# 054 - Modern Philosophy Chapter 63 German Philosophy - Kant

An episode of [History of Philosophy](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1877164155), 3 Mar 2026, 1 h 07 min.

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## Transcript

[0:01] Speaker 1: Chapter sixty three of History of Philosophy. This is a
[0:05] Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
[0:10] Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
[0:16] Speaker 1: Recording by Andre Levy andre Levy dot net, Lisbon, Portugal.
[0:22] Speaker 1: History of Philosophy by William Turner, Chapter sixty three, German
[0:29] Speaker 1: Philosophy Kant third period from Kant to our own time.
[0:37] Speaker 1: One of the most striking results of the French and
[0:40] Speaker 1: German Illumination was the nationalization of philosophy. During the Middle Ages,
[0:47] Speaker 1: Latin was the language of the scientific world, and even
[0:50] Speaker 1: long after most of the manners and customs of the
[0:53] Speaker 1: Middle Ages had disappeared, it continued to be the language
[0:57] Speaker 1: in which philosophical treatises were imposed. Contemporaneously, with the rise
[1:03] Speaker 1: of the Deistic controversy in England and the spread of
[1:07] Speaker 1: the illumination in France and Germany, Latin was discarded and
[1:12] Speaker 1: philosophy began to speak in the vernacular. The result of
[1:17] Speaker 1: this change was that philosophy ceased to be cosmopolitan in character,
[1:22] Speaker 1: and racial and national traits, which had always been distinguishable,
[1:27] Speaker 1: became more strongly marked. Hence, we have during the nineteenth
[1:32] Speaker 1: century German, English, French, Scotch and Italian philosophy, each possessing
[1:40] Speaker 1: its distinctly national characteristics. It will therefore be found more
[1:45] Speaker 1: convenient from this point onward to follow philosophy in its
[1:49] Speaker 1: national development, and to treat the history of philosophy according
[1:54] Speaker 1: to nations rather than according to schools and systems. Footnote
[2:00] Speaker 1: for the history of the philosophy of the nineteenth century,
[2:03] Speaker 1: consult besides the works already referred to on page four
[2:07] Speaker 1: hundred twenty two. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Boston,
[2:13] Speaker 1: eighteen ninety two. Bert History of Modern Philosophy, two volumes, Chicago,
[2:20] Speaker 1: eighteen ninety two. Grigg's Philosophical Classics, edited by Morris, Series
[2:28] Speaker 1: of Modern Philosophers edited by Sneith. The Library of Philosophy,
[2:34] Speaker 1: edited by Murehead end of footnote, Chapter sixty three. German Philosophy.
[2:46] Speaker 1: Although the greater part of Kant's life lies within the
[2:49] Speaker 1: eighteenth century, his philosophy belongs to the nineteenth. It is
[2:54] Speaker 1: from the fundamental principles of a system of thought that
[2:57] Speaker 1: the great speculative and practical tenancies of this third period spring.
[3:03] Speaker 1: With Kant. Therefore begins the last period in the history
[3:07] Speaker 1: of modern philosophy. Kent life. Emmanuel Kant was born at
[3:14] Speaker 1: Conningsburg in the year seventeen twenty four. His parents were,
[3:19] Speaker 1: according to family tradition, of Scotch descent. At the age
[3:23] Speaker 1: of sixteen, he entered the University of Conningsburg and there
[3:28] Speaker 1: for six years studied Wolfe's philosophy and Newton's physics, having
[3:33] Speaker 1: for teacher Martin Knutsen. On leaving the university, he spent
[3:38] Speaker 1: nine years as tutor in several distinguished families. He returned
[3:43] Speaker 1: to Conningsburg in seventeen fifty five to qualify himself for
[3:47] Speaker 1: the position of licensed but unsalaried teacher privatocent at the university,
[3:54] Speaker 1: a career in which he lingered for fifteen years. His
[3:58] Speaker 1: first book, which was published in seventeen forty seven under
[4:02] Speaker 1: the title gedunkan vodrvaren Schatzung der liebedinge Kuft Thoughts on
[4:09] Speaker 1: the True Estimation of Living Forces, was followed by several
[4:13] Speaker 1: others which treated of physical and metaphysical problems. Meantime, he
[4:19] Speaker 1: continued to lecture on Wolfian philosophy, employing the textbooks then
[4:24] Speaker 1: commonly in use. Although it is evident from his written
[4:28] Speaker 1: works and from the programme of his lectures that he
[4:31] Speaker 1: had at this time begun to criticize both Wolf and Newton.
[4:37] Speaker 1: The first outline of a definitive independent system appears in
[4:41] Speaker 1: the dissertation De Munli sin sibilis atke inteligibilis forms et principis,
[4:49] Speaker 1: which was published in seventeen seventy. In the same year,
[4:54] Speaker 1: Kant was appointed to the chair of Philosophy at Conningsburg,
[4:57] Speaker 1: which he held until seventeen ninety. His epic making work,
[5:03] Speaker 1: The Critik der reinen Vernunft, appeared in seventeen eighty one.
[5:09] Speaker 1: This was followed by the grundelugin zur Metaphysique der Ziten
[5:13] Speaker 1: seventeen eighty five, the Critik de pratte kishin Vernunft seventeen
[5:20] Speaker 1: eighty eight, the Critik der ur Salschaft seventeen ninety and
[5:26] Speaker 1: The religion inner Abbe de Gretzen der blossen Vernunft seventeen
[5:32] Speaker 1: ninety four. The last of these works provoked the hostility
[5:37] Speaker 1: of the Orthodox and was the occasion of a reprimand
[5:40] Speaker 1: from the government of East Prussia. Kant spent the greater
[5:45] Speaker 1: part of his life as professor at Conningsburg. He never
[5:49] Speaker 1: traveled and had no appreciation of art. He was, however,
[5:53] Speaker 1: thoroughly in sympathy with nature in all her moods, professing
[5:57] Speaker 1: unbounded admiration for the starry sky above him and the
[6:02] Speaker 1: moral law within him. End he died in eighteen o four.
[6:09] Speaker 1: Sources the three critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason, the
[6:14] Speaker 1: argument of which is presented in shorter and more readable
[6:18] Speaker 1: form in the Prolgomena to any Future Metaphysic, The Critique
[6:23] Speaker 1: of Practical Reason, and the Critique of the Faculty of
[6:26] Speaker 1: Judgment form a trilogy of Kantian literature. Kant's complete works
[6:33] Speaker 1: were published at various times, the best editions being Hartenstein's
[6:38] Speaker 1: second edition in eight volumes, Leipzig eighteen sixty seven to
[6:43] Speaker 1: eighteen sixty nine, and Rosenkrantz and Schubert's edition in twelve volumes,
[6:49] Speaker 1: Leipzig eighteen thirty eight to eighteen forty two. A new
[6:54] Speaker 1: edition is being published by the Berlin Academy of Sciences.
[6:59] Speaker 1: The Critique of Pure Reason was translated into English by
[7:03] Speaker 1: Mecheljohn London eighteen fifty four and by Max Mueller London
[7:09] Speaker 1: eighteen eighty one, The Prologomena by Mahaffy and Bernard London
[7:14] Speaker 1: eighteen eighty nine, The Critique of Practical Reason by Abbott
[7:20] Speaker 1: London eighteen eighty nine, and the Critique of Judgment by
[7:24] Speaker 1: Bernard London eighteen ninety two. To the list of secondary
[7:29] Speaker 1: sources must be added M. Reisen's Cant Kran Philosoff Series, Paris,
[7:36] Speaker 1: nineteen hundred and Paulson's Cant translated by Crichton and Lefevre,
[7:42] Speaker 1: New York, nineteen oh two. Footnote confer Falconberg's List Opositatum,
[7:50] Speaker 1: page two sixty nine, English translation, page three hundred and thirty.
