# Challenge to the FTC's Independence

An episode of [Bloomberg Law](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/277975394), 8 Aug 2025, 23 min.

Audio: https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/7c892d84-801f-4c0b-b0e9-ae2b0012ff5f/8a18e6c7-8457-4321-8f0c-b333018041c0/audio.mp3?utm_source=Podcast&in_playlist=91224201-26a6-429d-ac3c-ae2b0012ff6d

William Kovacic, former FTC Chairman and a Professor at the George Mason University School of Law, discusses the implications of President Trump’s attack on the independence of the Federal Trade Commission. June Grasso hosts. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

## Transcript

[0:02] Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Grossel from Bloomberg Radio.
[0:08] Speaker 2: The Trump administration has been mounting an unprecedented campaign to
[0:13] Speaker 2: reign in independent agencies and increase executive authority. To that end,
[0:19] Speaker 2: President Trump has fired more than a dozen leaders of
[0:22] Speaker 2: independent agencies without cause. What stands out in the long
[0:26] Speaker 2: list is Trump firing the two Democratic members of the
[0:30] Speaker 2: Federal Trade Commission. Rebecca Kelly. Slaughter is fighting her dismissal
[0:35] Speaker 2: in court, arguing that it was illegal.
[0:38] Speaker 3: Only one time in history has a president attempted to
[0:41] Speaker 3: remove an FTC commissioner over a policy disagreement. It was
[0:46] Speaker 3: ninety years ago President Roosevelt tried to remove Commissioner Humphrey,
[0:50] Speaker 3: and in the face of the clear language of the statute,
[0:53] Speaker 3: the Supreme Court said that was illegal, that the statute
[0:57] Speaker 3: is constitutional, and that FTC commissioner and other commissioners of
[1:01] Speaker 3: multi member bipartisan agencies cannot be simply removed because the
[1:06] Speaker 3: president doesn't agree with them.
[1:07] Speaker 2: But the Justice Department has said it's going to ask
[1:10] Speaker 2: the Supreme Court to reverse that ninety year old president
[1:14] Speaker 2: called Humphrey's executor. Legal experts say they'll be broad ramifications
[1:19] Speaker 2: if the President can fire FTC commissioners at will, and
[1:24] Speaker 2: the agency is no longer independent. My guest is William Kavasik,
[1:28] Speaker 2: former FDC chair and a professor at the George Mason
[1:32] Speaker 2: University School of Law. Bill tell us about the president
[1:36] Speaker 2: firing Slaughter.
[1:37] Speaker 1: Yeah, the President decided that he has the authority to
[1:41] Speaker 1: simply fire members of the FTC without any cause, and
[1:46] Speaker 1: this contradicts a nineteen thirty five Supreme Court decision called
[1:50] Speaker 1: Humphrey's Executor that said that FTC commissioners can be removed
[1:55] Speaker 1: only for good cause. The President clearly wanted to remove
[1:58] Speaker 1: the two Democrats from the FTC, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and
[2:02] Speaker 1: Alvaro Beadoya, and he simply dismissed them. So he decided
[2:07] Speaker 1: not just for the FTC, but I think as part
[2:09] Speaker 1: of a program for government generally, decided to assert executive
[2:13] Speaker 1: authority to control more directly who can serve on these
[2:16] Speaker 1: regulatory agencies.
[2:18] Speaker 2: Slaughter won her first battle in court. A federal judge
[2:21] Speaker 2: reinstated her last month, although that reinstatement has been put
[2:26] Speaker 2: on hold pending an appeals court decision. Explain the judge's
[2:30] Speaker 2: reasons for reinstating her.
