# 056 - Modern Philosophy Chapter 65 German Philosophy - Hegel

An episode of [History of Philosophy](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1877164155), 5 Mar 2026, 58 min.

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Dive into the captivating journey of philosophical thought through the ages with History of Philosophy. This podcast unravels the rich tapestry of philosophical opinions, systems, and schools of thought, exploring the lives of influential philosophers and the intricate connections between different schools of philosophy. Discover the origins of Ancient Philosophy across cultures like Babylon, China, India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, as well as the profound insights of the Christian Era, featuring thinkers such as St. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ockham. Journey into Modern Philosophy with giants like Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, all guided by the insightful narration of Beth Thomas. This episode includes AI-generated content.

## Transcript

[0:00] Speaker 1: Chapter sixty five of History of Philosophy. This is a
[0:04] Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
[0:09] Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
[0:15] Speaker 1: Recording by Lizzie Schneider. History of Philosophy by William Turner,
[0:21] Speaker 1: Chapter sixty five German Philosophy continued. Hegel life Georg Wilhelm
[0:30] Speaker 1: Friedrich Hegel was born at Stuttgart in seventeen hundred seventy.
[0:35] Speaker 1: His life, like that of all the great Postcantian philosophers,
[0:39] Speaker 1: is merely the history of his academic and literary career.
[0:43] Speaker 1: At the age of eighteen, he entered the theological seminary
[0:46] Speaker 1: at Tubingen, where he diverted himself to the study of
[0:49] Speaker 1: content Vissau, having for companions Shelling and the young poet Helderlin,
[0:54] Speaker 1: whose enthusiasm for Greek poetry he fully shared. The year
[0:59] Speaker 1: seventeen hundred ninety three to eighteen hundred he spent his
[1:03] Speaker 1: private tutor at Bern and at Frankfurt, a main years
[1:06] Speaker 1: in which, through the study of Hellenic literature, he attained
[1:10] Speaker 1: a realization of the spiritual significance of nature as the
[1:14] Speaker 1: key to the harmony of existence. In eighteen hundred one
[1:18] Speaker 1: he entered the University of Yena, and after a few
[1:21] Speaker 1: years spent there as Privatotzen was appointed Professor extraordinary eighteen
[1:27] Speaker 1: hundred five. While at Yena he renewed his acquaintance with Schelling,
[1:32] Speaker 1: who was at that time editor of the Critical Journal
[1:35] Speaker 1: of Philosophy. Soon, however, diverdence of opinion between the two
[1:40] Speaker 1: great opponents of Fichtis subjectivism led to the development by
[1:44] Speaker 1: Hege of a system opposed to the philosophy of identity.
[1:48] Speaker 1: In eighteen hundred seven he published his Finomilolugidis Geistis, his
[1:53] Speaker 1: first important contribution to speculative philosophy. After spending a year
[1:58] Speaker 1: as newspaper editor at Bamberg, Hige became rector of the
[2:02] Speaker 1: Gymnasium at Nuremberg and while there published his Logik Wisenschaft
[2:07] Speaker 1: Logic eighteen hundred sixteen. In eighteen hundred sixteen he was
[2:11] Speaker 1: made professor of philosophy at Heidelberg, and in eighteen hundred
[2:15] Speaker 1: eighteen was transferred to the University of Berlin. While at
[2:20] Speaker 1: Heidelberg he published the Encyclopidia Encyclopidida Philosophi and Weisenshaftnem Contrese
[2:26] Speaker 1: eighteen hundred seventeen. He died at Berlin in eighteen hundred
[2:31] Speaker 1: thirty one. Sauces Hige's works were published soon after his
[2:37] Speaker 1: death Berlin eighteen hundred thirty two and following in nineteen volumes,
[2:42] Speaker 1: the last volume being The Life of Hege, written by
[2:45] Speaker 1: Rosenkrantz The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Volumes one to five.
[2:51] Speaker 1: Saint Louis eighteen hundred sixty seven to eighteen hundred seventy
[2:55] Speaker 1: one published translations of the Finnomilulugi and of portions of
[3:00] Speaker 1: the encyclopy D. The Low Gig was translated by W. T.
[3:04] Speaker 1: Harris and is to be found in the second volume
[3:07] Speaker 1: of the Journal just to third two. Wallace has published
[3:11] Speaker 1: translations of the most important portions of the encyclopy D.
[3:15] Speaker 1: The Logic of Hegel Oxford eighteen hundred ninety two and
[3:19] Speaker 1: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind Oxford eighteen hundred ninety four. The
[3:23] Speaker 1: translation of the four lesung in Uberti Philosophy de Gesichte
[3:27] Speaker 1: by Sibri is published in Bourne's Library. Philosophy of History, London,
[3:33] Speaker 1: eighteen hundred sixty eighteen hundred eighty four Professor Katz Heger
[3:39] Speaker 1: Blackwoods Philosophical Classics, Edinburgh and Philadelphia eighteen hundred ninety six
[3:44] Speaker 1: will be found very useful by those who are not
[3:47] Speaker 1: prepared to take up Sterling's form. A double exposition The
[3:50] Speaker 1: Secret of Heger two volumes, London, eighteen hundred sixty five,
[3:55] Speaker 1: one volume, Edinburgh and London eighteen hundred ninety eight. Mind,
[4:01] Speaker 1: especially in the new series, contains many valuable articles expository
[4:06] Speaker 1: and explanatory of Hegalian philosophy. See also Fischer's Hege Heidelberg
[4:13] Speaker 1: eighteen hundred ninety eight to nineteen hundred one Doctrines the
[4:19] Speaker 1: Problem of Philosophy. Thus, far in following the cause of
[4:23] Speaker 1: development of philosophic thought in Germany, we have found that Kant,
[4:28] Speaker 1: by feeling to complete the synthesis of ultimate reality, bequeath
[4:32] Speaker 1: the problem towards the solution of which all postcontient speculation
[4:36] Speaker 1: was directed. Fiste completed the synthesis by merging the thing
[4:41] Speaker 1: in itself object in the activity of the ego subject.
[4:46] Speaker 1: Shalling try to effect the synthesis equally complete by merging
[4:50] Speaker 1: both subject and object in the indifference of the absolute
[4:55] Speaker 1: Heger now approaches the problem anew Dissatisfied with shalling solution
[5:00] Speaker 1: of the problem, he proposes to substitute for the absolute
[5:04] Speaker 1: of indifference, an absolute of imminent activity. According to Shelling,
[5:09] Speaker 1: nature and spirit, object and subject proceed from the absolute.
[5:15] Speaker 1: According to Heger, the absolute becomes successively nature in spirit.
[5:20] Speaker 1: The absolute of hegres speculative system is a process rather
[5:24] Speaker 1: than a source. It is infinite, but unlike the spinazystic substance,
[5:29] Speaker 1: it is an infinite of activity, opposition, and tension, rather
[5:33] Speaker 1: than of static immensity and of undifferentiated plnitude. It is
[5:39] Speaker 1: a maelstrom rather than a sea of unruffled rest. This
[5:43] Speaker 1: concept of the absolute is Heger's starting point, But we
[5:47] Speaker 1: can understand neither his starting point nor his method unless
[5:51] Speaker 1: we first obtain a clear conception of the frame of
[5:54] Speaker 1: mind in which he approaches the problems of philosophy. In Fichte,
[5:58] Speaker 1: as in Kant, the ethical character predominated, and in Fiktus philosophy,
[6:03] Speaker 1: the practical reason retained its supremacy. In Shalling it was
[6:08] Speaker 1: the scientific, artistic character that prevailed, and in his philosophy,
[6:12] Speaker 1: the real and the ideal, the rational and the imaginative,
[6:16] Speaker 1: were given equal play. In Hegal, the rational or idealistic
[6:21] Speaker 1: temperament is predominant in his vast philosophical synthesis. The theoretical
[6:27] Speaker 1: is placed supreme above the practical. An action is subordinated
[6:31] Speaker 1: to thought, for thought is the center in sum of reality. Quote,
[6:36] Speaker 1: the rational alone is real unquote quote, all being is
[6:42] Speaker 1: thought realized, and all becoming is a development of thought unquote.
