created since the Bolshevist revolution a year ago; _ it was the one which the Allies could most easily _ recognize.” It was this government which a coup d’etat turned out of power on the 18th of November. _ An Associated Press dispatch from Vladivostok 3 F iclls the story: “Through a coup on the part of the council of Ministers of the new All-Russian government at Omsk, Admiral Alexander Kolchak has become vir- tual dictator and commander of the All-Russian army and fleet. Two ministers, M. Avksentieff and, M. Zenzenoft who opposed Admiral Kolchak’s dictator- ship, have been arrested. A portion of the directorate of the erstwhile Ufa government, which formed the administrative body of the new government, and to which the Ministry was responsible, supports Ad- miral Kolchak. ‘Telegrams received here from Omsk state that the move was ‘due to extraordinary circum- stances and danger menacing the state.’ - Was there an implication here that Kolchak him- "self had been a conspirator in the coup-d’etat which had arrested Ministers who “‘opposed”’ his rise to ’ the dictatorship? If so, the public was speedily in- 3 formed that no such implication’ was intended. ' From Washington (November 22) came the fol- _ lowing dispatch—based on information supplied by the “Russian Embassy” (the italics are ours) : 4 “Cable dispatches received at the Russian Embassy, today, from Siberia, throw a new light on the pp changes that took place recently i in the All-Russian Se ee eT ee ee eee She Ny ate ea RS eS : ie Woey or tl Pie ee » . aes are ~ ~s f THE NEW REPUBLIC Kolchak government of Omsk, and brought to the front, Admiral Kolchak as dictator with the approval of the government. A group of three military officers, on the night of November 18, according to these - dispatches, arrested without authority two members of the directory, Avksentieff and Zenzenoff, and two prominent citizens of Omsk, Argunoff and Rogovsky. The coup, the object of which is. not entirely clear, was attempted without any knowl- edge or participation of the government. It was promptly and emphatically disapproved by the government. In order to prevent further irrespon- sible activities and to maintain the principle of firm — governmental power, the Council of Ministers urged energetic measures and issued a decree authorizing Admiral Kolchak to take over the power of the State. By his order, the offenders were turned over at once for trial. ” This paragraph presents the case of Kolchak’s apologists: that Kolchak was no party to the coup d’etat. That he was its innocent beneficiary. That he was, in fact, brought into power for the express purpose of preventing just such coups in future, and for punishing those who had carried off the present one. Did Kolchak, the innocent bene- ficiary of a coup d’etat, bring to punishment the oficers arrested for overturning the Vologodsky cabinet? We have been unable to find in the Times this final chapter of the story: _ “Omsk. An order was issued to declare to all parts of the army that Col. Volkoff, Ataman Krasilnikoff and Army Chief Kitanayeff, who had been tried by — the Field Court Martial, were found—not guilty.” ’ Thus runs a report in the monarchist People’s Gazette of November 27.* The Man on Horseback A few frank reports of the effect of the Kolchak coup d’etat came to the Times from Mr. Acker- man. He cabled (November 26) that “the situa-_ tion is daily growing increasingly serious asa re- — sult of the Omsk coup d’etat.’’ And again, (No- vember 25) that ‘‘the Omsk coup d’etat has had a bad effect upon the Czech troops, according to General Syrovy. ‘The change of government,’ he said, ‘has killed our soldiers. ‘They say that for four years they have been fighting for democracy, and that now that a dictatorship ruled in Omsk, they are no longer fighting for democracy.’ ”’ | But despite such reports, the coup d’etat found * See The New Republic of July 9, 1919.

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20 THE NEW -~an early welcome in other quarters. The same issue of the Times which published first news of the coup carried also the dispatch which fol- lows: COUP PLEASES WASHINGTON STRONG HEAD OF SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL “Washington, Nov. 21.—News of the coup at Omsk by which Admiral Kolchak virtually became dictator of the All-Russian forces, is regarded at the State Department as another sign pointing to stabi- lization of the movement relied upon to regenerate Russia. The great weakness of the situation in Si- beria, it has been believed for some time, is the lack of a powerful head of the government who eannot be swayed by popular demonstration and who will work toward the reconstruction of the government with a firm hand... .” A firm hand and ‘an ability to resist “popular demonstration” had their charm. The same Times editorial (November 24) which had paid tribute to the old government admitted this much about the new: ‘‘Kolchak’s stroke changes its outward appearance, but may not have changed the es- sence .... Personally, Kolchak seems to be a strong man, and an honest man. In the group around him, is certainly to be found the nearest. approach to ‘Russia’ at the present moment... . We should give all possible support to any stable and approximately representative government that can be found. .” That pavernmient, it became more and more clear, was Kolchak’s. By January 17, the Times was ready to say: ‘From this distance it appears that his [Kolchak’s] appointment to a sort of con- stitutional dictatorship was the best thing that could have been done under the circumstances”; and by the time Kolchak’s armies were ready to move, he might—so far as emphasis on the coup d’etat was concerned—have been elected to the post of dic- tator by a popular ballot. ‘It was a democratic change,” said the Times on April 21, “there was no arbitrary coup d'etat.” | Recognition Kolchak had not been in power more than a few months before the question of diplomatic recognition for his government made the first of its many appearances in the news. On April 18, an unidentified dispatch from Washington asserted: “Unofficial advices from London have reached Washington today, that the leading Entente powers, as well as the United States government, would simultaneously recognize the Kolchak government at Omsk, in Siberia, immediately after the Ger- ~ mans have signed the peace treaty ....” It is important to note the stream of similar dis- _ be recognized”’; REPUBLIC patches that followed. These rumors were th . verse side of that other picture drawn so oft the picture of impending collapse in Petrograd é Moscow. Foreign correspondent and Washingt bureau kept repeating that Kolchak would “soe foreign correspondent and Wa ington bureau kept repeating that Soviet Rus would “soon collapse.” Prophecy was intertwit with news—and was utterly false in both cas Kolchak was never recognized; the Soviet gover ment, a full year later, had not fallen. But co stant repetition had its effect on public opinion, = So important is the subjective effect upon th reader of this sort of iteration that it is wor while following this story of Kolchak recognitio It began, as we have said, in the Spring of 19m We have in the following paragraphs listed a ff of its varied reappearances. ‘The instances see to us fairly chosen. In none of them does the coi respondent say that Kolchak should be recognize or that he might be; he reports that there evidence Kolchak will be recognized; and 1 some cases, (as items in the list show) he assei that recognition is nothing less than an accomplis ed fact. * _ April 22.* (Special dispatch, Washington) “Theil sion of the United States, Great Britain, France, | Italy .... to accord recognition to the Omsk cabinea de ‘ecg government of the country was reached, it learned today, under the leadership of the United — etc. | q May 206. (Special cable, London) —“A well authorig report reaches the New York ‘Times correspondent # recognition of the Kolchak government by Great Britain imminent. .. .” (The Headline read: Government.”’ ) May 27. (Special ae Laniloa) 22 The Council Four has unanimously decided in favor of the recognit in principle of the Kolchak government, advices from Pa say. his disposes of rumors current here relative to Pr dent Wilson’s opposition... . .” (The headline read: “Allies Recognize Kolchak ¢ C inet. ) =a “Britain to Recognize sa June 12. (Havas, Paris)—‘“The Council of Fours the complete text of the reply of Admiral Kolchak. < Recognition of the Omsk government, it is believed, not be much longer delayed.” - (Headline: “Recognize Kolchak Soon.’’) 3 4 August 26. (Special dispatch, Washington) —“Re S. Morris, the American Ambassador to Japan, w ic sent to Omsk to confer with officials of the Kolchak | ernment and make report on the situation in Siberia : recommended that the American government. grant it diate recognition to the Kolchak government . e nition is expected to: be granted inside of a month, Me * The date, in each-instance, is the date of publica : the Times. ‘ 4

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Reap ae, et te ee ee eS ee ae Ne St oh ae ps oh LE Oh =e Sa Peale PS ae ers r me deri se ee THE NEW Kolchak in Power August 4, 1920. " government only when it seems to have secured _ a firm hold over the people which it governs. Dur- ing the months Kolchak was in power there ap- 3 | peared in the Times evidence to show that despite _ the coup d’etat which had upset a democratic gov- ernment, Kolchak was winning the loyalty of the - Siberian people. Some of these reports had their 2 oe an ex-Minister of the Tsar presided) ; others, ‘the Russian Embassy” in Washington. Many F such reports, however, were based upon events of : { some significance and merited transmission as news. _ No doubt there were Zemstvos and trade unions _ and other democratic bodies that gave their support _ to Kolchak; we know (by this time) that there _ were also certain others, both in Siberia and in _ European Russia, that gave equal loyalty to the ~ Soviets. A declaration of support by a democratic _ assembly, either in favor of Kolchak or in favor _ of Lenin, is a news event of somewhat similar im- - portance. Is it the true function of a newspaper - and a press association to report or to ignore such - events without discrimination? In the Times you _ will find sixteen reports* of declarations by - Zemstvos, trade unions and other bodies, in_favor _ of the Kolchak government. There is no similarly - complete record of that gradual accretion of power _ which the Soviets must have had, to stay on top ~ in Moscow. Emphasis is an important factor in journalism. _ It is sometimes achieved simply by silence. Section III of this review gives a resumé of the various reports of revolt in Soviet Russia, of strikes and of revolutions. It is fair to say that whenever the Soviets were suspected of being in trouble, and of _ course they were in trouble, the entire civilized _ world knew of it the following morning. Was Kolchak never in trouble? He was, to be - sure, harrassed by bandit leaders like Semenof, _ and Kalmykoff.t But the Times had an explana- tion? for his failure to rid himself of such gentry: - “In spite of the demands of his war with the Bol- _ sheviki, he [Kolchak] made preparations once, if "not twice, to send a military expedition against these two Cossack adventurers, with the object of restor- - ing all Siberia to allegiance to the Omsk govern- * ment. Americans returned from Siberia say that _ this vindication of authority was halted by the mili- ; tary representatives of a foreign government, who _ find the Cossack leaders useful for their own pur- ig q _* Jan. 9, 1919; Jan. 18; Jan. 27; April 6; May 21; _ May 22; June 1; June 7; June 11; June 13; July 22; july 25; July 31; Aug. 3; Sept. 27; Nov. 23. _ q +See Times of May 31, 1919; August 1; By: etc. pepe October 4, 1919. August RST P| Recognition is ordinarily granted a de facto 3 origin in “the Russian Committee in Paris’ (over REPUBLIC eo poses, and who threatened to use force against Kolchak if he persisted.’ = Kolchak, in other words, could not be expected — | to take on Japan when he went gunning for two modest bandits. And with the reasonableness of this logic we agree—though it might be pointed out that the constant open rebellion of Semenoff and Kalmykoff made a little absurd the designations ‘All-Russian Government” and ‘Supreme Ruler.” But aside from the bandit chieftains, what of © Kolchak’s control over his own section of Siberia? What preparation had a reader of the Times for the revolutionary explosion that was coming? Had he been warned that it was from Vesuvius that ~ Kolchak ruled? ee It is remarkable how little can be found in thea columns of the Times to suggest the revolution that was to sweep Kolchak out of power—until the re- volution itself had broken. Reports received in August, that Ambassador Morris had found Kolchak’s position critical, were followed by reports — of a more favorable turn, Even as late as December _ 2, the conclusion of a Times editorial was not one that foreshadowed collapse. Kolchak was seek-~ ing to remedy mistakes; ‘“‘his government should be much more solidly established hereafter.” Twenty-two days later, there was no government — left to establish. On December 23, a revolutionary — ‘government was proclaimed in Kolchak’s second capital (Irkutsk). The following day, came ~ Kolchak’s abdication: | “In order to unite all armed forces fighting to make secure our political organization, I name Gen- eral. Semenoff, Commander in Chief, with head- quarters in the Irkutsk and trans-Baikal Russian military districts. All military commanders will be subordinate to him.” The Supreme Ruler had resigned in favor of the — Cossack Adventurer himself. Ironically, from — Washington, on December 31, came a special dis- patch to the Times (italics ours) : “ ... Information now received indicates that the appointment of Semenoff was in reality very little more than a recognition by Admiral Kolchak of an _ already established fact... .” . - To the reporting of Admiral Kolchak’s activities in the field it has seemed worth while to devote a — separate section of this study. ‘That section fol- — lows. For Kolchak’s activities as a statesman, the Czechs may speak. They knew and served hig 3 best: aa “By guarding and maintaining order, our army has been forced against its convictions to support a state of absolute despotism and unlawfulness which has had its beginnings here under defense of the Czech arms. “The military authorities of the Government of Omsk are permitting criminal actions that will stag-

