# Episode 8: The Scramble For Somalia w/ Samar Al-Bulushi

An episode of [Turbulence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1847060038), 6 Jan 2026, 1 h 19 min.

Audio: https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/183646721/c88d0c7edb959bdca4d1faef5d2e7f9e.mp3

Samar Al-Bulushi joins us to discuss Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, US intervention in the Horn of Africa, and why the Red Sea corridor has become such a hotspot in the rapidly shifting global order. Works mentioned: Israel, Ethiopia and the Somali question Samar Al-Bulushi is an Associate Professor of Anthropology at UC Irvine. She is the author of War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024). Her analysis on militarism and imperialism in Africa has been featured in The Intercept, Al-Jazeera, Teen Vogue, Jacobin, Democracy Now! and Africa is a Country. Twitter: @samar42 Bluesky: @samar42.bsky.social We’re committed to independence and will never run ads or take money from institutions. That means Turbulence is entirely listener-funded. For $5 a month, paid subscribers gain access to weekly news analysis bonus episodes, where we respond to events as they unfold, follow up on previous discussions, and draw connections across the conflicts shaping our world. Most importantly, paid subscriptions make it possible for us to keep doing this work independently, week after week. Subscribe today at turbulencepod.substack.com Follow along on Twitter/X and Instagram @turbulence_pod Theme: Eye for an Eye, Haram (2017) Art: Vivek Venkatraman This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit turbulencepod.substack.com/subscribe

## Transcript

[0:06] SPEAKER_01: It's good to talk to you.
[0:07] SPEAKER_01: And before anything else,
[0:10] SPEAKER_01: I want you to know that I'm signing now,
[0:12] SPEAKER_01: as we speak,
[0:13] Israel's official recognition of Somaliland and its right of
[0:21] self-determination.
[0:22] SPEAKER_01: Our friendship is...
[0:24] SPEAKER_01: seminal and historic.
[0:26] SPEAKER_01: So I'm very,
[0:27] very happy and I'm very proud of this day and I want to wish
[0:30] you and the people of
[0:31] SPEAKER_01: Somaliland the very,
[0:33] SPEAKER_01: very best there.
[0:34] SPEAKER_01: I want to use this opportunity to invite you to an official visit
[0:40] SPEAKER_01: to Israel at your convenience.
[0:43] SPEAKER_01: And I hope very much to see you here soon.
[0:45] SPEAKER_01: This is a wonderful day.
[0:47] SPEAKER_01: It's a historic day.
[0:48] SPEAKER_01: And of course,
[0:49] I'll communicate to President Trump your willingness and desire
[0:53] to join the Abraham
[0:54] SPEAKER_01: Accords.
[0:55] SPEAKER_01: So thank you, Mr. President.
[0:56] Please convey my best regards and the best regards of the
[0:59] people of Israel to the
[1:01] SPEAKER_01: people,
[1:02] SPEAKER_01: to the independent people of Somaliland.
[1:05] SPEAKER_01: Thank you, sir.
[1:38] SPEAKER_02: Hello,
[1:39] SPEAKER_02: dear listeners,
[1:40] SPEAKER_02: friends,
[1:41] SPEAKER_02: comrades,
[1:42] SPEAKER_02: subjects,
[1:42] SPEAKER_02: citizens,
[1:43] SPEAKER_02: insurgents,
[1:44] SPEAKER_02: fugitives,
[1:45] SPEAKER_02: defectors,
[1:45] SPEAKER_02: dissidents,
[1:47] SPEAKER_02: even the haters and losers.
[1:48] SPEAKER_02: Welcome to Turbulence.
[1:50] SPEAKER_02: My name is Dylan Saba,
[1:51] SPEAKER_02: and I'm here with my co-host,
[1:53] SPEAKER_02: Seamus Malikafzeli,
[1:54] SPEAKER_02: and our producer,
[1:56] SPEAKER_02: M.
[1:56] SPEAKER_02: Siniza.
[1:57] SPEAKER_02: We're recording from New York City,
[1:59] SPEAKER_02: the center of a world empire that is dying,
[2:02] SPEAKER_02: but so,
[2:02] SPEAKER_02: so far from dead.
[2:04] The Republic of Somaliland declared independence from Somalia
[2:10] in May 1991.
[2:13] SPEAKER_03: Despite holding its core territory for almost 35 years,
[2:17] it has never been formally recognized by any other country or
[2:20] even any other
[2:21] SPEAKER_03: largely unrecognized state.