[7:55] Speaker 1: The works of Adikes, b Erdmann and Weyhinger are of
[8:02] Speaker 1: special importance and a footnote. Wallace's Can't Blackwood's Philosophical Classics,
[8:09] Speaker 1: Edinburgh and Philadelphia, eighteen ninety two and E. Card's Critical
[8:15] Speaker 1: Philosophy of Kant, London, eighteen eighty nine are the best
[8:19] Speaker 1: English presentations of Kant's system. Footnote consult also T. H.
[8:26] Speaker 1: Green Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant in Works Volume two.
[8:32] Speaker 1: Adamson The Philosophy of Kant, Edinburgh, eighteen seventy nine. Watson
[8:39] Speaker 1: Knt and his English Critics, London, eighteen eighty eight. Article
[8:44] Speaker 1: on cat in Encyclopedia Britannica, et cetera, and a footnote Doctrines,
[8:53] Speaker 1: general standpoint and aim in the introduction to the Proligomena
[9:00] Speaker 1: cont informs us of the origin and aim of his
[9:02] Speaker 1: philosophical investigations. It was he observes the suggestion of David Hume,
[9:09] Speaker 1: which first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations
[9:14] Speaker 1: in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction.
[9:19] Speaker 1: I first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put
[9:23] Speaker 1: into a general form, and soon found that the concept
[9:27] Speaker 1: of the connection of cause and effect was, by no
[9:30] Speaker 1: means the only one by which the understanding thinks the
[9:34] Speaker 1: connection of things. A priori, I sought to make certain
[9:39] Speaker 1: of the number of such connections, And when I had
[9:43] Speaker 1: succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I
[9:47] Speaker 1: proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was
[9:51] Speaker 1: now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended,
[9:56] Speaker 1: but sprang from the pure understanding and quote footnote Mahafe's translation,
[10:05] Speaker 1: page seven end a footnote, If therefore we divide systems
[10:11] Speaker 1: of philosophy, interrational and empirical, according as they lay stress
[10:17] Speaker 1: on the a priori concepts and principles of the pure understanding,
[10:22] Speaker 1: or on a posterorrii impressions and associations of the empirical faculties.
[10:29] Speaker 1: We may describe Kant as dissatisfied with the rational philosophy
[10:34] Speaker 1: because it exaggerated the a priori and with the empirical
[10:39] Speaker 1: philosophy because it exaggerated the a postorrii elements of knowledge. Consequently,
[10:46] Speaker 1: he sets himself the task of examining or criticizing all
[10:51] Speaker 1: knowledge for the purpose of determining, or as he says,
[10:55] Speaker 1: quote deducing end quote, the a priori concepts or forms
[11:00] Speaker 1: of thought. And if it is the task of philosophy
[11:05] Speaker 1: to answer the questions what can I know? What ought
[11:09] Speaker 1: I to do? What may I hope? For? Cant considers
[11:13] Speaker 1: that the answers to the second and third questions depend
[11:18] Speaker 1: on the answer given to the first. His philosophy is
[11:22] Speaker 1: therefore a transcendental criticism, that is, an examination of knowledge
[11:28] Speaker 1: for the purpose of determining the a priori elements which
[11:32] Speaker 1: are the conditions of knowledge and which we cannot know
[11:36] Speaker 1: by mere experience. Footnote Falkenberg Opi Sitatum, page two hundred
[11:45] Speaker 1: seventy seven. English translation page three hundred forty explains that
[11:51] Speaker 1: altheaux Count at different times attaches different meanings to the
[11:56] Speaker 1: word transcendental. He always uses it as a posed to
[12:00] Speaker 1: empirical confer Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology edited by Baldwin
[12:07] Speaker 1: article Kant's terminology numbers twelve and thirteen end a footnote
[12:17] Speaker 1: Division of philosophy. Kant, as is well known, first devoted
[12:22] Speaker 1: his attention to the transcendental criticism of pure reason, and
[12:27] Speaker 1: afterwards took up the transcendental criticism of practical reason. In
[12:33] Speaker 1: the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, he
[12:36] Speaker 1: distinguishes the transcendental esthetic and the transcendental logic, and subdivides
[12:42] Speaker 1: the latter into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. Transcendental esthetic
[12:52] Speaker 1: is defined as quote science of all the principles of
[12:57] Speaker 1: sensibility a priori end quote, or the inquiry into the
[13:03] Speaker 1: a priori conditions of sensation. Footnote Critique of Pure Reason,
[13:10] Speaker 1: page seventeen. References are to Maximuller's translation end of footnote.
[13:18] Speaker 1: Now our external senses represent their objects as extended in
[13:24] Speaker 1: space and our internal senses represent our conscious states as
[13:30] Speaker 1: succeeding each other in time. Space and time are the
[13:35] Speaker 1: a priori conditions of external and internal sensations, conditions or
[13:41] Speaker 1: forms which make sensation possible. They are therefore anterior to
[13:47] Speaker 1: all experience. Space and time are not, as is commonly supposed,
[13:53] Speaker 1: empirical concepts derived from experience. Their a priori character appears
[14:01] Speaker 1: from the very fact that knowledge based on the nature
[14:04] Speaker 1: of space and time mathematical knowledge is necessary and universal,
[14:11] Speaker 1: for it is a primary postulate of all Kant's transcendental
[14:16] Speaker 1: inquiry that nothing which is necessary and universal can come
[14:22] Speaker 1: from experience. Space and time are not properties of things.
[14:28] Speaker 1: They belong to the subject inhere in the subject, and
[14:32] Speaker 1: are so to speak, part of the subjective world. Their
[14:37] Speaker 1: role is to reduce the multiplicity of the object to
[14:42] Speaker 1: that unity which is an essential condition of being perceived
[14:46] Speaker 1: by the subject, which is one. They are the conditions
[14:51] Speaker 1: of sensitive intuition and have no objective reality, except in
[14:56] Speaker 1: so far as they are applied to real things in
[15:00] Speaker 1: the act of perception. Quote. Space and time are the
[15:06] Speaker 1: pure forms of our intuition, while sensation forms its matter.
[15:13] Speaker 1: End of quote. Footnote opositatum page thirty four, end quote
[15:24] Speaker 1: Transcendental logic. General logic treats either of the pure forms
[15:31] Speaker 1: of thought, or of these forms in their relation to
[15:35] Speaker 1: concrete experience. Applied logic. Transcendental logic treats of the origin, extent,
[15:43] Speaker 1: and validity of concepts which are neither of empirical nor
[15:48] Speaker 1: of esthetic origin, but are a priori. It is divided
[15:53] Speaker 1: into transcendental analytic and transcendental Dialectic. First treats of the
[16:01] Speaker 1: forms of the pure understanding judgment, while the second treats
[16:06] Speaker 1: of the elements of that knowledge which is pure understanding
[16:10] Speaker 1: applied to objects given in intuition. And as this application
[16:15] Speaker 1: is made by the reason, we may describe transcendental dialectic
[16:20] Speaker 1: as the criticism of reason in the stricter sense of
[16:23] Speaker 1: the word. The first treats of the forms of the
[16:32] Speaker 1: pure understanding judgment, while the second treats of the elements
[16:37] Speaker 1: of that knowledge which is pure understanding applied to objects
[16:41] Speaker 1: given in intuition. And as this application is made by
[16:45] Speaker 1: the reason, we may describe transcendental dialectic as the criticism
[16:51] Speaker 1: of reason in the stricter sense of the word. Footnote
[16:57] Speaker 1: confer Oppositatum, pages forty two to fifty and a footnote
[17:06] Speaker 1: a transcendental analytic. The a priori forms of the pure
[17:12] Speaker 1: understanding are the categories which stand to intellectual knowledge, in
[17:18] Speaker 1: the relation in which space and time stand to sense knowledge.
