# 053 - Modern Philosophy Chapters 61 and 62 Pan-Phenomenalism German Illumination

An episode of [History of Philosophy](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1877164155), 2 Mar 2026, 22 min.

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Dive into the captivating journey of philosophical thought through the ages with History of Philosophy. This podcast unravels the rich tapestry of philosophical opinions, systems, and schools of thought, exploring the lives of influential philosophers and the intricate connections between different schools of philosophy. Discover the origins of Ancient Philosophy across cultures like Babylon, China, India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, as well as the profound insights of the Christian Era, featuring thinkers such as St. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ockham. Journey into Modern Philosophy with giants like Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, all guided by the insightful narration of Beth Thomas. This episode includes AI-generated content.

## Transcript

[0:00] Speaker 1: Chapters number sixty one and sixty two of History of Philosophy.
[0:07] Speaker 1: This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in
[0:11] Speaker 1: the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please
[0:16] Speaker 1: visit LibriVox dot org. Recording by Katarina Glovala. History of
[0:24] Speaker 1: Philosophy by William Turner, Chapter sixty one pen Phenomenalism Yume.
[0:34] Speaker 1: So far, the history of philosophy of the eighteenth century
[0:37] Speaker 1: has been the story of the empirical attempt to solve
[0:41] Speaker 1: the Cartesian problem by reducing mind to matter, and of
[0:45] Speaker 1: the idealistic attempt to solve the same problem by reducing
[0:49] Speaker 1: matter to mind. There remains one more phase of eighteenth
[0:53] Speaker 1: century speculation, namely Yume's answer to the Cartesian problem, if
[0:58] Speaker 1: indeed it may be called an anaza, since it is
[1:01] Speaker 1: rather a denial of the reason for proposing such a
[1:04] Speaker 1: problem at all. For instead of trying to untie what
[1:08] Speaker 1: may be called the Gordian knot of Postcartesian speculation, Yum
[1:12] Speaker 1: cut the knot by denying the substantial existence of mind
[1:15] Speaker 1: and matter. Hume life David Hume was born at Edinburgh
[1:24] Speaker 1: in seventeen eleven. After an unsuccessful attempt to fit himself
[1:28] Speaker 1: for the profession of law, he decided to take up
[1:31] Speaker 1: the study of philosophy and literature. During the years seventeen
[1:35] Speaker 1: thirty four to seventeen thirty seven, which he spent in France,
[1:40] Speaker 1: he wrote his Treatise on Human Nature. The work, he says, quote,
[1:45] Speaker 1: fell dead born from the press, without reaching such distinction
[1:49] Speaker 1: as even to excite a murmur among the Zealids end
[1:53] Speaker 1: of quote. Later he recast the first book of the
[1:57] Speaker 1: treatise into his Enquiry concerning Human and Dstanding, the second
[2:01] Speaker 1: book into his Dissertation on the Passions, and the third
[2:05] Speaker 1: into his Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. His essays Moral, Political,
[2:12] Speaker 1: and Literary, which were published at Edinburgh in seventeen forty two,
[2:17] Speaker 1: met a favorable reception. In seventeen forty seven he accompanied
[2:22] Speaker 1: a military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin,
[2:26] Speaker 1: and again in seventeen sixty three he accompanied the English
[2:30] Speaker 1: ambassador to the court of Versailles, where he remained until
[2:33] Speaker 1: seventeen sixty six. During the interval he had held the
[2:37] Speaker 1: office of keeper of the Advocates Library at Edinburgh, and
[2:41] Speaker 1: had begun the publication of his history of England. In
[2:44] Speaker 1: seventeen sixty seven. He was made Under Secretary of State
[2:47] Speaker 1: in the Foreign Office. In seventeen sixty nine. He returned
[2:51] Speaker 1: to Edinburgh and died there in seventeen seventy six. Sourceis.