[2:24] That is,
[2:25] until now,
[2:26] when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced to the world
[2:28] that his state
[2:30] Israel will be the first to recognize the territory as an
[2:33] independent,
[2:34] sovereign nation.
[2:36] SPEAKER_02: We are returning to the Gulf of Aden,
[2:38] that highly important waterway so critical to the flow of
[2:41] international trade.
[2:43] SPEAKER_02: We were here in our first episode,
[2:45] where we looked at the Ansarallah naval blockade in solidarity
[2:48] with Palestine.
[2:49] We discussed how Yemenis have taken advantage of their
[2:51] strategic geographic
[2:53] SPEAKER_02: location to punch above their weight in challenging Israel's genocide.
[2:58] SPEAKER_02: We were also in this region for our episode on Sudan,
[3:01] where we looked at how the United Arab Emirates has fueled a
[3:04] devastating civil war
[3:05] SPEAKER_02: through its sponsorship of the RSF.
[3:08] SPEAKER_02: This week,
[3:09] SPEAKER_02: we turn to the Horn of Africa,
[3:11] SPEAKER_02: where we encounter many of the same players—Israel,
[3:14] SPEAKER_02: the UAE,
[3:15] SPEAKER_02: the US,
[3:16] SPEAKER_02: Ethiopia,
[3:17] SPEAKER_02: among others—and try to make sense of the latest developments in Somalia,
[3:22] SPEAKER_02: a country whose sovereignty seems to be perpetually under assault.
[3:27] Something that I found out while researching this episode was
[3:30] just how much the
[3:32] territory that is now Somaliland was critical to Britain's
[3:36] colonial ambitions in
[3:37] SPEAKER_03: what is now Yemen.
[3:39] In the 1800s,
[3:40] they used what was then British Somaliland as essentially a
[3:44] guard post for Aden
[3:46] shielding its food supply and protecting its communication
[3:49] lines with Britain's
[3:50] SPEAKER_03: other far more important colonial holding,
[3:53] SPEAKER_03: India.
[3:54] That relationship to protecting Western interests in Yemen was
[3:58] present from the very beginning.
[4:01] SPEAKER_02: We're constantly inundated with the message that Somalia is a,
[4:04] SPEAKER_02: quote,
[4:05] SPEAKER_02: failed state,
[4:06] as though the breakdown of its sovereignty was some kind of
[4:08] organic malfunction.
[4:10] But the more you dig into both the history and the contemporary
[4:13] power struggles,
[4:14] SPEAKER_02: the clearer it becomes that Somalia is treated,
[4:17] SPEAKER_02: in no small part due to its geography,
[4:19] SPEAKER_02: as a stomping ground for larger actors,
[4:21] SPEAKER_02: both regional and international.
[4:23] SPEAKER_02: The Somali people,
[4:24] SPEAKER_02: of course,
[4:25] are always sidelined and have suffered devastating consequences
[4:28] as a result.
[4:29] SPEAKER_02: That history in particular,
[4:30] SPEAKER_02: though,
[4:31] of the British securing Somaliland to protect their colonial
[4:34] interests in Yemen,
[4:35] SPEAKER_02: has a pretty striking historical resonance today,
[4:38] SPEAKER_02: as now Israel,
[4:39] SPEAKER_02: Britain's colonial successor in Palestine,
[4:42] SPEAKER_02: appears to be bolstering Somaliland in part to attack Yemen.
[4:46] SPEAKER_02: But of course,
[4:47] SPEAKER_02: it's not just colonial powers that have an interest in Somalia,
[4:50] and we're seeing the country emerge as the latest front in a
[4:52] broader struggle that
[4:53] SPEAKER_02: involves not only Israel,
[4:55] SPEAKER_02: but UAE,
[4:56] SPEAKER_02: Saudi Arabia,
[4:57] SPEAKER_02: Turkey,
[4:57] SPEAKER_02: and others.
[4:59] The UAE in particular is playing out a larger strategy to
[5:01] exploit the internal
[5:03] SPEAKER_02: economic tensions in peripheral states for their own ends.
[5:06] SPEAKER_02: In northern Somalia,
[5:07] they seem to be positioning for access to key ports and
[5:10] logistical nodes in an
[5:11] SPEAKER_02: effort to control the flow of resources,
[5:14] SPEAKER_02: weapons,
[5:14] SPEAKER_02: and people.