[2:32] Speaker 1: Now. She concluded that the president's authority is defined by
[2:36] Speaker 1: the nineteen thirty five Supreme Court decision, and the nineteen
[2:40] Speaker 1: thirty five Supreme Court decision said that the president can
[2:43] Speaker 1: remove Federal Trade Commissioners only for good cost, that the
[2:47] Speaker 1: limitation on removal was established in the FTC Statute adopted
[2:52] Speaker 1: in nineteen fourteen, and that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
[2:57] Speaker 1: that statute limited the circumstances in which the present and
[3:00] Speaker 1: it could remove FPC commissioners. Judge Ali Khan and the
[3:04] Speaker 1: District Court opinion concluded that those authorities are controlling, that
[3:09] Speaker 1: the statute itself makes clear the conditions enrich removal can
[3:13] Speaker 1: take place, and the Supreme Court upheld the limitation on
[3:17] Speaker 1: executive power, and she said the President contradicted that approach,
[3:22] Speaker 1: and until the Supreme Court says otherwise about it's nineteen
[3:26] Speaker 1: thirty five decision, that decision is binding on me and commissioners,
[3:31] Speaker 1: Slaughter is entitled to be reinstated.
[3:33] Speaker 2: It seems like Humphrey's executor is in jeopardy at the
[3:37] Speaker 2: Supreme Court. In July, the Court allowed the Trump administration
[3:40] Speaker 2: to remove three democratic members of the Consumer Product's Safety
[3:45] Speaker 2: Commission that were fired by Trump and then reinstated by
[3:48] Speaker 2: a federal judge. And it may the Court rule that
[3:51] Speaker 2: the democratic members of the NLRB and Merit Systems Protection
[3:55] Speaker 2: Board couldn't return to their jobs because the government was
[3:59] Speaker 2: likely to be able to show that the agency's exercised
[4:03] Speaker 2: considerable independent power. So does it seem like the Supreme
[4:07] Speaker 2: Court is ready to overturn Humphrey's Executor.
[4:11] Speaker 1: As you say, June, The Court's given a number of
[4:13] Speaker 1: hints that it is ready to revisit Humphrey's executor and
[4:17] Speaker 1: to overturn it. The Court has cautioned that every burn
[4:21] Speaker 1: in the road that we're not making a final decision
[4:23] Speaker 1: on the merit, that that fuller evaluation of the merit
[4:27] Speaker 1: of Humphrey and its vitality today remains to take place.
[4:31] Speaker 1: So they've said we're not deciding now, but the way
[4:34] Speaker 1: in which they've written the decisions that you referred to,
[4:37] Speaker 1: even these preliminary rulings where they're not offering a final
[4:41] Speaker 1: view about the legitimacy of the challenges at issue, have
[4:44] Speaker 1: given hints that at least three members of the Court
[4:47] Speaker 1: think that Humphreys must be overturned, maybe two more members
[4:51] Speaker 1: of the Court are wavering in their support of Humphreys.
[4:55] Speaker 1: I suppose if you were making a wager now about
[4:58] Speaker 1: whether Humphrey's will live through the end of twenty twenty six,
[5:02] Speaker 1: I suppose the way to bet would be to say no,
[5:05] Speaker 1: that it won't. I don't think the possibilities for Humphrey's
[5:08] Speaker 1: executors to survive have been extinguished. There's still possibilities that
[5:12] Speaker 1: the Court might reflect on the basis for the creation
[5:15] Speaker 1: of the limit on removal, might think more completely about
[5:19] Speaker 1: existing controls that the President already has over administrative agency discretion,
[5:24] Speaker 1: to realize that the choice here is not between having
[5:27] Speaker 1: no control and absolute control over appointments and removal. The
[5:31] Speaker 1: president already has a number of tools at the president's
[5:34] Speaker 1: disposal to influence the way in which the Federal Trade
[5:37] Speaker 1: Commission and similar agencies operate. The real issue here is
[5:41] Speaker 1: whether that control must be absolute, and the Court might
[5:44] Speaker 1: reflect on that in a more elaborate way and come
[5:46] Speaker 1: to a different conclusion. But that's a long way of
[5:48] Speaker 1: saying that Humphrey's Executor appears to be in peril, and
[5:53] Speaker 1: that when the Court does come at some point, perhaps
[5:56] Speaker 1: in twenty twenty six, to confront the continuing vitalent of
[6:00] Speaker 1: Hunfrees executive, it will probably say that we've decided to
[6:04] Speaker 1: change our minds.
