# Episode 13: UAE's Weaponized Interdependence w/ Andreas Krieg

An episode of [Turbulence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1847060038), 10 Feb 2026, 1 h 01 min.

Audio: https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/187492268/38a786460314df06c22829ec124ddfce.mp3

Andreas Krieg joins us to discuss the United Arab Emirates’ regional rivalry with Saudi Arabia, its cultivation of an ‘Axis of Secessionists,’ and what its network-centric geopolitical approach portends for the future of the world system. Texts mentioned: A Thousand Plateaus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Dr. Andreas Krieg is an associate professor at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London and a Fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies. His research focuses on network-centric statecraft, information operations, and security dynamics across the Middle East. He has been seconded to the Royal College of Defence Studies since 2018. Dr. Krieg has published extensively on networked statecraft, proxy warfare, and the weaponization of narratives, with a particular emphasis on Gulf security and the geopolitical rivalry between regional actors. He is the author and coauthor of several books, including Subversion, Surrogate Warfare and Socio-Political Order & Security in the Arab World. He is the director of the London-based geostrategic risk consultancy MENA analytica since 2019. We’re committed to independence and will never run ads or take money from institutions. That means Turbulence is entirely listener-funded. For $5 a month, paid subscribers gain access to weekly news analysis bonus episodes, where we respond to events as they unfold, follow up on previous discussions, and draw connections across the conflicts shaping our world. Most importantly, paid subscriptions make it possible for us to keep doing this work independently, week after week. Subscribe today at turbulencepod.substack.com Follow along on Twitter/X and Instagram @turbulence_pod Theme: Eye for an Eye, Haram (2017) Art: Vivek Venkatraman This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit turbulencepod.substack.com/subscribe

## Transcript

[0:01] SPEAKER_01: Mr.
[0:01] SPEAKER_01: President,
[0:03] I thank you for giving me the floor to respond to the ludicrous
[0:06] allegations made by
[0:08] SPEAKER_01: the representative of Sudan,
[0:10] SPEAKER_01: who represents the Sudanese armed forces,
[0:14] SPEAKER_01: one of the warring parties in Sudan.
[0:17] SPEAKER_01: At the outset,
[0:18] the United Arab Emirates expresses its deep concern over the
[0:21] tragic consequences of
[0:23] SPEAKER_01: the worsening conflict on the brotherly Sudanese people.
[0:28] SPEAKER_01: Yesterday,
[0:29] the UAE announced that it is allocating another 70 million US
[0:32] dollars in aid to
[0:33] SPEAKER_01: Sudan through key partners and UN agencies,
[0:37] SPEAKER_01: with a further 30 million US dollars to support neighboring countries.
[0:43] This comes on top of 130 million US dollars in aid over the
[0:48] last 10 months from the UAE.
[0:51] SPEAKER_01: We believe that the Sudanese people deserve justice and peace.
[0:55] They need a ceasefire,
[0:57] a credible political process,
[0:59] and unhindered flow of humanitarian aid.
[1:04] SPEAKER_01: Excuses and finger pointing only prolong the suffering of civilians.
[1:10] SPEAKER_01: The representative of the SAF should be asked,
[1:14] SPEAKER_01: if they seek an end to the conflict and civilian suffering,
[1:18] SPEAKER_01: then why won't they come to the Jeddah talks?
[1:21] SPEAKER_01: Why are they blocking aid?
[1:24] SPEAKER_01: What are you waiting for?
[1:26] You should stop grandstanding in international fora such as
[1:30] this and instead take
[1:34] SPEAKER_01: responsibility for ending the conflict you started.
[2:10] SPEAKER_02: Hello,
[2:10] SPEAKER_02: dear listeners,
[2:12] SPEAKER_02: friends,
[2:12] SPEAKER_02: comrades,
[2:13] SPEAKER_02: subjects,
[2:14] SPEAKER_02: citizens,
[2:15] SPEAKER_02: insurgents,
[2:16] SPEAKER_02: fugitives,
[2:16] SPEAKER_02: defectors,
[2:17] SPEAKER_02: dissidents,
[2:18] SPEAKER_02: even the haters and losers.
[2:20] SPEAKER_02: Welcome to Turbulence.
[2:22] SPEAKER_02: My name is Dylan Saba,
[2:23] SPEAKER_02: and I'm here with my co-host,
[2:24] SPEAKER_02: Seamus Malikafzeli,
[2:26] SPEAKER_02: and our producer,
[2:27] SPEAKER_02: M.
[2:27] SPEAKER_02: Siniza.
[2:28] SPEAKER_02: We're recording from New York City,
[2:30] SPEAKER_02: the center of a world empire that is dying,
[2:33] SPEAKER_02: but so,
[2:34] SPEAKER_02: so far from dead.
[2:36] If you've been listening to this show,
[2:38] two things should already be apparent.
[2:41] SPEAKER_02: One,
[2:41] SPEAKER_02: the world order is shifting dramatically,
[2:44] SPEAKER_02: and those shifts have highly accelerated in the past several years.
[2:48] SPEAKER_02: And two,
[2:49] those shifts are more visible and potentially most decisive in
[2:53] the broader region
[2:54] SPEAKER_02: surrounding the Red Sea.
[2:56] SPEAKER_02: In fact,
[2:57] if we were to draw a triangle on the map stretching from Libya
[3:00] in the west to Iran
[3:01] SPEAKER_02: in the east and down to Somalia in the south,
[3:04] SPEAKER_00: I would call this the zone of turbulence.
[3:07] SPEAKER_00: Since October 7th,
[3:08] SPEAKER_00: Israel has been fighting to establish a regional hegemony,
[3:12] SPEAKER_00: a regional supremacy in the region.
[3:15] But as we've seen,
[3:16] they are not the only state vying for an extraordinary amount
[3:20] of power.
[3:20] SPEAKER_00: Over the past several years,
[3:22] SPEAKER_00: the United Arab Emirates,
[3:24] SPEAKER_00: the UAE,
[3:25] have been trying to get out from under the shadow of the
[3:27] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
[3:29] SPEAKER_00: historically the strongest Arab state in the Gulf.
[3:33] SPEAKER_00: And also historically,
[3:34] SPEAKER_00: the center of opposition internationally,
[3:38] SPEAKER_00: I should say,
[3:39] SPEAKER_00: to Israel under King Faisal.
[3:42] SPEAKER_00: Now,
[3:42] the UAE has placed its thumb on the scales of places like Libya
[3:47] during the Second
[3:48] SPEAKER_00: Civil War.
[3:48] SPEAKER_00: in places like Sudan during its current civil war,
[3:51] SPEAKER_00: but also in Yemen,
[3:53] where it has backed the Southern Transitional Council and where
[3:56] that competition
[3:57] SPEAKER_00: has spilled out possibly the most violently between it and Saudi Arabia,
[4:03] with the Saudi military striking an Emirati weapons shipment
[4:09] that had come into an
[4:10] SPEAKER_00: STC-controlled port last month.
[4:15] What makes the UAE a fascinating actor in all this is not just
[4:19] that they are a
[4:19] SPEAKER_02: relatively small state vying for outsized influence and power.
[4:23] SPEAKER_02: It's how they're going about doing it.
[4:25] Small and medium-sized states tend to operate in alliance with
[4:28] larger ones that can
[4:29] SPEAKER_02: provide a security umbrella or economic protection.
[4:32] SPEAKER_02: But by contrast, the Emiratis have taken a different approach altogether.
[4:37] SPEAKER_02: Instead of working within the interstate system,
[4:39] SPEAKER_02: they've built a network of influence that undermines it altogether.
[4:44] They've done this by expanding control over key ports and
[4:47] logistics corridors,
[4:48] and by cultivating relationships with a whole host of
[4:51] secessionist groups and proxy
[4:53] SPEAKER_02: militias throughout the region.
[4:55] SPEAKER_00: This has allowed the UAE to support genocidal groups,
[4:59] SPEAKER_00: annihilatory nihilistic groups,
[5:01] SPEAKER_00: such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan,
[5:04] SPEAKER_00: while maintaining a level of plausible deniability.
[5:08] SPEAKER_00: At least speaking for how I see things in the West,
[5:11] SPEAKER_00: how things get communicated to Western audiences,
[5:14] the UAE is presented as an almost anti-ideological
[5:20] forward-thinking Gulf state.
[5:22] that is unconcerned by the kinds of ideological conflicts that
[5:26] afflict the region,
[5:27] SPEAKER_00: whereas the exact opposite is true.
[5:30] Overall,
[5:31] it's a much more horizontal,
[5:33] decentralized approach to power and influence.
[5:36] SPEAKER_02: And it reminds me of the work of my two favorite French psychos,
[5:41] SPEAKER_02: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
[5:44] SPEAKER_02: In their masterpiece A Thousand Plateaus,
[5:46] SPEAKER_02: they describe this kind of networked structure as rhizomatic.
[5:50] SPEAKER_02: In a rhizomatic structure,
[5:52] SPEAKER_02: unlike you would find in a traditional state apparatus,
[5:55] power is dispersed across many different nodes and peripheral
[5:59] relationships.
[6:00] SPEAKER_02: This approach for the UAE makes them more nimble and adaptable.
[6:03] If power is cut somewhere,
[6:05] it can reappear somewhere else without impacting the whole.
[6:08] SPEAKER_02: It can focus on cultivating these relationships built on resources,
[6:11] SPEAKER_02: arms,
[6:12] SPEAKER_02: trade,
[6:12] SPEAKER_02: etc.,
[6:13] SPEAKER_02: without ever getting bogged down in meta-narratives and grand alliances.
[6:17] SPEAKER_02: It can support the RSF without admitting they support them,
[6:20] and ally with Israel and the US while maintaining significant
[6:23] trade with Iran.
[6:24] SPEAKER_00: While this all may sound a bit overcomplicated,
[6:27] SPEAKER_00: we had a great guest on this week to discuss with us,
[6:31] SPEAKER_00: Dr.
[6:32] SPEAKER_00: Andreas Krieg.
[6:33] He is an associate professor of security studies at King's
[6:36] College London.
[6:37] SPEAKER_00: I have seen Krieg's work in the media.
[6:39] He's been on Al Jazeera numerous different times,
[6:42] and he has impressed on all of those.
[6:44] SPEAKER_00: And we were very lucky to have him on this program.
[6:48] Before we get into the conversation,
[6:49] we do have a pitch to you,
[6:51] the listener.
[6:52] SPEAKER_00: Turbulence is entirely listener funded.
[6:54] SPEAKER_00: We don't run ads.
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[7:01] SPEAKER_00: It only exists because of you.
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[8:35] SPEAKER_00: We are speaking today with Dr. Andreas Krieg.
[8:39] He is an associate professor of defense studies at King's
[8:43] College London,
[8:43] and he joins us now.
[8:44] SPEAKER_00: Dr. Krieg, welcome to Turbulence.
[8:47] SPEAKER_00: Great to be with you guys.
[8:48] SPEAKER_00: So I,
[8:49] and I think many listeners will have seen the news of the wide
[8:54] scale Southern
[8:55] Yemeni separatist offensive in December that placed the Saudi
[8:59] backed Yemeni
[9:00] SPEAKER_00: government on the back foot.
[9:02] SPEAKER_00: And then that rapid
[9:03] melting away of those same Southern separatists in January to
[9:07] the point where they
[9:08] SPEAKER_00: lost their capital in Avon.
[9:10] SPEAKER_00: The Southern Transitional Council was heavily supported by the UAE,
[9:15] SPEAKER_00: and that collapse occurred only days after the army left the country.
[9:20] But other Western-aligned proxies have stood for much longer
[9:24] after their support was withdrawn.
[9:26] SPEAKER_00: South Vietnam, for instance, held on for years after America withdrew.
[9:29] SPEAKER_00: Why was the South Yemen project so fragile,
[9:34] SPEAKER_00: and was it something to do with how the UAE did its business in Yemen in
[9:38] SPEAKER_00: particular?
[9:39] SPEAKER_02: That's a very interesting question.
[9:41] Look,
[9:41] I think if we look at the SEC,
[9:42] first of all,
[9:42] I think the project isn't finished.
[9:44] SPEAKER_02: We have to look at this as being an organic movement.
[9:48] SPEAKER_02: The southern cause in Yemen obviously goes back decades.
