Foundations for Moral Relativism
by J. David Velleman
In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”.
Description from LibreTexts.
- Publisher
- New York University
- Subjects
- Humanities, Philosophy
- Licence
- CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, as LibreTexts states it. Non-commercial use only, and no changed versions.
- Who can read
- Teens profiles and older, judged from its title and subjects