[2:57] Speaker 1: In addition to the works already mentioned, Yum wrote a
[3:00] Speaker 1: Natural History of Religion and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The
[3:05] Speaker 1: standard edition of Hume's philosophical works is that of Green
[3:08] Speaker 1: and Gross, four volumes, London, eighteen seventy four, reprinted eighteen
[3:14] Speaker 1: eighty nine to eighteen ninety. The student may be referred
[3:17] Speaker 1: to Huxley's Yume Englishmen of Letters Series eighteen seventy nine,
[3:22] Speaker 1: to Knights Yume, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics eighteen eighty six, and
[3:28] Speaker 1: to the introduction to Green Engross's edition of Hume's works
[3:33] Speaker 1: Doctrines starting point. Hume's starting point is that of the empiricist,
[3:40] Speaker 1: and his conception of the method of philosophical procedure is
[3:44] Speaker 1: that of the critical philosopher. In the introduction to the
[3:47] Speaker 1: Treaties on Human Nature, he writes, quote to me, it
[3:51] Speaker 1: seems evident that the essence of the mind being equally
[3:54] Speaker 1: unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must
[3:58] Speaker 1: be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers
[4:01] Speaker 1: and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments. Tis
[4:06] Speaker 1: certain we cannot go beyond experience end of quote. The
[4:11] Speaker 1: critical element appears when in this same introduction and in
[4:14] Speaker 1: the opening paragraphs of the Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, he
[4:18] Speaker 1: reduces all philosophy to the study of human nature, basing
[4:22] Speaker 1: the study of human nature on the observation of mental
[4:25] Speaker 1: phenomena end quote, an exact analysis of the powers and
[4:30] Speaker 1: capacity and quote of the mind. Analysis of mind. According
[4:36] Speaker 1: to you, the mind is its contents. His analysis of
[4:41] Speaker 1: the mind is therefore merely an inventory of the contents
[4:45] Speaker 1: of the mind, or of perceptions. In Hume's philosophy, perception
[4:50] Speaker 1: is synonymous with state of consciousness, the term being equivalent
[4:54] Speaker 1: to the Cartesian thought and to the idea of Locke
[4:57] Speaker 1: and Berkeley. Ume divides perceptions into two classes, impressions, which
[5:03] Speaker 1: are defined as the more lively perceptions experienced when we
[5:07] Speaker 1: hear see will love, et cetera. Perceptions therefore include passions
[5:13] Speaker 1: and emotions, as well as sensations and ideas or thoughts,
[5:17] Speaker 1: which are faint images of impressions. As to the innateness
[5:22] Speaker 1: of impressions and ideas, Yume says that if by innate
[5:26] Speaker 1: we mean contemporary with our birth, the dispute seems to
[5:30] Speaker 1: be frivolous. But if by innate we understand what is
[5:33] Speaker 1: original or copied from no precedent perception, then we may
[5:37] Speaker 1: assert that all our impressions are innate and our ideas
[5:41] Speaker 1: not innate. When therefore Yume speaks of memory, imagination, ideas
[5:47] Speaker 1: of relation, abstract ideas, et cetera, he's speaking of mental
[5:51] Speaker 1: faculties and states, which are ultimately reducible to sense faculties
[5:56] Speaker 1: and to the impressions of the senses. What then, are
[6:00] Speaker 1: the objects of our impressions? Hume answers that we do
[6:03] Speaker 1: not perceive substance nor qualities, but only our own subjective states.
[6:08] Speaker 1: Quote tis not our body we perceive when we regard
[6:12] Speaker 1: our limbs and members, but certain impressions which enter by
[6:15] Speaker 1: the senses end of quote. The last words seem to
[6:19] Speaker 1: indicate a belief in an external cause of our impressions,
[6:22] Speaker 1: and indeed Hume is not at all consistent in his subjectivism,
[6:27] Speaker 1: for he admits in at least one passage the possibility
[6:30] Speaker 1: of our impressions, either arising from the object, or being
[6:34] Speaker 1: produced by the creative power of the mind, or being
[6:37] Speaker 1: derived from the author of our being. The denial of
[6:41] Speaker 1: the substantiality of the mind is Ume's most distinctive contribution
[6:45] Speaker 1: to psychology. It is he says, successive perceptions only that
[6:50] Speaker 1: constitute the mind. The substantiality of the ego is a delusion.
[6:55] Speaker 1: What we call mind is, simply quote, a heap or
[6:59] Speaker 1: collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed,
[7:05] Speaker 1: though falsely, to be endowed with simplicity and identity end
[7:09] Speaker 1: of quote. Thus did hum complete the work of empiricism.