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an THE NEW REPUBLIC. ger the entire world. The burning of villages, the murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants and the shooting of hundreds of persons of democratic con- victions and also those only suspected of political dis- loyalty occurs daily. ‘The responsibility for this be- fore the peoples of the world will fall on us, inas- much as we, possessing sufficient strength, do not pre- VIL. An American can picture the scalaion of Kol- chak’s armies, before the start of the 1919 offen- sive, if he imagines that Moscow is Des Moines, and that the Kolchak forces are drawn up on a line reaching roughly from Lake Ontario, on the north, to Roanoke, Va., on the south. It must - further be imagined, of course, that the railway lines reaching westward from the Appalachians are greatly inferior in- trackage and rolling stock to anything that might be called a trunk line in this country. Moreover, while the Appalachian Moun- tains may be considered as non-existent, for Kol- -chak, it is necessary to add a number of new and important rivers to our map—rivers flowing north and south, and thereby forming bunkers in the way of an advance upon Des Moines, should hostile forces dynamite the bridges. Finally, the important industrial cities between Des Moines and the Ap- palachians have no equivalent in Russia between Perm and Moscow. There are, for our calcula- tions, no Pittsburghs, Buffalos, Clevelands and 3 Detroits—along the line of advance—in which old equipment might be repaired and new material se- cured. What resources had Kolchak, for an advance upon Moscow, in the face of difficulties so sub- stantial ? Three months before the start of his of- fensive, he was credited with an army numbering **100,000 men, 200,000 more recruited, and await- ing equipment.’’ (Statement by Boris Bakhmetell published in the Times December 31, 1918.) How many of the second 200,000 had been equipped when Kolchak gave the word to start, it is impos- sible to say. It is also impossible to find in the Times a confident estimate of the number of Soviet troops opposing him. Some advantage Kolchak had, however, in the fact that the tide was running: in his direction when he started, Late in December, Siberian and Czechoslovakian troops had captured the city of Perm, (which corresponds to a point near Hamilton, Ont., on our transposed map) with reported captures of 31,000 prisoners, 120 field guns, 1,000 machine guns, and the annihilation of ten Bolshevist regiments. (Associated Press dis- patch from Vladivostok, published in the Times January 3, 1919. ) The Kolchak Offensive August 4, 19% vent this lawlessness. a “Thus our passiveness appears as a direct conse- 4 quence of the principles of neutrality and non-inteaay ference in Russian internal affairs, and we are becoming apparent participants in these crimes as a result of our observing absolute neutrality.” (Time, a November 18, 1919.) : The Oifeaiicn Starts Now the extraordinary thing about the new of Kolchak’s westward push is the extravanie of the claims that were made for him, on the basil of what’can fairly be called indefinite information, First news of what might be called the opening of the Spring offensive, was published in the Times’ on March 25. (Unidentified dispatch, Paris.) Kolchak was then advancing on a line some 250° miles in length. ‘At certain points” he had driven the Bolsheviki back “more than thirty miles”; a small city (Okransk) had been captured. ‘a Two days later, the Times published a second dispatch. (London via Montreal.) The definite information it contained was meagre. “A large number’”’ of prisoners had been captured; three Bolshevist regiments had been “‘annihilated’’; the city of Osa had been taken. Probably few Amer- | icans, however, realized that the capture of Osa had about the same significance and represented - about the same progress as the advance of our imag. inary army from Hamilton, Ont., to a point on the north shore of Lake Erie; and accordingly few may have thought the headline of the Times and the hrst@ sentence of the dispatch unduly optimistic: KOLCHAK PURSUES BROKEN RED ARMY * * * * * * * * “London, March 26 (via Montreal )—The troops of the Kolchak government who pierced the Bol- shevist front on a thirty-mile sector on March 11, continue their progress and the position of the Bol- sheviki is precarious. .... _ Their position, apparently, was equally precatis ous in Moscow and Petrograd. On April 3, a special cable to the Times from London (quotiagl the Morning Post’s correspondent in Warsaw), announced that ‘“‘Lenin and Trotzky have come to a definite break.” ‘The situation in Moscow and Petrograd has become so serious that there is promise of a popular uprising against the entire Bolshevist regime... .” . Meantime, during the first three. weeks of April the news of Kolchak’ 8 campaign was not substantial. Soviet troops were “retiring rapidly” on the ex- treme southern end of the line; a regiment had deserted in the north; nine hindsed Bolsheviki_ - ne. ag } .

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August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC ag 23 SERS ate e, Sea of” AZOW - European Russia, superimposed upon a map of the United States to show relative distances. Moscow coincides with Des Moines, Iowa.

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eS hd had been slain in Sarapul (a city which would cor- respond, on our transposed map, to Lorain, Ohio) ; and the city of Sterlitamak (about as far west, com-— paratively, as Grafton, W. Va.) had been taken. On the basis of such achievement, however, the Times published (April 20)—wunder the headline: “Reds Collapsing in the East’—the opinion vol- unteered by the ‘Russian Embassy” in Washington, | that ‘‘a collapse of the Bolshevist forces in Eastern Russia was imminent.”’ The Soviet army,.declared the “Embassy,” was becoming “‘more and more demoralized.” | Kolchak Triumphant Two days later, on the first page of the Times there appeared the headlines: RED RULE TOTTERS AS KOLCHAK WINS Now Kolchak, though readers of the Times might not have realized it, was still some five hundred and ninety miles away from Moscow when the Soviets thus tottered. At Chateau-Thierry the ~ Germans were fifty miles from Paris. What was the basis of such cheer? ‘‘Heavy losses” had been inflicted on the enemy; demoralization of the Bol- shevist troops was ‘“‘reported to be growing”’; three divisions had refused to fight; there were more rumors of revolts by the peasants. We are, at this point, hastening along toward the very zenith of Kolchak’s success. Note what happens in the meantime: an Associated Press dispatch from Paris (dated April 28) reports him in a village forty miles east of Samara (which, on an Americanized version of the map, might put him somewhere near Covington, Ky.) ; another dispatch from Paris (dated eleven days later) reported the evacuation of Samara itself; another six days, and Kolchak was in the city. This, in a few words, is the story of the drive on Moscow. Practically no definite claims had been made of prisoners taken, losses inflicted, or war material captured. Kolchak’s troops had simply followed an army (size unknown) apparently retreating at least in good enough order to save the bulk of its supplies. So far as the occupation of Des Moines was con- cerned, Kolchak still had Indiana, Illinois, and half of Iowa to fight across. Yet on May 15, the French Wireless Service, plus the headline-writer of the Times, informed the public: KOLCHAK PLANS MOVE ON MOSCOW _ BUT SIBERIAN DICTATOR SAYS HE WILL FIRST SEEK TO DESTROY THE RED ARMY * * * % * * * * “Paris, May 13 (French Wireless Service )—Plans are being made by the All-Russian government at Omsk to begin an advance on Moscow, Admiral - Kolchak, the head of the government, declared in an interview with the correspondent of the Petit Pa- risien. ne ~~ Sa Ng Oe tS ee A ee a See ee a ee ee yh SV bd = T-e a5 TS ES Sage ee cea a Renae ese Satie - (has eg ie eee ee ee ye oe ’ . Saabs satin hy Si eae 6 ite Pah eR ee Nod om - erga < ou Sle x THE NEW REPUBLIC center of the Ural mining district, and the site q August 4 7 ; From the hills of Kentucky Kolchak saw,” only with his mind’s eye, the steeples of Des Mo —saw them, now no more than four hundred ninety miles BETOES him. Disillusion Samara was the apex. Three weeks | (June 6), the Times reported Kolchak’s capt of Uralsk. But Uralsk was behind the line of vance, farther to the south. And the follow day, there appeared this cryptic sentence in a 7 don report of Winston Churchill’s address tot House of Commons: “Mr. Churchill said that the check to Admir F Kolchak’s advance was now more pronounced, ant that no attempt should be made to encourage ex - vagant hopes in that quarter.” x What did Mr, Churchill mean? puzzled readers of the Times. But in this instan he proved himself a prophet. Five days later, # Times published a report that Soviet troops we in Ufa; July 3, they had recaptured Perm. Ke chak was back where he had started. An uniden fied dispatch (Paris, July 5) brought a ray of hop “Reports from Omsk”’ told of “‘an i improvement it the situation. . Soviet troops were “showing fa igue’; Kolchak was “receiving reinforcement But it was of little use. On July 17, the Times t ported the capture by the Soviet army of the cit Ekaterinburg. Kolchak in that defeat lost one his most important bases. Ekaterinburg was # He may I 1a important factories. sive? ‘ No. Not, at least, for the ‘Russian Embassy sy A special to the Times from Washington, date July 31, brought the reassuring opinion of — Bo Bakhmeteff, now returned from Paris. One sho Nu go slowly in evaluating a “temporary reverse ‘Ups and downs, fluctuations of military chancel | but natural.” ‘For a healthy cause, 4 setbac - but a step toward improvement.” : And then, the following morning, came a from the blue: Was it the end of the os a ; “Paris, Aug. 1 (Associated Press)—The All Russian government is preparing to move from Oms k , to Irkutsk, Siberia, and the morale of the Kolchak army is becoming so bad that there is little hope of it regaining the territory lost to the Bolsheviki, accord: ing to dispatches received 1 in Paras .3< 5° 4 Cheliabinsk was lost. Another important b There was no base left for Kolchak, now European Russia. Brusquely, on August 2a Times told its readers what they might expect “Special to The New York Times. Washing on, Aug. 11—The position of the anti-Bolshevist army

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ok ales Date > hein we ay J wy 1 4h Ra ees nd IP rea lal ‘August 4, 1920 ¥ - Y ‘ x o iS Sees eee, eRe: Sn aS 4. : oaths renee eens Sinaia ane RE Sse Rn nettinscrerceete ‘ es . tere were » Bas European and Asiatic Russia, superimposed upon an outline of the United States. Moscow comes where Kolchak’s retreat from Perm to Irkutsk was accordingly a retreat corresponding to Francisco would be. THE NEW REPUBLIC cgncae™ re 7 oe — aah ied i te ee ue es * y eben tos Sate Se Tie ET GRE BS OOO eS re es 2 bie Soa niabe 7 “ EA RII Ns . Ries sis oa) Pana! 36 from Santa Fe, N. M., to a point off the Bahama Islands. commanded by Admiral Kolchak is so critical that official Washington is now openly apprehensive of the collapse of the entire movement headed by Kolchak. . . . The time has come, a high official of the govern- ment stated tonight, to prepare the people of the anti- Bolshevist world for a possible disaster to the Kolchak regime in Western Siberia. . . .” The following morning, three months after the headlines had said ‘Kolchak Plans Move on Moscow,” the Times tolled the bell for the fallen Admiral. ‘Kolchak Beaten’ was the caption on its editorial. Re-Enchantment As later events demonstrated, the judgment in that editorial was entirely sound. Kolchak’s day was done. But consider, for a moment, the con- sequences of ‘Kolchak Beaten’’: Kolchak was ‘‘the All-Russian Government.” He 3 had been groomed for leadership. Suppose that he had failed? Suppose it was clear that he had lost his chance to get to Moscow? There might, in that case, have been two queries working their way in- sidiously into American opinion. First: Where was that popular backing which Kolchak’s prop- agandists had claimed for him? Second: If the Soviet Government were to continue to hold power, was it not necessary to stop regarding it as a gov- ernment we need have no policy about? The news suddenly struck a cheerier note. Iwo days after the commemorative editorial, there ap- peared in the Times these headlines: LONDON NOT ANXIOUS ABOUT KOLCHAK AMERICAN FEARS THAT ADMIRAL’S FORCE IS NEAR COLLAPSE CAUSE SURPRISE DOUBT HE IS IN PERIL * * * * * ee * “Special Cable to the New York Times. London, Aug. 14.—American fears that Admiral Kolchak’s force is on the eve of collapse have been heard with surprise in well informed circles here... .” The dispatch went on to say that the well- informed circles had heard nothing alarming from General Knox (in the field with Kolchak), and that alarmist-reports seemed to “‘be inspired by deliber- ate misrepresentations in Bolshevist wireless re- — ports.” —Propaganda, in other words. The Times correspondent in Washington wired simultaneously in the same optimistic tone used by his brother correspondent in London: ‘Despite the unfavorable news that has come from Omsk re- cently, there are many army officers’’—no clue to their identity—‘‘who do not consider the situation in Siberia so bad as it has been painted in the last few days. These officers point out that equipment should now be reaching Kolchak, and with the Si- berian winter,” etc .... Moreover, “the State Department received advices from Scandinavian 3