[5:16] SPEAKER_03: Just today,
[5:17] SPEAKER_03: on the day of this recording,
[5:18] the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a
[5:21] communique stating that it
[5:23] affirms its principled alignment with the United States in
[5:26] support of calibrated
[5:28] SPEAKER_03: international action aimed at restoring constitutional order,
[5:32] SPEAKER_03: democratic legitimacy,
[5:34] SPEAKER_03: and the rule of law in Venezuela.
[5:36] SPEAKER_03: Of course, referring to the kidnapping of President Nicolas Maduro.
[5:41] SPEAKER_03: Something that I want to ask you about,
[5:44] SPEAKER_03: Dylan,
[5:44] SPEAKER_03: before we get into this,
[5:45] what did you know about Somaliland before the recognition news
[5:50] came through?
[5:52] I knew that it was an autonomous region that was seeking
[5:55] independence and secession.
[5:57] I think I learned that lesson the hard way by describing
[6:00] Northern Somalia as
[6:01] SPEAKER_02: Somaliland to a Somali at some point years ago.
[6:04] SPEAKER_02: And they had a very strong negative reaction to it.
[6:08] SPEAKER_02: And I was profoundly embarrassed by that in the conversation.
[6:13] But I think I had a kind of limited knowledge of the precise
[6:18] national claims.
[6:18] SPEAKER_02: And it was more of a kind of
[6:20] SPEAKER_02: geography of Africa trivia knowledge for me.
[6:24] SPEAKER_02: How familiar were you with the Somaliland national cause?
[6:29] I was on the internet too much when I was in elementary school
[6:32] and middle school.
[6:33] So I got really obsessed with unrecognized states and like
[6:37] limited recognition states.
[6:39] SPEAKER_03: So Abkhazia was one of those.
[6:42] SPEAKER_03: Love the Abkhaz flag.
[6:44] SPEAKER_03: If any of you listening today want to look that up, it's pretty great.
[6:48] SPEAKER_03: Sapa Setia was up there.
[6:49] SPEAKER_03: And Somaliland, of course, was one of the big ones.
[6:52] SPEAKER_03: Great flag.
[6:53] I was really fascinated by the idea that this state was just
[6:56] hanging out in Africa.
[6:58] SPEAKER_03: No one wanted to recognize it.
[7:00] SPEAKER_03: And whenever I would watch documentaries about it,
[7:03] The way that they advertised that was that,
[7:05] hey,
[7:06] the rest of Somalia is in total chaos.
[7:08] SPEAKER_03: There's suicide bombings every single day.
[7:11] SPEAKER_03: The capital is about to fall to Al Shabaab.
[7:14] SPEAKER_03: But over in this section, people observe traffic lights.
[7:21] There's a president,
[7:22] there's a functioning parliament,
[7:24] there's a democracy there.
[7:26] SPEAKER_03: They would take this very hokey angle to it where like,
[7:28] SPEAKER_03: they're spunky and they want recognition.
[7:33] And how can you deny them that kind of international
[7:36] recognition when they are a
[7:37] SPEAKER_03: functioning state?
[7:39] SPEAKER_03: Obviously,
[7:40] SPEAKER_03: whenever I would see this media,
[7:41] the political context and what kind of alignment they were
[7:45] seeking was totally
[7:46] SPEAKER_03: stripped away.
[7:48] SPEAKER_03: It was not a part of the discussion whatsoever.
[7:50] SPEAKER_03: You're supposed to take it in as a curio.
[7:54] SPEAKER_03: And as someone who was probably nine or 10 years old,
[7:57] the idea of a geopolitical curio was something that was very
[8:01] interesting to me.
[8:02] SPEAKER_02: I feel like that would not have worked on me as a young lad,
[8:05] SPEAKER_02: in part because I've always had an aversion to secession.
[8:09] SPEAKER_02: I don't know if that came out of learning about the Civil War or what,
[8:14] SPEAKER_02: but ever since I was young and learning about geopolitics more broadly,
[8:18] SPEAKER_02: I was a big advocate of the world state.
[8:21] SPEAKER_02: So anything moving-
[8:24] SPEAKER_02: anything moving away from that direction was extremely suspect to me.
[8:27] And,
[8:28] and even up through law school,
[8:30] you know,
[8:30] reading about like Kosovo and stuff like that.
