# Most Horrifying Weapons of WWI

An episode of [Human History ASMR](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/6793196842), 7 Sep 2026, 1 h 06 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/74777216/most_horrifying_weapons_of_wwi_human_voiced_no_ads.mp3

Step onto the battlefields of the First World War and discover the terrifying weapons that transformed modern warfare. This episode explores some of the most destructive and feared weapons of World War I, from machine guns and heavy artillery to poison gas, flamethrowers, tanks, submarines, aircraft, and mines. Discover how industrial technology changed the scale of warfare and created new dangers for soldiers on the front lines. Learn how these weapons were developed, how they were deployed, and why they had such a devastating impact on the battlefield. We examine trench warfare, artillery bombardments, chemical attacks, armored warfare, naval blockades, and the emerging use of aircraft in reconnaissance and combat. The episode also explores how soldiers adapted to these new technologies, developing protective equipment, defensive tactics, trenches, gas masks, and new battlefield strategies. Rather than focusing only on the machinery, we examine the human consequences of industrialized warfare. Drawing on military records, soldiers' accounts, photographs, battlefield archaeology, technical documents, and modern historical scholarship, this episode separates popular myths from the documented realities of World War I weapons. Narrated with a calm, human voice, this immersive journey into military history is perfect for history enthusiasts, World War I fans, military history lovers, documentary listeners, relaxation, or listening before sleep. Discover the technology, destruction, and battlefield innovations that made the First World War unlike any conflict that came before it.

## Transcript

[0:01] Speaker 1: It was five o'clock on an April afternoon in 1915,
[0:05] Speaker 1: when soldiers near Ypres watched a greenish-yellow cloud drift toward
[0:11] Speaker 1: them from the German trench. Some thought it was a
[0:15] Speaker 1: kind of smoke screen. Some thought it was a flare.
[0:20] Speaker 1: Some had no idea and just watched. What it really was,
[0:25] Speaker 1: was 168 tons of chlorine gas. released from 6,000 cylinders
[0:33] Speaker 1: along a four-mile front. And when it reached the trenches
[0:37] Speaker 1: and settled into the low ground, it reacted with the
[0:40] Speaker 1: moisture in the men's lungs and became hydrochloric acid. Some ran,
[0:47] Speaker 1: the ones who could, and they were not cowards. They
[0:51] Speaker 1: were merely rational men, responding to a weapon they had
[0:55] Speaker 1: no defense against and no framework of understanding. When all
[1:00] Speaker 1: was said and done, the gap they left in the
[1:03] Speaker 1: line was four miles wide. And that moment, the afternoon
[1:10] Speaker 1: the war became something chemistry could do to a human body,
[1:14] Speaker 1: is where this story begins. Because the weapons of the
[1:20] Speaker 1: First World War didn't just kill on a new scale,
[1:23] Speaker 1: they killed in a new way. and those ways to
[1:27] Speaker 1: find the conflict more than any battle ever could. So today,
[1:33] Speaker 1: we talk about the most horrifying weapons of the First
[1:37] Speaker 1: World War. Before we start, thank you for everyone keeping
[1:41] Speaker 1: this channel ad and sponsor free. If you want to
[1:43] Speaker 1: help us out financially, links are in the pinned comment
[1:45] Speaker 1: and description. If you don't, well, I understand that things
[1:50] Speaker 1: are getting worse before they get better out there, but
[1:52] Speaker 1: a like, subscribe, and comment is completely free. And it
[1:56] Speaker 1: helps us out in the algorithm and, well, perhaps makes
[2:00] Speaker 1: the platform filled with more history-related content. Anyway, thank you
[2:05] Speaker 1: in advance. Let's begin. Of course, I suppose we've already begun.
[2:13] Speaker 1: So let's just talk a bit more about the detail
[2:16] Speaker 1: of the poison gas. The development of gas as a
[2:21] Speaker 1: weapon of war across the four years of the First
[2:23] Speaker 1: World War. traces one of the darkest arcs in the
[2:27] Speaker 1: history of science, from the improvised chlorine release at Ibra
[2:33] Speaker 1: in April 1915 that we spoke about, to the systematic
[2:37] Speaker 1: large-scale deployment of mustard gas. Well, that happened in 1917.
[2:45] Speaker 1: We also know it as dichlorodethyl sulfide, a progression of
[2:51] Speaker 1: driven by the same industrial logic of innovation and counter-innovation
[2:55] Speaker 1: that governed the development of every other weapons system in
[2:59] Speaker 1: the war. Each new gas agent was a response to
[3:04] Speaker 1: the defensive measures the previous agent had prompted. Each new
[3:09] Speaker 1: defensive measure was a response to the agent it had
[3:12] Speaker 1: been designed to defeat. And the men in the trenches
[3:16] Speaker 1: had to endure the consequences of this Chemical arms race
[3:20] Speaker 1: with their lungs, their skin, their eyes. Chlorine, the first
[3:28] Speaker 1: mass-deployed agent. That's interesting. It kills by destroying the tissue
[3:34] Speaker 1: of the respiratory system. Victims essentially drown in the fluid
[3:40] Speaker 1: produced by their own damaged lungs. Pretty horrifying, right? Well,
[3:47] Speaker 1: that's why we called it Horrifying Weapons of World War I.
[3:52] Speaker 1: So you know what to expect, huh? It is detectable
[3:56] Speaker 1: by smell and colour, which gave it a significant tactical
[4:00] Speaker 1: limitation once both sides understood what they were dealing with.
[4:04] Speaker 1: Soldiers who observed the characteristic greenish-yellow cloud and smelled what
[4:09] Speaker 1: witnesses consistently described as the smell of bleach or cut
[4:13] Speaker 1: grass had some seconds or minutes to take protective measures.
[4:19] Speaker 1: Speaking of protective measures, the earliest protection was a cloth
[4:24] Speaker 1: soaked in water or urine, held over the nose and mouth,
[4:29] Speaker 1: which worked because the ammonia in urine neutralizes chlorine at
[4:34] Speaker 1: least partially. The image of men urinating on their own
[4:38] Speaker 1: clothing and pressing it to their faces as a survival
[4:41] Speaker 1: measure captures in a specific and unforgettable detail the nature
[4:46] Speaker 1: of war that industrial chemistry had produced. And then there
[4:51] Speaker 1: was the gas mask. That was a fancy innovation that
[4:55] Speaker 1: replaced this improvisation. It went through multiple iterations across 1915
[5:00] Speaker 1: and 16, each generation more effective, and sometimes more cumbersome
[5:07] Speaker 1: than the last. before arriving at the box respirator that
[5:11] Speaker 1: provided reasonably reliable protection against most agents then in use.
[5:18] Speaker 1: But then, of course, became the new innovation, the phosgene gas,
[5:25] Speaker 1: that was more dangerous than chlorine, and far more difficult
[5:28] Speaker 1: to detect. It smelled faintly of freshly cut hay. a
[5:34] Speaker 1: smell that men in the field found difficult to distinguish
[5:36] Speaker 1: from the ordinary agricultural smells of the French and Belgian countryside,
[5:42] Speaker 1: and its effects were delayed. A soldier who had inhaled
[5:46] Speaker 1: a lethal dose of phosgene may feel relatively well for
[5:50] Speaker 1: 24 to 48 hours, but then that would change. The
[5:56] Speaker 1: symptoms would manifest, during which time he had to continue
[6:01] Speaker 1: in the line, continue breathing, continue accumulating damage to lung
[6:06] Speaker 1: tissue that was already irreparably compromised. By the time he collapsed,
[6:13] Speaker 1: the damage was done, and the medical system of 1916
[6:17] Speaker 1: had nothing to offer him, besides a few prayers. Faustine
[6:23] Speaker 1: was responsible for approximately 85% of gas deaths in the
[6:28] Speaker 1: entire war, a statistic that shows both its lethality and
[6:33] Speaker 1: the difficulty of defending against an agent whose signature was
[6:36] Speaker 1: so subtle, and whose effects were so delayed. So what
[6:41] Speaker 1: about the medical response? Well, that was a separate catastrophe
[6:45] Speaker 1: developing alongside the tactical one. Hospitals and casualty clearing stations
[6:52] Speaker 1: had been designed and staffed for the management of wounds,
[6:56] Speaker 1: the specific localized destruction of tissue by metal fragments, that is,
[7:01] Speaker 1: and the presentation of men whose entire respiratory systems were compromised,
[7:05] Speaker 1: whose eyes were swollen shut from chemical exposure, or whose
[7:09] Speaker 1: skin was blistered across large surface areas. Well, that required
[7:15] Speaker 1: a set of interventions that military medicine in 1915 simply
[7:19] Speaker 1: did not have. The doctors who received the first chlorine
[7:24] Speaker 1: casualties at Ypres in April 1915 could do almost nothing
[7:29] Speaker 1: beyond putting the men in physicians sitting upright supported that
[7:34] Speaker 1: eased the effort of breathing slightly, and waiting to see
[7:38] Speaker 1: whether the dose they had received was lethal or merely
[7:42] Speaker 1: just severe. The development of triage protocols for gas casualties,
[7:49] Speaker 1: the establishment of specialist gas hospitals further down the evacuation chain,
[7:55] Speaker 1: and eventually... the development of trained gas officers to advise
[8:01] Speaker 1: on treatment all developed across 1915 and 1916, driven by
[8:06] Speaker 1: the volume of casualties whose specific condition the existing medical
[8:10] Speaker 1: system simply had no idea of how to deal with.