[9:52] SPEAKER_02: It's organic.
[9:53] SPEAKER_02: It has a lot of wide-ranging support from different factions within the
[9:56] SPEAKER_02: Southern Yemen,
[9:57] they can all agree to an extent that they don't want to be part
[10:02] of a country with
[10:02] SPEAKER_02: the northerners.
[10:03] They can't agree on a lot more in the South,
[10:05] so the South itself is very divided.
[10:07] SPEAKER_02: Now,
[10:07] SPEAKER_02: the Emiratis only arrived at the scene in around a decade,
[10:12] SPEAKER_02: 2015,
[10:12] SPEAKER_02: really,
[10:12] SPEAKER_02: to kind of build an institutional form or framework around the movement.
[10:17] SPEAKER_02: And the way they've done it is through,
[10:19] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[10:20] basically just working alongside people that they knew and
[10:24] building alliances,
[10:25] SPEAKER_02: partnerships,
[10:26] SPEAKER_02: mostly commercial nature,
[10:27] SPEAKER_02: but also transactional,
[10:28] any form of material support and an ideological one as well
[10:32] over a couple of years.
[10:33] And so the network that they tapped into the Emiratis,
[10:37] that network still exists.
[10:38] SPEAKER_02: I think what we've seen is we always look at the non-state,
[10:41] SPEAKER_02: the violent non-state actor part on the top.
[10:43] SPEAKER_02: as sort of that's where everyone is focusing upon.
[10:46] SPEAKER_02: But I would say that these non-state actors are like icebergs.
[10:49] So what you actually see is just the tip of the iceberg is the
[10:52] violent non-state actor piece.
[10:53] SPEAKER_02: But it's all that part below the waterline,
[10:56] the far more extensive network of networks that's below the
[10:58] waterline that
[10:59] SPEAKER_02: includes,
[11:00] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[11:00] SPEAKER_02: any sort of fixer,
[11:01] SPEAKER_02: intermediaries,
[11:02] SPEAKER_02: financiers,
[11:03] SPEAKER_02: commodity traders,
[11:04] SPEAKER_02: logisticians,
[11:05] SPEAKER_02: you name it,
[11:06] SPEAKER_02: to actually make a non-state actor function.
[11:08] SPEAKER_02: And it's the local community as well.
[11:10] SPEAKER_02: And this is where the Emiratis have tapped into.
[11:13] They've been able to turn some heads,
[11:14] win some hearts and minds here and there.
[11:16] SPEAKER_02: But they very much exist.
[11:18] SPEAKER_02: The non-state actor element has been pushed back.
[11:21] SPEAKER_02: But for the most part, this was just a way for the Saudis.
[11:24] What they did is they reorchestrated essentially a network that
[11:27] the Emiratis had set up.
[11:28] They basically said,
[11:29] okay,
[11:29] who are the mapping out the main influences in southern Yemen?
[11:32] SPEAKER_02: What are we going to do about them?
[11:33] SPEAKER_02: We're going to use some coercion,
[11:35] SPEAKER_02: some military force,
[11:36] SPEAKER_02: some pressure,
[11:36] but then we also engage those elements in the South who used to
[11:39] be in the Emirati
[11:41] SPEAKER_02: camp and try to win them over.
[11:42] SPEAKER_02: And for the most part,
[11:43] SPEAKER_02: the Saudis succeeded in bringing these people into Saudi,
[11:46] SPEAKER_02: inviting them,
[11:46] SPEAKER_02: sitting them around the table saying,
[11:48] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[11:48] we understand there is an organic cause and we understand that
[11:51] this cause still
[11:52] SPEAKER_02: persists.
[11:52] SPEAKER_02: We ultimately think you should be awarded with some sort of autonomy,
[11:55] SPEAKER_02: yet not with a separate state.
[11:57] SPEAKER_02: And apart from the actual formal STC,
[12:01] SPEAKER_02: the Southern Transitional Council,
[12:02] which was just the sort of the shell that the Marathis put on
[12:05] top of that and was
[12:06] SPEAKER_02: led by this guy,
[12:06] SPEAKER_02: Al-Zubaydi,
[12:07] SPEAKER_02: who fled the country in the middle of the night,
[12:10] SPEAKER_02: apart from him and the sort of formal top framework of the STC,
[12:15] SPEAKER_02: the rest of the guys are still in southern Yemen.
[12:16] SPEAKER_02: They're just now answering to a different patron.
[12:19] SPEAKER_02: And I think that's kind of where we are right now.
[12:21] And I think it's a bit premature to say that the Emiratis have
[12:23] lost everything
[12:24] SPEAKER_02: because after all,
[12:25] SPEAKER_02: these networks are very volatile.
[12:27] SPEAKER_02: They pivot from one side to the next and they can be won over again.
[12:31] And I wouldn't be surprised if the Emiratis were trying to get
[12:34] back in and try to
[12:35] disrupt by playing some of their people on the ground that
[12:38] they've engaged with for
[12:38] SPEAKER_02: now a decade.
[12:40] SPEAKER_02: Taking a bit of a wider view,
[12:41] SPEAKER_02: you've described Abu Dhabi's regional play as cultivating a quote,
[12:46] SPEAKER_02: axis of secessionists.
[12:48] building influence through a portfolio of non-state and
[12:51] quasi-state actors across
[12:53] SPEAKER_02: Libya,
[12:53] SPEAKER_02: Sudan,
[12:54] SPEAKER_02: Somalia,
[12:55] SPEAKER_02: and Yemen,
[12:55] SPEAKER_02: as we've been talking about.
[12:57] SPEAKER_02: Can you walk us through the basic logic of that strategy?
[13:01] SPEAKER_02: What problem is it solving for the Emiratis?
[13:03] SPEAKER_02: What outcomes is it designed to produce?
[13:06] And what makes it different from perhaps more familiar forms of
[13:10] proxy politics?
[13:11] We probably have to start by saying that in the Middle East and
[13:14] in Africa,
[13:15] SPEAKER_02: this is a region where states are fragile anyway,
[13:18] SPEAKER_02: where they're not failed but failing and where there are a lot of,
[13:21] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[13:22] SPEAKER_02: non-state governed spaces.
[13:23] SPEAKER_02: So I don't believe in ungoverned spaces,
[13:25] SPEAKER_02: but spaces that are not governed by regular states or government,
[13:28] SPEAKER_02: which leaves a lot of gaps for non-state actors to fill.
[13:31] SPEAKER_02: And so in this space,
[13:32] SPEAKER_02: if you want to compete,
[13:33] SPEAKER_02: if you want to have influence,
[13:34] SPEAKER_02: you kind of have to work through intermediaries.
[13:37] And most of them are non-state actors,
[13:38] private individuals,
[13:39] commercial entities and whatnot.
[13:40] SPEAKER_02: The Emiratis themselves are a small state.
[13:43] SPEAKER_02: The Emirates is a country,
[13:45] a Gulf monarchy consisting of seven federal Emirates led by Abu
[13:49] Dhabi and really
[13:50] SPEAKER_02: over the last 15 years really been subverted by Abu Dhabi.
[13:53] So really the UAE now is Abu Dhabi and six other Emirates are
[13:57] basically answering to Abu Dhabi.
[13:59] SPEAKER_02: but it's a country that is highly active,
[14:03] SPEAKER_02: proactive,
[14:04] SPEAKER_02: and assertive,
[14:04] but doesn't have the human capacity as a small state to
[14:07] actually build an extensive
[14:09] SPEAKER_02: expeditionary capability.
[14:11] SPEAKER_02: So if they want to go out, do statecraft.
[14:14] SPEAKER_02: Statecraft is something that middle and great powers do.
[14:16] SPEAKER_02: Small states usually don't do much of statecraft.
[14:19] SPEAKER_02: They usually respond to external impetus and external pressure points,
[14:24] SPEAKER_02: but they don't kind of design their own statecraft.
[14:26] SPEAKER_02: So the Emirates had to find a way to do this.
[14:29] SPEAKER_02: The only thing that they do have is obviously they are very rich.
[14:32] They have a lot of oil money that they can throw around and
[14:34] that they can translate
[14:35] SPEAKER_02: into capability.
[14:36] And that's something that they have been trying to do for the
[14:38] last 20 years or so.
[14:40] SPEAKER_02: So it's a country of a million people.
[14:42] And for a country of a million people to be the greatest
[14:45] investor in Africa,
[14:46] SPEAKER_02: even more so than China nowadays,
[14:48] SPEAKER_02: Having strategic depth across very,
[14:50] SPEAKER_02: very competitive spaces from Libya over Sudan,
[14:54] SPEAKER_02: Somalia,
[14:55] SPEAKER_02: Yemen,
[14:56] SPEAKER_02: but also playing games in Pakistan,
[14:58] SPEAKER_02: in India,
[14:59] SPEAKER_02: in Afghanistan,
[15:00] SPEAKER_02: and also playing a game with great powers as well.
[15:03] SPEAKER_02: I mean, they're the main interlocutor for the Russians in Africa.
[15:06] They're also a main interlocutor for the United States in some
[15:08] parts of Africa.
[15:09] So for a country of a million to be able to do this,
[15:12] they needed to delegate.
[15:13] SPEAKER_02: That was just in the nature of what they've been doing.
[15:16] SPEAKER_02: They've always been delegating.
[15:17] SPEAKER_02: They're always very comfortable with it because they were,
[15:19] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[15:20] even if you go back to the 19th century when they were
[15:22] basically very much
[15:23] SPEAKER_02: backwaters of backwaters in the Gulf.
[15:25] SPEAKER_02: Anything they were doing was working through intermediaries.
[15:28] They were working through traders and commercial entities that
[15:30] they delegated
[15:31] SPEAKER_02: commercial trade to.
[15:32] SPEAKER_02: So they're very comfortable with delegation.
[15:34] SPEAKER_02: They're very comfortable working through intermediaries,
[15:36] very different from the sort of statecraft that we might be
[15:40] familiar with of the
[15:41] big empires and great powers of history who usually used
[15:44] in-house capacity to an
[15:45] SPEAKER_02: extent.
[15:46] SPEAKER_02: I mean, there are obviously some caveats to that.
[15:47] I mean,
[15:48] England was a small state at some point in the early 17th
[15:51] century.
[15:51] SPEAKER_02: And in a century, they kind of became the greatest power on earth.
[15:54] SPEAKER_02: They didn't do it because they had a lot of ingrown in-house capacity.
[15:58] SPEAKER_02: They did also most of it through delegation,
[16:00] SPEAKER_02: working through intermediaries,
[16:01] SPEAKER_02: commercial entities in particular,
[16:03] SPEAKER_02: such as the East India Company.
[16:04] And a lot of what the Emiratis are doing kind of resembles what
[16:07] England did in like
[16:08] SPEAKER_02: 400 years ago,
[16:09] SPEAKER_02: small state on the periphery,
[16:11] SPEAKER_02: building up capacity,
[16:12] SPEAKER_02: strategic depth across the developing world.
[16:16] SPEAKER_02: Why are they doing it?
[16:16] SPEAKER_02: Because they want to be relevant.
[16:17] SPEAKER_02: They want to be,
[16:18] they don't just want to be another small state at the periphery
[16:21] of global affairs.
[16:22] SPEAKER_02: They want to be right at the heart of it.
[16:24] SPEAKER_02: They think if they want to survive as an independent country,
[16:27] SPEAKER_02: kind of wedged between Iran and Saudi,
[16:29] SPEAKER_02: they have to develop their own sense of statecraft,
[16:31] SPEAKER_02: their own strategic culture,
[16:32] SPEAKER_02: their own strategic depth,
[16:34] SPEAKER_02: and most importantly,
[16:34] SPEAKER_02: relevance.
[16:35] SPEAKER_02: And beyond relevance,
[16:36] SPEAKER_02: they've started wanting to be relevant,
[16:38] SPEAKER_02: and now it's all about being indispensable.
[16:40] And you could make the case that they are now indispensable in
[16:43] a lot of the conflicts.
[16:44] and a lot of the crises and a lot of the countries that we
[16:47] described across Africa
[16:48] SPEAKER_02: and the Middle East.
[16:48] SPEAKER_02: And that's quite a remarkable achievement, I think.