[8:32] SPEAKER_02: I'm like,
[8:32] you have to have an extremely compelling case of secession for
[8:36] me to be like,
[8:37] SPEAKER_02: okay,
[8:38] SPEAKER_02: I think you should have your own independent country.
[8:40] SPEAKER_03: Oh,
[8:41] SPEAKER_03: Not even from a nationalist perspective,
[8:43] SPEAKER_03: like you're not a Serbian nationalist,
[8:45] SPEAKER_03: not a Somalian nationalist,
[8:45] SPEAKER_03: just like,
[8:46] SPEAKER_03: no,
[8:46] SPEAKER_03: everyone should be the same country.
[8:48] SPEAKER_03: Everybody should be under global government.
[8:50] SPEAKER_02: I think we should work it out.
[8:51] SPEAKER_02: I think we should work it out.
[8:53] SPEAKER_02: And I think one big country,
[8:55] SPEAKER_02: and you know,
[8:55] SPEAKER_02: definitely I support secession in some instances,
[8:58] SPEAKER_02: but you know,
[8:59] SPEAKER_02: like the Quebecois and stuff,
[9:00] SPEAKER_02: I'm like,
[9:01] SPEAKER_02: I'm just not,
[9:02] SPEAKER_02: I'm not fully compelled that the level of oppression,
[9:05] SPEAKER_02: although shouts out to the Quebecois,
[9:08] SPEAKER_02: shouts out to them though for having strong anti-imperialist politics
[9:11] SPEAKER_02: And they had some interesting innovations on like the bombing front.
[9:14] SPEAKER_03: So complicated relationship.
[9:17] SPEAKER_03: I should say,
[9:18] SPEAKER_03: as soon as you said the Quebecois don't have as much of a right,
[9:22] SPEAKER_03: I did remember there is a title of a book that I cannot say here,
[9:26] SPEAKER_03: but I will direct listeners to look it up by Pierre Vallieres,
[9:32] who wrote an incredible book about how the Quebecois are like
[9:37] black people,
[9:38] SPEAKER_03: but he uses a very different word.
[9:40] SPEAKER_03: In any case,
[9:41] SPEAKER_03: Dylan,
[9:42] I think you should also explain to everyone what secession
[9:44] movements you support
[9:45] SPEAKER_03: and which ones you don't.
[9:46] SPEAKER_03: And I want you to list them out in a bulleted list.
[9:51] SPEAKER_02: Wow, you've really put me on the spot here.
[9:53] SPEAKER_02: So I definitely don't support the Québécois.
[9:57] SPEAKER_02: I don't support the ****.
[9:59] SPEAKER_02: Whoa, whoa.
[10:01] SPEAKER_02: What's going on, man?
[10:02] SPEAKER_02: Wait, like, what is the economic exploitation?
[10:07] SPEAKER_02: Like these kinds of things, I'm like, just.
[10:09] SPEAKER_02: No, no, no, no, no.
[10:10] SPEAKER_03: Separate language, separate culture.
[10:12] SPEAKER_03: Language, the language.
[10:13] SPEAKER_03: No, no, no, no, no, no.
[10:14] SPEAKER_03: That language is entirely unlike any other.
[10:16] SPEAKER_03: It is a language isolate.
[10:18] SPEAKER_03: It is not like the Canadian French.
[10:21] SPEAKER_03: It's not nowhere near it.
[10:22] SPEAKER_03: But OK, fine.
[10:23] SPEAKER_03: I did ask.
[10:24] SPEAKER_02: What I support is national liberation.
[10:27] If you are being colonized,
[10:29] then I think you should be able to kick out the settlers.
[10:32] SPEAKER_02: I support independence for Western Sahara.
[10:35] SPEAKER_02: I support obviously Algerian independence.
[10:39] SPEAKER_02: I support independence in that context.
[10:41] SPEAKER_02: But if you're just having some troubles, you know, work it out.
[10:45] SPEAKER_02: We're all moving towards the world state.
[10:48] SPEAKER_02: Nationalism's fake.
[10:50] SPEAKER_02: That's my policy.
[10:51] The ETA fans who listen to this are going to be extraordinarily
[10:55] angry with you.
[10:56] SPEAKER_03: But I'm absconding from that opinion altogether.
[11:00] SPEAKER_03: I am looking through the list of active separatist movements in Europe.
[11:03] And I do have to agree on the idea that there should be a free
[11:06] Saxony in Germany.
[11:08] SPEAKER_03: I don't think that's real.