[17:23] Speaker 1: It will be well to consider a the existence of
[17:27] Speaker 1: the categories, b the construction of the table of categories,
[17:32] Speaker 1: C the nature of the categories, and D the objective
[17:38] Speaker 1: value of the categories. A the existence of the categories.
[17:46] Speaker 1: All intuitions being sensuous, and the understanding being a supersensible faculty,
[17:53] Speaker 1: it is evident that the concepts which belong to the
[17:57] Speaker 1: understanding are not immediately referred to to an object, but
[18:01] Speaker 1: to some other representation, that is, to an intuition or
[18:05] Speaker 1: to another concept. All the acts of the understanding may
[18:10] Speaker 1: therefore be reduced to judgments. Footnote Opositatum, page fifty six,
[18:18] Speaker 1: and a footnote. Now there are judgments which are merely
[18:23] Speaker 1: contingent and particular, as quote, this table is square end quote.
[18:31] Speaker 1: And there are judgments which are necessary and universal as quote,
[18:37] Speaker 1: the sides of a square are equal to one another
[18:40] Speaker 1: end quote. But and this is the fundamental assumption in
[18:45] Speaker 1: Kant's critique, what is necessary and universal in our knowledge?
[18:50] Speaker 1: Is a priori. Therefore, there is in our knowledge of
[18:55] Speaker 1: necessary and universal propositions an a priori el em, and
[19:01] Speaker 1: this is the form or category B construction of the
[19:10] Speaker 1: table of categories. Kant considers that Aristotle fail to draw
[19:16] Speaker 1: up a complete and scientific table of the highest genera
[19:21] Speaker 1: because that quote acute thinker end quote did not realize
[19:26] Speaker 1: that the right method to be pursued is not the
[19:29] Speaker 1: analysis of being, but the analysis of thought. Now, according
[19:35] Speaker 1: to Kant, to think is to judge, and to judge
[19:39] Speaker 1: is to synthesize or unite two representations, namely subject and predicate.
[19:47] Speaker 1: But since we are inquiring into the a priori elements
[19:52] Speaker 1: of thought, we must empty the subject in predicate of
[19:55] Speaker 1: all their empirical and intuitional content, and consider are merely
[20:00] Speaker 1: their relations to each other. On the different kinds of
[20:04] Speaker 1: relation which exist between subject and predicate. We shall base
[20:09] Speaker 1: our construction of the table of categories. These relations contraduces
[20:15] Speaker 1: to twelve, to which therefore correspond the twelve categories table.
[20:24] Speaker 1: First column kinds of judgment. Second column categories section one
[20:33] Speaker 1: quantity one, universal unity two, particular plurality three, singular totality,
[20:49] Speaker 1: section two, Quality four, affirmative reality five, negative negation six,
[21:03] Speaker 1: infinite limitation, Section three relation, seven, categorical subsistence and inherence, eight,
[21:18] Speaker 1: hypothetical causality and dependence, disjunctive, reciprocity, active and passive. Section
[21:30] Speaker 1: four modality ten, problematical possibility, impossibility, eleven, assertory existence, non existence,
[21:47] Speaker 1: twelve apodeictic necessity, contingency. End of table. It may be
[21:59] Speaker 1: observed in criticism of this system of categories that an
[22:03] Speaker 1: analysis of judgment is not a complete analysis of thought,
[22:07] Speaker 1: for the ideas of which the judgment is composed are
[22:11] Speaker 1: themselves capable of analysis. Indeed, while the analysis of judgment
[22:17] Speaker 1: may be made the basis of a system of predicables,
[22:21] Speaker 1: it is on an analysis of ideas that a system
[22:24] Speaker 1: of categories must be based. Moreover, it is evident that
[22:28] Speaker 1: in the content table of categories, correctness of analysis is
[22:33] Speaker 1: sacrificed to symmetry of arrangement. See the nature of the categories.
[22:43] Speaker 1: Kant's a priori forms or categories are not mere subjective dispositions,
[22:49] Speaker 1: mere tendencies, such as Leibniz attributed to the psychic monad,
[22:54] Speaker 1: capabilities to be evolved into actuality in the process of ideation,
[23:01] Speaker 1: Nor are they full fledged ideas, such as Plato attributed
[23:06] Speaker 1: to the soul in its pre natal existence. They are
[23:10] Speaker 1: the empty forms of intellectual knowledge, all the contents of
[23:15] Speaker 1: intellectual knowledge being derived from experience. The nature of the
[23:21] Speaker 1: categories is best understood by a study of their function.
[23:26] Speaker 1: All knowledge, whether sensuous or intellectual, is conditioned by unity,
[23:32] Speaker 1: and is effected by a synthesis of the manifold of representations, sense, impressions,
[23:39] Speaker 1: et cetera. Now, how kat asks should we a priori
[23:46] Speaker 1: have arrived at such a synthetical unity if the subjective
[23:51] Speaker 1: grounds of such unity were not contained a priori in
[23:56] Speaker 1: the original sources of all our knowledge and footnote Opositatum,
[24:04] Speaker 1: page one hundred and two and a footnote, We have
[24:11] Speaker 1: seen that the a priori forms which affect the requisite
[24:15] Speaker 1: unity in the case of sense knowledge are space and time.
[24:20] Speaker 1: The function of the categories is entirely similar to affect
[24:25] Speaker 1: the requisite unity in the case of intellectual knowledge. To
[24:29] Speaker 1: synthesize the manifold of experience, But how is the application
[24:35] Speaker 1: of the form to the contents brought about? The a
[24:39] Speaker 1: priori forms must be brought down to the empirical contents
[24:44] Speaker 1: anteriorly to experience, for they render empirical knowledge possible. Kant
[24:51] Speaker 1: is therefore obliged to have recourse to the doctrine of schematism.
[24:57] Speaker 1: The schemata are the work of the sense ynthetic imagination
[25:01] Speaker 1: and mediate between the a priori form and the manifold
[25:05] Speaker 1: of experience. Thus, quote, the transcendental determination of time, which
[25:12] Speaker 1: is the principal schema, is so far homogeneous with the
[25:16] Speaker 1: category that it is general and founded on a rule
[25:20] Speaker 1: a priori. And it is, on the other hand, so
[25:24] Speaker 1: far homogeneous with the phenomena that time must be contained
[25:28] Speaker 1: in every empirical representation of the manifold. End quote footnote oppositatum,
[25:37] Speaker 1: page one hundred and thirteen and a footnote from the
[25:43] Speaker 1: fundamental schema, which is time, are derived as many schemata
[25:48] Speaker 1: as there are categories. The mental field thickens with the
[25:55] Speaker 1: multitude of media through which and by means of which
[25:59] Speaker 1: the process of intellectual knowledge takes place. We have first
[26:04] Speaker 1: the manifold representations of sense impression, then the application of
[26:10] Speaker 1: the forms of space and time resulting in sense intuition.
