# 048 - Modern Philosophy Chapter 56 Spinoza

An episode of [History of Philosophy](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1877164155), 25 Feb 2026, 52 min.

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Dive into the captivating journey of philosophical thought through the ages with History of Philosophy. This podcast unravels the rich tapestry of philosophical opinions, systems, and schools of thought, exploring the lives of influential philosophers and the intricate connections between different schools of philosophy. Discover the origins of Ancient Philosophy across cultures like Babylon, China, India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, as well as the profound insights of the Christian Era, featuring thinkers such as St. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ockham. Journey into Modern Philosophy with giants like Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, all guided by the insightful narration of Beth Thomas. This episode includes AI-generated content.

## Transcript

[0:00] Speaker 1: Chapter fifty six of History of Philosophy. This is a
[0:04] Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
[0:09] Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit libevox dot org.
[0:15] Speaker 1: Recording by Florence. History of Philosophy by William Turner, chapter
[0:21] Speaker 1: fifty six. Spinoza life Barruk Benedict Spinosa was born in
[0:27] Speaker 1: sixteen thirty two at Amsterdam, where his parents, who were
[0:31] Speaker 1: Portuguese Jews, had sought refuge from religious persecution. He received
[0:37] Speaker 1: his early education in the Jewish Academy at Amsterdam. Later,
[0:42] Speaker 1: he studied natural science under the tuition of a freethinking
[0:46] Speaker 1: physician named van den End, and was initiated into the
[0:51] Speaker 1: mysteries of Talmudic literature and philosophy by the Rabbi Montera.
[0:56] Speaker 1: In sixteen fifty six, he was solemnly excommunity indicated by
[1:00] Speaker 1: the Synagogue on account of his heterodox views, and obliged
[1:04] Speaker 1: to leave his native city. After a few years spent
[1:08] Speaker 1: at Reinsberg and Voorburg, he repaired in sixteen sixty nine
[1:12] Speaker 1: to the Hague, where he earned his livelihood by polishing lenses.
[1:18] Speaker 1: In sixteen seventy three he declined the offer of a
[1:22] Speaker 1: professorship at Heidelberg. Preferring the quiet and independence of the
[1:26] Speaker 1: humble life which he had elected to lead, he chose
[1:30] Speaker 1: poverty for his lot, and when he died in sixteen
[1:33] Speaker 1: seventy seven, his worldly possessions were barely sufficient to pay
[1:37] Speaker 1: a few trivial debts which he had contracted during his illness.
[1:42] Speaker 1: Sources the principal philosophical works of Spinosa ar De Intellectus,
[1:49] Speaker 1: Emendatione Ethica, ordinae Geometrico, Demonstrator, Tractatus Politicus, Tractatus Theologico Politicus, Principea,
[2:01] Speaker 1: Philosophia Cartesiana in geometrical form, Cogitato Metaphysica, and a short
[2:09] Speaker 1: treatise on God and Man written in Dutch. The best
[2:13] Speaker 1: edition of Spinoza's works is that of Van Vloten and
[2:17] Speaker 1: Land the Hague eighteen eighty two to eighteen eighty three
[2:21] Speaker 1: in two volumes, reprinted eighteen ninety five in three volumes.
[2:26] Speaker 1: Pollux Spinoza, His Life in Philosophy, London, eighteen eighty and
[2:32] Speaker 1: Principal Cads Spinoza. Blackwood's philosophical classics Edinburgh and Philadelphia eighteen
[2:39] Speaker 1: eighty eight are excellent Introductions to the Philosophy of Spinoza.
[2:44] Speaker 1: The Ethica was translated by White London eighteen eighty three
[2:49] Speaker 1: and by Elvis London eighteen eighty three to eighteen eighty four.
[2:54] Speaker 1: Doctrines Spinoza's idea of philosophy. It will be impossible to
[3:00] Speaker 1: arrive at a definite idea of Spinoza's system, or to
[3:04] Speaker 1: reconcile the widely divergent interpretations of his philosophy, unless we
[3:10] Speaker 1: first inquire into the motive which actuated him in his
[3:13] Speaker 1: philosophical speculations, and try to discover the point of view
[3:18] Speaker 1: from which he looked out on the world of life
[3:21] Speaker 1: and thought. In the treatise they intellect Us Emma datione,
[3:27] Speaker 1: he gives us a kind of mental autobiography and tells
[3:30] Speaker 1: us that his aim in philosophy is to seek the
[3:33] Speaker 1: knowledge which makes men happy. His thought, therefore is not
[3:38] Speaker 1: set in motion by a problem of causality, nor is
[3:41] Speaker 1: he interested in the question of the value of knowledge.
[3:45] Speaker 1: But he is troubled at the unrest of which the
[3:48] Speaker 1: whole world is full, and he approaches the problems of
[3:51] Speaker 1: philosophy in the ethical rather than in the scientific spirit,
[3:56] Speaker 1: with the hope of leading his reader to look upon
[3:59] Speaker 1: things in that aspect of them which shall conduce to
[4:02] Speaker 1: greater spiritual and moral perfection. This is the significance of
[4:07] Speaker 1: the title Ethica, by which he designated his great metaphysical treatise.
[4:13] Speaker 1: To this ethical aim of his philosophy, Spinosas subordinated everything else,
[4:19] Speaker 1: even logical consistency and systematic coherency, causing to converge in
[4:25] Speaker 1: one channel of thought Cartesianism, the pantheism of Bruno Amemnodaise,
[4:32] Speaker 1: and the mysticism of the neo Platonists and the Kabalistic philosophers.
[4:38] Speaker 1: Starting point definitions, Spinoza's method is even more formally and
[4:44] Speaker 1: technically mathematical than that of Decar. The Ethica starts with
[4:50] Speaker 1: definitions and axioms and proceeds by a process of syllogistic
[4:55] Speaker 1: proof to the establishment of propositions and corollaries. Spinoza defines
[5:01] Speaker 1: substance as follows definition three pear substantium inteligo id quad
[5:08] Speaker 1: in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id
[5:14] Speaker 1: crugis conceptus known indigate conceeptu alterius ray aquo fomari debia.
[5:22] Speaker 1: And here whatever view we may take as to the
[5:25] Speaker 1: preponderance of Descartes's influence on Spinoza's mind, we cannot fail
[5:30] Speaker 1: to observe that Spinoza's definition is but an interpretation of
[5:35] Speaker 1: the ambiguous words in which Descar defines substance rays quai
[5:41] Speaker 1: itta existed ut nulla alia ray in digiat add existendum.