[16:51] Within a matter of maybe 15,
[16:53] 20 years,
[16:53] they've built this strategic depth.
[16:55] And they've done it through delegation via non-state actors and
[16:57] non-state entities.
[16:58] I've been interested in these different attitudes between the
[17:03] UAE and Saudi Arabia
[17:05] SPEAKER_00: about Israel in particular,
[17:07] SPEAKER_00: the question of public diplomatic recognition.
[17:11] I mean,
[17:11] the KSA is probably going to join the Abraham Accords at some
[17:15] point in the future.
[17:16] SPEAKER_00: It feels like an inevitability.
[17:18] SPEAKER_00: But it has been hampered,
[17:19] SPEAKER_00: delayed,
[17:20] and beset by obstacles related to the aftermath of October 7th
[17:25] and the war against
[17:26] SPEAKER_00: Gaza,
[17:27] in which Saudi officials are clearly very concerned about how
[17:31] they look today.
[17:32] SPEAKER_00: in regards to building up any kind of relationship with Tel Aviv.
[17:35] SPEAKER_00: Meanwhile, in Abu Dhabi, in Dubai, this concern feels much more moot.
[17:41] SPEAKER_00: I mean,
[17:42] SPEAKER_00: you're talking about the fact that the UAE wants to build up all of this
[17:45] SPEAKER_00: independent capacity.
[17:46] SPEAKER_00: It doesn't want to be in Saudi Arabia's shadow.
[17:50] SPEAKER_00: But I'm curious as to how you see it.
[17:53] SPEAKER_00: Why is it that the UAE is so fervent
[17:57] in wanting to dive into expanding its relationship with Israel
[18:02] amidst this genocide.
[18:04] Why is Saudi Arabia more cautious and what is the UAE getting
[18:09] out of this relationship?
[18:10] SPEAKER_00: Why does it see Israel as so critical to this?
[18:14] SPEAKER_02: I would actually start by contradicting you there.
[18:16] SPEAKER_02: I don't think Saudi will ever join the Abram Accords.
[18:19] SPEAKER_02: First and foremost, the Abram Accords are an Emirati project.
[18:22] SPEAKER_02: They're run by Abu Dhabi.
[18:23] SPEAKER_02: Everyone who has joined the Abram Accords,
[18:25] SPEAKER_02: Bahrain,
[18:26] SPEAKER_02: Sudan,
[18:27] SPEAKER_02: Morocco,
[18:27] SPEAKER_02: done so under pressure from the UAE,
[18:29] SPEAKER_02: and they joined an Emirati project.
[18:31] SPEAKER_02: They were, again, sort of a vessel state to an Emirati project.
[18:35] Saudi Arabia never,
[18:36] and that predates the current crisis and spat between UAE and
[18:40] Saudi.
[18:40] Saudi would have never planned on becoming subservient to an
[18:43] Emirati project.
[18:44] SPEAKER_02: Because the Abram Accords are an Emirati project,
[18:46] SPEAKER_02: they have an Emirati flag on it,
[18:48] SPEAKER_02: they serve Emirati interests,
[18:49] and anybody who joins will inevitably be part of an Emirati
[18:53] agenda that is dictated
[18:54] SPEAKER_02: by Abu Dhabi.
[18:55] SPEAKER_02: Riyadh would have never joined them.
[18:57] So Riyadh was always going to have its own process of
[18:59] normalization at its own pace with Israel.
[19:01] SPEAKER_02: And that, again, predates the 7th of October as well.
[19:04] SPEAKER_02: Yes, the Saudis were on a path to normalization.
[19:07] SPEAKER_02: They were in serious talks.
[19:08] There have been loads of different meetings between
[19:10] intelligence officials and so on.
[19:11] But it was always about making an aid palatable to their own
[19:14] population in Saudi,
[19:16] SPEAKER_02: making sure that it was palatable to the Islamic community as well.
[19:19] I mean,
[19:19] they have different responsibilities that the Emirates don't
[19:22] have.
[19:22] SPEAKER_02: Saudi Arabia can't just decide what they want to do.
[19:25] They have a responsibility to the Islamic world and to the Arab
[19:28] world as well.
[19:28] SPEAKER_02: And they have this sense of responsibility that the Emiratis don't have.
[19:31] SPEAKER_02: The Emiratis have absolutely no sense of responsibility.
[19:34] SPEAKER_02: They do whatever serves their interests.
[19:35] SPEAKER_02: They're very Machiavellian in that way.
[19:37] SPEAKER_02: But also the Saudis wanted to do this.
[19:39] That was always going to be a bargain,
[19:41] which didn't only serve Saudi interests.
[19:42] SPEAKER_02: It would have also served Palestinian interests.
[19:44] SPEAKER_02: I mean,
[19:45] SPEAKER_02: they always wanted the Israelis to make some concessions,
[19:48] SPEAKER_02: minimal concessions to the Palestinians to make it somewhat palatable.
[19:52] SPEAKER_02: The Emiratis didn't make any of these demands.
[19:54] I mean,
[19:55] the Emiratis literally asked for absolutely nothing for the
[19:57] Palestinians.
[19:58] SPEAKER_02: They have been,
[19:59] SPEAKER_02: I would even say,
[20:00] counterproductive to stopping Israel instead of actually using
[20:03] the leverage that
[20:03] they have vis-a-vis Israel to help the Palestinians in Gaza
[20:06] over the last two and a
[20:07] SPEAKER_02: half years.
[20:08] SPEAKER_02: But that's because it was never about the Palestinians.
[20:10] The Abraham Accords from the beginning were an out-of-jail card
[20:13] for the Emirates in Washington.
[20:14] SPEAKER_02: It was about strategic depth in Washington.
[20:17] And it still works today,
[20:18] not just in Washington,
[20:19] but primarily in Washington.
[20:20] SPEAKER_02: It also is an out-of-jail card with the Israeli lobby here in the UK,
[20:24] SPEAKER_02: but with the Israel lobby across the world.
[20:26] SPEAKER_02: Those who are friends of Israel,
[20:28] SPEAKER_02: those especially neoconservatives who stand with Israel unconditionally,
[20:32] SPEAKER_02: they will always say,
[20:33] SPEAKER_02: we don't like what the Emiratis are doing in Sudan,
[20:35] SPEAKER_02: but hey,
[20:36] SPEAKER_02: they're the ones who normalized with Israel.
[20:37] SPEAKER_02: They're the guys we need to protect.
[20:39] They are used as a role model on the far right in Europe and on
[20:42] the conservative
[20:42] SPEAKER_02: side and on the right in America as a role model of an Arab country,
[20:46] SPEAKER_02: not because of what they're doing domestically,
[20:48] SPEAKER_02: obviously very authoritarian.
[20:50] SPEAKER_02: not in terms of the stuff that they're doing across the developing world,
[20:53] SPEAKER_02: which is highly problematic.
[20:54] SPEAKER_02: And,
[20:54] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[20:55] SPEAKER_02: I mean,
[20:55] SPEAKER_02: if you look at it,
[20:55] you could make the argument that they are supporting the
[20:57] genocide in Sudan.
[20:58] SPEAKER_02: So it's not all of that.
[21:00] SPEAKER_02: It's all of that doesn't matter because in the end of the day,
[21:02] SPEAKER_02: people are saying they're the ones who normalized with Israel.
[21:04] SPEAKER_02: They're leading on the Abram Accords.
[21:06] SPEAKER_02: They have that relationship with Israel.
[21:07] SPEAKER_02: They're a different Middle Eastern country.
[21:09] SPEAKER_02: So it's a way of basic differentiation,
[21:11] SPEAKER_02: differentiating themselves from the rest of the Arab and Islamic world.
[21:14] But also,
[21:15] and that's primarily,
[21:16] it's about the out-of-jail card in Washington,
[21:18] and it works.
[21:19] SPEAKER_02: And secondly, it was getting access to technology.
[21:22] SPEAKER_02: Israel is a major exporter for AI, high-tech, and defense technology.
[21:27] And getting access to this meant you need to have a normalized
[21:29] relationship with Israel.
[21:30] You had said that the UAE did not really want any concessions
[21:35] from Israel on the
[21:36] SPEAKER_00: Palestinian issue.
[21:37] SPEAKER_00: But I remember when the Abraham Accords first emerged,
[21:41] the way that it was sold in the Gulf press was that they were
[21:45] stopping the
[21:46] SPEAKER_00: impending annexation of the West Bank.
[21:49] SPEAKER_00: And I also remember after that normalization happened,
[21:53] SPEAKER_00: there was this significant,
[21:55] SPEAKER_00: albeit brief,
[21:56] SPEAKER_00: push by the media in Dubai to portray the UAE as still a friend of the
[22:01] SPEAKER_00: Palestinians.
[22:02] And I also remember there was this unprecedented aid plane into
[22:07] Tel Aviv so that
[22:08] SPEAKER_00: they could deliver COVID aid to Gaza.
[22:11] SPEAKER_00: Just thinking about all of this,
[22:12] because I'm in agreement that the UAE really does not feel any
[22:17] responsibility
[22:17] SPEAKER_00: towards the Palestinians.
[22:19] SPEAKER_00: So I'm just confused as to why,
[22:21] SPEAKER_00: for that very brief period,
[22:23] SPEAKER_00: outside of the context of the genocide in Gaza,
[22:26] why they felt only in that moment that they needed to sell
[22:30] things to other Arabs.
[22:31] Why was it only relevant in that moment if they have never
[22:35] shown any real care
[22:37] SPEAKER_00: towards the Palestinians?
[22:38] SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
[22:39] SPEAKER_02: So it's a country of seven emirates.
[22:41] SPEAKER_02: Abu Dhabi dictates the terms.
[22:42] SPEAKER_02: They basically decide foreign and security policy.
[22:45] SPEAKER_02: The Abu Dhabi leadership,
[22:46] SPEAKER_02: Mohammed bin Zaid,
[22:47] SPEAKER_02: if you look at the WikiLeaks,
[22:48] there's a lot of the leaked diplomatic cables from US diplomats
[22:51] talking to Mohammed
[22:52] SPEAKER_02: bin Zaid,
[22:52] where he was basically saying that he doesn't care about the
[22:55] Palestinian cause.
[22:56] SPEAKER_02: So he personally was never affectionate to this cause.
[22:58] SPEAKER_02: There's always this argument,
[22:59] SPEAKER_02: Abu Dhabi,
[23:00] SPEAKER_02: that the Palestinian,
[23:01] SPEAKER_02: that predate,
[23:02] SPEAKER_02: I mean,
[23:02] SPEAKER_02: that goes more than a decade back.
[23:03] SPEAKER_02: where they're saying they never really care about the Palestinians,
[23:06] SPEAKER_02: and also they sold their land,
[23:07] SPEAKER_02: so it's their own problem.
[23:09] SPEAKER_02: So they never were very empathetic about the Palestinian cause.
[23:11] You go to Dubai or the Northern Emirates,
[23:13] the situation is slightly different.
[23:15] SPEAKER_02: People are very passionate about the Palestinians.
[23:17] SPEAKER_02: You also see some commentators from the Northern Emirates,
[23:19] SPEAKER_02: including from Dubai,
[23:20] SPEAKER_02: who are speaking out against Israel amid the genocide.
[23:23] SPEAKER_02: So we have to be very careful not to use a big,
[23:25] SPEAKER_02: broad brush and say,
[23:26] SPEAKER_02: all the Emiratis don't care.
[23:27] I think there's friction domestically between the leadership in
[23:30] Abu Dhabi and the population.
[23:32] SPEAKER_02: Generally, the population does care about Palestine.
[23:34] SPEAKER_02: But obviously,
[23:35] they're investing quite a lot into the Israelis have their
[23:37] so-called Hasbara
[23:38] SPEAKER_02: networks,
[23:39] the kind of the ones that explain the Israeli cause to people
[23:42] in the world.
[23:42] And the Emiratis have their own sort of pro-Israel networks
[23:45] that speak to the local
[23:47] population and basically tell them why they now need to love
[23:49] Israel and why the
[23:50] SPEAKER_02: Israelis on the right side and why,
[23:52] because they're fighting terrorism and Hamas is the Muslim
[23:54] Brotherhood and they're
[23:54] SPEAKER_02: the terrorists.
