# Toughest Regiments of World War One

An episode of [Human History ASMR](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/6793196842), 8 Sep 2026, 1 h 04 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/74777220/toughest_regiments_of_world_war_one_human_voiced_no_ads.mp3

Step onto the brutal battlefields of the First World War and discover the regiments and military units that earned reputations for extraordinary courage, endurance, discipline, and battlefield effectiveness. This episode explores some of the most renowned regiments of World War I, examining the soldiers who served in them, the battles they fought, and the conditions they endured. From the trenches of the Western Front to the mountains, deserts, and distant battlefields of the wider war, these units faced artillery bombardments, machine-gun fire, disease, exhaustion, mud, hunger, and constant danger. Discover how different regiments developed their reputations, how they were recruited and trained, and what made certain units particularly effective under extreme conditions. We also examine leadership, morale, discipline, tactics, equipment, battlefield experience, and the bonds formed between soldiers. The episode explores famous formations from Britain and its empire, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and other combatant nations, while recognizing that wartime reputations were often shaped by propaganda, newspapers, military traditions, and later historical memory. Drawing on military records, soldiers' memoirs, battlefield accounts, official histories, photographs, and modern scholarship, this episode separates genuine battlefield achievements from myths and exaggerated legends. Narrated with a calm, human voice, this immersive journey into World War I military history is perfect for history enthusiasts, military history fans, documentary listeners, relaxation, or listening before sleep. Discover the soldiers, battles, hardships, and extraordinary endurance behind some of the toughest regiments of the First World War.

## Transcript

[0:01] Speaker 1: Bravery. That's how you get a medal. And there were
[0:06] Speaker 1: plenty of medals being handed out in the First World War.
[0:10] Speaker 1: And they had to be brave. The men who weren't
[0:13] Speaker 1: didn't survive long enough to build much of a reputation.
[0:17] Speaker 1: But the men who were usually the bravest, well, they
[0:22] Speaker 1: were at the front of the line and unfortunately didn't
[0:25] Speaker 1: come back to tell their stories. But there was something
[0:29] Speaker 1: else that was quite uncommon. Something harder to name. A
[0:35] Speaker 1: specific combination of training, leadership, cohesion, and sheer tactical stubbornness
[0:42] Speaker 1: that turned certain units into something that the enemy learned
[0:46] Speaker 1: to dread. And so today, we are talking about the
[0:52] Speaker 1: toughest regiments of World War I. And we're not just
[0:56] Speaker 1: talking about the allies either. We're talking about both sides,
[1:01] Speaker 1: all the way from the French to the Germans, the Ottomans,
[1:06] Speaker 1: and everything in between. So, let's get straight into it
[1:12] Speaker 1: and hear their stories. Before we begin, thank you to
[1:15] Speaker 1: those supporting the channel and giving us ad and sponsor free.
[1:20] Speaker 1: You are the reason why we can do this. And
[1:23] Speaker 1: you have my thanks at the start and end of
[1:25] Speaker 1: every video. If you're interested in becoming a member, or
[1:28] Speaker 1: busy in the merch store, links are in the pinned
[1:30] Speaker 1: comment and description. Otherwise, do the like, comment, subscribe thing,
[1:34] Speaker 1: and that pushes us out in the algorithm. That being said,
[1:38] Speaker 1: let's get straight into it. And what better place to
[1:44] Speaker 1: start than the 369th Infantry Regiment, also known as the
[1:49] Speaker 1: Harlem Hellfighters. If you've played Battlefield 1, you'll know all
[1:54] Speaker 1: about it. Anyway, the regiment that became the 369th Infantry
[2:00] Speaker 1: had its origins in the 15th New York National Guard,
[2:03] Speaker 1: a black regiment organized in 1916 under the command of
[2:08] Speaker 1: Colonel William Hayward, a white officer of genuine ability who
[2:12] Speaker 1: spent considerable energy fighting the institutional resistance both of the U.S.
[2:17] Speaker 1: Army and the state of New York to the idea
[2:20] Speaker 1: that regiments could be mixed-race. and the idea that African
[2:24] Speaker 1: Americans could be trained and armed as combat soldiers. When
[2:29] Speaker 1: the United States entered the war in April of 1917,
[2:32] Speaker 1: the 15th New York was federalized, and eventually redesignated the
[2:40] Speaker 1: 369th Infantry Regiment, and the question of what to do
[2:44] Speaker 1: with it became immediately political. The U.S. Army's solution was
[2:52] Speaker 1: the same solution applied to all of its mixed-race combat units,
[2:57] Speaker 1: or rather African-American combat units, was to transfer the regiment
[3:02] Speaker 1: to French command, where racial segregation of the kind the
[3:06] Speaker 1: American military insisted upon was not a feature of the
[3:09] Speaker 1: operational structure. I mean, think about it, you know, the
[3:14] Speaker 1: French Empire had plenty of colonial possessions in Africa and
[3:18] Speaker 1: plenty of... People from those colonial possessions were fighting on
[3:22] Speaker 1: the French side. So, the French didn't have much of
[3:25] Speaker 1: a problem with it, at least not at a level
[3:28] Speaker 1: on paper. Now, the French took the 369th without apparent hesitation,
[3:35] Speaker 1: and they integrated them into their own divisional organization. The
[3:40] Speaker 1: regiment arrived in France in December of 1917, and entered
[3:45] Speaker 1: the front-line trenches in the Argonne in March 1918. where
[3:50] Speaker 1: it remained in continuous combat, longer than any other American
[3:55] Speaker 1: unit committed to the war. 191 days in the front line,
[4:01] Speaker 1: a figure that no comparable American formation came close to matching.
[4:08] Speaker 1: And in all of that time, believe this, right, it's true,
[4:12] Speaker 1: not a single member of the regiment was captured, and
[4:15] Speaker 1: not a single position held by the regiment was taken
[4:18] Speaker 1: by the enemy. And that's a pretty good ratio. You
[4:23] Speaker 1: can't get much better than that. The operational record is unambiguous.
[4:30] Speaker 1: And the French military authorities who assessed it were unambiguous
[4:34] Speaker 1: in their response. The regiment was awarded the Croix de Guerre,
[4:39] Speaker 1: the Cross of War, as a unit. And a significant
[4:44] Speaker 1: number of individual soldiers received the medal individually. Henry Johnson
[4:48] Speaker 1: of Albany, New York, a twenty-year-old private who had been
[4:53] Speaker 1: working as a porter at Albany's Union Station before the war,
[4:57] Speaker 1: received the medal with palm, the highest grade of the decoration,
[5:02] Speaker 1: for an action on the night of the 14th of
[5:04] Speaker 1: May 1918, in which he and his partner, Needham Roberts,
[5:09] Speaker 1: both wounded and in danger of being taken prisoner by
[5:12] Speaker 1: a German raiding party of twenty-four men, fought off the
[5:16] Speaker 1: entire lot of them. Johnson killed four Germans and wounded others.
[5:22] Speaker 1: He used his bolo knife when his rifle jammed and
[5:25] Speaker 1: his grenades were exhausted, and prevented Roberts from being dragged
[5:30] Speaker 1: back to the German trench. He was not, however, recognized
[5:36] Speaker 1: by the United States for this action until 2015. Little
[5:43] Speaker 1: bit late, right? When President Barack Obama awarded him the
[5:48] Speaker 1: Medal of Honor posthumously. 96 years after the war ended.