[6:47] Speaker 1: Mere science, he observes, looks for the causal explanations of phenomena.
[6:52] Speaker 1: Philosophy seeks to find the ideal interpretation of phenomena, to
[6:56] Speaker 1: understand them in terms of the absolute, which is thought
[7:00] Speaker 1: as to content. Therefore, philosophy does not go beyond experience.
[7:05] Speaker 1: It is, to repeat Khann's distinction, transcendental but not transcendent. Indeed,
[7:12] Speaker 1: it cannot go beyond rational experience, since the rational alone
[7:16] Speaker 1: is real, and philosophy must necessarily be in harmony with
[7:20] Speaker 1: actuality and experience. As to form. However, philosophy differs from
[7:26] Speaker 1: the empirical sciences, for to the laws, classifications, and categories
[7:31] Speaker 1: of these sciences, it adds the categories of notion, being, essence,
[7:36] Speaker 1: et cetera. In logic. As we shall see, these categories
[7:40] Speaker 1: are studied as it were in vacuo, that is, devoid
[7:44] Speaker 1: of all empirical content. But in the philosophy of nature
[7:48] Speaker 1: and in the philosophy of mind, they are studied in
[7:51] Speaker 1: their development and determination. Logic is nevertheless a science of reality,
[7:57] Speaker 1: for in it reality is studied through the act strict categories.
[8:02] Speaker 1: Hegels is a critical philosophy, yet it is at the
[8:05] Speaker 1: same time systematic or constructive. It is, as Wallas says, quote,
[8:11] Speaker 1: a system which is self critical and systematic only through
[8:14] Speaker 1: the absoluteness of its criticism quote, Or to use Heger's
[8:20] Speaker 1: own phrase, it is quote an imminent and incessant dialectic
[8:26] Speaker 1: on quote. Briefly, then, Hegre's philosophy is idealism in the
[8:30] Speaker 1: absolute sense of the word logical or conceptual, rather than
[8:35] Speaker 1: ethical or scientific. It is a philosophy of identity inasmuch
[8:40] Speaker 1: as it looks upon nature in spirit as manifestations of
[8:43] Speaker 1: a higher absolute. It is a philosophy of development inasmuch
[8:48] Speaker 1: as the absolute from which it deduces Nature in spirit
[8:51] Speaker 1: is not as static but a dynamic priss. This dynamic
[8:56] Speaker 1: prize of nature in spirit is the process from in
[8:59] Speaker 1: it self Anzich through out of self Thursy under sign
[9:04] Speaker 1: too for itself Unonfursig. Before passing to consider hegres method,
[9:11] Speaker 1: it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the idea
[9:14] Speaker 1: of development and to explain the principle which governs all development,
[9:19] Speaker 1: whether in the purely logical order or in nature and mind.
[9:24] Speaker 1: In its barer statement, the principle is that all development
[9:28] Speaker 1: passes through three stages, in itself, out of self, and
[9:32] Speaker 1: for itself. This may be called a metaphysical application of
[9:36] Speaker 1: the maxim on which the mystics insist, namely, die to live,
[9:41] Speaker 1: for it pertains through the very essence of spirit, that
[9:44] Speaker 1: through disintegration it must attain to reintegration, through diversity, to unity,
[9:51] Speaker 1: through strife, to peace, through opposition to agreement. It is
[9:56] Speaker 1: a law of thought as well as a law of being,
[9:58] Speaker 1: and thought is being that a concept where a thing
[10:02] Speaker 1: realizes itself by going out from itself, losing itself in
[10:06] Speaker 1: the other, and returning to itself. To take one of
[10:10] Speaker 1: Heger's favorite examples, freedom is developed by discipline, which is
[10:15] Speaker 1: its opposite. The freedom of the child is surrendered in
[10:19] Speaker 1: the discipline of education in order to become the major
[10:22] Speaker 1: freedom of the man, and the freedom of the man
[10:25] Speaker 1: is in turn surrendered in the discipline of law in
[10:29] Speaker 1: order to become the freedom of the citizen. Hegar's method
[10:33] Speaker 1: is to be understood in the light of his principle
[10:35] Speaker 1: of development. Fichte, while admitting in theory that philosophic method
[10:40] Speaker 1: consists in the use of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, failed
[10:45] Speaker 1: to develop this idea of method and to apply it
[10:48] Speaker 1: to every department of thought. Shalling relied on intuition and
[10:53] Speaker 1: gave free scope to his exuberant imagination. Heger insists on
[10:58] Speaker 1: the pruning of the imagination faculty and the discussion of
[11:02] Speaker 1: all intuitions by means of dialectic philosophy. He observes being
[11:07] Speaker 1: the thinking study of things does not stop at the
[11:10] Speaker 1: intuition which presents the thing object in its immediate unity,
[11:15] Speaker 1: for that is only part of the truth, but follows
[11:18] Speaker 1: it out into the self mediation, whereby it passes into
[11:22] Speaker 1: its opposites and back again to reconstructed unity. Philosophy therefore
[11:28] Speaker 1: must pursue a concept or an object from its immediate
[11:31] Speaker 1: unity into the divergence of opposites, so as to arrive
[11:35] Speaker 1: at the full truth. In the reconciliation of opposites. For
[11:40] Speaker 1: all position is negation. Every concept contains its opposite, and
[11:46] Speaker 1: all negation is position. Every opposite contains that to which
[11:50] Speaker 1: it is opposed, So that neither an affirmation nor in
[11:54] Speaker 1: negation is there the full truth, but in the reaffirmation
[11:58] Speaker 1: which follows affirmation in negation. Here we have the famous
[12:02] Speaker 1: dialectical method, the triadism, which determines the division as well
[12:07] Speaker 1: as the method of hegres philosophy. It is important to
[12:11] Speaker 1: note here that quote at least the first and third category,
[12:15] Speaker 1: the in itself and for itself in every triad may
[12:19] Speaker 1: be looked upon as definitions of the absolute or metaphysical
[12:22] Speaker 1: definitions of God, the first where the thought form of
[12:26] Speaker 1: the triad is formulated in its simplicity, and the third
[12:29] Speaker 1: being the return from differentiation to a simple self reference.
[12:34] Speaker 1: The second subcategory, the out of self in each tribe,
[12:37] Speaker 1: where the grade of thought is in its differentiation, gives,
[12:41] Speaker 1: on the other hand, a definition of the finite en quote.
[12:45] Speaker 1: We shall find as we proceed tri It within tri it,
[12:49] Speaker 1: the first great triad is idea, nature and spirit, which
[12:53] Speaker 1: gives us the division of philosophy. Division of philosophy philosoph
[13:00] Speaker 1: He starts with the idea. It is scarcely necessary to
[13:03] Speaker 1: remark that the term idea does not here designate a
[13:06] Speaker 1: phenomenon of the individual consciousness, but the system of reason,
[13:10] Speaker 1: the sum of reality. Now, the idea, following the law
[13:14] Speaker 1: of development, is at first in itself unsich, then outside
[13:19] Speaker 1: itself fusi under sign, and finally for itself unn fusig.