[5:47] Speaker 1: Spinoza next proceeds to define attribute pear attributum inteligo id
[5:54] Speaker 1: quod intellectus day substantia pecipit tanqui eristem sent m constituents
[6:04] Speaker 1: definition four. In the following definition definition five, he describes
[6:10] Speaker 1: mode per modem inteligo substantii effectitiones ci ve d quadinalio
[6:19] Speaker 1: st peer quad etim concipitor substance, substance, Attribute and mode
[6:27] Speaker 1: are the cardonal ideas in Spinosa's system of thought. Having
[6:32] Speaker 1: defined them, therefore, he proceeds to show from the definitions
[6:37] Speaker 1: A that substance is one infinite proposition eight and indivisible
[6:44] Speaker 1: proposition twelve. B that the one substance is God proposition fourteen.
[6:51] Speaker 1: Now God is defined definition six as ends absolute infinitum
[6:58] Speaker 1: hoc s substantia constants infinitis attributis quorum unum quad quay
[7:06] Speaker 1: itnum et infinitam essentiam expremit. God is then an infinity
[7:13] Speaker 1: of infinities, and although an attribute such as thought or
[7:18] Speaker 1: a mode such as space may be infinite, God alone
[7:22] Speaker 1: is infinite in the infinity of his infinite attributes. They
[7:27] Speaker 1: are infinite in one respect. He is infinite in all respects.
[7:32] Speaker 1: The existence of God is a necessary truth. In proof
[7:36] Speaker 1: of this, Spinoza advances the argument that God is substance,
[7:41] Speaker 1: and substance must exist proposition six, for not depending on
[7:47] Speaker 1: anything else for its existence, it must cause itself, and
[7:51] Speaker 1: therefore its essence must contain existence in the second place,
[7:56] Speaker 1: Spinoza proposition eleven advances in proof of the existence of God,
[8:02] Speaker 1: an argument of which the following is the major premise
[8:06] Speaker 1: id necessario existed cugis nulla ratio valcorsa data quai impedit
[8:14] Speaker 1: quominus exist at. He then proceeds to argue that neither
[8:19] Speaker 1: in the divine nature nor outside it, is there any
[8:23] Speaker 1: cause which could prevent the existence of God. The argument,
[8:28] Speaker 1: as is evident, is guilty of the fallacy of passing
[8:32] Speaker 1: from the order of ideas to the order of existence,
[8:35] Speaker 1: and merely proves the self evident truth that if God exists.
[8:40] Speaker 1: Existence is a necessary ashboot of the divinity. Thirdly, Spinoza
[8:45] Speaker 1: advances the following proof of the existence of God posse
[8:49] Speaker 1: non existere impotentia est et contra posse existeria potentia est
[8:58] Speaker 1: ut per s notum s ittoque id qua jam necessaria
[9:04] Speaker 1: existed No nisi entie finita sunt sunt ergo entie finita
[9:12] Speaker 1: potentiora anti absolute infinito at qui hoc utp se notem
[9:20] Speaker 1: absurdum est ergo vel nihil existed, vel ends absolute infinitum
[9:27] Speaker 1: necessario etiem existed at quien nos vel in nobus vel
[9:33] Speaker 1: in alio quad necessario existed existimus ergo ends absolute infinitum
[9:42] Speaker 1: hoc est peer definition six deus necssario existed. In a
[9:49] Speaker 1: scolion appendent to this argument, Spinosa, after calling attention to
[9:54] Speaker 1: the apparently a posteriori form of the proof, remarks that
[9:59] Speaker 1: in reality we do not argue from the existence of
[10:02] Speaker 1: the finite to that of the infinite. That the conviction
[10:06] Speaker 1: that God exists is based not on the reality of
[10:10] Speaker 1: the finite, but rather on the unreality, that is, on
[10:14] Speaker 1: the imperfection of all finite being for the more perfect
[10:19] Speaker 1: a substance is the more reality it possesses. God is
[10:24] Speaker 1: the only substance Proposition fourteen. Whatever is is in God
[10:31] Speaker 1: Proposition fifteen. It follows proposition eighteen that God is the imminent,
[10:39] Speaker 1: not the transient, cause of all finite existence. It remains
[10:43] Speaker 1: therefore for us to find in His unity that from
[10:47] Speaker 1: which the differences of things are derived. This Spinoza attempts
[10:52] Speaker 1: to do by means of the doctrine of attributes and
[10:55] Speaker 1: modes attributes of the divine substance. The first determination of
[11:01] Speaker 1: the infinite is by means of the attributes thought and extension.
[11:07] Speaker 1: God is indeed an infinity of attributes. Thought and extension
[11:12] Speaker 1: are merely the two attributes under which the human mind
[11:15] Speaker 1: is capable of representing Him. Instead, therefore, of Descartes's doctrine
[11:20] Speaker 1: of the antithesis of the substance of mind to the
[11:24] Speaker 1: substance of matter, we have the doctrine of one substance
[11:28] Speaker 1: conceived under the antithetical attributes thought and extension. For thought
[11:34] Speaker 1: is merely one way of looking at God, and extension another.
[11:38] Speaker 1: So that when I say deist s raise Cogitans and
[11:43] Speaker 1: deist s raise extensor, I am speaking of one and
[11:47] Speaker 1: the same reality conceived in two different ways. The attributes,
[11:52] Speaker 1: therefore are not ways in which God determines himself, but
[11:57] Speaker 1: rather ways in which we determine him. And consequently, the
[12:02] Speaker 1: first attempt to find in the one the reason of
[12:05] Speaker 1: the difference of the many is a failure. Indeed, Spinoza,
[12:10] Speaker 1: if he were consistent, should have ended where he began,
[12:14] Speaker 1: namely at the definition of the one substance, and never
[12:17] Speaker 1: have even attempted to derive the many from the one.
[12:21] Speaker 1: Not deterred, however, by his first failure, Spinoza, in his
[12:25] Speaker 1: Doctrine of Modes, renews the attempt to find a derivation
[12:29] Speaker 1: of the finite from the infinite modes of the divine substance.
[12:34] Speaker 1: The attributes were never, it seems, intended to mean finite,
[12:38] Speaker 1: being for the character of independence per set concipie belongs
[12:44] Speaker 1: to attribute, as it does to substance. But the mode,
[12:49] Speaker 1: which can neither exist nor be conceived without substance. Definition five,
[12:55] Speaker 1: is surely finite, And here, if anywhere, we shall find
[12:59] Speaker 1: the derivation of the finite from the infinite. For modes
[13:03] Speaker 1: are apparently the countless parts into which the divine substance
[13:08] Speaker 1: is sundered. The numberless billows which the ocean of eternal
[13:12] Speaker 1: being casts up from its unfathomed depths. It is only
[13:17] Speaker 1: in so far as God is determined to particular modes
[13:20] Speaker 1: of being that He can be said to cause them.