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press sources today’’—original source of Scandinav- ian information not stated—‘that conditions in - Bolshevist Russia are very unsettled, while there is underway a great exodus from Moscow, the Bol- shevist capital.” | The Strategic Withdrawal Nevertheless, the retreat continued. Kolchak’s army fell back into Asiatic Siberia—lost Tiumen, another base of supply. Was it a serious loss? The - special correspondent of the Times in Washington wired on August 18 that “from almost every point of military stategy” the position of the Omsk army was superior to what it had been “‘before the recent withdrawal of the Kolchak forces began.” (Times, August 19.) An Associated Press-dispatch from Tokio (published three days later) was less en- couraging; reports apparently reliable, it said, in- dicated ‘“‘that the Omsk government’s position is growing weaker instead of stronger because of the advances of the Bolsheviki and the deser- tion of Siberian troops.” We had heard very little, up to this point, about the desertion of Siberian ‘troops. The attempts during the month of September to keep an appearance of life in an already dead movement were heroic. On September 6, a head- line in the Times announced: KOLCHAK RALLIES FROM HIS REVERSES The dispatch that followed (a special to the Times from Washington) declared that from what was “gathered” in the ‘“‘Russian Embassy” the tone of telegrams from Omsk during the last ten days had been “more encouraging and comforting”; Kolchak was “making plans for dealing with the situation.” And though, a few days later, a wireless from Moscow claimed the surrender to the Bolshevik of what remained of Kolchak’s Southern Army, there was at this time a little flurry about Kolchak’s regaining the offensive. He had, by the end of the month, pushed the Soviet troops back seventy- five' miles, “‘along the whole front,” and taken 15,000 prisoners. (Associated Press, Omsk, Sep- tember 28.) And on October 13, a wireless mes- sage from Omsk to London claimed again that “the Bolsheviki are retreating along the whole line.” According to a London dispatch: “The message also reports that a Bolshevist wire- less dispatch had been received which admitted that in a plebiscite in Moscow, the workmen had declared themselves against the Soviet and as supporting Ad- miral Kolchak.” “Certainly, with the Moscow proletariat coming out for Kolchak there was reason to keep faith burning. 7 THE NEW of the Allied Missions was ‘‘not believed to denote | typical of reports of the whole campaign that even R E P U B L I C Panga 4 4, 19: [ "The End of the Kolchak My The collapse of the ‘All-Russian Government” : came suddenly, and for readers of the Times, per haps a little unexpectedly. A brief two’ weeks” more, and there arrived direct from Omsk news that gave warning of the impending smash. ‘Am Associated Press dispatch (dated October 29) re- 3 ported that ‘‘the Siberian armies of Admiral Kol. : chak have been falling back rapidly since their re cent reverses on the line of the Tobol River.”’ These reverses foreshadowed the loss of Kolchak’s capital. Nevertheless, an Associated Press dispatch from Omsk, on November 6, reported that the departure any immediate danger to Omsk.’’ But the dangen for all that, was there. Nine days later Kolchak had fled his capital with the last remnants of his army, and the Bolsheviki had marched in. It is ~ in the loss of the capital itself there was console : to be found: 4 “Sentiment despite the reverses suffered by the All- — Russian armies continues in favor of Kolchak and the.evacuation of Omsk is not regarded as jeopard- _ izing the stability of the government and the integrity of the army.” (Associated Press, via Novo Niko- levsk, November 11.) | So ended the Kolchak offensive. it began, on a note of cheer. There was a thin stream of later news: the weary withdrawal to Tomsk; the further retreat to Irkutsk; the British War Office statement (Associated Pies: London, — January 1) that Kolchak had “‘ceased to be a factom : in Russian military affairs.” ; An extraordinary offensive it had been indeed. te never got within four hundred miles of its objective, It ended two thousand miles behind the line from which it started. On its behalf, when it was mov- ing westward, extravagant claims were put forward; in retreat, there was constant assurance that an early turn was coming. 4 Failure of the Allies to send 1 war material was the e chief cause of Kolchak’s rout? You will find Times editorials to assure you of that. But you will find also Mr. Lloyd George, saying in the House ¢ of Common, on November 8: ‘We have given real proof of our sympathy for the men of Russia whe have helped the Allied cause, by sending one hur dred million sterling worth of material and suppor of every form.” q That was not enough? No. Something more in. deed was needed. What Kolchak’s offensive demon strated was that soldiers, too, were necessary. An the soldiers did not materialize—those Russia soldiers who, the interventionists had promis ed us, would so willingly flock to Kolchak’s stand ard. a 4 is wa It ended, as

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August 4, 1920 THE NEW VIII. - The Denikin government, even more clearly than _ the government of Omsk, was a product of military _ power. Under the Tsar’s régime, Denikin had held _ high office. He had once been Chief of Staff; later, in command of the Russian armies on the south- western front. Apparently he was an able soldier; but until his sudden rise to power there was certain- _ly nothing in his career to mark him as that sort of radical democrat who alone could hope to rule suc- _ cessfully in revolutionary Russia. What put Denikin at the head of a government was simply the support of Cossack troops. ‘The fol- lowing dispatch tells the story: 3 “Copenhagen, Nov. 20.—The Ukrainian govern- ment has been overturned and Kiev has been captured by troops from Astrakhan, according to Kiev dis- patches to the Swedish newspapers. “The Ukrainian National Assembly has fled and a Provisional Gov- ernment has been established by the captors of the city, who are apparently commanded by General Denikin, leader of the anti-Bolshevist forces.” There was no ‘coup d’etat.” Denikin simply marched in and smashed the government headed by Skoropadski. That government, however, was “‘pro- German’’? It has been variously.described, Mr. Harold Williams, cabling to the Times from Geneva, on November 20, asserted that ‘“‘General Skoropadski’s last cabinet was pro-Entente, and in- stead of independence of the Ukraine demanded a union with federated Russia.’’ Whether pro-En- tente or pro-German, Bolshevik or Bourbon, one thing is clear. It was no sort of popular referendum _ that put an end to the last Ukrainian cabinet. It ~ was a Cossack army. Democracy in the Ukraine Now despite the fact that Denikin had been Chief _ of Staff under the Tsar, despite the fact that he had chosen the Tsar’s own Foreign Minister (Sergius Sazonoff) to represent him internationally, an at- tempt was nevertheless made to establish the credit of Denikin’s government as a democracy. Effort _ to create such an impression, while never so in- sistent as in the case of Kolchak, followed the same lines. Evidence principally of two sorts was intro- duced. 3 First: There were declarations of a democratic program. Some of these statements came from the _ government itself. For such statements, needless to say, neither the Times nor its field service shares any responsibility. Such matter was properly trans- mitted as news. But there were certain other oc- - casions when the correspondent himself undertook REPUBLIC Se Denikin to describe what the government was up to. Thus Mr. Harold Wiliams cabled from Ekaterinodar on July 2, 1919: “The scheme is clear and simple. It comprises: Russia, one and undivided, with broad local self-gov- ernment extending in certain regions to autonomy; land reforms ‘giving ordered satisfaction to the land hunger of the peasantry, an advanced labor program, a National Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, to determine the form of government, whether republic or constitutional monarchy. . = Was this an accurate report of the intentions of © the Denikin government on the date it was cabled? In such a case, it seems to us, the correspondent and _ his employer owe a responsibility to the public for an examination into the sincerity of programs which one of them offers as evidence of Denikin’s demo- cratic intentions, and the other prints. — The second sort of evidence introduced to sub- stantiate the democracy of Denikin’s régime con- __ sisted of reports of the loyalty he commanded. There were not many such reports, compared with the number of similar declarations circulated in behalf of Kolchak. But there were enough to sug- gest that Denikin had found popular backing. Thus Mr. Williams cabled from Ekaterinodar, on June 8: “When Denikin passed in his car through the streets of Kharkov women weeping for joy pressed forward to kiss his hand and those who could not do that, kissed even the mud-guards of his car. Endless deputations greeted him, among them one of factory workers who thanked him for their deliverance from the Bolsheviki liberty.” And again, from een on November 20, Mr. Williams reported that “‘the number of volun- teers for the army far exceeds the capacity of the army to receive them.” Finally,.so far as concessions to Ukrainian na- tionalism were concerned, Mr. Willams reported that Denikin had “made allowance for all reason- able demands by pledging himself to a considerable degree to the principle of regional autonomy, and to permitting the cultivation of the Ukrainian or Little Russian language and literature.” (Rostov- on-Don, September 13.) From the start, less at- tention was paid to the political side of Denikin’s venture than to its military results. Nevertheless — such reports as these lent a certain aura of democ- ‘racy to the leader of anti-Bolshevism in the South. Denikin had undertaken the construction of a dem- — ocratic government, had found popular support and had ‘‘made allowance for all reasonable demands” on the part of Ukrainian nationalism.

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The Pictare Fades Suppose one were to consult the dispatches de- voted not to celebration of Denikin in the heydey of his success, but to explanation of his failure after . the event? From Riga, on December 7, 1919—when Deni- _ kin was no longer a real factor in the military situ- *%, —- more loudly still.” spoke more loudly still? © [8 ation—Mr. Walter Duranty cabled that it was “precisely toward the re-establishment of the old régime that the Allies’ support has been direct- ed. No matter what the White leaders may pro- fess in the way of liberal intentions, the facts speak What were these facts that From other dispatches to the Times—dispatches which arrived when the battle was over, and judg- -* ment of Denikin’s régime no longer a critical yk a¥ £ issue—some of these facts may be assembled. The cable sent by Mr. Williams on July 2, 1919, with its report of ‘‘a National Assembly,” etc. (see above), must have seemed to many Americans to indicate an effort on Denikin’s part to establish a

ee <a the detailed annals of that campaign. _ genuinely democratic and responsible government. _ Yet it was not until seven months later, (February 2, 1920) that Mr. Williams reported certain po- litical developments by which Denikin “‘ceases to be ~ dictator, and has taken the plunge into democ- | tracy. * Again, take Mr. Williams’s report (November _ 20, 1919) that “the number of volunteers for the army far exceeds the capacity of the army to re- * The truth of the matter is, that Denikin’s government grew more and more democratic as his army fell farther and farther away from Moscow. In fact, by February 17, 1920, Mr. Williams reported the creation of a cabinet re- sponsible to the elective Assembly. Note that he terms this ‘a complete change in form of government.” There would be little value in tracing day by day the news reports of the campaign in southern Russia. The campaign does not fall into the more _ or less clearly marked phases that characterize the Kolchak offensive in the East. Furthermore, its advances and retreats are more local in character. line, Reports of successes in the Caucasus appear oy with reports of reverses farther west. Nor is it the purpose of this a to write Its purpose is rather to review the various news dispatches that reached the American reader, and to indicate their character. - Cities in South Russia, of course, meant very lit- “THE NEW. REPUBLIC — ‘many months, stood between the American public — . sive will perhaps reveal. Ix. The Denikin Offensive There is not always a general movement of the. See, a. Ps ie ‘ead “August 4, ceive them’’—and compare it with the after-the fact explanation made by Mr. E. L, James 1 in | special cable from Paris, on January 31, 1920: — “Tt is impossible to recruit in Russia an anti-Soviet a army, large enough to achieve success, according to M. Cinguareanu, representing Bessarabia at the peace ~ conference.... M. Cinguareanu told me that there ~ were many reasons why a big anti-Soviet army could ~~ not be raised in Russia, but all others were subordi- “4 nate to one reason, that not enough men could be found who wished to fight the Bolsheviki.” Or compare the early Summer report sent by Mr. Williams that Denikin was winning popula support with such a cable as the following: a “Berne, Oct. 11.—The Ukrainian rising against General Denikin in southwestern Russia, is continu- ing, especially in the neighborhood of Kiev, accord- ing to reports received here by the Ukrainian mission. . Among the troops who are fighting against Gen- eral Denikin are many former soldiers and mounted peasants who are said to have become enraged — the Cossack leader because of alleged atrocities. . . .” Mr. Williams had reported that Denikin had made “allowance for all reasonable demands” ong the part of the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, it was — revolt in the Ukraine—widespread and almost con. | stant revolt—that played a major part in Denikin’s — ultimate defeat. He pushed his troops toward Moscow. But he marched on a bed of quicksand. It would be easy, however, to overstress the im- — portance of the political side of the Denikin ad-— venture. Kolchak, not Denikin, was the protag- onist of democracy 1 in Russian intervention. Deni- — kin counted by virtue of his army. That army, for —~ and a realistic appraisal of the situation in Russia. — How effectively, a summary of the Denikin offen- : al x ~<a tle to the American public. The fall of Viadikav- kaz, of Paulograd, of Kamishin, had no significance - for the ordinary reader, But the capture of troops ~ and. guns and war material was another matter. One thousand prisoners on Tuesday, two thousand - on Friday, a steady iteration of this sort of news inevitably produces an effect waa the mind of any 4 reager..~- . A second factor of importance, from the stand. point of the present discussion, is the extent to which the American reader was either rightly guid- ed or misled, by the conclusions which correspond- E ents drew from actual achievements in the field. It is with an eye upon these two factors, particu- : larly, that this review of General Denikin’s cam paign is written. ; ey = ee ae

