# Complete History of the 1979 Iranian Revolution

An episode of [Human History ASMR](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/6793196842), 13 Sep 2026, 1 h 29 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/74777823/complete_history_of_the_1979_iranian_revolution_human_voiced_no_ads.mp3

Journey into one of the most consequential political upheavals of the 20th century and discover the complete history of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This episode explores how Iran transformed from a monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into the Islamic Republic, reshaping the country's politics, society, religion, and relationship with the wider world. Begin with the roots of the revolution, examining the Shah's modernization programs, the White Revolution, rapid economic and social change, growing political repression, and opposition from religious leaders, leftist groups, nationalists, students, and other sections of Iranian society. Discover how decades of political tensions gradually developed into a nationwide movement against the monarchy. Follow the dramatic events of 1978 and early 1979, from mass demonstrations and strikes to the Shah's departure from Iran and the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Explore the collapse of the monarchy, the final confrontation between revolutionary forces and the military, and the establishment of a new political order. The episode also examines the competing visions that existed within the revolutionary movement and how Iran's post-revolutionary government consolidated power. Explore the constitutional referendum, the creation of the Islamic Republic, political purges, the changing role of religious institutions, and the revolutionary transformations that affected everyday life. Drawing on contemporary accounts, political documents, historical scholarship, and firsthand testimony, this immersive journey separates established historical evidence from later political narratives and examines the revolution within its broader Cold War and Middle Eastern context. Narrated with a calm, human voice, this episode is perfect for history enthusiasts, modern history lovers, political history fans, documentary listeners, relaxation, or listening before sleep. Discover the events, personalities, conflicts, and ideas that transformed Iran in 1979 and continue to shape its history today.

## Transcript

[0:01] Speaker 1: February, 1979. A sea of millions swarm the streets of Tehran,
[0:08] Speaker 1: shouting in joy as a Boeing 747 carrying Ayatollah Khomeini
[0:13] Speaker 1: touches down at Meribat Airport. After fifteen long years in exile,
[0:19] Speaker 1: the aging cleric emerges, and he raises his hands in victory.
[0:25] Speaker 1: It was at that moment that the two-and-a-half-thousand-year-old Persian monarchy
[0:31] Speaker 1: was on the verge of collapse. Just days earlier, the
[0:36] Speaker 1: once unassailable King of Kings, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled
[0:42] Speaker 1: Iran under a wave of popular fury. But how did
[0:46] Speaker 1: we get here? The Iranian Revolution wasn't a spontaneous combustion,
[0:52] Speaker 1: rather a dramatic climax of decades of simmering grievances, political drama,
[0:58] Speaker 1: cultural awakening, and of course, foreign meddling. Today we're going
[1:05] Speaker 1: to talk about everything that led up to the 1979
[1:08] Speaker 1: revolution and the revolution itself. We're going to talk about
[1:12] Speaker 1: all the threads of Iranian nationalism, the general Cold War
[1:17] Speaker 1: geopolitical situation, also the Islamic fervor. But, of course, we're
[1:23] Speaker 1: not going to water down the clandestine operations by the
[1:28] Speaker 1: CIA and Mossad. It's a story of a people's determination
[1:32] Speaker 1: to reclaim their destiny, spurred by both genuine grassroots anger
[1:38] Speaker 1: and shadowy interventions from abroad. But of course, sometimes it
[1:43] Speaker 1: doesn't always go to plan. In any case, to further
[1:47] Speaker 1: understand current global politics, let's go back a generation or
[1:53] Speaker 1: so and learn about the Iranian revolution. I have a
[1:57] Speaker 1: feeling this video will be a little bit suppressed, so
[1:59] Speaker 1: I'd appreciate if you shared it around. And thank you
[2:02] Speaker 1: for liking, commenting, subscribing, that kind of thing. Also, thank
[2:05] Speaker 1: you to those keeping everything ad-free. We are crowdfunded, quite
[2:09] Speaker 1: proudly so. YouTube memberships, Patreon, merch store, and the occasional donation. So,
[2:14] Speaker 1: thank you for those who want to check out those
[2:16] Speaker 1: links in the pinned comment. Anyway, let's begin. First, we
[2:23] Speaker 1: have to grasp Iran's 20th century struggles against imperial influence. Iran,
[2:28] Speaker 1: which was formerly known as Persia until 1935, was never
[2:33] Speaker 1: fully colonized, at least not in a traditional sense, but
[2:38] Speaker 1: certainly by the early 1900s it had effectively become a
[2:41] Speaker 1: part of the, well, effectively a pawn of the great
[2:45] Speaker 1: power's sphere of influence. The Qayyar dynasty's weakness allowed Britain
[2:50] Speaker 1: and Russia to dominate Iran's economy and politics. It was
[2:55] Speaker 1: in 1906, amid popular anger at corruption and foreign control,
[2:59] Speaker 1: that the Iranians launched the Constitutional Revolution. It demanded rule
[3:04] Speaker 1: of law and a parliament. For a brief moment, constitutionalists
[3:09] Speaker 1: reigned in royal power. Yet foreign interference continued. In 1907,
[3:16] Speaker 1: Britain and Russia literally split Iran into spheres of influence
[3:20] Speaker 1: by secret agreement. Of course, this was a big undermining
[3:24] Speaker 1: of Iran's sovereignty. The seeds of nationalist resentment were well
[3:29] Speaker 1: and truly sown. Out of the chaos of the First
[3:33] Speaker 1: World War and the waning Qayyar dynasty rose Reza Khan,
[3:39] Speaker 1: an ambitious military officer who seized power in 1921, crowning
[3:43] Speaker 1: himself Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925, he founded the Pahlavi
[3:50] Speaker 1: dynasty and pursued a bold project of modernization. Reza Shah
[3:56] Speaker 1: built railways, secular schools, and a modern army, curbed the
[4:01] Speaker 1: power of restive tribes, and tried to imitate Turkey's model
[4:05] Speaker 1: of a strong secular nation-state. But the problem was, he
[4:11] Speaker 1: was also quite autocratic, and he wasn't tolerant of dissent. Crucially,
[4:17] Speaker 1: Reza Shah bristled at foreign influence. He reduced Britain's grip
[4:21] Speaker 1: on Iran's oil and sidelined foreign advisors. Yet even this
[4:26] Speaker 1: powerful king could not escape imperial meddling. During the Second
[4:30] Speaker 1: World War, Reza Shah leaned toward Germany. In 1941, Britain
[4:35] Speaker 1: and the Soviet Union jointly invaded Iran to secure oil
[4:39] Speaker 1: and supply lines. This forced Reza Shah to abdicate. In
[4:46] Speaker 1: a humiliating echo of Iran's powerlessness, the Allies sent the
[4:50] Speaker 1: monarch into exile, and they elevated his meek 21-year-old son,
[4:55] Speaker 1: Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, to the peacock throne. Thus, from the
[5:01] Speaker 1: outset of Muhammad Reza's reign, many Iranians saw him as
[5:05] Speaker 1: a king installed by foreign will, and of course expected
[5:10] Speaker 1: to be very accommodating to Allied interests. The young Shah
[5:16] Speaker 1: Mohammad Reza initially promised to be a constitutional monarch, but
[5:21] Speaker 1: he found it difficult to resist the temptations of absolutism. Iran,
[5:26] Speaker 1: after World War II, was politically vibrant. The communists, i.e.
[5:31] Speaker 1: the Today Party, nationalists, clerics, and monarchists, they were all
[5:36] Speaker 1: vying for their own influence. This post-war era set the
[5:40] Speaker 1: stage for a fateful confrontation between that would shape the
[5:42] Speaker 1: fate of Iran, but also the Shah's legitimacy, that being
[5:47] Speaker 1: the rise and fall of Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadegh. Now,
[5:52] Speaker 1: Mossadegh was a fiery nationalist parliamentarian who became immensely popular
[5:58] Speaker 1: for championing one very important cause, and that was the
[6:03] Speaker 1: nationalization of Iran's oil. By 1951, Iran's oil industry was
[6:11] Speaker 1: controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Iranians received only
[6:17] Speaker 1: a pittance of the profits, but the foreigners took the
[6:20] Speaker 1: lion's share. Mossadegh, echoing the nation's aspirations to throw off
[6:26] Speaker 1: imperialist shackles, moved to nationalise the industry. Now, the Iranian
[6:31] Speaker 1: public were very pleased with this. But was there somebody
[6:36] Speaker 1: you forgot to ask? Britain was not happy with this.
[6:41] Speaker 1: Of course, you know, it cut out all of their profits,
[6:44] Speaker 1: and I suppose there were probably a lot of people saying, too, well,
[6:48] Speaker 1: we've set up the entire infrastructure for this, we've set
[6:51] Speaker 1: up everything, so we should get the lion's share, but, well,
[6:55] Speaker 1: it doesn't always work out that way, doesn't it? In
[6:57] Speaker 1: any case, Mosaday, an aristocratic yet ascetic man, often seen
[7:03] Speaker 1: wrapped in a blanket during the Parliament sessions, became a
[7:06] Speaker 1: symbol of Iranian dignity and independence. In 1951, the young
[7:12] Speaker 1: Shah reluctantly appointed Mossadegh as Prime Minister, bowing to parliamentary democracy.
[7:18] Speaker 1: And for a moment, Iran's destiny seemed to be in
[7:23] Speaker 1: their own hands, and the Shah was sort of pushed
[7:27] Speaker 1: to the side, relegated to a figurehead role. This is,
[7:34] Speaker 1: at least for a moment, The Mosaddegh episode soon erupted
[7:41] Speaker 1: into a high-stakes international showdown. And this was all at
[7:44] Speaker 1: the height of the Cold War, too. Britain sought to
[7:48] Speaker 1: protect its oil interests and retaliate against Iran's audacity in
[7:53] Speaker 1: nationalizing its resources. After failing to bully Mossad through Mosaddegh, rather,
[8:00] Speaker 1: through sanctions and international legal battles, the British looked to
[8:04] Speaker 1: the United States for help. The U.S., Under President Eisenhower
[8:09] Speaker 1: was growing weary that Iran's turbulence could invite Soviet influence,
[8:13] Speaker 1: or even a communist takeover via the Today Party. Together,
[8:20] Speaker 1: American and British intelligence orchestrated a covert operation to topple
[8:24] Speaker 1: Iran's democratically elected government. This was called Operation Ajax, as
[8:30] Speaker 1: the CIA codenamed it. This operation, carried out in August
[8:36] Speaker 1: of 1953, is one of the clearest examples of CIA
[8:41] Speaker 1: and MI6 meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, and obviously became
[8:45] Speaker 1: a source of deep Iranian resentment. The coup plot was
[8:51] Speaker 1: certainly a cloak-and-dagger affair, like something out of James Bond,
[8:57] Speaker 1: Kermit Roosevelt Jr., the CIA's main man on the ground,
[9:01] Speaker 1: and ironically the grandson of the US President Teddy Roosevelt,
[9:05] Speaker 1: snuck into Tehran. and spent frantic weeks bribing newspaper editors,
[9:11] Speaker 1: rallying paid mobs, and conspiring with the Iranian military officers
[9:15] Speaker 1: to turn against Mossadegh. British intelligence coordinated closely, even employing
[9:23] Speaker 1: the BBC Persian radio service to send coded signals. In fact,
[9:28] Speaker 1: on the eve of the coup, the BBC broadcast a
[9:31] Speaker 1: seemingly banal line. It is now exactly midnight. Well, that
[9:38] Speaker 1: was a prearranged code that told the shah and coup
[9:42] Speaker 1: planners that the operation was good to go. Few ordinary
[9:47] Speaker 1: Iranians listening would have known. But those in on the plot, well,
[9:53] Speaker 1: they heard it as a dog whistle. The foreign powers
[9:56] Speaker 1: were moving the pieces on the board. Initially, the coup
[10:01] Speaker 1: seemed to falter. On August 15th, 1953, royalist military officers
[10:07] Speaker 1: delivered to Mosaday a decree from the Shah dismissing him,
[10:11] Speaker 1: only for Mosaday to refuse and the plotters to be arrested.