[13:24] Speaker 1: My body is caused by God inasmuch as it is
[13:28] Speaker 1: a determination of him, So too is my soul. So
[13:33] Speaker 1: also are the various objects in the world around me.
[13:37] Speaker 1: When therefore, I ask are these modes identical with God?
[13:41] Speaker 1: Am I God? I must answer that I am not God,
[13:46] Speaker 1: for He is infinite and I am determined to this
[13:49] Speaker 1: particular mode. But take away the determination of my mode
[13:53] Speaker 1: of being, and I am God. In this sense we
[13:57] Speaker 1: are diminished Gods. There are therefore two ways of viewing
[14:02] Speaker 1: concrete finite things, first as they are determined in time
[14:06] Speaker 1: and space, and secondly subspecie eternitatis, that is, prescinding from
[14:14] Speaker 1: all determination and looking at things merely as flowing necessarily
[14:20] Speaker 1: from the divine substance A. We are now in a
[14:24] Speaker 1: position to ask is Spinoza a pantheist, For the answer
[14:29] Speaker 1: to this question will depend on the answer to this
[14:32] Speaker 1: other question. Does Spinoza hold that finite things as such
[14:36] Speaker 1: exist at all? That the modes have any existence apart
[14:41] Speaker 1: from the substance that they determine the substance in the
[14:45] Speaker 1: sense of a real determination. Spinoza expressly teaches that nothing
[14:51] Speaker 1: proceeds from the infinite except the infinite. Are the modes
[14:56] Speaker 1: then infinite since they come from the infinite? He answers
[15:01] Speaker 1: that the modes come from God inasmuch as quietness God
[15:07] Speaker 1: is modified by finite modes and may therefore be finite. This, however,
[15:13] Speaker 1: is merely a subterfuge. The real answer is given when
[15:18] Speaker 1: on the ground that all determination is negation or limit
[15:22] Speaker 1: is not being. Spinoza finally denies that the mode is
[15:26] Speaker 1: real the senses it is true present the world to
[15:31] Speaker 1: us as consisting of finite beings, really determined and distinct
[15:35] Speaker 1: from one another and from the infinite. Yet if we
[15:40] Speaker 1: view things subspecie eternitartis and reflect that all determination is negation,
[15:48] Speaker 1: then all distinction and all finiteness disappear, and we find
[15:53] Speaker 1: that we have returned to the starting point to the assertion,
[15:56] Speaker 1: namely that God is one and all is God. We
[16:01] Speaker 1: may indeed distinguish between natura naturans, which is substance absolutely
[16:07] Speaker 1: devoid of determination, the indivisible one, and natura naturata, which
[16:13] Speaker 1: is substance, infinitely modified and determined to an infinity of
[16:18] Speaker 1: modes of being. But the distinction dissolves when we reflect
[16:23] Speaker 1: that determination is negation, and that consequently the sum of
[16:28] Speaker 1: all determinations is equal to nothing. We may therefore maintain
[16:33] Speaker 1: the formula substance equals God equals nature. It is clear
[16:39] Speaker 1: now that the mode is as unreal as the attribute,
[16:43] Speaker 1: and that substance evades all attempts at differentiation. In determination.
[16:49] Speaker 1: We can see how things lead up to substance, but
[16:51] Speaker 1: we cannot see how they are derived from it. The substance,
[16:56] Speaker 1: which is the central concept in knows the system of thought,
[17:00] Speaker 1: being compared to the lion's den, whither many tracks lead,
[17:04] Speaker 1: but whence none can be seen to return b the
[17:08] Speaker 1: self maintaining impulse. Spinoza once more renews the attempt to
[17:14] Speaker 1: derive the finite from the infinite when he describes the
[17:18] Speaker 1: finite as only partly negative exparte negatio. There is then
[17:24] Speaker 1: in the finite a positive element, which, when we come
[17:28] Speaker 1: to examine it, we find to be a self maintaining impulse,
[17:32] Speaker 1: an effort connatus by which it seeks to preserve its existence.
[17:38] Speaker 1: In Ethhaica three six, this impulse is said to be
[17:41] Speaker 1: the essence of finite being. But here once more, when
[17:45] Speaker 1: we ask how this positive element is related to the substance,
[17:50] Speaker 1: Spinoza is obliged to answer that it is a determination
[17:54] Speaker 1: of God. We are therefore thrown back on the monism
[17:58] Speaker 1: with which we started, There is no being but God
[18:02] Speaker 1: see description of the infinite. Abandoning now all attempt at
[18:07] Speaker 1: deriving the many from the one, let us inquire with
[18:11] Speaker 1: Spinoza into the nature of the one substance. We must
[18:14] Speaker 1: not expect to define it, for to define is to determine.
[18:19] Speaker 1: We may, however, describe it by predicating terms of it analogously,
[18:24] Speaker 1: as the schoolmen would say. It is, for example, a cause,
[18:29] Speaker 1: not in the sense in which fire is a cause
[18:31] Speaker 1: of heat, but rather in the sense in which the
[18:34] Speaker 1: blackboard may be said to be the cause of the
[18:36] Speaker 1: figures which limit or determine portions of its surface. The
[18:41] Speaker 1: one substance may be said to be eternal in the
[18:45] Speaker 1: sense that its essence involves existence, or, to use Spinoza's
[18:49] Speaker 1: peculiar phraseology, in the sense that it is the cause
[18:53] Speaker 1: of itself, but What surprises us most in Spinoza's description
[18:57] Speaker 1: of the one substance is the assertion that possesses neither
[19:01] Speaker 1: intellect nor will, these being determinations belonging to natura naturata.
[19:06] Speaker 1: It is evident, therefore, that the infinite is a geometrical
[19:11] Speaker 1: rather than a dynamic infinet, that there is in it
[19:15] Speaker 1: no principle of freedom or finality, that all things proceed
[19:19] Speaker 1: from it by necessary and immutable law, just as the
[19:23] Speaker 1: properties of a triangle, to use Spinosa's favorite illustration, proceed
[19:28] Speaker 1: from the nature of the triangle. God is not a
[19:31] Speaker 1: self determining, self integrating spirit, but an inert impersonal substance.