[6:05] Speaker 2: Bill. Is the FDC right now a fully independent agency?
[6:10] Speaker 1: When you look at the design, organization and operation of
[6:14] Speaker 1: the agency, I think we discover that the English word
[6:18] Speaker 1: independence is badly ill suited to describe the Commission's place
[6:22] Speaker 1: in the political landscape. You know, first, the President gets
[6:25] Speaker 1: to designate the chair from among existing members of the Commission,
[6:30] Speaker 1: and that only takes signing a letter that says you're
[6:32] Speaker 1: the chair. That comes with a lot of power, because
[6:35] Speaker 1: since nineteen forty nine nineteen fifty, the chair of the
[6:39] Speaker 1: so called independent agencies has been the chief operating officer
[6:44] Speaker 1: and the chief executive of these agencies and exercises extraordinary
[6:49] Speaker 1: authority as part of that reshuffling of government power that
[6:53] Speaker 1: took place in the Government Reorganization Act of nineteen forty
[6:57] Speaker 1: nine and a reorganization plan that put in place for
[7:00] Speaker 1: the FTC in nineteen fifty. So that already gives the
[7:03] Speaker 1: president a lot of power. Of course, the White House
[7:06] Speaker 1: submits the budget on behalf of the United States to
[7:09] Speaker 1: the Congress. The FDC does not do that. Directly, so
[7:12] Speaker 1: the FTC's budget requests have to be filtered through the
[7:15] Speaker 1: white The White House controls whether FTC officials can go overseas.
[7:20] Speaker 1: The Executive Branch gives permission to FDC officials to travel
[7:25] Speaker 1: abroad for government purposes, So if they don't want the
[7:30] Speaker 1: FTC roaming the global landscape speaking on its own, they
[7:34] Speaker 1: can stop that right away. The Department of Justice intervenes
[7:37] Speaker 1: in a number of instances in the cases of the
[7:41] Speaker 1: FTC to oppose the FTC. This is a short list
[7:44] Speaker 1: of ways in which the FTC is not independent, and
[7:48] Speaker 1: in a broader sense, when we look at Congress, the Congress,
[7:51] Speaker 1: of course controls the FTC's budget, and every year the
[7:54] Speaker 1: FTC has to go ask for money, I would say
[7:57] Speaker 1: that an agency that every year has to ask Congress
[8:00] Speaker 1: for an allowance is not very independent, no more independent
[8:04] Speaker 1: than a college student is going to their parents at
[8:06] Speaker 1: the beginning every school year and saying, top up my allowance.
[8:10] Speaker 1: That independence is severely constrained, and maybe a better way
[8:13] Speaker 1: to describe the FTC's relationship to the political process is
[8:17] Speaker 1: semi autonomous with respect to some functions like adjudication, But
[8:22] Speaker 1: independence is a badly inaccurate way to describe its place
[8:26] Speaker 1: in the political ecology.
[8:28] Speaker 2: Let's talk about what would happen the changes if the
[8:32] Speaker 2: FDC loses the independence it now has. It's been said
[8:36] Speaker 2: that one casualty would be the in house adjudication system.
[8:41] Speaker 1: I think that's right too, and I think the administrative
[8:43] Speaker 1: in house adjudication system ultimately topples. For this reason, I
[8:48] Speaker 1: think crucial to the legitimacy of any judicial dispute resolution
[8:52] Speaker 1: tribunal is some degree of autonomy. This is where the
[8:56] Speaker 1: autonomy is most important for legitimacy. Once times a parent
[9:00] Speaker 1: that the president can simply fire Federal Trade commissioners because
[9:04] Speaker 1: he doesn't like their work, doesn't like their philosophy, I
[9:08] Speaker 1: think that system unravels. You can't have courts where the
[9:11] Speaker 1: judges are aware that a decision or a specific approach
[9:16] Speaker 1: taken in a given case could cause their dismissal, and
[9:19] Speaker 1: the FTC commissioners serve as adjudicators when the FTC uses
[9:24] Speaker 1: that internal mechanism. So, I think a domino that falls
[9:29] Speaker 1: if Humphrey's executor is overturned is the perceived legitimacy and
[9:33] Speaker 1: functioning of the administrative adjudication system That disappears.