[23:55] In this kind of black and white stand of you have to choose and
[23:57] Israel is the
[23:58] choice of the government and hence why everyone in the Emirates
[24:01] has to choose for
[24:02] SPEAKER_02: Israel.
[24:02] It works to an extent,
[24:03] not necessarily very successfully,
[24:05] but it works to an extent.
[24:06] SPEAKER_02: They've been able to subvert the discourse and people are also deterred.
[24:10] The UAE is one of the most authoritarian countries in the world
[24:12] when it comes to
[24:12] SPEAKER_02: freedom of speech and academic freedom.
[24:14] SPEAKER_02: So they're extremely repressive.
[24:16] People were arrested because they were waving the Palestinian
[24:18] flag or they had a
[24:19] SPEAKER_02: badge with a watermelon on or whatever.
[24:21] Because it's speech that Abu Dhabi finds threatening because
[24:24] they feel if people
[24:26] wave the Palestinian flag and they mobilize around a civil
[24:29] societal cause outside
[24:30] SPEAKER_02: of the parameter of government control,
[24:33] it could potentially lead to mobilization that could grow into
[24:36] a bigger movement
[24:36] SPEAKER_02: that could overthrow the government.
[24:38] Hence,
[24:38] they're already trying to repress it at its core in the
[24:40] beginning.
[24:41] SPEAKER_02: So Abu Dhabi never really cared about Palestinians in that respect,
[24:44] SPEAKER_02: and hence any support that they were giving.
[24:46] SPEAKER_02: I remember the narrative was about annexation.
[24:48] SPEAKER_02: And I think annexation is kind of the red line.
[24:51] They want to keep the illusion alive,
[24:52] at least,
[24:53] Abu Dhabi,
[24:53] that they prevented annexation.
[24:55] SPEAKER_02: But when in reality, if you look at what happened in the West Bank,
[24:58] SPEAKER_02: not just since the 7th of October,
[24:59] SPEAKER_02: but definitely accelerated since the 7th of October,
[25:02] SPEAKER_02: is a quasi-annexation anyway.
[25:03] So red lines have been crossed and they are being crossed and
[25:07] Abu Dhabi is
[25:07] SPEAKER_02: absolutely doing nothing about it.
[25:09] SPEAKER_02: So they really don't care.
[25:10] SPEAKER_02: And it's quite clear now that they don't care.
[25:12] SPEAKER_02: Also, as Trump doesn't seem to care.
[25:14] SPEAKER_02: So, you know, they do whatever serves them in Washington.
[25:17] SPEAKER_02: I'd like to ask a bit about the Saudis.
[25:20] In response to the Emiratis' emerging axis and also against the
[25:25] backdrop of an
[25:27] SPEAKER_02: emboldened and increasingly aggressive Israel in the wake of October 7th,
[25:31] Saudi Arabia appears to be forming its own strategic alliances
[25:36] with states in the
[25:36] SPEAKER_02: region.
[25:37] SPEAKER_02: I'm thinking about Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, etc.,
[25:40] Do you read this as fundamentally an attempt to preserve a
[25:44] regional order based on sovereignty?
[25:46] SPEAKER_02: So as against the broader secessionist agitations of the Emiratis?
[25:52] Or is this more classically a power block forming in advance of
[25:55] some wider rupture,
[25:57] SPEAKER_02: perhaps in the wake of US decline as a regional leader?
[26:00] SPEAKER_02: I think it's far less binary than that.
[26:02] So for Egypt,
[26:03] for Pakistan,
[26:04] Turkey,
[26:04] they don't want to align with either side.
[26:07] SPEAKER_02: They don't like bloc politics.
[26:08] They currently don't feel pressure of having to side with
[26:11] either side of this divide.
[26:12] SPEAKER_02: But they find it problematic,
[26:14] and I think all of the states in the region find it highly
[26:17] problematic that there
[26:18] is a divide and rule agenda where states that are already
[26:21] fragile are now being
[26:22] SPEAKER_02: hollowed out even more and basically contested from inside.
[26:25] which has been an old Israeli strategy because the Israelis
[26:28] obviously feeling
[26:28] SPEAKER_02: threatened by the Arab states.
[26:30] SPEAKER_02: They always try to find ways to internally weaken these Arab states.
[26:33] SPEAKER_02: And so the divide and rule approach is something that is not new.
[26:36] And it's also not surprising that the Israelis are jumping on
[26:39] the Emirati bandwagon
[26:40] SPEAKER_02: in Somaliland,
[26:41] SPEAKER_02: for example,
[26:41] where Somaliland has been carved out by the Emirates for the
[26:44] last 15 years or so.
[26:46] And the Israelis are now the first ones to recognize Somaliland
[26:49] as an independent country.
[26:50] SPEAKER_02: That's not surprising.
[26:51] SPEAKER_02: That's an old Israeli strategy.
[26:53] SPEAKER_02: But the thing is that in this region where statehood has been fragile,
[26:57] all of the states are trying to find a way to keep territorial
[27:01] integrity and keep
[27:01] SPEAKER_02: the sovereignty of states alive.
[27:03] And you could make a case that this conflict between the UAE
[27:06] and Saudi is a
[27:07] SPEAKER_02: conflict over ontology and also strategic culture.
[27:10] SPEAKER_02: Ontology and philosophy in terms of how does order look like?
[27:13] SPEAKER_02: How do you want order to look like?
[27:14] SPEAKER_02: And the Emiratis are saying,
[27:15] SPEAKER_02: you will not restore a state-centric order in this part of the world.
[27:18] SPEAKER_02: It's gone.
[27:19] SPEAKER_02: And in the gap,
[27:20] SPEAKER_02: we might be able and willing to build our own sort of non-state,
[27:23] actor-based or quasi-state order where we carve out small
[27:27] pockets of stability and
[27:29] SPEAKER_02: leave the rest to its own devices.
[27:31] And the Saudis are saying vehemently,
[27:33] that's not something we can agree on.
[27:35] SPEAKER_02: This is going to be a disaster for the region.
[27:37] SPEAKER_02: And I think all Arab states kind of side with Saudi on this,
[27:41] SPEAKER_02: of saying this is an absolute disaster.
[27:43] Turkey as well has a long-standing strategic culture of not
[27:46] allowing non-state
[27:47] SPEAKER_02: actors to carve out zones of influence outside of state control.
[27:51] It's almost a trauma for the Turks that goes back to the
[27:53] dissolution of the Ottoman
[27:54] SPEAKER_02: Empire in the 1920s,
[27:56] SPEAKER_02: when a lot of non-state,
[27:57] SPEAKER_02: non-Turkish entities try to break away,
[27:59] SPEAKER_02: and some of them succeeded in breaking away.
[28:01] SPEAKER_02: They obviously have that history with the Kurds trying to break away.
[28:04] SPEAKER_02: So the Turks really do not believe in secession.
[28:07] SPEAKER_02: And so they very much are aligned with the Saudis on this.
[28:10] SPEAKER_02: Pakistan has its own kind of breakaway region.
[28:13] SPEAKER_02: They don't believe in that either.
[28:14] SPEAKER_02: And Egypt, the same.
[28:15] SPEAKER_02: I mean, Egypt is very much a state state.
[28:17] It's a state nation more than probably any other state in this
[28:20] part of the world
[28:21] SPEAKER_02: because that state of Egypt goes back thousands of years.
[28:24] SPEAKER_02: So they have that as an Arab state.
[28:25] SPEAKER_02: They're probably the biggest,
[28:26] SPEAKER_02: what we call a state nation,
[28:27] SPEAKER_02: a nation that was formed after the state was created,
[28:30] while many of the other states in the region or some other
[28:33] states in the region,
[28:34] SPEAKER_02: they might have been nations first and then became states.
[28:36] So Egypt very much believes in strong states,
[28:38] clear boundaries and enforceable borders.
[28:41] SPEAKER_02: And the Emirates,
[28:42] SPEAKER_02: obviously,
[28:42] SPEAKER_02: if you're sitting in Cairo right now,
[28:44] you're looking at Libya with the LNA potentially a threat to
[28:48] the border and the LNA
[28:49] SPEAKER_02: being an Emirati proxy.
[28:51] You're looking at Ethiopia and the Great Dam of the Nile that
[28:54] is the lifeline for
[28:55] SPEAKER_02: Egypt,
[28:55] SPEAKER_02: where there's a conflict that's been going on for a while with Ethiopia,
[28:58] SPEAKER_02: where again,
[28:59] SPEAKER_02: Ethiopia is a key partner and proxy of the UAE.
[29:01] SPEAKER_02: You look at Sudan,
[29:02] SPEAKER_02: the civil war on the southern border of Egypt,
[29:05] SPEAKER_02: a great threat to Egypt's stability.
[29:06] Again,
[29:07] the Emiratis being on the other side there with the support of
[29:09] the RSF.
[29:10] SPEAKER_02: And then you look to Gaza,
[29:11] SPEAKER_02: where in Gaza,
[29:12] SPEAKER_02: the Emirates are emerging as well as a key driver,
[29:15] SPEAKER_02: not a consensual player with the rest of the Arab world,
[29:17] SPEAKER_02: but with their own agenda,
[29:19] working together with the Israelis and also allowing the
[29:21] Israelis to carve up
[29:22] SPEAKER_02: territory in northern Gaza and Rafa,
[29:24] SPEAKER_02: where obviously most
[29:25] SPEAKER_02: Most of it is done through the Emirati Red Crescent,
[29:28] SPEAKER_02: where it's about humanitarian aid,
[29:29] but also working through the infrastructure and the structures
[29:32] that the Israelis
[29:33] leave in place rather than the UN agenda to kind of also carve
[29:36] out their own
[29:37] SPEAKER_02: spheres of influence.
[29:38] And the Israelis would be very happy for the Emiratis to run
[29:41] Gaza rather than
[29:42] SPEAKER_02: having the Saudis,
[29:43] SPEAKER_02: the Turks,
[29:43] SPEAKER_02: the Qataris or anyone else do it.
[29:45] SPEAKER_02: So if you're in Egypt right now,
[29:46] you see this sort of divide and rule approach by the Emiratis
[29:49] as a fundamental
[29:50] SPEAKER_02: threat to your national security.
[29:51] I'm just curious how you see this playing out with respect to
[29:54] US policy in the region.
[29:56] Do you read this kind of shift or potential shift in a
[30:00] hegemonic order from a
[30:02] state-centered approach toward a more networked approach as
[30:06] something that is
[30:07] SPEAKER_02: emerging in the wake of US withdrawal?
[30:10] Or is it part of the American project in the region or some
[30:14] combination or neither?
[30:15] SPEAKER_02: I do think that the region is now a networked order,
[30:18] but you could make the case that the world is going towards a
[30:21] neo-medieval order
[30:22] SPEAKER_02: anyway.
[30:23] Neo-medieval in the sense that there are competing authority
[30:25] structures everywhere
[30:26] SPEAKER_02: in the world right now where states are losing,
[30:28] SPEAKER_02: essentially,
[30:29] SPEAKER_02: power to supranational and subnational entities or subnational forces and
[30:34] SPEAKER_02: movements.
[30:34] SPEAKER_02: That is a natural development.
[30:36] SPEAKER_02: I think the idea of a state-centric world is historically an anachronism.
[30:40] It's an anachronism in the way as most of human history was
[30:43] about competing
[30:44] SPEAKER_02: authority structures.
[30:45] SPEAKER_02: States were never omnipotent.
[30:46] SPEAKER_02: The idea that states are omnipotent is probably,
[30:49] SPEAKER_02: I don't know,
[30:50] SPEAKER_02: maybe an idea of the late 19th century and the 20th century.
[30:53] SPEAKER_02: but that's not a long period in human history.
[30:55] So I think we're going back into a neo-medieval world of
[30:58] competing authority
[30:58] structures where sub-state entities in particular take over
[31:02] local and regional
[31:03] SPEAKER_02: authority,
[31:04] SPEAKER_02: competing or sometimes complementing the state,
[31:06] because it's not always the case that non-state actors are a
[31:09] threat to the state.
[31:10] SPEAKER_02: They sometimes complement the state as well.
[31:12] SPEAKER_02: That is the reality on the ground.