[8:15] Speaker 1: And spare a thought for the doctors for a moment,
[8:18] Speaker 1: because they were doing the best they could. Of course,
[8:21] Speaker 1: they knew how to patch up wounds from shrapnel, Bullets,
[8:26] Speaker 1: all the rest doing the best they could, but this?
[8:31] Speaker 1: Imagine the sleepless nights for them. Then, of course, there
[8:36] Speaker 1: was mustard gas, introduced by Germany in July 1917 at
[8:41] Speaker 1: the Third Battle of Ypres, and subsequently used by both sides,
[8:46] Speaker 1: qualitatively different from its predecessors. in ways that made it
[8:51] Speaker 1: uniquely demoralizing and uniquely difficult to defend against. It was,
[8:57] Speaker 1: by the way, not primarily a lethal agent. Its purpose
[9:00] Speaker 1: was incapacitation rather than killing, though it did kill readily enough.
[9:07] Speaker 1: It worked by contact as much as inhalation, blistering any
[9:11] Speaker 1: skin surface it touched, causing temporarily or permanent blindness through
[9:16] Speaker 1: its action on the eyes and persisting in the soil,
[9:21] Speaker 1: on clothing, and on surfaces for days or weeks after
[9:24] Speaker 1: its deployment, turning the ground over which it had been
[9:28] Speaker 1: used into a zone of continuous hazard. A soldier who
[9:32] Speaker 1: walked through the ground previously shelled with mustard gas in
[9:35] Speaker 1: contaminated boots could develop blisters on his feet hours later
[9:39] Speaker 1: from the gas absorbed into the leather. And yes, it
[9:43] Speaker 1: would get through the leather. The treatment for mustard gas
[9:46] Speaker 1: casualties in 1917 continued. was essentially limited to washing and waiting.
[9:53] Speaker 1: John Singer Sargent's painting, Gassed, she might have seen completed
[9:58] Speaker 1: in 1919 from sketches made at a casualty clearing station
[10:02] Speaker 1: shows a line of blinded men being led by an
[10:05] Speaker 1: orderly the image most accurately encodes the specific horror of
[10:11] Speaker 1: mustard gas in the ward's visual record maybe we should
[10:17] Speaker 1: do an entire video on gas attacks If you want that,
[10:21] Speaker 1: then let us know in the comments and we'll put
[10:25] Speaker 1: one together. There's a lot more World War I content
[10:29] Speaker 1: to come. But anyway, let's move on. Well, next up
[10:36] Speaker 1: I've got one word for you. Flamenwerfer. Or in English
[10:42] Speaker 1: we call it a flamethrower. But in German it sounds
[10:45] Speaker 1: a little cooler. Well, the component parts literally translate as
[10:51] Speaker 1: flame thrower. Go figure. But that's a bluntness that the
[10:58] Speaker 1: weapon itself matched, I see. It was not invented for
[11:03] Speaker 1: the First World War and been developed by the German
[11:06] Speaker 1: military engineer Richard Fiedler in the early 1900s. But it
[11:13] Speaker 1: was the war that gave it its first operational use
[11:16] Speaker 1: at scale. and that established its psychological profile in the
[11:20] Speaker 1: military imagination as something distant from and worse than other
[11:25] Speaker 1: weapons that also set people on fire. The distinction was
[11:29] Speaker 1: partly rational. You see, a flamethrower attack was personal in
[11:35] Speaker 1: a way that artillery fire was not. It required the
[11:38] Speaker 1: attacking soldier to approach close enough to directly burn the
[11:44] Speaker 1: opponent with oil. Well, it's also partly irrational. It reflects
[11:49] Speaker 1: a deep and ancient human fear of fire that no
[11:53] Speaker 1: amount of modern military conditioning entirely suppresses. It never really
[11:57] Speaker 1: worked out the kinks in human psychology. So what about
[12:02] Speaker 1: the first significant use of the Flamenwerfer? Well, that was
[12:07] Speaker 1: at Hooge in Belgium, 13th of July, 1915, where German
[12:12] Speaker 1: pioneer engineering engineer Units, that is, deployed both portable and
[12:20] Speaker 1: fixed flamethrower systems against British trenches in a sector of
[12:24] Speaker 1: the Ypres-Salien. The portable version, carried by a single operator,
[12:30] Speaker 1: had an effective range of approximately 18 to 20 meters,
[12:34] Speaker 1: and a fuel capacity sufficient for approximately 30 seconds of
[12:39] Speaker 1: continuous fire. Fixed versions installed in tunnels that the pioneers
[12:44] Speaker 1: had dug toward the British line, were connected to much
[12:47] Speaker 1: larger fuel reservoirs, and had a longer range and a
[12:51] Speaker 1: far greater volume of flame. The attack was successful tactically.
[12:57] Speaker 1: The British position at Hooge was taken, and the specific
[13:02] Speaker 1: nature of the weapon's effect on the British troops who
[13:04] Speaker 1: faced it was reported in sufficient detail in the British press.
[13:08] Speaker 1: to produce a public reaction whose intensity surprised even those
[13:12] Speaker 1: who had anticipated that the weapon would be controversial. The
[13:17] Speaker 1: accounts left by soldiers who experienced flamethrower attacks describe the
[13:22] Speaker 1: weapon's psychological effect with a consistency that goes beyond what
[13:26] Speaker 1: the physical statistics of casualties would predict, but it is
[13:30] Speaker 1: really hard to state in words, I mean, the terrifying
[13:34] Speaker 1: nature of this weapon. Not just when it's coming at you,
[13:37] Speaker 1: but imagine being the one tasked with doing that. It's
[13:41] Speaker 1: one thing to shoot a guy in the head, but
[13:44] Speaker 1: it's another thing to cover them in flames and watch
[13:48] Speaker 1: them slowly burn to death. It's one way of giving
[13:52] Speaker 1: yourself nightmares. The sight of burning liquid arcing through the
[13:58] Speaker 1: air toward a trench position was visible. It was trackable
[14:03] Speaker 1: and apparently deliberate in a way that artillery fire was not.
[14:07] Speaker 1: It produced a specific quality of terror that differed from
[14:11] Speaker 1: the terror of shell fire. Shell fire, of course, was impersonal, statistical,
[14:17] Speaker 1: pretty random in its individual distribution. The flamethrower attack, that
[14:23] Speaker 1: was up close and personal. The flame appeared to be aimed,
[14:28] Speaker 1: not at the trench in general, but at you specifically.
[14:33] Speaker 1: The survival responses it provoked— flight, surrender, or the desperate attempt
[14:38] Speaker 1: to shoot the operator before the weapon reached its target— were
[14:42] Speaker 1: different in character from the survival responses provoked by other weapons.
[14:46] Speaker 1: And the accounts suggest that the willingness of men to
[14:49] Speaker 1: break and run rather than hold position was significantly higher
[14:53] Speaker 1: under flamethrower attack than under equivalent levels of machine gun
[14:58] Speaker 1: or artillery fire, which we'll get to in a moment.