[7:14] Speaker 1: Locke reasoned away everything except the primary qualities of bodies
[7:18] Speaker 1: and the unknown substratum substance in which they adhere. Berkeley
[7:23] Speaker 1: showed that even the substance and primary qualities of bodies
[7:26] Speaker 1: might be reasoned away. And now Hume applies the same
[7:30] Speaker 1: solvent to the substance of mind itself and leaves nothing
[7:33] Speaker 1: but phenomena. If the substantial nature of the ego is
[7:37] Speaker 1: a delusion, immortality is not a datum of reason. We
[7:41] Speaker 1: are not surprised, therefore, to find that in the Essay
[7:45] Speaker 1: on the Immortality of the Soul, Hume, after examining the
[7:49] Speaker 1: arguments in favor of immortality, which arguments he divides into metaphysical, moral,
[7:55] Speaker 1: and physical, concludes that it is the Gospel, and the
[7:59] Speaker 1: Gospel alone that has brought life and immortality to light.
[8:03] Speaker 1: End of quote. Analysis of causation. Quite in keeping with
[8:09] Speaker 1: Hume's denial of substance is his analysis of causation into
[8:13] Speaker 1: a succession of phenomena. All our ideas, he teaches, are
[8:17] Speaker 1: connected either by resemblance, continuity in time, continuity in space,
[8:23] Speaker 1: or causality. Causality, then, is merely a relation between our ideas.
[8:29] Speaker 1: But is it an a priori relation? And if not,
[8:32] Speaker 1: whence and how does it arise? The first of these
[8:36] Speaker 1: questions Hume answers in the negative. He formulates the principle
[8:40] Speaker 1: of causality as follows, whatever event has a beginning must
[8:45] Speaker 1: have a cause footnote c. F. Huxley's Hume, page hundred twenty.
[8:51] Speaker 1: In Hume's Treates on Human Nature, page three hundred eighty
[8:55] Speaker 1: one occurs to form whatever has a beginning has also
[8:59] Speaker 1: a cause of existence. End of footnote. He maintains that
[9:05] Speaker 1: quote the knowledge of this relation causality is not in
[9:09] Speaker 1: any instance attained by reasonings are priori but arises entirely
[9:13] Speaker 1: from experience. When we find that any particular objects are
[9:18] Speaker 1: constantly conjoined with each other, all distinct ideas are separable
[9:22] Speaker 1: from each other, and as the ideas of cause and
[9:25] Speaker 1: effect are evidently distinct, twill be easy for us to
[9:28] Speaker 1: conceive any object as nonexistent this moment and existent the next,
[9:33] Speaker 1: without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause
[9:36] Speaker 1: or producing principle. End of quote. The argument, as Huxley remarks, quote,
[9:44] Speaker 1: is of the circular sort, for the major premise that
[9:47] Speaker 1: all distinct ideas are separable in thought assumes the question
[9:51] Speaker 1: at issue. End of quote. The axiom of causality therefore
[9:56] Speaker 1: comes from experience. But Yume observes, one in instance does
[10:00] Speaker 1: not constitute sufficient experimental evidence of the causal connection of
[10:04] Speaker 1: two phenomena. When, however, quote, one particular series of events
[10:10] Speaker 1: has always, in all instances been conjoined with another, we
[10:14] Speaker 1: make no longer any scruple in foretelling one on the
[10:16] Speaker 1: appearance of the other. We then call the one cause
[10:20] Speaker 1: and the other effect. We suppose that there is some
[10:22] Speaker 1: connection between them, some power in the one by a
[10:26] Speaker 1: virtue of which it infallibly produces the other. But there
[10:30] Speaker 1: is nothing in a number of instances different from every
[10:33] Speaker 1: single instance which is supposed to be exactly similar, except
[10:37] Speaker 1: only that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind
[10:41] Speaker 1: is carried by habit upon the appearance of one event
[10:44] Speaker 1: to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it
[10:47] Speaker 1: will exist. End of quote. There is therefore no real
[10:52] Speaker 1: dependence of effect on cause, no ontological nexis, but merely
[10:57] Speaker 1: a psychological one, an expectation aroun rising from habit or custom.