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eek ons Poe tre 2S ete ust 4, 1920 s The Spring of 1919 D ring the months of April, May and June, 19, Denikin’s troops were operating on a line Gnning from the Caspian Sea to the Sea of Azov. erhaps it will make events more graphic if the merican analogy is again brought into service. foscow, once more, is represented by Des Moines. yn that basis, Denikin is operating on a me running roughly east and west across cen- ral Mississippi and southern Arkansas. He is try- x, of course, to push north. Meantime, an anti- olshevis army is operating in the Caucasus the Gulf, on our map) ; and there are anti-Bolshe- ist Ukrainian troops along the Pripet River much farther north and west; we might say, west- rn Kansas). " Without doubt, the Spring offensive in the South lad one genuinely important result. Denikin man- iged to cut the contact between Moscow and the faluable Donetz coal basin, June was the month n which the Soviet armies began their counter-of- ensive against Kolchak in the East. Troops from he South may have been diverted, and, from the point of view, diverted wisely. But the loss 9 the Donetz region must certainly have been a rious one. = Aside from this success, however, there was no breat shift in the situation in the South, during the nonths of Spring. Denikin managed to push his roops north as far as Paulograd (which might be jompared to an advance as far as McAlester, Ok- ahoma, on the push towards Des Moines). Never- theless, there were more or less open promises of great things soon to come. The Times on June 24 printed a special cable from Mr. Harold Wil- ; ms, declaring the rout of Bolshevism on the Eka- erinodar front to be ‘“‘marvellously complete.’’ There was also news of trouble on the inside of joviet Russia. A dispatch from the Washington fice of the Times reported, on April 22, news : aching the State Department that “the bean frotzky régime is beginning to crack.’ A special lispatch from Geneva, published on the same day, isserted that the government was “menaced by an mtirely new revolutionary. movement.’’ And on May 24, the Times gave its readers a report more } romising still: _ -“London, hee 23.—The entire Bolshevist struc- "ture in Russia appears to be crumbling. _ “The evacuation of Moscow, the head centre of | " Bolshevism, has begun, according to reports brought 7 from Petrograd to Copenhagen by travelers, and for- "warded by the Exchange Telegraph Company. . ‘ It. was in captures, however, that Denikin’s army ad made a rich showing during the Spring cam- aign, “Tt had already, by June 1.... captured 00 locomotives.”’ (Times, June 27, special cable me “THE NEW REPUBLIC. 0,000 prisoners, 30 guns, 700 machine guns, and © from Eoaden.) Later in the month, 5, 500 more prisoners, 10 more guns, and three armored trains. were added. That brought the total for prisoners to 55,500, for the guns (including machine guns) to 740. ‘These figures let us carry over. -Midsummer Denikin’s army, by the first of July, had become the chief hope of the interventionists, chak offensive in the East had collapsed. Kolchak was back at the line from which he started. But Denikin was the new hope of Russia. During the months of July and August the anti- Bolshevist forces in the South took from the Bol- sheviki a half dozen cities of some importance. Odessa was their chief prize—although, through- out the campaign in the South—the fact that an — Allied fleet patrolled the Black Sea made Odessa a point of less real value to the Soviets than it might otherwise have been. Denikin’s line by the end of August, ran east approximately from Pol- tava to Kamishin, via Kharkov and Pavlovsk. That is, on an American version of the map, with Des Moines representing Moscow—it ran, roughly, across the northern end of Oklahoma, Arkansas and Tennessee. Kharkov was nearest to Mos- cow of the larger cities Denikin had captured. And Moscow was still 375 miles away. Nevertheless, the reports narrating this advance (to a point 375 miles removed from its objective) were often put in such a way that a complete col- lapse of the Bolshevik defensive was made to seem likely. Thus Mr. Williams asserted, in a cable published on the 13th of July: “There is really nothing now to prevent a rapid break through to Moscow, provided communications could be secured and civil administration be guar- anteed....” Headlines told much the same story: : July 3. DENIKIN SWEEPING ALL BEFORE HIM July 10. © ie ; TROTZKY’S FORCES FLEEING IN PANIC July 106. COULDN’T FIND FRONT OF DENIKIN’S ARMIES ADVANCED SO FAST DR. WILLIAMS AND BRITISH OFFICERS WERE UNABLE TO CATCH UP July 24. ONWARD TO MOSCOW IS DENIKIN’S ORDER Denikin, to be sure, was moving forward. Did = The Kol-~ —_,

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ae ee THE NEW headlines such as these seem to put him very near that ultimate success which (as events demonstrat- ed) he was due never to attain? There was again, in August, the familiar run of prophecy and rumor of domestic crises facing the Soviets, On August 5, the Times published an Associated Press dis- patch from Paris, quoting the opinion of a former Kerensky Minister that “perhaps the bottom would drop from the resistance of the Bolsheviki.” A week later, a headline in the Times: announced: “Strikes All Over Russia’—with a _ report that Lenin intended quitting his post. Notice how this report came to the American reader from its original source, whatever and wherever that source may have been. The Times got it from some unidentified news service. This service got it from its representative in Copenhagen. That rep- resentative got it from “dispatches from Helsing- fors.” And those dispatches, finally, were based on ‘Russian reports.” Where these “reports” in turn had their source, there was nothing in the dispatch to indicate. . Before leaving the midsummer phase of the cam- paign in the South, it is worth noting that during _the months of July and August there were announc- ed in Denikin’s behalf captures amounting to 74,-' 000 prisoners, 60 guns, 150 machine guns, 130 locomotives, 1200 cars, “large quantities of sup- plies and war material,” and ‘about half of the military supplies and equipment of the Bolshevist troops.’’* If these figures are amalgamated with the captures announced during the Spring, the rez ported victories of Denikin had, by the end of August, netted him: 129,500 prisoners, 950 guns, 330 locomotives, 1200 cars, “large quantities of supplies and war material” ; ~ and “about half of the military supplies and equip- ment of the Bolshevist troops.” Late in August a dispatch from London (August 21) reported that “‘the latest information” indi- cated the strength of the Soviet armies on the south- _ ern front to be 146,000. Denikin’s captures, then, by the end of August, had amounted to almost as many prisoners as there were troops left in the army opposing him. Denikin’s Farthest North It was the month and a half beginning early in September that saw Denikin at his best. His troops during that period occupied a number of strategic railway centers, one of which was the im- ‘portant city of Kiev. And in mid-October he marched into -Orel. Orel was Farthest North. * This material-is drawn from the following sources: communiqué from Omsk, published July 18; unidentified dispatch, London, August 1; Associated Press, London, August 12, quoting War Office report; and unidentified dispatch, London, August 28, quoting report from Gen- eral Kamontolv. So ae ae Cee sie RPO / ‘nounced: REPUBLIC ~ August 4, 1 Two hundred miles from Moscow, it might be el resented in the advance upon Des Moines whic we have imagined, by a point near Topeka, Kansas is Beyond Orel, Denikin managed to throw — part of his army. But there the tide turned back The present period was marked, as the earlier ones had been, by repeated stories of trouble De: hind the lines of the Soviet army. Taken by them: selves, these stories were enough to keep alive the myth that Soviet power might soon be broken coupled with some of the prophecy and suggestion contained in the report of the offensive, there may have seemed to be no doubt about it. On Septem: ber 28, for instance, headlines in the Times ail DENIKIN SMASHES BOLSHEVIST ARMY : Staff correspondents of the Times in Washing ; ton, and in Europe, reported that chances seemed good for an early and a complete success. Reader rs of the Times were informed, on October 21, of the confidence of such an outcome “in diplomatic circles’ in Washington. “Diplomatic circles” often imparts official color to a dispatch without the as- sumption of responsibility. On the present occa: sion “diplomatic circles” were reported to feel that ‘“‘a few more successes” for the White armies and “the Bolshevist leaders would make a fresh at tempt to negotiate peace.” “It is the mprea here, however, that none of the anti-Bolshevis t leaders will consider anything but unconditional sur- render, and the punishment of the Soviet chief tains.’ 4 But though its news columns exhaled an air of early victory, the Times, it must be said, was more cautious editorially. Had the Kolchak fiasco been a warning? “Lenin is still strong,’’ said the Time: on September 25, “‘but he is far weaker than h seemed to be a few weeks ago.” Weak indeed, i the correspondents of the Times might be reliee upon. Mr. Walter Duranty, cabling on o- 8, reported “the growing opinion” in Paris, “the the days of the present Bolshevist régime are nun bered” and that the government of Lenin “w: be overthrown from within.” News of h sort of thing Mr. Duranty may have had in min appeared in the Times a few days later (Oc i2).2 ‘7 NEW OUTBREAK _ IN PETROGRAD ANTI-SOVIET FORCES SAID TO HAVE CAPTURED IMPORTANT GOVERN- MENT BUILDINGS a eT % % eo fSce * * _ “Copenhagen, Oct. 11.—According to a dispatch from Helsingfors, Russian newspapers report that t serious fighting has broken out in Petrograd between adherents and opponents of the Soviet regime. 4 “The ‘Counter Revolutionaries’ have taken posses- ~«

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Ay eW eee et Betis tel PMR ee te lugust 4, 1920 THE NEW sion of several important buildings and Government institutions, it is said... .”” - Revolution in Petrograd, reports from Paris ai the days of the Soviet government were num- bered, Denikin moving upon Moscow,—a reader ‘might not have guessed that six months later the Bvicts would still remain in power. Moreover, ‘there were more impressive reports of prisoners : ‘captured and war material taken by Denikin. How ‘copious those captures were, the following table ‘shows. (Duplications have been omitted, as in all { earlier tabulations.) | War Material. 11 guns, 100 machine guns. — Source. Prisoners. _ Associated Press, London, Beet. 13, quoting British | & War Office 9,000 "Special cable, Harold _ Williams, Taganrog, (published Sept. 18) 13,000 tee eee q Special cable, Harold _ Williams, Rostov-on-Don (published Sept. 28) 13,600 q Unidentified dispatch, Lon- don, Oct. 7, quoting a “a large amount of i¥ ¥ Denikin communiqué 15,000 booty.” 3 Unidentified dispatch, Lon- don, Oct. 13, quoting a Denikin communiqué Be ee deans e q " Associated Press, London, - Oct. 16, quoting a Deni- 27 guns and “many ma- | kin communiqué 5,000 chine guns.” a _ Unidentified dispatch, Lon- don, Noy. 5, quoting a _ Denikin communiqué (RROD Sia arin eine sete ss 3 Total 115,600 a - It had been estimated, let us remember, on the "basis of “the latest information,” that on August 21, the Soviet forces on the southern front amount- ed to 146,000 troops. Since that date, Denikin’s -announced captures had amounted to 115,600. There was left, then, the small force of 30,400 men “to defend Moscow (assuming there had been no one killed or wounded; in that case there would have been fewer still). Other troops were rushed "in as reinforcements? Presumably. But let us remember, too, that during the time with which "we are now dealing, the Bolsheviki were also oper- -ating against Kolchak in the East—a thousand 4 miles away from Moscow. Just how inexhaustible were the troops and the supplies of this tottering and distracted government? Total the figures given in these tables, and you will find that between April 1st and late October Denikin’s forces cap- a ‘tured 1,008 guns (of various sorts) and no fewer than 245,100 Bolsheviki. And yet, there came a turning of the tide. “REPUBLIC 31 Denikin in Retreat The turning, we have said, came in late October. ‘There were, to be sure, later offensives on Den- ikin’s part, some of them recovering considerable territory. But from this time forward, most of Denikin’s announced successes were on one flank or another. He pressed no nearer Moscow. Re- volts behind his own line, in Ukrainia, were costly. By the end of November, Soviet troops were 120 miles south of Orel. Three weeks more, and they had recovered Kiev and Kharkov. At that point, a dispatch from London (December 18) summar- ized the opinion of the British War Office: “During the last week, the Bolsheviki have com- pelled Denikin to withdraw another fifty miles along a vast front .... the present indications are there is no reason why the Reds should not continue to advance.” By the end of the month Soviet troops had re- covered Ekaterinoslav; three weeks more, and they were in Odessa—with a line flung eastward to the Sal River, six hundred miles southeast of Moscow. The campaign in South Russia was ended. On March 4 came this dispatch from London: ‘The complete elimination of the forces of General Den- ikin in South Russia has been brought about, ac- cording to expert interpretation of the War Office advices of the past week’s operations. ,.. ”’ And yet, throughout this vast retreat, what sort of news arrived from the staff correspondent of the — Times with Denikin’s forces in South Russia? Was it plain statement of events? Or was there once more that false note of optimism, keeping alive the old belief that there was no need of revaluating our policy of intervention? Let us examine a few of Mr. Harold Williams’s dispatches, printed in the Times not in the first days of the retreat, but after a summary of British War Office opinion had reported that Denikin was falling back “along a vast front’ and that there appeared to be no military reason “why the Reds should not continue to advance.” From Denikin’s foadadastare in South Risen on December 16, Mr. Williams sent this message to counteract any “wrong impression’”’ “The spectacular fall of Kharkov may easily give a wrong impression of the situation here. It is neces- sary, therefore, to say that in Denikin’s armies there is no impression or expectation of defeat. ‘The losses during the retreat have been small, and great has been the army’s disappointment at leaving the area recently conquered. There are not the faintest symp- toms of débacle, and:the determination to win is as strong as ever... .” | Mr. Williams, all along, had the disadvantage of | poor cable communications. There was, according- ly, little snap left in his prophecies by the time they