[26:15] Speaker 1: Next we have the schema, and last of all the
[26:19] Speaker 1: a priori form. And yet all this multiplicity is introduced
[26:25] Speaker 1: in order to effect the synthetic unity, without which knowledge
[26:30] Speaker 1: is impossible. The representations are unified by the application of
[26:36] Speaker 1: the a priori forms of space and time. The intuitions
[26:41] Speaker 1: resulting from this application are in turn unified by the
[26:45] Speaker 1: determining schema, which gives reality to the highest unifying form,
[26:51] Speaker 1: namely the category. Finally, above all these is the unity
[26:56] Speaker 1: of consciousness. The doctrine of the function of the categories
[27:02] Speaker 1: is well summed up in the formula. Representations without the
[27:07] Speaker 1: categories are blind. The categories without representative or other empirical
[27:13] Speaker 1: content are empty. With regard to the schematism of our
[27:20] Speaker 1: understanding applied to phenomena and their mere form, it were well,
[27:25] Speaker 1: perhaps to content ourselves with Kant saying that such schematism
[27:30] Speaker 1: is quote an art hidden in the depth of the
[27:34] Speaker 1: human soul, the true sense of which we shall hardly
[27:38] Speaker 1: ever be able to understand. End quote footnote Oppositatum, page
[27:45] Speaker 1: one hundred and sixteen. End a footnote d The objective
[27:54] Speaker 1: value of the categories. The value of the categories lies
[27:59] Speaker 1: in the that they render synthetic a priori judgments possible,
[28:05] Speaker 1: and thus make intellectual knowledge possible. In judgments which are
[28:11] Speaker 1: merely analytical, we remain within the given concept while predicating
[28:17] Speaker 1: something of it. But in judgments which are synthetic, we
[28:22] Speaker 1: go beyond the concept in order to bring something together
[28:26] Speaker 1: with it which is wholly different from what is contained
[28:29] Speaker 1: in it. Footnote Opositatum, page one hundred and twenty six
[28:37] Speaker 1: and a footnote. It is therefore, by means of synthetic
[28:42] Speaker 1: a priori judgments that we make progress in our intellectual
[28:47] Speaker 1: knowledge of reality. And since the categories are the a
[28:51] Speaker 1: priori elements of such judgments, the elements which confer necessity
[28:56] Speaker 1: and universality on them, thereby making them to be scientific,
[29:02] Speaker 1: it is evident that it is the categories that render
[29:06] Speaker 1: intellectual knowledge possible. Without the categories, the objects of intellectual
[29:11] Speaker 1: knowledge would be given in experience but not known. Although
[29:19] Speaker 1: the categories are a priori that is, independent of sensation,
[29:25] Speaker 1: they do not extend our knowledge beyond phenomena. They do
[29:29] Speaker 1: not lead us to a noumental knowledge of that which
[29:32] Speaker 1: is given in sensation. Of themselves, they are empty. In
[29:38] Speaker 1: order to be valid, they must be filled by experience.
[29:43] Speaker 1: In all, the content which experience can put into them
[29:46] Speaker 1: is phenomenal. Quote the understanding a priori can never do
[29:54] Speaker 1: more than anticipate the form of a possible experience. And
[29:59] Speaker 1: as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon,
[30:04] Speaker 1: it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the
[30:08] Speaker 1: limits of sensibility. As phenomena are nothing but representations, the
[30:14] Speaker 1: understanding refers them to a something as the object of
[30:18] Speaker 1: our sensuous intuition. This means as something equal to X,
[30:25] Speaker 1: of which we do not nay, with the present constitution
[30:30] Speaker 1: of understanding, cannot know anything footnote Oppositatum, pages two hundred
[30:40] Speaker 1: and one and two hundred and four end a footnote.
[30:47] Speaker 1: This something is the noumenon the transcendental object, the thing
[30:53] Speaker 1: in itself Dinganzik b. Transcendental dialectic, which is the third
[31:00] Speaker 1: portion of the critique of pure reason, has for its
[31:04] Speaker 1: object the examination or criticism of the ideas. These are
[31:09] Speaker 1: forms less general than the categories elements of reasoning rather
[31:14] Speaker 1: than of judgment, serving to unify the manifold of intellectual experience,
[31:19] Speaker 1: just as the categories and space and time serve to
[31:23] Speaker 1: unify the manifold of sense, representation, and impression. Consequently, they
[31:29] Speaker 1: do not refer immediately to the objects of intuition, but
[31:33] Speaker 1: only to the understanding and its judgments. Now, just as
[31:38] Speaker 1: the forms of judgment furnished us with the basis for
[31:42] Speaker 1: the system of categories, so the forms of inference serve
[31:47] Speaker 1: as a basis for the enumeration of ideas to the
[31:52] Speaker 1: three forms of syllogistic reasoning, namely categorical, empirical, and disjunctive.
[31:59] Speaker 1: Correspond the three ideas of the reasoning faculty, namely the
[32:04] Speaker 1: idea of the soul or thinking subject, the idea of
[32:08] Speaker 1: matter or the totality of phenomena, and the idea of
[32:13] Speaker 1: God the supreme condition of all possibility footnote Opicitatum, pages
[32:22] Speaker 1: two hundred and forty and following, and a footnote reason
[32:29] Speaker 1: being imminent, that is, having no direct relation to objects.
[32:34] Speaker 1: These three ideas, the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological,
[32:40] Speaker 1: should remain eminent. The attempt to establish them as existing
[32:45] Speaker 1: outside the mind must necessarily lead to an entanglement of contradictions.
[32:52] Speaker 1: And it is the aim of the transcendental dialectic to
[32:55] Speaker 1: expose these contradictions and so dispel that transcendental illusion which
[33:01] Speaker 1: has vitiated every system of psychology, cosmology, and theology. A
[33:09] Speaker 1: psychological idea. Kant rejects the rational psychology, which attributes to
[33:17] Speaker 1: the soul, identity, substantiality, immateriality, and immortality. The whole Wolfian
[33:26] Speaker 1: and Cartesian system of psychology he considers to be false
[33:30] Speaker 1: in its starting point, the assumption, namely, that we have
[33:34] Speaker 1: an intuitive knowledge of the understanding we have. He contends
[33:39] Speaker 1: no such intuition. Thought is a succession of unifications or synthesis.
[33:47] Speaker 1: At the apex of the pyramid, the basis of which
[33:50] Speaker 1: is the manifold representation, stands the conscious principle. But as
[33:55] Speaker 1: the conscious principle is devoid of empirical content, it is
[34:00] Speaker 1: like the numenon an x, an unknowable quantity. Descartes says, quote,
[34:08] Speaker 1: I think end quote. But what Kant asks is the eye.
[34:14] Speaker 1: It is the emptiest of all forms, a psychological subject
[34:19] Speaker 1: of conscious states, which never can become the logical subject
[34:24] Speaker 1: of a predicate referring to these states or to anything else.
[34:28] Speaker 1: Empirical psychology, which alone can extend our knowledge of mental life,
[34:34] Speaker 1: does not aim at telling us anything about the ego.