[11:01] Speaker 1: Hume indeed admits that, in addition to the notion of
[11:04] Speaker 1: sequence of phenomena, there is in our concept of causality
[11:08] Speaker 1: the idea of something resident in the cause a power, force,
[11:12] Speaker 1: or energy which produces the effect. When, however, he comes
[11:17] Speaker 1: to analyze this notion of power, he finds it to
[11:19] Speaker 1: be merely a projection of the subjective feeling of effort
[11:23] Speaker 1: into the phenomenon, which is the invariable antecedent quote. No
[11:28] Speaker 1: animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment
[11:31] Speaker 1: of a nisis or endeavor, and every animal has a
[11:35] Speaker 1: sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an
[11:38] Speaker 1: external object that is in motion. We consider only the
[11:41] Speaker 1: constant experienced conjunction of the events, and as we feel
[11:45] Speaker 1: the customary connection between the ideas, we transfer that feeling
[11:49] Speaker 1: to the objects and of quote. From the empirical viewpoint,
[11:54] Speaker 1: UM's analysis of the principle of causality is thorough. If
[11:59] Speaker 1: there is in the mind no power superior to sensation
[12:01] Speaker 1: and reflection, no faculty by which we are enabled to
[12:05] Speaker 1: abstract from the contingent data of sense the necessary elements
[12:09] Speaker 1: of intellectual thought, then all the axioms of science, the
[12:13] Speaker 1: accidents of causality included, are mere associations of sense impressions.
[12:18] Speaker 1: But the empirical standpoint is erroneous. In this as in
[12:22] Speaker 1: other instances, empiricism stops where the real problem of philosophy begins,
[12:27] Speaker 1: as is evident from the fact that while Yume succeeds
[12:30] Speaker 1: in showing that one event is connected with another in
[12:33] Speaker 1: our past experience, neither he nor any other empiricist has
[12:37] Speaker 1: shown why we are entitled to expect that events which
[12:40] Speaker 1: have been connected in the past will be connected in
[12:43] Speaker 1: the future. Empiricism can show a connectiofacty, but it cannot
[12:47] Speaker 1: show a connectziouris between antecedent and consequent between cause and
[12:52] Speaker 1: effect ethics. Yum's ethical system is a development of the
[12:57] Speaker 1: fundamental doctrine of the English schools of the eighteenth century.
[13:02] Speaker 1: He restricts the role of reason as a moral criterion
[13:05] Speaker 1: and develops the doctrine that moral distinctions are determined by
[13:08] Speaker 1: our sense of the agreeable and the disagreeable. Abstract distinctions
[13:13] Speaker 1: mere rational intuitions or inferences leave us perfectly indifferent as
[13:18] Speaker 1: to action, so long as they fail to acquire an
[13:20] Speaker 1: emotional value through some relation to the passions and ultimately
[13:24] Speaker 1: to the feeling of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the
[13:28] Speaker 1: action to be performed. Quote. Nothing but a sentiment can
[13:31] Speaker 1: induce us to give the preference to the beneficial and
[13:34] Speaker 1: useful tendencies over pernicious ones. This sentiment is, in short,
[13:39] Speaker 1: nothing but sympathy. End of quote. The following is the
[13:43] Speaker 1: ultimate analysis of moral value. Quote. No man is absolutely
[13:47] Speaker 1: indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first
[13:51] Speaker 1: has a natural tendency to give pleasure, the second pain.
[13:54] Speaker 1: This every one may find in himself. It is not
[13:57] Speaker 1: probable that these principles can be resolved into principles more
[14:01] Speaker 1: simple and universal. Whatever attempts may be made to that
[14:04] Speaker 1: purpose end of historical position. Yum's philosophy is summed up
[14:10] Speaker 1: in the words punt, phenomenalism, and skepticism. He reduced mind
[14:14] Speaker 1: as well as matter, to mere phenomena, and denied the
[14:17] Speaker 1: ontological maxis between cause and effect. He maintained that there
[14:21] Speaker 1: is no permanent, immutable element in the world of our experience,
[14:25] Speaker 1: and that there is no valid principle which can justify
[14:28] Speaker 1: metaphysical speculation concerning the world beyond our experience. It was
[14:33] Speaker 1: this total subversion of the necessary and universal that evoke
[14:37] Speaker 1: Kunt from his dogmatic slumber and gave rise in Scotland
[14:41] Speaker 1: to the movement in favor of the philosophy of common sense.