[5:52] Speaker 1: A little bit late, but I suppose it's better late
[5:55] Speaker 1: than never. The regiment's jazz band, yes, they had a
[6:01] Speaker 1: jazz band, led by James Reese Europe, a musician who
[6:06] Speaker 1: had been one of the most prominent figures in the
[6:07] Speaker 1: New York scene before the war, was itself one of
[6:11] Speaker 1: the more remarkable cultural exports of the American military presence
[6:14] Speaker 1: in France. Europe's band performed across the country during rest periods,
[6:20] Speaker 1: and in Paris, introducing the French audiences to syncopated jazz
[6:25] Speaker 1: rhythms that they found baffling and irresistible, as jazz usually is,
[6:32] Speaker 1: as confusing as it is enjoyable. The French composer Claude
[6:36] Speaker 1: Debussy reportedly attended one of the band's performances, and described
[6:41] Speaker 1: the experience as unlike anything he'd previously encountered. By the way,
[6:46] Speaker 1: Claude Debussy is the composer who did Claire de Lune,
[6:50] Speaker 1: by the way. Beautiful piece of music, among other things.
[6:54] Speaker 1: You know, it's not the only thing he did, but
[6:56] Speaker 1: it just gets the most attention. Anyway, the music and
[7:01] Speaker 1: the military performance of the 369th were inextricable in the
[7:05] Speaker 1: public imagination of the time. The regiment was understood by
[7:10] Speaker 1: the French public who encountered it as a demonstration that
[7:13] Speaker 1: something was happening in American culture that the formal structures
[7:18] Speaker 1: of the American racial politics were not yet capable of acknowledging.
[7:23] Speaker 1: The individual story of Henry Johnson rewards closer examination, because
[7:28] Speaker 1: it shows with a bit more clarity the specific conditions
[7:32] Speaker 1: under which the 369th operated, and the specific quality of
[7:36] Speaker 1: recognition they received for their performance. On the night of
[7:40] Speaker 1: the 14th of May 1918, Johnson and Roberts were manning
[7:45] Speaker 1: a listening post in the forest when a German raiding
[7:48] Speaker 1: party attacked. Roberts was wounded by grenades early in the engagement,
[7:54] Speaker 1: Johnson shortly afterward. He sustained twenty-one wounds during the action,
[8:00] Speaker 1: the largest number recorded for a soldier who survived the night.
[8:04] Speaker 1: He used every weapon available to him in sequence, all
[8:08] Speaker 1: the grenades until they were gone, the rifle until it jammed,
[8:12] Speaker 1: the butt of his rifle until it broke. and his
[8:15] Speaker 1: bolo knife until the Germans eventually withdrew. The French army
[8:20] Speaker 1: awarded him their highest decoration without hesitation. The American army
[8:26] Speaker 1: classified his file for decades. They even denied him veterans'
[8:30] Speaker 1: benefits that he was entitled to, on the grounds of
[8:34] Speaker 1: administrative confusion. Can you imagine that? That's terrible. So the
[8:40] Speaker 1: poor bloke was left to die in poverty, and he
[8:43] Speaker 1: did so in 1929. having received nothing from his country
[8:47] Speaker 1: that he served. I mean, the French could have sorted
[8:50] Speaker 1: him out, but they were probably too busy rebuilding their
[8:54] Speaker 1: own country, I suppose. In any case, the posthumous Medal
[8:59] Speaker 1: of Honour arrived 86 years later. Another cold comfort. The
[9:05] Speaker 1: Homecoming Parade on Fifth Avenue in February 1919 was both
[9:10] Speaker 1: a celebration and an indictment. The regiment marched to a
[9:14] Speaker 1: reception that dwarfed the welcome given to most returning white
[9:18] Speaker 1: American units. Through the streets lined with a crowd that
[9:22] Speaker 1: understood what it was celebrating and why it mattered. Within weeks,
[9:28] Speaker 1: the same men were navigating the old problems with the
[9:32] Speaker 1: Red Summer of 1919, a period of anti-black riots and
[9:37] Speaker 1: lynchings across the United States, in which the military service
[9:41] Speaker 1: of black veterans offered No protection whatsoever. Henry Johnson died
[9:47] Speaker 1: in 1929. Destitute. Poor guy. Needham Roberts died in a
[9:53] Speaker 1: veterans' hospital. Well, the regiment was all demobilized. The French
[10:00] Speaker 1: military continued to regard its service as one of the
[10:03] Speaker 1: most distinguished of any foreign unit that had served under
[10:06] Speaker 1: French command in the war. And I suppose it's only
[10:10] Speaker 1: in hindsight that we get to really tell their story.
[10:14] Speaker 1: So I think it's an important one to tell. Anyway,
[10:18] Speaker 1: let's Move on. The phrase shock troops of the British
[10:26] Speaker 1: Empire is usually attributed to Erich Ludendorff, the German quartermaster
[10:32] Speaker 1: general who was effectively running the German war effort by 1917.
[10:37] Speaker 1: And whatever precise origin of the formulation, the assessment reflected
[10:41] Speaker 1: genuine professional respect from an opponent who had spent considerable
[10:45] Speaker 1: effort and casualties attempting to dislodge the Canadian Corps from
[10:52] Speaker 1: positions that they had been assigned to hold. By the
[10:56] Speaker 1: final two years of the war, the Canadian Corps had become,
[11:00] Speaker 1: by the consensus of military analysts on both sides of
[11:03] Speaker 1: the front, the most consistently effective assault formation on the
[11:07] Speaker 1: Western Front. The status achieved through a combination of tactical innovation,
[11:13] Speaker 1: exceptionally capable Corps-level leadership, and a willingness on the part
[11:18] Speaker 1: of the Canadian government to treat its forces in the
[11:21] Speaker 1: field as a single national formation, rather than dispersing them
[11:26] Speaker 1: across British divisions as drafts. The event that most clearly
[11:31] Speaker 1: established the Canadians' reputation was the capture of the Vimy
[11:35] Speaker 1: Bridge on the 9th of April, 1917, an action that
[11:40] Speaker 1: has acquired the status of a foundational national myth in Canada.
[11:46] Speaker 1: and that retains genuine military significance, independent of the national
[11:50] Speaker 1: narrative built around it. Now, Vimy Bridge was a dominant
[11:55] Speaker 1: tactical feature of the Western Front that the French had
[11:58] Speaker 1: attempted to take in 1915, and it did not go well,
[12:04] Speaker 1: and so poorly they had about 150,000 casualties. Well, the
[12:10] Speaker 1: British had attacked repeatedly too, and they didn't have much
[12:13] Speaker 1: success either. All four divisions of the Canadian Corps attacked
[12:19] Speaker 1: together for the first time on the same morning, behind
[12:23] Speaker 1: a creeping artillery barrage, whose timing and execution had been
[12:27] Speaker 1: rehearsed in detail on ground marked out behind the lines.
[12:32] Speaker 1: They took the ridge in four days. They lost about 10,600 casualties, though.
[12:39] Speaker 1: The German position, which had been considered effectively insurmountable, impregnable,
[12:45] Speaker 1: fell because the Canadians had planned the operation at a
[12:48] Speaker 1: level of tactical detail unprecedented in the British Expeditionary Force.
[12:53] Speaker 1: Every soldier was briefed on the overall plan. Every company
[12:58] Speaker 1: commander knew the objectives of the formations on his flanks.
[13:03] Speaker 1: Every man carried maps of his own objectives. Rather than
[13:07] Speaker 1: advancing into ground, he had not been shown. In layman's terms,
[13:11] Speaker 1: they knew what they were doing and they bloody did it.
[13:17] Speaker 1: The Corps' commander for most of the war's critical phase
[13:20] Speaker 1: was Lieutenant General Arthur Currie, a pre-war real estate agent
[13:26] Speaker 1: from Victoria, British Columbia, who had zero military training before 1914,
[13:32] Speaker 1: and who became, in the assessment of many military historians,
[13:36] Speaker 1: the best Corps commander the British Empire produced in the
[13:39] Speaker 1: entire war. At Lekker, World War I version of Nelson,
[13:44] Speaker 1: kind of thing. Perhaps the Duke of Edinburgh. Now, Currie
[13:50] Speaker 1: was unpopular with politicians, and with some of the men
[13:54] Speaker 1: that he commanded. He was cold, demanding, physically unimpressive, and
[14:00] Speaker 1: absolutely unwilling to undertake operations he judged likely to fail,
[14:05] Speaker 1: regardless of the political pressure applied to him. But there
[14:09] Speaker 1: was one thing he understood. and that was the mechanics
[14:12] Speaker 1: of set-piece assaults on the Western Front, with a clarity
[14:15] Speaker 1: that eluded officers with vastly more formal training. He consistently
[14:21] Speaker 1: refused to commit his corps to attacks that he hadn't
[14:24] Speaker 1: had the time to prepare, and the correlation between the
[14:27] Speaker 1: level of his preparation and the level of his casualty
[14:30] Speaker 1: rates is one of the more striking statistics in the
[14:36] Speaker 1: operational history of the wars. The methodological innovation that Vimy
[14:42] Speaker 1: represented extended well beyond the standard account of meticulous planning.