[34:38] Speaker 1: Rational psychology, which does aim at establishing truths concerning the ego,
[34:44] Speaker 1: is wrong in its very starting point and is full
[34:47] Speaker 1: of contradictions in the course of its development. Kant of course,
[34:52] Speaker 1: does not deny the unity's substantiality, et cetera, of the soul,
[34:58] Speaker 1: for he contends that reason is as far from being
[35:01] Speaker 1: able to disprove as it is from being able to
[35:04] Speaker 1: prove these truths, which, as the critique of practical reason
[35:09] Speaker 1: will demonstrate, rest ultimately on man's moral consciousness. B cosmological idea,
[35:20] Speaker 1: the totality of phenomena, or the world of which the
[35:24] Speaker 1: cosmologists speak, presents, according to Kant, difficulties similar to those
[35:29] Speaker 1: presented by the psychological idea. To every thesis which is
[35:35] Speaker 1: formulated concerning the ultimate nature of matter may be opposed
[35:39] Speaker 1: an equally plausible antithesis. The antinomies, however, as these apparent
[35:46] Speaker 1: contradictions are called, do not disprove the formal correctness of
[35:50] Speaker 1: the inferential process employed in rational cosmology. They merely show
[35:56] Speaker 1: that the cosmical concepts matter, cause, et cetera, extend beyond
[36:01] Speaker 1: the limits of empirical knowledge and rational experience. The antiinomies
[36:06] Speaker 1: are four, corresponding to the four classes of categories. Alpha
[36:13] Speaker 1: thesis the world must have a beginning in time and
[36:17] Speaker 1: be enclosed in finite space. Antithesis, the world is eternal
[36:24] Speaker 1: and infinite beta thesis. Matter is ultimately divisible into simple
[36:33] Speaker 1: parts atoms or monats, incapable of further division. Antithesis, every
[36:40] Speaker 1: material thing is divisible. There exists nowhere in the world
[36:44] Speaker 1: nothing simple gamma thesis. Besides the causality, which is according
[36:55] Speaker 1: to the laws of nature and therefore necessary, there is
[36:59] Speaker 1: causality which is free. Antithesis. There is no freedom. Everything
[37:06] Speaker 1: in the world takes place entirely according to the laws
[37:10] Speaker 1: of nature. Delta thesis. There exists an absolutely necessary being
[37:21] Speaker 1: belonging to the world, either as a part or as
[37:25] Speaker 1: a cause of it. Antithesis. There nowhere exists an absolutely
[37:32] Speaker 1: necessary being, either within or without the world. It is
[37:40] Speaker 1: only in the case of the first two antinomies that
[37:43] Speaker 1: Kant considers both the thesis and antithesis to be false
[37:49] Speaker 1: see theological idea. The idea of God is, according to Kant,
[37:56] Speaker 1: the ideal of reason, that is, the expression of the
[38:00] Speaker 1: need which reason has of coming to a perfect unity.
[38:05] Speaker 1: Kant nowhere denies the objective validity of this idea. He contends, however,
[38:10] Speaker 1: as we shall see, that it rests on the moral consciousness,
[38:14] Speaker 1: not on any speculative basis. The criticism of The theological
[38:19] Speaker 1: idea is therefore confined to an examination of the ontological, cosmological,
[38:25] Speaker 1: and physical theological proofs which natural theology brings forward to
[38:31] Speaker 1: establish the thesis that God exists. The ontological proof, which
[38:37] Speaker 1: was formulated successively by Saint Olsem, Descartes and Leibniz, deduces
[38:43] Speaker 1: the existence of God from the concept which we are
[38:46] Speaker 1: able to form of him. Kant points out the impossibility
[38:51] Speaker 1: of arguing from the idea of a thing to the
[38:54] Speaker 1: existence of that thing. Existence, he observes, is not a
[38:58] Speaker 1: quality or acat tribute of the same nature as goodness
[39:03] Speaker 1: or greatness. It adds nothing to the content of the idea.
[39:08] Speaker 1: Quote one hundred real followers contain no more as to
[39:13] Speaker 1: concept than a hundred possible ones. Besides, all existential propositions
[39:22] Speaker 1: are synthetical because existence is not a quality of an idea,
[39:27] Speaker 1: but a relation between the idea and experience. Therefore, an
[39:32] Speaker 1: existential proposition cannot be demonstrated from a concept without reference
[39:37] Speaker 1: to experience. The cosmological proof argues from the existence of
[39:43] Speaker 1: contingent being to the existence of necessary being. Kant criticizes
[39:49] Speaker 1: the argument from the viewpoint of his own theory of cognition.
[39:54] Speaker 1: Since the axiom of causality on which the argument rests
[39:58] Speaker 1: is a synthetic judgment, it cannot be applied beyond the
[40:01] Speaker 1: limits of experience. Quote. The principle of causality has no
[40:07] Speaker 1: meaning and no criterion for its use beyond the world
[40:10] Speaker 1: of sense, while here it is meant to help us
[40:13] Speaker 1: beyond the world of sense. End quote. Footnote Opositatum, page
[40:21] Speaker 1: four hundred ninety one. End a footnote. The physical theological
[40:28] Speaker 1: argument is that which is commonly called the argument from
[40:32] Speaker 1: the purposiveness or design which is evident in the order
[40:36] Speaker 1: of nature. Now, order and design. Quote may prove the
[40:41] Speaker 1: contingency of the form, but not of the matter. End quote.
[40:46] Speaker 1: They may prove that there is a designer, but not
[40:49] Speaker 1: that there is a creator of the universe. Kant wishes
[40:53] Speaker 1: to quote commend and encourage end quote the use of
[40:58] Speaker 1: such a line of reasoning, but he maintains that quote
[41:01] Speaker 1: it cannot by itself alone establish the existence of a
[41:05] Speaker 1: supreme being. End quote. Footnote Oppositatum, page five hundred and three.
[41:13] Speaker 1: End a footnote. The conclusion of the transcendental dialectic is,
[41:21] Speaker 1: therefore that the ideas do not add to our experience
[41:26] Speaker 1: speculative philosophy does not add to our knowledge of the soul,
[41:30] Speaker 1: the world, and God. Nevertheless, these ideas, although they do
[41:36] Speaker 1: not constitute experience, regulate it, so that we cannot better
[41:41] Speaker 1: order the faculties of the soul than by acting as
[41:45] Speaker 1: if there were a soul. Neither can we better order
[41:48] Speaker 1: our experience of the external world than by representing it
[41:53] Speaker 1: as made up of a multiplicity of created things, each
[41:57] Speaker 1: of which stands to the rest of reality in reciprocal
[42:01] Speaker 1: relation necessitated by law, and all of which spring from
[42:05] Speaker 1: a common ground of unity and are ruled by the
[42:09] Speaker 1: same guiding principle. Moreover, the criticism of the ideas shows
[42:15] Speaker 1: that while speculative philosophy is enabled to establish the existence
[42:20] Speaker 1: of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom
[42:23] Speaker 1: of the will, materialism, fatalism, and atheism are equally unable
[42:29] Speaker 1: to overthrow our belief in the truth of these doctrines.
[42:34] Speaker 1: The ideas therefore clear the way for irrational faith founded
[42:38] Speaker 1: on the moral consciousness. Before we come to the constructive
[42:43] Speaker 1: portion of Kant's philosophy, as contained in the Critique of
[42:47] Speaker 1: Practical Reason, we may here sum up the results of
[42:51] Speaker 1: his destructive criticism of speculative philosophy, and of theoretical knowledge
[42:56] Speaker 1: in general. There is no transcendent knowledge, no knowledge beyond
[43:02] Speaker 1: the limits of experience. In our knowledge of the empirical world.