[19:37] Speaker 1: Philosophy of the finite, the first determinations of substance are
[19:42] Speaker 1: as we have seen, mind and matter, or substance conceived
[19:46] Speaker 1: as thinking and substance conceived as extended. These attributes, although
[19:52] Speaker 1: antithetical and therefore exclusive of interaction, are arranged in a
[19:57] Speaker 1: certain parallelism, so that every mode of substance has its
[20:01] Speaker 1: thought aspect and its extension aspect. For example, the idea
[20:06] Speaker 1: of a circle and the circle itself are the thought
[20:09] Speaker 1: aspect and the extension aspect of one and the same
[20:13] Speaker 1: mode of substance. To this parallelism we shall return later on.
[20:19] Speaker 1: Before taking up the philosophy of mind and the philosophy
[20:22] Speaker 1: of matter, it is necessary to speak of the infinite modes.
[20:26] Speaker 1: A The infinite modes are introduced in order to fill
[20:30] Speaker 1: up the gap between God and finite modes. As modes,
[20:34] Speaker 1: they are finite. As infinite modes, they belong to the
[20:38] Speaker 1: sphere of the infinite. These infinite modes are either modifications
[20:43] Speaker 1: of the absolute nature of some attribute, or modifications of
[20:47] Speaker 1: an attribute already modified, but so modified as to be
[20:51] Speaker 1: eternal and infinite. When asked for examples, Spinosa answers that
[20:57] Speaker 1: to the first class belongs infinite into as an infinite
[21:01] Speaker 1: mode of thought and motion, and rest as infinite modifications
[21:05] Speaker 1: of extension, while to the second class belongs the form
[21:10] Speaker 1: of the whole universe Phacier's totious universie, which, though it
[21:16] Speaker 1: varies in an infinity of ways, is always the same.
[21:20] Speaker 1: This final attempt at mediation between the infinite and the
[21:23] Speaker 1: finite is like Allspinoza's previous attempts in the same direction.
[21:28] Speaker 1: A failure for the modes must in ultimate analysis, be
[21:33] Speaker 1: either finite or infinite. The doctrine of infinite modes is, however,
[21:39] Speaker 1: interesting by reason of its striking resemblance to the neoplatonic
[21:43] Speaker 1: doctrine of the logos, which was just such an illogical
[21:47] Speaker 1: introduction of a something intermediate between the one and the many. Indeed,
[21:53] Speaker 1: Spinoza himself was aware of the resemblance. The doctrine is
[21:57] Speaker 1: also of interest as showing once more has Spinoza's speculative
[22:01] Speaker 1: intuition realize the necessity of introducing into his system some
[22:06] Speaker 1: principle productive of differentiation and plurality, a principle which, however,
[22:13] Speaker 1: the logic of his system would not and could not admit,
[22:17] Speaker 1: from each of the infinite modes precedes an infinity of
[22:20] Speaker 1: finite modes. From infinite intellect precede all finite minds, and
[22:26] Speaker 1: from infinite extension precede all finite bodies. We come therefore
[22:31] Speaker 1: to the philosophy of body and mind be philosophy of body.
[22:37] Speaker 1: Extension is infinite, one because it is an attribute of God,
[22:42] Speaker 1: and two because its development could be impeded neither by
[22:46] Speaker 1: a mode of thought nor by a mode of extension.
[22:50] Speaker 1: And whatever is finite is so because it is in
[22:53] Speaker 1: some way impeded in its development. Extension is not only infinite,
[22:59] Speaker 1: it is also one and continuous, because and whatever problem
[23:03] Speaker 1: Spernoza happens to be discussing, he always takes us back
[23:07] Speaker 1: to this point. Substance is one and continuous. There is
[23:12] Speaker 1: therefore no substantial but merely a modal divisibility of extension.
[23:19] Speaker 1: Extension is essentially active, not inert, as Stascartes taught. For
[23:24] Speaker 1: it is, as we have seen, an attribute of substance,
[23:27] Speaker 1: and substance, although incapable of self differentiation, is essentially and
[23:33] Speaker 1: eternally active. Every extended mode of substance is therefore preceded
[23:39] Speaker 1: by and followed by an infinite series of movements. Thus,
[23:43] Speaker 1: for the mechanism of Descartes Spinoza substitutes a dynamism of
[23:48] Speaker 1: a peculiar kind, namely, a dynamism based on the eternal
[23:52] Speaker 1: activity of the infinite substance, not on the activity of
[23:56] Speaker 1: matter itself. Particular bodies are systems of movements. The molecules
[24:02] Speaker 1: of the living body, for instance, are constantly changing, yet
[24:06] Speaker 1: the body remains the same because the same relation continues
[24:10] Speaker 1: to exist between the molecules. The set of movements remains
[24:14] Speaker 1: the same, but the living body is itself part of
[24:18] Speaker 1: a larger system of movements of the terrestrial planet, for instance,
[24:24] Speaker 1: and this in turn forms part of a still larger system,
[24:28] Speaker 1: so that the isolated individuality of any one body is
[24:32] Speaker 1: an illusion of the imagination. A comprehensive view, that is,
[24:37] Speaker 1: an inadequate knowledge of any particular body reveals it to
[24:41] Speaker 1: be but part of the universal system of movements. But
[24:45] Speaker 1: whence comes the order in this cosmic system of movements?
[24:49] Speaker 1: Whence the adaptation of organ to function and of individual
[24:53] Speaker 1: to environment. Spinosa has already answered in general terms that
[24:58] Speaker 1: in the geometrical process, as of the finite from the infinite,
[25:02] Speaker 1: there is no place for the concept of finality. So
[25:06] Speaker 1: too in the philosophy of body, he teaches that the
[25:09] Speaker 1: extension modes of substance proceed from substance as extended, not
[25:15] Speaker 1: as thinking. There can therefore be no intended adaptation. The
[25:21] Speaker 1: processes of the cosmos proceed by an unconscious geometry, in
[25:26] Speaker 1: the same way as the spider spins its web without
[25:30] Speaker 1: any knowledge of the proportion and symmetry of figures. It
[25:34] Speaker 1: is only by imagination that we distinguish objects, fancy them
[25:39] Speaker 1: to be individual, group them in figures, and arrange them
[25:42] Speaker 1: so as to produce beauty of form or color. This
[25:46] Speaker 1: arrangement was not intended in the processes themselves, so that
[25:50] Speaker 1: if we see beauty and adaptation in the geometrical processes
[25:55] Speaker 1: of nature, it is due to the illusions arising from
[25:59] Speaker 1: the inadequous of our knowledge see Philosophy of Mind. Spinoza's
[26:06] Speaker 1: psychology is partly foreshadowed in his doctrine of substance. Thought
[26:11] Speaker 1: as an infinite attribute of the infinite. Substance is eternal
[26:15] Speaker 1: and necessary. It is the thought of God by God.