[15:02] Speaker 1: The tactical limitations of the weapon were significant, and were
[15:06] Speaker 1: recognized quickly by both sides. You see, the operator was
[15:09] Speaker 1: a pretty conspicuous target. The fuel tanks on his back
[15:13] Speaker 1: were quite visible at considerable range, and their destruction was
[15:21] Speaker 1: quite obviously going to be fatal to him. I mean,
[15:24] Speaker 1: you blow up a gas tank strapped to someone's back,
[15:27] Speaker 1: I mean, they're not going to be walking away from
[15:30] Speaker 1: that one. The weapon also required him to advance to
[15:34] Speaker 1: close range of the position he was attacking, which also
[15:38] Speaker 1: placed him in effective rifle and machine gun range before
[15:42] Speaker 1: he was within effective flamethrower range. The pioneer units that
[15:48] Speaker 1: operated the weapon suffered casualty rates that reflected this tactical reality,
[15:53] Speaker 1: and the weapon's operational use was consequently reserved for specific
[15:58] Speaker 1: assault scenarios. Maybe that could have been the initial attack
[16:02] Speaker 1: on a prepared position, clearing of a fortified village, things
[16:06] Speaker 1: like that, rather than employed as a general-purpose weapon of
[16:10] Speaker 1: offensive operations. Both the British and the French developed their
[16:15] Speaker 1: own versions across 1916 and 1917, and by the war's end,
[16:20] Speaker 1: the flamethrower had been integrated into the tactical repertoire of
[16:25] Speaker 1: all major armies as a tool for a specific and
[16:29] Speaker 1: Terrible purpose. Now we mentioned artillery, so we better move
[16:36] Speaker 1: on to that now. Because artillery killed more men in
[16:40] Speaker 1: the First World War than any other weapon. The standard
[16:44] Speaker 1: estimate places between 60 and 70% of all casualties on
[16:48] Speaker 1: the Western Front fell because of artillery fire. And the
[16:52] Speaker 1: statistical dominance shapes the entire tactical and operational history of
[16:56] Speaker 1: the conflict. in ways that are probably easy to state
[17:00] Speaker 1: but difficult to fully absorb. Every tactical problem of the
[17:06] Speaker 1: war was a problem of artillery. How to neutralize the
[17:10] Speaker 1: enemy's guns, how to protect your own infantry from their guns,
[17:15] Speaker 1: how to use your own guns to enable infantry movement
[17:19] Speaker 1: across ground that they could not cross without protection from
[17:22] Speaker 1: a weapon that moved faster. And they did, and hit harder.
[17:28] Speaker 1: excuse me, a weapon that moved faster than they did
[17:31] Speaker 1: and hit harder than anything else in the arsenal. Well,
[17:35] Speaker 1: the evolution of artillery doctrine across four years of war
[17:39] Speaker 1: constitutes one of the most rapid developments in tactical thought
[17:43] Speaker 1: in all military history, driven by the lethal urgency of
[17:48] Speaker 1: the possibility of getting it wrong. So we already know
[17:53] Speaker 1: that artillery killed more in the First World War than
[17:56] Speaker 1: any other weapon But there were certain pieces of artillery
[18:00] Speaker 1: that were extremely feared. The gun that did the most
[18:05] Speaker 1: killing of all was not the famous Big Bertha, the
[18:10] Speaker 1: Krupp 420mm howitzer that demolished Belgian forts in 1914. But
[18:13] Speaker 1: it was actually the French 75mm field gun, the Canon
[18:14] Speaker 1: Model 1897. which was the most advanced field gun in
[18:28] Speaker 1: the world at the war's opening, and which fired a
[18:31] Speaker 1: shrapnel shell at a rate and with a precision that
[18:34] Speaker 1: its opponents could not initially match. A well-crewed French 75mm
[18:40] Speaker 1: could fire 15 aimed rounds per minute, a rate of
[18:44] Speaker 1: fire that made it effectively a rapid-fire weapon at artillery scales,
[18:51] Speaker 1: and the shrapnel round it fired. was optimized for the
[18:54] Speaker 1: destruction of infantry in the open. It was a bloody
[18:59] Speaker 1: good weapon, ideal for the war of movement that both
[19:04] Speaker 1: sides had anticipated in August of 1914. In the static
[19:09] Speaker 1: war that had actually developed, its limitations were as significant
[19:14] Speaker 1: as its strengths. It couldn't fire at high angles. which
[19:18] Speaker 1: meant it could not loft shells over the parapets of
[19:21] Speaker 1: the deep defensive trenches that developed after the first weeks
[19:24] Speaker 1: of fighting. Next up was the Paris gun, the long-ranged
[19:31] Speaker 1: siege weapon that Germany used to bombard Paris from a
[19:35] Speaker 1: distance of 130 kilometres during the Spring Offensive of 1918.
[19:38] Speaker 1: It occupies a specific place in the history of artillery
[19:43] Speaker 1: because it was, at that moment, the longest-range artillery weapon
[19:48] Speaker 1: ever constructed. and because the shells it fired were the
[19:52] Speaker 1: first human-made objects to reach the stratosphere in the course
[19:57] Speaker 1: of their trajectory. The gun fired a shell weighing 94
[20:02] Speaker 1: kilograms at a velocity sufficient to carry it to an
[20:06] Speaker 1: altitude of 40 kilometers before it descended on the French capital. Now,
[20:12] Speaker 1: I think 40 kilometers is about 20 miles, something like that.
[20:17] Speaker 1: I think that's it. Maybe, don't quote me on that. Well,
[20:22] Speaker 1: the physical effect was modest by the standards of weapons
[20:26] Speaker 1: that actually mattered tactically. Approximately 350 Parisians were killed across
[20:32] Speaker 1: bombardment campaigns, but the psychological effect of being bombarded from
[20:37] Speaker 1: a distance at which the gun could fire not be seen, heard,
[20:42] Speaker 1: or attacked, was genuinely quite novel. And the people of Paris,
[20:48] Speaker 1: who fled the city in response to it, were responding
[20:52] Speaker 1: rationally to a weapon that had made a specific category
[20:54] Speaker 1: of previous assumption about safety well and truly obsolete. The
[21:01] Speaker 1: experience of artillery fire from the receiving end was among
[21:06] Speaker 1: the most psychologically devastating features of the war, and the
[21:11] Speaker 1: memoir literature returns to it with a frequency and an
[21:15] Speaker 1: emotional intensity that suggests that it occupied a particular place
[21:19] Speaker 1: in the hierarchy of horrors that that war produced. There
[21:23] Speaker 1: was the inability to respond produced across weeks and months
[21:29] Speaker 1: of cumulative exposure, a specific psychological damage that the period
[21:34] Speaker 1: diagnosed as shell-shock, and that we now understand as complex
[21:38] Speaker 1: post-traumatic stress syndrome, whose physical and psychological dimensions are truly inseparable.
[21:46] Speaker 1: Ernst Jünger wrote in Storm of Steel that a man
[21:51] Speaker 1: who has been under heavy bombardment for long enough reaches
[21:55] Speaker 1: a state in which the fear ceases and is replaced
[21:58] Speaker 1: by something closer to indifference. It's not really courage. but
[22:03] Speaker 1: it's just the exhaustion of the capacity of fear. The
[22:08] Speaker 1: subsequent return of that capacity, when the bombardment lifted and
[22:12] Speaker 1: the man survived, was itself a different form of suffering. Well,
[22:20] Speaker 1: of course, next up, we have that emblematic weapon, the
[22:25] Speaker 1: machine gun, the silent killer. Ah, shirt available in the
[22:34] Speaker 1: merch store, of course. Of course, the machine gun did
[22:38] Speaker 1: not cause the trench warfare of World War I, but
[22:43] Speaker 1: it did make trench warfare quite inescapable, because, you see,
[22:47] Speaker 1: the tactical problem the machine gun presented to attacking infantry
[22:50] Speaker 1: didn't really have a solution within the doctrinal and technological
[22:54] Speaker 1: framework available to any army in 1914, and for quite
[22:58] Speaker 1: a while after that, too. A single Maxim gun operated
[23:03] Speaker 1: by a crew of two and adequately supplied with ammunition,
[23:07] Speaker 1: could fire five hundred rounds a minute, and maintain that
[23:12] Speaker 1: rate of fire for extended periods through the mechanism of
[23:15] Speaker 1: the water-cooling jacket that surrounded the barrel. Two such guns,
[23:20] Speaker 1: positioned to provide mutual support, could cover a front of
[23:24] Speaker 1: several hundred metres, the volume of fire that no infantry
[23:28] Speaker 1: formation advancing in the open could penetrate. The mathematics were
[23:33] Speaker 1: Pretty simple. And the implications were catastrophic. The Maxim gun.