[13:25] Speaker 1: There therefore three parts of philosophy. First logic, the science
[13:30] Speaker 1: of the idea in itself. Second philosophy of nature, the
[13:35] Speaker 1: science of the idea outside itself or in the state
[13:39] Speaker 1: of otherness. Third philosophy of mind, the signs of the
[13:43] Speaker 1: idea come back to itself out of other nests. In
[13:48] Speaker 1: each of these divisions there are subordinate triadic divisions, so
[13:52] Speaker 1: that each part is a circle, rounded and completed in itself,
[13:56] Speaker 1: while philosophy as a whole resembles a circle of circles. First,
[14:02] Speaker 1: logic is the science of the pure idea. This does
[14:06] Speaker 1: not mean that logic is the science of the forms
[14:08] Speaker 1: of thought, or that it is the science of mere thought.
[14:12] Speaker 1: It is the science of reality. For the idea is
[14:15] Speaker 1: the sum of reality, the synthetic unity of experience. Logic
[14:20] Speaker 1: differs from the other parts of philosophy merely in this
[14:23] Speaker 1: that it is the science of reality looked at through
[14:26] Speaker 1: the medium of pure or abstract thought. If then logic
[14:31] Speaker 1: is the morpholity of thought, Hegelian logic is the morphology
[14:34] Speaker 1: of the world of life, of reality. As Higel himself says, quote,
[14:40] Speaker 1: logic coincides with metaphysics the signs of things set and
[14:44] Speaker 1: held in thoughts. On quote. It is important to remark
[14:48] Speaker 1: here that the identification of logic with metaphysics necessitates a
[14:53] Speaker 1: change in the meaning of the word category, and in
[14:56] Speaker 1: that of the phrase deduction. Of The categories of thought
[15:00] Speaker 1: are for Hegel what they were for none of his
[15:02] Speaker 1: Kantian predecessors, forms of being in a sense akin to
[15:06] Speaker 1: that which the schoolmen attached to the substantial forms, although
[15:10] Speaker 1: of course they differ radically from the scholastic forms inasmuch
[15:14] Speaker 1: as they are wholly dynamic processes rather than static entities
[15:19] Speaker 1: conceived after some remote analogy to a mold or die.
[15:24] Speaker 1: The forms of thought are for Hegel what they were
[15:27] Speaker 1: for none of his Kantium predecessors, forms of being in
[15:31] Speaker 1: a sense akin to that which the schoolmen attached to
[15:34] Speaker 1: substantial forms, although of course they differ radically from the
[15:38] Speaker 1: scholastic forms inasmuch as they are wholly dynamic processes rather
[15:43] Speaker 1: than static entities conceived after some remote analogy to a
[15:47] Speaker 1: mold or die. If then the categories are processes of
[15:52] Speaker 1: being as well as forms of thought, the deduction of
[15:55] Speaker 1: the categories will be the tracing of their genealogy from
[15:59] Speaker 1: the first form, which is being. It will not be
[16:02] Speaker 1: enough to enumerate the categories and to indicate their systematic articulation.
[16:07] Speaker 1: It will be necessary to discover and demonstrate that genetic connection,
[16:12] Speaker 1: their functional dependence, so to speak, on one another. Logic
[16:16] Speaker 1: is not only the morphology, it is also the physiology
[16:20] Speaker 1: of thought. It is important to note also that neither
[16:24] Speaker 1: in the logic, nor anywhere else in Hegalian philosophy are
[16:28] Speaker 1: the categories discovered. The task of discovering the categories belongs
[16:32] Speaker 1: to experience and to empirical sciences. The categories being given
[16:37] Speaker 1: philosophy shows how they grow out of each other and
[16:41] Speaker 1: are phases of the same reality. Philosophy not merely enumerates them,
[16:46] Speaker 1: for that would be simply mechanical synthesis. It also shows
[16:51] Speaker 1: their functional interdependence and interconnection, thus effecting an organic synthesis.
[16:57] Speaker 1: Logic is divided into a doctrine of being sign that is,
[17:03] Speaker 1: of the idea in its immediacy, B doctrine of essence vison,
[17:08] Speaker 1: that is, of the idea in its reflection or mediation.
[17:12] Speaker 1: C doctrine of notion begriff, that is, of the idea
[17:17] Speaker 1: returned to itself. Being is the notion implicit or in jam.
[17:22] Speaker 1: Essence is the show or appearance shine of the notion,
[17:26] Speaker 1: and the notion is being or idea in and for itself.
[17:32] Speaker 1: A doctrine of being Logic begins with being, because being
[17:37] Speaker 1: is on the one hand, pure thought, and on the
[17:40] Speaker 1: other immediacy itself simple and indeterminate. Now, if being is
[17:45] Speaker 1: complete indeterminateness, it is identical with nothing. Needs. Let us
[17:51] Speaker 1: see what Hegel means by the famous formula being equals nothing.
[17:56] Speaker 1: He means that where there is undoubtedly a distinction between
[17:59] Speaker 1: being and nothing, the distinction is not absolute, but only relative.
[18:03] Speaker 1: When Aristotle enunciated the principle of contradiction, he gave expression
[18:08] Speaker 1: to what is only part of the truth. For if
[18:11] Speaker 1: it is true that every object in every thought is
[18:14] Speaker 1: differentiated from every other object and every other thought, and
[18:18] Speaker 1: is therefore identical with itself. A is not not a
[18:21] Speaker 1: A equals a. It is no less true that every
[18:25] Speaker 1: object and every thought is related to every other object
[18:29] Speaker 1: and every other thought, and that in so far as
[18:32] Speaker 1: it is related to another, it is differentiated from itself
[18:36] Speaker 1: and identical with that other. A is not a A
[18:41] Speaker 1: equals not a. Aristotal emphasizing one aspect of thought, namely its
[18:47] Speaker 1: differentiating power, and failing to realize the equal importance of
[18:51] Speaker 1: the relating power of thought formulated the principle of contradiction.
[18:56] Speaker 1: The differentiation of things as if it were an absolute truth,
[19:00] Speaker 1: whereas it is only relative to one aspect of thought
[19:03] Speaker 1: and being. Looking at thought and being from the viewpoint
[19:06] Speaker 1: of totality, we see that the absolute differentiation or the
[19:10] Speaker 1: absolute identity of concepts or of things, is but part
[19:14] Speaker 1: of the truth, the whole truth being that concepts and
[19:18] Speaker 1: things are partially differentiated and partially identified. We have consequently
[19:24] Speaker 1: as much right to say that being is nothing as
[19:27] Speaker 1: that being is being, Since the whole truth is that
[19:30] Speaker 1: being is both being and nothing, It is becoming Doswaden.