[26:20] Speaker 1: Minds created minds as we commonly call them, and ideas
[26:25] Speaker 1: are modes of substance under the aspect of thought, just
[26:29] Speaker 1: as bodies are modes of substance under the aspect of extension.
[26:33] Speaker 1: The order and connection of ideas is already determined by
[26:37] Speaker 1: the order and connection of extension modes edom s ordo
[26:42] Speaker 1: ideerum et order rereum. To every thought mode corresponds an
[26:47] Speaker 1: extension mode, and this parallelism, being universal, implies that everything thinks. Indeed,
[26:54] Speaker 1: Spinoza openly teaches that animals, plants, and even inanimate objects think,
[27:01] Speaker 1: for the essence of a thing is the self maintaining
[27:04] Speaker 1: impulse and an impulse is a tendency conatus, and tendency
[27:09] Speaker 1: implies thought. Plant thought, however, and animal thought, Spinoza confesses
[27:15] Speaker 1: to be thought of a very rudimentary kind. The human
[27:18] Speaker 1: mind is, like every other mind, a mode of the
[27:21] Speaker 1: divine substance. But what kind of mode it is? Defined?
[27:27] Speaker 1: In the first place, as the idea of the body,
[27:30] Speaker 1: we commonly say that man is composed of body and soul.
[27:34] Speaker 1: In reality, man is substance determined to that particular mode
[27:39] Speaker 1: of extension which we call body, and to that particular
[27:43] Speaker 1: mode of thought, which is the idea of body, and
[27:46] Speaker 1: which we call soul. Body and soul are therefore one
[27:51] Speaker 1: and the same thing, conceived under the aspects of extension
[27:55] Speaker 1: and of thought, respectively. It will be observed, however, that
[28:00] Speaker 1: although Spinoza reduces the soul to an idea, he is
[28:04] Speaker 1: far from maintaining with a phenomenalist that the soul has
[28:08] Speaker 1: no substantial reality. For he maintains that the soul is
[28:12] Speaker 1: a mode of the great reality, which is the one substance.
[28:17] Speaker 1: It will be observed also that since the soul is
[28:20] Speaker 1: the idea of the body, or in other words, the
[28:23] Speaker 1: consciousness of the organic states of the body, the conclusion
[28:27] Speaker 1: that we must be aware of everything which takes place
[28:29] Speaker 1: in the body, and that consequently every man must be
[28:33] Speaker 1: an adept in physiology, appears at first sight inevitable Spinosa,
[28:40] Speaker 1: wishing to ward against the reductio ad absurdum of his definition,
[28:45] Speaker 1: teaches that the human mind does not involve an adequate
[28:48] Speaker 1: knowledge of the parts of the body, and that the
[28:51] Speaker 1: ideas of the affections of the body, in so far
[28:54] Speaker 1: as they are related only to the human mind, are
[28:57] Speaker 1: not clear and distinct, but can fused. The human mind
[29:02] Speaker 1: is defined in the second place as the idea of
[29:05] Speaker 1: an idea idia idia or idia mentis. In other words, mind,
[29:13] Speaker 1: after having been defined as consciousness, is now defined as
[29:17] Speaker 1: self consciousness. The second definition is supplementary of the first,
[29:23] Speaker 1: and like the first, defines mind with a distinct reference
[29:27] Speaker 1: to body. For when we say that mind is the
[29:30] Speaker 1: idea of an idea, we mean the idea of the
[29:33] Speaker 1: idea of the body. Self consciousness is consciousness of self
[29:38] Speaker 1: as revealed by bodily states, or the reflex consciousness of
[29:43] Speaker 1: our perceptions of those states. Having defined mind, we next
[29:48] Speaker 1: turn to the study of knowledge, which is the characteristic
[29:51] Speaker 1: attitude of the mind. Towards things. In the first exercise
[29:56] Speaker 1: of the mind, our knowledge is inadequate, fragmentary, and confused.
[30:01] Speaker 1: The reason of this imperfection is the fact that, at first,
[30:06] Speaker 1: our point of view is purely individual, the point of
[30:09] Speaker 1: view of one who, being himself part of the world
[30:12] Speaker 1: of reality, apprehends merely those portions of reality with which
[30:17] Speaker 1: he comes in contact. The inadequacy of this kind of
[30:22] Speaker 1: knowledge is increased by the tendency of the mind to
[30:26] Speaker 1: form fictitious universals, such as being man et cetera, which
[30:32] Speaker 1: are not a sign of the mind's strength, but rather
[30:35] Speaker 1: of its weakness, that is to say, of its inability
[30:39] Speaker 1: to keep impressions apart from each other when they reach
[30:43] Speaker 1: a certain limit in number and complexity. From this imperfect
[30:47] Speaker 1: and inadequate knowledge, man must pass to perfect and adequate
[30:51] Speaker 1: knowledge by abandoning the individual and partial point of view,
[30:56] Speaker 1: and by rising above himself and finite conditions. For perfect
[31:01] Speaker 1: and adequate knowledge is untroubled by finite conditions and by
[31:05] Speaker 1: the peculiarities of individual temperament. In this development from inadequate
[31:11] Speaker 1: to adequate knowledge, Spinoza distinguishes two stages. A reason ratio
[31:19] Speaker 1: is the knowledge of the laws or principles which are
[31:21] Speaker 1: common to all bodies, and which determine not their accidental
[31:26] Speaker 1: but their essential relations. This kind of knowledge is acquired
[31:31] Speaker 1: not immediately but by deduction. Arguing from effect to cause,
[31:37] Speaker 1: we arrive at a knowledge of the permanent and essential
[31:39] Speaker 1: properties of things, and of their unnulterable laws and natures,
[31:44] Speaker 1: a knowledge which is superior to the imperfect individualistic knowledge,
[31:49] Speaker 1: inasmuch as the latter reveals to us merely the illusory
[31:53] Speaker 1: surface qualities of things. Studied from the point of view
[31:57] Speaker 1: of reason, things assume as certain permanency, and consequently, rational
[32:03] Speaker 1: knowledge may be said to be a knowledge of things
[32:06] Speaker 1: subquadums specie itternit artis. Rational knowledge is, however, necessarily incomplete.