[10:16] Speaker 1: The Shah panicked and tried to flee the country in haste,
[10:20] Speaker 1: flying to Baghdad and then Rome, convinced that his throne
[10:24] Speaker 1: was completely lost. But the CIA and MI6 doubled down. Roosevelt,
[10:32] Speaker 1: working from a safehouse, rallied street thugs to stage pro-Shah riots,
[10:38] Speaker 1: spread false news that Mosaday was collapsing, and bribed many
[10:42] Speaker 1: more army units. On August 19th, crowds, some genuinely monarchist,
[10:48] Speaker 1: Many hired with CIA money, though, marched on Mosaday's residence
[10:52] Speaker 1: and government buildings, chanting their loyalty to the Shah. A
[10:57] Speaker 1: pitched battle in Tehran's streets unfolded. The Mosaday loyalists and
[11:01] Speaker 1: the Tehran garrison were overwhelmed by military units led by
[11:05] Speaker 1: coup generals, and by the end of the day, Mosaday's
[11:09] Speaker 1: government was toppled. The frail prime minister surrendered. He would
[11:15] Speaker 1: later face a show trial and house arrest. and General
[11:20] Speaker 1: Fazlullah Zahedi, the CIA's chosen Iranian collaborator, took the premiership.
[11:28] Speaker 1: As for the Shah, hearing the news in his Italian exile,
[11:32] Speaker 1: reportedly leapt with joy and flew back to Iran in triumph.
[11:38] Speaker 1: For the Shah, 1953 was a personal victory that transformed
[11:41] Speaker 1: him from a weak constitutional monarch into an unchallengeable autocrat.
[11:48] Speaker 1: but for many Iranians, the ousting of Mossadegh became a
[11:52] Speaker 1: national trauma. It was now clear that their elected government
[11:57] Speaker 1: had been crushed by foreign powers, American and British spy agencies,
[12:03] Speaker 1: in collusion with domestic elites. The US and UK restored
[12:09] Speaker 1: the Shah to his peacock throne, but in doing so,
[12:13] Speaker 1: they branded him as a puppet of Western imperialism in
[12:17] Speaker 1: the eyes of a large segment of his people. Now,
[12:20] Speaker 1: it is important to say that some people were genuinely
[12:24] Speaker 1: loyal to the monarchy. It's not like everyone was anti-monarchy,
[12:28] Speaker 1: but yes, the majority of the people were certainly not
[12:33] Speaker 1: happy with this situation. The CIA's own documents, declassified decades later,
[12:40] Speaker 1: frankly admit their role in these events, and the 1953
[12:43] Speaker 1: coup is often cited as a textbook example of Cold
[12:48] Speaker 1: War interventionalism. Iranians didn't need to see the documents, though.
[12:53] Speaker 1: They lived the consequences. And when they eventually came out,
[12:59] Speaker 1: it was kind of one of those I-told-you-so moments. As
[13:03] Speaker 1: for the name Mossadegh, it became a rallying cry for
[13:06] Speaker 1: future opposition, a martyr for independence, betrayed by the Shah
[13:13] Speaker 1: and his shadowy foreign friends. Indeed, the 1979 revolutionaries would
[13:19] Speaker 1: often invoke his memory as they accused the Shah of
[13:23] Speaker 1: being a traitor and a lackey to the Americans. The
[13:27] Speaker 1: shadow of 1953 loomed large over 1979. So, what happens next? Well,
[13:37] Speaker 1: after 1953, Mohammad Reza Shah ruled with new confidence and
[13:43] Speaker 1: a bit of ruthlessness. Having learned that survival meant concentrating power,
[13:48] Speaker 1: the Shah dismantled Iran's democratic institutions. The parliament, also called
[13:53] Speaker 1: the Males, became a rubber stamp. Opposition parties were banned.
[13:59] Speaker 1: The ones that were around were, well, effectively neutered, if
[14:04] Speaker 1: we can use the term. As for dissent, that was
[14:07] Speaker 1: completely silenced. Key to this machinery of control was the
[14:12] Speaker 1: creation of a fearsome secret police, and intelligence service known
[14:17] Speaker 1: as SAVAK, which is basically the Organization of Intelligence and
[14:22] Speaker 1: National Security. It's a bit of an abbreviation of the Persian,
[14:27] Speaker 1: but I'm not going to attempt it. I'm sure you understand. Well,
[14:31] Speaker 1: in 1957, the Shah established SAVAK to root out and
[14:36] Speaker 1: crush his opponents, be they communists, nationalists, or Islamist dissidents. Now, notably,
[14:45] Speaker 1: Foreign advisors played a role in the building of Savak
[14:48] Speaker 1: from the ground up. The CIA provided funding, training, and
[14:53] Speaker 1: technology to this new secret police. And they weren't alone.
[14:57] Speaker 1: The Israeli Mossad also served as eager consultants in security
[15:02] Speaker 1: and intelligence. It is a remarkable historical footnote that Major
[15:06] Speaker 1: General Norman Schwarzkopf Sr., the father of the U.S. General
[15:11] Speaker 1: famous from the Gulf War, was one of the early
[15:15] Speaker 1: American instructors who helped train Iran's security forces. Under such tutelage,
[15:21] Speaker 1: SAVAK grew into a dreaded institution with thousands of agents,
[15:26] Speaker 1: famous for its surveillance and brutal torture. By the 1970s,
[15:33] Speaker 1: the mere mention of SAVAK could send a chill down
[15:36] Speaker 1: the ordinary person's spine. Iranians knew that behind the Shah's
[15:42] Speaker 1: blue eyes and polished speeches, stood a network of prisons
[15:47] Speaker 1: and interrogators, many trained by Israelis and Americans, and they
[15:53] Speaker 1: all enforced his rule. In these years, the Shah cast
[15:58] Speaker 1: himself as an enlightened monarch, leading Iran into the modern age.
[16:03] Speaker 1: But his rule was a paradox of progressive imagery and
[16:06] Speaker 1: autocratic reality. On one hand, Iran was undergoing rapid modernization,
[16:12] Speaker 1: Flush with oil revenues, especially after the prices soared in
[16:16] Speaker 1: the 70s, Iran's economy was initially doing quite well. The
[16:20] Speaker 1: Shah launched the White Revolution in 1963, a series of
[16:25] Speaker 1: reforms that included land redistribution from feudal landlords to peasants,
[16:31] Speaker 1: expansion of education and healthcare, enfranchisement of women with the
[16:35] Speaker 1: right to vote, and ambitious infrastructure projects. These reforms were
[16:41] Speaker 1: meant to undercut the appeal of communist ideology by improving
[16:45] Speaker 1: social justice and distribution, and also to create a loyal
[16:49] Speaker 1: peasant and middle-class base for the monarchy. The White Revolution
[16:54] Speaker 1: did bring social change, have to be fair. Literacy improved,
[16:59] Speaker 1: and some peasants became landowners. But it also had a
[17:03] Speaker 1: few consequences. The traditional landowners, some of them influential clergy
[17:10] Speaker 1: who managed religious endowments, were angered by the reforms. Conservative
[17:15] Speaker 1: clerics saw women's suffrage and secular education as an assault
[17:18] Speaker 1: on Islamic values, and many urban intellectuals dismissed the reforms
[17:24] Speaker 1: as superficial changes that left the Shah's absolute power intact.
[17:29] Speaker 1: So basically, the Shah was modernizing from above. while fiercely
[17:33] Speaker 1: suppressing any political participation from below. That being said, you
[17:39] Speaker 1: never keep anybody happy with these kinds of reforms, won't you?
[17:43] Speaker 1: In any case, it was during this period of the
[17:46] Speaker 1: 1960s that a previously little-known cleric began to emerge as
[17:51] Speaker 1: a formidable critic of the regime, and that was Ayatollah
[17:56] Speaker 1: Ruola Khomeini, a scholarly Shia cleric from the holy city
[18:01] Speaker 1: of Qom. who found his voice as an opposition leader
[18:05] Speaker 1: by directly challenging the Shah's legitimacy and his ties to
[18:08] Speaker 1: the West. In June of 1963, during the important Shia
[18:14] Speaker 1: holiday of Ashura, Khomeini delivered an audacious sermon in Qom
[18:19] Speaker 1: that rather riled up his followers and startled the regime.
[18:25] Speaker 1: He denounced the Shah as a, quote, wretched, miserable man,
[18:30] Speaker 1: and went so far as to warn the Shah that
[18:33] Speaker 1: continuing his oppressive ways would lead to his removal by
[18:37] Speaker 1: the people. Even more provocatively, Khomeini accused the Shah of
[18:42] Speaker 1: being a pawn of Israel and America, attacking the regime's
[18:46] Speaker 1: recent granting of diplomatic immunity to the U.S. military personnel
[18:51] Speaker 1: in Iran and its friendly ties with Israel. Quote, Khomeini
[18:57] Speaker 1: thundered to the crowd, Israel wants there to be no
[19:05] Speaker 1: clerics in Iran. Israel wants there to be no Islam
[19:10] Speaker 1: in Iran. These incendiary words, linking the Shah to an
[19:15] Speaker 1: anti-Islamic foreign conspiracy, seem to have struck a chord. They
[19:20] Speaker 1: came at a time when many devout Iranians were uneasy
[19:23] Speaker 1: about the rapid westernization of their society. Khomeini's boldness, effectively
[19:28] Speaker 1: calling the Shah an agent of infidels, which is the
[19:31] Speaker 1: worst thing you can be in that kind of culture,
[19:33] Speaker 1: but was certainly unheard of. Everyone was too afraid of
[19:38] Speaker 1: the Savak to talk out against the regime, and, well,
[19:43] Speaker 1: here's Khomeini going from zero to a hundred in two
[19:46] Speaker 1: seconds flat. Of course, the regime was not happy about this.