[19:37] Speaker 1: Here we have the barest and most abstract form of development,
[19:40] Speaker 1: by means of the union of opposites becoming is, as
[19:45] Speaker 1: Hegel himself says, a poor term meager of content. Life
[19:50] Speaker 1: and mind are higher, richer, more intense unions of opposites
[19:55] Speaker 1: than is mere becoming, which however, is the abstract formula
[20:00] Speaker 1: of life and mind. The result of the union of
[20:03] Speaker 1: being and nothing in becoming is first the process itself,
[20:08] Speaker 1: an endless waging, a constant tension, and secondly, at each
[20:13] Speaker 1: stage of the process a product, so that to being
[20:17] Speaker 1: identical with nothing succeeds. Determinate being or what we call
[20:21] Speaker 1: something or being then in their design. Now the determinateness
[20:27] Speaker 1: of being is in its immediacy quality, from which are
[20:31] Speaker 1: it used the categories otherwise being, negation, limit, alteration, being
[20:37] Speaker 1: for itself, which is the one with its attraction and repulsion,
[20:41] Speaker 1: but in attraction and repulsion the one annuls itself and
[20:45] Speaker 1: its determinants, becoming the many. At this point, therefore, quality
[20:50] Speaker 1: passes over into quantity. Quantity is defined as quote pure being,
[20:57] Speaker 1: where the mode or character quality is no no longer
[21:00] Speaker 1: taken as one with the being itself, but explicitly put
[21:04] Speaker 1: as superseded or indifferent. Quantity arises from a unit and
[21:11] Speaker 1: the identification or equalization of other units completing. Now that
[21:17] Speaker 1: triadic circle within pure being, we have measure mass as
[21:21] Speaker 1: the union of quality and quantity. In measure, these two
[21:25] Speaker 1: are united. So, for example, progressive diminution in temperature causes
[21:30] Speaker 1: a transition from heat to cold. For quantity is implicitly
[21:35] Speaker 1: quality and quality is implicitly quantity. Being, which is thus
[21:41] Speaker 1: determined by quality, quantity and measure, becomes essence. Or in
[21:47] Speaker 1: other words, the determinations quality, quantity and measure being transitory.
[21:53] Speaker 1: The result of their dialectic is essence. B doctrine of
[21:59] Speaker 1: essence essence Viason is defined as being coming into mediation
[22:05] Speaker 1: with itself through the negativity of itself. Being, as we
[22:09] Speaker 1: have seen, is immediate in its self identity. Now, when
[22:14] Speaker 1: this immediacy is deposed, Being is reduced to a reflected light,
[22:19] Speaker 1: and essence is being thus reflected on itself. As reflexion
[22:25] Speaker 1: supersedes immediacy, essence supersedes being. The reflexion is, however, to
[22:31] Speaker 1: be conceived as inward indirection, for the outer rind oc
[22:36] Speaker 1: curtain is being and the inner reflexion is essence. There
[22:41] Speaker 1: is therefore a duality here. The categories of essence common pairs,
[22:46] Speaker 1: as for instance, essence and appearance, force and expression, matter
[22:51] Speaker 1: and form, substance and accident, cause and effect, a duality which,
[22:57] Speaker 1: as we shall see, disappears in the known, where in
[23:01] Speaker 1: the opposite aspects of being attain final unity. First we
[23:06] Speaker 1: have essence and appearance. Immediate being is now in appearance.
[23:11] Speaker 1: Yet it is not, as we should say, merely phenomenal,
[23:15] Speaker 1: for it is the appearance of an essence, and it
[23:18] Speaker 1: is as necessary that the appearance should have an essence
[23:22] Speaker 1: as it is that the essence should appear. Life, for example,
[23:26] Speaker 1: must manifest itself, the cause must produce an effect, and
[23:30] Speaker 1: at the same time, there is no manifestation of life
[23:34] Speaker 1: without life, and no production of an effect without a cause. Next,
[23:39] Speaker 1: as determinations of essence, we have identity and difference. The
[23:44] Speaker 1: unity of these is the ground kund, which is defined
[23:49] Speaker 1: quote the essence put explicitly in totality on quote. At
[23:54] Speaker 1: this point, essence has completed the circle of self mediation reflection,
[24:00] Speaker 1: so that we are back again at immediate being, not
[24:03] Speaker 1: at being in its primitive immediacy, but it being in
[24:06] Speaker 1: an immediacy which results from the annulment of all intermediation.
[24:12] Speaker 1: Being which is immediate in this sense is existence. Developing
[24:17] Speaker 1: now the categories of ground and existence into an explicit unity,
[24:21] Speaker 1: we arrive at the category of thing. Ding thing in
[24:26] Speaker 1: its relation to reflection on other things develops the category
[24:29] Speaker 1: of properties, and the union of essence with existence. Combining
[24:34] Speaker 1: all the essential with the existential aspects of being gives
[24:38] Speaker 1: the form of actuality, which is synonymous with reality. Similarly
[24:43] Speaker 1: by processes, the details of which it is unnecessary to
[24:47] Speaker 1: set down here, The category is content and form, power
[24:51] Speaker 1: and expression, inner and outer, substance and accident, cause and effect,
[24:57] Speaker 1: action and reaction are deduced from s. It is important, however,
[25:02] Speaker 1: to note that as substance and accident, so cause and effect,
[25:07] Speaker 1: and indeed all the categories which come under the head
[25:10] Speaker 1: of essence and appearance are inseparable. Cause passes over into effect,
[25:16] Speaker 1: so that the effect is the cause explicated or manifested,
[25:19] Speaker 1: and effect in turn passes over into cause. For the
[25:23] Speaker 1: cause of series is not a progress at infinitum, the
[25:26] Speaker 1: rectilinear movement from cause to effect being bent back on
[25:30] Speaker 1: itself so as to form a circle in which every
[25:34] Speaker 1: effect becomes the cause of its cause. This reciprocity is
[25:38] Speaker 1: illustrated in history. For example, the character and manners of
[25:42] Speaker 1: a nation influence its constitution and laws, while in turn,
[25:46] Speaker 1: the constitution and laws of a country influence the character
[25:50] Speaker 1: and manners of its people. The category of reciprocity Vexlwolkung
[25:55] Speaker 1: does away with the idea of predetermining fatality, shows that
[25:59] Speaker 1: free is to be found in the concept of absolute
[26:02] Speaker 1: but reciprocal necessity, and thus leads us to the category
[26:06] Speaker 1: of the notion see doctrine of the notion. The notion
[26:13] Speaker 1: begriff is quote essence reverted to the immediacy of being.
[26:19] Speaker 1: Or since each category is inseparable from its antecedent, the
[26:23] Speaker 1: notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance
[26:27] Speaker 1: self realized. In fact, the notion contains all the earlier
[26:31] Speaker 1: categories and may therefore be defined as the truth of
[26:34] Speaker 1: being an essence. Obviously, then we may understand the notion
[26:39] Speaker 1: to be synonymous with totality fully realized, which is apparently
[26:44] Speaker 1: what Hegel means when he says that quality, quantity, forice, cause, necessity,
[26:49] Speaker 1: freedom are nothing apart from the notion. The dialectical process
[26:54] Speaker 1: of being was transition, that of essence was reflection. The
[26:59] Speaker 1: movement of the notion is merely development. It is Hegel
[27:02] Speaker 1: tells us, to be looked upon as play for the
[27:05] Speaker 1: other which it sets up is not really another. Following
[27:10] Speaker 1: this play of the notion we find that its triatic
[27:13] Speaker 1: development is subjective notion, objective notion, and absolute notion or idea.
[27:20] Speaker 1: A subjective notion is the notion as notion, and as
[27:25] Speaker 1: such has three moments universality, particularity, and individuality. The meaning
[27:32] Speaker 1: is that the notion passes from unity to petition and
[27:36] Speaker 1: thence back to the explicit identification of parts in the one.
[27:40] Speaker 1: This reintegration is effected by means of judgment utile, which,
[27:45] Speaker 1: as its name implies, signifies the identification of partition with
[27:49] Speaker 1: primary unity, so that the abstract form in which all
[27:53] Speaker 1: judgments may be expressed is quote. The individual is the universal. Quote. Now, judgment,
[28:01] Speaker 1: inasmuch as it affirms the identity of the individual with
[28:04] Speaker 1: the universal, contains a contradiction. This contradiction is removed in
[28:10] Speaker 1: the syllogism. The syllogism is therefore the complete expression of
[28:14] Speaker 1: the subjective notion, the reintegration of the partitions of the
[28:18] Speaker 1: notion in the universal by means of the particular quote. Consequently,
[28:24] Speaker 1: at the present stage in the deduction of the categories.