[23:40] Speaker 1: That's where it all starts. It had been invented in
[23:43] Speaker 1: 1884 by the American-born British inventor Hiram Maxim, who offered
[23:49] Speaker 1: it to the British War Office, was initially rebuffed, and
[23:53] Speaker 1: he subsequently sold it to the German army with a
[23:56] Speaker 1: bit more success. Of course, you go where the money goes,
[24:00] Speaker 1: business is business. But hey, It is what it is. Now,
[24:05] Speaker 1: of course, there's, when we say machine gun, of course,
[24:07] Speaker 1: there's Gatling guns, there's different guns, but really the Maxim
[24:12] Speaker 1: gun was where it was really at. Anyway, the German MG08,
[24:20] Speaker 1: the 1908 version, was the German version of the Maxim
[24:25] Speaker 1: design and was the weapon that inflicted the majority of
[24:29] Speaker 1: British casualties on the first day of the Somme in July.
[24:34] Speaker 1: of 1916. The German machine-gun positions in the Somme sector
[24:40] Speaker 1: had been constructed in deep concrete emplacements that survived the
[24:43] Speaker 1: week-long preliminary British bombardment, and the barrage lifted at 7.30
[24:49] Speaker 1: in the morning, and the British infantry climbed out of
[24:51] Speaker 1: their trenches and began to advance. The German machine-gun crews
[24:55] Speaker 1: emerged from their shelters, positioned their weapons, and opened fire
[25:00] Speaker 1: across the ground they had previously ranged with careful precision Now,
[25:04] Speaker 1: the range was known. The target was visible. The calculation
[25:10] Speaker 1: required was not too complex either. Pull the trigger and
[25:16] Speaker 1: just wave the gun from left to right. No need
[25:20] Speaker 1: to aim too much at that fire rate. You'll hit something.
[25:24] Speaker 1: The rest of them should run. You can't blame them. Well,
[25:30] Speaker 1: then you had the British Vickers machine gun. the standard
[25:34] Speaker 1: British medium machine gun of the war. It was itself
[25:38] Speaker 1: one of the most reliable weapons produced during the conflict,
[25:42] Speaker 1: able of firing continuously for hours with the water cooling maintained.
[25:47] Speaker 1: And the accounts of its use during the war's defensive
[25:50] Speaker 1: phases describe a mechanical consistency that its crews found both
[25:54] Speaker 1: reassuring and appalling. At the Battle of High Wood on
[25:58] Speaker 1: the 24th of August 1916, The 100th Company of Machine
[26:03] Speaker 1: Gun Corps fired their Vickers guns continuously for 12 hours,
[26:08] Speaker 1: expending approximately one million rounds, one million, wow, and replacing
[26:14] Speaker 1: barrels and cooling water at intervals that a subsequent analysis
[26:19] Speaker 1: calculated had required the equivalent of 100 buckets of water.
[26:25] Speaker 1: The guns did not jam. The targets just kept presenting themselves,
[26:32] Speaker 1: It's all pretty grim. It's just like this sacrifice almost.
[26:36] Speaker 1: They didn't really stand a chance. Now that million rounds,
[26:42] Speaker 1: it represents a specific and a non-abstract quantity of violence
[26:47] Speaker 1: applied in a specific and non-abstract period to a very
[26:51] Speaker 1: specific and non-abstract group of human beings. The specific experience.
[26:58] Speaker 1: Being under machine-gun fire in the open, as opposed to
[27:01] Speaker 1: under artillery fire, produced a distinct testimony in the accounts
[27:05] Speaker 1: of survivors. Shell fire killed randomly. A man might be
[27:10] Speaker 1: in the same shell crater as a companion, and one
[27:13] Speaker 1: would die and one would not, with no principle governing
[27:17] Speaker 1: the distribution beyond the trajectory mathematics of the incoming shell.
[27:23] Speaker 1: But machine fire, that was different. It swept, it traversed,
[27:28] Speaker 1: it was aimed. Men who survived running across open ground
[27:33] Speaker 1: under machine gun fire described a specific clarity of helplessness.
[27:38] Speaker 1: The visible stream of tracer rounds where tracer was used,
[27:42] Speaker 1: or the line of soil kicked up by impacting bullets,
[27:47] Speaker 1: tracking across the ground toward them at a speed that
[27:50] Speaker 1: made evasion a matter of chance rather than skill. There
[27:54] Speaker 1: was no shelter to take. no action to perform, and
[27:58] Speaker 1: no way to make oneself less of a target with
[28:01] Speaker 1: anything one did. The experience of running across ground that
[28:05] Speaker 1: a machine gun was traversing reduced the question of survival
[28:09] Speaker 1: to pure probability, in a way that even the most
[28:12] Speaker 1: terrifying artillery bombardment did not entirely accomplish. But there was
[28:18] Speaker 1: a tactical response to the machine gun, the problem that
[28:21] Speaker 1: occupied the minds of every army's most capable officers throughout
[28:25] Speaker 1: the war. and it eventually produced the combined arms doctrine
[28:30] Speaker 1: that the tank, the artillery-creeping barrage, and the stormtrooper infiltration
[28:36] Speaker 1: tactics all represented different approaches to. None of them really
[28:41] Speaker 1: solved the problem fully within the war's timeframe, but together
[28:46] Speaker 1: they degraded the machine gun's dominance sufficiently to make movement
[28:50] Speaker 1: possible again by 1918. What the machine gun had demonstrated definitively,
[28:57] Speaker 1: and at enormous cost. Was it infantry advancing in the
[29:00] Speaker 1: open against prepared defence positions without specific and adequate countermeasures?
[29:06] Speaker 1: Was simply not viable as a tactical concept? Doesn't matter
[29:11] Speaker 1: how courageous they are, doesn't matter how trained they are
[29:14] Speaker 1: or numerical superiority, it was all out the window. There
[29:19] Speaker 1: was a lesson, though, which seems obvious in retrospect. It
[29:25] Speaker 1: had cost the war perhaps a million casualties before it
[29:30] Speaker 1: was fully absorbed at the level of doctrine. I suppose
[29:34] Speaker 1: that lesson was it would have been best just to
[29:37] Speaker 1: wait and see you can't just keep throwing bodies at
[29:41] Speaker 1: the problem but I suppose when you've got the generals
[29:45] Speaker 1: in the nicer telegraph rooms in the trench well all
[29:51] Speaker 1: those young lads they don't really mean much they just
[29:56] Speaker 1: become a statistic at the end Well, moving on. Let's
[30:04] Speaker 1: talk about a weapon that no one really mentions too much.
[30:10] Speaker 1: Because it's not really a weapon. But you still wouldn't
[30:15] Speaker 1: want to get tangled up in it. That's barbed wire.
[30:20] Speaker 1: And it doesn't usually appear on lists of the First
[30:23] Speaker 1: World War's weapons. It's more categorized as an obstacle, a
[30:28] Speaker 1: defensive and a... engineering material, something that armies deployed rather
[30:33] Speaker 1: than something that fought. But, here's the thing, this categorization
[30:39] Speaker 1: is misleading, because barbed wire in combination with machine guns
[30:44] Speaker 1: constituted a weapon system whose combined effect was greater than
[30:48] Speaker 1: the sum of its parts, and whose specific function, i.e.
[30:52] Speaker 1: holding infantry in the open long enough to be killed
[30:55] Speaker 1: at the gun's position to cover the wire, placed it
[30:59] Speaker 1: at the centre of the tactical problem to find the war. Sure,
[31:03] Speaker 1: the wire didn't kill directly, but it did kill indirectly,
[31:08] Speaker 1: by stopping men where machine guns could not reach them,
[31:12] Speaker 1: and its contribution to the death toll the Western Front
[31:16] Speaker 1: is embedded invisibly in every machine gun casualty figure. They
[31:23] Speaker 1: might have been able to get past, if not for
[31:26] Speaker 1: all the obstacles. That's why barbed wire is dangerous. So
[31:32] Speaker 1: the barbed wire that armies deployed in front of their
[31:35] Speaker 1: positions was not the single strand familiar from agricultural fencing.