[31:14] SPEAKER_02: Obviously,
[31:15] the fact that great powers have withdrawn themselves and are
[31:19] weakened and find it
[31:20] SPEAKER_02: extremely difficult to project force over a long period of time,
[31:23] SPEAKER_02: and that includes the United States of America,
[31:26] despite the fact that they have the biggest war machinery in
[31:28] human history.
[31:29] SPEAKER_02: that they're unable to project,
[31:31] SPEAKER_02: or unwilling as well,
[31:32] to project force and bandwidth to this part of the world for an
[31:36] extended period of
[31:37] SPEAKER_02: time.
[31:37] SPEAKER_02: If you look at Iraq,
[31:38] SPEAKER_02: you look at Afghanistan,
[31:40] which I think are the two wars that broke American hegemony and
[31:44] also probably
[31:44] SPEAKER_02: America's superpower status in the world,
[31:46] that was due to the fact that they weren't able to control the
[31:49] complexity of social
[31:51] SPEAKER_02: politics and geoeconomics in the Middle East.
[31:53] And we didn't even start talking about Africa and other parts
[31:56] of the world.
[31:56] SPEAKER_02: So I think this is a contributing factor
[31:58] SPEAKER_02: It's a bit of the chicken and the egg.
[32:00] Is it America's withdrawal that really accelerated this or was
[32:03] it already the
[32:04] developments that already existed that made this possible in
[32:07] the first place for
[32:08] SPEAKER_02: America or that prompted America to leave?
[32:10] SPEAKER_02: I don't know.
[32:11] But these things certainly kind of complement each other in
[32:14] many ways where
[32:15] SPEAKER_02: America's withdrawal accelerated it,
[32:17] but also America had to withdraw because it couldn't deal with
[32:19] the complexity on
[32:20] the ground and it failed to build stable state institutions in
[32:24] Iraq and Afghanistan
[32:25] SPEAKER_02: and other parts of the Middle East.
[32:27] Certainly,
[32:27] I think the Arab Spring is a turning point in that way as well.
[32:31] The fact that for at least for the Gulf states and for Abu
[32:33] Dhabi in particular,
[32:34] it came as a shock that America wasn't there to actually keep
[32:37] and protect the
[32:37] SPEAKER_02: regimes,
[32:38] but actually allow the regimes to fall and then not caring for
[32:41] what would happen
[32:41] SPEAKER_02: afterwards.
[32:42] SPEAKER_02: I mean, if you look at Libya, for example.
[32:43] SPEAKER_02: That is a trauma for Abu Dhabi.
[32:45] SPEAKER_02: It's a trauma for other Gulf states as well.
[32:47] SPEAKER_02: And they realized that America is not omnipotent.
[32:49] SPEAKER_02: And I think America is now trying from afar to kind of manage the mass,
[32:55] SPEAKER_02: but doing it via proxies themselves and intermediaries,
[32:58] SPEAKER_02: which is just a natural response to what's going on on the ground.
[33:01] You're talking about the shocks that happened with the Gulf
[33:04] states when they
[33:04] SPEAKER_00: realized that America was not guaranteed to come to their aid.
[33:09] SPEAKER_00: And this was,
[33:09] SPEAKER_00: of course,
[33:10] the context that the diplomatic rapprochement with Iran
[33:14] happened several years ago.
[33:15] So I'm curious as to how stable you believe this rapprochement
[33:20] would remain if,
[33:21] SPEAKER_00: God forbid,
[33:22] SPEAKER_00: there is a war and Iran makes good on its promises to bombard the
[33:27] SPEAKER_00: American bases that are inside of Gulf states,
[33:30] SPEAKER_00: which Saudi Arabia and the UAE are both clearly concerned about.
[33:33] SPEAKER_00: I mean,
[33:33] SPEAKER_00: what interested me,
[33:34] SPEAKER_00: at least in how Axios reported on this,
[33:37] is that Saudi Arabia's defense minister apparently took the
[33:40] position that Trump
[33:41] would lose face if he did not bombard Iran after making the
[33:46] assurances he did to
[33:47] SPEAKER_00: protesters.
[33:48] Do you think that the UAE and Saudi Arabia would move as one on
[33:52] this issue or would
[33:53] SPEAKER_00: their ambitions still make things difficult,
[33:56] SPEAKER_00: so to speak?
[33:57] SPEAKER_02: Well,
[33:58] let's go back to June and September 2025 when Qatar was bombed
[34:04] first by Iran and
[34:04] SPEAKER_02: then later on by Israel.
[34:06] SPEAKER_02: In both instances,
[34:07] we had a very short moment of unity in the Gulf where people
[34:10] rallied around the
[34:11] flag because they were saying it was unacceptable for Qatar as
[34:14] the main mediator in
[34:15] SPEAKER_02: all these crises,
[34:16] SPEAKER_02: being now bombed by both of the mediating parties,
[34:18] SPEAKER_02: first Iran and then Israel.
[34:20] SPEAKER_02: And so that was a rallying moment for the Gulf where I thought,
[34:22] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[34:23] SPEAKER_02: here is a Gulf moment where the Gulf stands together.
[34:25] SPEAKER_02: That very quickly fell apart.
[34:27] SPEAKER_02: On Iran itself, there isn't a unified position.
[34:31] It's quite clear Oman,
[34:32] Qatar,
[34:32] Saudi have a very clear vision of saying we need to engage
[34:34] Iran.
[34:35] SPEAKER_02: There is no military solution to the problem.
[34:37] SPEAKER_02: We certainly don't want military escalation.
[34:39] The Emiratis have taken probably two weeks to actually jump on
[34:42] the bandwagon of
[34:43] SPEAKER_02: saying,
[34:43] SPEAKER_02: actually,
[34:43] we also don't want any war and we're not going to support the
[34:45] Americans on it.
[34:46] SPEAKER_02: But they took some time to do it.
[34:48] SPEAKER_02: It really depends on what the Iranians are going to do.
[34:50] SPEAKER_02: Are the Iranians going to strike Qatar?
[34:53] SPEAKER_02: I think that Qatar is a consensual entity nowadays,
[34:56] where I think every party in the Gulf see Qatar as a
[34:59] constructive player and kind
[35:00] SPEAKER_02: of the bedrock of stability,
[35:02] which wasn't the case obviously during the blockade a couple of
[35:04] years ago,
[35:04] SPEAKER_02: but it is now the case.
[35:06] If Saudi was going to be hit,
[35:08] I think everyone would have to express their sympathy.
[35:11] If the UAE were to be hit,
[35:13] you know,
[35:13] obviously there would be expressions of solidarity as well.
[35:16] But I think there are some voices in the Gulf people I've
[35:19] spoken to over the last
[35:20] couple of weeks that maybe they deserve it because they've been
[35:22] playing with fire
[35:23] and they always see they've been aligning themselves so closely
[35:25] with Israel.
[35:26] SPEAKER_02: Maybe they should be struck.
[35:27] SPEAKER_02: That's obviously nothing they would ever express publicly.
[35:29] SPEAKER_02: But these are privately held sort of opinions.
[35:32] SPEAKER_02: But it really depends.
[35:33] I'm not confident,
[35:35] but I'm hopeful that we can avoid a military escalation.
[35:39] SPEAKER_02: There is, I think, a consensus in the way that Iran is going to stay.
[35:43] SPEAKER_02: Nobody really wants to have a civil war, Iran.
[35:46] The idea that Iran is going to sink into a sort of Iraq-like
[35:49] chaos where the regime
[35:50] SPEAKER_02: collapses and then different factions are trying to fight it out.
[35:53] SPEAKER_02: And obviously Trump is not someone who does regime change.
[35:57] SPEAKER_02: Like in Venezuela,
[35:57] he's quite happy to kidnap someone who will kill the leader and
[36:00] then leave the
[36:00] country to its own devices and not bear the burden of
[36:03] reconstruction and nation
[36:04] SPEAKER_02: building,
[36:04] which is where we failed and which cost most of the money and
[36:07] lives for American
[36:08] SPEAKER_02: soldiers.
[36:09] SPEAKER_02: So there aren't any good scenarios that I can see right now,
[36:12] SPEAKER_02: militarily speaking,
[36:13] SPEAKER_02: where,
[36:14] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[36:14] SPEAKER_02: the United States strikes,
[36:15] SPEAKER_02: decapitates,
[36:16] SPEAKER_02: because I don't think Iran can be decapitated.
[36:18] SPEAKER_02: I think it's a network state.
[36:19] It's far more horizontally organized than Venezuela or any
[36:23] other state in this part
[36:24] SPEAKER_02: of the world.
[36:24] SPEAKER_02: So,
[36:25] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[36:25] SPEAKER_02: taking out Khamenei is not going to lead to the collapse of the regime,
[36:28] SPEAKER_02: but it will lead to some sort of transformation.
[36:30] SPEAKER_02: There will be changes made.
[36:31] SPEAKER_02: I think the IRGC would take over.
[36:33] But if we have an extensive air campaign for a couple of days
[36:37] where the IRGC is the
[36:38] SPEAKER_02: heart of revolutionary guards at the heart of the regime,
[36:42] SPEAKER_02: if they were to feel threatened,
[36:43] SPEAKER_02: they might do all kinds of things.
[36:45] SPEAKER_02: It could be, you know, harassing, and I think that'd be very likely.
[36:47] They'd be using their power to disrupt trade around the Strait
[36:50] of Hormuz and the
[36:52] SPEAKER_02: Bab al-Mandeb,
[36:53] SPEAKER_02: which are two key choke points for global energy trade.
[36:56] SPEAKER_02: They'd be obviously striking U.S.
[36:58] assets,
[36:59] potentially in Qatar,
[37:00] even if Qatar is being very clear now they're mitigating,
[37:03] SPEAKER_02: also not hosting the US to launch any strikes.
[37:05] But all of that really depends on if there is a military
[37:09] escalation,
[37:09] how it will unfold.
[37:10] SPEAKER_02: As it looks now,
[37:11] SPEAKER_02: there is a very,
[37:12] very small hope that I have that the Iranians can come to face
[37:18] saving deal that
[37:19] SPEAKER_02: Trump can agree to as well.
[37:20] SPEAKER_02: Because I don't think Trump actually wants to go to war anymore.
[37:22] I think he would much rather prefer to have a deal that he can
[37:25] sell as a victory
[37:26] and then leave this because he's already far too long engaged
[37:29] on the issue of Iran.
[37:30] SPEAKER_02: This has been going on for weeks now.
[37:32] He's someone quick in quick out and then move on rather than
[37:35] being now booked down
[37:36] week after week in a negotiation process that I don't think is
[37:39] going to give any
[37:40] SPEAKER_02: quick victories.
[37:40] SPEAKER_02: But I'm hopeful that over the next couple of days,
[37:43] SPEAKER_02: we'll find some sort of framework that Trump can agree to,
[37:46] SPEAKER_02: to at least avoid escalation.
[37:48] SPEAKER_02: My question with respect to that is,
[37:50] SPEAKER_02: you know,
[37:51] there is one player in the region that does seem to think it's
[37:53] in their strategic
[37:54] SPEAKER_02: interest for there to be a war,
[37:55] SPEAKER_02: and that's Israel.
[37:56] And as we know,
[37:57] with the June War,
[37:58] that escalatory sequence was initiated by Israel.
[38:01] And I'm curious what you make of the possibility of Israel
[38:04] deciding that if they
[38:05] find it's in their interest to try to sabotage a deal by
[38:09] escalating things on their
[38:10] SPEAKER_02: own accord.
[38:11] SPEAKER_02: You're absolutely right.
[38:12] SPEAKER_02: Israel is the one out.
[38:14] Their brinkmanship has led us to the current chaos post October
[38:18] 7th in Lebanon,
[38:19] SPEAKER_02: in Syria,
[38:20] SPEAKER_02: in Yemen.
[38:21] I mean,
[38:21] I think they struck Tunisia at some point,
[38:23] Iran,
[38:24] obviously,
[38:24] and Qatar.
[38:25] SPEAKER_02: So we always have to be careful.
[38:28] SPEAKER_02: On the other hand,
[38:28] I think the strike on Qatar was a turning point for Netanyahu
[38:31] as well to say,
[38:32] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[38:32] SPEAKER_02: we've crossed the red line.
[38:33] SPEAKER_02: There was global outrage.