[19:50] Speaker 1: The response was quite swift. Khomeini was arrested in 63,
[19:54] Speaker 1: sparking three days of huge protests known as the 15
[19:58] Speaker 1: Khordad Uprising. Thousands poured into the streets of Qom, Tehran
[20:04] Speaker 1: and other cities, demanding Khomeini's release. The Shah's security forces
[20:10] Speaker 1: brutally crushed the demonstrations. Hundreds were killed in the crackdown,
[20:15] Speaker 1: shot down right there in the streets. This was the
[20:19] Speaker 1: first sign that the Shah's modernization had endangered a, well,
[20:24] Speaker 1: it basically engendered a potent backlash from Iran's religious and
[20:30] Speaker 1: traditional sectors. Now the name itself, Khomeini, began to be
[20:34] Speaker 1: a symbol of resistance, a rallying cry for for everybody
[20:38] Speaker 1: who wanted back the, quote, good old days, as we
[20:42] Speaker 1: can put them. So, after a brief release, Khomeini was
[20:46] Speaker 1: arrested again in 1964, when he criticized a new law
[20:51] Speaker 1: which granted U.S. military personnel full legal immunity in Iran,
[20:57] Speaker 1: basically a license to do whatever they want. The Shah's government,
[21:02] Speaker 1: likely at the urging of American officials who were tired
[21:04] Speaker 1: of this troublesome cleric, decided to exile Khomeini abroad. In
[21:10] Speaker 1: late 1964, Khomeini was deported to neighbouring Iraq, where he
[21:14] Speaker 1: would live for the next 13 years in the Shia's
[21:17] Speaker 1: scholarly centre of Najaf. From exile, however, Khomeini continued to
[21:22] Speaker 1: write and preach against the Shah, developing and spreading his
[21:26] Speaker 1: revolutionary Islamist ideas through smuggled tapes and letters. In Najaf,
[21:31] Speaker 1: in the early 70s, he gave a series of lectures
[21:34] Speaker 1: on Islamic government, later compiled into his book, Governance of
[21:38] Speaker 1: the Jurist, articulating his vision that Islamic clerics should rule
[21:43] Speaker 1: in place of corrupt monarchs. These ideas slowly percolated into Iran,
[21:51] Speaker 1: building an ideological foundation for what was to come. Well,
[21:56] Speaker 1: at the time, few in the West took notice of
[21:59] Speaker 1: this Ayatollah in exile. The Shah certainly did, though. Savak
[22:04] Speaker 1: kept tabs on Khomeini's activities, but Iran's secular opposition and
[22:08] Speaker 1: its Western backers seemed to have generally underestimated the challenge
[22:14] Speaker 1: from the cleric. They assumed Iran's main threats were communists
[22:19] Speaker 1: or secular intellectuals, not the ulama, the clergy. After all,
[22:25] Speaker 1: this was the Cold War time. I mean, the communist
[22:28] Speaker 1: was kind of the catch-all boogeyman for all sorts of problems,
[22:31] Speaker 1: so That's what they were sort of scared about. In
[22:35] Speaker 1: any case, underestimating the clergy proved to be a grave mistake.
[22:41] Speaker 1: During the 60s and early 70s, the Shah's Iran was
[22:45] Speaker 1: undergoing profound changes. A cultural westernization was in full swing
[22:49] Speaker 1: in Tehran. Western fashions, music, and lifestyles were certainly in
[22:54] Speaker 1: vogue among the elite. Iran was allied closely with the
[22:59] Speaker 1: United States. By the 70s, some 40,000 American advisors and
[23:04] Speaker 1: technicians were actually living in Iran, training the army and
[23:08] Speaker 1: running projects. The Shah was buying billions of dollars' worth
[23:13] Speaker 1: of American weaponry, fighter jets, tanks, missiles, essentially transforming Iran
[23:19] Speaker 1: into the guardian of US interests in the Persian Gulf,
[23:22] Speaker 1: after Britain's withdrawal east of the Suez. Iran and Israel, too.
[23:29] Speaker 1: enjoyed a clandestine but pretty robust partnership. Although Iran did
[23:33] Speaker 1: not officially recognize Israel, in deference to Muslim solidarity, that is,
[23:39] Speaker 1: the two had a de facto alliance against common adversaries.
[23:44] Speaker 1: Israeli Mossad and Iran's SAVAK shared intelligence. Israeli military experts
[23:50] Speaker 1: helped Iran build its arsenal and even cooperated on advanced
[23:54] Speaker 1: weapons projects. Israeli companies were active in Iran, and Iranian
[23:59] Speaker 1: oil flowed to Israel. In the region's Cold War politics,
[24:04] Speaker 1: Iran under the Shah and Israel saw themselves as bastions
[24:08] Speaker 1: of pro-Western stability, surrounded by hostile Arab nationalism. This strategic bond, again,
[24:16] Speaker 1: was largely hidden from the Iranian public. But those who
[24:19] Speaker 1: knew of it, like Khomeini and his followers, saw it
[24:23] Speaker 1: as just another piece of evidence that the Shah was
[24:25] Speaker 1: betraying the Islamic world for Israel and the West. Hang on,
[24:32] Speaker 1: let me drink some tea. I'll be all right. Okay,
[24:39] Speaker 1: I'm back. Yet, beneath the Shah's grandiose plans and the
[24:44] Speaker 1: petrodollar-fueled prosperity, discontent was spreading across various segments of society.
[24:51] Speaker 1: By the mid-1970s, Economic troubles began to surface. After the
[24:56] Speaker 1: oil boom of 73 to 74, Iran's economy began to overheat.
[25:01] Speaker 1: Inflation surged, and income equality became more glaring. In the
[25:06] Speaker 1: urban shanty towns, rural migrants who had flocked to the
[25:10] Speaker 1: cities for jobs saw a contrast between their hardships and
[25:14] Speaker 1: the opulence of the Shah's court. Almost like a French
[25:19] Speaker 1: Revolution moment. you know, looking over that fence at Versailles.
[25:24] Speaker 1: Corruption was rampant among the Shah's family and cronies. Glittering
[25:29] Speaker 1: skyscrapers and lavish celebrations, it contrasted with the persistent poverty
[25:34] Speaker 1: that most had to go through. The Shah famously spent
[25:38] Speaker 1: vast sums on a spectacular 2,500-year-old anniversary celebration of the
[25:44] Speaker 1: Persian monarchy at Persepolis in 1971, flying in foreign dignitaries,
[25:49] Speaker 1: and shipping gourmet food from Paris, all the while many
[25:53] Speaker 1: ordinary Iranians were struggling to just make ends meet. This
[25:59] Speaker 1: extravagance did not go unnoticed. It fed into a narrative
[26:03] Speaker 1: that the monarchy was decadent and out of touch. Moreover,
[26:09] Speaker 1: the political repression was stifling any peaceful outlet for dissent.
[26:14] Speaker 1: Thousands of political prisoners languished in Sabak cells, International human
[26:19] Speaker 1: rights organizations in the 70s, such as Amnesty International, condemned
[26:24] Speaker 1: Iran's torture of prisoners and noted that Iran had one
[26:28] Speaker 1: of the worst human rights records in the world. Although
[26:33] Speaker 1: later research suggests the opposition may have exaggerated the number
[26:37] Speaker 1: of prisoners and the executions. Maybe. But there is no
[26:41] Speaker 1: doubt that fear of SAVAK certainly permeated society. Intellectuals, journalists,
[26:49] Speaker 1: religious activists, anyone who spoke too loudly against the regime,
[26:54] Speaker 1: risked harassment, imprisonment or worse. Under such pressure, opposition movements
[27:00] Speaker 1: either went underground or were driven to radicalise. By the
[27:05] Speaker 1: early 1970s, some factions lost hope in peaceful reform and
[27:10] Speaker 1: turned to armed resistance. Underground guerrilla groups like the People's Mujahideen,
[27:17] Speaker 1: the MEK, a mix of Marxism and Islamism, and the
[27:21] Speaker 1: Marxist Fedayeen, began launching asymmetrical attacks and assassinations, targeting regime officials.
[27:30] Speaker 1: Though these groups were relatively small, they signalled that a
[27:33] Speaker 1: portion of Iran's youth was certainly ready to take up
[27:35] Speaker 1: arms against the Shah. So, before we get into the real...
[27:42] Speaker 1: Meat and potatoes. If this isn't really already meat and potatoes,
[27:47] Speaker 1: we've just got to say that this is the lead-up
[27:49] Speaker 1: to everything. So, in sum, by the late 70s, look
[27:55] Speaker 1: at Iran as a nation with a polished modern surface,
[27:59] Speaker 1: but deep issues beneath. The Shah stood at the apex
[28:04] Speaker 1: of a powerful security state, backed enthusiastically by foreign powers,
[28:09] Speaker 1: especially the United States, his chief patron. and Israel, his
[28:14] Speaker 1: secret partner. He commanded a well-equipped military and economy, that
[28:20] Speaker 1: on paper that was booming quite well, but his base
[28:24] Speaker 1: of genuine domestic support was pretty narrow. The traditionalists and
[28:28] Speaker 1: clergy resented the erosion of Islamic values and domination of foreigners.
[28:33] Speaker 1: The liberal educated class chafed at the lack of freedoms.
[28:38] Speaker 1: The leftists saw an American puppet. The merchants felt squeezed
[28:42] Speaker 1: by state-backed conglomerates. There weren't many groups besides the monarchy
[28:49] Speaker 1: themselves that were really benefiting from this system. For a while,
[28:54] Speaker 1: fear and the apparent absence of an alternative kept a
[28:58] Speaker 1: lid on the grievances. Yet a spark was all that
[29:03] Speaker 1: was needed to ignite the flame. And that would come
[29:08] Speaker 1: in the late 70s. accelerated by a confluence of events and,
[29:12] Speaker 1: once again, foreign hands would play intriguing and decisive roles
[29:17] Speaker 1: in the unfolding drama. January 1977. The Carter administration takes
[29:24] Speaker 1: office in the United States, bringing a new emphasis on
[29:28] Speaker 1: human rights in American foreign policy. President Jimmy Carter spoke
[29:33] Speaker 1: publicly about reducing support for regimes that violated human rights.
[29:38] Speaker 1: A veiled warning. even to ask. like the Shah. Now,
[29:42] Speaker 1: speaking of the Shah, he had enjoyed unwavering backing from
[29:46] Speaker 1: prior US presidents. Everyone was on his side, until now.
[29:52] Speaker 1: And suddenly, he was faced with this subtle pressure to
[29:57] Speaker 1: back off a little bit, especially on the torture and imprisonments.
[30:02] Speaker 1: Carter's stance emboldened Iran's dissidents just a little, sensing a
[30:06] Speaker 1: slight chance in the international winds of change. In 1977,
[30:11] Speaker 1: the Shah's government allowed a small opening. A handful of
[30:15] Speaker 1: political prisoners were freed, censorship was eased marginally, and opposition
[30:21] Speaker 1: figures felt a bit bolder to voice their criticism. This
[30:27] Speaker 1: period of relative thaw proved to be the regime's undoing.
[30:32] Speaker 1: What's the old saying? You give an inch, they take
[30:34] Speaker 1: a mile. Well, that's pretty appropriate here. What was intended
[30:41] Speaker 1: as a safety valve for discontent became a gateway to
[30:45] Speaker 1: a flood of opposition. That same year, 1977, witnessed the
[30:51] Speaker 1: death of a key figure in Khomeini's family, Mustafa Khomeini,
[30:55] Speaker 1: the Ayatollah's eldest son, under mysterious circumstances in Iraq. I
[31:02] Speaker 1: can see your eyebrow already raising, right? Rumours spread that
[31:06] Speaker 1: Sabak had a hand in his sudden heart attack, though
[31:10] Speaker 1: no proof emerged. In any case, to the disaffected, Mustafa
[31:15] Speaker 1: became just another martyr, and gatherings were held in Iran
[31:19] Speaker 1: to commemorate him. These morning ceremonies for Khomeini's son, cautiously
[31:25] Speaker 1: allowed by the regime, actually helped reignite Khomeini's name in
[31:29] Speaker 1: Iran's public consciousness and served as a catalyst for the
[31:32] Speaker 1: religious opposition to mobilize. By autumn 1977, secular intellectuals were
[31:39] Speaker 1: also organizing too. A group of prominent lawyers, writers and
[31:43] Speaker 1: professionals penned open letters to the Shah calling for the
[31:46] Speaker 1: rule of law and the release of all political prisoners.
[31:50] Speaker 1: Such open defiance would have been unthinkable a few years prior.