[31:41] Speaker 1: It was multiple overlapping belts, staked into the ground at
[31:46] Speaker 1: intervals by iron pickets driven in at night to avoid
[31:49] Speaker 1: the noise that the hammering would produce, layered at different
[31:53] Speaker 1: heights and densities to defeat different approachers, and arranged in
[31:58] Speaker 1: patterns that channeled attacking infantry toward killing grounds that the
[32:02] Speaker 1: machine-gun positions were already covering. A well-prepared defensive position might
[32:08] Speaker 1: have a hundred yards of wire in front of its
[32:10] Speaker 1: forward trench, and the wire's belts' specific arrangement would have
[32:15] Speaker 1: been designed by engineers who had walked the ground and
[32:18] Speaker 1: identified the exact lines of approach that an attacker would
[32:21] Speaker 1: naturally take. The wire itself was not a passive obstacle,
[32:26] Speaker 1: but an active component of a defensive system. It was
[32:30] Speaker 1: designed to deliver the attacker to the place where the
[32:33] Speaker 1: guns were waiting for him, like a funnel, and they
[32:37] Speaker 1: had no choice but to go through. The weapons available
[32:41] Speaker 1: to deal with barbed wire in 1914 were two, mainly.
[32:46] Speaker 1: You had manual cutting by soldiers approaching the wire at
[32:49] Speaker 1: night with pliers, and then there was artillery fire, Now,
[32:55] Speaker 1: first up, the manual cutting was dangerous, slow, and you
[32:59] Speaker 1: better believe people are going to hear you. If you've
[33:02] Speaker 1: ever cut barbed wire, you'd know. I don't know how
[33:07] Speaker 1: many of you had, but I'm sure we all know
[33:09] Speaker 1: the sound of wire cutters breaking through iron and metal,
[33:14] Speaker 1: this kind of thing. You're going to hear it. And
[33:17] Speaker 1: it's quite distinctive, that sound of wire cutting in the dark.
[33:21] Speaker 1: It was well known to defenders who illuminated the area
[33:24] Speaker 1: with star shells and opened fire as soon as they
[33:27] Speaker 1: heard it. Artillery was theoretically faster and less exposed, but
[33:33] Speaker 1: cutting wire with shell fire required a specific combination of
[33:36] Speaker 1: shell type, fuse setting, and fire density that the artillery
[33:41] Speaker 1: of the early war did not yet know how to
[33:44] Speaker 1: calculate reliably. High explosive shells flung wire about, sometimes just
[33:50] Speaker 1: making it even more tangled up. Shrapnel shells were more
[33:54] Speaker 1: effective at wire cutting, but they required an extremely precise
[33:58] Speaker 1: airburst height that the fused technology of 1914 and 15
[34:03] Speaker 1: could not consistently deliver. The failure of the British artillery
[34:08] Speaker 1: to cut the German wire on the Somme in July
[34:10] Speaker 1: of 1916 was not a failure of effort or intention.
[34:13] Speaker 1: Approximately 1,500 guns fired nearly 1.5 million shells in the
[34:18] Speaker 1: seven-day preliminary bombardment, but it was rather a failure of
[34:22] Speaker 1: technical precision that the infantry paid for with their lives.
[34:29] Speaker 1: The psychological dimension of barbed wire as a feature of
[34:33] Speaker 1: combat deserves specific acknowledgement, because the accounts of men caught
[34:38] Speaker 1: on wire under fire Describe an experience whose specific horror
[34:42] Speaker 1: the statistics cannot convey. A soldier entangled in barbed wire
[34:48] Speaker 1: under machine gun fire lost the ability to move. He
[34:51] Speaker 1: couldn't advance, he couldn't retreat. He was fully visible to
[34:55] Speaker 1: the guns that were firing at him, and has only
[34:58] Speaker 1: the options of remaining still, which offers statistical uncertainty about
[35:03] Speaker 1: the probability of being hit. He could struggle against the wire,
[35:08] Speaker 1: but that makes him more visible and more of a target.
[35:12] Speaker 1: And a damned if you do, damned if you don't, right? Well,
[35:16] Speaker 1: the accounts in the memoir literature describe soldiers who hung
[35:21] Speaker 1: on wire for hours, sometimes dying slowly in clear view
[35:25] Speaker 1: of their comrades who couldn't reach them, sometimes surviving only
[35:30] Speaker 1: because of the volume of fire eventually moving to other targets.
[35:35] Speaker 1: It is one of the war's most specific images of helplessness,
[35:39] Speaker 1: like a spider caught in a web. And, well, the
[35:43] Speaker 1: survivors were quite haunted by it long after the war ended. Now,
[35:50] Speaker 1: of course, next one we've got the big ticket item,
[35:56] Speaker 1: and that's the tank. As a matter of fact, the
[35:59] Speaker 1: tank was the only weapon of the First World War
[36:01] Speaker 1: that was designed specifically to solve the tactical problem that
[36:05] Speaker 1: the machine gun and the barbed wire had created. And
[36:09] Speaker 1: its development and first deployment constitute one of the more
[36:14] Speaker 1: compressed stories of technological innovation under operational pressure that the
[36:18] Speaker 1: war produced. The concept of an armoured, tracked vehicle, capable
[36:25] Speaker 1: of crossing the broken ground of no man's land, crushing
[36:30] Speaker 1: the barbed wire, and providing mobile protection for the infantry
[36:33] Speaker 1: advancing behind it, was proposed by several individuals, more or
[36:38] Speaker 1: less simultaneously in 1914 and 15. So it's hard to
[36:43] Speaker 1: really see whose invention it was, at least who came
[36:48] Speaker 1: up with the concept. The process by which it moved
[36:51] Speaker 1: from proposal to prototype to the battlefield at Flecoselete, on
[36:57] Speaker 1: the 15th of September 1916, took less than two years.
[37:03] Speaker 1: An extraordinary development, by the way, for a weapons system
[37:06] Speaker 1: with no precedent in military history. Well, unless we're going
[37:11] Speaker 1: to start getting technical, talk about Leonardo da Vinci and
[37:15] Speaker 1: all of his things, but let's not do that. Anyway,
[37:20] Speaker 1: the Mark I tank that appeared at Fleur-Causse-Salette was, by
[37:25] Speaker 1: any objective assessment, a deeply flawed weapon. In layman's terms,
[37:31] Speaker 1: it was complete bollocks. It was mechanically unreliable. Approximately 49
[37:37] Speaker 1: of the 49 vehicles committed to the attack broke down
[37:42] Speaker 1: before they even got to the German line, which I'm
[37:46] Speaker 1: sure the Germans, famous for their sense of humour, would
[37:49] Speaker 1: have been having quite a giggle at that. a mechanical
[37:52] Speaker 1: failure rate so high that it reduced the operational force
[37:55] Speaker 1: to something below what the concept required to be decisive. Now,
[38:00] Speaker 1: inside the vehicle, the crew of eight operated in conditions
[38:04] Speaker 1: of heat, noise, and carbon monoxide concentration that were incompatible
[38:11] Speaker 1: with sustained effective action. Temperatures inside the tank regularly exceeded
[38:16] Speaker 1: 50 degrees Celsius, which is, I think, about 110 120 Fahrenheit,
[38:23] Speaker 1: I think. Once again, don't quote me on that. It's
[38:27] Speaker 1: very hot, let's just put it that way. The engine
[38:30] Speaker 1: noise prevented verbal communication between the crew members, and the
[38:34] Speaker 1: carbon monoxide from the engine and gun propellants accumulated in
[38:38] Speaker 1: the enclosed space at levels produced headaches, confusion, and in
[38:43] Speaker 1: some cases unconsciousness before the action was over. The tactical
[38:48] Speaker 1: visibility from inside the vehicle was extremely limited. The sponson-mounted
[38:55] Speaker 1: guns could traverse only slightly, and the observation slits through
[39:00] Speaker 1: which the crew attempted to navigate were small enough that
[39:04] Speaker 1: coordinating movement with the infantry outside was genuinely difficult. The
[39:10] Speaker 1: effect of the tank's first appearance on the German soldiers
[39:13] Speaker 1: who encountered it was by their own accounts and the
[39:16] Speaker 1: accounts of German prisoners interviewed afterwards, one of the most
[39:19] Speaker 1: significant psychological shocks of the entire war. Nothing in the
[39:24] Speaker 1: German army's training or operational experience had prepared its men
[39:29] Speaker 1: for the sight of a vehicle that was impervious to
[39:32] Speaker 1: rifle fire, that crushed through barbed wire without slowing, and
[39:36] Speaker 1: that appeared to be unstoppable by any weapon immediately available
[39:40] Speaker 1: to the infantry in the forward trenches. Now some German
[39:45] Speaker 1: soldiers ran, some fired at the tanks with rifles, which
[39:49] Speaker 1: accomplished nothing, of course. Some attempted to climb onto the
[39:53] Speaker 1: tanks and attack them with grenades through the observation slits,
[39:57] Speaker 1: which was both more rational but considerably more dangerous. Still,
[40:02] Speaker 1: I mean, that probably makes the most sense. The German
[40:06] Speaker 1: high command's response to develop anti-tank tactics and eventually a
[40:11] Speaker 1: German tank of their own called the Sturmpanzerwagen or the
[40:17] Speaker 1: A7B took long enough that the tactical initiative provided by
[40:22] Speaker 1: the tank's introduction was largely wasted by the decision to
[40:25] Speaker 1: deploy it piecemeal, rather than in concentrated masses, that its
[40:30] Speaker 1: most perceived, rather most perceptive advocates had argued for. While
[40:37] Speaker 1: the German army's initial response to the tank, beyond the
[40:40] Speaker 1: immediate tactical panic of its first encounters, was to develop
[40:45] Speaker 1: specific counter-tank measures, with a speed that reflected both the
[40:49] Speaker 1: seriousness of the threat and the limits of the technology
[40:52] Speaker 1: available to address it. The standard German anti-tank measure of
[40:57] Speaker 1: 1916 and 1917 was the direct-fire artillery piece, a field
[41:03] Speaker 1: gun deployed in a position from which it could engage
[41:06] Speaker 1: tanks at close range before they reached the forward trench.