[38:35] SPEAKER_02: I don't think any country,
[38:36] SPEAKER_02: even the most pro-Israel people,
[38:38] SPEAKER_02: didn't come out and say Israel had the right to do it.
[38:40] Even those Americans who usually stand with Israel also then
[38:44] tended to stand with Qatar.
[38:46] SPEAKER_02: The Europeans stood with Qatar.
[38:47] SPEAKER_02: And it was clear for Netanyahu that he overreached.
[38:50] SPEAKER_02: And striking Iran again,
[38:51] SPEAKER_02: I think there's consensus now that what the regime has done domestically,
[38:54] the Israelis feel a freedom to push for harsher actions now
[38:58] than even six months
[38:59] SPEAKER_02: ago.
[39:00] SPEAKER_02: But equally, I think Israel is militarily deterred.
[39:03] SPEAKER_02: Their experience of the June War was not that it was a victory,
[39:06] SPEAKER_02: despite the fact that this is what they're propagating.
[39:08] SPEAKER_02: If you speak to people in the IDF Home Command,
[39:10] SPEAKER_02: people who've had to deal with the aftermath,
[39:13] SPEAKER_02: with the air defense that failed a couple of times,
[39:15] SPEAKER_02: You'll see that this was quite a traumatic experience for the Israelis,
[39:19] SPEAKER_02: quite unprecedented even in Israel's history,
[39:21] SPEAKER_02: of being struck,
[39:22] SPEAKER_02: and obviously being struck right at the heart of power,
[39:24] SPEAKER_02: at least from a military point of view in Tel Aviv,
[39:27] SPEAKER_02: and their inability to take out the incoming missiles.
[39:30] SPEAKER_02: Even if many of the missiles now have been depleted and destroyed,
[39:33] SPEAKER_02: any retaliation from Iran will be costly again.
[39:36] SPEAKER_02: And this is a cost that Israel would like to avoid,
[39:38] and they probably would like the Americans to fight Iran to the
[39:41] last American.
[39:42] SPEAKER_02: and doing that without being dragged into the war themselves,
[39:45] I don't think the Israelis would be stupid enough to launch an
[39:47] attack that wouldn't
[39:48] SPEAKER_02: be plausibly deniable.
[39:50] Obviously they have an interest in rallying up any sort of
[39:52] mobilization against the
[39:54] SPEAKER_02: regime domestically,
[39:55] SPEAKER_02: funding any protest movement that they can find,
[39:57] SPEAKER_02: and obviously there's an organic mobilization that you can tap into.
[40:01] That's the sort of stuff the Israelis would be happy to do
[40:03] because it's plausibly deniable.
[40:05] SPEAKER_02: But flying their planes over Jordan,
[40:07] SPEAKER_02: Iraq into Iran and striking targets inside Iran,
[40:10] that would just lead to a retaliation that I think is going to
[40:13] be costly and
[40:13] SPEAKER_02: potentially more costly than what we've seen.
[40:15] There are some people in Iran who are saying that they held
[40:18] back in June and they
[40:19] SPEAKER_02: could even strike harder next time around.
[40:21] SPEAKER_02: So this is certainly not something that the Israelis want.
[40:24] And the Americans are already there and they can do the dirty
[40:26] work and they will
[40:27] SPEAKER_02: have to bear the burden of this conflict.
[40:29] And that's kind of the Israeli,
[40:30] it has been the Israeli playbook for quite some time.
[40:33] SPEAKER_00: I want to go back just to Saudi Arabia and the UAE for a moment,
[40:37] SPEAKER_00: the historical context,
[40:38] because I think the general impression that many people outside
[40:42] of the Gulf have is
[40:43] SPEAKER_00: that Saudi Arabia,
[40:44] SPEAKER_00: the UAE,
[40:45] SPEAKER_00: all these different states in the region,
[40:46] SPEAKER_00: except for Qatar,
[40:47] SPEAKER_00: as you said,
[40:48] SPEAKER_00: for that one period in late 2010s,
[40:50] all of these countries are a united front in some form or
[40:54] another against Iranian
[40:56] SPEAKER_00: expansionism.
[40:57] This most recent flaring in Yemen was unprecedented and a
[41:01] significant shock,
[41:02] SPEAKER_00: but this has been building for some time,
[41:04] SPEAKER_00: for years earlier.
[41:05] Was there an initial moment in history when this split between
[41:11] Saudi and Emirati
[41:13] SPEAKER_00: ambitions began to emerge,
[41:14] SPEAKER_00: or was this baked into their relationship from the very beginning,
[41:18] SPEAKER_00: when the UAE came into existence in the 70s?
[41:22] SPEAKER_02: You could make that case for all the smaller Gulf states.
[41:24] SPEAKER_02: So the Gulf states,
[41:25] SPEAKER_02: except for Oman,
[41:26] SPEAKER_02: who are different,
[41:27] they're a civilizational state with thousands of years of
[41:30] history and always built
[41:32] SPEAKER_02: around sedentary culture.
[41:34] SPEAKER_02: They weren't Bedouins, and they obviously had their own empire.
[41:36] SPEAKER_02: And they're on the eastern side of the Strait of Hormuz.
[41:38] SPEAKER_02: But all the ones who are to the north of the Strait of Hormuz,
[41:41] SPEAKER_02: the truchel states,
[41:42] SPEAKER_02: as we call them,
[41:43] SPEAKER_02: used to be British protectorates.
[41:45] SPEAKER_02: And they all got an independence in the 60s and then later on in the 70s,
[41:48] SPEAKER_02: especially what is now the UAE and Qatar.
[41:51] SPEAKER_02: They always were in the shadow of Saudi Arabia,
[41:54] SPEAKER_02: and they always felt when they came into existence,
[41:56] they knew that were small or even microstates that were living
[42:00] at the mercy of
[42:00] SPEAKER_02: Saudi Arabia as the big brother.
[42:02] SPEAKER_02: The GCC itself was built around Saudi Arabia as the big brother.
[42:06] SPEAKER_02: And Saudi Arabia
[42:06] had to come to terms with the fact that these small states were
[42:10] developing,
[42:10] SPEAKER_02: and they were developing at much faster speed than Saudi did,
[42:13] SPEAKER_02: particularly in the 70s,
[42:14] SPEAKER_02: and then later on in the 90s and 2000s.
[42:16] SPEAKER_02: If you look at Qatar in the early 90s,
[42:18] SPEAKER_02: or even Dubai in the early 90s,
[42:20] SPEAKER_02: and compare it to Qatar,
[42:21] SPEAKER_02: Dubai,
[42:22] SPEAKER_02: and Abu Dhabi in the late 2010s,
[42:24] SPEAKER_02: or even in 2010,
[42:26] SPEAKER_02: within 20 years,
[42:27] you had a hyperdevelopment that I think in human history is
[42:30] unprecedented.
[42:30] SPEAKER_02: And that's because of the wind rush,
[42:32] SPEAKER_02: the money that's come in from oil and gas,
[42:34] SPEAKER_02: gas in Qatar's case,
[42:35] SPEAKER_02: And then that allowed them to build quite quickly,
[42:38] SPEAKER_02: build massive,
[42:39] SPEAKER_02: not just infrastructure,
[42:40] but also getting people to come there and building nations
[42:42] essentially within a
[42:43] SPEAKER_02: very short amount of time.
[42:44] SPEAKER_02: At a time when the Saudis were kind of caught in strategic drift,
[42:48] SPEAKER_02: where you don't have leadership that was really building anything,
[42:50] SPEAKER_02: you had domestic issues with money being siffened off and corruption,
[42:54] and particularly the royal family doing whatever they needed to
[42:57] do to have fun.
[42:58] SPEAKER_02: reinvesting very little of the money that Saudi had.
[43:00] SPEAKER_02: I mean, Saudi was a very rich country in the 1970s.
[43:03] Of that money that came with the oil crisis,
[43:05] very little was reinvested effectively.
[43:07] It was wasteful spending,
[43:08] was spent overseas,
[43:10] it went into private pockets.
[43:11] Qatar and the UAE are different in the way that a lot of that
[43:14] money went into
[43:15] SPEAKER_02: building a nation,
[43:16] SPEAKER_02: building infrastructure,
[43:17] SPEAKER_02: making themselves relevant,
[43:18] SPEAKER_02: building networks globally,
[43:20] SPEAKER_02: and building influence.
[43:21] SPEAKER_02: And so the Saudis had to play catch up.
[43:23] SPEAKER_02: And when Mohammed bin Salman came to power,
[43:26] SPEAKER_02: or King Salman came to power in 2015,
[43:29] SPEAKER_02: his son Mohammed bin Salman came out of nowhere.
[43:31] Nobody had him on their sheet in terms of nobody thought this
[43:34] guy was in any way important.
[43:36] SPEAKER_02: But yet he became eventually crown prince in 2017.
[43:40] SPEAKER_02: We see a clash of personalities.
[43:42] SPEAKER_02: Mohammed bin Salman,
[43:43] SPEAKER_02: obviously very eager,
[43:44] SPEAKER_02: very young,
[43:45] SPEAKER_02: very immature,
[43:46] SPEAKER_02: vis-a-vis MBZ,
[43:48] SPEAKER_02: who then crown prince of Abu Dhabi later now,
[43:50] SPEAKER_02: obviously president of the UAE,
[43:52] SPEAKER_02: that you had that clash of individuals.
[43:53] SPEAKER_02: And that friction between these individuals,
[43:55] SPEAKER_02: which for a very short period was,
[43:57] SPEAKER_02: MBS was the protege of MBZ for a very short period of time.
[44:00] SPEAKER_02: But then MBS realized, I don't need MBZ anymore.
[44:02] And also maybe MBZ has a project in mind that is seeing Saudi
[44:06] as a secondary sort
[44:08] SPEAKER_02: of state or secondary power.
[44:09] SPEAKER_02: The Emiratis always had an issue with Saudi.
[44:12] SPEAKER_02: They always had a concern that Saudi might collapse eventually.
[44:14] SPEAKER_02: The Qataris as well.
[44:15] The small states were always fearful that if there was internal
[44:19] turmoil in Riyadh
[44:20] SPEAKER_02: that would lead to a collapse of the state in Saudi,
[44:23] SPEAKER_02: they'll be dealing with a monster,
[44:25] SPEAKER_02: a Frankenstein monster falling apart that nobody can control.
[44:28] SPEAKER_02: So stability in Riyadh was important.
[44:31] SPEAKER_02: But equally, they had their own ambitions now.
[44:33] SPEAKER_02: Saudi was standing for a project that the Emiratis no longer supported.
[44:37] SPEAKER_02: The Emiratis no longer believed in,
[44:39] or maybe never believed in the sort of Salafi project that the
[44:42] Saudis were
[44:43] SPEAKER_02: advocating and projecting into the world in the 1980s during the war in
[44:46] SPEAKER_02: Afghanistan,
[44:47] SPEAKER_02: where they're supporting the Mujahideen and building a sort of a global
[44:50] SPEAKER_02: infrastructure for Dawah and Islamic teaching and Islamic centers,
[44:54] SPEAKER_02: and very much projecting also Islamic conservatism across the world.
[44:57] SPEAKER_02: That's something that the Emirates didn't
[44:59] SPEAKER_02: support.
[45:00] The countries themselves obviously didn't have so much of a
[45:03] problem with the
[45:03] Islamic side of things and the conservatism that came out of
[45:06] Saudi initially.
[45:08] SPEAKER_02: But then in the 90s,
[45:09] SPEAKER_02: Hamad came to power,
[45:10] SPEAKER_02: the father emir now,
[45:12] SPEAKER_02: and he said,
[45:12] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[45:13] SPEAKER_02: if we want development,
[45:14] SPEAKER_02: we need to allow women,
[45:15] SPEAKER_02: not just women to drive,
[45:16] SPEAKER_02: but women need to come into education,
[45:17] SPEAKER_02: women need to be full functioning members of society,
[45:20] SPEAKER_02: we need to back them
[45:21] And also we need to get rid of that conservatism coming out of
[45:24] Saudi because it
[45:25] SPEAKER_02: will hold us back.
[45:26] And so a lot of that development that happened in Qatar with
[45:28] the money coming in,
[45:30] but also the liberalization that happened politically and
[45:32] socially went against the
[45:34] Saudi conservatism in the same way that Emirati liberalization
[45:37] went against the
[45:38] SPEAKER_02: Saudi project.