[14:47] Speaker 1: The Canadians introduced at Vimy several specific tactical practices that
[14:52] Speaker 1: subsequently became standard in the Allied defensive. The use of
[14:57] Speaker 1: creeping barrage timed to the precise pace of the infantry
[15:01] Speaker 1: advance rather than estimated from artillery positions alone. The distribution
[15:08] Speaker 1: of maps and operational objectives to every soldier, not just
[15:12] Speaker 1: to officers, so that individuals could continue toward their objectives,
[15:16] Speaker 1: regardless of what happened to the chain of command above them.
[15:20] Speaker 1: And the establishment of dedicated counter-battery fire plans, designed to
[15:25] Speaker 1: suppress German artillery before the infantry advanced, rather than during
[15:31] Speaker 1: the advance. The intelligence preparation for the attack, included the
[15:36] Speaker 1: construction of a large-scale plaster model of the ridge and
[15:40] Speaker 1: the German defensive positions on it, which was used to
[15:44] Speaker 1: brief every soldier in the Corps on the terrain that
[15:46] Speaker 1: they would cross and the positions they were required to take.
[15:50] Speaker 1: The model was built from aerial reconnaissance photographs and prisoner
[15:54] Speaker 1: interrogation reports. Every man who attacked Vimy Bridge on the
[15:58] Speaker 1: 9th of April 1917 had seen it, They all knew
[16:02] Speaker 1: where to go, when to go, and what to do
[16:05] Speaker 1: when they got there. Makes sense, right? The Hundred Days
[16:12] Speaker 1: Offensive of August-November 1918, the final Allied campaign that broke
[16:17] Speaker 1: the German army and ended the war, opened at Amiens
[16:22] Speaker 1: on the 8th of August with the Canadian Corps and
[16:24] Speaker 1: the Australian Corps as its principal assault formation. The Canadians
[16:29] Speaker 1: advanced offensively eight miles on the first day, the largest
[16:34] Speaker 1: single day advance by any formation on the Western Front
[16:38] Speaker 1: since the war had become static in late 1914. The
[16:42] Speaker 1: Ludendorff subsequently described the 8th of August as the Black
[16:47] Speaker 1: Day of the German Army, a day on which the
[16:50] Speaker 1: German forces facing the assault showed a willingness to surrender
[16:54] Speaker 1: rather than fight that he'd previously not observed. The Canadians
[17:01] Speaker 1: had been moved secretly to the Amiens sector, specifically because
[17:05] Speaker 1: German intelligence had learned to treat Canadian troops as reliable
[17:09] Speaker 1: indicators of a major offensive action. Certainly not good news. Now,
[17:16] Speaker 1: getting them to Amiens undetected, that required an operational security
[17:21] Speaker 1: effort of considerable complexity, including the dispatch of Canadian wireless
[17:27] Speaker 1: operators to the Flemish coast. to simulate a corps headquarters
[17:32] Speaker 1: in the wrong location. A ruse, if you will. Next up,
[17:41] Speaker 1: we have the Australia New Zealand Armoured Corps, or ANZAC
[17:47] Speaker 1: for short. Coined as an administrative convenience, it became in
[17:52] Speaker 1: the course of one catastrophic morning on the 25th of
[17:55] Speaker 1: April 1915 that one of the most resonant acronyms in
[18:00] Speaker 1: military history of the English-speaking world. The landing at what
[18:05] Speaker 1: became Anzac Cove on Gallipoli was supposed to be securing
[18:10] Speaker 1: the heights above the landing ground and enable an advance
[18:14] Speaker 1: that would threaten the Turkish lines from the rear. The
[18:18] Speaker 1: Brits wanted to open up a second front line in
[18:20] Speaker 1: the war, you know, and, well, the Australians and the
[18:24] Speaker 1: New Zealanders got sort of sent to do the dirty work,
[18:27] Speaker 1: I suppose. Well, the people who landed that morning found
[18:32] Speaker 1: themselves instead on a narrow beach below cliffs and ridges,
[18:36] Speaker 1: held by Ottoman defenders who had been placed there by
[18:40] Speaker 1: a 35-year-old lieutenant colonel named Mustafa Kemal, who had moved
[18:45] Speaker 1: his regiment to the commanding heights on his own initiative.
[18:50] Speaker 1: Without orders, by the way. At the exact moment needed
[18:54] Speaker 1: to prevent the Anzacs from establishing a position, from which
[18:57] Speaker 1: they could not be dislodged. The Gallipoli campaign lasted eight months,
[19:04] Speaker 1: and ended in an evacuation. That was, by general agreement,
[19:09] Speaker 1: the most successfully executed operation of the entire campaign. And
[19:13] Speaker 1: that ought to give you a bit of an indication
[19:16] Speaker 1: of how the campaign went. If the retreat is the
[19:19] Speaker 1: most successful thing, well... It was clever, though. Anyway, we'll
[19:26] Speaker 1: get to it. The Australians had lost 8,709. The New
[19:32] Speaker 1: Zealanders had lost 2,721. The failure of the campaign had
[19:38] Speaker 1: no significant effect on the Anzac reputation, but if anything
[19:42] Speaker 1: it enhanced it, because what the men who fought at
[19:45] Speaker 1: Gallipoli demonstrated, and what the correspondents who accompanied them were
[19:50] Speaker 1: reporting back to Australia and New Zealand with a vivid
[19:53] Speaker 1: attention to specific human detail, was a quality of individual
[19:57] Speaker 1: initiative and physical resilience that the formal structures of the
[20:01] Speaker 1: British military culture had not anticipated, and didn't really know
[20:06] Speaker 1: what to do with. The men of the Anzac Corps were,
[20:10] Speaker 1: in the assessment of many British officers who commanded alongside them,
[20:14] Speaker 1: the most physically capable soldiers in the entire British Imperial Force.