[41:10] Speaker 1: This was tactically effective, but logistically it was very demanding.
[41:17] Speaker 1: It required the positioning of heavy equipment in exposed forward positions,
[41:21] Speaker 1: where it was itself vulnerable to the British artillery. The
[41:26] Speaker 1: German army also developed the first armour-piercing rifle bullet, called
[41:31] Speaker 1: the K-bullet, which could penetrate the relatively thin armour of
[41:35] Speaker 1: early British tanks at close range, and they trained infantry
[41:40] Speaker 1: to direct their fire at the observation slits, through which
[41:43] Speaker 1: the crew attempted to navigate. The conditions created by rifle
[41:48] Speaker 1: fire impacting the outside of an early tank were particularly
[41:51] Speaker 1: unpleasant for the crew, of course. The steel of the hull,
[41:55] Speaker 1: not designed to absorb such impacts without deformation, shed small
[42:00] Speaker 1: splinters of metal from its inner surface when struck, which
[42:04] Speaker 1: peppered the crew inside with hot metal fragments, while the
[42:07] Speaker 1: vehicle remained structurally intact. Now, the Battle of Cabrae, in
[42:14] Speaker 1: November of 1917, was the first occasion in which tanks
[42:18] Speaker 1: were used to concentrate, used rather in the concentrated mass
[42:22] Speaker 1: that the theory required. 476 tanks advanced on a six-mile
[42:29] Speaker 1: front without a preliminary artillery bombardment, relying instead on surprise
[42:36] Speaker 1: and the tank's ability to crush the wire that the
[42:39] Speaker 1: artillery would have normally cut. And they achieved in the
[42:42] Speaker 1: first few hours the largest single-day advance on the Western
[42:46] Speaker 1: Front since the war had become static. Church bells were
[42:50] Speaker 1: rung in London to celebrate the breakthrough. The subsequent German
[42:54] Speaker 1: counter-attack recovered most of the ground taken, and the battle
[42:59] Speaker 1: ended approximately where it had begun. But what Cabrai had
[43:04] Speaker 1: demonstrated was not a failure of a concept, but the
[43:08] Speaker 1: failure to exploit the concept's success quickly enough. The infantry
[43:13] Speaker 1: and cavalry reserves that should have poured through the breach
[43:17] Speaker 1: the tanks had created were not positioned close enough to
[43:20] Speaker 1: move before the breach was sealed. The tanks could create
[43:23] Speaker 1: the opening, but they couldn't really hold it. Well, let's
[43:30] Speaker 1: move on from the tank. I'm sure we'll have a
[43:33] Speaker 1: whole video about World War I tanks soon. But it
[43:38] Speaker 1: is not this day. Let's talk about the trench mortars.
[43:43] Speaker 1: that occupied a specific and largely unremarked place in the
[43:47] Speaker 1: hierarchy of World War I weapons. It wasn't the most powerful,
[43:53] Speaker 1: it wasn't the longest range, nor was it the most
[43:56] Speaker 1: technically sophisticated, and not the most psychologically novel either. But
[44:02] Speaker 1: it was, however, by the consistent testimony of the men
[44:06] Speaker 1: who were on the receiving end of one, the one
[44:09] Speaker 1: that was most feared. The specific quality of fear that
[44:14] Speaker 1: the trench mortar induced was a product of its trajectory
[44:17] Speaker 1: and its visibility. A mortar bomb, fired at high angles
[44:23] Speaker 1: from a weapon position nearby in the opposing trench, described
[44:27] Speaker 1: a visible arc through the air above the target, appearing
[44:32] Speaker 1: at the top of its trajectory as a visible object
[44:35] Speaker 1: moving slowly enough that a watching soldier could track it,
[44:38] Speaker 1: assess its likely point of impact and experience a period
[44:41] Speaker 1: of several seconds of knowledge That large explosive device was
[44:45] Speaker 1: about to land in a location he could estimate before
[44:49] Speaker 1: he could determine exactly where it was. Fingers crossed it
[44:52] Speaker 1: wasn't going to land where he was standing. Now the
[44:57] Speaker 1: German Meinenwerfer. Yeah, it's Meinenwerfer, yes. The mine thrower. I
[45:03] Speaker 1: remember that word, werfer, you know. Thrower, like Flamenwerfer. Meinenwerfer,
[45:09] Speaker 1: this kind of thing. For all the Germans out there. Well,
[45:14] Speaker 1: the Minethrower was the most sophisticated trench mortar of the war,
[45:18] Speaker 1: produced in three sizes, whose destructive capacity scaled from the
[45:24] Speaker 1: 76mm light version that a small crew could carry in
[45:27] Speaker 1: position quickly, to the 250mm Meinenwerfer, whose bomb weighed almost 90kg,
[45:31] Speaker 1: believed or not. That's about 180 pounds. I'm good with
[45:42] Speaker 1: the maths, aren't I? I'm trying to do the measurements
[45:46] Speaker 1: for our brothers across the Atlantic. And sisters, I know. Anyway,
[45:54] Speaker 1: that kind of weapon, this 250 millimeter, the impact could
[45:58] Speaker 1: destroy a substantial section of a trench with a single shot. Now,
[46:04] Speaker 1: the Wehrer, Meinenwerfer, as they called it, the 250mm, fired
[46:09] Speaker 1: so slowly and at such a high angle that experienced
[46:12] Speaker 1: soldiers could sometimes hear and report the weapon firing and
[46:16] Speaker 1: take some protective action before the bomb actually arrived. But
[46:21] Speaker 1: that didn't make it any less frightening, of course. If anything,
[46:24] Speaker 1: the interval between the report and the impact was part
[46:28] Speaker 1: of what made the weapon so psychologically corrosive. because it
[46:32] Speaker 1: required the target to make consciously experience, it required the
[46:37] Speaker 1: target to rather consciously experience the approach of his potential
[46:42] Speaker 1: doom for a period long enough to be aware of it.
[46:46] Speaker 1: The waiting is the hardest part, as they say. Then
[46:50] Speaker 1: there was the British Stokes mortar, introduced in 1915 and
[46:55] Speaker 1: designed by Wilfred Stokes, was a simpler weapon that the
[46:59] Speaker 1: Mainenwerfer was kind of not convinced quite up to in
[47:03] Speaker 1: terms of its swiftness. You see, because the British one
[47:08] Speaker 1: was faster to operate and lighter to move, a trained
[47:11] Speaker 1: crew could fire 22 rounds per minute, creating a concentration
[47:16] Speaker 1: of explosive effect on a small area that the heavier
[47:20] Speaker 1: German weapon could not match for tempo. The Levens Projector,
[47:26] Speaker 1: developed in 1917 by William Howard Levens, specifically for the
[47:31] Speaker 1: projection of gas drums, was a mortar-like device that could
[47:35] Speaker 1: be electrically fired in banks of several hundred simultaneously, delivering
[47:40] Speaker 1: a sudden massive cloud of gas to a target area
[47:43] Speaker 1: with a concentration and surprise that cylinder release could not achieve.