[14:45] Speaker 1: It will be necessary, before entering on the study of
[14:48] Speaker 1: these reactions against Hume, to give a brief sketch of
[14:51] Speaker 1: what is known as the German illumination, the transition from
[14:55] Speaker 1: Leibniz to Kunt Chapter sixty two German Illumination transition to
[15:01] Speaker 1: Kant Philosophy of law during the seventeenth century. Samuel von
[15:07] Speaker 1: Puffendorff sixteen thirty two to sixteen ninety four, who aimed
[15:12] Speaker 1: at mediating between Grozius and Hobbes, and Christian Toomasius sixteen
[15:18] Speaker 1: fifty five to seventeen twenty eight, who is considered the
[15:21] Speaker 1: first of the German Illuminati, appeared as representatives of a
[15:25] Speaker 1: new philosophy of law. They investigated the foundations of natural
[15:30] Speaker 1: right and formulated theories in accordance with the changed political
[15:34] Speaker 1: conditions of europe popularizers. It was the aim of many
[15:39] Speaker 1: of the philosophical writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century
[15:43] Speaker 1: to free philosophy from the technical difficulties which rendered it
[15:47] Speaker 1: inaccessible to the generality of readers, and in this way
[15:50] Speaker 1: to reach the people, as the French authors of the
[15:53] Speaker 1: Encyclopedia were doing. Walta van Chenhausen sixteen fifty one to
[15:58] Speaker 1: seventeen o eight, Johann Nicholas Titans seventeen thirty six to
[16:04] Speaker 1: eighteen o five, and Moses Mendelssohn seventeen twenty nine to
[16:08] Speaker 1: seventeen eighty six represented different phases of this movement in
[16:13] Speaker 1: different departments of thought, physical science, mental science, and religious philosophy.
[16:20] Speaker 1: To the same period belongs the so called Pietistic movement,
[16:24] Speaker 1: which aimed at counteracting the rationalistic tendencies by quickening religious
[16:28] Speaker 1: feeling during the storm and stress movement of the last
[16:32] Speaker 1: decades of the eighteenth century, when rationalism was at its height.
[16:36] Speaker 1: Gotthold Ivrahim Lessing seventeen twenty nine to seventeen eighty one,
[16:40] Speaker 1: the philosopher poet expounded a system of religious philosophical thought
[16:45] Speaker 1: which may be said to be a system of natural religion,
[16:47] Speaker 1: based partly on the pantheism of Spinosa's Ittica and partly
[16:51] Speaker 1: on the theism of Leibnitz's Tioditze. To the same period belongs
[16:56] Speaker 1: to Johann Godfried von Herder seventeen forty four to eighteen
[16:59] Speaker 1: o one three, whose edeens So Philosophy de geschich de
[17:03] Speaker 1: des Menschide marks an epoch in the history of the
[17:06] Speaker 1: philosophy of history. In this work, Hedda interprets history from
[17:11] Speaker 1: the point of view of the organic unity of the
[17:13] Speaker 1: human race. Christian von Wolf sixteen seventy nine to seventeen
[17:18] Speaker 1: fifty four is of special importance on account of the
[17:22] Speaker 1: influence which he exercised on Khan's early training. He attempted
[17:26] Speaker 1: to reduce Leibniz's philosophy to a systematic form, but in
[17:30] Speaker 1: doing so he modified the essential tenets of his predecessor,
[17:35] Speaker 1: restricting the doctrine of pre established harmony to the explanation
[17:39] Speaker 1: of the relations of soul and body, and so changing
[17:42] Speaker 1: the doctrine of the dualism of the monarch as practically
[17:45] Speaker 1: to restore the Cartesian anti thesis of mind and matter.