[43:07] Speaker 1: There is, however, a transcendental element, the a priori forms
[43:12] Speaker 1: of sensation, the categories, and the regulative ideas, which make
[43:16] Speaker 1: empirical knowledge possible, although they do not add to it,
[43:21] Speaker 1: either in content or in extension. The moral consciousness alone
[43:27] Speaker 1: takes us beyond experience to the immutable, eternal, and universally
[43:32] Speaker 1: valid ground on which all higher truth rests. Critique of
[43:39] Speaker 1: practical reason. When we pass from the critique of pure
[43:44] Speaker 1: reason to the critique of practical reason, from the study
[43:48] Speaker 1: of what is or must be to the study of
[43:52] Speaker 1: what ought to be, from the inquiry into the conditions
[43:56] Speaker 1: of possible theoretical experience to the inquiry to the conditions
[44:00] Speaker 1: of actual moral experience, from the analysis of thought to
[44:05] Speaker 1: the analysis of action, we find ourselves in an altogether
[44:10] Speaker 1: new atmosphere. The second critique discovers in the obligation of
[44:15] Speaker 1: the moral law, the a liquid inconcussibile, which, as the
[44:19] Speaker 1: first critique taught us, is not to be found in
[44:22] Speaker 1: rational speculation and thus are restored the existence of God,
[44:27] Speaker 1: the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will,
[44:31] Speaker 1: which in the first critique were relegated to the rank
[44:34] Speaker 1: of mere regulative formulas. Kant's empathetic assertion of the supremacy
[44:40] Speaker 1: of the moral law is well known. The starry heaven
[44:44] Speaker 1: above us and the moral law within us are, he
[44:48] Speaker 1: was accustomed to say, the only objects worthy of supreme admiration.
[44:54] Speaker 1: But on what is the moral law founded? Consciousness tells
[44:59] Speaker 1: me that I I ought to perform certain actions, and
[45:03] Speaker 1: a little thought suffices to convince me that the oughtness
[45:07] Speaker 1: is universal and necessary. If I analyze, for example, the
[45:12] Speaker 1: sense of obligation in the negative principle lie not, I
[45:17] Speaker 1: find that, apart from the question of motive or utility,
[45:21] Speaker 1: which are contingent determinates, it is a principle valid throughout
[45:26] Speaker 1: all time and space. Now it is these properties necessity
[45:32] Speaker 1: and universality that will enable us to answer the question
[45:37] Speaker 1: on what is the moral law founded? It is necessary, however,
[45:42] Speaker 1: to remark that, according to Kant, the universality and necessity
[45:47] Speaker 1: affect the form, not the contents, of the moral law,
[45:51] Speaker 1: so that in the example just mentioned, the universality of
[45:55] Speaker 1: the prohibition lie not is derived from the general form
[46:00] Speaker 1: into which all obligation is translatable. So act that you
[46:06] Speaker 1: can will that the maxim on which your conduct rests
[46:10] Speaker 1: should become a universal law. Footnote Grundelung zur Metaphysik der
[46:17] Speaker 1: Ziten two aps Verka edited by Kershmann, volume three forty four,
[46:27] Speaker 1: also critique their practition Vernunft number seven Verrke volume two
[46:35] Speaker 1: thirty five end a footnote. More simply, the maxim on
[46:42] Speaker 1: which your conduct rests must be fit to be an
[46:46] Speaker 1: element of universal legislation. The moral law is not founded
[46:52] Speaker 1: on pleasure, for nothing is more unstable than feeling, which
[46:57] Speaker 1: is the determinant of pleasure, Whereas the moral law, because
[47:01] Speaker 1: of its universality and necessity, must rest on an unchangeable foundation.
[47:07] Speaker 1: It is not founded on happiness, for the essential characteristic
[47:12] Speaker 1: of the moral law is its obligatoriness, and no one
[47:15] Speaker 1: is obliged to be happy. It is not founded on
[47:19] Speaker 1: a moral sense, for a mere sense cannot represent obligation
[47:24] Speaker 1: as necessary and universal. Finally, it is not founded on
[47:29] Speaker 1: perfection of self, for perfection is, in final analysis, reducible
[47:34] Speaker 1: to pleasure or happiness. The moral law is its own foundation.
[47:41] Speaker 1: It is autonomous, being neither imposed by any external motive
[47:46] Speaker 1: nor deduced by the purely speculative reason from theoretical principles,
[47:53] Speaker 1: but being impressed on the will by the practical reason
[47:57] Speaker 1: and revealed to us by immediate consciences. Footnote Falkenberg Oppositatum,
[48:06] Speaker 1: page three hundred sixteen. English translation page three hundred eighty
[48:11] Speaker 1: eight calls attention to cons identification of will with practical
[48:15] Speaker 1: reason and a footnote. Thus it stands on a basis
[48:22] Speaker 1: firmer than that which theoretical knowledge can furnish, and it
[48:26] Speaker 1: remains unaffected by the contention and clamor of metaphysical discussion.
[48:34] Speaker 1: The moral law is imperative. Consciousness reveals it to us
[48:39] Speaker 1: as commanding, not merely as persuading or advising. Its command
[48:45] Speaker 1: may be categorical as thou shalt not lie, or hypothetical
[48:52] Speaker 1: as if you wish to become a clergyman, you must
[48:55] Speaker 1: study theology. The categorical imperative is, however, the characteristic expression
[49:01] Speaker 1: of the moral law, and it is only in the
[49:04] Speaker 1: authoritative though quote hollow unquote voice of the universal categorical imperative,
[49:12] Speaker 1: so act et cetera, that the moral law speaks with
[49:15] Speaker 1: all the authority of a universal and necessary moral determinate.
[49:22] Speaker 1: The moral law is the form which imparts to the
[49:25] Speaker 1: contents of an action its goodness. The contents may be
[49:29] Speaker 1: good relatively. The will, which is the form, is an
[49:33] Speaker 1: absolute good quote. Nothing Kant observes can be called good
[49:39] Speaker 1: without qualification except a good will end quote. Effects and
[49:46] Speaker 1: circumstances are not, therefore, of themselves determinants of moral value.