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PME WRESTLE! OPA es! Suen py PeUp pat spe) oN A et LRN Petey 1A Shen lob th AA PEER AMP) SR Ry PWS EER OMe RMR Ct ge Rh OSI ou son ORS RL ARGS A aaa a A ie aa ab a MRE Md Vad te a . vor rey ACPI DON tata BN A i ea Le f * vel tey, sy a 32 actually got published. The present message ap- peared in the Times on December 27—and by that time Soviet armies were eighty miles south- west of the city whose loss Mr. Williams had mini- mized. Again, from Novorossysk, on January 12, Mr. Williams cabled that Denikin’s army had “been greatly strengthened by the infusion of fresh ‘troops’; but two days after this report had found _ its way to New York and appeared in print (Jan- uary 21), a Moscow wireless announced that Soviet troops were within six miles of the Black Sea at Perekop. On February 2, Mr. Williams, cabled (again from Novorossysk) that “the position at the front is steadily improving.” In fact, “the - morale of the Bolshevist troops seems suddenly to have collapsed.” But that optimistic message did not get into print until February 18. And in the Times of that same date appeared a Moscow wire- x The West Front From Kolchak and Denikin we turn to the West front, omitting from this study the question of in- _tervention in the North. ‘That chapter is not in- cluded because this is primarily a study of Russian news, not Russian history, and the news from Arch- _angel—throughout the period of Allied occupation —was limited principally to brief reports of mili- tary engagements. We believe that there were de- velopments in Archangel, particularly in the dic- tatorship of Russian civil government exercised by Allied soldiers, which failed to receive adequate description in the Times. We have chosen, how- ever, throughout this study to limit our case prim- arily to the news as printed. Partly for that rea- son, and partly because the Archangel adventure was never on the main track to some new ‘‘All-Rus- sian Government,’’ we pass over an experiment both disingenuous and disastrous. On the West front intervention never attained the scope it had in the East and South: There were neither Czechoslovaks nor Don and Kuban Cos- sacks upon whom it could be based. The offensives were the work of Finns and Letts and other border peoples, assisted by certain numbers of anti-Bolshe- vist Russians. To such forces the French and British governments lent aid. The French supplied military advisers; the British dispatched warships to the Gulf of Finland; and both governments fur- nished materials of war. | But while intervention in the West was upon a _ scale more limited than that upon the other fronts, it played nevertheless an important part in the familiar process of convincing the western .world that Soviet power was cracking, and that foreign THE NEW ‘REPUBLIC aay re Me fr Ee baste as} Ti ia ugust at | _viving optimism, the campaign in southern Russi chak’s, showed how little popular support the im Probably he was even better cared for. less announcing that Denikin’s army had su b i se quently been driven back to the Sea of Azoy. © Ht ie) xy Lal ty With this sort of alternately exploded and f died gradually away. Denikin’s offensive, like terventionists could muster.. Denikin, like Kol chak, drew supplies and equipment from the Al 25 But he could not march to Moscow, he could not even hold the line from which he started, because behind hin there was no body of genuine enthusiasm. For Denikin’s offensive, as for Kolchak’s, great claims were made in the campaign’s early stages. And when the later stages came, when Denikin’s troops were driven hundreds of files by the beaten armies of a tottering government, at least one voice wa: raised to cry ‘“This can’t be true!” That voice be- longed to the correspondent of the Times. AiG ‘a a a armies would be welcomed bes the Russian people, There were two offensives in the West: one in ne Spring of 1919, which the Finns and Esthoniar s started; the other in the Fall, chiefly the affair of the “Northwestern Army” under Yudenitch. Why r the Finns and Esthonians should have been so con- cerned about law and order in Russia as to want to invade the country, remains a question still unan- ‘ swered. i | The Spies Offensive Petrograd, of course, was the objective of both campaigns in the West. To its assailants, the city offered none of the tremendous distances involved in an advance upon Moscow. It lay just acros: the border from Finland, not much more than a hundred miles from the eastern line of Esthonill | At home, in their own capitals, the Esthonians and the Finns were nearer Petrograd than either Kol- chak or Denikin ever got to Moscow. a The first offensive in the West began late : April, 1919. On May 2, the Times published ar unidentified dispatch from Helsingfors announcin: that Petrograd was “being evacuated by the Bok sheviki.” ‘This dispatch was based on “reports . from reliable sources.’’ Two days later, there ap- ' peared on the first page of the Times the headline: PETROGRAD REPORTED WON 4 The source of this news was another unidentified dispatch, this time from Paris: ‘Petrograd 2 probably been taken by the Finns, according to in formation believed to be trustworthy, which hi BS reached Paris. "

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Syne ety Pee rat Ba « ; fe wus 4, 1920 4 ‘ a But though ‘reports from reliable sources” and “information believed to be trustworthy,’’ were thus “encouraging, Petrograd was not doomed to fall this early in the Spring. It simply disappeared from the “news for a few days—and then a fresh start was ~made. On May 13, headlines announced: TWO RUSSIAN COLUMNS MOVING ON PETROGRAD _ grad from the southern shore of the Gulf of Fin- land, three thousand more from the Olonetz dis- trict on the North. This information was supplied “by a dispatch from London, quoting a Socialist “newspaper published in Helsingfors. Would the _ advancing columns reach the city? _ ‘The following morning there were headlines _ reading: : q - 'TREDWELL REPORTS q ) RED RULE SHAKY _ Mr. Tredwell’s reports (according to a special | - dispatch from Washington) had strengthened the belief “of officials here’ that the “‘days of the - Lenin-Trotzky régime are numbered.” ‘Iwo more days, and a dispatch from Helsingfors (based on “reports received here’) announced that again the ' government had advised people living in Petro- ' grad to leave without delay. Lees What happened, next, the following headlines show: | ) : May 25. q PETROGRAD AFIRE a AS FALL IMPENDS os | May 28. FOREIGN REDS OUST BOLSHEVIKI CHINESE, LETTS, AND FINNS CON- — TROL PETROGRAD AFTER SEV- ERAL DAYS OF FIGHTING June 4. REPORT PETROGRAD TAKEN BY ANTI-REDS -ESTHONIAN AND FINNISH FORCES HAVE ENTERED RUSSIAN CAPIT- AL, COPENHAGEN HEARS a These headlines marked the high tide of the first offensive. What happened afterwards is not quite i clear. (Reval to Helsingfors to London to New York, “published June 17) that the naval base of Kron- ‘mies. But a little later (July 7) the Esthonian Bureau announced quite unexpectedly that'the at- ‘tacking army had “suffered a reverse.” It was “now in full retreat.” The first offensive was end- i * i a ed. ig ad Bp » a ET Ne eee CERN RE Ay Thane Ane RATT TON. Na MtrPh ay Boater On RAN W RUSE hee Ras eM TEN gv. aS: iy IISA eae Tae hes * Ritter LPN NR PRATER YES ay, ey np rat ge) Os) Ake ey wale bas Se oY es sa) > nie bree) a ey ee ie , “ ie ie 47 . \. A 4 a. ee ' Mat AM; iy SLAP. RMT DRS ce RE nec eee ahs kh 5 Maysare ~NEW _ Three thousand troops were to march on Petro- There was a report, several weeks later, stadt was about to be captured by anti-Soviet. ar-. Reecrric: , But not without results. Twice Petrograd had been evacuated. Three times it had fallen. nothing like the headlines and the news position that went to the ‘“‘evacuations” and the ‘‘falls,” a reader of the Times might be pardoned if he found him- self, at the end of the offensive, believing the hold of the Soviets on Petrograd a tenuous one at best. The Second Victory During the Summer months there was little news _of the attack upon Petrograd; but early in the Fall the second offensive started with Yudenitch in com- mand. It moved quickly. By October 12 it had reached Jamburg, seventy-five miles.southwest of Petrograd. Yudenitch at Jamburg—rwenty-seven killed and ee ee Y I Se And since the collapse of the attacking army received -. (There were so few casualties for | one hundred fifty wounded—that it seemed to some — observers possible that the Soviet troops intended to make their stand in the defenses of Petrograd itself.) One day later and Yudenitch was approach- ing Gatschina, thirty-five miles from Petrograd. Four days more, and an Associated Press dispatch from Stockholm announced the capture of the fortress of Kronstadt by a British fleet (‘according to advices received here”), And then, on the fol- lowing morning, and continuing for four successive days, began perhaps as remarkable a series of head- lines ‘as ever the Times has published: October 18. ANTI-RED FORCES NOW IN PETROGRAD STOCKHOLM HEARS October 109. ANTI-BOLSHEVIKI | GRIP PETROGRAD; END OF REDS SEEN | October 20. PETROGRAD’S FALL AGAIN REPORTED; MOSCOW LINE CUT hae October 21 ANTI-RED FORCES NEAR PETROGRAD NEWS OF FALL OF CITY BEFORE YUDENITCH’S ARMY HOURLY EXPECTED IN LONDON On to Moscow? . Well, not immediately. Ac- cording to a special dispatch from Washington, ~ also published on the 21st: ‘‘Word was received today to the effect that Gen. Yudenitch, if he cap- tures Petrograd, will not immediately move against © Moscow, but will stay in Petrograd long enough to organize the population and create a more ef- fective force for the southward movement.” Mos-

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ue COW ould wait. “It is believed here that Denikin will have invested Moscow before Yudenitch is ready to march against the Soviet capital.” So unreliable did these dispatches prove to be that the Times itself, after its four days of head- lines, lamented in an editorial the quality of its news. The four reports had been based respective- ly on a dispatch received in Stockholm; on “the lat- est official advices” received in London; on “‘a tele- gram received at the Russian Embassy in Paris’; and on a statement of the British War Office plus ‘‘a message from Helsingfors.” Coming on suc- cessive days they marked the high point of success for Yudenitch. During the week that followed, sensational headlines disappeared. There was still encouraging news: ‘“The fall of Petrograd is in- evitable, according to reliable advices,” said an unidentified dispatch from Reval, dated October 26. But the offensive, for all that, had reached its end. From London, an Associated Press dispatch, dated only one day later, reported: ‘The chances of General Yudenitch, commander of the Russian Northwestern Army, capturing Petrograd before Winter puts an end to operations, seem again to be fading.” Overnight the situation had so chang- ed that what had been considered Brardeoms Sy in Reval on Saturday was, by ara “fading” London. The fading, once started, shoved: a rapid process. “Extraordinary pressure” was brought to bear to - jnduce Finland to join in the attack (Associated Press, Helsingfors, October 30) ; but while Finland hesitated, Yudenitch continued to fall back. By November 4, Soviet troops had recovered Gat- schina; a week later, Mr, Walter Duranty cabled to the Times from Stockholm: “It is beleved that The Offensive Against Poland The activity of Poland’s army, unlike that of the other anti-Bolshevist armies, was theoretically lim- ited to the defensive. It was never advertised for an advance upon Petrograd, as was the army of Yudenitch; nor for a march on Moscow, like the armies of Kolchak and Denikin. It was, so far as official statement went, an army fighting to preserve that new state created in the councils of Versailles. Poland, however, was the keystone of the cordon sanitaire which Foch and Clemenceau endeavored _ to build around Soviet Russia. ‘The ostensible rea- son for this cordon sanitaire was the danger of Rus- sian armies carrying Bolshevism into western Eu- rope. That danger the Polish statesmen frequently proclaimed. Soviet Russia, according to their evi- dence, was continually on the point of launching an offensive against Poland. America and the Allies THE NEW REPUBLIC ees Bae, RY Be en Yudenitch is thoroughly beaten.” The offensie had collapsed. Yudenitch, like Kolchak and Hain: had found no soldiers with loyalty sufficient for his enterprise, Whether his army actually melted away in its ad- vance upon Petrograd (as a Kornilov army once melted) we were not told. But once it had met reverses, once it was checked, its disintegration proved again that there was no real support for the interventionists. A reverse that might have proved temporary became nothing less than defeat itself, because there was no real loyalty to ne cause. Yudenitch’s soldiers left him. His forces dwindled. By November 24, the Esthonian Chief & of Staff reported that the Yudenitch Army “had virtually gone out of existence.’ 7 Yudenitch was an adventurer. ‘There is no more! grim appraisal of the cause he represented, the character of intervention in the West, than this brief item in the Times of February 29: q YUDENITCH QUITS ARMY STARTS FOR PARIS WITH HIS FORTUNE OF 100,000,000 MARKS “Copenhagen, Feb. 27.—It is officially announced — that the Latvian Government has permitted General _ Nicholas Yudenitch, former Commander of the Northwestern Army, and some of his staff officers, to proceed to Paris, by way of Libau. a “The Berlingske Tidende’s Reval correspondent ~ says that General Yudenitch and his Generals left — Esthonia in an automobile flying the British flag. — The correspondent states that Yudenitch is taking his private fortune, estimated at 100,000,000 Esthonian — marks. Of Yudenitch’s army, it is said, there remain in Esthonia 12,000 men, who are suffering from spotted typhus. ‘There are also in Esthonia 21,000 — hunger-stricken fugitives.” | were summoned to the‘rescue, Poland needed g and ammunition. Were the war materials that Poland soughll fact to be used exclusively for the protection 0: Poland’s frontier? Or were they wanted for at offensive—an offensive which was to dig deepe into Russia, to cut a larger slice of territory fol new Poland than the generous diplomats in Par had awarded her? ; We know, now, two things indisputably: First: that by December 2, 1919, the Polish a mies were more than 180 miles deep in Russian te ritory (General Bliss told this to a Congression committee on January 15; it must have shocke Congressmen who had been reading about the § S$ viet offensive). | Second: that Poland. on February 24, 192055 Pp