[28:28] Speaker 1: The definition of the absolute is that it is a syllogism,
[28:32] Speaker 1: or stating the principle in the form of a proposition,
[28:36] Speaker 1: everything is a syllogism unquote b objective notion. Thus far
[28:43] Speaker 1: the notion has been considered in its subjective state, as
[28:47] Speaker 1: it were in the abstract, as form without content. But
[28:51] Speaker 1: since it is a form which in its ultimate development
[28:54] Speaker 1: is a union of opposites, it constantly tends to objectify itself.
[28:59] Speaker 1: Then the notion as object is the totality of objects
[29:03] Speaker 1: the universe. Here, as usual, we are to distinguish three
[29:08] Speaker 1: forms mechanism or the juxtaposition of independent objects held together
[29:13] Speaker 1: as an aggregate chemism, or the mutual attraction, penetration and
[29:19] Speaker 1: neutralization of objects elements held together by affinity and organism,
[29:24] Speaker 1: or the complete unity of purposive action, in which the
[29:28] Speaker 1: independence of the objects body cells disappears and parts are
[29:32] Speaker 1: made to serve the purpose of the entire structure. Now
[29:36] Speaker 1: notion become object implies a contradiction, for its subjective notion
[29:42] Speaker 1: was form without content. So the object as object is
[29:46] Speaker 1: content without form. The play of the notion has here
[29:50] Speaker 1: reached a point where the notion is not a notion.
[29:54] Speaker 1: The contradiction, however, disappears in the idea or absolute notion
[30:00] Speaker 1: see absolute notion is the truth in itself and for itself,
[30:05] Speaker 1: the absolute unity of notion and objectivity. It may be
[30:09] Speaker 1: defined as reason, subject, object, the union of the real
[30:13] Speaker 1: with the idea, of the body with the soul, et cetera.
[30:17] Speaker 1: It is essentially a process. In its immediate form, it
[30:21] Speaker 1: is life. When it becomes its own object. In the
[30:24] Speaker 1: theoretical order, it becomes the true. When it becomes its
[30:28] Speaker 1: own object, in the practical order, it becomes the good.
[30:33] Speaker 1: And when, by its theoretical and practical activity the knowledge
[30:37] Speaker 1: of the true and the pursuit of the good, it
[30:40] Speaker 1: returns to itself from the bias and finiteness of cognition
[30:43] Speaker 1: and volition, it becomes the absolute idea. Life is defective
[30:49] Speaker 1: inasmuch as it is the idea implicit or natural cognition.
[30:53] Speaker 1: Volition is defective in so far as it is the
[30:56] Speaker 1: idea as merely conscious and therefore one's. The absolute idea
[31:02] Speaker 1: unites the truth of life with the truth of consciousness,
[31:05] Speaker 1: supplying the defect of the former and overcoming the one
[31:09] Speaker 1: sidedness of the latter. This is the goal of the
[31:12] Speaker 1: entire series of logical processes. In its next phase, the
[31:16] Speaker 1: idea passes over into otherness and becomes nature. Thus far
[31:22] Speaker 1: we have followed the triadic developments of the idea reality, reason,
[31:26] Speaker 1: the absolute through processes which in non technical language may
[31:30] Speaker 1: be stilled the dialectic of the divine Reason. Untilarly to
[31:34] Speaker 1: the creation of the universe. We come in the next
[31:37] Speaker 1: place to the study of reason in nature. Second philosophy
[31:43] Speaker 1: of nature. Nature is the idea reason in the state
[31:48] Speaker 1: of otherness, a state intermediate between the immediacy of reason
[31:52] Speaker 1: as notion and the reintegrated immediacy of reason as it
[31:57] Speaker 1: fully realizes itself in spirit. In nature, the idea has
[32:01] Speaker 1: become externalized and particularized. Its unity has disappeared, or rather
[32:07] Speaker 1: is concealed. Still Nature, while it is a state of
[32:11] Speaker 1: the idea, is also a process of spirit. And although
[32:15] Speaker 1: the natural sciences are right in regarding phenomena as isolated realities,
[32:20] Speaker 1: they do not fully exhaust the truth of nature, the
[32:23] Speaker 1: very plurality of phenomena being a contradiction, which of itself
[32:28] Speaker 1: shows that nature is a process. Philosophy, therefore, taking a
[32:33] Speaker 1: higher viewpoint than that of science represents nature as a
[32:37] Speaker 1: series of successful struggles by which the idea, scattered as
[32:41] Speaker 1: it were in plurality, regains unity and self identity self
[32:45] Speaker 1: consciousness in the individual spirit man, which is the goal
[32:50] Speaker 1: of the processes of nature. Exclude this concept of the
[32:54] Speaker 1: upward struggle of nature, and natural phenomena become a tangled
[32:58] Speaker 1: mass of events in inexten tiokable disorder. There are three
[33:02] Speaker 1: stages in the process which is nature, namely mechanics, matter
[33:06] Speaker 1: and space, physics, bodies and organics. Life. In bodies, nature
[33:14] Speaker 1: attains individuality. In living organisms, it attains subjectivity or consciousness.
[33:21] Speaker 1: It is only in man that it attains self consciousness
[33:24] Speaker 1: self as subject and object. Man, however, while he is
[33:29] Speaker 1: the highest product of the idea in nature, is like
[33:33] Speaker 1: nature itself, subject to the law of development. No sooner therefore,
[33:38] Speaker 1: has the idea become spirit by attaining self consciousness in man,
[33:43] Speaker 1: than it undergoes a further and final process of development
[33:46] Speaker 1: as subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. This last process is
[33:52] Speaker 1: the subject matter of the philosophy of mind. The philosophy
[33:56] Speaker 1: of nature has been pronounced the least original and the
[33:59] Speaker 1: least consistence of the three portions into which Hegre's philosophy
[34:02] Speaker 1: is divided. It underwent more modification in the hands of
[34:06] Speaker 1: Hego's pupils and successors than did the logic or the
[34:10] Speaker 1: philosophy of mind. Yet, even in its modified form, the
[34:14] Speaker 1: Hegelian philosophy of nature is far from being consistent with
[34:17] Speaker 1: the principle of absolute idealism. Indeed, the supreme test of
[34:22] Speaker 1: a system of metaphysics is its compatibility with the ultimate
[34:26] Speaker 1: truth of empirical science, a test to which it is
[34:29] Speaker 1: safe to say no system of idealism from the days
[34:33] Speaker 1: of Parmenides to those of Hega has consistently conformed. Not
[34:37] Speaker 1: that the metaphysical point of view is not different from
[34:40] Speaker 1: that of the physical sciences. There may, however, be difference
[34:44] Speaker 1: without antagonism, For as Hegan himself observes quote, the philosophical
[34:50] Speaker 1: way of presenting things is not a capricious effort, for
[34:53] Speaker 1: once in a way to walk on one's head as
[34:56] Speaker 1: a change from the ordinary method of walking on one's feet.
[34:59] Speaker 1: But it is because the manner of science does not
[35:02] Speaker 1: fully satisfied, that we are obliged to go beyond it. Third,
[35:09] Speaker 1: philosophy of mind, mind, spirit geist is the truth of nature.