[9:38] Speaker 2: And even now we're seeing motions to dismiss FTC cases,
[9:43] Speaker 2: eleging that the FTC structure is unconstitutional because of this
[9:49] Speaker 2: weight over Humphreys, I.
[9:51] Speaker 1: Think the deeper threat to the FTC's effectiveness is that
[9:55] Speaker 1: when it goes to court, it has always had the
[9:58] Speaker 1: capacity to tell the court the positions we are taking
[10:01] Speaker 1: are the result of our best professional judgment, and as
[10:04] Speaker 1: an expert body, we are asking for respect for our
[10:08] Speaker 1: judgments because they're based on our accumulated experience, our research
[10:13] Speaker 1: in the field of competition and consumer protection, and the
[10:16] Speaker 1: expertise that individual members of the Commission bring to the
[10:20] Speaker 1: analysis of specific cases. When you put all of those together,
[10:24] Speaker 1: you have a key element of professional judgment that might
[10:28] Speaker 1: not be always correct, but it deserves respect because it
[10:33] Speaker 1: is more likely to be correct than the judgment of
[10:37] Speaker 1: individual federal judges, the parties, and the cases. That is
[10:41] Speaker 1: that that judgment is worthy of respect. It doesn't mean
[10:43] Speaker 1: that the FDC is always going to prevail in court.
[10:46] Speaker 1: The moment that courts perceive that you are using your
[10:50] Speaker 1: authority not because of your best professional judgment, but because
[10:55] Speaker 1: you are simply an extension of the political process and
[10:59] Speaker 1: you are serving the specific interests or whims and the
[11:03] Speaker 1: chief executive, that element of professional judgment and respect disappear.
[11:07] Speaker 1: They're gone. So I think a consequence ipumphrase dies is
[11:11] Speaker 1: that the Commission loses the ability to scand before the
[11:14] Speaker 1: courts and say you can trust us. And in so
[11:17] Speaker 1: many ways, that's what government agencies ask court is trust
[11:22] Speaker 1: us because we are the professionals. We're using professional judgment,
[11:26] Speaker 1: and that's why you can have confidence in the judgments
[11:29] Speaker 1: we're making. You take protection against removal except for a
[11:34] Speaker 1: good cause away the basis for asserting that respect disappears,
[11:40] Speaker 1: and I think it means that, simply stated, you have
[11:43] Speaker 1: a harder time winning your cases when you go to court.
[11:45] Speaker 2: Coming up next on the Bloomberg Lan Show, I'll continue
[11:48] Speaker 2: this conversation with former FTC chair Bill Kvasik. We'll talk
[11:52] Speaker 2: about a bill to consolidate anti trust authority solely in
[11:56] Speaker 2: the Justice Department. You're listening to Bloomberg. I'm talking to
[12:00] Speaker 2: former FTC chair William Kavasik about the Trump administration's campaign
[12:06] Speaker 2: to reign in independent agencies and increase executive power.
[12:11] Speaker 4: Bill. Is there any argument that you see for a
[12:16] Speaker 4: president having the ability to fire commissioners at will.
[12:20] Speaker 1: I guess the best argument would be this. I mean,
[12:22] Speaker 1: suppose you're an incoming president and the existing configuration of
[12:28] Speaker 1: the commission means that there is nobody from your political
[12:31] Speaker 1: party on the board. Imagine a commission of five and
[12:34] Speaker 1: you have two vacancies, and the vacancies ordinarily would be
[12:38] Speaker 1: your party, but nobody's been confirmed. In that insense, you
[12:42] Speaker 1: can make an argument that the president ought to be
[12:44] Speaker 1: able to put the president's preferred person on the board,
[12:48] Speaker 1: although even there they have to go through Senate confirmation.
[12:51] Speaker 1: They'd have to go through Senate confirmation. And if you
[12:53] Speaker 1: have a vacancy, you can you can appoint somebody to
[12:55] Speaker 1: fill that spot. I guess the other argument one could
[12:58] Speaker 1: make is that in d need, these agencies exercise significant discretion.