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“ * Bae re. 4 eter ee a eS! ee ee ew oe Pee eet eet ta ee We Ba pS ee ie ee Ok eee oo ee Oh ie pt ide Pe bgt Ae eye ware |e baa ‘3 Ve res 2 he alt Ne ‘ w ; . o3 t >» at re cay AW a i. °3 gust 4, 1920 Py | a claim for an eastern froritier as it existed in 772—a claim which the Times’ own Washington respondent characterized as so ambitious that it ight “threaten the future peace and stability of lat part of Europe unless the program of the Pol- h imperialists i is abandoned.” (Times, March 7, 920. ) | 'N ow, these facts are known to most people Oday. It was not until July of 1920, in fact, that ie Soviets started a counter-offensive against the lish army. ‘That Polish army, meantime, had or more than a year and a half been deep in Rus- ian soil. And the theory that a Polish army an be advancing into Russia and still be on the lefensive is a theory many reasonable people have ound difficult to accept. Since General Bliss made lis statement and since the Polish diplomats put ip their peace terms, there is probably a growing lumber of Americans who suspect that for a year ind a half the repeated threats of a Bolshevist of- ensive simply served as a smokescreen for Polish iggression. E There is no criticsm to i made of a newspaper br a press service for reporting the opinions of olish or any other statesmen, provided such opin- ons come clearly labelled.* Collecting such ma- erial is part of the business of news-gathering. But sit not another matter if the propaganda of states- len appears in the form of news? We quote a few lispatches descriptive of the relations between oland and Soviet Russia. In our opinion it is fair 0 say that in the guise of news they picture Rus- a, and not Poland, as the aggressor as early as lanuary, 1919. What was the actual situation, at ae time each dispatch was filed? January I, 1919. ; On this date, the Times published an Associated ress dispatch from Warsaw, December 30. 1 Poland,” is said, “is preparing for a military ampaign along her entire Russian frontier... . rhe Bolsheviki have forced the Poles to take up rms by their advance into Polish territory.” Italics ours.) 3 At what point were the Bolsheviki advancing ito Polish territory? ‘The same dispatch had this ) say: “The Bolsheviki are advancing toward ina.’ Now where is Vilna? Is it in Poland? or the reader of this dispatch, that is certainly the ference to be drawn, But Vilna, as a matter of sal fact, is east of the boundaries later drawn for oland by the Conference of Versailles. Of course e man familiar with Eastern Europe or the man ho reads with an ethnographic map in hand, * A scrupulous editor might have felt it necessary in the - se of these threats of a Soviet offensive against Poland, ‘have added a note for the benefit of his readers. He cht have suggested, for instance: “It is hard to see how Soviet mobilization against foreign troops 180 miles deep Russian territory can be called an offensive.” THE NEW A could set himself right by locating Vilna. But how many readers are of that sort? In this dispatch it is explicitly stated that ‘the Bolsheviki have forced the Poles to take up arms by their advance into Polish territory’; and then, as evi- dence, is cited an advance upon Vilna, a city outside Polish borders. Was the correspondent of the Associated Press in Warsaw proceeding on the assumption that the Peace Conference would as- sign to Poland this city which he defined as “Polish — territory’? : REPUBLIC : January 22, 1920. The Spring offensive of 1919 had not material. ized. Would there be a Spring offensive of 1920? A special to the Times from Washington, dated January 21, made this flat statement, and made it as news: “The strategy of the Bolshevist military campaign during the coming Spring contemplates a massed at- tack against Poland, as the first step in a projected Red invasion of Europe and a military diversion through Turkestan and Afghanistan toward India. Plans for both campaigns are well under way, ac- cording to the best military and diplomatic intelli- gence received in Washington,” etc. Eight days later, as a matter of fact, the Soviet government again “recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Polish republic” and again invited Polish statesmen to enter into peace discus- sions. ‘That offer was insincere? Assume it was. Where were Polish troops when Russia was plan- ning ‘‘a projected Red invasion of Europe’? They were (see General Bliss’s testimony) 180 miles across their border into Russia. | February 16, 1920. One further instance: A special cable to the Times from Copenhagen, dated F ebruary 15, again made a flat statement of fact: “Information collected from reliable agents in Russia leaves no doubt that the Bolsheviki are pre- paring an enormous offensive against Poland, for early in the Spring, that negotiations with England are only to gain time, and then, Poland, undermined by propaganda, cannot resist the Soviet Army of 2,000,000.” ; On this date not only were Polish troops still deep in Russian territory, but in the Times itself. it was reported (special dispatch from Washington, March 6) that the Polish representative in Paris refused to “transmit to Poland the demand of the Allies for withdrawal of Polish troops to the ethno- graphic frontier fixed by the Allied Supreme Coun- 2 Paag Soviet Russia, the aggressor; Poland desperately in need of assistance that she might hold the fron- tiers assigned her by the Peace Conference—that, we believe, is the conclusion a reader might have drawn from many dispatches in the Times while

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Oi hee Re oe Ae RD ae ach hr I 2 a ee Ta I a a a Be Rae peak’ aay ERED rok ree be Ma . 4 th, : +4 Rr ae ta i Wy Melo sah yf Ww sat. es . Boyne i erie | ahs Pah A ee a iu a) Be Ap 8S Pras | a\ v5 vie , e SA eB oe \ . i a b 36 Polish troops were still on Russian soil. ‘There is one particularly illuminating incident. It is un- ‘important, but it throws a light on the handling of Polish-Russian news in the columns of the Times. On March 4th appeared this dispatch: London, March 3.—A Moscow wireless dispatch received here, says the proposed peace conditions with Poland have been denounced as extravagant. The XII. One section more will serve to bring this study to an end; for with the collapse of intervention, in the last months of 1919, relations between Russia and the Allied: world entered a deadlock during which a single, easily discernible note has dominat- ed the news of Russia, as that news finds expression in the columns of the limes. Before turning to this final chapter, however, it is worth while to note one factor which in our opinion played a substantial part in keeping many Americans satisfied that there was no better policy to be adopted towards Russia, from February to November, 1919, than the policy of helping White Guards make their wars. This factor is the inade- quate and therefore misleading fashion in which were reported the several efforts of the Allied Pow- ers, during that period, to give their policy a new turn. Bt KOE silése forts the Prinkipo proposal was the first. Why did that program fail? On March 1, 1919, the Times printed a dispatch from Paris, quoting M, Clemenceau’s aide, M. André Tar- dieu: “There was no longer any question of going on with the Prinkipo conference, he informed the cor- respondents. He said that the Bolsheviki had failed to comply with the conditions laid down by the Entente as to a suspension of hostilities and that the Allies had in view new methods of restoring order in Russia and were examining available means to carry out this purpose.” | Had the Soviets in fact refused ‘“‘to comply with the conditions laid down by the Entente as to a sus- pension of hostilities’? Examine the Soviet reply to the Prinkipo proposal, as printed in the Times (February 7): “The Russian Soviet Government, in a wireless message to the Entente Governments sent out from Moscow by M. Tchitcherin, Minister of Foreign Af- fairs, announcing that it is willing to begin conversa- tions with the Entente with the object of bringing about a cessation of military activities, declares it is willing to acknowledge financial obligations regard- ‘ing the creditors of Russia of Entente nationality. Moreover it offers to guarantee the payment of inter- est on its debts by means of stipulated quantities of Nee: ne Ranks AR ee! nnd re a sais Bie ia) Fano Oi Tiere? THE ‘NEW REPUBLIC When Intervention Failed the abridged version for publication—whether gc ae rly a Ys A bd / aa: ont ta" “At a a) ae bt dey a August dispatch adds that Nikolai Lenin, the Bolshevist E mier, in a speech at the Cossack Congress said: “Tf the Polish aggressor invades our country, 1 will give him a blow that will not be orate” Ry al a a n By Lenin declared that Russia would fight a defense. And the headline in the Times read: © LENIN THREATENS POLAND raw materials, and to place concessions in mines, for- ests, etc., at the disposal of citizens of the Entente, provided ‘the social and economic order of the Soviet t Government is not affected by internal disorders con nected with these concessions.’ “The message adds: “The extent to which the Soviet Government is pre- pared to meet the Entente will depend on its military position in relation to that of the Entente Govern- _ ments, and it must be emphasized that its ) posta improves every day’. ”’ ‘ This constitutes the full reply of the Soviet fl | ernment, as printed in the Times. And it tendal self to M. Tardieu’s interpretation. For thought considers other subjects, in it there is not a wor about willingness to suspend hostilities. 4 Compare, however, this abbreviated version. ( the reply with the full statement as now publish in “Russian-American Relations.”* In this cot plete statement the Soviet government declares self “anxious to secure an agreement that wou put an end to hostilities”; it is, in fact, ready | discuss ‘‘the question of annexation of Russian te ritories by the Entente Powers,” or by “fore which . . . receive financial, technical, military, ¢ any other support from them’’—in other veq Kolchak and Denikin. r What is the meaning of this discrepancy betwet the complete and the abridged versions of the § | viet reply? ‘Simply this: that whoever prepar ernment censor or correspondent or editor om ted from that version the offer of the Soviet go ernment to conclude an armistice—and that sub quently it was on the ground of Soviet unyill ness to quit fighting that M. Tardieu, official r resentative of France, justified the abandonment the whole plan. The Allies may indeed have be unwilling to trust the word of the Russian gove ment—though to it they addressed a formal p posal. The fact remains that Americans who | lied on the Times’ version of the Soviet reply w I, Bs. pe a ay hp) ys * “Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920” ( page : 29 As an earlier footnote has pointed out, one of the th men who directed the preparation of this volume—Wil Allen White—was selected by President Wilson as At ican representative at the Prinkipo conference.