[11:10] SPEAKER_03: Venetian independence.
[11:12] SPEAKER_03: I don't think that's real either.
[11:14] SPEAKER_03: Transylvania apparently has a...
[11:17] SPEAKER_03: secession movement?
[11:18] SPEAKER_03: No.
[11:20] Wait,
[11:21] there is like one lit one in Europe that's like an island
[11:24] colonized by France.
[11:25] SPEAKER_02: You were thinking of Corsica.
[11:27] SPEAKER_02: Corsica, yeah.
[11:29] SPEAKER_02: Okay, I rock with Corsica.
[11:30] SPEAKER_02: I don't have an explanation why that's different.
[11:33] SPEAKER_02: No, Corsica rocks.
[11:35] SPEAKER_02: I support Corsican independence.
[11:37] SPEAKER_03: If we're talking about decolonization,
[11:38] I think that would be a great segue to introduce the guests
[11:42] that we spoke to today.
[11:43] SPEAKER_03: about the Somaliland issue.
[11:46] Dr.
[11:47] Samar Al-Balushi,
[11:48] she is an associate professor of anthropology at UC Irvine.
[11:52] SPEAKER_03: Her research interests are feminist geopolitics,
[11:56] SPEAKER_03: imperialism,
[11:57] SPEAKER_03: militarism,
[11:58] SPEAKER_03: East Africa,
[11:59] SPEAKER_03: Red Sea,
[12:00] SPEAKER_03: and she even lists elites,
[12:02] SPEAKER_03: which I could not agree more with.
[12:05] SPEAKER_03: She was a great person to discuss this with.
[12:08] SPEAKER_03: Before we turn to our interview,
[12:10] SPEAKER_03: Dylan,
[12:10] SPEAKER_03: Em,
[12:11] SPEAKER_03: and I,
[12:11] let's take a moment as we come back for our first episode of
[12:16] the new year to say
[12:17] SPEAKER_03: thank you to our listeners.
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[14:42] SPEAKER_03: We are speaking today with Dr. Samar Albulushi.
[14:46] She is the Associate Professor of Anthropology at UC Irvine,
[14:51] and she joins us today.
[14:52] SPEAKER_03: How are you?
[14:53] SPEAKER_00: I'm great.
[14:53] SPEAKER_00: It's good to be here.
[14:55] SPEAKER_03: So I,
[14:56] and I think many people were extraordinarily surprised by the
[15:02] sudden recognition,
[15:03] especially as someone who was familiar with the phenomenon of
[15:09] Somaliland being this
[15:11] SPEAKER_03: unrecognized state that no other state in the world would recognize,
[15:14] SPEAKER_03: not even other quasi-states like South Ossetia or Artsakh.
[15:19] Did this come out of nowhere to you or had this been in the
[15:22] cards for a while?
[15:24] SPEAKER_00: Yeah, it did not come out of nowhere for me.
[15:26] There have been signs,
[15:28] I think,
[15:28] for at least a year that this was in the cards.
[15:32] SPEAKER_00: And I would say that the signs were coming more from the US side.
[15:38] It began with actually Project 2025 mentions that Somaliland is
[15:42] an area of
[15:47] SPEAKER_00: strategic significance for the United States,
[15:51] that it has shown indication of being an ally of Israel and of
[15:56] a willingness to
[15:57] SPEAKER_00: join the Abraham Accords.
[15:59] SPEAKER_00: And on that basis,
[16:01] we saw from the very moment that Trump came into power in
[16:05] January of last year,
[16:06] a growing reference to Somaliland and the need to recognize it
[16:13] as an independent
[16:14] SPEAKER_00: state.
[16:16] SPEAKER_00: And this is why what did come as a surprise to me,
[16:19] SPEAKER_00: and perhaps we can come back to this in a moment,
[16:22] was the response by Trump in the immediate aftermath of
[16:27] Israel's declaration that
[16:28] SPEAKER_00: it would recognize Somaliland.
[16:31] Trump acted as though he had never heard of Somaliland as an
[16:34] entity at all,
[16:36] right?
[16:36] SPEAKER_00: And so there's a deliberate, I think, attempt to downplay
[16:40] the extent to which the US has been gradually moving towards
[16:45] itself recognizing Somaliland.
[16:47] SPEAKER_00: And again,
[16:48] the US has been very careful in the last couple of days to
[16:52] pretend that that has
[16:53] SPEAKER_00: not been the case.