[35:16] Speaker 1: Its formal essence is freedom. The absolute self identity of
[35:21] Speaker 1: the idea mind, it is important to note, is the
[35:25] Speaker 1: most complete development of the absolute, so that when we
[35:29] Speaker 1: say the absolute is mind, we have the supreme definition
[35:33] Speaker 1: of the absolute. But our though mind is absolutely the
[35:36] Speaker 1: price of nature, yet for us it comes out of
[35:39] Speaker 1: nature and therefore brings with it what may be called
[35:43] Speaker 1: a germ of development. In this development we are to distinguish,
[35:47] Speaker 1: as usual three stages subjective mind, objective mind, and absolute mind.
[35:54] Speaker 1: A subjective mind. If freedom is the formal essence of mind,
[36:00] Speaker 1: consciousness is its material essence, for it is by successive
[36:04] Speaker 1: steps towards complete self consciousness that mind attains perfect freedom.
[36:10] Speaker 1: Hegel agrees with Spinoza in teaching that the emancipative acts
[36:15] Speaker 1: of the soul are conditioned by advance in knowledge, a
[36:18] Speaker 1: doctrine which does not surprise us when we remember that,
[36:22] Speaker 1: in Hegel's view, thought is essentially dynamic heaven, so to speak,
[36:27] Speaker 1: a volitional as well as a cognitive face. While mind
[36:32] Speaker 1: was still immersed in nature, it took part in the
[36:35] Speaker 1: planetary life of the universe, responding to the change of seasons,
[36:39] Speaker 1: et cetera, partially emerging from nature, it experienced in the
[36:44] Speaker 1: first dull stirring of consciousness, namely sensation infinno, a kind
[36:49] Speaker 1: of vague realization for itself as in and for itself
[36:55] Speaker 1: feeling does full succeeded sensation and was in turn succeeded
[37:01] Speaker 1: by self feeling sebstiful, which is the ground of consciousness
[37:05] Speaker 1: bevust sign. When it has reached this stage, mind, recognizing
[37:11] Speaker 1: itself as an ego, has divested itself of nature. Next,
[37:16] Speaker 1: as theoretical mind, it passes through the stages of intuition, unshown,
[37:21] Speaker 1: representation foorstenung, and thought dostanton. Having now taken possession of
[37:29] Speaker 1: its intuitions, representations, and thoughts, it proceeds as practical mind
[37:34] Speaker 1: to determine its contents. This it does by means of impulse, tribe,
[37:40] Speaker 1: desire begean, and inclination nigung, thus arriving at complete self determination,
[37:47] Speaker 1: which is freedom. Free will is therefore the union of
[37:51] Speaker 1: theoretical and practical mind quote it was Hegel remarks through
[37:57] Speaker 1: Christianity that this idea of actual freedom came into the world.
[38:01] Speaker 1: According to Christianity, the individual as such has an infinite
[38:06] Speaker 1: value as the object and aim of divine law. The
[38:11] Speaker 1: Greeks and Romans, he explains, maintained that freedom is an
[38:15] Speaker 1: accident of birth, or is grounded in strength of character,
[38:19] Speaker 1: or is acquired by education and philosophy, while Christianity, on
[38:23] Speaker 1: the contrary, maintains that man as man is free. Freedom,
[38:29] Speaker 1: once attained, must be realized, and according to the universal
[38:34] Speaker 1: formula of development, it must be realized through its opposite necessity.
[38:40] Speaker 1: It is for this reason that mind objectifies itself in law,
[38:44] Speaker 1: the family, and the state. In this way, through the
[38:48] Speaker 1: discipline of necessity, the egotistic impulse becomes property right, sexual
[38:53] Speaker 1: impulse becomes moral in marriage, and the inclination to revenge
[38:58] Speaker 1: is transformed into punitive justice in the state. B objective
[39:04] Speaker 1: mind the yoke of necessity to which free will subjects
[39:08] Speaker 1: itself in order to realize full freedom is a right Recht,
[39:14] Speaker 1: in which freedom attains outer actuality, b morality, morality, it
[39:20] Speaker 1: in which it attains inner actuality, and C social morality silicite,
[39:26] Speaker 1: in which it attains complete actuality, which is both inner
[39:30] Speaker 1: and outer. A from right springs ownership property, and from
[39:37] Speaker 1: ownership the right to dispose of one's possessions by contract. Now,
[39:43] Speaker 1: although contract refers primarily to individual property. It implies the
[39:48] Speaker 1: merging of two wills in the common will. Hence arises
[39:52] Speaker 1: the possibility of conflict between the will of the individual
[39:55] Speaker 1: and that of the community. In this conflict consists wrong unricht,
[40:01] Speaker 1: which is the duty of the public authority to correct,
[40:04] Speaker 1: but punishment. In this way, the idea of contract leads
[40:08] Speaker 1: to the idea of the state. B From morality spring purpose,
[40:14] Speaker 1: the inner determination of the subject. Intention, the subjective aim
[40:18] Speaker 1: of the action to be performed, inasmuch as that aim
[40:22] Speaker 1: is implied in the general well being of the subject,
[40:26] Speaker 1: and good and evil the moral aspects of action. These
[40:31] Speaker 1: determine the moral standpoint, the conscientious attitude, as we should
[40:36] Speaker 1: call it, of the agent. However, they determine it so
[40:40] Speaker 1: vaguely and unsatisfactorily that a conflict of apparent duties often results.
[40:46] Speaker 1: For conscience is liable to error, and what is subjectively
[40:50] Speaker 1: represented as good may be objectively evil. To right, therefore,
[40:55] Speaker 1: and to morality must be added social morality right regulates
[40:59] Speaker 1: me nearly the external material interests of life. Conscience is
[41:04] Speaker 1: one sided because it is subjective, social morality being at
[41:10] Speaker 1: once objective and subjective, external and internal is the complete
[41:16] Speaker 1: realization of freedom through the discipline of necessity see social morality.
[41:24] Speaker 1: In social moral life, the individual recognizes that what he
[41:28] Speaker 1: ought to do is for his duty is presented to
[41:32] Speaker 1: him in its objective, concrete realization in the family and
[41:35] Speaker 1: in the state. He is no longer subject to the
[41:39] Speaker 1: uncertainty of selective reflection. He sees his duty and he is,
[41:44] Speaker 1: as it were, constrained to fulfill it. It is by
[41:48] Speaker 1: submitting to this restraint that he attains the fullness of freedom.
[41:53] Speaker 1: The primary social moral institution is the family. It is
[41:57] Speaker 1: the foundation of the state and is of its nature permanent.
[42:02] Speaker 1: Hege was opposed to the principle of divorce and would
[42:05] Speaker 1: justify the granting of divorce only in exceptional cases provided
[42:09] Speaker 1: for by law. Civil society, the burgerli Higuzeyschaft is the
[42:14] Speaker 1: relative toatality of individuals. It is different on the one
[42:19] Speaker 1: hand from the family, for the family is an individual,
[42:22] Speaker 1: and on the other hand, from the state, for the
[42:25] Speaker 1: state is a complete organic unity in which individuals as
[42:29] Speaker 1: individuals do not exist. Civil society aims merely at the
[42:34] Speaker 1: protection of individual interests. Its mission is purely economic. The
[42:39] Speaker 1: state start is the perfect social organization. It does not
[42:44] Speaker 1: live for the individuals of which it is composed, but
[42:47] Speaker 1: for the ethical idea which it embodies. Individuals being merely
[42:51] Speaker 1: means which, when occasion demands, it must be sacrificed, as
[42:55] Speaker 1: all private interests must be sacrificed for the good of
[42:58] Speaker 1: the whole. Hegel, in Treating of the State, takes up
[43:03] Speaker 1: in succession constitutional law, the inner form of particular state organizations.