[20:19] Speaker 1: They were better shots, they were better at night work,
[20:22] Speaker 1: they were more comfortable in rough terrain, and considerably less
[20:26] Speaker 1: patient with the deference to rank and protocol that the
[20:29] Speaker 1: British regular army considered essential to military discipline. Now, And
[20:39] Speaker 1: the other thing was they were probably a bit more
[20:40] Speaker 1: used to the heat. The Turkish climate is a little
[20:46] Speaker 1: bit closer to the Australian climate than the British one,
[20:49] Speaker 1: especially if you've got highland regiments. And another thing, they
[20:53] Speaker 1: came up with a very interesting invention. They would have
[20:56] Speaker 1: this pulley system attached to rifles in trenches, right? And
[21:01] Speaker 1: when they were retreating, it would be ripping out water
[21:05] Speaker 1: and changing the weights of things and these strings would
[21:09] Speaker 1: kind of trigger the firing mechanisms on the rifles so
[21:14] Speaker 1: it made it look and sound like these trenches were
[21:17] Speaker 1: occupied but they really weren't so on the other side
[21:22] Speaker 1: they didn't really know that a full-scale evacuation was happening
[21:27] Speaker 1: because the bullets somehow kept on firing and when they
[21:31] Speaker 1: showed up and saw all the empty bottles and all
[21:34] Speaker 1: the rest, well, I suppose it kind of made sense. Now,
[21:40] Speaker 1: on the Western Front, to which the Anzac Corps was
[21:43] Speaker 1: transferred after Gallipoli, its performance across the battles of 16,
[21:48] Speaker 1: 17 and 18 confirmed the assessment of its first campaign,
[21:53] Speaker 1: while adding a specifically industrial dimension to the reputation. The
[21:58] Speaker 1: Battle of Poziar Village on the Somme, in July and
[22:02] Speaker 1: August of 1916, cost the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions
[22:07] Speaker 1: approximately 23,000 casualties in six weeks, more than the entire
[22:12] Speaker 1: eight months at Gallipoli. A grinding, attritional battle for a
[22:18] Speaker 1: ridge whose tactical significance was real, but whose cost was
[22:22] Speaker 1: genuinely devastating. The Australian official historian Charles Bean wrote afterwards
[22:29] Speaker 1: that Possier Ridge was, quote, more densely sown with Australian
[22:33] Speaker 1: sacrifice than any other place on earth. The units that
[22:38] Speaker 1: fought there did not collapse, however. They were relieved, reconstituted,
[22:44] Speaker 1: and returned to the line. The operational achievement that most
[22:50] Speaker 1: clearly demonstrates the ANZAC Corps' capabilities at their peak was
[22:54] Speaker 1: the Battle of Hamel on the 4th of July, 1918.
[22:59] Speaker 1: A date chosen partly because it allowed American units to
[23:02] Speaker 1: participate on their National Independence Day, and, well, maybe that
[23:06] Speaker 1: would motivate them a little bit. Just my theory. The
[23:11] Speaker 1: Corps Commander, Lieutenant General John Monash, who, by the way,
[23:16] Speaker 1: we have a university named after in Melbourne, planned the
[23:20] Speaker 1: operation to run for exactly 93 minutes, using tanks, infantry, aircraft,
[23:26] Speaker 1: and artillery. in an integrated combination that modern military analysts
[23:31] Speaker 1: regard as the prototype of the all-arms-battle concepts that dominated
[23:35] Speaker 1: 20th century warfare. And it did run for 93 minutes.
[23:42] Speaker 1: That's a pretty good estimate, huh? The objective was taken
[23:46] Speaker 1: on schedule, with minimal casualties. Monash subsequently described his operation
[23:53] Speaker 1: philosophy as the delivery of victory at the maximum possible,
[23:58] Speaker 1: rather minimum possible cost in human life, not the maximum.
[24:02] Speaker 1: A principle that stated plainly seems obvious, but that was
[24:07] Speaker 1: in practice revolutionary in the context of the Western France
[24:12] Speaker 1: culture of attritional commitment. Well, next up, let's take a
[24:18] Speaker 1: look at the Other side, the German Stossgruppen, the tactical
[24:24] Speaker 1: revolution that the German army effected between 1915 and 1918
[24:29] Speaker 1: in its infantry assault methods, was one of the most
[24:32] Speaker 1: significant military developments of the whole war, and the Stossgruppen,
[24:37] Speaker 1: the stormtroopers, they were its principal instrument. The concept did
[24:43] Speaker 1: not emerge fully formed from a single mind or a
[24:46] Speaker 1: single moment, It was the product of a sustained institutional
[24:50] Speaker 1: effort by the German army to solve the problem that
[24:53] Speaker 1: the Western Front presented, which was, at its core, the
[24:58] Speaker 1: problem of how to attack a deeply organized defensive system
[25:03] Speaker 1: with enough speed and surprise to prevent the defender from
[25:06] Speaker 1: restoring his position before the breach could be exploited. The
[25:11] Speaker 1: answer that the stormtrooper units embodied involved the decentralization of
[25:17] Speaker 1: tactical authority to levels previously unthinkable in a major European army,
[25:25] Speaker 1: the training of small groups of men in specific skills
[25:28] Speaker 1: of close combat, and the abandonment of the pre-war doctrine
[25:33] Speaker 1: of advancing in organized waves in favor of infiltration, the
[25:39] Speaker 1: movement of small units through gaps in the defensive line,
[25:43] Speaker 1: bypassing strong points rather than attacking them, striking for depth
[25:48] Speaker 1: rather than for the complete destruction of the forward position.
[25:53] Speaker 1: The systematic development of the stormtrooper tactics is associated with
[25:58] Speaker 1: several figures, of whom the most important for the doctrinal
[26:03] Speaker 1: development were Captain Willie Roar, who commanded the Storm Battalion Roar,
[26:10] Speaker 1: the first dedicated assault battalion established in the German army,
[26:15] Speaker 1: and General Oskar von Hutier, whose application of infiltration tactics
[26:20] Speaker 1: at the capture of the Russian fortress of Riga in
[26:23] Speaker 1: September 1917 produced a large-scale proof of concept that the
[26:28] Speaker 1: spring offensive of 1918 would apply on the Western Front.
[26:33] Speaker 1: The artillery component of the stormtrooper system, developed primarily by
[26:38] Speaker 1: Colonel Greg Bruckmuller, was as important as the infantry tactic
[26:43] Speaker 1: it supported. Bruckmuller's fire-vaults, as it was called, replaced the
[26:52] Speaker 1: prolonged preparatory bombardments that had characterized Allied offensives with short, intense,
[26:59] Speaker 1: and precisely timed artillery strikes that targeted communication systems, headquarters,
[27:05] Speaker 1: and rear-area logistics. rather than attempting the physical destruction of
[27:10] Speaker 1: the forward position. The goal was to paralyze, rather than destroy,
[27:17] Speaker 1: and to do it fast enough that the attacking infantry
[27:20] Speaker 1: could be moving before the defense had time to respond
[27:23] Speaker 1: or really figure out what was going on. The spring
[27:28] Speaker 1: offense of March 1918, Operation Michael, opened on the 21st
[27:32] Speaker 1: of March, with a bombardment of 6,000 guns across a
[27:38] Speaker 1: front of 40 miles, and an advance that, in his
[27:42] Speaker 1: first three days, broke the British Fifth Army and penetrated
[27:46] Speaker 1: 40 miles into Allied territory, the largest advance by any
[27:51] Speaker 1: formation on the Western Front since the war became static.
[27:56] Speaker 1: The stormtrooper battalions that led the assault move through the
[27:59] Speaker 1: British defensive system at a speed that the British command structure,
[28:03] Speaker 1: which had anticipated the general form of the attack, had
[28:08] Speaker 1: not been able to organize a response to. The stormtroopers
[28:15] Speaker 1: were already behind the forward positions, before orders had even
[28:19] Speaker 1: reached the British reserves to move. So for several days
[28:24] Speaker 1: in late March 1918, the German high command genuinely believed
[28:29] Speaker 1: that the war could be clawed back from the jaws
[28:32] Speaker 1: of defeat. The specific training regime that produced stormtrooper-quality soldiers
[28:40] Speaker 1: in the German army was a departure from the German
[28:43] Speaker 1: military tradition, significant enough to be worth describing before we
[28:47] Speaker 1: move on. Standard German infantry training emphasized the collective discipline
[28:52] Speaker 1: of the unit, the ability of formed bodies of men
[28:56] Speaker 1: to move under fire or under orders from their officers.
[29:00] Speaker 1: But the stormtrooper training substituted this, a program that developed
[29:06] Speaker 1: individual judgment, the ability to navigate and make tactical decisions
[29:12] Speaker 1: without reference to a superior, and proficiency in a wider
[29:16] Speaker 1: range of weapons than the standard infantryman was expected to handle.
[29:22] Speaker 1: You had light machine guns, mortars, flamethrowers, and demolition charges.