[13:03] Speaker 1: They have considerable powers. The FPC has a broad mandate
[13:08] Speaker 1: with a number of policymaking tools to implement it, and
[13:12] Speaker 1: those are significant economically important. And if I'm the president,
[13:16] Speaker 1: I'm saying I have to have the ability to determine
[13:20] Speaker 1: how this large machine of government functions and where it's going. Now, again,
[13:24] Speaker 1: as I've said before, I think the president already has
[13:27] Speaker 1: a lot of tools to influence that and what you
[13:30] Speaker 1: have in the status quo embodied in cases like Humphreys
[13:33] Speaker 1: is basically a bargain between the legislature and the President
[13:37] Speaker 1: over how oversight functions will be allocated. Some of those
[13:41] Speaker 1: functions reside in the White House today already, such as
[13:44] Speaker 1: the ability to designate the scare among members of the Commission.
[13:47] Speaker 1: Others such as congressional oversight control of the budget, reside
[13:51] Speaker 1: in the Congress. One way to put it is that
[13:53] Speaker 1: it is shared oversight and accountability that engages the Congress,
[13:57] Speaker 1: the President, and indeed the Federal Court. So my view,
[14:01] Speaker 1: and this is very much based on my experience that
[14:03] Speaker 1: the FTC is a member of the Commission for a
[14:06] Speaker 1: year is chair that I was always aware of the
[14:09] Speaker 1: capacity of the White House to shape what we were
[14:11] Speaker 1: doing in key respects. That is, from the place that
[14:14] Speaker 1: we occupied on Pennsylvania Avenue. I was always aware of
[14:18] Speaker 1: both ends of the avenue, that both of them had
[14:21] Speaker 1: a lot to do to shape the environment in which
[14:23] Speaker 1: we worked in. And when I looked out the window
[14:26] Speaker 1: at the front of the building, they're also sat the
[14:29] Speaker 1: Federal Courthouse for the District of Columbia. So I always
[14:34] Speaker 1: knew that we were working in an environment when all
[14:36] Speaker 1: three could hold us to account, and I was aware
[14:39] Speaker 1: of the history that showed that they certainly would.
[14:42] Speaker 2: Slaughter has said there are two lines of pushback, one legal,
[14:45] Speaker 2: the other political. Quote.
[14:47] Speaker 4: The legal fight we're having in the court, but the
[14:49] Speaker 4: political fight is in the court of public opinion. Do
[14:53] Speaker 4: you think that the public is aware of what's happening
[14:56] Speaker 4: with these agencies?
[14:58] Speaker 1: For the broader public, I have re doubts. I suspect
[15:02] Speaker 1: that there are many in the public, for a variety
[15:04] Speaker 1: of reasons, who are aware that there's something called the
[15:07] Speaker 1: Federal Trade Commission. But if you gave the ordinary American
[15:11] Speaker 1: citizen a short quiz, true false questions or multiple choice questions,
[15:17] Speaker 1: I don't know how many would answer it in a
[15:20] Speaker 1: way that reflected a real understanding of how these agencies
[15:23] Speaker 1: function and what they do. So, if we're talking about
[15:25] Speaker 1: the US public writ large, I doubt there's a keen
[15:30] Speaker 1: awareness of the governance mechanism of the FPC and what
[15:34] Speaker 1: removal of commissioners does to that framework. The larger public
[15:38] Speaker 1: might be aware of efforts by the President to consolidate
[15:44] Speaker 1: power in the White House. They've probably noticed in this
[15:47] Speaker 1: barely six months of the second Trump presidency, that the
[15:51] Speaker 1: President is doing a number of things to exercise power,
[15:54] Speaker 1: imposing tariffs, for example, setting in motion dramatic reductions in
[15:58] Speaker 1: force for individual real agencies. And maybe they're aware of
[16:03] Speaker 1: the dismissals of heads of different institutions at a high level.