[43:09] Speaker 1: International law, the outer form of states, which is regulative
[43:13] Speaker 1: of the interrelations of states and the dialectics of history,
[43:18] Speaker 1: the laws of the general development of the universal mind,
[43:21] Speaker 1: which manifests itself both in the internal constitution and in
[43:25] Speaker 1: the outer forms of particular states. Constitutional law in ill Statsrecht,
[43:33] Speaker 1: the constitution is the articulation or organization of state power.
[43:39] Speaker 1: From the point of view of the individual, the power
[43:42] Speaker 1: of the state is a restriction still inasmuch as it
[43:46] Speaker 1: functions for the common good. It is the substance of
[43:49] Speaker 1: the volition of the individual by nature manner unequal, but
[43:54] Speaker 1: before the law, that is, by virtue of the principle
[43:57] Speaker 1: of state organization, the merging of individual your freedom in
[44:00] Speaker 1: the objective mind, all men are equal. This, however, means
[44:06] Speaker 1: that as abstract persons, they are equal, for in the
[44:10] Speaker 1: concrete there is no perfect equality, men being equal before
[44:14] Speaker 1: the law only in so far as they are equal
[44:17] Speaker 1: outside the law. The collective spirit of the nation is
[44:21] Speaker 1: the constitution, the real living totality. The embodiment of the
[44:26] Speaker 1: collective spirit is the government. And although according to the
[44:31] Speaker 1: basic laws of organization, the government must divide its powers legislative, judicial,
[44:37] Speaker 1: and executive, it must nevertheless preserve the highest form of
[44:42] Speaker 1: organic unity. For this reason, a constitutional monarchy is superior
[44:47] Speaker 1: to a republic on the one hand, and to an
[44:50] Speaker 1: absolute monarchy on the other hand. But while Hegel opposes
[44:54] Speaker 1: the extension of individualism within the state, he is in
[44:57] Speaker 1: favor of the individualism of state with respect to one another.
[45:02] Speaker 1: For the state is based on national spirit, and the
[45:06] Speaker 1: national spirit is fostered by unity of language, customs, religion,
[45:10] Speaker 1: et cetera. So long as a nation stands for a
[45:13] Speaker 1: national idea, it is a crime. Hego teaches to annex
[45:16] Speaker 1: it better. International law. Thus Eusichtadtricht, including treaty law and
[45:23] Speaker 1: natural law, governs the relation of states to one another
[45:27] Speaker 1: in time of peace and in time of war. War.
[45:30] Speaker 1: Hego teaches, is the indispensable means of political progress. It
[45:36] Speaker 1: is a crisis in the development of the idea which
[45:39] Speaker 1: is embodied in the different states, a crisis out of
[45:42] Speaker 1: which the better state, that is, the state which approaches
[45:46] Speaker 1: more closely to the ideal, is certain to emerge victorious,
[45:51] Speaker 1: for right is might, the better state conquers because it
[45:56] Speaker 1: is better. Thus, in every period of the world's history,
[46:00] Speaker 1: there has been some one chosen people, a nation which
[46:03] Speaker 1: realizes more perfectly than any other the ideal of national life.
[46:09] Speaker 1: This consideration leads to the next point, the dialectics of
[46:13] Speaker 1: history Gomma. The dialectics of history. Higin's philosophy of history
[46:20] Speaker 1: is perhaps the most important portion of his speculative system.
[46:25] Speaker 1: In it we find the most intelligible application of the
[46:29] Speaker 1: principle of development, which dominates the method and contents of
[46:32] Speaker 1: the other portions of his philosophy. Indeed, Heger, as well
[46:36] Speaker 1: as Shelling, insisted that the lower is to be understood
[46:40] Speaker 1: by the higher. The philosophy of history will therefore throw
[46:44] Speaker 1: light on the philosophy of nature and on logic. The
[46:49] Speaker 1: most general definition of the philosophy of history is that
[46:52] Speaker 1: it is the thoughtful consideration of history. More specifically, The
[46:58] Speaker 1: thought which philosophy brings to the study of history is
[47:01] Speaker 1: the conception of a sovereign reason, of which the succession
[47:05] Speaker 1: of historical events is a rational process. This is at
[47:09] Speaker 1: once a postulative history inasmuch as it is a demonstrated
[47:13] Speaker 1: thesis of philosophy, and a conclusion of history inasmuch as
[47:17] Speaker 1: it is the most obvious inference from the study of
[47:20] Speaker 1: historical happenings. The micrologist admits the peddling of the idea
[47:25] Speaker 1: of providence, but denies its applicability to the process of
[47:29] Speaker 1: history as a whole. We must not heal, observes, imagine
[47:33] Speaker 1: God to be too weak to exercise his wisdom on
[47:36] Speaker 1: the grand scale. History, then, is the process of reason
[47:41] Speaker 1: as spirit, interest, passion, character. In a word, all the
[47:46] Speaker 1: forces at play in the process are a compound of
[47:49] Speaker 1: will and intelligence. The world historical persons, the great men
[47:54] Speaker 1: of history, apparently drew the impulse of their lives from themselves.
[47:59] Speaker 1: In reality, however, they were great because they quote had
[48:03] Speaker 1: an insight into the requirements of the time, which was
[48:07] Speaker 1: ripe for development. They embodied the irresistible force of spirit
[48:13] Speaker 1: in their own lives. They lived not for themselves but
[48:16] Speaker 1: for the idea which was their master passion. Their fate
[48:20] Speaker 1: therefore was not a happy one. The development of the
[48:24] Speaker 1: spirit in history aims at complete freedom. The processes, however,
[48:29] Speaker 1: not a tranquil growth, but a stern, reluctant working through
[48:33] Speaker 1: opposition to complete realization. Thus we have three stages oneness, expansion,
[48:40] Speaker 1: and concentration. The Oriental monarchies represented despotism, the Grecian republics
[48:46] Speaker 1: represented the unstable equilibrium of democracy, tending towards demagogic rule,
[48:52] Speaker 1: and the Christian and parliamentary monarchy represents the reintegration of
[48:57] Speaker 1: freedom in constitutional government. Here we have an ideal example
[49:02] Speaker 1: of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, the triadic movement, which is
[49:07] Speaker 1: the law of all development. Even in the highest and
[49:11] Speaker 1: most perfect form of political organization, mind is limited, and
[49:15] Speaker 1: though the necessity which the state imposes makes for ultimate freedom,
[49:19] Speaker 1: yet it is necessity. Mind. Therefore, having objectified itself in
[49:24] Speaker 1: the state, must complete the circle of development by returning
[49:28] Speaker 1: to itself, become an identical with itself, and subjecting itself
[49:33] Speaker 1: to itself alone as absolute mind. In art, religion and philosophy,
[49:41] Speaker 1: c absolute mind is the ultimate identification of mind with itself. Here,
[49:47] Speaker 1: mind subjects itself to itself, not as limited, but as infinite.
[49:52] Speaker 1: There are three stages of absolute mind, art, religion, and philosophy.
[49:58] Speaker 1: A art. In art, mind has an intuitive contemplation of
[50:03] Speaker 1: itself as infinite in the objective actuality of the art material.
[50:08] Speaker 1: According as the art material becomes more docile, less rebellious
[50:13] Speaker 1: to the idea, we have architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry.
[50:19] Speaker 1: This is at once the line of ascending perfection and
[50:22] Speaker 1: the line of historical development b religion. In religion, mind
[50:29] Speaker 1: feels that the idea is superior to all its finite
[50:32] Speaker 1: and particular manifestations. Religion arises from poetry, the highest form
[50:38] Speaker 1: of art, but it is by its nature a protest
[50:41] Speaker 1: against the tendency of art to become pantheistic. Religion insists
[50:46] Speaker 1: on the infinity of God and the finiteness of man,
[50:49] Speaker 1: whereas the tendency of art is to defy man and
[50:53] Speaker 1: represent God as human. Nevertheless, it is essential to religion
[50:58] Speaker 1: to represent the infinite and finite as in some relation
[51:01] Speaker 1: with each other. Oriental religions exaggerated the idea of the infinite.