[32:14] Speaker 1: It enables us to arrive at generic and specific concepts
[32:18] Speaker 1: partial unifications, but it cannot lift us up to that
[32:22] Speaker 1: point where knowledge is completely unified and all things are
[32:26] Speaker 1: viewed subspecie itternit artis. This point we reach by means
[32:32] Speaker 1: of be intuitive knowledge scientia intuitiva. In this stage of development,
[32:40] Speaker 1: the mind, being farthest removed from the individual point of view,
[32:45] Speaker 1: no longer proceeds inferentially from one part of reality to another,
[32:51] Speaker 1: but taking a comprehensive intuitive view of all reality, apprehends
[32:55] Speaker 1: all things in the light of the first principle substance,
[33:00] Speaker 1: and looking at all things subspeccie itnitatis, sees all in God,
[33:06] Speaker 1: and God in all. From this point of view, space, time,
[33:12] Speaker 1: difference are seen to disappear and to be swallowed up
[33:15] Speaker 1: in the immensity of God. He who has reached this
[33:18] Speaker 1: point evolves all his ideas from that which represents the
[33:23] Speaker 1: origin and source of all nature, so that that idea
[33:28] Speaker 1: appears to be the source of all others. He has
[33:31] Speaker 1: arrived at the culminating point in the development of human knowledge.
[33:36] Speaker 1: We may remark in this theory of development of knowledge,
[33:39] Speaker 1: one that whereas Descartes was content with making clearness and
[33:44] Speaker 1: distinctness of perception a criterion of truth, Spinoza requires that,
[33:50] Speaker 1: in addition to clearness and distinctness, our knowledge possesses also
[33:55] Speaker 1: adequacy or comprehensiveness. Two that's d KNOWSA maintains the power
[34:01] Speaker 1: of the human mind to comprehend infinite substance, that is,
[34:06] Speaker 1: to know God adequately. Three that error exists only where
[34:12] Speaker 1: knowledge is confused and inadequate. That consequently, the mind never
[34:18] Speaker 1: errs if it views things subspecie eternitatis, and that, since
[34:23] Speaker 1: it is the will which determines whether a man shall
[34:27] Speaker 1: or shall not attain intuitive knowledge, will and not intellect,
[34:31] Speaker 1: is the source of error. Four, that the three stages
[34:36] Speaker 1: of development of knowledge may be described as sense knowledge,
[34:40] Speaker 1: scientific knowledge, and philosophical knowledge. We must, however, always remember
[34:47] Speaker 1: that Spinoza sets the practical above the theoretical, and that
[34:51] Speaker 1: he considers the third to be the most perfect kind
[34:54] Speaker 1: of knowledge, not because it implies greater speculative insight into
[34:59] Speaker 1: the nature of things, but because it sets the soul
[35:02] Speaker 1: at rest, and, like the ecstatic knowledge of which the
[35:06] Speaker 1: mystics speak, enables us to despise the unrest and worry
[35:11] Speaker 1: caused by the underward events of life. This consideration brings
[35:16] Speaker 1: us to the study of the ethical problems on which
[35:19] Speaker 1: all Spinosa's philosophy converges. The moral nature of man. We
[35:25] Speaker 1: have seen that the essence of finite things is the
[35:29] Speaker 1: cannatus existendi, the self maintaining impulse. In man. This self
[35:36] Speaker 1: realizing impulse accompanies each of the three stages of knowledge,
[35:40] Speaker 1: assuming in each a different complexion. In the plane of
[35:45] Speaker 1: confused knowledge, it manifests itself as emotions. In the higher
[35:49] Speaker 1: plane of rational knowledge, it manifests itself as will, and
[35:54] Speaker 1: in the highest plane, namely that of intuitive knowledge, it
[35:58] Speaker 1: manifests itself as the intellectual love of God, in which
[36:03] Speaker 1: consists the blessed life of immortality. A Let us consider
[36:09] Speaker 1: the mind in the state of confuse knowledge. Its being
[36:12] Speaker 1: is thought. It is a diminished God, a God repressed,
[36:17] Speaker 1: as it were, by the modes which limit its thought
[36:20] Speaker 1: on every side. Like every other finite being, it strives
[36:25] Speaker 1: not only to maintain itself but also to extend its
[36:29] Speaker 1: being by breaking through the modes which hem it in.
[36:33] Speaker 1: But unlike other finite beings, the mind is conscious of
[36:37] Speaker 1: this effort. It is conscious also of the modes which
[36:41] Speaker 1: affect it through the body, and it knows whether such
[36:44] Speaker 1: modes diminish or increase its power of thought. This consciousness
[36:49] Speaker 1: is emotion. In the third definition of the third part
[36:54] Speaker 1: of the Ethica, emotion is defined peer effectum inteligo could
[37:00] Speaker 1: porus effectiones quipercipsius couporus agendi potentia augatur vel minuitare juvater
[37:10] Speaker 1: vel coecatur edsimil haum effectionem ideas, And in the eleventh
[37:17] Speaker 1: proposition of the same part. Spinosa proves that whatever increases
[37:22] Speaker 1: or diminishes the body's power of action, increases or diminishes
[37:26] Speaker 1: the mind's power of thought. Emotion, then, is the obscure
[37:31] Speaker 1: and inadequate consciousness of a transition from a less to
[37:35] Speaker 1: a greater, or from a greater to a less power
[37:39] Speaker 1: of body or mind. The fundamental emotion is desire cupiditas,
[37:45] Speaker 1: which is perhaps more properly described as the mental prerequisite
[37:49] Speaker 1: of all emotional activity, for it is the self maintaining
[37:54] Speaker 1: impulse itself. When a mode of the body, such as
[37:58] Speaker 1: the sight of a flower, increases the mind's activity, there
[38:03] Speaker 1: results the emotion of pleasure or joy latitia. When, on
[38:08] Speaker 1: the contrary, a mode of a body, such as the
[38:11] Speaker 1: hearing of unwelcome news, diminishes the mind's activity, there results
[38:16] Speaker 1: the emotion of sadness fristithia. Love is the idea of
[38:22] Speaker 1: an external thing which is the cause of joy, and
[38:26] Speaker 1: hatred is the idea of an external thing which is
[38:29] Speaker 1: the cause of sadness. Hope is the fluttering inconstant's joy,
[38:35] Speaker 1: and fear the intermittent sadness arising from the idea of
[38:39] Speaker 1: an event which is of doubtful occurrence. When the element
[38:44] Speaker 1: of doubt is removed, hope becomes security, and fear passes
[38:49] Speaker 1: into despair. The emotional state called gaudium is joy arising
[38:55] Speaker 1: from the remembrance of a certain event as passed, while
[38:59] Speaker 1: its opposite regret conscientia imorsus his sadness, arising from the
[39:05] Speaker 1: remembrance of a certain event which has occurred. Both these
[39:09] Speaker 1: states imply a previous doubt as to whether the event
[39:13] Speaker 1: to which they refer did or did not occur. The
[39:16] Speaker 1: emotions are associated by contiguity, resemblance, and causation. This portion
[39:24] Speaker 1: of Spinoza's Ethhica is replete with instances of acute psychological analysis.