[31:55] Speaker 1: Small-scale protests were held by students and others. The Shah's
[31:59] Speaker 1: response oscillated. At times, police dispersed protesters with force. Other times,
[32:05] Speaker 1: the regime seemed to tolerate a bit of criticism, perhaps
[32:10] Speaker 1: under US diplomatic pressure to show restraint. Then, at the
[32:15] Speaker 1: very end of 1977, President Jimmy Carter himself visited Tehran,
[32:21] Speaker 1: On New Year's Eve 1977, Carter toasted the Shah at
[32:25] Speaker 1: a lavish state dinner, astonishing many with his enthusiastic praise
[32:29] Speaker 1: of the Iranian monarch. In a moment that would seem
[32:33] Speaker 1: tragically ironic after a while, Carter stated, Iran, because of
[32:39] Speaker 1: the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of
[32:42] Speaker 1: stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.
[32:47] Speaker 1: Of course, the Shah beamed with pride upon that one.
[32:50] Speaker 1: Yet even as these words were spoken, the ground beneath
[32:53] Speaker 1: the throne was beginning to quake. Within days, that island
[32:58] Speaker 1: of stability would be rocked by a tide of unrest.
[33:03] Speaker 1: The immediate ignition of the revolt is often traced to
[33:07] Speaker 1: an event in January 1978. On January 7th of that year,
[33:12] Speaker 1: the state-controlled newspaper Etelart published a scandalous front-page article attacking
[33:21] Speaker 1: Ayatollah Khomeini, who, by the way, was still exiled in
[33:25] Speaker 1: Iraq at the time. The article, reportedly approved by the
[33:29] Speaker 1: royal court, denounced Khomeini as a, quote, British agent, which
[33:35] Speaker 1: is quite ironic, and a person of ill character, using
[33:39] Speaker 1: language so insulting, including crude insinuations about his ancestry and morals,
[33:45] Speaker 1: that it enraged the clergy and students online. This move
[33:49] Speaker 1: was a severe miscalculation by the regime. Rather than discrediting Khomeini,
[33:55] Speaker 1: it just made everybody really, really angry. The very next day,
[34:01] Speaker 1: January 8th, 1978, protests erupted in the holy city of Qom,
[34:06] Speaker 1: where Khomeini had taught years before. Seminary students and clerics,
[34:12] Speaker 1: joined by laypeople, poured into the streets of Qom, denouncing
[34:16] Speaker 1: the slander against the Ayatollah and shouting, Death to the Shah!
[34:20] Speaker 1: The authorities cracked down harshly. Troops took the guns out
[34:26] Speaker 1: and opened fire. Several protesters were killed in Qom. Among
[34:32] Speaker 1: the traditionally religious populace, government forces spilling blood in a
[34:36] Speaker 1: holy city added fuel to the fire of indignation. It
[34:42] Speaker 1: was like everything they did to try to stop the riot.
[34:45] Speaker 1: just riled people up even more. Well, once the ball
[34:50] Speaker 1: is rolling, it's hard to stop, I suppose. Now, in
[34:55] Speaker 1: Shia Islam, when people are killed unjustly, it's customary to
[34:59] Speaker 1: hold memorials on the 40th day after death, the observance
[35:03] Speaker 1: of Arba'in or Chehrlom. The opposition cleverly adopted this cycle
[35:08] Speaker 1: of mourning as a rhythmic engine for sustained protest. Forty
[35:13] Speaker 1: days after the Qom killings, in February of 1978, demonstrations
[35:18] Speaker 1: broke out in various cities, especially in Tabriz, a major
[35:22] Speaker 1: city in Azerbaijan. The Tabriz protests on February 18th turned
[35:28] Speaker 1: violent and widespread. What began as a mourning observance for
[35:32] Speaker 1: the Qom martyrs escalated into rioters burning down government buildings,
[35:37] Speaker 1: cinemas and liquor stores. the latter too seen as symbols
[35:42] Speaker 1: of the Shah's westernization. Security forces again responded with deadly force,
[35:47] Speaker 1: killing dozens in Tabriz and imposing martial law. But each
[35:52] Speaker 1: new bloodshed created new martyrs for the movement. And the
[35:57] Speaker 1: cycle just continued. Forty days after Tabriz, more protests and
[36:02] Speaker 1: clashes occurred in the city after city. At Yazd, Shiraz, Mashhad,
[36:08] Speaker 1: and so on. each time keeping alive the memory of
[36:12] Speaker 1: those killed and adding new names to the list. Through
[36:16] Speaker 1: the spring and summer of 1978, this 40-day rhythm of
[36:20] Speaker 1: revolt spread unrest nationwide. What started as primarily a religious
[36:26] Speaker 1: protest in Qom soon drew in broader groups. Secular students
[36:31] Speaker 1: and professionals began joining marches, seeing an opportunity to air
[36:36] Speaker 1: their long-suppressed grievances along the cry of Allahu Akbar and
[36:41] Speaker 1: death to the Shah. The movement was snowballing, transcending its
[36:47] Speaker 1: origins to become a mass upheaval. Throughout mid-1978, the Shah's
[36:55] Speaker 1: regime was clearly losing its footing, unsure whether to crack
[36:59] Speaker 1: down with full force or to offer conciliatory gestures. In
[37:04] Speaker 1: some cities, local commanders refused to order mass shootings of demonstrators,
[37:10] Speaker 1: recalling the spectre of Black Friday in 63, when the
[37:15] Speaker 1: Shah's troops had massacred protesters, and indeed some were haunted
[37:18] Speaker 1: by the historical parallel of Imam Hussein's martyrdom, which savvy
[37:23] Speaker 1: agitators evoked by scheduling big protests during the Islamic month
[37:27] Speaker 1: of Muharram. In other moments, the security forces did fire
[37:33] Speaker 1: on crowds, producing more casualties. and more reasons to protest,
[37:38] Speaker 1: of course. Foreign journalists started reporting on the Iranian unrest,
[37:43] Speaker 1: and images of unarmed demonstrators facing tanks began to appear
[37:48] Speaker 1: on international news. This further constrained the Shah. Aware of
[37:52] Speaker 1: his image abroad and mindful of Carter's human rights talk,
[37:57] Speaker 1: he hesitated to unleash the full terror of his army.
[38:01] Speaker 1: The Shah's oscillation extended to politics. In late summer of 1978,
[38:05] Speaker 1: he sacked his prime minister and brought in Jafar Sharif Emami,
[38:12] Speaker 1: a politician with some clerical lineage, hoping this would mollify
[38:16] Speaker 1: the religious opposition. Spoiler alert, it didn't. Well, Sharif Emami
[38:22] Speaker 1: declared an end to some of the most unpopular policies.
[38:28] Speaker 1: He closed down casinos and nightclubs, which... obviously offensive to
[38:33] Speaker 1: the Islamic-minded, abolished the Shah's imposed Western calendar, which had
[38:39] Speaker 1: replaced the Islamic calendar, which was a deeply resented change,
[38:43] Speaker 1: and made other symbolic concessions. The gestures, however, were far
[38:49] Speaker 1: too little, far too late. It might have pleased people
[38:53] Speaker 1: ten years ago, but by this time the toothpaste cannot
[38:57] Speaker 1: be put back in the tube, as they say. By
[39:00] Speaker 1: now the protests had gained an irreversible momentum and a
[39:04] Speaker 1: radical tone. Many were openly calling for the overthrow of
[39:09] Speaker 1: the Shah and the return of Khomeini. Slogans like Independence, Freedom,
[39:16] Speaker 1: Islamic Republic rang out, showing the convergence of nationalist and
[39:21] Speaker 1: Islamist aspirations. Iranian workers began to strike in various sectors,
[39:27] Speaker 1: adding economic paralysis to political pressure. Notably, by October 1978,
[39:32] Speaker 1: a series of strikes crippled the vital oil industry, the
[39:37] Speaker 1: lifeblood of the regime's finances. Oil output plummeted as technicians
[39:43] Speaker 1: and workers just walked off the job. showing that even
[39:48] Speaker 1: the traditionally apolitical working class had joined the revolutionary wave.
[39:55] Speaker 1: One of the most dramatic and controversial events of this
[39:57] Speaker 1: period was the Cinema Rex fire in Abadan. This happened
[40:02] Speaker 1: on August 19th, 1978. On that summer night, the southern
[40:07] Speaker 1: oil city of Abadan, in that city rather, the packed
[40:12] Speaker 1: Cinema Rex theatre was set ablaze by arsonists while a
[40:15] Speaker 1: movie was showing, The doors had been locked from the outside,
[40:20] Speaker 1: panic spectators were trapped inside the inferno, and 400 people perished,
[40:27] Speaker 1: burned alive, one of the worst fire disasters in modern history.
[40:31] Speaker 1: The Iranians were horrified and aghast. But of course the
[40:36] Speaker 1: question came up, who was responsible for such an unspeakable act?
[40:43] Speaker 1: The Shah's government quickly blamed, quote, Islamic Marxist terrorists, suggesting
[40:49] Speaker 1: radical revolutionaries did it to implicate the Shah. The opposition,
[40:54] Speaker 1: and many ordinary Iranians, reflexively blamed Savak, the hated secret police,
[41:00] Speaker 1: accusing the regime of staging a false flag atrocity to
[41:03] Speaker 1: discredit the protest movement. You think they would do that?
[41:10] Speaker 1: Maybe a video all about false flags soon, huh? I'm
[41:13] Speaker 1: going to get this channel in trouble. In any case,
[41:17] Speaker 1: to this day, the true culprits have never been conclusively identified.
[41:22] Speaker 1: Later evidence suggested Islamic militants aligned with Khomeini may have
[41:27] Speaker 1: started the fire, thinking the cinema was showing an immoral film. But,
[41:34] Speaker 1: once again, that's not proved. In any case, the public
[41:37] Speaker 1: perception in 1978 overwhelmingly pinned the horror on the Shah's regime.
[41:44] Speaker 1: In any case, whoever did it, I hope, you know, well,
[41:49] Speaker 1: you're probably not sleeping very well at night anyway, but
[41:51] Speaker 1: I hope you get brought to justice. What a terrible
[41:54] Speaker 1: injustice they were never caught. The cinema wrecks fire, in
[41:59] Speaker 1: any case, became a rallying point. Mourners at funerals for
[42:03] Speaker 1: the victims cursed the Shah as a murderer, and the
[42:07] Speaker 1: incident crystallized the worst fears about the Shah's brutality. Any
[42:11] Speaker 1: remaining trust was obliterated, The slogan, Burn the Shah, gained
[42:18] Speaker 1: literal and figurative resonance. Tensions reached a climax, however, in
[42:27] Speaker 1: September 1978. On September 8th, a day that would be
[42:32] Speaker 1: remembered as Black Friday, the Shah's regime imposed martial law
[42:36] Speaker 1: in Tehran and other major cities, and ordered the military
[42:39] Speaker 1: to quash demonstrations once and for all, despite the curfew.
[42:44] Speaker 1: Thousands of protesters gathered in Tehran's Jalais Square that morning,
[42:48] Speaker 1: completely undeterred. And what happened next? Well, that was really
[42:54] Speaker 1: the point of no return. Army units, including the elite
[42:58] Speaker 1: Royal Guard troops, opened fire with live ammunition into the crowd.