[16:07] Speaker 1: They may be aware that the presidents seeking to exert
[16:10] Speaker 1: more control over how the government operates. So that awareness
[16:14] Speaker 1: I suspect exists, and certainly to the extent of the
[16:17] Speaker 1: public she is speaking about, includes the Congress of the
[16:20] Speaker 1: United States. I assume that more keenly than the ordinary citizen,
[16:24] Speaker 1: they are very aware of the reallocation of power that's
[16:28] Speaker 1: taking place in Washington and ought to be concerned about,
[16:32] Speaker 1: especially because in the case of the FTC, when Congress
[16:35] Speaker 1: created the FTC in nineteen fourteen, their unmistakable view is
[16:40] Speaker 1: that the FTC would be accountable through the Congress. First
[16:42] Speaker 1: and foremost. Here are debate in the Senate, for example,
[16:46] Speaker 1: where members of the Senate asked, as part of the
[16:48] Speaker 1: colloquy that takes place in the legislative debates, aren't we
[16:52] Speaker 1: giving a lot of fairly open ended power to the
[16:54] Speaker 1: federal Trade Commission, shouldn't we specify more carefully what the
[16:58] Speaker 1: relevant offenses might be? And the defenders of the FTC
[17:02] Speaker 1: Act has ultimately adopted said, you need a flexible, adaptable mandate.
[17:06] Speaker 1: That's why we're putting it that way. And if the
[17:08] Speaker 1: STC ever misused that mandate, we, the Congress that created it,
[17:12] Speaker 1: could abolish it. In the words of one senator, we
[17:16] Speaker 1: created it, we could destroy it. So there was no
[17:20] Speaker 1: doubt in the minds of Congress that this institution, with
[17:23] Speaker 1: its considerable authority, will answer first and foremost to us.
[17:27] Speaker 1: So the Congress ought to be keenly aware of the
[17:31] Speaker 1: process by which the relevant oversight, responsibility and accountability mechanisms
[17:38] Speaker 1: are changing.
[17:39] Speaker 2: Can you give us the broader reasons why you think
[17:42] Speaker 2: the FTC's independence is critical.
[17:46] Speaker 1: The broader, high level reason is that the FTC exercises
[17:51] Speaker 1: significant economic policy making functions and as broad regulatory responsibilities.
[17:57] Speaker 1: I think in any economy, and certainly in our market economy,
[18:01] Speaker 1: the business community, the citizens as a whole have to
[18:04] Speaker 1: have confidence that that authority is being used in a
[18:07] Speaker 1: principled way, and then when it's used, it reflects truly
[18:11] Speaker 1: the exercise of high quality professional judgment from an agency
[18:16] Speaker 1: that has special expertise broad experience, and then when it's
[18:19] Speaker 1: making those judgments, it's making it on the basis of
[18:22] Speaker 1: sound policy analysis. That assumption and confidence vanishes if the
[18:28] Speaker 1: head of State can simply designate outcomes or point the
[18:31] Speaker 1: agency in a specific direction. I mean, it's the same
[18:34] Speaker 1: concern we have about the Federal Reserve Board and monetary policy.
[18:38] Speaker 1: Notice how the markets lose their minds when it appears
[18:42] Speaker 1: as though the Fed might lose that insallation from direct
[18:45] Speaker 1: political influence over the monetary system. I can't quite assert
[18:48] Speaker 1: that the FTC occupies the same position in the minds
[18:53] Speaker 1: of business leaders and others about its role in the economy,
[18:57] Speaker 1: but I think it is nonetheless and important pillar of
[19:01] Speaker 1: the regulatory mechanism in the US. If you take away
[19:05] Speaker 1: some measure of autonomy, especially in the decision to prosecute,
[19:09] Speaker 1: the decision to impose sanctions, the decision to do things
[19:13] Speaker 1: that in a broad sense hurt, you take away that
[19:16] Speaker 1: presumption of good professional judgment and autonomy with respect to
[19:20] Speaker 1: those functions. I think it underminds confidence in the regulatory
[19:23] Speaker 1: process itself, and at a higher level, for our entire
[19:27] Speaker 1: political economy. And our stature in the world. For the
[19:30] Speaker 1: last thirty plus years, we have been telling the world
[19:33] Speaker 1: that these key economic regulatory functions must have some element
[19:38] Speaker 1: of protection with respect to these fundamental decisions about prosecuting cases,
[19:43] Speaker 1: initiating rules, that there has to be an accountability regime.