[29:28] Speaker 1: They were all part of the stormtrooper arsenal. The smallest
[29:33] Speaker 1: tactical unit of the stormtrooper system was the Gruppe, a
[29:38] Speaker 1: section of approximately eight to ten men, which was expected
[29:42] Speaker 1: to be capable of independent tactical action at distances, and
[29:46] Speaker 1: for periods that would have been inconceivable for a comparable
[29:49] Speaker 1: unit of standard infantry. The implication was a fundamental shift
[29:54] Speaker 1: in where tactical authority resided, not in the battalion commander,
[29:59] Speaker 1: or even the company commander, but in the section leader,
[30:04] Speaker 1: and ultimately in the individual soldier. The ultimate failure of
[30:09] Speaker 1: the spring offensive, sorry to give you the spoiler alerts,
[30:13] Speaker 1: the Germans lost the war, in case you didn't know,
[30:17] Speaker 1: despite its initial tactical brilliance, is the essential limiting effect
[30:22] Speaker 1: of the stormtrooper assessment. Now the infiltration tactics created breakthroughs
[30:27] Speaker 1: that German logistical and operational systems could not exploit. The
[30:33] Speaker 1: stormtrooper units advanced faster than supplies could, faster than their
[30:37] Speaker 1: supporting artillery, and faster than the worn and depleted German
[30:41] Speaker 1: reserves that needed to follow them. The same qualities that
[30:46] Speaker 1: made them effective at penetration, their speed, their independence of
[30:50] Speaker 1: action and forward momentum, made them impossible to support once
[30:54] Speaker 1: they had gone into the enemy trenches. They took ground
[31:01] Speaker 1: and couldn't hold it, exhausted Germany's best remaining infantry in
[31:06] Speaker 1: doing so too, and left the German line in autumn
[31:10] Speaker 1: of 1918 in the hands of formations whose quality, by
[31:14] Speaker 1: the testimony of the German commanders themselves, had catastrophically declined. Well,
[31:23] Speaker 1: moving on from the Germans, let's talk about the French.
[31:26] Speaker 1: The French army of the First World War drew on
[31:29] Speaker 1: the manpower of an empire that extended across North Africa,
[31:32] Speaker 1: sub-Saharan Africa, and Indochina. Basically, Vietnam, if you don't know.
[31:39] Speaker 1: And the units raised from these territories, the Tireliu Senegalese,
[31:44] Speaker 1: the Moroccan Goumiers, and the Algerian Zouiav, the Indochinese battalions,
[31:52] Speaker 1: contributed to the French war effort at a scaled and
[31:57] Speaker 1: human cost that the metropolitan French public has never fully
[32:01] Speaker 1: reckoned with. At the peak of the French colonial military mobilization,
[32:06] Speaker 1: roughly 600,000 men from the French Empire served in the
[32:09] Speaker 1: European theater, and the units in which they served acquired,
[32:13] Speaker 1: collectively and individually, reputations for assault performance that made them
[32:19] Speaker 1: the French Army's preferred instrument for most difficult operations. Now,
[32:25] Speaker 1: the Division Marocaine, the Moroccan Division, was the elite formation
[32:31] Speaker 1: of the French colonial military establishment in Europe, composed of
[32:35] Speaker 1: French Foreign Legion battalions, Moroccan Tireliers, and the Zouave units,
[32:41] Speaker 1: under a command structure that combined French professional officers with
[32:44] Speaker 1: the specific tactical knowledge that the colonial campaigns of the
[32:48] Speaker 1: preceding decades had produced. At the Second Battle of the
[32:52] Speaker 1: Marne in 1914, and throughout the subsequent years of the
[32:56] Speaker 1: Western Front, the Division Marocaine was consistently assigned to the
[33:01] Speaker 1: sectors where the French command expected the hardest fighting or
[33:06] Speaker 1: required the deepest commitment. It was the more decorated unit
[33:13] Speaker 1: than any other division in the French army by the
[33:16] Speaker 1: war's end. The consistently higher rates of assault success recorded
[33:21] Speaker 1: by the colonial formations relative to comparable metropolitan French units
[33:26] Speaker 1: were noted by the French general staff and generated in
[33:30] Speaker 1: the internal debates of the French military establishment an uncomfortable
[33:34] Speaker 1: tension between the tactical value of deploying colonial troops in
[33:38] Speaker 1: the most dangerous roles and the moral implications of systematically
[33:42] Speaker 1: using colonized people as the instrument of a European war
[33:46] Speaker 1: that they had, well, never chosen to be a part of.
[33:52] Speaker 1: Same happened with Australians and New Zealanders, I suppose. New Zealanders,
[33:57] Speaker 1: colonies notwithstanding, you know. Anyway, the Tivoli Senegalais, the recruits
[34:03] Speaker 1: from West Africa, i.e. Senegal, whose designation derived from the
[34:08] Speaker 1: Senegalese origin of the 1st Battalion's race in the 1850s,
[34:13] Speaker 1: but who by 1914 included men from across the French
[34:16] Speaker 1: African Empire, quite extensive, served in the most extreme conditions
[34:21] Speaker 1: the Western Front offered, and were assigned a symbolic weight
[34:25] Speaker 1: by French colonial ideology that further complicated their military history.
[34:32] Speaker 1: General Charles Manzan, who advocated the for the most forceful
[34:38] Speaker 1: use as assault troops, wrote a book in 1910 called
[34:43] Speaker 1: La Force Noire, The Black Force, which argued that African
[34:48] Speaker 1: troops possessed particular physical and psychological qualities that suited them
[34:53] Speaker 1: for aggressive assaults in ways that European troops didn't really
[34:57] Speaker 1: have the stomach for. The argument combined genuine military assessment
[35:03] Speaker 1: of colonial troops' performance in French campaigns with a few
[35:08] Speaker 1: crude assumptions, mainly racial assumptions, and specific that reading Manjean's
[35:17] Speaker 1: prose today requires a, I suppose, an act of contextual discipline. Well,
[35:23] Speaker 1: what is certain is that the Senegalese regiment suffered casualty
[35:28] Speaker 1: rates at least as high as the metropolitan French units
[35:32] Speaker 1: alongside them, and they were treated systematically as expendable assault material,
[35:38] Speaker 1: and received after the war a fraction of the recognition
[35:41] Speaker 1: and the veterans' benefits that the French soldiers were accorded
[35:44] Speaker 1: back on the continent. The tactical performance of the French
[35:49] Speaker 1: colonial formations in the critical battles of 1918, the Second
[35:54] Speaker 1: Battle of the Marne in July, and the Meuse-Argonne offensive,
[35:57] Speaker 1: the final Allied advance, was part of what made the
[36:00] Speaker 1: Allied victory possible. in the form and at the time
[36:04] Speaker 1: it came. These men were among the most experienced soldiers
[36:08] Speaker 1: in the French army by 1918, survivors of four years
[36:12] Speaker 1: of continuous campaigning, in conditions that had destroyed unit after
[36:17] Speaker 1: unit of metropolitan French infantry, and the institutional knowledge of
[36:22] Speaker 1: assault tactics that the surviving men embodied was, quite frankly, irreplaceable.
[36:29] Speaker 1: The thing is, their story is... the hardest one to account. Well,
[36:35] Speaker 1: at least to tell with full honesty. Because it requires
[36:39] Speaker 1: holding simultaneously the genuine military excellence of what they did,
[36:45] Speaker 1: but also the deeply unjust system in which they did it.
[36:51] Speaker 1: In any case, let's move on. On the morning of
[36:57] Speaker 1: the 1st of July, 1916, the first day of the
[37:00] Speaker 1: Battle of the Somme, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment advanced from
[37:04] Speaker 1: its position near Beaumont-Armel into German fire that had not
[37:09] Speaker 1: been suppressed by the week-long preliminary bombardment that was supposed
[37:13] Speaker 1: to have made the advance possible. Supposed to, but, you know.
[37:20] Speaker 1: 801 men went forward. The British units, who were supposed
[37:26] Speaker 1: to advance alongside them, had been stopped by uncut German
[37:30] Speaker 1: wire before they reached their own parapets. The Neufendlers went anyway,
[37:36] Speaker 1: as ordered, through a gap in the British rear wire
[37:39] Speaker 1: that funnelled them towards the German machine-guns that had a
[37:41] Speaker 1: clear line of fire the entire length of their approach.