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7 ae RREE SS EMRE As ed Gy ies VAP TENS ENS OVALE T eo ve ph iY re RIN a eg fgte To ‘ at oy Ne oe my aris i 4 bia 2 ia ' ie « NPS, Ks a By TH PY Le Sie Le | We ra f% at we Bal Ty a] tee ok W9. La, _ } 7 Ps Pe hae fe aK SCIP abn wile ® ' ‘ eee ie Pye aaa THE NEW a f & } ugust 4, 1920 a imply not supplied with a fact necessary to an in- elligent understanding of why the Prinkipo plan was a failure. Read in the light of the complete statement certain other news items appearing about he same time assume more significance. In the three weeks before M, Tardieu gave the press his explanation, you find not all the fighting in Russia was being done by the Soviet forces: an Allied of- fensive had been started near Kadish, in the North (Times, February 9); Denikin had reached the Caspian Sea after a march in which he scattered “over 100,000 Bolsheviki” (Times, February 19) ; Polish forces were “steadily advancing along the railways’’—advancing into Russia—and thus far they had “‘met with no determined resistance from the Bolsheviki’’ (Times, February 23). In these circumstances the complete reply of the Soviets to the Prinkipo offer would have been instructive. It was not available. a Rs a M q Dr. Nansen _ The Nansen offer, following close upon the heels of the Prinkipo affair, serves as a second incident of the sort with which we are now dealing. On April 3* (1919) Dr. Fridtjof Nansen proposed to the Supreme Council his plan for ‘“‘a purely humanitar- ian commission for the provisioning of Russia.” On April 17* the Supreme Council, declaring it “shocking to humanity that millions of men, women and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable,’’ marked out the conditions of its cooperation and asserted that upon those con- ditions ‘‘we should be prepared to give it our full support.” Yet the plan failed. Nothing came of the sudden humanitarian interest. Why? ' “Lenin Rejects Feeding Project,’’ said head- dines in the Times, on May 14—and this report followed: : | _ “Paris, May 13, (Associated Press)—A wireless ' message received here addressed to Dr. Fridtjof q Nansen, head of the commission to feed Russia, from _M. Tchitcherin, the Bolshevist Foreign Minister, and 4 relayed by the Foreign Office at Berlin, announces _ that the Bolsheviki refuse to cease hostilities as a con- _ _ dition of the provisioning of Russia by neutrals. | ' “YT chitcherin says he received Dr. Nansen’s com- ' munication, dated April 17, on May 4. He thanks 4 Nansen for his interest in the conditions in Russia, but declares that a continuation of hostilities is neces- ' sary for political reasons and that it would be poor 9 policy to stop them. ‘The Soviet Government, he _ adds, is willing to support a movement to feed Russia so long as it has no political character, ‘but will not be duped’. : : _ “He then goes on to denounce Admiral Kolchak ' and General Denikin, and concludes by declaring -* See “Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920” (pages 329-331). mi _ in the Times of May 14. ee i i that it will be impossible to give up fighting, as ene-. mies are attacking on all sides.” REPUBLIC How accurate a version of the Soviet reply did this summary offer? It makes an interesting com- parison with the complete document.* In the first place, that document is more than 1,300 words in length—and even the best reporter or the most conscientious censor (whichever did the editing in this case) must supply a necessarily inadequate ver- sion when he compresses a document of that length into 144 words. If the complete reply was avail- able to the Associated Press agent, this would seem to have been one of those occasions (particularly — in view of the unimportant material which often . comes over the wires) when he was warranted in sending a full text. It may be that a more adequate summary was indeed cabled by the Associated Press, and that the pruning was done somewhere on this side of the Atlantic. In any event, either cen- sor, correspondent or editor missed a chance of sup- plying the American public with information neces- sary for an independent judgment of the situation. But this is not all. The published summary is not only abbreviated, but it omits entirely the one point in the complete document which in our opinion is most relevant, According to the published sum- mary, the Soviets declare ‘‘it will be impossible to give up fighting.”” What does the unabridged text say, at this point? © | “We are in a position to discuss cessation of hostil- ities only if we discuss the whole problem of our relations to our adversaries—that is, in the first place, to the Associated Governments. ‘That means to dis- cuss peace, and to open real negotiations bearing upon the true reasons for the war waged upon us, and upon those conditions that can bring us lasting peace. We were always ready to enter into peace negotiations, — and we are ready to do it now as before.” Add this passage to the Soviet reply as published It does not, to be sure, alter the fact that the Soviet government turned down the Nansen offer. The Soviets did reject that proposal, as the headlines said they did. But their declared reason for rejecting it—a reason indicated neither in headlines nor in the dispatch—was not because they chose to keep on fighting, but because they asserted only a general peace could put an end to war. This was an irrelevant observation? No. The Council of Four, in its reply to Dr. Nansen, had declared that any “relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would be impossible to consider.” ‘The Soviet government thereupon declared its willing- ness ‘‘to discuss peace and to open real negotia- tions.’ Its offer may have been disingenuous. The Council of Four, though it declared for peace, may * Now published in “Russian-American Relations, 1917- 1920” (page 332). :

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| 38 ct Sy 4 aay me ind oa ee ee ee es See oP ey See Ved "2 OP ig) sw eee ihe “e entre eee Be | Re a NT ee ~*~ \ rae. > » Mee ONES ROT ce Rite ec laet Se eee nfien Uae aN, AY, MeN URRY ONE E UMMERTSCUMC TAT Cy) SUERA SaR MN en Rosalie ola Rea SR eS me pe ao wi ah hAaes ‘o ads Sie ae Si hd ope nae > tu ey. ‘ YIM PPR or ae e Dea Se ke rr é) 4 Ses Mya idee s ae, an em ee ay eee ee Not > Mahe Tees Ba ty em a PAT A Ee Suche Mies Rae Wake Me ee) ek Re as er sss) Rut Obie ly ES Solis Pt ange ts ee ie er ee af Cheat Mere Cor a TAs aby eras es cha La | <8 freee 7 Sy a Siok to ha ea He om : ‘ ‘ ee, oz ea Nan AS eee 4 * ” ¥ THE NEW have been unwilling to face it, when it came. But this was not the phase of the question suggested to the American public by the abridged version of the Russian reply published in the Times. That abridg- ed version declared the Soviet reply to be: “it will be impossible to give up fighting.” ‘The proposal - for a general peace was entirely omitted. Six days later (May 20) the Times published this second dispatch—a tombstone sie amr the burial spot of Dr. Nansen’s plan: “Paris, May 18.—There is a general impression that the reply of M. Tchitcherin, Bolshevist Foreign Minister of Russia, to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen’s pro- posals to feed Russia, brings the whole project to a close. ‘The reply is generally accepted here as, in effect, a refusal by the Bolsheviki to cease attempting to invade their neighbors’ territory. . . .” War’s End The failure of the Nansen plan and of the Prinkipo conference, with the subsequent and equal- ly dismal failure of the three White Generals, brought the Allies through their second year of in- decision and left them, at the end of 1919, no nearer peace in Eastern Europe than they had been before. The period which followed, the period with which this study closes, may be said to have had its beginning in November, 1919. By that time there was little hope left of success for the White armies. Kolchak was “‘falling back rapidly” in Siberia (Associated Press dispatch dated October 29); Yudenitch had had his second try at Petro- grad, and missed it; Denikin had touched his farth- est north, and now was facing south again. Winter promised little to the interventionists. Out of the failure of the White Generals might have come, in those days of early winter, a break in the current of American opinion. Intervention was discredited. So was the myth of a Soviet Gov- ernment perpetually tottering on the brink of de- struction. If the Soviets were there to stay, even though their stay be temporary, was it not neces- sary to revaluate the policy of the Allies? Reports of atrocities—there had been scores of such reports, during 1919—had kindled in American opinion no feeling of respect or friendliness for the Soviet Government. But war had failed. War in Eastern Europe meant no peace for the rest of the world. Why not try peace with Russia? Not peace in its diplomatic sense, probably, with loans and treaties, and all that may accompany formal recognition. But peace in the sense of having nothing more to do with playing favorities, with dis- patching arms to one faction at the expense of another. Peace, too, in the matter of the blockade, with medicines for a stricken country, and a re- sumption of trade relations provisional upon good behavior in respect to “international propaganda.” - towards peace, and of the uneasiness that must have e ear sy! ere Bi sv 4, 1 Some such policy, we believe, was a natural 01 ut growth of the factors in the Russian situation ¢ the end of 1919—an outgrowth of the failure af intervention, of the natural reaction from war been growing in the minds of many normally gener ous Americans over a policy which condemned te 3 starvation and to death by disease many Raa men and women innocent of all complicity in ne Soviet adventure. What prevented these opinions from ripening into insistence upon a re-assessment of American policy toward Russia? 4 Doubtless a number of different factors played their part. One factor, we believe, falls within a range of this present. study : the character of t news about Russia coming in a rush during the final period with which we are now dealing. 4 From the time the three White Generals had started their offensives until the winter months came : round, the dominant note in the news—as the fore- going sections amply illustrated—had been one 0: all-pervading optimism. Kolchak and Deni 7 were on more than one occasion advancing upon Moscow—Yudenitch, upon Petrograd. And from, within Soviet Russia, we remember, came many re- ports of crises and counter-revolutions heralded it headlines as foreshadowing the’ doom of So 4 power. In the months between March and No- vember, 1919, there was little in the news about Red Peril. White was triumphant. 4 Once before, in such a moment as this, when ; v lied diplomacy had come squarely to the cross-roads, the Red Peril played a part in turning it from peace That, as an earlier section of this study has told, was immediately after the armistice—when there was no longer motive for reconstituting an easter! front, and when reason pointed to a withdraw: of troops from alien soil. ‘Then the Red Peril ap: peared—furnishing a new cause for intervention Once again, at the present cross-roads, that Peri emerged from the oblivion to which the past s months shad relegated it—and cast its shadow on the sky. ‘% Early November (1919) marked its reappear ance. On the 1oth of that month the Times printe a special cable from London. “Attempts were mad in several countries over the week-end,” it read, “ put into operation an ambitious program of a ‘Red international effort at a world rising in support 0 Bolshevism.” Four days later Rppeatey anoth dispatch from London: a LENIN THREATENS INDIA HINTS AT FUTURE OPERATIONS IN LETTER TO TURKESTAN REDS ake Nov. 13.—Nicolai Lenin, the Russian Bolshevist Premier, has sent a letter to Turkestan Communists in which he says that the restoration of communications between Soviet Russia and Turkestan

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sa ow ' ee om oS aa ee gus 4, 1920 THE NEW 4 opens the way for a struggle against universal im- { Serialism headed by Great Britain.” _ The message is interpreted here as a hint at opera- _ tions in the direction of British India. q Two weeks later (November 30) headlines in the Times announced : q CRISIS IN THE FIGHT q AGAINST BOLSHEVISM A NEW MILITARY MENACE TO BE OVER- COME IN EASTERN EUROPE TO MAKE VICTORY SECURE E There followed a special dispatch from Washing- ‘ton. Events in. Russia, it declared, had brought ‘officials and diplomats ‘‘to a sudden reconsideration ‘of the whole complicated situation involved in the worldwide menace of the Bolshevist movement.’ That familiar device—the ‘well-informed circle” — was busily ona again: “The best canvass of opinion in wall datornied circles in Washington indicates that the Russian Bol- __ shevist movement is now to be regarded primarily as _ a military menace rather than as a political one—a ' menace that should be dealt with militarily and crushed militarily, just as the threat of German mili- tarism and imperialism against the world’s safety, which loomed larger when the German drives began in the Spring of 1917, almost simultaneously with the entry of the United States into the world war, had to be met militarily.” What was to be the Allied program? Those in- Beinately familiar with the situation had ready a "Solution: | “It has now become clear to men intimately fa- _ miliar with the situation that the Bolshevist military _ - menace’ must be smashed and that in President Wil- __ son’s phrase, it can be met only with ‘force without r stint’. « Pi. 'g ¥ To a long train of similar dispatches picturing i the Red Peril these two were the forerunners. Those which followed touched on many themes. Aside from the idea of general peril there was, for in- stance, the special peril menacing the Baltic States. ‘Thus on December 17 (1919) the Times published a special dispatch from Washington, asserting that Bh Soviets were attempting ‘‘to dragoon the _Esthonians into acceptance of impossible demands in the face of military pressure.” A high official ‘in the State Department had summarized for the “correspondent his idea of the Russian tactics: “These Avenida.” said a high official of the State Department today, in an authorized statement having __ the indorsement of Secretary Lansing, “which would _ make Esthonia essentially a part of Bolshevist Russia, _ ate being enforced by determined military attacks _ upon the Esthonian front. . . .” / |G wig Oo, Sie ie 39 headline in the Times itself announced: ‘“Esthonia Got Much From Soviet Russia” (Times, F ebruary 6, 1920).* Again, there was the special peril menacing countries less directly in the path of Soviet Russia than were the Baltic states. Headlines on the first page of the Times, December 30, 1919, reported “Reds Seek War with America’; and the Times of February 11, 1920, carried this dispatch: * * co * bo *% * * FEAR THAT BOLSHEVIKI WILL NOW INVADE JAPANESE TERRITORY Honolulu, T. H., Feb. 9 (Associated Press) —Siberian Bolsheviki have captured Alexandrovsk, capital of the island of Sakhalin, and fear is felt that the radical forces may enter Japan proper, according to a special cable dispatch from the Tokio corres- pondent of Nippu Jiji, Honolulu Japanese language newspaper. ... Now and then there was peril which the Amer- ican Government itself took a hand in advertising. Thus the Times on February 7, 1920, under head- lines asserting ‘‘Reds Raising Army To Attack | India,” carried a dispatch beginning in the follow- ing fashion: Special to the New York Times. - Washington, Feb. 6.—A brief but significant announcement was issued by the State Depart-. ment today, based on its official advices, to the effect that the Bolsheviki were endeavoring to establish ’ military bases in Turkestan for a campaign against India. “The department’s information,” says the official announcement, “‘is to the effect that in Turkestan the Bolsheviki are recruiting natives and war prisoners into new units and are establishing military bases said to be preliminary to a campaign against India.” ‘ Z ' As authority for this statement the Department cited an intercepted wireless message from Moscow to Tashkend, on December 6, 1919, announcing that ‘‘a propaganda train for organization and in- structive purposes will be dispatched to Turkestan.” This intercepted wireless was all of the document- ary proof brought forward. Nothing in the pub- lished-report was said of any propaganda outside of Turkestan. Was the State Department (guilty of more than one slip in the past) forgetful of the fact * Esthonia, according to accounts in the Times, Feb- ruary 3, 4, and 6, 1920, received full recognition of her independence; fifteen million rubles in gold; exoneration from her proportional share in the repayment of Imperial Russia’s debt; and preferential rights to a concession for building and exploiting direct railway connections between Moscow and the Esthonian frontier. ‘Times headlines an- - nounced February 15, however, that the Esthonian peace was only a “Lenin makeshift,” and that Lenin had de- clared the terms would “be quite different when local Reds Yet when peace was signed, seven weeks later, a get control.” ‘