[19:46] Speaker 1: But you can't have political leadership telling the agency to
[19:50] Speaker 1: punish enemies, reward friends, and otherwise simply be party to
[19:54] Speaker 1: a negotiation between top political leadership and individual business interests.
[19:59] Speaker 1: So once you do that, confidence in the entire system
[20:02] Speaker 1: of governments tends to erode. And if the Humphries executive
[20:06] Speaker 1: protections against removal except for good cause disappear, that's a
[20:11] Speaker 1: step in the direction of diminishing that confidence and legitimacy
[20:15] Speaker 1: for the regulatory process.
[20:17] Speaker 2: I want to get.
[20:17] Speaker 4: Your input on the bill to consolidate federal antitrust authority
[20:23] Speaker 4: solely within the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, so that would
[20:27] Speaker 4: lead the FTC as a consumer protection agency. What's your
[20:33] Speaker 4: take on that.
[20:34] Speaker 1: I think it's a bad time to do that. I
[20:36] Speaker 1: think the question of whether you want two federal agencies
[20:40] Speaker 1: to occupy in many ways the same policy domain is
[20:44] Speaker 1: a very useful and important issue. That's worthy of debate.
[20:48] Speaker 1: I would hope that that debate would involve a more
[20:52] Speaker 1: nuanced than careful consideration of what the FTC has brought
[20:56] Speaker 1: to the mix. I mentioned the FTC because the assumption
[20:59] Speaker 1: always is, as you say, all that authority will be
[21:02] Speaker 1: given to the Department of Justice. The main reason I
[21:04] Speaker 1: think it's a bad tub to do this is that
[21:06] Speaker 1: in the area of all things digital and information systems platforms,
[21:11] Speaker 1: there is a growing global awareness that the solution to
[21:15] Speaker 1: problems observed in that area and the disciplines that have
[21:19] Speaker 1: to be brought to bear to come up with good
[21:21] Speaker 1: policy foundations include competition law, antitrust, consumer protection law, and
[21:27] Speaker 1: privacy data protection law. There is one agency in the
[21:31] Speaker 1: world that has all three of those mandates under its
[21:34] Speaker 1: umbrella in its portfolio. That's a Federal Trade Commission, which
[21:38] Speaker 1: also has distinctive information gathering powers and report writing powers,
[21:43] Speaker 1: has a collection of policy making tools that can bring
[21:47] Speaker 1: all of these policy domains to bear on specific issues.
[21:51] Speaker 1: I think in a time when we are seeing that
[21:54] Speaker 1: policy making involving information systems digital AI involve an intersection
[22:01] Speaker 1: of these different policy areas, I think that's exactly the
[22:04] Speaker 1: wrong time to divest the FPC of its Competition Policy mandate,
[22:09] Speaker 1: also because I think the Competition Policy Mandate has brought
[22:14] Speaker 1: useful discipline and direction to the consumer protection program. And
[22:18] Speaker 1: if you sever the competition mandate from the Consumer Protection mandate,
[22:23] Speaker 1: I think the consumer Protection Mandate and the Data Protection
[22:26] Speaker 1: Mandate they both suffer.
[22:28] Speaker 2: It's always great to have you on Bill, Thanks so much.
[22:31] Speaker 2: That's former FTC Chair William Kavasik, a professor at George
[22:35] Speaker 2: Mason University School of Law. And that's it for this
[22:38] Speaker 2: edition of The Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always
[22:41] Speaker 2: get the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast.
[22:44] Speaker 2: You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at
[22:47] Speaker 2: www dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast Slash Law, and
[22:53] Speaker 2: remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight
[22:56] Speaker 2: at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm Jim Grosso and
[22:59] Speaker 2: your listen listening to Bloomberg.
[23:05] Speaker 4: Hmm

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