[37:46] Speaker 1: It took approximately thirty minutes. When a roll-call was done
[37:52] Speaker 1: the next morning, sixty-eight men answered. The precise casualty figure
[37:59] Speaker 1: from that morning varies slightly between sources depending on how
[38:03] Speaker 1: casualty is defined. The regiment suffered 733 casualties out of
[38:07] Speaker 1: 801 who advanced. That's a rate of 91.4% in a
[38:09] Speaker 1: single action of 30 minutes. And of those 733, 272
[38:10] Speaker 1: were killed outright or died of their wounds. 438 were
[38:27] Speaker 1: wounded and 23 were missing. It's difficult to find an
[38:32] Speaker 1: equivalent in modern military history, not simply for the proportion
[38:36] Speaker 1: of men lost, but for the absolute compression of the
[38:40] Speaker 1: loss into such a brief window. The German machine-gun position
[38:46] Speaker 1: that inflicted this were well documented in subsequent analysis. as
[38:51] Speaker 1: having been entirely predictable targets that the artillery preparation had
[38:55] Speaker 1: failed to neutralize. Which makes the decision to proceed with
[38:59] Speaker 1: the advance, in the face of clear evidence that the
[39:02] Speaker 1: flanking units had been stopped, and that the wire remained intact,
[39:07] Speaker 1: one of the more sobering command failures of an offensive
[39:10] Speaker 1: that produced many. Now as for Newfoundland, that was not
[39:16] Speaker 1: a Canadian province in 1914. It was a self-governing dominion
[39:22] Speaker 1: of the British Empire in its own right, and the
[39:25] Speaker 1: regiment it raised was consequently the only regiment from a
[39:29] Speaker 1: dominion as distant from a colony or province to serve
[39:33] Speaker 1: in the First World War as an independent national formation.
[39:38] Speaker 1: The regiment had arrived in France wearing blue puttees, the
[39:43] Speaker 1: khaki-coloured leg wrappings that were standard British army issue had
[39:47] Speaker 1: ran out, you see, and the first men recruited had
[39:50] Speaker 1: been issued blue ones from the local police force. So,
[39:55] Speaker 1: the blue putties became one of the regiment's identifying features,
[40:01] Speaker 1: and one of the more humanizing details in an otherwise
[40:04] Speaker 1: devastating history. After Beaumont-Tamel, the regiment was rebuilt, reinforced with
[40:12] Speaker 1: replacements from Newfoundland, and returned to the line. It fought
[40:17] Speaker 1: at Guedecourt. at Mont Chalipre, and in the final advance
[40:23] Speaker 1: of 1918, accumulating by the war's end a casualty list
[40:29] Speaker 1: that represented a significant portion of every able-bodied man the
[40:33] Speaker 1: island had sent. Now the context of the Newfoundland regiment's
[40:37] Speaker 1: advance within the broader first day of the Somme is
[40:41] Speaker 1: essential to understanding both the specific tragedy and its place
[40:44] Speaker 1: within the larger catastrophe of the first day of July 1916.
[40:49] Speaker 1: The Somme offensive that day produced 57,470 British casualties, the
[40:57] Speaker 1: worst single day in the history of the British Army,
[41:00] Speaker 1: across a front of 25 kilometers. In most sections, the
[41:05] Speaker 1: attacking infantry was destroyed before reaching the German front-line trench,
[41:11] Speaker 1: because the artillery preparation had failed to cut the wire,
[41:15] Speaker 1: destroy the deep German dugouts, or really do anything to
[41:19] Speaker 1: neutralize the machine-gun positions and make any real headway in
[41:24] Speaker 1: damaging the Germans at all. The Newfoundland regiment's experience was
[41:30] Speaker 1: typical of the day's pattern, rather than exceptional within it.
[41:35] Speaker 1: Except in one specific respect. The regiment was required to
[41:39] Speaker 1: advance through a gap in the British wire, rather than
[41:42] Speaker 1: through the forward British trench. Because those trenches were blocked
[41:47] Speaker 1: by the casualties of earlier waves, which is, frankly, horrifying.
[41:53] Speaker 1: This funneled the Newfoundlands into a lane of ground that
[41:55] Speaker 1: the German machine-gunners had already registered. The regiment's officers knew this,
[42:01] Speaker 1: but they advanced anyway because those were the orders, and
[42:03] Speaker 1: there was no mechanism within the operational plan for acknowledging
[42:07] Speaker 1: the situation the plan had assumed no longer existed. That's
[42:11] Speaker 1: just the way it is. Now, In 1918, King George
[42:17] Speaker 1: V granted the regiment the designation Royal, making it the
[42:22] Speaker 1: only regiment of the First World War to receive that
[42:25] Speaker 1: honour for its wartime service, a recognition of what the
[42:28] Speaker 1: regiment had endured and continued to endure after Beaumont-Tamel, rather
[42:35] Speaker 1: than a single operation success. And, not so fun fact,
[42:44] Speaker 1: The battlefield of Beaumont-Tamel is now a Newfoundland and Canadian
[42:48] Speaker 1: National Memorial site, and the ground over which the regiment
[42:53] Speaker 1: advanced on the 1st of July 1916 is preserved exactly
[42:57] Speaker 1: as it was. The shell craters, remains of the wire, everything.
[43:02] Speaker 1: They even have the position of the German machine gun
[43:05] Speaker 1: emplacements visible in the reconstructed landscape. You can go visit,
[43:11] Speaker 1: any time you like. exercise your free will, and perhaps
[43:15] Speaker 1: lay a wreath of flowers as respect. Perhaps you can
[43:20] Speaker 1: stand there and think about the soldiers who had to
[43:24] Speaker 1: go through that. It's possible to even see from the
[43:27] Speaker 1: German positions every step of ground that the regiment crossed.
[43:32] Speaker 1: And the clarity of that is a little bit appalling,
[43:36] Speaker 1: to be honest. War is hell, isn't it? Now, we
[43:44] Speaker 1: talked about Gallipoli before, but let's have a look from
[43:47] Speaker 1: the other side. The defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula by
[43:52] Speaker 1: Ottoman forces has been, in the English language historiography of
[43:56] Speaker 1: the First World War, persistently under-examined relative to the Allied
[44:00] Speaker 1: experience of the same campaign, partly because the sources are
[44:05] Speaker 1: less accessible, partly because the campaign has been framed almost
[44:08] Speaker 1: exclusively through the Anzac experience. But there's another thing. The
[44:14] Speaker 1: Ottoman army's performance at Gallipoli doesn't really fit too comfortably
[44:18] Speaker 1: into the broader narrative of Ottoman military decline, because that's
[44:23] Speaker 1: something that characterizes the rest of the war. The Ottomans
[44:27] Speaker 1: were really on their last legs at this point. Well,
[44:31] Speaker 1: at Gallipoli, the Ottoman defense was not just effective, it
[44:35] Speaker 1: was exemplary, and the 57th Infantry Regiment which bore the
[44:40] Speaker 1: initial weight of the Anzac landing on the 25th of
[44:42] Speaker 1: April 1915, was right at the nucleus of that achievement.
[44:49] Speaker 1: The events of the morning of the 25th of April 1915,
[44:51] Speaker 1: in the sector above Anzac Cove, are inseparable from the
[44:56] Speaker 1: actions of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, the regimental commander who
[45:02] Speaker 1: was later to become Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic.
[45:07] Speaker 1: Quite a résumé. Should do a full video about him. Anyway.