[39:30] Speaker 1: The greatest defect in his treatment of the emotions is
[39:33] Speaker 1: the exclusion of all intellectual emotions, such as zeal, love
[39:38] Speaker 1: of God, love of justice, love of country, et cetera.
[39:43] Speaker 1: The emotional life of man belongs, according to Spinoza, to
[39:48] Speaker 1: the condition of bondage. As long as we continue to
[39:52] Speaker 1: look on the modes of the finite world as they
[39:55] Speaker 1: affect us through the modes of our own bodies, so
[39:58] Speaker 1: long are we nearly part of nature and subject to
[40:02] Speaker 1: nature's inevitable laws, we may imagine that we are free
[40:07] Speaker 1: because we have no clear knowledge of the antecedents of
[40:10] Speaker 1: the modes which affect us. But in reality, every indistinct
[40:15] Speaker 1: consciousness is itself physically determined, and we are no more
[40:20] Speaker 1: free to act than the straw which floats down the
[40:23] Speaker 1: river is free to turn and float against the current.
[40:27] Speaker 1: In this condition of bondage, man's moral life has not
[40:31] Speaker 1: properly begun at all, for in this condition there is
[40:34] Speaker 1: no right or wrong, but only pleasure or pain. Man's
[40:39] Speaker 1: moral life begins in the stage of rational knowledge, in
[40:42] Speaker 1: which the emotions give place to will be in the
[40:46] Speaker 1: second stage of knowledge, we possess adequate instead of inadequate ideas.
[40:52] Speaker 1: Taking a broader view and contemplating the vast order of
[40:56] Speaker 1: the universe and its eternal laws, we see that the
[41:00] Speaker 1: objects of our love and aversion are really parts of
[41:04] Speaker 1: the complex totality ruled by the inexorable laws of nature.
[41:09] Speaker 1: And the vehemence of our passions appears to us as
[41:12] Speaker 1: it really is, no more reasonable than the child's anger
[41:16] Speaker 1: at the stone which has hurt it. Reason can no
[41:20] Speaker 1: more be moved by pleasure or pain, by love or
[41:23] Speaker 1: hatred of any finite cause of our emotions than it
[41:27] Speaker 1: can love or hate a triangle, because the latter possesses
[41:31] Speaker 1: three angles, which are equal to two right angles. Thus,
[41:35] Speaker 1: the mind, when it has arrived at the plane of
[41:38] Speaker 1: rational knowledge, having lifted itself above the cloud land of
[41:42] Speaker 1: emotional life, having risen above the storm of passion, is
[41:47] Speaker 1: no longer buffeted by every wind of feeling, or constrained
[41:51] Speaker 1: by pleasure and pain. In a word, it passes from
[41:55] Speaker 1: the state of bondage to the state of freedom. There
[41:59] Speaker 1: is a rational en element in every passion, and when
[42:02] Speaker 1: having acquired an adequate idea of the passion, we recognize
[42:07] Speaker 1: that rational element. Blind impulse gives way to deliberate pursuit
[42:12] Speaker 1: or avoidance. Remark that in the stage of rational knowledge,
[42:17] Speaker 1: this rational element is not yet located in God, but
[42:21] Speaker 1: merely in the common properties of things or in universal law.
[42:26] Speaker 1: The perfection of freedom and the final location of all
[42:29] Speaker 1: the objects of will in God himself, is attained by
[42:33] Speaker 1: means of intuitive knowledge. It is somewhat surprising to find
[42:38] Speaker 1: that Spinoza describes the moral emancipation of man as a
[42:42] Speaker 1: process of intellectual development without distinct reference to will, which
[42:48] Speaker 1: is the proper subject of moral excellence. The explanation is
[42:52] Speaker 1: to be found in the fact that Spinoza identifies will
[42:56] Speaker 1: with intellect. Will ununderstanding, he says, are one and the same.
[43:01] Speaker 1: Intelligence contains in itself that free voluntary activity which we
[43:07] Speaker 1: are accustomed to regard as the exclusive function of will,
[43:12] Speaker 1: for good or evil, means whatever helps or hinders our
[43:16] Speaker 1: power of thought. It is of great importance to note
[43:20] Speaker 1: that freedom, as understood by s. Menosa, is, even in
[43:25] Speaker 1: the sense of free understanding rather than of free will,
[43:29] Speaker 1: incompatible with his general concept of the universe, and is
[43:33] Speaker 1: maintained only at the expense of logical consistency. If man,
[43:39] Speaker 1: in the state of confused knowledge is a slave to
[43:42] Speaker 1: passion because he is part of nature and is therefore
[43:46] Speaker 1: subject to the iron rule of necessity, which governs all things,
[43:50] Speaker 1: from substance down to the least of the modes of substance,
[43:54] Speaker 1: it follows that man cannot become free except by ceasing
[43:58] Speaker 1: to be part of nature, and this he can never do.
[44:03] Speaker 1: Even the state of bondage. There is no germ of freedom.
[44:06] Speaker 1: Freedom cannot be developed by any development of knowledge. Spinoza
[44:11] Speaker 1: cannot consistently avoid determinism. He should never have tried to
[44:16] Speaker 1: emancipate man, just as he should never have attempted to
[44:20] Speaker 1: derive the manifold from the one. See. We come now
[44:25] Speaker 1: to the third stage in the moral emancipation of the
[44:28] Speaker 1: human mind, namely to that in which man attains to
[44:33] Speaker 1: the intellectual love of God and the blessed immortality. In
[44:38] Speaker 1: the fifth part of the Ethica, Spinoza teaches that the mind,
[44:43] Speaker 1: arriving at the culminating stage of intellectual development scientia intuitiva,
[44:50] Speaker 1: wherein it sees all things in God, can bring it
[44:53] Speaker 1: about that all bodily affections and images of things are
[44:57] Speaker 1: referred to the idea of God. When this state is reached,
[45:02] Speaker 1: all passion ceases, and emotion and volition are absorbed in
[45:06] Speaker 1: the knowledge and love of God, amor intellectualist day. This
[45:13] Speaker 1: intellectual love of God is the highest kind of virtue,
[45:17] Speaker 1: and it not only makes man free, but also confers immortality.