[47:48] Speaker 1: There's that. Imagine you're sitting there and your husband or
[47:53] Speaker 1: your father has come up with a new invention. You
[47:57] Speaker 1: ask him what it is, he says, well, I've come
[47:59] Speaker 1: up with a new way to gas people. Okay, then.
[48:05] Speaker 1: Can't we have something useful? Well, I suppose that was
[48:07] Speaker 1: useful at the time, but still. Could have came up with,
[48:11] Speaker 1: I don't know, tuberculosis medication. Anyway, different field, perhaps. The
[48:18] Speaker 1: psychological legacy of the trench mortar in the accounts of
[48:21] Speaker 1: the men who served in the forward trenches is one
[48:24] Speaker 1: of accumulated dread. rather than acute terror. Unlike the sudden
[48:29] Speaker 1: impact of a direct shell hit, which was either survived
[48:32] Speaker 1: or not with essentially no interval of anticipation, the mortar
[48:36] Speaker 1: bomb allowed its target time to soak it all in,
[48:42] Speaker 1: time to think, time for their lives to flash before
[48:46] Speaker 1: their eyes, I suppose. Veterans consistently described the specific anxiety
[48:51] Speaker 1: of identifying the sound of a meinenwerfer and firing a
[48:55] Speaker 1: These kinds of weapons they would attempt to calculate from
[48:58] Speaker 1: the sound and visible arc of the bomb as it
[49:01] Speaker 1: crested the trajectory, whether or not it was going to
[49:04] Speaker 1: land close enough to matter. And this calculation was performed repeatedly,
[49:09] Speaker 1: across weeks and months of forward service, and the cumulative
[49:14] Speaker 1: psychological cost of performing it was something that the memoir
[49:19] Speaker 1: literature acknowledged. identifies as one of the more wearing features
[49:23] Speaker 1: of continuous frontline duty, distinct from the acute terror of
[49:28] Speaker 1: the major battles, and more insidious for its persistence. Well,
[49:36] Speaker 1: next up we have a less ground-based weapon, and also
[49:40] Speaker 1: quite a new technology. The aerial bombing of civilian populations,
[49:48] Speaker 1: a practice that the 20th century would make sufficiently routine
[49:51] Speaker 1: to desensitize most observers, was genuinely quite novel in the
[49:56] Speaker 1: First World War, and the public reaction to it in
[49:59] Speaker 1: Britain and France reflected not merely the physical danger of
[50:02] Speaker 1: the raids, but the conceptual shock of a category of
[50:05] Speaker 1: violence for which no existing social framework was really adequate.
[50:10] Speaker 1: Civilians in British and French cities had not, in any
[50:13] Speaker 1: previous war within living memory, been required to consider the
[50:17] Speaker 1: possibility that war might actually reach them directly, that the
[50:21] Speaker 1: sky above their homes might deliver the same explosive violence
[50:26] Speaker 1: that their sons and brothers were experiencing over in the trenches. Well,
[50:32] Speaker 1: when that possibility was realised... With the Zeppelin appearing over
[50:38] Speaker 1: the Norfolk coast in January of 1915 and dropping the
[50:41] Speaker 1: first bombs on British soil since the Dutch raid of 1667,
[50:46] Speaker 1: topic for another time, the psychological effect was out of
[50:51] Speaker 1: all proportion to the physical damage inflicted. The German Zeppelin
[50:56] Speaker 1: program of 1915-17 conducted 51 raids on Britain. killing 557
[51:03] Speaker 1: and injuring 1,358. Figures that, by the standards of violence
[51:09] Speaker 1: incurring simultaneously in France and Belgium, were, perhaps in numerical terms,
[51:14] Speaker 1: almost trivial. But still, people didn't expect it. The raid's
[51:20] Speaker 1: significance was not their casualty numbers. That wasn't the point.
[51:25] Speaker 1: It was more about the demonstration that the concept of
[51:27] Speaker 1: a safe civilian rear had ceased to be reliable. Didn't
[51:32] Speaker 1: matter if you were far away from the front lines anymore.
[51:35] Speaker 1: The Germans were coming to you. A rigid airship, carrying
[51:40] Speaker 1: two tons of bombs, and capable of reaching London from
[51:43] Speaker 1: its base in Germany, could not, with the technology of 1915,
[51:47] Speaker 1: be reliably intercepted, shot down, or deterred. The British public's
[51:52] Speaker 1: response included the blacking out of city lights, the construction
[51:56] Speaker 1: of listening posts designed to detect the characteristic sound of
[52:00] Speaker 1: Zeppelin engines, and the degree of public anxiety that the
[52:05] Speaker 1: German high command had correctly anticipated, and that contributed to
[52:10] Speaker 1: the political pressure on the British government. The Zeppelin crews
[52:15] Speaker 1: were not indifferent to what they were doing. The accounts
[52:18] Speaker 1: left by their commanders show men who knew that they
[52:21] Speaker 1: were killing civilians, and who justified themselves. by saying that
[52:26] Speaker 1: the military logic was that civilian industrial production was a
[52:30] Speaker 1: legitimate military target, a logic that would be employed with
[52:34] Speaker 1: enormously greater destructive effort by both sides in the war
[52:38] Speaker 1: that followed. The replacement of the Zeppelin with the Gotha
[52:43] Speaker 1: G4 bomber from 1917 made the strategic bombing campaign significantly
[52:50] Speaker 1: more dangerous and far more difficult to intercept. The Gotha
[52:56] Speaker 1: was a fixed-wing twin-engine aircraft that could carry a bomb
[53:00] Speaker 1: load of approximately 500 kilograms to London at altitudes that
[53:06] Speaker 1: the defending fighters of 1917 could barely reach, and it
[53:10] Speaker 1: flew in formation rather than lone, which provided mutual defensive
[53:15] Speaker 1: fire against the interceptors and concentrated the bombing effect on
[53:18] Speaker 1: the target. The first daylight raid on London by a
[53:22] Speaker 1: formation of Gotha bombers on the 13th of June 1917
[53:26] Speaker 1: killed 162 people, including 18 children at a primary school
[53:31] Speaker 1: in Poplar, who died when a bomb penetrated the school roof.
[53:36] Speaker 1: The Poplar bombing produced a public and political response of
[53:40] Speaker 1: sufficient intensity to force the withdrawal of the fighter squadrons
[53:43] Speaker 1: from the Western Front to home defence. A strategic effect,
[53:48] Speaker 1: far in excess, of what the physical damage of the
[53:50] Speaker 1: raid would justify, but also a demonstration of the specific
[53:55] Speaker 1: leverage that civilian bombing provided as a means of imposing
[54:00] Speaker 1: political costs. The British response to the strategic bombing campaign
[54:05] Speaker 1: eventually included the formation of the Royal Air Force on
[54:08] Speaker 1: the 1st of April 1918, the world's first independent air force,
[54:14] Speaker 1: created partly from the need to centralise the control of
[54:17] Speaker 1: home defence and also the development of strategic bombing doctrines
[54:22] Speaker 1: that would be applied enormously to greater effect in the
[54:25] Speaker 1: Second World War, which of course we'll definitely be covering
[54:30] Speaker 1: extensively when the time comes. The aircraft and the bomb
[54:34] Speaker 1: loads of 1917 and 1918 were too small and too
[54:38] Speaker 1: technically limited to produce the kind of systematic destruction that
[54:43] Speaker 1: strategic bombing theory promised. But it was the concept that
[54:48] Speaker 1: air power could be used to directly attack an enemy's
[54:51] Speaker 1: ability and will to wage war by striking its civilian
[54:55] Speaker 1: and industrial base. That was established in World War I,
[55:00] Speaker 1: and it would define the character of aerial warfare for
[55:03] Speaker 1: the century that followed. Well, the last weapon of the
[55:10] Speaker 1: day is actually a little bit removed from the battlefield,
[55:15] Speaker 1: or at least the traditional battlefield of the trenches. The
[55:19] Speaker 1: German U-Boat. Which apparently is Unterseeboot. German, which I find
[55:27] Speaker 1: a little bit humorous. Unterseeboot. Yeah, anyway. Well, they had
[55:35] Speaker 1: their campaign of the First World War to make lots
[55:39] Speaker 1: of these. And they introduced to naval warfare a form
[55:41] Speaker 1: of violence whose specific character, i.e. invisible, sudden violence, and
[55:47] Speaker 1: directed at anyone who happened to be aboard a vessel
[55:49] Speaker 1: that a U-boat commander decided to sink, was as shocking
[55:53] Speaker 1: to the contemporary moral sensibility as the chlorine gas attack
[55:56] Speaker 1: was in Ypres, and for similar reasons. You see, it
[56:01] Speaker 1: violated the existing conventions of warfare in ways that were
[56:06] Speaker 1: legally arguable and humanely indefensible. The Conventions of Naval Warfare
[56:14] Speaker 1: as they existed in 1914, required a submarine like any
[56:17] Speaker 1: other warship to stop and search a vessel before sinking
[56:21] Speaker 1: it and to make provision for the safety of the
[56:23] Speaker 1: crew and passengers. The German military establishment correctly identified this
[56:28] Speaker 1: requirement as operationally incompatible with the strategic purposes of submarine warfare,
[56:35] Speaker 1: which was to cut the supply lines sustaining Britain's war
[56:38] Speaker 1: effort by sinking the merchant shipping that carried food, raw materials,
[56:43] Speaker 1: and military supplies across the Atlantic. Now, the sinking of
[56:47] Speaker 1: the RMS Lusitania on the 7th of May, 1915, by
[56:51] Speaker 1: U-20 under Walfa Schwieger, killed 1,198 of the 1,959 people aboard,
[56:55] Speaker 1: including 128 Americans. The Lusitania was a British passenger liner
[57:09] Speaker 1: that the German government had previously advertised in American newspapers
[57:13] Speaker 1: as a legitimate target for a submarine attack. The sinking
[57:17] Speaker 1: produced a diplomatic crisis with the United States that eventually
[57:21] Speaker 1: contributed to the American entry into the war in 1917.