[45:12] Speaker 1: Kamal was conducting a training exercise with his regiment when
[45:15] Speaker 1: he heard the artillery fire that accompanied the Anzac landing
[45:19] Speaker 1: and moved immediately toward the sound. Not even bothering to
[45:23] Speaker 1: wait for any confirmations or orders. He knew what he
[45:26] Speaker 1: was doing. A decision that in the geography of the
[45:31] Speaker 1: Gallipoli Peninsula placed his regiment on the dominant heights above
[45:35] Speaker 1: the landing ground at exactly... the right moment when those
[45:39] Speaker 1: heights were the decisive tactical feature of the entire operation.
[45:44] Speaker 1: His order to his men, when he found them beginning
[45:47] Speaker 1: to withdraw under pressure from the advancing Anzacs, has become
[45:52] Speaker 1: the most famous words of the Gallipoli campaign. Quote, I
[45:58] Speaker 1: am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you
[46:03] Speaker 1: to die in the time which passes until we die
[46:07] Speaker 1: other troops and commanders can come forward and take our places.
[46:13] Speaker 1: Certainly knows how to motivate them, doesn't he? Now it
[46:16] Speaker 1: is worth noting that this order was an operational calculation,
[46:21] Speaker 1: as much as a rhetorical one. Kamal understood that holding
[46:26] Speaker 1: the heights for the hours needed to bring the reinforcements
[46:29] Speaker 1: forward was the essential requirement, and the cost of holding
[46:34] Speaker 1: them was simply unavoidable. The 57th Regiment held. By the
[46:40] Speaker 1: time the crisis of the first day had passed, and
[46:43] Speaker 1: Ottoman reinforcements had consolidated the positions above the landing ground,
[46:47] Speaker 1: the 57th Infantry had effectively ceased to exist as a unit.
[46:53] Speaker 1: It had been destroyed in the process of accomplishing what
[46:55] Speaker 1: Kamal had required of it. A sacrifice, basically. The regiment
[47:01] Speaker 1: was reconstituted, but never returned to the same strength. And
[47:05] Speaker 1: in the Ottoman military tradition, the unit is commemorated as
[47:08] Speaker 1: having been martyred in the defense of the peninsula, a
[47:12] Speaker 1: designation that reflects the specific cultural weight of the Gallipoli defense.
[47:18] Speaker 1: And of course, you know, it has different connotations in
[47:21] Speaker 1: the Islamic tradition. The peninsula's name, Chanakale, as they call it,
[47:28] Speaker 1: became synonymous in Turkish identity with a resistance against overwhelming force,
[47:33] Speaker 1: that succeeded at catastrophic cost. And the date of the
[47:37] Speaker 1: 25th of April is observed in Turkey as the Kanakale
[47:42] Speaker 1: Martyrs' Day, a national day of commemoration whose emotional weight
[47:46] Speaker 1: is comparable to the Anzac Day observed at the same
[47:49] Speaker 1: date in Australia and New Zealand. Now the specific conditions
[47:56] Speaker 1: under which the 57th Regiment fought on the 25th of
[48:00] Speaker 1: April deserves a bit more precision. because the accounts that
[48:05] Speaker 1: have entered the popular history of Gallipoli tend to compress
[48:07] Speaker 1: the specific sequence of events in ways that obscure what
[48:11] Speaker 1: the regiment actually accomplished. The Anzac landing came ashore at
[48:17] Speaker 1: a point approximately one mile north from the intended landing zone,
[48:21] Speaker 1: a navigational error that placed the Australians at the base
[48:27] Speaker 1: of terrain considerably more difficult than what they had been
[48:30] Speaker 1: briefed to expect. So basically, it was all going wrong
[48:35] Speaker 1: from the start. The heights above the beach, the Saribere,
[48:40] Speaker 1: and its subsidiary ridges, were the dominating ground of the
[48:45] Speaker 1: entire northern Gallipoli sector, and their possession was the essential
[48:50] Speaker 1: precondition for any subsequent Allied advance. Kamal's regiment was the
[48:54] Speaker 1: only Ottoman force in a position to contest them, and
[48:58] Speaker 1: the 45 minutes between Kamal's decision to move to the
[49:01] Speaker 1: heights and the arrival of his regiment at their crest,
[49:05] Speaker 1: was the margin by which the Allies failed to take
[49:08] Speaker 1: the commanding ground on that first day. Just 45 minutes.
[49:14] Speaker 1: I mean, talk about timing, right? Had Kamal delayed? or
[49:21] Speaker 1: waited for orders, or moved to any other position that
[49:24] Speaker 1: might have seemed equally reasonable at the moment of decision,
[49:28] Speaker 1: the history of the Gallipoli campaign might have been different
[49:30] Speaker 1: enough to change the entire war. Now, the broader Ottoman
[49:35] Speaker 1: military performance at Gallipoli across the eight months of the campaign...
[49:39] Speaker 1: is something else we should talk about, and it's a
[49:42] Speaker 1: little beyond the specific actions of the 57th Regiment. The
[49:46] Speaker 1: Ottoman forces defending the peninsula were frequently short of ammunition, food,
[49:51] Speaker 1: and medical supplies. They operated in a command structure that
[49:55] Speaker 1: was partially under German direction, with German officers integrated at
[50:00] Speaker 1: various levels of the Ottoman military hierarchy, in ways that
[50:04] Speaker 1: created both friction and capability. And they were fighting against
[50:08] Speaker 1: opponents who, whatever the failures of the Allied command at
[50:12] Speaker 1: the strategic and operational level, included individuals of extremely high quality.
[50:19] Speaker 1: That they not only held but comprehensively defeated an Allied
[50:23] Speaker 1: force that included the Anzac Corps, regular British divisions and
[50:27] Speaker 1: French colonial formations, says quite a lot about the defensive
[50:33] Speaker 1: performance of the Ottoman army in this particular theatre. a
[50:36] Speaker 1: performance that the subsequent collapse of the Ottoman war effort
[50:39] Speaker 1: in Mesopotamia and Palestine should not be allowed to entirely obscure.
[50:48] Speaker 1: Next up we have the Alpenkor, the German Alpine Corps,
[50:54] Speaker 1: raised in the summer of 1915 specifically for the mountain
[50:57] Speaker 1: warfare that the entry of Italy into the war and
[51:00] Speaker 1: the ongoing campaigns in the Carpathians and Balkans demanded. And
[51:04] Speaker 1: it became across the following three years, the most well-traveled
[51:08] Speaker 1: and arguably most tactically versatile formation in the German order
[51:12] Speaker 1: of battle serving on the Italian, Romanian and Macedonian front.
[51:19] Speaker 1: And in the final battles of the Western front in 1918,
[51:23] Speaker 1: its formations drew on the Bavarian mountain troops who had
[51:27] Speaker 1: the relevant experience of high altitude warfare supplemented by specialist units.
[51:33] Speaker 1: in the specific skills of movement in steep terrain, i.e.
[51:37] Speaker 1: rope work, ski warfare, and stuff like that. Well, the
[51:41] Speaker 1: specific qualities that defined the Alpine Corps as an elite
[51:44] Speaker 1: formation were not merely physical, though the physical demands of
[51:49] Speaker 1: mountain warfare were certainly something not to be balked at.