[45:23] Speaker 1: For this love has no relation to the body or
[45:26] Speaker 1: to bodily states, and consequently it cannot be in any
[45:30] Speaker 1: way affected by the destruction of the body. But here
[45:35] Speaker 1: it naturally occurs to us to ask what has become
[45:38] Speaker 1: of the principle that to every mode of thought there
[45:42] Speaker 1: corresponds a mode of extension when the body perishes. What
[45:47] Speaker 1: extension mode corresponds to the eternal thought, which is bliss
[45:51] Speaker 1: and immortality. Spinoza answers that while the mode of extension,
[45:58] Speaker 1: which is the human body conditioned by time and space, perishes,
[46:03] Speaker 1: there remains the essence of the body, which is conceived
[46:06] Speaker 1: under a form of eternity. At the same time, the sensitive,
[46:11] Speaker 1: an imaginative part of the soul perishes with the actual body,
[46:16] Speaker 1: so that the ultimate conclusion is that both body and
[46:20] Speaker 1: soul are partly mortal and partly immortal. We must not
[46:25] Speaker 1: overlook the fact that in his Ethica, Spinoza speaks of
[46:30] Speaker 1: the eternity rather than of the immortality of the soul,
[46:35] Speaker 1: and by eternity he does not primarily mean unending duration,
[46:40] Speaker 1: but a kind of rational necessity by which a thing
[46:44] Speaker 1: forms once for all an integral part of the universe,
[46:48] Speaker 1: although of course what is necessarily a part of the
[46:51] Speaker 1: universe cannot cease to exist. Moreover, this eternity or deathlessness,
[46:59] Speaker 1: is a condition into which the soul enters in this life.
[47:03] Speaker 1: The immortality which is sanctioned by Spinoza's principles is not
[47:08] Speaker 1: a quantitative but a qualitative endowment, not existence for indefinite time,
[47:15] Speaker 1: but the quality of being above all time. Spinoza does
[47:19] Speaker 1: not conceive immortality as originally and equally inherent in all men.
[47:25] Speaker 1: He conceives it as something to be acquired by each
[47:28] Speaker 1: man for himself, and is capable of being acquired in
[47:31] Speaker 1: different degrees. Finally, we may ask whether the immortality of
[47:36] Speaker 1: which Spinoza speaks is immortality at all. Is there in
[47:41] Speaker 1: this concept of immortality a survival of the individual. On
[47:46] Speaker 1: the one hand, Spinoza teaches that imagination and memory perish
[47:51] Speaker 1: with the actual body, and with these faculties perish all
[47:56] Speaker 1: the recollections, associations, educated nerve processes, and everything else which
[48:03] Speaker 1: serves to perpetuate personal traits and characteristics. On the other hand,
[48:09] Speaker 1: Spinoza is careful to guard against the doctrine of absorption
[48:12] Speaker 1: of the individual in God, for he teaches that final
[48:17] Speaker 1: happiness is a state in which man, in attaining the
[48:20] Speaker 1: highest unity with God, attains at the same time the
[48:25] Speaker 1: highest consciousness of self, so that in this union the
[48:29] Speaker 1: distinction between God and creature is not obliterated, but rather accentuated.
[48:36] Speaker 1: The conclusion seems to be that the blessed life is
[48:39] Speaker 1: a state in which we shall retain our individuality, but
[48:43] Speaker 1: shall have apparently no means of recognizing ourselves as the
[48:48] Speaker 1: same individuals historical position. What first arrests our attention in
[48:55] Speaker 1: the study of Spinoza's philosophy is the strict geometrical method
[49:00] Speaker 1: which he adopted. Starting with the definition of substance, he
[49:04] Speaker 1: proceeds to deduce from a single truth a whole system
[49:08] Speaker 1: of philosophy. From this definition, we follow him to the
[49:13] Speaker 1: point where he first attempts to account for the diversity
[49:16] Speaker 1: of things, and there his first lapse into inconsistency occurs.
[49:22] Speaker 1: In order to account for the diversity of things, he
[49:25] Speaker 1: is forced to assume something besides the one inert substance,
[49:29] Speaker 1: and over and over again he surreptitiously introduces a principle
[49:34] Speaker 1: which the logic of his premises can never justify. The
[49:38] Speaker 1: truth is that, as has already been said, if Spinoza
[49:43] Speaker 1: had been perfectly consistent, he should never have attempted to
[49:47] Speaker 1: go beyond the definition of substance, which is his starting
[49:51] Speaker 1: point and should also have been the final goal of
[49:54] Speaker 1: his system. In attempting to explain away the inconsistencies of
[49:59] Speaker 1: Spinoza as thought. Some have overlooked the individualistic elements in
[50:04] Speaker 1: his system and represented him merely as a pantheist, while others,
[50:10] Speaker 1: looking upon the pantheistic elements as mere formulas, represent him
[50:14] Speaker 1: as an empiricist. To one, he is a god intoxicated man.
[50:20] Speaker 1: To another, he is a sordid and filthy atheist, sordidus
[50:24] Speaker 1: et lutulentus atheus. Both these views are in a certain
[50:30] Speaker 1: sense correct, and yet both are wrong. For if we
[50:34] Speaker 1: consider merely the speculative elements in Spinoza's philosophy, we must
[50:39] Speaker 1: pronounce him to be at once a pantheist and an empiricist,
[50:43] Speaker 1: an anomalous being reminding us of the winged bull of
[50:47] Speaker 1: a Syrian art, a creature of air and a creature
[50:50] Speaker 1: of earth. But as has been pointed out above, Spinoza's
[50:54] Speaker 1: aim was practical rather than theoretical. We must not picture
[51:00] Speaker 1: him as concerned merely with the speculative aspect of the
[51:04] Speaker 1: problems of philosophy. We must rather picture him as he
[51:08] Speaker 1: represents himself, and as we know him from the events
[51:12] Speaker 1: of his life, a poor persecuted Jew, rejected by his
[51:16] Speaker 1: co religionists and despise by his Christian neighbors, bearing impatience
[51:22] Speaker 1: the sufferings which were his lot in life. For him,
[51:26] Speaker 1: metaphysics was what it never had been, even for Plato,
[51:30] Speaker 1: a religion and a refuge. In it, he hoped to
[51:34] Speaker 1: find that view of the universe which would reconcile him
[51:38] Speaker 1: to his own hard fate and enable him to rise
[51:41] Speaker 1: to a plane where his enemies could not reach him.
[51:44] Speaker 1: We should bear these facts in mind when we criticize Spinosa,
[51:49] Speaker 1: and though they should not render us blind to his errors,
[51:53] Speaker 1: which are many and serious, they should enable us to
[51:56] Speaker 1: understand his thought, which is often sublime and is always
[52:01] Speaker 1: deserving a sympathetic attention. End of Chapter fifty six.

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