[16:54] SPEAKER_00: They've been very, very careful about the language that they use.
[16:57] SPEAKER_00: But in fact,
[16:58] SPEAKER_00: this has been in the works,
[16:59] SPEAKER_00: at least from the US side,
[17:01] in terms of declarations made and indications made to the
[17:06] Somali government that
[17:07] SPEAKER_00: that the U.S.
[17:08] SPEAKER_00: would be gradually withdrawing its support.
[17:12] So the Somali government has seen this in the cards for the
[17:15] last year and has been
[17:17] SPEAKER_00: acting out of desperation.
[17:19] And I can outline more concretely what they've been doing to
[17:22] try to maintain U.S.
[17:23] SPEAKER_00: support.
[17:24] SPEAKER_00: And then secondly, Israel, too, has been taking steps.
[17:27] SPEAKER_00: And what's,
[17:28] SPEAKER_00: I think,
[17:28] SPEAKER_00: perhaps most striking to me,
[17:30] SPEAKER_00: and I have spent the last couple of days trying to process,
[17:33] SPEAKER_00: is why Israel took this step of public recognition.
[17:38] Because now what we've seen in the last couple of days is an
[17:42] incredibly critical
[17:44] SPEAKER_00: response from much of the rest of the world.
[17:47] SPEAKER_00: And I've wondered to myself, what do they gain by having taken this step?
[17:51] SPEAKER_00: Because they could have continued to operate behind the scenes.
[17:55] SPEAKER_00: setting in place everything that they are hoping to get.
[17:58] SPEAKER_00: And we can, you know, we can get into that in more detail in a moment.
[18:02] But my ultimate conclusion about their reasoning is that
[18:06] despite the initial public
[18:08] SPEAKER_00: outcry,
[18:09] SPEAKER_00: that this is a long-term strategy of normalizing Israeli presence and the
[18:16] SPEAKER_00: engagement of African states with Israel in the long term,
[18:21] SPEAKER_00: right?
[18:21] SPEAKER_00: So
[18:22] It's a price that they're willing to pay in the short term in
[18:25] the interest of normalization.
[18:27] SPEAKER_03: I did see Tammy Bruce, the U.S.
[18:30] SPEAKER_03: ambassador to the U.N.,
[18:31] SPEAKER_03: comment on this in which she,
[18:33] SPEAKER_03: again,
[18:33] SPEAKER_03: publicly insisted that there had been no change in American policy,
[18:36] SPEAKER_03: that this had been a unilaterally Israeli move.
[18:39] SPEAKER_03: But she then made it a cudgel to use against other U.N.
[18:43] SPEAKER_03: states that had recognized Palestine.
[18:45] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, she says here,
[18:46] SPEAKER_03: Earlier this year,
[18:47] SPEAKER_03: several countries,
[18:48] SPEAKER_03: including members of this council,
[18:49] made the unilateral decision to recognize a non-existent
[18:53] Palestinian state.
[18:54] And yet no emergency meeting was called to express this
[18:57] council's outrage.
[18:59] This council's persistent double standards and misdirection of
[19:02] focus distract from
[19:03] SPEAKER_03: its mission of maintaining international peace and security.
[19:08] SPEAKER_03: When I think about Trump...
[19:10] SPEAKER_03: not knowing what Somaliland is.
[19:13] SPEAKER_03: Just with him personally,
[19:15] SPEAKER_03: he doesn't seem to be able to comprehend or remember very many things,
[19:20] SPEAKER_03: generally speaking.
[19:21] But there are obviously people in his orbit who you're talking
[19:25] about who sees
[19:26] SPEAKER_03: Somaliland as a potential ally.
[19:28] Are there specific names that you can think of who were close
[19:32] to that Project 2025
[19:33] SPEAKER_03: team that supported Somaliland,
[19:35] SPEAKER_03: other people I'm not thinking of?
[19:37] SPEAKER_00: Yeah, Marco Rubio is probably at the forefront.
[19:41] And Rubio was one among several members of Congress that
[19:45] introduced a bill in
[19:46] SPEAKER_00: Congress in June of this year,
[19:48] SPEAKER_00: calling for the U.S.
[19:50] SPEAKER_00: to recognize Somaliland.
[19:52] SPEAKER_00: And perhaps I can just give us a little bit of background on U.S.,
[19:58] policy in the region and how it started to shift to help
[20:02] explain why we've gotten
[20:04] SPEAKER_00: to this point,
[20:05] SPEAKER_00: right?