[49:52] Speaker 1: The sense of duty is alone praiseworthy. The only moral
[49:56] Speaker 1: motive is respect for the moral law. Thus does Kant
[50:01] Speaker 1: carry his reverence for the moral law to the extreme
[50:05] Speaker 1: of purism, the exclusion of all egotistic motive as derogatory
[50:10] Speaker 1: to the moral worth of actions. The moral law is
[50:15] Speaker 1: unconditional in the form of the categorical imperative. Its voice
[50:20] Speaker 1: is unconditionally authoritative, and its command is unconditionally a law
[50:26] Speaker 1: of human conduct. It speaks to us immediately, for we
[50:31] Speaker 1: are conscious of its commands. Here, then we have found
[50:34] Speaker 1: something which metaphysicians have sought in vain, an incontrovertible truth
[50:40] Speaker 1: on which the freedom of the will, the existence of God,
[50:44] Speaker 1: and the immortality of the soul may be made to rest. First,
[50:49] Speaker 1: the will is free. For the moral law in saying
[50:53] Speaker 1: thou aughtest implies that thou canst We have no immediate
[50:59] Speaker 1: consciousness of her freedom, but we have immediate consciousness of
[51:03] Speaker 1: the moral law, which implies freedom. I can because I ought,
[51:09] Speaker 1: and I know that I can because I know that
[51:12] Speaker 1: I ought. Freedom is therefore the racio essendi of the
[51:17] Speaker 1: moral law, and the moral law is the racio cognisendi
[51:22] Speaker 1: of freedom. Footnote confer critique de preticition ver nut Verke,
[51:30] Speaker 1: volume two, pages one thirty two and following end a footnote. Secondly,
[51:41] Speaker 1: the moral law postulates the existence of God, for the
[51:44] Speaker 1: imperative nature of the moral law implies that there exists
[51:48] Speaker 1: somewhere a good which is not only supreme, but complete consumatum,
[51:55] Speaker 1: an embodiment, so to speak, of that perfect holiness, which
[51:59] Speaker 1: is the some of all the conditions implied in the
[52:02] Speaker 1: moral order. Thus, while theonomic ethics supposes the existence of God,
[52:10] Speaker 1: autonomic morality proves his existence. Footnote Opicitatum, volume two pages
[52:21] Speaker 1: one forty nine, in following end footnote. Thirdly, the moral
[52:28] Speaker 1: law postulates the immortality of the soul. Theoretical reason, as
[52:33] Speaker 1: we have seen, fails to determine in any manner the
[52:36] Speaker 1: noumental reality of the subject of our conscious states. But
[52:40] Speaker 1: surely the practical reason, which imposes its law so imperiously
[52:45] Speaker 1: is a noumental reality of which its every action is
[52:49] Speaker 1: a determination. Thus, the soul is immortal, because immortal duration
[52:55] Speaker 1: is alone sufficient for the complete fulfillment of the moral law.
[53:00] Speaker 1: The highest perfection that we can attain in this life
[53:04] Speaker 1: is virtue, and virtue is essentially incomplete. It is a
[53:08] Speaker 1: striving towards holiness with a residual inclination towards unholiness. Since
[53:15] Speaker 1: the moral law will always continue with the same unrelenting
[53:19] Speaker 1: imperativeness to urge the soul towards holiness, and since the
[53:24] Speaker 1: inclination towards unholiness will never be completely overcome, the struggle
[53:30] Speaker 1: between the desire to obey and the impulse to transgress
[53:34] Speaker 1: the law must continue forever. Footnote Oppositatum, volume two, page
[53:43] Speaker 1: one hundred forty six. In following and a footnote, the
[53:52] Speaker 1: three postulates of the moral law restore therefore freedom, immortality,
[53:57] Speaker 1: and theistic belief, which find no justifiable basis in the
[54:02] Speaker 1: speculative reason, but which are we to believe the theoretical or
[54:08] Speaker 1: the practical reason. Kant does not hesitate to reply, we
[54:12] Speaker 1: are to believe the practical reason for it is supreme.
[54:17] Speaker 1: Faith is a rational conviction based on the sense of duty,
[54:21] Speaker 1: and is not less, but rather more valid than the
[54:24] Speaker 1: conviction based on theoretical knowledge. This is not the place
[54:29] Speaker 1: to take up Kant's theory of natural religion. It is
[54:33] Speaker 1: sufficient to note that, as the principle enunciated at the
[54:37] Speaker 1: end of the preceding paragraph implies, religion, according to Kant,
[54:41] Speaker 1: is based on ethics. We come then to the third
[54:45] Speaker 1: of Kant's philosophical critiques, critique of the faculty of judgment.
[54:53] Speaker 1: The understanding, pure reason is the faculty of a priori
[54:58] Speaker 1: forms and principles of knowledge. Practical reason is the faculty
[55:03] Speaker 1: of a priori principles of action. Mediating, as it were,
[55:08] Speaker 1: between these is judgment in the stricter sense of the word,
[55:13] Speaker 1: which is the faculty of the a priori forms and
[55:16] Speaker 1: principles of esthetic feeling. In other words, the beautiful or purposive,
[55:23] Speaker 1: which is the object of judgment, is intermediate between the
[55:27] Speaker 1: true and the good, which are the objects of pure
[55:31] Speaker 1: reason and practical reason, respectively. Judgment may be defined as
[55:36] Speaker 1: the faculty by which we subsume the particular under the
[55:41] Speaker 1: universal law, or find the universal under which the particular
[55:46] Speaker 1: is to be arranged. It refers the manifold to the one,
[55:51] Speaker 1: the sensible order, to the supersensible principle of design, And
[55:56] Speaker 1: since all actualization of design produces in a the sentiment
[56:01] Speaker 1: of the beautiful, the faculty of judgment is also concerned
[56:05] Speaker 1: with the esthetic aspect of nature and art. We have then,
[56:10] Speaker 1: as divisions of the critique of judgment, one critique of
[56:15] Speaker 1: the theological judgment, and two critique of the esthetic judgment
[56:23] Speaker 1: a critique of the theological judgment. The analytic of the
[56:29] Speaker 1: theological judgment has for its scope to determine the different
[56:33] Speaker 1: kinds of adaptation. These contubserves are two external and internal.
[56:42] Speaker 1: External adaptation, such as that of the pine to the
[56:46] Speaker 1: soil on which it grows, may be explained by mechanical causes,
[56:51] Speaker 1: but internal adaptation, which is found in organic structure and function,
[56:57] Speaker 1: cannot be explained by mechanical causes alone. There is in
[57:01] Speaker 1: the organism a relation of part to part and of
[57:05] Speaker 1: part to the whole, but no causal relation in anything
[57:09] Speaker 1: outside the organism, so that the organism is at once
[57:13] Speaker 1: cause and effect. We cannot explain organic activity in terms
[57:19] Speaker 1: of mechanical causality. We can understand it only on the
[57:24] Speaker 1: supposition that organisms act as though they were produced by
[57:28] Speaker 1: a cause which had a purpose. In view, the teleological
[57:33] Speaker 1: concept is therefore regulative of our experience. That the theleological
[57:40] Speaker 1: concept is merely regulative, not constitutive, of experience appears from
[57:45] Speaker 1: the antinomy of which Kant treats in the dialectic of
[57:49] Speaker 1: the teleological judgment. The antinomy is as follows thesis, all
[57:55] Speaker 1: productions of material things and their forms may be explained
[57:59] Speaker 1: by mechanical causes. Antithesis, some products of material nature cannot
[58:06] Speaker 1: be judged possible unless we suppose a final cause. Now,
[58:12] Speaker 1: as doctrines mechanism as opposed to teleology and teleology are irreconcilable,
[58:20] Speaker 1: but as rules or maxims regulative of our experience, one
[58:26] Speaker 1: is supplementary of the other. Footnote Opositatum, volume two, page
[58:34] Speaker 1: two hundred and sixty two, and a footnote B critique
[58:43] Speaker 1: of the esthetic judgment. The name judgment applied to the
[58:48] Speaker 1: esthetic faculty is evidence of the purpose of this portion
[58:52] Speaker 1: of Kant's philosophy. The purpose, namely to mediate between the
[58:56] Speaker 1: sensationalists who reduced beauty to mere feelings and the rationalists
[59:02] Speaker 1: who removed all feeling from the faculty of esthetic appreciation.