[51:54] Speaker 1: They were severe enough to constitute a genuine selection pressure
[51:59] Speaker 1: on the men who served in it. The tactical qualities
[52:03] Speaker 1: that mountain warfare required, they were precisely the qualities that
[52:07] Speaker 1: the Alpine Corps training system was designed to develop, and
[52:11] Speaker 1: that distinguished its combat performance from that of a standard
[52:14] Speaker 1: infantry formation in the same theatre. The Alpine Corps' most
[52:19] Speaker 1: famous individual action was its participation in the Battle of Caporetto,
[52:25] Speaker 1: October 1917, the breaking, the breakthrough rather. the Italian front
[52:32] Speaker 1: that produced the largest single military disaster of the war
[52:34] Speaker 1: in the Italian theatre. Within the Alpine Corps' performance at Caporetto,
[52:40] Speaker 1: the individual achievement of Lieutenant Erwin Rommel, that's right, then
[52:45] Speaker 1: attached to the Corps' Württemberg Mountain Battalion, in capturing 9,000
[52:51] Speaker 1: prisoners with fewer than 200 men in 52 hours, is
[52:56] Speaker 1: well documented and has been discussed elsewhere. in the different
[53:01] Speaker 1: videos that are coming up soon, once we get to
[53:04] Speaker 1: our World War II stuff, okay? Now, less often noted
[53:10] Speaker 1: is the broader Alpine Corps achievement of which Rommel's action
[53:13] Speaker 1: was a part. The Corps penetrated the Italian defensive system
[53:18] Speaker 1: to a depth of over 20 kilometers in less than
[53:21] Speaker 1: two days. Crossing terrain that the Italian command had assessed
[53:25] Speaker 1: as incapable of supporting a major offensive movement, And its
[53:30] Speaker 1: advance was the decisive stroke that converted what might have
[53:34] Speaker 1: been a local tactical success into the operational catastrophe that
[53:39] Speaker 1: forced the Italian army to retreat more than a hundred
[53:42] Speaker 1: kilometers and required the transfer of British and French divisions
[53:46] Speaker 1: from the Western front to prevent a complete Italian collapse.
[53:51] Speaker 1: Certainly a bad day for Italy. Then there was the
[53:55] Speaker 1: Romanian campaign of 1916. in which the Alpine Corps played
[53:59] Speaker 1: a central role in the German-led advance that overran much
[54:03] Speaker 1: of Romania within months of the Romanian entry into the war,
[54:07] Speaker 1: and the Macedonian campaigns of 16 and 17 demonstrated the
[54:11] Speaker 1: Corps' ability to operate effectively in geographically and climatically demanding environments.
[54:19] Speaker 1: The transfer of the Alpine Corps to the Western Front
[54:22] Speaker 1: in the spring of 1918 for participation in the stormtrooper
[54:26] Speaker 1: offensives brought its specific combination of skills into the context
[54:31] Speaker 1: for which the Spring Offensive's tactical doctrine had been designed,
[54:35] Speaker 1: and the open-cause units that led the assault on the
[54:38] Speaker 1: Western Front performed with the consistency that their previous three
[54:42] Speaker 1: years of varied campaigning had established as the standard. Well,
[54:48] Speaker 1: last up we've got the Austro-Hungarian Kaiser Jäger. The Austro-Hungarian
[54:56] Speaker 1: army of the First World War was one of the
[54:58] Speaker 1: most internally contradictory military institutions, an institution nominally unified under
[55:04] Speaker 1: the Habsburgs, but composed of men from eleven major national groups,
[55:10] Speaker 1: yet the Germans, Czechs, Poles, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Romanians, Italians, Hungarians, Slovaks,
[55:18] Speaker 1: and a few others, who shared neither language nor in
[55:21] Speaker 1: many cases a sense of any common identity with one
[55:25] Speaker 1: another or the empire they were fighting for. That this
[55:29] Speaker 1: institution managed to produce and sustain elite formations whose cohesion
[55:33] Speaker 1: and performance met the standard of the German army alongside
[55:36] Speaker 1: they were increasingly operating with is a fact that deserves
[55:40] Speaker 1: quite a bit of recognition. And the Kaiserjäger, the imperial riflemen,
[55:46] Speaker 1: are the unit whose record most clearly demonstrates that. The
[55:53] Speaker 1: Kaiserjäger were Tyrolean mountain troops, raised from the German-speaking Alpine
[56:00] Speaker 1: districts of the Habsburg Empire, and trained specifically for the
[56:04] Speaker 1: terrain that constituted the Italian front. The Dolomites, the Karnic Alps,
[56:10] Speaker 1: the Isonzo Valley, where Austro-Hungarian and Italian forces fought twelve
[56:15] Speaker 1: major battles between June 1915 and September 1917, in a
[56:21] Speaker 1: campaign of attritional violence, whose geographical setting was as dramatic
[56:26] Speaker 1: as anything the war produced. The twelve battles of the
[56:30] Speaker 1: Isonzo consumed roughly 300,000 Austrian and 300,000 Italian dead across
[56:37] Speaker 1: two and a half years, and the Kaiserjäger units that
[56:40] Speaker 1: held the Austrian defensive positions in the mountain sectors did
[56:44] Speaker 1: so in conditions of altitude, cold, and rock-face combat. that
[56:49] Speaker 1: added the specific dangers of avalanche, frostbite, and exposure to
[56:52] Speaker 1: the standard dangers of artillery and infantry assault. Not a
[56:57] Speaker 1: nice place to be, is what I'm trying to say.
[57:00] Speaker 1: There are sections of the Dolomite Front, where the opposing
[57:04] Speaker 1: positions were separated by a few dozen meters of vertical
[57:08] Speaker 1: rock face, positions where soldiers used ropes and climbing equipment
[57:12] Speaker 1: to reach their posts, where artillery shells had to be
[57:16] Speaker 1: winched up the mountains on cable systems, and where the
[57:20] Speaker 1: dead of both armies remained embedded in the glaciers for
[57:24] Speaker 1: decades after the fighting ended. Now the cohesion of the Kaiserjäger,
[57:30] Speaker 1: in the face of structural contradictions of the empire they served,
[57:34] Speaker 1: was maintained primarily by the regimental identity themselves, by the
[57:41] Speaker 1: specific Tyrolean identity, the mountaineer culture, and the unit traditions
[57:46] Speaker 1: that the Kaiserjäger regiment carried as a formation distinct from
[57:50] Speaker 1: the Austro-Hungarian mass. Where other Habsburg formations showed the strains
[57:56] Speaker 1: of internal national conflict, the documented cases of Czech or
[58:01] Speaker 1: Croatian units showing reluctance to fight under certain circumstance, or
[58:06] Speaker 1: of men surrendering to the Russians in numbers that reflected
[58:09] Speaker 1: political disillusionment with the Habsburg cause, the Kaiserjäger maintained a
[58:14] Speaker 1: consistency of performance that reflected the specific coherence of a
[58:19] Speaker 1: unit drawn from a single regional identity and trained for
[58:22] Speaker 1: the specific environment in which it had to fight. The
[58:26] Speaker 1: end of the Kaiser Jäger story is the end of
[58:29] Speaker 1: the empire that created them. No empire, no Kaiser Jäger.
[58:34] Speaker 1: The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October and November
[58:38] Speaker 1: of 1918 left the surviving Kaiser Jäger in the position
[58:42] Speaker 1: of soldiers whose state had ceased to exist before the
[58:47] Speaker 1: war had even formally ended. So they just returned to
[58:53] Speaker 1: a Tyrol that was partially absorbed into the new Republic
[58:58] Speaker 1: of Austria, and partially, the South Tyrol, ceded to Italy
[59:02] Speaker 1: under the post-war settlement. A division had placed a portion
[59:05] Speaker 1: of the population from which the Kaiserjäger had been recruited
[59:09] Speaker 1: under Italian sovereignty. The regiment's history ends not with defeat
[59:14] Speaker 1: but with disillusion. The disillusion of the world that had
[59:19] Speaker 1: produced it into the new map of a new Europe
[59:22] Speaker 1: that the war had rebuilt from the foundations in ways
[59:25] Speaker 1: that no one who had fought it had intended. And
[59:29] Speaker 1: few of them would have chosen anyway. And of course,
[59:32] Speaker 1: that's what caused the entire Second World War, but hey,
[59:36] Speaker 1: that's a story for another time. Anyway, thank you very
[59:41] Speaker 1: much for listening. A good hour-long video for you, huh?
[59:48] Speaker 1: I'd like to thank those supporting, keeping us ad and
[59:50] Speaker 1: sponsor free. Thank you very much. If you're interested in that,
[59:54] Speaker 1: links in description, pinned comment, you know where to go.
[59:58] Speaker 1: That is it from me today. So I wish you
[1:00:03] Speaker 1: good night, farewell, and I will see you next time.

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