[43:04] Speaker 1: The scene was a nightmare. Bodies fell as people fled
[43:09] Speaker 1: in terror. The square was covered in blood. Deftoles remained disputed,
[43:16] Speaker 1: but official figures admitted to around 87 killed, while opposition
[43:20] Speaker 1: sources claimed hundreds or even thousands died. In any case,
[43:25] Speaker 1: the impact is undeniable. One is too many. Black Friday
[43:30] Speaker 1: shattered any illusions of compromise. The Shah had effectively declared
[43:34] Speaker 1: war on his own people. Many who had been on
[43:38] Speaker 1: the fence, or hoped for gradual reform, now say that
[43:42] Speaker 1: the regime was irredeemable. Even moderate voices in the opposition,
[43:48] Speaker 1: who had advocated for constitutional monarchy or a gradual transition,
[43:52] Speaker 1: were radicalized by the massacre. Popular poets and writers eulogized
[43:56] Speaker 1: the martyrs of Jalais Square, and mosques across the nation
[44:00] Speaker 1: held ceremonies in their honor. Black Friday also had a
[44:04] Speaker 1: certain sobering effect on some of the Shah's forces. There
[44:08] Speaker 1: were reports that certain army officers, Horrified at shooting, civilians
[44:13] Speaker 1: began losing their resolve to continue to do so. After
[44:17] Speaker 1: September 8th, Iran entered its revolutionary spiral. The Shah, by now,
[44:24] Speaker 1: was increasingly desperate and isolated. Key pillars of his regime
[44:29] Speaker 1: were breaking away. Some of the business elite, the bazaar merchants,
[44:34] Speaker 1: who had been hurt by economic troubles, started financing strikes
[44:38] Speaker 1: and demonstrations. the moderate middle class, were now firmly anti-Shah.
[44:45] Speaker 1: Even within the government, officials were making contingency plans. The
[44:50] Speaker 1: Shah's American and British allies were alarmed, but they seemed
[44:54] Speaker 1: paralyzed about how to respond. More on that soon. Over
[44:59] Speaker 1: the next month, the protests only grew larger. During the
[45:03] Speaker 1: Islamic month of Muharram in December 1978, a time when
[45:10] Speaker 1: Shia piety commemorates the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. The opposition
[45:15] Speaker 1: made a masterful move by organising massive marches on the
[45:18] Speaker 1: days of Tusuwa and Ashura, the peak of Muharram ceremonies,
[45:23] Speaker 1: which fell on December 10th and 11th of that year.
[45:27] Speaker 1: In Tehran and other cities, literally millions of people marched peacefully,
[45:34] Speaker 1: dressed in black, many carrying Khomeini's portraits alongside banners that
[45:38] Speaker 1: likened the Shah, to the tyrant Yazid. He was the
[45:41] Speaker 1: killer of Imam Hussein, by the way. And Khomeini, too. Well,
[45:46] Speaker 1: he was likened to Hussein himself. Observers estimated that up
[45:51] Speaker 1: to 10% of Iran's entire population took to the streets
[45:54] Speaker 1: on those days. The sheer scale of the demonstrations was staggering.
[46:00] Speaker 1: Footage showed an endless sea of humanity in Tehran stretching
[46:04] Speaker 1: for miles. The army, now exhausted and demoralized, largely stood
[46:09] Speaker 1: back and did not intervene in the marches. Doing so
[46:12] Speaker 1: would have led to an unimaginable bloodbath. For the shah
[46:16] Speaker 1: and his supporters, the Muharram protests were the final proof
[46:21] Speaker 1: that they had lost control of the streets, and basically
[46:25] Speaker 1: lost the heart of the populace. The cry of Allahu
[46:28] Speaker 1: Akbar and Mark Bashar, death to the shah, reverberated from
[46:34] Speaker 1: rooftops every night in Tehran, as protests had dropped at
[46:38] Speaker 1: a tactic of collectively chanting from homes after dark, a
[46:43] Speaker 1: haunting chorus that signalled solidarity and defiance. In other words,
[46:48] Speaker 1: it was on like Donkey Kong, as we say in
[46:52] Speaker 1: layman's terms. By the end of 1978, Iran was effectively
[46:58] Speaker 1: in a state of revolutionary paralysis. Nationwide strikes had shut
[47:02] Speaker 1: down key sectors. The oil output was... It was basically
[47:06] Speaker 1: just a little drip at this point, causing economic crisis.
[47:11] Speaker 1: Newspapers weren't even publishing. Garbage was piling up uncollected. Universities
[47:17] Speaker 1: and schools were closed by boycotts. Everything was falling apart.
[47:23] Speaker 1: The Shah's once efficient state machinery was coming to a
[47:26] Speaker 1: halt as bureaucrats quietly stopped obeying orders. And internationally, confidence
[47:32] Speaker 1: in the Shah had all but evaporated. During these months
[47:39] Speaker 1: of late 1878 to early 79, foreign governments, particularly the
[47:44] Speaker 1: Shah's longtime allies, the United States, and to a lesser
[47:47] Speaker 1: extent Britain and Israel, were deeply involved in behind-the-scenes maneuvers.
[47:53] Speaker 1: The CIA was monitoring events, but has been criticized for
[47:56] Speaker 1: failing to predict the speed and magnitude of the revolution.
[48:01] Speaker 1: In fact, a notorious CIA intelligence estimate in late 1978 said,
[48:06] Speaker 1: still insisted that Iran, quote, is not in a revolutionary
[48:11] Speaker 1: or even pre-revolutionary situation. End quote. Well, that showcases how
[48:18] Speaker 1: badly American intelligence underestimated what was really going on. Still,
[48:24] Speaker 1: as the situation deteriorated, Washington had to decide whether to
[48:27] Speaker 1: stick with the Shah, push for reforms, or prepare for
[48:31] Speaker 1: a post-Shah scenario. These deliberations led to some of the
[48:36] Speaker 1: most controversial foreign interventions of the crisis. One key episode
[48:41] Speaker 1: was the secret mission of General Robert E. Husser, the
[48:46] Speaker 1: deputy commander of NATO sent by President Carter's administration to
[48:49] Speaker 1: Tehran in January of 79. Husser arrived in Tehran on
[48:55] Speaker 1: January 4th under a great secrecy and pretended to be
[48:59] Speaker 1: on a routine visit. But in reality, He was asked
[49:03] Speaker 1: with a delicate, rather tasked with a delicate and somewhat
[49:07] Speaker 1: contradictory mission, to prevent Iran's military from launching a coup,
[49:13] Speaker 1: and also to ensure the military's unity and some role
[49:16] Speaker 1: in the outcome. Essentially, Washington... was hedging its bets. They
[49:22] Speaker 1: did not want a hardline military junta that might massacre
[49:25] Speaker 1: thousands of people, and possibly push Iran towards a leftist
[49:29] Speaker 1: revolution or Soviet intervention. But they also did not want
[49:33] Speaker 1: the military to disintegrate. or leave a power vacuum that
[49:37] Speaker 1: radical Islamists or Communists could fully exploit. Husserl met with
[49:41] Speaker 1: the Shah's top generals repeatedly, trying to persuade them to
[49:45] Speaker 1: support a political solution, rather than seize power themselves. He
[49:50] Speaker 1: encouraged them to keep the army intact, maintain order, but
[49:55] Speaker 1: also to accept the appointment of a civilian transitional government.
[50:00] Speaker 1: Many of those Iranian generals were fiercely loyal to the Shah,
[50:05] Speaker 1: and were basically inclined to fight it out. They distrusted
[50:10] Speaker 1: the incoming revolutionaries, and were perfectly capable of attempting a
[50:14] Speaker 1: coup or a bloodbath crackdown. Husserl essentially urged patience and
[50:19] Speaker 1: dissuaded them from acting unilaterally. However, in the fevered atmosphere
[50:25] Speaker 1: of Tehran, rumours were swirling about Husserl's true intent. To
[50:31] Speaker 1: anti-Shah Iranians, especially Islamists, any presence of a high-ranking American
[50:36] Speaker 1: general was confirmation of America's continuing plots. Many believed, and
[50:42] Speaker 1: some in Iran still believe, that Hughes' mission was to
[50:45] Speaker 1: neutralize the Iranian army on behalf of Khomeini, that the
[50:51] Speaker 1: Americans had to decide to ditch the Shah and were
[50:54] Speaker 1: now backing Khomeini as an ostensibly anti-communist leader who could
[50:59] Speaker 1: stabilize Iran without having to lean to the Soviets. Interesting theory. Well,
[51:06] Speaker 1: it does posit that Husserl basically told generals not to
[51:10] Speaker 1: intervene against the revolution, thus handing over Iran to Khomeini's forces.
[51:16] Speaker 1: But on the other side, American officials vehemently deny this narrative.
[51:22] Speaker 1: They argue that they never wanted Khomeini in power. Indeed,
[51:26] Speaker 1: Khomeini's ideology was hostile to America, and that Husserl was
[51:30] Speaker 1: trying to foster a moderate coalition, trying to avoid the
[51:34] Speaker 1: worst outcomes. Now, both perspectives certainly deserve a mention. There's
[51:40] Speaker 1: little hard evidence that the U.S. actively conspired to bring
[51:43] Speaker 1: Khomeini to power. In fact, they were scrambling to figure
[51:47] Speaker 1: out who Khomeini really was and whether they could work
[51:50] Speaker 1: with him. But the perception among the revolutionaries was that
[51:54] Speaker 1: the U.S. was pulling the strings one way or another.
[51:58] Speaker 1: Old habits die hard, I suppose. Qusa left Iran on
[52:02] Speaker 1: February 3rd, after the Shah's departure. once it became clear
[52:07] Speaker 1: that the army would not move against Khomeini at that point.
[52:11] Speaker 1: The Iranian generals felt dismayed, perhaps betrayed. Later, many of
[52:17] Speaker 1: the same generals would be executed by revolutionary courts, some
[52:21] Speaker 1: blaming Husserl for urging them to stand down and thus
[52:25] Speaker 1: sealing their fate. Meanwhile, American diplomats were doing some bet-hedging.
[52:33] Speaker 1: William H. Sullivan said, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, opened
[52:38] Speaker 1: back-channel communications with Khomeini's camp as early as late 78.
[52:41] Speaker 1: In one notable instance, he met with an intermediary of
[52:46] Speaker 1: Khomeini to understand the Ayatollah's intentions and to assure him
[52:50] Speaker 1: that the U.S. sought a peaceful outcome. Now, Ambassador Sullivan
[52:56] Speaker 1: even famously sent her cabled to Washington titled, quote, Thinking
[53:00] Speaker 1: the Unthinkable, suggesting the US should prepare for the Shah's
[53:04] Speaker 1: exit and Khomeini's potential takeover. Suppose that wasn't a very
[53:09] Speaker 1: popular correspondence to receive. Hope it wasn't on a Friday night. Well,
[53:14] Speaker 1: Sullivan and some State Department officials believed Khomeini's movement was
[53:19] Speaker 1: too powerful to stop, and that the best hope was
[53:22] Speaker 1: to steer it towards a moderate path. Now, on the
[53:26] Speaker 1: other side of the U.S. government, National Security Advisor Brzezinski
[53:31] Speaker 1: was more hawkish in his expression and urged support in
[53:35] Speaker 1: Iran's generals in a crackdown to maintain control. This split
[53:40] Speaker 1: within the Carter administration led to a somewhat paralyzed U.S. policy.
[53:44] Speaker 1: One day they were encouraging the Shah to compromise. The
[53:48] Speaker 1: next day, telling him to stand firm or for generals
[53:51] Speaker 1: to consider contingency plans. Now, no direct US military intervention
[53:58] Speaker 1: was seriously considered. Memories of Vietnam and a lack of
[54:03] Speaker 1: political appetite for another foreign war made that option unthinkable.