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40 that Puckeutun had been. part of Russia when the Tsar sat on the throne? Was it no longer a part of Russia? The one solid thing in the State De- partment’s memorandum was an intercepted wire- less, and that wireless proved only that the Govern- ment of Russia was attempting the no doubt hazard- ous experiment of winning the Mohammedans of Russians Turkestan by propaganda instead of simp- ly by the bayonet in the manner of the Tsar. Red Peril Again To gauge the effect of steady repetition, and to mark the sources from which material for that re- petition was drawn, take the news of a single month. We have chosen January of the year 1920. For the present purpose that is an important month be- cause it was then that final elimination of the last of the three White Generals had begun to prepare the way for new rumors that the Allies contemplat- _ed peace with Russia. The Red Peril, in that month, was a eerecet visitor: January 5*: Mr. Duranty cables from Riga that he has obtained copies of letters written to Moscow by a captured courier, and that they prove Moscow is working for “the establishment of universal dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet rule.”’ | January 9: “Official quarters’’ describe the Bol- shevist menace in the Middle East as ominous. (Special cable from London.) January 10: “It is asserted” that the Soviets plan an offensive against the British in India. (Un- identified dispatch, London.) January 11: _ envisage “‘a possible invasion of Europe.” dispatch from Washington. ) January 13: invasion of Persia. ington. ) ? January 16: “British military authorities”’ pect an attack on Persia. London. ) : January 16: “Expert military opinion” expects an attack on Poland. (Associated Press, from London. ) January 16: “Well-informed diplomats” expect both a military invasion of Europe and a Soviet advance into Eastern and Southern Asia. (Special dispatch from Washington. ) January 20: “It is understood” that the Supreme Council considered measures for protecting Azer- baijan and Georgia from attacks by the Soviets. (Unidentified dispatch, Paris.) January 21: “Information . placed before the three Premiers’? shows the Sais are planning to open the way into Mesopotamia and Persia. (Mr. Edwin L. James, cabling from Paris.) (Special (Another special from Wash- exX- (Special cable from * ‘The date, in each instance, is the date of publication in the Times. THE NEW REPUBLIC warning of Red Peril to India and Poland, Eurogil “Allied officials and diplomats” ‘‘Allied diplomatic circles” fear an but also to mark the sources from which they wer agents of the French Foreign Office in India. There a et tee ee ee (SRR GW ev Cet a ee : te are Sai / August 4, 19: o January 21: “A dispatch to the Central New from Paris’ states that the Supreme Council ¥ send 200,000 troops to oppose the Soviets in the Caucasus. (Associated Press, London.) — 7 January 22: “The best military and diplomatic intelligence received in Washington” expects a massed attack against Poland. (Special dispatch from Washington. ) i 7 January 23: “Poland’s diplomats’’ expect a mil lion Soviet troops to be sent against them. (Mr, James, cabling from Paris.) a January 30: “The French Foreign Office has received from its agents in India a report saying that the Bolsheviki are making extensive prepara- tions for an uprising in India against the British. ” (Mr. James again.) : - Fourteen dispatches in the month of January, and Azerbaijan, Persia, Georgia and Mesopotamiay : That, averaged, is a dispatch almost every alter- - nate day throughout the month. The net effect was certainly towards checking growth of an opinion that Russia’s failure to rally to the interventionists had demonstrated the need of a new policy—of considering the Soviets as an authority with which some sort of truce could and must be made. You ‘ cannot make truce with Peril. a There is, of course, the point of view which ree gards as wholly desirable this checking of the growth in public opinion towards support of a new policy. The reiterated warnings of Red Peril, ace cording to this point of view, performed a use ad public service. That, certainly, is a logical attitude —and it is no part of our task to dispute it. We are discussing not Russian policy but Russian news. It seems to us important, however, not only to note the fact that such dispatches appeared with regula ity during a period when they were most useful, drawn: letters of a captured courier, “officiz quarters’”’ (London), “allied officials and diplol mats” (Washington), “allied diplomatic circles” (Washington), “British military authorities (London), “expert military opinion” (London), “well-informed diplomats”’ (Washington), infor= mation “placed before the three Premiers” (Paris), ‘‘a dispatch to the Central News from Paris” (Lon don), “the best military and diplomatic intelligence received in Washington,” ‘“Poland’s diplomats,” are certain sources here—the last, for instance— which seem more definite and responsible than cer: tain others. But to us it seems fair comment that taken as a whole, with their reliance upon unidenti- fied “experts” and “diplomats” and upon ‘official quarters’”’ where rumor invariably finds its favorite haven, particularly with the subordinate, thes sources represent in fact a fairly irresponsible, s i

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gust 4, 1920 ortment. The impression that they had their in- piration in rumor rather than in fact, it must be idded, is heightened by contrasting them with what has actually happened ‘subsequent to their publica- _ on. Five months have passed since January. But It -was Poland, and not Russia, that first started an offensive. Soviet troops have indeed been landed ina Persian port (Enzeli), but there they went in pursuit of a Russian fleet which had landed there before them—Denikin’s—and a dispatch to the q wondon. Herald states they have subsequent- y been withdrawn.* There has been no uprising in in India. Nor has there been an invasion of India. There has been no invasion of Mesopotamia. The most sensational, in fact, of all these January dis- patches, was as sensationally contradicted on the very day following its publication. January 16, a Wide, announced : BRITAIN, FACING WAR WITH REDS, CALLS COUNCIL IN PARIS 7 ‘And the following morning came the news: No WAR WITH RUSSIA, ALLIES TO T RADE WITH HER F The first report, then, was not reliable. So swift 4 * See the Times, June 19, 1920. .; * Assuming that the preceding chapters constitute at least a prima facie case for saying that the run of the news on one matter of transcendent impor- ‘tance to Americans has been dubious, what de- ‘ductions are there to be drawn by the constructive ‘critic of the press? Primarily, we believe, that the ‘enough, and the discipline by which standards are Maintained not strong enough, to carry the press triumphantly through a test so severe as that pro- yided by the Russian Revolution. _ First as to standards. The analysis shows how ‘seriously misled was the Times by its reliance upon the official purveyors of information. It indicates that statements of fact emanating from govern- Tents’ and the circles around governments as well as from the leaders of political movements cannot be taken as judgments of fact by an independent press. They indicate opinion, they are controlled news. If, for example, the Russian Minister of War says that the armies of Russia were never ‘stronger, that cannot be accepted by a newspaper as news that the armies of Russia are stronger than ever. The only news in the statement is that the THE NEW first-page headline in the Times, eight columns ‘professional standards of journalism are not high by special purpose, and they are not trustworthy REPUBLIC 4l a contrast between rumor and fact would—even were there no other reasons for doubt—raise legiti- mate suspicion concerning the accuracy of other news pitched in a similar key. It is on the note of the Red Peril that this study ends. It has appeared at every turn to obstruct the restoration of peace in Eastern Europe and Asia, and to frustrate the resumption of enonomic life. The Allied proposal in January to open trade relations was speedily labelled ‘‘nothing more than a tactical political move” on the part of the Allied Governments (special dispatch from Washington to the Times, January 22). In that way, too, have been tagged successive offers coming from Russia. ‘There has been no doubt at any time in Washing- ton official circles,” said a special dispatch to the Times, March 14, “that the Soviet ‘peace’ drive represented nothing more than a scrap-of-paper policy of the Soviet leaders, a mere tactical move, and that what they really sought was a breathing spell in which to concentrate their energies for a renewed drive toward world-wide revolution.” Each peace proposal, whichever side first launch- ed it, a tactical move ..... Meantime the Red Peril. That, with armed intervention no longer a possibil-_ ity, was the propaganda in the news. And if the peace of the world had not hung in the balance it would have made an interesting stalemate. | Deductions Minister says they are stronger. By any high jour- nalistic standard, the Minister’s statement if it deals with a matter of vital importance is a challenge to independent investigation. The analysis shows that even more misleading than the official statement purporting to be a state- ment of fact, is the semi-official and semi-authorita- — tive but anonymous statement. Such news is fathered by such phrases as: “Officials of the State Department” “government and diplomatic sources’’ “reports reaching here” “it is stated on high authority that’’ Behind those phrases may be anybody, a minor bureaucrat, a dinner table conversation, hotel lobby | gossip, a chance acquaintance, a paid agent; Dis- patches of this type put the editor at home and the reader at the mercy of opinion that he cannot check, and .it is time to demand that the correspondent take the trouble to identify his informants sufh- ciently to supply the reader with some means of es- timating the character of the report. He need not name the individual source but he can ‘place’ him. The analysis shows that certain correspondents are totally untrustworthy because their sympathies

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=e ig re eee aes Se Ie eC ye ia ee Meee iets MC Ree gly me aes ror Ne) Awe Far Tae ae Ee ale eh ey Se ONE a ie oe RE SYNE Mae ak % ZN by $i Da ams ri dt Co Rey sara Sate iar hid es <4 2 Ma's OA Oe ce ae § eh Lieber eet rs mee eg PART ye of D , t pees Ee 7 fe hs : p i : ; Sy RR BS AY oy] - rf : - ; THE NEW REPUBLIC -are too Heroly engaged. Mr. Harold Williams’s reports from Denikin’s army were obviously queer at the time and are ridiculous in the light of events. A reporter is not entitled to hold an assignment when his disinterestedness is open to question. One is not able to avoid the impression that in the se- lection of correspondents the virture of conformity is at least balanced against the virtues of objectivity, insight and credibility. The analysis indicates also that even so rich and commanding a newspaper as the Times does not take seriously enough the equipment of the cor- respondent., For extraordinarily difficult posts in extraordinary times, something more than routine correspondents are required. Reporting is one of the most difficult professions, requiring much expert knowledge and serious education. The old conten- tion that properly trained men lack the “news _ sense’’ will not stand against the fact that improper- ly trained men have seriously misled a whole nation. It is habit rather than preference which makes read- ers accept news from correspondents whose useful- ness is about that of an astrologer or an alchemist. Important as it is for the press to read lessons in efficiency to workingmen, employees and politicians, ‘it is no less important for the press to study those lessons itself. Measured by its responsibility and pretensions the efficiency of the newspapers is not what determined men could make it. The analysis shows further that at critical periods the time honored tradition of protecting news _ against editorials breaks down. The Russian policy of the editors of the Times profoundly and crassly influenced their news columns. The office handling of the news, both as to emphasis and captions, was unmistakeably controlled by other than a profes- sional standard. So obvious is this fact, so blatant fundamental reliance must be on the corporal made by the Interchurch World Movement is ¢ Geman a nah mi ah yl oS ths Whe te it aie ile hie ot ea ages ty CRA a ei A oS MLA oe rem aea T) SLar an ; F aa pe . dish ts is the intrusion of an editorial bias, that it y quire serious reform before the code whic been violated can be restored. - Where is the power to be found which can ¢ fi the standards of journalism and enforce thei Primarily within the profession itself. We do believe that the press can be regulated by law. | dition and discipline of the newspaper guild, is for them to agree on a code of honor, as ' Bar Associations and Medical Societies have ag ee and for them to watch vigilantly for infractions 3 that code. As citizens they cannot escape this du | and as members of a profession they are fore to it by the growing distrust which everywhe greets them. They know that to-day they are fear but not intimately respected, and the sins of son are visited upon. all. 4 But while the technical code ait journalistic stan ards, the tradition and the discipline belong to # guild, newspapers must be prepared for an i creasing supervision from the readers of the pres Those readers will not simply “‘write letters to # editor” effective as such letters are. They w speak through organizations which will becon centers of resistance. The report on the steel stril example of such resistance to the newspaper report of that strike. The report on the activities of th Attorney-General by twelve lawyers for the Pop lar Government League is an example of fr sistance to the red hysteria of 1919-20. They lustrate the point that a powerful engine of criticis is appearing in the community which will no long naively accept the current news on contentio questions. With that fact the profession of jo u we nalism will have to make a reckoning. 4