[45:39] SPEAKER_02: So you see already that there is friction in the system.
[45:42] SPEAKER_02: The Saudis suddenly realizing these small brothers are...
[45:46] SPEAKER_02: equals or pretending to be equals.
[45:48] The countries during the Arab Spring obviously punching above
[45:51] their weight was a
[45:51] SPEAKER_02: major threat to the Saudis.
[45:53] SPEAKER_02: They thought,
[45:53] who is this small microstate of 350,000 Qatar trying to do what
[45:57] they're doing now
[45:58] SPEAKER_02: without asking and consulting us?
[46:00] SPEAKER_02: And then the Emirates,
[46:01] SPEAKER_02: obviously,
[46:01] SPEAKER_02: after the counter-revolution happened in 2013 that they led,
[46:05] SPEAKER_02: the Emirates obviously never gave up.
[46:06] They continued their project and they built themselves up into
[46:09] this global,
[46:10] SPEAKER_02: definitely global player,
[46:11] SPEAKER_02: but certainly a regional,
[46:12] SPEAKER_02: almost a regional hegemon,
[46:13] SPEAKER_02: I would
[46:14] I would make the case that the UAE now is the most powerful
[46:17] country in the region.
[46:18] And so the UAE certainly outperforming the Saudis,
[46:22] and that was going to lead to friction.
[46:24] If you ask me for a single moment,
[46:26] I think a single moment is Yemen is where it all fell apart.
[46:30] Because the Yemen war was a war which was supposed to be a
[46:33] Saudi-led war to defend Saudi.
[46:35] SPEAKER_02: And the Emiratis came on board to help the Saudis,
[46:37] SPEAKER_02: but then ended up doing their own thing,
[46:39] advancing their own interests with their own proxies on the
[46:42] ground in the south
[46:43] SPEAKER_02: against Saudi interests.
[46:45] SPEAKER_02: And that's kind of where it fell apart.
[46:47] And 2019 is the first time we see major friction over Yemen,
[46:50] repeated in 2021.
[46:52] SPEAKER_02: And I would say since 21,
[46:54] SPEAKER_02: we see major friction between the UAE and Saudi,
[46:56] SPEAKER_02: which kind of now led to that clash in January 2026,
[47:00] when the Saudis decided to strike that shipment of arms from
[47:04] the Emirates to the
[47:05] SPEAKER_02: STC in Yemen.
[47:06] SPEAKER_02: So as you've described a key pillar of the UAE's networked power,
[47:11] SPEAKER_02: especially in comparison with Saudi Arabia,
[47:14] SPEAKER_02: is control over shipping ports,
[47:17] SPEAKER_02: logistics corridors.
[47:19] who controls checkpoints,
[47:20] who runs terminals,
[47:21] who's policing maritime space,
[47:22] etc.
[47:23] Can you explain in a bit more detail how that logistics
[47:26] strategy translates to
[47:28] political leverage on the ground in some of these cases that
[47:31] you're mentioning?
[47:32] SPEAKER_02: So I'm thinking of in Yemen, perhaps in Somalia and Sudan.
[47:35] Yeah,
[47:36] so this is part of the mercantilist geoeconomic grand strategy
[47:39] of the UAE.
[47:41] And hence why I make that comparison to England in the 1600s
[47:44] and the East India Company.
[47:46] SPEAKER_02: If you control supply chains, you essentially become influential.
[47:50] You're becoming codependent or interdependent with a global
[47:53] network of trade.
[47:54] SPEAKER_02: And so the Emiratis and Dubai anyway,
[47:56] SPEAKER_02: Dubai was traditionally the trading hub,
[47:59] SPEAKER_02: the commercial hub of the Gulf.
[48:00] SPEAKER_02: And so Dubai grew organically into a commercial hub.
[48:04] SPEAKER_02: The way that Dubai does trade is literally commercial interdependence.
[48:08] SPEAKER_02: There was never a weaponization of this.
[48:10] This was never about,
[48:11] you know,
[48:12] Dubai,
[48:12] hard power,
[48:13] leverage,
[48:14] or using that for coercive ends.
[48:15] SPEAKER_02: Abu Dhabi,
[48:16] SPEAKER_02: obviously becoming rich through oil trade,
[48:19] SPEAKER_02: has a very different cultural approach to trade.
[48:21] SPEAKER_02: They were never a real trading hub.
[48:23] SPEAKER_02: They were always second to Dubai in the Emirates.
[48:25] SPEAKER_02: But with that oil money,
[48:27] SPEAKER_02: they said,
[48:27] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[48:27] SPEAKER_02: if we reinvest that strategically,
[48:29] SPEAKER_02: maybe we can become a player in our own right.
[48:32] And the statecraft element of the Emirates is really a strategy
[48:35] of what I call
[48:36] SPEAKER_02: weaponized interdependence.
[48:37] SPEAKER_02: where you use benign means of trade.
[48:40] SPEAKER_02: You build relationships,
[48:41] logistical or commodity trade or financial relationships
[48:45] between financial services
[48:46] SPEAKER_02: and so on.
[48:47] SPEAKER_02: You export them.
[48:48] SPEAKER_02: You create an interdependence between a client and a provider.
[48:51] And the UAE are a provider and they build relationships with
[48:54] other clients.
[48:55] SPEAKER_02: There's nothing wrong with that.
[48:56] But the idea then for Abu Dhabi is where can we use that
[48:59] interdependence where both
[49:00] sides are winning and skew it in our favor and weaponizing that
[49:04] to create some sort
[49:04] SPEAKER_02: of codependence.
[49:05] SPEAKER_02: And if we just look at the logistics side of things,
[49:08] SPEAKER_02: if we just look at DP World,
[49:09] SPEAKER_02: Dubai Ports World,
[49:10] SPEAKER_02: and Abu Dhabi Ports,
[49:11] SPEAKER_02: state-owned enterprises,
[49:13] SPEAKER_02: one owned by the Emirate of Dubai and one by Abu Dhabi,
[49:16] they have become one of the major players in the world for the
[49:19] management of
[49:20] SPEAKER_02: container terminals.
[49:21] And they basically control the chalk points in and out of
[49:25] different countries.
[49:26] SPEAKER_02: If you look at the African continent,
[49:28] most of the trade in and out of the continent via container
[49:31] terminals goes via
[49:33] SPEAKER_02: Dubai or Abu Dhabi managed ports.
[49:35] SPEAKER_02: That's quite a significant chalk point policy.
[49:38] SPEAKER_02: And what that means is you control...
[49:40] potentially you can close the choke point you could say we're
[49:43] denying company x y
[49:45] and z or vessels from country x y and z access to the port
[49:48] potentially it means you
[49:49] know what's being traded through your port so you have
[49:52] knowledge of who trades what
[49:53] SPEAKER_02: with whom is that kind of panopticon effect
[49:55] SPEAKER_02: But it also gives you access to local political elites.
[50:00] So if a country's trade is entirely dependent on one choke
[50:03] point that you control,
[50:04] SPEAKER_02: that the UAE Abu Dhabi controls,
[50:06] SPEAKER_02: you can use that as leverage.
[50:07] And political elites want to make sure that they have you on
[50:11] their good side.
[50:12] SPEAKER_02: And that is then something that can translate into political influence.
[50:15] SPEAKER_02: It's a game that the Chinese are playing as well.
[50:18] SPEAKER_02: It's a game that the Russians tried to play.
[50:19] SPEAKER_02: They're not playing it very well.
[50:21] SPEAKER_02: And it's certainly a game that America under Trump is playing now.
[50:24] Weaponized interdependence and geoeconomic statecraft is
[50:27] certainly something that
[50:28] we see in the Trump administration being played out on the
[50:30] African continent.
[50:31] SPEAKER_02: Where you're saying, okay, what is America's greatest source of power?
[50:35] SPEAKER_02: It's not its military, it's the US dollar.
[50:37] SPEAKER_02: That is also something that you can weaponize by saying,
[50:40] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[50:40] SPEAKER_02: people are dependent on the dollar,
[50:42] SPEAKER_02: so we can use that to extract leverage from those who trade in dollar.
[50:46] SPEAKER_02: And the Emiratis basically say,
[50:47] SPEAKER_02: you use our infrastructure,
[50:49] SPEAKER_02: we own the infrastructure for trade in this part of the world,
[50:51] SPEAKER_02: so we're weaponizing that.
[50:52] SPEAKER_02: But it goes beyond that.
[50:53] SPEAKER_02: It's also commodity trade.
[50:55] SPEAKER_02: So Dubai has emerged as the greatest gold hub in the world.
[50:58] SPEAKER_02: It trades most of the artisan gold and regularly mined gold from Africa.
[51:02] SPEAKER_02: And they don't ask any questions.
[51:04] SPEAKER_02: They open up their jurisdiction.
[51:05] SPEAKER_02: If you have a suitcase full of gold nuggets,
[51:08] SPEAKER_02: you bring them into Dubai,
[51:09] SPEAKER_02: nobody really checks where they're coming from.
[51:11] SPEAKER_02: They melt it down.
[51:12] SPEAKER_02: You can then translate that into any sort of
[51:15] SPEAKER_02: cash or into any sort of commodity that you want to translate it to.
[51:18] SPEAKER_02: You can store it in Emirati banks.
[51:20] SPEAKER_02: It's very easy to open a bank account and maintain it there.
[51:22] SPEAKER_02: No questions asked.
[51:24] Dubai and UAE were graylisted by financial authorities for a
[51:28] while for that reason,
[51:29] SPEAKER_02: because of all the laundering that's been going on.
[51:30] SPEAKER_02: But if you're a non-state actor and aren't non-state actor in Africa,
[51:33] SPEAKER_02: such as the RSF,
[51:34] SPEAKER_02: and you own a couple of gold mines,
[51:36] SPEAKER_02: you can just trade them into the UAE,
[51:38] SPEAKER_02: no questions asked,
[51:39] SPEAKER_02: and you translate that into any sort of cash or cryptocurrency,
[51:43] SPEAKER_02: whatever it is.
[51:44] SPEAKER_02: Again, they're becoming a hub in crypto as well.
[51:46] SPEAKER_02: You create a value chain where you can then buy
[51:48] arms with that,
[51:49] you can buy material support with that,
[51:51] and you can ship it back.
[51:52] And the shipping is not just done via obviously maritime trade,
[51:56] but air cargo.
[51:57] SPEAKER_02: The UAE is a major hub for air cargo companies,
[52:00] companies who maintain private fleets of cargo planes that can
[52:03] help you fly
[52:05] SPEAKER_02: material from the UAE to Africa,
[52:06] SPEAKER_02: but also from point A to point B in Africa.
[52:09] SPEAKER_02: So again,
[52:10] SPEAKER_02: if you're a non-state actor,
[52:11] your infrastructure depends entirely on access to all these
[52:14] services that the
[52:15] SPEAKER_02: jurisdiction of the UAE offers to you.
[52:17] SPEAKER_02: And what is interesting is that this didn't happen coincidentally.
[52:20] SPEAKER_02: It's not like the Emirates opened up a jurisdiction and people came.
[52:23] SPEAKER_02: What they did is they very much lured actively,
[52:27] SPEAKER_02: the leadership lured people into the UAE,
[52:29] SPEAKER_02: saying,
[52:29] SPEAKER_02: you want to open up shop here.
[52:30] So the Haftas of the world,
[52:32] the Haftas is the guy who runs the LNA in Libya,
[52:35] SPEAKER_02: Hemeti, who runs the RSF, his family's money is in the UAE.
[52:39] SPEAKER_02: Funny enough,
[52:40] SPEAKER_02: even Western Libyan families,
[52:41] SPEAKER_02: so those in Tripoli who are supposed to be opposed to the UAE,
[52:45] SPEAKER_02: have their money in the UAE.
[52:46] You look at the SEC,
[52:48] Zubedi has his money and the UAE is now an Emirati citizen.
[52:51] SPEAKER_02: You look at the Somali elites in Pantland,
[52:53] SPEAKER_02: Somaliland,
[52:54] SPEAKER_02: and Jubaland,
[52:54] SPEAKER_02: they've got their private money in the UAE.