[51:07] Speaker 1: Greek religion gave undue importance to the finite. Christianity, being
[51:13] Speaker 1: a synthesis of both, represents the union of the infinite
[51:17] Speaker 1: and the finite in the doctrine of the incarnation, and
[51:21] Speaker 1: represents all truth in the dogma of the Trinity by
[51:24] Speaker 1: teaching as far as representation can teach the triadic development
[51:29] Speaker 1: of imminent reason as idea nature and spirit. The intellectual
[51:35] Speaker 1: content of Christianity is thus the same as that of philosophy.
[51:39] Speaker 1: There is no supernatural truth gnosticism. Religion, however, contains the
[51:45] Speaker 1: truth in the form of symbols and representations. Philosophy, therefore,
[51:50] Speaker 1: which contains the truth as reason, is superior to religion.
[51:56] Speaker 1: See philosophy is the unity of art and religion. The infinite, which,
[52:01] Speaker 1: as the beautiful was rendered visible in art and as
[52:05] Speaker 1: God was made the object of representation and feeling in religion,
[52:10] Speaker 1: is now as the true made the object of the
[52:13] Speaker 1: thinking faculty in philosophy. Philosophies consequently quote the highest, freest
[52:19] Speaker 1: and wisest phase of the union of subjective and objective
[52:23] Speaker 1: mind and the ultimate goal of all development en quote
[52:29] Speaker 1: historical position. It is difficult to trace, even in outline
[52:34] Speaker 1: the influence which Hegre's philosophy exercised on the thought of
[52:37] Speaker 1: his own and subsequent generations. Some of Figu's contemporaries regarded
[52:42] Speaker 1: his system of philosophy as the organic synthesis of all
[52:46] Speaker 1: preceding speculation and the final form of philosophic thought. Others believed,
[52:51] Speaker 1: and not a few still believe, that that system must
[52:55] Speaker 1: be the foundation of all profitable speculation in the future,
[53:00] Speaker 1: when due allowance is made for the exaggerations which are inevitable.
[53:04] Speaker 1: Whenever the cult of greatness attains, as in this instance
[53:08] Speaker 1: it has attained, almost to the proportions of religious venovation,
[53:12] Speaker 1: it cannot be denied that Hegels was the mind which,
[53:16] Speaker 1: in developing towards a more complete unity the elements of
[53:19] Speaker 1: kanteent thought, took the most comprehensive synthetic view of the
[53:23] Speaker 1: problems of philosophy, reached farthest and deepest into every department
[53:28] Speaker 1: of knowledge, and found in the principle of development the
[53:32] Speaker 1: bond best suited, by reason of its simplicity and universal applicability,
[53:38] Speaker 1: to hold together the various elements of a system extending
[53:42] Speaker 1: from the promise of logic to the analysis of religion.
[53:46] Speaker 1: It is safe to say that no department of human
[53:49] Speaker 1: knowledge has failed to feel the influence of Heger's doctrines,
[53:53] Speaker 1: or at least of his method, and this is due
[53:56] Speaker 1: partly to the fact that his philosophy embodies the highest
[53:59] Speaker 1: aspirations of the spirit of the nineteenth century, the spirit
[54:03] Speaker 1: of collectivism, and partly to the fact that in his
[54:07] Speaker 1: system of thoughts, so large scope is assigned to the
[54:10] Speaker 1: principle of development, which has so dominated the scientific as
[54:14] Speaker 1: well as the philosophical thought of the century. But the
[54:18] Speaker 1: very greatness of Hegre's plan, the vastness of the enterprise itself,
[54:23] Speaker 1: was the surest guarantee of its ultimate failure. The rational
[54:27] Speaker 1: alone is real is a formula which, as understood and
[54:31] Speaker 1: applied by Hege, means that there are no limits to
[54:35] Speaker 1: the power of the thinking faculty. For whether we understand
[54:38] Speaker 1: the rational to refer to the infinite reason of the
[54:41] Speaker 1: creator or to the finite reason of the creature, the
[54:45] Speaker 1: conclusion is ultimately the same, that everything real is to
[54:49] Speaker 1: be analyzed in terms of rational thought. How inadequate is
[54:54] Speaker 1: this view of reality? The reaction against Hegelianism has taught
[54:59] Speaker 1: us by in insisting on the importance of the non rational,
[55:03] Speaker 1: and how hopeless is the self imposed task of this
[55:06] Speaker 1: new gnosticism is proved by Hegel's concept of God, which
[55:10] Speaker 1: is the least satisfactory portion of his philosophy. The attempt
[55:14] Speaker 1: to bring all reality under a single formula may indeed
[55:18] Speaker 1: be the ideal of philosophy, but it is certainly an
[55:22] Speaker 1: ideal which is as unattainable in practice as the dream
[55:26] Speaker 1: of the world conqueror, who would bring all the nations
[55:29] Speaker 1: of the earth under the scepter of one monarch. The
[55:32] Speaker 1: highest unification which the finite mind can effect will necessarily
[55:37] Speaker 1: fall short of absolute unity, for it is not given
[55:41] Speaker 1: to the human mind to grasp the fatality of being
[55:45] Speaker 1: and to find in one formula a rationale of all reality.
[55:50] Speaker 1: No philosophical system can consistently claim to comprehend God. It
[55:55] Speaker 1: may discover him, but it must acknowledge that He and
[55:59] Speaker 1: his ways are inscrutable. Philosophy must leave room for faith,
[56:03] Speaker 1: and its last word must be the necessity of faith. Gnosticism,
[56:09] Speaker 1: as the modern world is just now realizing, is more
[56:12] Speaker 1: a religious than agnosticism. It was the followers of Hegel
[56:17] Speaker 1: who first revealed to the religious world the true drift
[56:20] Speaker 1: of Hegalianism. The so called Hegelian leftists developed the anti
[56:25] Speaker 1: Christian elements in Hegel's thought, while the rightists maintained that
[56:30] Speaker 1: the teaching of Hegel accords with Christian faith and the
[56:34] Speaker 1: doctrines of the church. To the leftists belonged to Strauss
[56:39] Speaker 1: eighteen hundred eight to eighteen hundred seventy four, author of
[56:43] Speaker 1: dosleib Miyezu, Puno Bauer eighteen hundred nine to eighteen hundred
[56:48] Speaker 1: eighty two, author of Critik de ifangilih geshichtid As Johannes
[56:52] Speaker 1: not to be confused with F. C. Bauer seventeen hundred
[56:56] Speaker 1: ninety two to eighteen hundred sixty, head of the tubing
[57:00] Speaker 1: In School, Feuerbach eighteen hundred four to eighteen hundred seventy two,
[57:04] Speaker 1: author of Daswisend's Kisten Tombs, and the socialist Karl Marx
[57:09] Speaker 1: eighteen hundred eighteen to eighteen hundred eighty three. To the
[57:13] Speaker 1: rightists belonged Goshel seventeen hundred eighty one to eighteen hundred
[57:18] Speaker 1: sixty one, Rosenkrantz eighteen hundred five to eighteen hundred seventy nine,
[57:23] Speaker 1: professor at Koenigsberg, and Johann Eduard Erdmann eighteen hundred five
[57:28] Speaker 1: to eighteen hundred ninety two, Professor at Halle. End of
[57:33] Speaker 1: chapter sixty five

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