[54:06] Speaker 1: There's no way the general public would have stood for
[54:09] Speaker 1: it anyway. But the absence of a clear US strategy
[54:13] Speaker 1: also meant that the Shah felt increasingly alone and ultimately
[54:17] Speaker 1: unsure of who to listen to. Across the Atlantic, another
[54:23] Speaker 1: critical meeting was unfolding that would later be seen as
[54:26] Speaker 1: sealing the Shah's fate, the Guadalupe Conference of early January 1979.
[54:33] Speaker 1: In the first week of this month, the leaders of
[54:38] Speaker 1: the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany convened at
[54:43] Speaker 1: a summit on the Caribbean island of Guadalupe to discuss
[54:46] Speaker 1: various global issues. Iran's crisis was high on the list.
[54:52] Speaker 1: By this point, all four Western leaders had concluded that
[54:55] Speaker 1: the Shah's position was untenable. Reports from that conference indicate
[55:00] Speaker 1: that President Carter, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President
[55:05] Speaker 1: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt all
[55:10] Speaker 1: agreed that the Shah likely could not survive this turmoil.
[55:14] Speaker 1: They worried that a protracted conflict in Iran could invite
[55:18] Speaker 1: Soviet intervention or an all-out civil war. Thus, they tacitly
[55:23] Speaker 1: decided to support a plan where the Shah would leave Iran,
[55:26] Speaker 1: ostensibly for a vacation or medical reasons. A transitional government
[55:33] Speaker 1: would negotiate with opposition forces and hopefully avoid a collapse
[55:37] Speaker 1: into chaos or communism. Although they did not choose Khomeini,
[55:43] Speaker 1: by essentially withdrawing support for the Shah and urging a change,
[55:46] Speaker 1: the Western powers signalled to Iranian elites that the Shah
[55:50] Speaker 1: was now a liability. Now, notably, I suppose it's not
[55:55] Speaker 1: too much of a surprise, there wasn't a single Iranian
[55:58] Speaker 1: present at Guadalupe. It was a meeting of foreign powers,
[56:03] Speaker 1: deciding the future of an old nation among themselves, a
[56:07] Speaker 1: fact that later fed into Iranian narratives that the West
[56:10] Speaker 1: plotted the Shah removal. When news leaked at Guadalupe that
[56:15] Speaker 1: the Shah's allies had not backed him to use force,
[56:19] Speaker 1: it demoralized the royalists and emboldened the revolutionaries. The Shah
[56:24] Speaker 1: himself later bitterly recounted how he felt abandoned by his
[56:28] Speaker 1: American and British friends at this critical juncture. And what
[56:34] Speaker 1: of the Shah's other key ally? What of Israel? Well,
[56:39] Speaker 1: the Israeli government, under Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1978,
[56:45] Speaker 1: watched Iran's unravelling with dread. Iran had been one of
[56:50] Speaker 1: Israel's few friends in the Muslim world, Well, at least,
[56:55] Speaker 1: the Shah had been. A strategic partnership that was critically
[56:59] Speaker 1: important for Israeli oil supplies and regional intelligence. In public,
[57:06] Speaker 1: Israel was quiet, given the relations were semi-secret anyway. But privately,
[57:12] Speaker 1: Israeli officials urged the Shah to take stronger action to
[57:15] Speaker 1: save himself. Some accounts suggest Israeli military advisers in Iran
[57:20] Speaker 1: advocated a tough crackdown. fearing that an Islamic regime under
[57:23] Speaker 1: Khomeini would turn Iran from a friend into a bitter
[57:26] Speaker 1: enemy of Israel. In the final days of the Shah's rule,
[57:31] Speaker 1: Eliezer Tzafir, the Mossad station chief in Tehran, had astonishing
[57:37] Speaker 1: encounters that illustrate the intimacy of the Israel-Iran connection. After
[57:43] Speaker 1: the Shah fled, Iran's last prime minister of the monarchy,
[57:46] Speaker 1: Shapur Bakhtiar, secretly met the Mossad officer in Tzafir. and
[57:51] Speaker 1: in desperation, asked Israel to assassinate Ayatollah Khomeini, who was
[57:58] Speaker 1: then in exile near Paris, waiting for his return. Bagdia
[58:04] Speaker 1: hoped that decapitating the revolution might save Iran from theocracy.
[58:10] Speaker 1: Zafrir relayed this request to the Mossad headquarters. In late
[58:16] Speaker 1: January of 1979, A top group of Israeli officials, including
[58:20] Speaker 1: Mossad director Yitzhak Hoffi, debated this rather stunning proposition. And ultimately,
[58:29] Speaker 1: they decided against assassinating Khomeini, perhaps calculating that such an
[58:34] Speaker 1: operation in France was too risky, and that it, well,
[58:39] Speaker 1: probably would only make the revolutionaries more angry. The fact
[58:43] Speaker 1: that Bakhtiar turned to Israel for such a dramatic measure
[58:47] Speaker 1: shows how deeply enmeshed Israeli intelligence really was in Iran,
[58:52] Speaker 1: and how dire the situation had become for those in
[58:55] Speaker 1: the twilight days of the Shah's regime. Israeli agents in
[58:59] Speaker 1: Iran during the revolution also found themselves in personal peril.
[59:04] Speaker 1: As the revolutionary forces took over, mobs targeted anyone thought
[59:09] Speaker 1: to be Israeli or American. Zafria and his team had
[59:13] Speaker 1: to smuggle out Israeli citizens, who felt unsafe. In one
[59:18] Speaker 1: dramatic moment, as Zafria prepared to evacuate, an Iranian general
[59:23] Speaker 1: grabbed him by the legs and begged, take me with you.
[59:27] Speaker 1: Another illustration of how things had completely flipped. The once
[59:31] Speaker 1: arrogant Savak and military officials were now the ones trembling
[59:36] Speaker 1: and seeking help to escape the wrath of the people.
[59:42] Speaker 1: But through all this, the perception on the Iranian street
[59:44] Speaker 1: was consistent. Foreign powers were deeply involved in the country's affairs.
[59:50] Speaker 1: In the minds of many protesters, the Shah was the
[59:54] Speaker 1: American Shah. Demonstrators even held aloft empty tear gas canisters
[59:59] Speaker 1: that littered the streets, showing the imprint, Made in the USA,
[1:00:04] Speaker 1: as evidence that the weapons we used against them were
[1:00:07] Speaker 1: coming from America. Talk about caught red-handed, huh? Anti-Israeli sentiments
[1:00:13] Speaker 1: were also at a peak. Slogans equating the Shah with
[1:00:17] Speaker 1: Jews or Zionists were chanted. And the Israeli flag was
[1:00:21] Speaker 1: burned alongside the American flag in many rallies. Revolutionaries often
[1:00:26] Speaker 1: did not draw fine distinctions between foreign actors. They lumped
[1:00:31] Speaker 1: the Shah, the US, Britain, Israel, and sometimes the Soviet Union,
[1:00:36] Speaker 1: though the USSR had actually supported Mosaddegh in 1953, but
[1:00:39] Speaker 1: it was a little bit more ambivalent in 1979. In
[1:00:44] Speaker 1: any case, they were all together as part of an
[1:00:46] Speaker 1: imperious cabal, holding the little guy down. This conspiratorial world
[1:00:53] Speaker 1: view was in part of a product of truth and history.
[1:00:57] Speaker 1: You can't really blame them for coming to this conclusion.
[1:01:01] Speaker 1: I mean, after all, 1953, you look at the CIA
[1:01:05] Speaker 1: and MI6, well, we've got the documents, right? It was
[1:01:11] Speaker 1: also fuelled, though, by decades of the Shah's close alignment
[1:01:13] Speaker 1: with the West, and by anti-imperialist ideology currents of the
[1:01:18] Speaker 1: 60s and 70s, which influenced everyone, all the way from
[1:01:22] Speaker 1: Islamic thinkers to Marxists. Thus, when the revolution gained steam,
[1:01:29] Speaker 1: there were numerous theories and rumours about foreign rule. Some
[1:01:33] Speaker 1: believed that the United States, seeing the Shah as a liability,
[1:01:36] Speaker 1: was engineering a smooth transition to a military junta, or
[1:01:40] Speaker 1: to a moderate coalition that might include religious figures. This
[1:01:45] Speaker 1: was somewhat true, as we've seen in Carter's hedging. Others
[1:01:49] Speaker 1: went further to allege a dark theory that Britain had
[1:01:52] Speaker 1: secretly been grooming Khomeini from the start, pointing to the
[1:01:56] Speaker 1: fact that Khomeini had lived in Iraq, under a regime
[1:01:59] Speaker 1: that Britain had influence in, and then in France, a
[1:02:03] Speaker 1: Western country, from which he orchestrated his return. These theories
[1:02:08] Speaker 1: held that maybe the West preferred a weak, backward Islamic regime,
[1:02:14] Speaker 1: as they called it, to a strong independent Iran under
[1:02:17] Speaker 1: a modernizing Shah. or even under socialist influence. Ironically, such
[1:02:23] Speaker 1: theories contradicted the other camp's view that the Soviet KGB
[1:02:27] Speaker 1: was behind Khomeini to weaken the West. Ay, ay, ay. Oh,
[1:02:35] Speaker 1: there's so many moving parts, isn't there? Well, in reality, though,
[1:02:40] Speaker 1: we can say that Khomeini was not anyone's puppet. His
[1:02:46] Speaker 1: movement had genuine indigenous roots. It was all about his
[1:02:50] Speaker 1: own people. But given Iran's long history of the Great Game,
[1:02:56] Speaker 1: as they call it, and foreign manipulation, it was perhaps
[1:02:59] Speaker 1: inevitable that Iranians would suspect hidden hands at every turn,
[1:03:03] Speaker 1: a devil behind every door. Once again, they are products
[1:03:07] Speaker 1: of the last couple decades of having foreign meddling. Of course,
[1:03:12] Speaker 1: they're looking over their shoulders. Khomeini himself sometimes fanned the flames, though.
[1:03:17] Speaker 1: He would speak of colonialists and world devourers, orchestrating plots.
[1:03:23] Speaker 1: Yet he also recognized that the revolution's success lay in
[1:03:27] Speaker 1: portraying it as authentically Iranian and Islamic. In a strategic move,
[1:03:33] Speaker 1: Khomeini took care to reassure various groups. He told the
[1:03:37] Speaker 1: bazaar merchants that their economy would be respected, told the
[1:03:40] Speaker 1: secular middle class that an Islamic government would be democratic
[1:03:43] Speaker 1: and not a theocracy, and he even sent messages to
[1:03:47] Speaker 1: the American government saying, not to fear an Islamic movement,
[1:03:50] Speaker 1: since it was mainly against the Shah, not the American people.
[1:03:55] Speaker 1: And indeed, in early 1979, communist representatives in Paris met
[1:04:00] Speaker 1: with Americans and conveyed that Iran would continue to sell oil,
[1:04:04] Speaker 1: and would not export revolution to other countries. Well, assurances
[1:04:09] Speaker 1: that would later at least be proved to be partially false.
[1:04:15] Speaker 1: These communications suggest that the revolutionaries were keenly aware of
[1:04:19] Speaker 1: the foreign gaze and trying to manage it, even as
[1:04:23] Speaker 1: they rallied against foreign meddling. And so, as 1979 dawned,
[1:04:29] Speaker 1: they suddenly stood right at the Rubicon. The die was cast.