[59:07] Speaker 1: A in his analytic of the esthetic judgment, Count determines
[59:12] Speaker 1: that as to quality, the beautiful is the object of
[59:16] Speaker 1: disinterested satisfaction, wherein it differs from the agreeable and the good.
[59:22] Speaker 1: With regard to quantity, it pleases universally, wherein it differs
[59:28] Speaker 1: from the agreeable with regard to relation, it is not
[59:32] Speaker 1: based on concepts, wherein it differs from the good, that
[59:37] Speaker 1: being beautiful, in which we find the form or design
[59:40] Speaker 1: without representing to ourselves any particular design. Finally, with regard
[59:46] Speaker 1: to modality, it pleases necessarily, wherein again it differs from
[59:52] Speaker 1: the agreeable, that then is beautiful, which universally and necessarily
[59:58] Speaker 1: gives disinterested pleasure without the concept of definite design. The
[1:00:05] Speaker 1: satisfaction which we find in what is perfect is intellectual
[1:00:10] Speaker 1: or conceptual. The satisfaction which the beautiful affords is emotional
[1:00:16] Speaker 1: or esthetic. Footnote Critique der urthelschaft Verka, Volume two, page
[1:00:27] Speaker 1: forty one in following and a footnote the sublime is
[1:00:34] Speaker 1: that which is great beyond all comparison, it gives satisfaction
[1:00:39] Speaker 1: by its boundless and formless greatness, as the beautiful does
[1:00:44] Speaker 1: by its definiteness of form. This greatness is either extensive
[1:00:49] Speaker 1: in space or time, or intensive in force or power.
[1:00:55] Speaker 1: The great produces it is true a quote humiliating end
[1:00:59] Speaker 1: quote impression. But it is the sensitive nature that is humiliated,
[1:01:05] Speaker 1: while at the same time the spiritual nature is exalted
[1:01:09] Speaker 1: and carried out towards the idea of the infinite, which
[1:01:13] Speaker 1: the sublime always suggests. Footnote Opositatum, volume two, page ninety two.
[1:01:22] Speaker 1: In following end, a footnote b in the Dialectic of
[1:01:31] Speaker 1: the esthetic faculty cont insists that the highest use of
[1:01:36] Speaker 1: the sublime and beautiful is their use as a symbol
[1:01:39] Speaker 1: of moral good, for the esthetic feeling is akin to
[1:01:43] Speaker 1: the moral faculty, as indeed the thaliological judgment also is
[1:01:49] Speaker 1: the question of the objective value of one or other
[1:01:53] Speaker 1: of these faculties. Leads ultimately to the assertion that there
[1:01:57] Speaker 1: is hidden in nature a principle of beauty, uty, and
[1:02:00] Speaker 1: purpose and goodness which the speculative reason cannot formulate. Footnote
[1:02:09] Speaker 1: confer b erdmin die stellung didingis and zek in Kant's
[1:02:15] Speaker 1: esthetic un analytic Berlin, eighteen seventy three, end a footnote
[1:02:24] Speaker 1: historical position. Kant's influence on the development of thought in
[1:02:29] Speaker 1: the nineteenth century can hardly be overestimated. His philosophy is,
[1:02:34] Speaker 1: as it were, the watershed from which streams of thought
[1:02:38] Speaker 1: flow down in various courses into modern idealism, agnosticism, and
[1:02:43] Speaker 1: even materialism. To this source may also be traced some
[1:02:48] Speaker 1: of the most noteworthy currents of contemporary religious thought, especially
[1:02:52] Speaker 1: the movement towards non dogmatic Christianity. For it is not
[1:02:57] Speaker 1: difficult to see in Kant's assertion of the supremacy of
[1:03:00] Speaker 1: the moral law the origin of the tendency to regard
[1:03:03] Speaker 1: Christianity more as a system of ethics and less as
[1:03:07] Speaker 1: a system of dogmatic truth. Kant influenced not only the
[1:03:12] Speaker 1: literature of his own country to an extent unequaled perhaps
[1:03:16] Speaker 1: in the history of that literature, but also through his
[1:03:20] Speaker 1: English exponents, of whom Coleridge was the chief the literature
[1:03:24] Speaker 1: of the English speaking world. Philosophy owes to Kant the
[1:03:29] Speaker 1: energetic assertion of the grandeur of the moral law as
[1:03:32] Speaker 1: the foundation of ethics, and the scarcely less energetic assertion
[1:03:38] Speaker 1: of the essential unity of consciousness as a point of
[1:03:41] Speaker 1: view for the critical analysis of mental processes, whether or
[1:03:46] Speaker 1: not we admit with Macaush that Kant was distinguished more
[1:03:52] Speaker 1: as a logical thinker and systematizer than as a careful
[1:03:56] Speaker 1: observer of what actually takes place in the mind quote
[1:04:01] Speaker 1: or with Huxley that quote. His baggage train is bigger
[1:04:05] Speaker 1: than his army, and the student who at tax him
[1:04:08] Speaker 1: is too often led to suspect that he has won
[1:04:11] Speaker 1: a position when he has only captured a mob of
[1:04:14] Speaker 1: useless camp followers. We cannot deny that can't revolutionize the
[1:04:20] Speaker 1: world of speculative and practical thought by introducing a new
[1:04:24] Speaker 1: point of view for the study of mental phenomena, and
[1:04:28] Speaker 1: that to this extent, at least, he is, as he
[1:04:31] Speaker 1: himself claimed to be, the Copernicus of mental science. Footnote
[1:04:38] Speaker 1: Realistic Philosophy, Volume two, page one hundred ninety seven, Hume,
[1:04:46] Speaker 1: page eighty end a footnote Cant inaugurated transcendental criticism. Now,
[1:04:56] Speaker 1: criticism in the sense of a critical examination of experience
[1:05:01] Speaker 1: or the analysis of common consciousness is undoubtedly the beginning
[1:05:06] Speaker 1: of philosophical inquiry and a critical investigation of knowledge is
[1:05:10] Speaker 1: a starting point which philosophical method approves. But philosophical method
[1:05:16] Speaker 1: cannot approve the attempt to criticize all knowledge without the
[1:05:20] Speaker 1: aid of principles or standards of criticism. And such principles
[1:05:25] Speaker 1: or standards Kant does not pretend to adopt, we cannot
[1:05:29] Speaker 1: regard as a canon of criticism the assumption that what
[1:05:33] Speaker 1: is necessary and universal in our knowledge must be a priori,
[1:05:38] Speaker 1: an assumption which is untrue as to content. Yet it
[1:05:42] Speaker 1: is to this assumption that Kant constantly recurs in his
[1:05:45] Speaker 1: doctrine of categories, in his classification of certain judgments as
[1:05:49] Speaker 1: synthetic and a priori, et cetera. It is only in
[1:05:54] Speaker 1: the practical order, in the realm of moral consciousness, that
[1:05:58] Speaker 1: Kant finds refuge from the pan phenomenalism which he wishes
[1:06:02] Speaker 1: to avoid. For the thing in itself, the subject and God,
[1:06:08] Speaker 1: though existing, are unknown and unknowable as far as the
[1:06:13] Speaker 1: speculative reason is concerned. Kant, whose express purpose was to
[1:06:19] Speaker 1: deliver philosophy from skepticism, might well look back at Hume,
[1:06:24] Speaker 1: the skeptic, and exclaim quote there. But forre the categorical
[1:06:29] Speaker 1: imperative goes Immanuel Kant en end of chapter sixty three,

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