[20:05] SPEAKER_00: Such that there are a growing number of voices,
[20:07] SPEAKER_00: certainly within the Republican administration,
[20:09] but it's not exclusive to the Republicans that we've started to
[20:13] see the shift.
[20:14] SPEAKER_00: We saw even under the Biden administration,
[20:16] SPEAKER_00: an interest in engaging with the Somaliland government informally,
[20:22] even as it expressed continuous support for the national and
[20:27] territorial integrity
[20:29] SPEAKER_00: of Somalia.
[20:30] SPEAKER_00: So it's been a delicate balancing act that the U.S.
[20:33] SPEAKER_00: government has been engaging for a couple of years now.
[20:36] SPEAKER_00: It's partly triggered by the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
[20:41] SPEAKER_00: And what we've seen,
[20:43] given the negative economic ramifications of those attacks for
[20:48] global trade,
[20:49] SPEAKER_00: the U.S.
[20:50] SPEAKER_00: tried and failed,
[20:52] SPEAKER_00: as we have seen,
[20:53] SPEAKER_00: given the extent to which the Houthi attacks have disappeared.
[20:56] SPEAKER_00: continued.
[20:57] SPEAKER_00: The U.S.
[20:57] SPEAKER_00: tried through Operation Prosperity Guardian,
[21:00] SPEAKER_00: which was a multinational operation intended to go after the Houthis,
[21:04] and it failed to garner the support of countries in the
[21:08] immediate vicinity of
[21:10] SPEAKER_00: Yemen.
[21:12] SPEAKER_00: Surprise, surprise, because none of them wants to be attacked.
[21:15] SPEAKER_00: Right.
[21:15] SPEAKER_00: And one of those key governments is Djibouti.
[21:18] SPEAKER_00: Now, the U.S.
[21:19] has had its largest and only permanent military base in Africa
[21:24] in Djibouti since 2003.
[21:27] SPEAKER_00: Over the last couple of years,
[21:29] SPEAKER_00: precisely in response to the attacks by the Houthis,
[21:33] the foreign ministry of Djibouti has said very clearly to the
[21:37] United States,
[21:38] SPEAKER_00: we do not want you to launch strikes from our territory.
[21:44] SPEAKER_00: Why?
[21:44] SPEAKER_00: Because they don't want them to be attacked in retaliation.
[21:47] SPEAKER_00: Right.
[21:48] SPEAKER_00: And while officially speaking,
[21:51] the government of Djibouti has maintained a position of
[21:54] neutrality vis-a-vis the
[21:56] SPEAKER_00: war against the Houthis.
[21:58] SPEAKER_00: In practice,
[21:59] SPEAKER_00: the former foreign minister of Djibouti,
[22:01] SPEAKER_00: who is now the chairman of the African Union,
[22:04] stated very clearly that he sees the attacks of the Houthis as
[22:08] an expression of
[22:09] SPEAKER_00: solidarity with the Palestinians.
[22:11] and therefore does not want to involve Djibouti in the U.S.-led
[22:17] coalition against them.
[22:18] SPEAKER_00: Now, at the same time, a more recent development in terms of the U.S.
[22:23] SPEAKER_00: military presence in the region is that China set up
[22:27] SPEAKER_00: its only and largest foreign military presence also in Djibouti in 2017.
[22:33] SPEAKER_00: As we know, the U.S.
[22:34] SPEAKER_00: is concerned about the Chinese.
[22:37] SPEAKER_00: Well,
[22:37] SPEAKER_00: in general,
[22:38] SPEAKER_00: they're concerned about China,
[22:40] SPEAKER_00: but they're especially concerned about its presence in the region.
[22:43] SPEAKER_00: And
[22:44] they are increasingly doubtful of Djibouti's proclaimed
[22:50] neutrality,
[22:51] right?
[22:51] SPEAKER_00: And so what you see is a gradual reassessment of the U.S.
[22:55] SPEAKER_00: geostrategic positioning in the region,
[22:58] SPEAKER_00: such that they're thinking to themselves,
[23:00] SPEAKER_00: perhaps Djibouti is no longer the ally we once thought we could rely on,
[23:05] SPEAKER_00: and perhaps Somaliland presents an alternative.
[23:08] SPEAKER_00: Somaliland has aligned itself with Taiwan.
[23:11] SPEAKER_00: And so in that sense, the U.S.