[57:26] Speaker 1: Though the precise relationship between the Lusitania and the American
[57:30] Speaker 1: belligerence is a little bit more complicated than that standard
[57:34] Speaker 1: narrative implies. What the sinking demonstrated without ambiguity was the
[57:41] Speaker 1: U-boat's capacity to change the political calculus of the war
[57:45] Speaker 1: in ways that extended far beyond the immediate military impact
[57:48] Speaker 1: of any individual ship's loss. A single submarine operating alone
[57:54] Speaker 1: had produced an international incident that altered the diplomatic situation
[57:59] Speaker 1: of the world's most powerful nation. The Declaration of Unrestricted
[58:05] Speaker 1: Submarine Warfare i.e. the policy that any vessel found in
[58:09] Speaker 1: the waters around Britain was up for a target, was
[58:12] Speaker 1: announced by Germany in February of 1915, suspended under American
[58:17] Speaker 1: diplomatic pressure after the Lusitania in 1916, and reimposed in
[58:23] Speaker 1: February of 1917, in the calculated gamble that the war
[58:27] Speaker 1: could be won before the American military intervention could become decisive.
[58:33] Speaker 1: The February 1917 resumption was the single most consequential German
[58:38] Speaker 1: strategic decision in the second half of the war. And
[58:42] Speaker 1: not really because unrestricted submarine warfare was likely to succeed
[58:47] Speaker 1: on its own terms. It wasn't really that simple. You see,
[58:50] Speaker 1: the shipbuilding capacity of the Allied nations at America meant
[58:54] Speaker 1: that sinkings could eventually be replaced faster than they occurred.
[58:58] Speaker 1: But mainly because it made the American entry into the
[59:01] Speaker 1: war politically inevitable. The German Calculation that six months of
[59:07] Speaker 1: unrestricted submarine warfare would strangle British supply lines before American
[59:12] Speaker 1: forces could arrive in strength was wrong by approximately three
[59:17] Speaker 1: months in either direction. The convoy system, introduced in May
[59:23] Speaker 1: of 1917, reduced the sinking rate significantly faster than the
[59:27] Speaker 1: German planners had assumed. and American troops began arriving in
[59:32] Speaker 1: France at a rate that the German spring offensive in
[59:35] Speaker 1: 1918 was already just too late to prevent. Then there
[59:40] Speaker 1: was the sea mine. Well, it was a kind of
[59:44] Speaker 1: tethered explosive device anchored below the surface that detonated on
[59:48] Speaker 1: contact with the ship's hull. It predated the First World War,
[59:53] Speaker 1: but it was developed on an unprecedented scale across the
[59:56] Speaker 1: North Sea. and the major shipping lanes between 1914 and 1918.
[1:00:02] Speaker 1: Both sides laid minefields, designed to deny the enemy access
[1:00:06] Speaker 1: to strategic sea areas, and both sides suffered casualties from
[1:00:10] Speaker 1: mines laid by the other. The Northern Barrage, the Anglo-American
[1:00:16] Speaker 1: minefield stretching from the Orkney Islands to Norway, which is
[1:00:20] Speaker 1: 230 miles of ocean sown with 70,000 mines, was one
[1:00:25] Speaker 1: of the largest engineering undertakings of the entire war, designed
[1:00:29] Speaker 1: specifically to contain the German U-boat fleet in the North Sea.
[1:00:35] Speaker 1: The mines used contact fuses that detonated on physical impact
[1:00:40] Speaker 1: with the hull, producing an explosion directly against the most
[1:00:44] Speaker 1: vulnerable part of the ship's structure. A vessel that struck
[1:00:47] Speaker 1: a mine had very little warning. The explosion came without
[1:00:52] Speaker 1: the approach of a visible weapon. without the sound of
[1:00:56] Speaker 1: a torpedo running, without any perceptible interval between normality and catastrophe.
[1:01:03] Speaker 1: The conditions aboard the U-boats that rather conducted the German
[1:01:08] Speaker 1: submarine campaign were among the most extreme endured by any
[1:01:12] Speaker 1: combatants of the war, and they deserve a brief accounting
[1:01:15] Speaker 1: alongside the conditions of those whom the U-boats attacked. A
[1:01:20] Speaker 1: standard German U-boat of the period was approximately 60 meters
[1:01:24] Speaker 1: in length, and carried a crew of 35 men in
[1:01:28] Speaker 1: a space that allowed no privacy, minimal movement, constant humidity
[1:01:33] Speaker 1: from the water that condensed on every surface, and air
[1:01:36] Speaker 1: quality that deteriorated rapidly during extended dives as the oxygen
[1:01:41] Speaker 1: was consumed and carbon dioxide accumulated. Extended patrols would last weeks.
[1:01:49] Speaker 1: The men slept in rotations on bunks, shared between off-duty
[1:01:52] Speaker 1: crew members. The food was specifically stored to withstand the
[1:01:56] Speaker 1: conditions of the boat, but was generally described as barely
[1:02:00] Speaker 1: palatable after the first week. The casualty rate among U-boat
[1:02:05] Speaker 1: crews across the war was approximately 34%, higher than any
[1:02:10] Speaker 1: other branch of the German military, and of the roughly
[1:02:13] Speaker 1: 360 U-boats that served during the war, 178 were lost
[1:02:22] Speaker 1: And the ones who were lost, well, there were no survivors.
[1:02:30] Speaker 1: Ladies and gentlemen, we are at the end of the video.
[1:02:35] Speaker 1: I hope you've enjoyed this little World War I video.
[1:02:38] Speaker 1: If you want more World War I, you better let
[1:02:41] Speaker 1: me know in the comments. And we'll do more. But
[1:02:44] Speaker 1: for now, I'm very tired. And I am going to
[1:02:48] Speaker 1: go to sleep. Because I've been recording all night. But hey,
[1:02:54] Speaker 1: it's foggy and rainy outside, so if there was ever
[1:02:58] Speaker 1: a day for recording, it is this day. Thank you
[1:03:03] Speaker 1: so much for liking, subscribing, commenting, supporting on Patreon, memberships,
[1:03:10] Speaker 1: the bloody merch store, that's it. Thank you for doing
[1:03:15] Speaker 1: all that, if you've been doing it. I will see
[1:03:17] Speaker 1: you whenever you feel like coming back. Good night. And
[1:03:22] Speaker 1: farewell for now.

Shows are listed from Apple Podcasts' charts and directory, and Podcast Index where it is used. Every show and episode belongs to its publisher and plays from the publisher's own feed; this site hosts none of them.