[17:49] Speaker 1: He devoted special attention to philosophic method. Indeed, he sometimes
[17:53] Speaker 1: carried method to the extent of formalism. Wolf is the
[17:57] Speaker 1: author of the well known division of metaphysics in to ontology, cosmology, psychology,
[18:04] Speaker 1: and rational theology retrospect. The period from the card to
[18:09] Speaker 1: Hume was dominated by the influence of Cartesian thought, and
[18:13] Speaker 1: more particularly by the doctrine of the anti thesis of
[18:16] Speaker 1: mind and matter. It was the attempt to solve the
[18:19] Speaker 1: problem of this anti thesis that gave rise to the
[18:22] Speaker 1: pantheisticmonism of Spinosa, to the materialisticmonism of the thorough going empiricists,
[18:29] Speaker 1: to the idealistic moonism of Berkeley, to the partially idealistic
[18:34] Speaker 1: monodism of Leibniz, and to the pun phenomenalism of Hume,
[18:38] Speaker 1: which most astounding solution of all solves the problem of
[18:42] Speaker 1: the anti thesis by denying the substantial nature of both
[18:45] Speaker 1: mind and matter. Here the first act ends. Count next
[18:50] Speaker 1: appears and appalled at the side of the ruin which
[18:53] Speaker 1: Hume has wrought fearing for the spirituality of the soul,
[18:57] Speaker 1: the freedom of the will, the existence of God, and
[19:00] Speaker 1: the obligation of the moral law, opens a new scene
[19:04] Speaker 1: by proposing once more the question what other conditions of knowledge,
[19:09] Speaker 1: and prepares the way for the philosophy of the nineteenth
[19:12] Speaker 1: century by his attempt at constructive synthesis on the basis
[19:16] Speaker 1: of moral consciousness. We cannot fail to remark also in
[19:20] Speaker 1: the development of philosophy from Discard to Kant, a struggle
[19:24] Speaker 1: between the purely scientific view and the esthetic religious view
[19:28] Speaker 1: of the world. Wherever empiricism held full sway, there the
[19:32] Speaker 1: scientific view prevailed, and enlightenment, as it was called, was
[19:37] Speaker 1: sought rather than a deeper sense of the esthetic and
[19:40] Speaker 1: spiritual significance of things. Wherever, on the contrary, the idealistic
[19:45] Speaker 1: movement prevailed, their greater value was attached to the spiritual
[19:49] Speaker 1: and esthetic solution than to the scientific solution of the
[19:53] Speaker 1: problems of philosophy. But in spite of idealistic reactions, the
[19:57] Speaker 1: principles of deism continued to pervade English thought. The illumination
[20:02] Speaker 1: continued to flourish in France and Germany, and empiricism culminated
[20:07] Speaker 1: in the philosophy of Hume, which expresses the last and
[20:10] Speaker 1: most violent form of antagonism between the scientific and the
[20:14] Speaker 1: religious esthetic view of life. It was left for Kant
[20:18] Speaker 1: to undo the work of the Illuminati and of Hume,
[20:21] Speaker 1: and to lay the foundation for the constructive systems which
[20:24] Speaker 1: were to give to the religious and esthetic interest of
[20:27] Speaker 1: human life a place beside the merely scientific elements of
[20:31] Speaker 1: thought in a complete synthesis of philosophical knowledge. Finally, we
[20:35] Speaker 1: must observe in the eighteenth century a gradual increase in
[20:39] Speaker 1: the importance attached to the study of man in his
[20:41] Speaker 1: social and political relations, and the growth and development of
[20:45] Speaker 1: the idea of an antithesis between the individual and the state.
[20:50] Speaker 1: But while Rousseau was giving expression to the doctrine of
[20:53] Speaker 1: individualism in its most extreme form, Hirda, by his doctrine
[20:57] Speaker 1: of the organic union of the human race, was preparing
[21:01] Speaker 1: the way for the political philosophy of the nineteenth century.
[21:05] Speaker 1: For the new century was to discard the notion of
[21:07] Speaker 1: antithesis between the individual and the state and adopting an
[21:12] Speaker 1: organic instead of a mechanical concept of society was to
[21:16] Speaker 1: substitute for the individualism of the eighteenth century, a collectivism
[21:21] Speaker 1: which not only the great speculative systems such as Hegels,
[21:25] Speaker 1: but all the other important movements of the nineteenth century.
[21:28] Speaker 1: The evolution hypothesis, the rise of Romanticism in literature, the
[21:33] Speaker 1: Oxford Movement, and the great industrial and commercial centralization of
[21:37] Speaker 1: recent years were to exemplify and confirm in theory or
[21:41] Speaker 1: in practice end of Chapter sixty one and sixty two

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