[52:57] So the financial sector in itself is a means to create
[53:00] weaponized interdependence,
[53:01] where these individuals who shape social politics in these
[53:04] countries are dependent
[53:06] SPEAKER_02: on access to the Emirati jurisdiction and their financial services,
[53:10] which they could then close to these individuals and basically
[53:13] get them stranded
[53:13] SPEAKER_02: somewhere financially.
[53:14] SPEAKER_02: And so you want to make sure that the Emiratis are on your good side.
[53:17] SPEAKER_02: So it's a means of influence.
[53:19] SPEAKER_02: And it's using that connectivity,
[53:21] SPEAKER_02: and the Emiratis always talk about connectivity,
[53:23] SPEAKER_02: and weaponizing that connectivity to make themselves not just relevant,
[53:27] SPEAKER_02: but basically indispensable to elites across the African continent.
[53:31] SPEAKER_02: I'm curious if you see that emphasis on logistics,
[53:35] SPEAKER_02: what you're calling weaponized interdependence,
[53:38] SPEAKER_02: as not just opening up opportunities for the Emiratis,
[53:41] SPEAKER_02: but also exposing any vulnerabilities.
[53:43] I'm wondering if you see,
[53:44] for example,
[53:45] the threat of labor unrest at any of these
[53:48] ports as a potential impediment to that project and also given
[53:52] their reliance on
[53:54] SPEAKER_02: these logistics corridors and trade routes,
[53:57] attacks such as we've seen from the Houthis to really target
[53:59] those points of
[54:01] SPEAKER_02: commerce circulation as a vulnerability for their geoeconomic,
[54:05] SPEAKER_02: geopolitical project.
[54:06] SPEAKER_02: They are now because they've been exposed.
[54:08] SPEAKER_02: And obviously the Saudis have now suddenly said,
[54:10] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[54:10] SPEAKER_02: all of these companies are basically children horses.
[54:12] SPEAKER_02: So there is a narrative that's been going around.
[54:15] SPEAKER_02: People are waking up to it.
[54:16] SPEAKER_02: So you have Somali communities, Sudanese.
[54:18] I can see it with a lot of the stuff that I write in the
[54:21] podcast that I do on this.
[54:23] I do get a lot of positive feedback from communities in these
[54:26] countries saying,
[54:27] SPEAKER_02: oh my God,
[54:27] SPEAKER_02: yeah,
[54:28] SPEAKER_02: that's exactly what's happening here.
[54:29] SPEAKER_02: We always knew there was something fishy about it.
[54:31] So there is a domestic resistance to Emiratis controlling that
[54:35] infrastructure.
[54:35] SPEAKER_02: Obviously,
[54:36] SPEAKER_02: they were kicked out the Emiratis out of Djibouti,
[54:38] SPEAKER_02: very important port in East Africa because of a domestic spad.
[54:42] SPEAKER_02: with the UAE.
[54:42] SPEAKER_02: But that could happen elsewhere.
[54:44] SPEAKER_02: We see that in Somalia now,
[54:45] where the Mogadishu central government is basically telling
[54:47] Emirati companies to
[54:48] SPEAKER_02: leave.
[54:49] Difficult to enforce because the autonomous breakaway regions
[54:52] maintain their own
[54:53] SPEAKER_02: relationships with the UAE and they will continue to do so.
[54:56] SPEAKER_02: But the Emirates have done,
[54:57] SPEAKER_02: again,
[54:57] what the Chinese have done is they start with a commercial port
[55:00] and they then
[55:01] SPEAKER_02: expand
[55:01] that commercial port into a military facility providing them
[55:04] with basing rights or
[55:05] concessions where they can put up their military equipment or
[55:09] you know potentially
[55:10] as they had done in berbera building even a military airport
[55:12] next to it which they
[55:13] can use to basically resupply their non-state actors across the
[55:16] african continent
[55:17] SPEAKER_02: with arms
[55:18] SPEAKER_02: That is certainly causing friction.
[55:20] And I think particularly in the public domain,
[55:22] journalists are looking into it.
[55:24] Satellites images are being circulated,
[55:26] which kind of shows what the Emiratis are really doing.
[55:28] SPEAKER_02: They're talking about trade and connectivity,
[55:30] SPEAKER_02: but actually they're building a bit of a small networked empire.
[55:33] And so that is certainly backfiring,
[55:35] but it hasn't created major unrest yet.
[55:37] SPEAKER_02: that is pushing the Emiratis out.
[55:39] SPEAKER_02: There have been protests in Socotra.
[55:41] SPEAKER_02: Socotra is that island between Somalia and Yemen.
[55:44] SPEAKER_02: It belongs to Yemen, part of southern Yemen.
[55:46] SPEAKER_02: The Emiratis occupied it.
[55:48] SPEAKER_02: They had a signal intelligence unit tapping into undersea cables there,
[55:52] SPEAKER_02: but they also had a small military facility there.
[55:54] SPEAKER_02: Locals didn't like it, and they were protesting.
[55:57] So the Emiratis eventually had to leave,
[55:59] and they now completely left under Saudi pressure.
[56:02] SPEAKER_02: So there is domestic resistance.
[56:04] I think the Emirates are no longer seen as the sort of Teflon
[56:07] guys that come
[56:08] somewhere out of the goodness of their heart to invest for
[56:12] humanitarian aid into
[56:13] SPEAKER_02: certain countries to help them out.
[56:15] So there is a bit of an aftertaste now after particularly what
[56:18] happened in Sudan.
[56:19] I think that is kind of what broke the beautiful image that the
[56:22] Emiratis had
[56:22] SPEAKER_02: developed for themselves.
[56:24] SPEAKER_02: But then again,
[56:24] SPEAKER_02: if many of these infrastructures,
[56:26] SPEAKER_02: these social political setups are all three Terran in nature,
[56:30] SPEAKER_02: which means it doesn't matter what the people think.
[56:32] SPEAKER_02: And also the Emiratis are investing into their law enforcement sector.
[56:36] They obviously bring their own mercenaries,
[56:37] private military and security companies.
[56:39] SPEAKER_02: They are being used to control what domestic audiences see.
[56:42] And apart from that,
[56:43] the money that is being created,
[56:45] for example,
[56:46] by the RSF
[56:47] laundering gold in the UAE is translated into PR companies in
[56:52] Dubai and Abu Dhabi
[56:53] SPEAKER_02: who provide PR services to Hermeti,
[56:56] SPEAKER_02: for example,
[56:57] SPEAKER_02: or to Hafta or the STC,
[56:59] SPEAKER_02: promoting them domestically for domestic audiences in Yemen or Sudan,
[57:03] SPEAKER_02: respectively.
[57:04] SPEAKER_02: For the time being, I think the pros are outweighing the negatives.
[57:09] I'd like to just close us out by taking a step back and asking
[57:14] you about your
[57:15] SPEAKER_02: methodology as an analyst.
[57:17] SPEAKER_02: You make it your business to assess risk.
[57:20] SPEAKER_02: One feature of the world since October 7th,
[57:23] SPEAKER_02: particularly in the Middle East,
[57:25] SPEAKER_02: is that risk tolerance seems to have shifted pretty dramatically.
[57:30] Powerful states such as the US and Israel seem more willing to
[57:34] absorb escalation,
[57:35] SPEAKER_02: uncertainty,
[57:36] SPEAKER_02: and reputational costs than they were just a few years ago.
[57:40] SPEAKER_02: This has obviously forced every other player to reassess risk.
[57:43] SPEAKER_02: From your perspective,
[57:45] SPEAKER_02: what has changed in how key actors are assessing risk,
[57:49] and how do you adjust your own analytical framework when older
[57:52] assumptions about
[57:53] SPEAKER_02: deterrence and restraint no longer seem to hold?
[57:56] I think we've seen a complete collapse of regional order and
[58:01] particular rules-based
[58:02] SPEAKER_02: order as much as it even existed before the 7th of October,
[58:06] SPEAKER_02: which means everything is possible.
[58:08] The Israelis have been pushing the envelope and they've gotten
[58:10] away with it.
[58:11] Trump,
[58:12] since he came to power a second time around,
[58:14] is pushing the envelope.
[58:15] SPEAKER_02: He's getting away with it.
[58:16] I think we're living in very different times than we were even
[58:19] living in five years ago.
[58:20] SPEAKER_02: So you're absolutely right in terms of the risk appetite of the different
[58:24] SPEAKER_02: protagonists in the region has completely changed.
[58:28] But I think what has also dramatically changed is the ontology
[58:31] in terms of not just
[58:32] SPEAKER_02: the methodology,
[58:33] SPEAKER_02: but the ontology,
[58:34] the view of the world of what are the units of analysis that we
[58:37] have to look at,
[58:37] SPEAKER_02: that has changed.
[58:38] So we're no longer just looking at states and governments and
[58:41] formal state actors
[58:42] SPEAKER_02: in terms of their risk appetite and their decision making,
[58:45] SPEAKER_02: their policy making.
[58:45] We're looking at a networked order where basically you map out
[58:49] for each country a
[58:50] SPEAKER_02: very,
[58:50] SPEAKER_02: very complex web of stakeholders.
[58:53] And stakeholder assessment now has become so much more
[58:55] difficult than in previous
[58:57] SPEAKER_02: times because it's obviously,
[58:59] SPEAKER_02: I'm not saying it was ever simplistic.
[59:00] SPEAKER_02: It was never just the government, but
[59:02] If you look at Yemen and you do a risk assessment and you're
[59:05] trying to find out
[59:06] SPEAKER_02: what people are doing next,
[59:07] SPEAKER_02: particularly as you're trying to forecast what's going to happen next,
[59:10] you're looking now at hundreds and hundreds of different nodes
[59:14] in the network that
[59:14] SPEAKER_02: you need to analyze.
[59:15] And then obviously they themselves have external networks that
[59:18] go out of the country.
[59:20] SPEAKER_02: Most of the networks are transnational in nature anyway.
[59:23] SPEAKER_02: What has helped a lot is not just obviously gathering information,
[59:26] SPEAKER_02: having people on the ground gathering information,
[59:28] and having human intelligence to complement what is a very
[59:31] messy open source
[59:32] SPEAKER_02: intelligence picture that you get.
[59:34] Because obviously,
[59:34] since the arrival of AI,
[59:36] we've got so much content being pushed out.
[59:38] SPEAKER_02: A lot of it is misinformation.
[59:40] SPEAKER_02: Some of it is disinformation.
[59:41] SPEAKER_02: So it's difficult to see through.
[59:42] SPEAKER_02: So human intelligence is key.
[59:44] But what is helpful in this context as well in terms of
[59:47] technology is that AI helps
[59:49] SPEAKER_02: you to do the macro analysis.
[59:51] We've developed an interesting large language model around the
[59:55] database that we've
[59:56] SPEAKER_02: built over the last,
[59:56] SPEAKER_02: what is it now,
[59:57] SPEAKER_02: six and a half years in these countries in the Middle East.
[59:59] And it allows you to do stakeholder analysis in a much more
[1:00:03] rigorous way with a
[1:00:04] SPEAKER_02: very clear ontology,
[1:00:05] SPEAKER_02: with a very clear methodology,
[1:00:07] and allows you to measure different actors and their activities
[1:00:11] almost in parallel.
[1:00:13] Something that would have taken you days if you had human
[1:00:16] analysts doing it.
[1:00:17] SPEAKER_02: And so what is key is good data,
[1:00:19] but now you have a lot of technological help to help with the
[1:00:22] complexity of the
[1:00:23] SPEAKER_02: assessment.
[1:00:24] SPEAKER_02: And I think...
[1:00:25] SPEAKER_02: That is kind of revolutionizing the market as well,
[1:00:27] SPEAKER_02: because human analysts themselves can't possibly,
[1:00:30] SPEAKER_02: on their own,
[1:00:31] really do justice to the complexity of different actors that
[1:00:35] you need to look at
[1:00:36] SPEAKER_02: when you want to determine,
[1:00:37] SPEAKER_02: for example,
[1:00:38] SPEAKER_02: what's going to happen next between the US and Iran.
[1:00:40] SPEAKER_02: Dr. Krieg, thank you so much.
[1:00:42] SPEAKER_02: Thank you.
[1:00:43] SPEAKER_02: Great pleasure.
[1:01:06] Thank you.

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