[1:04:35] Speaker 1: The Shah's fate was sealed by a combination of internal
[1:04:37] Speaker 1: revolt and external withdrawal of support. Washington had signalled it
[1:04:42] Speaker 1: would not support a violent crackdown, General Hughes's presence paradoxically
[1:04:46] Speaker 1: ensured the army held back rather than seized power itself.
[1:04:50] Speaker 1: The Western European leaders quietly urged the Shah to step aside.
[1:04:55] Speaker 1: Israel was unable to affect events decisively, especially once it
[1:05:00] Speaker 1: became clear that being linked to Israel itself was a
[1:05:03] Speaker 1: stain on the Shah among his people. And so, the
[1:05:07] Speaker 1: final act of the Pahlavi dynasty had begun. On January 16th, 1979,
[1:05:15] Speaker 1: the Shah of Iran and his Empress Farah boarded a
[1:05:19] Speaker 1: Boeing 727 and left Iran, ostensibly for an extended vacation,
[1:05:28] Speaker 1: as they put it. As the Shah's plane soared away,
[1:05:32] Speaker 1: a huge roar of approval rose from Tehran's streets. People danced,
[1:05:38] Speaker 1: they hugged each other, they cried tears of joy. After
[1:05:42] Speaker 1: 37 years on the throne, with absolute power for 25
[1:05:45] Speaker 1: of those since 1953, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was gone. It
[1:05:51] Speaker 1: was a moment of personal devastation for the Shah. He
[1:05:54] Speaker 1: reportedly wept on the flight, uncertain if he would ever
[1:05:58] Speaker 1: see his homeland again. Well, tragic footnote, he never would, actually.
[1:06:03] Speaker 1: Suffering from cancer, he would wander in exile and die
[1:06:06] Speaker 1: in Egypt in July of 1980. Well, before departing, the
[1:06:11] Speaker 1: Shah appointed a regency council to nominally run the monarchy
[1:06:15] Speaker 1: in his absence, and in a final attempt at reconciliation,
[1:06:19] Speaker 1: he had earlier appointed Shapur Bhaktiar as Prime Minister to
[1:06:24] Speaker 1: lead a civilian government. Shapur Bhaktiar was a moderate opposition
[1:06:28] Speaker 1: figure from the National Front, Mossadegh's old party. He had
[1:06:32] Speaker 1: accepted the Shah's offer to become PM, on the condition
[1:06:36] Speaker 1: that the Shah leave, and that he, Bhaktiar, could implement
[1:06:41] Speaker 1: liberalisation himself. Bakhtiar was no royalist at heart. He had
[1:06:46] Speaker 1: fought against the Shah's dictatorship for years, but he feared
[1:06:50] Speaker 1: a revolutionary bloodbath and the rise of extremists. He thought
[1:06:55] Speaker 1: he could save Iran by creating a constitutional monarchy with
[1:06:59] Speaker 1: the Shah out of the country and negotiating with the
[1:07:02] Speaker 1: opposition for free elections. Once in office in early January,
[1:07:06] Speaker 1: Bakhtiar took bold steps. He dissolved SAVAK, at least on paper.
[1:07:12] Speaker 1: lifted censorship, released some political prisoners, and promised to hold
[1:07:17] Speaker 1: an eventual referendum on the monarchy. And then he welcomed
[1:07:22] Speaker 1: the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini to return, on the condition it
[1:07:26] Speaker 1: be a peaceful homecoming without incitement to violence. It seemed,
[1:07:31] Speaker 1: at least for a moment, that Iran had found a
[1:07:34] Speaker 1: middle path. However, Khomeini and his camp flatly rejected Bakhtiar's government,
[1:07:41] Speaker 1: from his exile in France, to which he had moved
[1:07:44] Speaker 1: in October 1978 after the Iraqi regime expelled him under
[1:07:48] Speaker 1: the Shah's pressure, Khomeini saw Bakhtiar as just another pawn
[1:07:53] Speaker 1: trying to salvage the monarchy. Khomeini declared he would not
[1:07:57] Speaker 1: negotiate with what he termed an illegitimate regime. He insisted
[1:08:03] Speaker 1: on the complete abolition of the monarchy. Famously, when urged
[1:08:08] Speaker 1: by some moderates, To at least talk to Bakhtiar, Khomeini quipped, quote,
[1:08:13] Speaker 1: I will accept Bakhtiar's government the day Bakhtiar accepts mine,
[1:08:18] Speaker 1: meaning Bakhtiar must resign and submit to the revolution. Khomeini's
[1:08:22] Speaker 1: unyielding stance reflected his understanding that a compromise at that
[1:08:27] Speaker 1: point could demoralize the revolutionary masses who wanted a clean sweep.
[1:08:32] Speaker 1: It was all or nothing. February 1st, 1979 After two
[1:08:38] Speaker 1: weeks of tense anticipation following the Shah's exit, Ayatollah Khomeini
[1:08:42] Speaker 1: returned to Iran in a chartered Air France jumbo jet.
[1:08:48] Speaker 1: The journey was broadcast worldwide. Journalists on board asked Khomeini
[1:08:52] Speaker 1: how he felt about returning in triumph. His response? Nothing.
[1:08:58] Speaker 1: That's all he said. The word nothing, not like nothing
[1:09:02] Speaker 1: is in the absence of a... Yeah, you know what
[1:09:03] Speaker 1: I mean. Well, this austere reply, whether out of personal
[1:09:07] Speaker 1: asceticism or calculated mystique, reinforced his image as a leader
[1:09:12] Speaker 1: on a divine mission, unmoved by personal emotion. When the
[1:09:17] Speaker 1: plane landed in Tehran... an ecstatic crowd of up to
[1:09:20] Speaker 1: five million people thronged the streets to greet him, effectively
[1:09:25] Speaker 1: shutting down the capital in a delirium of welcome. It
[1:09:29] Speaker 1: was one of the largest crowds in history to greet
[1:09:31] Speaker 1: a single individual. Kameni, clad in his black turban and cloak,
[1:09:37] Speaker 1: descended the airplane steps and was absolutely mobbed by supporters.
[1:09:43] Speaker 1: So dense was the crowd that his safe passage had
[1:09:45] Speaker 1: to be ensured by volunteers forming a human chain. At
[1:09:48] Speaker 1: one point he even had to be whisked away in
[1:09:49] Speaker 1: a helicopter to reach the cemetery where he delivered his
[1:09:52] Speaker 1: rival speech. His triumphant return triggered the final collapse of
[1:09:57] Speaker 1: the old order. He lost no time in making revolutionary moves, though.
[1:10:01] Speaker 1: Within days he appointed his own interim prime minister, Mehdi Bazagan,
[1:10:06] Speaker 1: to form a provisional revolutionary government. This move was essentially
[1:10:12] Speaker 1: a parallel government to Bakhtiar's, creating a showdown. Bakhtiar found
[1:10:19] Speaker 1: that power was slipping from his hands. Ministries stopped obeying him.
[1:10:24] Speaker 1: Soldiers were defecting or simply melting away. And Khomeini's decrees
[1:10:28] Speaker 1: were treated as law by the masses. On February 8th
[1:10:32] Speaker 1: to the 9th, a rebellion erupted within the Air Force ranks,
[1:10:35] Speaker 1: specifically the technicians known as the homophars, some of whom
[1:10:39] Speaker 1: were sympathetic to the revolution. When the Imperial Guard tried
[1:10:44] Speaker 1: to arrest the dissident airmen at an airbase, Street demonstrators
[1:10:49] Speaker 1: and rebel soldiers came to their defence, and Tehran once
[1:10:52] Speaker 1: again tipped into violent clashes. Young men raided police stations
[1:10:57] Speaker 1: and barracks for weapons, and suddenly firefights and skirmishes spread
[1:11:01] Speaker 1: through the city between pro-Khamenei rebel units joined by armed
[1:11:05] Speaker 1: civilians and the remnants of loyalist units. The 40-year-old monarchy
[1:11:09] Speaker 1: literally went down fighting in those street battles. For several
[1:11:14] Speaker 1: desperate hours it seemed the Imperial Guard might attempt a
[1:11:16] Speaker 1: last stand around key installations. But the tide was irreversible.
[1:11:22] Speaker 1: Military bases, one after another, fell to rebel soldiers and
[1:11:26] Speaker 1: angry crowds. On February 11th, 1979, the Supreme Military Council
[1:11:34] Speaker 1: of Iran announced the army's neutrality in the political conflict. Essentially,
[1:11:39] Speaker 1: the generals decided that not to continue fighting on behalf
[1:11:42] Speaker 1: of the Bakhtiar government. This was the moment when the
[1:11:47] Speaker 1: dam broke. With the military stepping aside, revolutionaries swiftly took
[1:11:51] Speaker 1: over radio and television stations, government offices, and the parliament building.
[1:11:57] Speaker 1: Shapur Bakhtiar went into hiding. He eventually fled Iran in disguise.
[1:12:02] Speaker 1: Years later, in 1991, he would be assassinated in Paris
[1:12:06] Speaker 1: by agents of the Islamic Republic, while last victims of
[1:12:10] Speaker 1: the revolution's long reach. Well, the Pahlavi monarchy had disintegrated. 2,500
[1:12:18] Speaker 1: years of continuous kingship in Persian history came to an end.
[1:12:23] Speaker 1: Jubilant crowds now chanted not just Death to the Shah,
[1:12:27] Speaker 1: but Long Live Imam Khomeini. And from then onward, Iran
[1:12:32] Speaker 1: was declared the Islamic Revolution Victorious. The days and weeks
[1:12:38] Speaker 1: that followed were a period of heavy exhilaration and chaotic transition. Khomeini,
[1:12:43] Speaker 1: now unquestionably the most powerful figure in Iran, set about
[1:12:47] Speaker 1: laying the groundwork for a new political system. While appointing
[1:12:50] Speaker 1: moderates like Bazir Khan to some post to reassure people
[1:12:53] Speaker 1: at first, Khomeini also endorsed the formation of revolutionary committees
[1:12:58] Speaker 1: and militias to keep order and punish counter-revolutionaries. The notorious
[1:13:03] Speaker 1: Sabak was formally disbanded. Many of its top officials and
[1:13:08] Speaker 1: known torturers were rounded up. Known torturers. Good Lord. I'm
[1:13:16] Speaker 1: guessing they did not get a slap on the wrist. Some,
[1:13:20] Speaker 1: such as the feared former Sabak general, Nematola Nassiri, and
[1:13:24] Speaker 1: the former Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveda, were executed after
[1:13:28] Speaker 1: summary trials. The Shah's top generals, who hadn't already fled,
[1:13:34] Speaker 1: were likewise arrested. Several were executed in short order, including
[1:13:39] Speaker 1: Generals Kasorad and Rahimi, and others who had been involved
[1:13:44] Speaker 1: in cracking down on protesters. Now, interestingly, one of the
[1:13:49] Speaker 1: Shah's most senior generals, General Abbas Garabaghi, who was part
[1:13:54] Speaker 1: of the final military council, cooperated with the revolutionaries and
[1:13:58] Speaker 1: saved his life for a time. And one of the
[1:14:03] Speaker 1: Shah's close confidants, General Hussein Fardoust, even defected and aided
[1:14:08] Speaker 1: the new regime in reconstituting an intelligence organisation from Savak's remnants.
[1:14:14] Speaker 1: But these nuances aside, the revolution was as much a
[1:14:18] Speaker 1: purge as it was a takeover. In the fervour of
[1:14:21] Speaker 1: early 1979, revolutionary tribunals proliferated, meting out summary justice. Some
[1:14:28] Speaker 1: Iranians cheered at the downfall of hated figures. while others
[1:14:32] Speaker 1: felt a pang of concern at the rough justice and
[1:14:35] Speaker 1: power grab starting to unfold. On April 1st, 1979, after
[1:14:41] Speaker 1: a quick national referendum, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic republic,
[1:14:46] Speaker 1: a novel state, a structure meant to embody both republican
[1:14:49] Speaker 1: popular sovereignty and Islamic theocratic governance. In December of 1979,
[1:14:56] Speaker 1: a new constitution was approved by popular vote, embedding Khomeini's doctrine,
[1:15:01] Speaker 1: of guardianship of the Islamic jurist. This made Khomeini the
[1:15:06] Speaker 1: supreme leader, the highest authority in the land, above even
[1:15:11] Speaker 1: the president and prime minister. Quite a dramatic elevation for
[1:15:15] Speaker 1: a cleric who had spent decades as an outsider. Now
[1:15:20] Speaker 1: he sat on the throne's place, albeit under a title
[1:15:24] Speaker 1: and institution of his own making. Well, we could end
[1:15:29] Speaker 1: the video there, but I know you want more. So
[1:15:34] Speaker 1: let's talk about the aftermath. What happened next? Well, the
[1:15:41] Speaker 1: Iranian revolution certainly shocked the world. A watershed event of
[1:15:46] Speaker 1: the 20th century. Comparable in impact to the Russian or
[1:15:50] Speaker 1: Chinese revolutions, yet distinctly different in character. It was not
[1:15:55] Speaker 1: a Marxist class uprising or a military coup. but rather
[1:15:59] Speaker 1: a populist revolution with a strong religious and nationalistic flavour.
[1:16:04] Speaker 1: For the first time in modern history, a firmly entrenched
[1:16:07] Speaker 1: pro-Western monarchy was thrown out by Islamic theocracy grounded in
[1:16:13] Speaker 1: sheer political ideology. Immediately, the new Islamic Republic of Iran
[1:16:18] Speaker 1: turned vehemently against its former benefactors. Relations with the US
[1:16:23] Speaker 1: deteriorated rapidly, when in October 1979, the U.S. admitted the
[1:16:29] Speaker 1: exiled Shah, sick with cancer, for medical treatment. Iran's revolutionary
[1:16:35] Speaker 1: leaders fear this was a prelude to another CIA-engineered coup
[1:16:39] Speaker 1: to restore the Shah, a repeat of 1953. In response,
[1:16:44] Speaker 1: on November 4, 1979, Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy
[1:16:49] Speaker 1: in Tehran and seized 52 American diplomats and staff as hostages.
[1:16:54] Speaker 1: They demanded the Shah's extradition to Iran for trial, among
[1:16:58] Speaker 1: other conditions. This Iran hostage crisis dragged on for 444 days,
[1:17:04] Speaker 1: humiliating the United States and poisoning any chance of rapprochement. Yeah,
[1:17:09] Speaker 1: it's one way to ruin foreign affairs, isn't it? Foreign
[1:17:13] Speaker 1: relations taking a beating. The embassy takeover was not directly
[1:17:17] Speaker 1: planned by Khomeini, by the way. But he did endorse it.
[1:17:21] Speaker 1: He called it a second revolution. and leveraging the situation
[1:17:25] Speaker 1: to rally nationalist sentiment and outflank any moderates in the government.
[1:17:30] Speaker 1: Prime Minister Bazargan, who favoured restoring national, rather normal diplomatic protocols,
[1:17:37] Speaker 1: resigned in protest during the hostage affair. And from that point,
[1:17:41] Speaker 1: any moderate influence began to wane, and the hardline Islamist
[1:17:46] Speaker 1: core consolidated power. Diplomatic ties with Israel were severed as well,
[1:17:55] Speaker 1: Khomeini's regime expelled Israelis from their unofficial Tehran mission and
[1:18:01] Speaker 1: handed the premises over to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The
[1:18:07] Speaker 1: Israelis wouldn't have liked that one, wouldn't they? Iran under
[1:18:11] Speaker 1: the Islamic Republic became stridently anti-Israel, reversing decades of quiet cooperation.
[1:18:18] Speaker 1: Death to Israel joined the Death to America chant as
[1:18:22] Speaker 1: the stables at rallies The revolution's ideology considered Israel and
[1:18:28] Speaker 1: the US as partners in imperialism, and ultimately, enemies of Islam. Now,
[1:18:37] Speaker 1: the regional impact was enormous too. The Arab monarchies of
[1:18:40] Speaker 1: the Persian Gulf, like Saudi and other secular regimes, watched
[1:18:45] Speaker 1: Iran's upheaval with a mix of fear and fascination. For
[1:18:49] Speaker 1: conservative Sunni monarchies, the idea of an Islamic revolution was worrisome.
[1:18:54] Speaker 1: Might their own Islamist dissidents be inspired to overthrow them? Maybe.
[1:19:00] Speaker 1: For secular Arab dictators, the fall of a Western allied
[1:19:04] Speaker 1: Shah was a win. But the rise of a theocratic
[1:19:07] Speaker 1: Iran would soon become a new threat. especially as Khomeini
[1:19:11] Speaker 1: declared it Iran's mission to export the revolution. Indeed, in
[1:19:18] Speaker 1: the years after 79, Iran would support Shia Islamist movements abroad,
[1:19:23] Speaker 1: from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Dawa in Iraq, rather alarming
[1:19:28] Speaker 1: to its neighbours. One neighbour in particular took drastic action,
[1:19:35] Speaker 1: Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Sensing Iran's post-revolutionary disorder and perhaps hoping
[1:19:40] Speaker 1: to squash any revolutionary Shia message that could inflame Iraq's
[1:19:45] Speaker 1: own Shia majority, Saddam launched an invasion of Iran in
[1:19:49] Speaker 1: September of 1980, triggering the bloody Eight-Year Iran-Iraq War. That
[1:19:56] Speaker 1: war would devastate both countries and further entrench the revolutionary
[1:20:00] Speaker 1: regime in Iran by uniting Iranians against a foreign foe. Notably,
[1:20:06] Speaker 1: During the 80s conflict, the ironies of foreign involvement came
[1:20:10] Speaker 1: full circle. The United States, which had lost Iran as
[1:20:14] Speaker 1: an ally, ended up tilting towards supporting Saddam Hussein in Iraq,
[1:20:21] Speaker 1: while also eventually engaging in secret arms sales to Iran,
[1:20:24] Speaker 1: the Iran-Contra affair, to fund Nicaraguan rebels. Israel, despite Iran's
[1:20:31] Speaker 1: official enmity, even supplied some arms to Iran early in
[1:20:36] Speaker 1: the war, seeing Saddam as a bigger threat. A reminder
[1:20:40] Speaker 1: that geopolitics can certainly make strange bedfellows. But such nuances
[1:20:45] Speaker 1: were lost on the Iranian people, who primarily saw that
[1:20:49] Speaker 1: once again world powers were meddling in their region, sometimes
[1:20:53] Speaker 1: feeding both sides of a war. Inside Iran, the revolution
[1:20:59] Speaker 1: went through its own convulsions. The broad coalition that had
[1:21:02] Speaker 1: ousted the Shah did not stay for too long. In 1980-81,
[1:21:07] Speaker 1: secular liberals, leftists, and even some Islamic factions that had
[1:21:13] Speaker 1: fought the Shah have found themselves marginalized or persecuted by
[1:21:17] Speaker 1: Khomeini's circle. The Islamist-Marxist group MEK, for example, went from
[1:21:23] Speaker 1: being a revolutionary ally to waging a violent insurgency against
[1:21:27] Speaker 1: the Republic after falling out with Khomeini. leading to a
[1:21:31] Speaker 1: brutal clackdown. The old-line Islamists who had hoped for a
[1:21:36] Speaker 1: more democratic Islamic society, like President Banisadur, were pushed aside.
[1:21:44] Speaker 1: By 1983, effectively all opposition, monarchists, nationalists, leftists, they were
[1:21:50] Speaker 1: all crushed or exiled. Now, for many Iranians, the revolution
[1:21:56] Speaker 1: brought a sense of pride and ownership of their country.
[1:22:00] Speaker 1: but also new hardships and repression. The slogans of independence
[1:22:05] Speaker 1: had been realized in one sense. Iran charted its own
[1:22:09] Speaker 1: independent course, not subordinating itself to either East or West. However,
[1:22:16] Speaker 1: the cost was severed ties with much of the world, isolation,
[1:22:22] Speaker 1: and quite a few losses of personal freedoms under a
[1:22:24] Speaker 1: strict religious regime. Now women who had attained certain rights
[1:22:29] Speaker 1: under the Shah were now required to veil, and were
[1:22:32] Speaker 1: pushed out of some public roles, even though ironically many
[1:22:36] Speaker 1: women had participated actively in the revolution. The intellectual and
[1:22:40] Speaker 1: cultural freedoms hoped for by students and thinkers didn't really materialise. Instead,
[1:22:46] Speaker 1: censorship and ideological policing just took a different form. Many
[1:22:51] Speaker 1: who had fought against the Shah found themselves imprisoned or
[1:22:55] Speaker 1: executed by the new authorities. This dark side of the
[1:22:58] Speaker 1: revolution's aftermath, however, was yet to fully unfold in the
[1:23:02] Speaker 1: immediate euphoria of 1979. In any case, standing in Tehran today,
[1:23:10] Speaker 1: one can still hear the echoes of those times. The
[1:23:14] Speaker 1: Islamic Republic continues to invoke the revolution's ideals of independence
[1:23:19] Speaker 1: and Islamic governments. Murals in the capital depict scenes of struggle,
[1:23:24] Speaker 1: often emphasising anti-American or anti-Israeli spirit. The embassy that was
[1:23:30] Speaker 1: once the U.S. mission is now a museum called the
[1:23:33] Speaker 1: Den of Espionage, with its walls bearing revolutionary graffiti. And
[1:23:39] Speaker 1: every year, on the anniversary of the revolution, rallies commemorate
[1:23:43] Speaker 1: the triumph over the Shah and his foreign backers. At
[1:23:48] Speaker 1: the same time, new generations of Iranians reflect on what
[1:23:51] Speaker 1: that history means to them. In the present context, well,
[1:23:55] Speaker 1: they see that as quite critical. In any case, I
[1:24:01] Speaker 1: think that's where we're going to end it. I hope
[1:24:05] Speaker 1: you've enjoyed, I hope you've learned something, and I hope
[1:24:07] Speaker 1: it's put current affairs into context for you. When certain
[1:24:13] Speaker 1: people talk about, well, our country needs to have a
[1:24:17] Speaker 1: role in choosing Iran's next leader, well, think about that
[1:24:23] Speaker 1: in the context of what you've just learned. They're saying
[1:24:28] Speaker 1: they want to do that to prevent any conflict. Well,
[1:24:32] Speaker 1: if anything is going to have conflict, it's that. Anyway,
[1:24:37] Speaker 1: not a political channel. Thank you so much for joining me, everyone.
[1:24:44] Speaker 1: And yeah, that's it from me. So if you've enjoyed,
[1:24:49] Speaker 1: leave a like, comment, subscribe, perhaps tell your friends. And
[1:24:54] Speaker 1: I hope you all stay safe out there. The following
[1:24:57] Speaker 1: is a list of our Patreon and YouTube membership supporters.
[1:25:01] Speaker 1: Thank you very much for supporting, giving it ad-free. Good
[1:25:06] Speaker 1: luck out there, everyone. We're gonna need it. Good night.
[1:25:11] Speaker 1: Lots of love to you all.

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