[23:13] has seen Somaliland as potentially a better fit in terms of its
[23:17] geostrategic
[23:18] SPEAKER_00: presence in the region.
[23:20] SPEAKER_03: I do want to speak about that alignment.
[23:23] SPEAKER_03: I've been watching I-24 news very closely over the past few days,
[23:28] and there has just been this wave of Somaliland officials and
[23:33] people in the
[23:33] SPEAKER_03: governmental orbit coming on.
[23:35] SPEAKER_03: And in particular,
[23:36] SPEAKER_03: I saw the director general of the foreign ministry come on and say,
[23:41] SPEAKER_03: quote,
[23:42] SPEAKER_03: we don't take lectures from other countries.
[23:45] SPEAKER_03: If we did, we wouldn't be where we are.
[23:48] Very much getting into the fabric of the Israeli-American
[23:53] discourse almost immediately.
[23:55] So I'm intrigued by that,
[23:58] but I also want to get us to think more critically about it.
[24:02] Because I actually was going back to Fanon and his chapter in
[24:07] The Wretched of the Earth.
[24:08] SPEAKER_00: and his discussion of the pitfalls of national consciousness.
[24:11] SPEAKER_00: And in that chapter,
[24:13] he says something to the effect of the national bourgeoisie is
[24:18] likely to employ
[24:20] SPEAKER_00: fancy language and to make fancy declarations
[24:23] SPEAKER_00: that are ultimately devoid of substance.
[24:26] And the reason I want to flag that intervention by Fanon is
[24:29] that I think it is
[24:31] directly applicable to what we have been seeing in the last
[24:35] four or five days since
[24:36] SPEAKER_00: the Israeli announcement of its recognition of Somaliland,
[24:40] SPEAKER_00: namely
[24:41] SPEAKER_00: one declaration after another,
[24:43] SPEAKER_00: from one Global South state official after another,
[24:45] SPEAKER_00: whether it's the Somaliland officials or others,
[24:48] SPEAKER_00: who are,
[24:49] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[24:50] SPEAKER_00: with ease,
[24:51] declare their solidarity with the government of Somalia and
[24:54] their intent to protect
[24:57] SPEAKER_00: the sanctity of the territorial integrity of Somalia.
[25:01] SPEAKER_00: But at the end of the day, that's where the conversation ends.
[25:05] SPEAKER_00: And what we have in effect
[25:07] SPEAKER_00: with this alignment between Somaliland and Israel is a very,
[25:12] very painful reminder of the power asymmetries that continue to
[25:16] structure the
[25:17] SPEAKER_00: global governance system,
[25:19] SPEAKER_00: right?
[25:20] And the reason I say that is that there's a profound irony in
[25:25] Somaliland's desire
[25:26] SPEAKER_00: for recognition as a sovereign state,
[25:29] SPEAKER_00: yet its simultaneous readiness
[25:31] SPEAKER_00: to align itself and to entertain a neocolonial arrangement with Israel.
[25:36] SPEAKER_00: And I think that what they're doing in aligning themselves with Israel is
[25:41] SPEAKER_00: effectively agreeing to a form of conditional sovereignty,
[25:44] SPEAKER_00: right?
[25:45] And it's a conditional sovereignty that is contingent upon
[25:48] accepting a new form of subjugation.
[25:51] SPEAKER_00: They're trading one form for another.
[25:53] SPEAKER_00: They don't want to be beholden to the Somalis.
[25:55] And now they're trading it in for being subjugated to the
[25:57] Israelis and potentially
[25:59] SPEAKER_00: soon the Americans as well.
[26:01] So I think that this is hardly a win in the struggle for
[26:04] self-determination and in
[26:07] SPEAKER_00: many ways captures the structural humiliations of
[26:12] SPEAKER_00: of the global order, right?
[26:14] SPEAKER_00: And I use that language,
[26:15] SPEAKER_00: structural humiliation,
[26:16] because we need to think both about the inequalities that
[26:21] continue to be at play,
[26:23] as well as the humiliating effects of continually being
[26:26] subjected to those
[26:27] SPEAKER_00: inequalities.
[26:28] And now I want to return back to the statement made by Donald
[26:32] Trump when he said,
[26:34] SPEAKER_00: what is Somaliland really?
[26:37] SPEAKER_00: He didn't say where
[26:40] SPEAKER_00: which would be the more obvious thing.
[26:42] SPEAKER_00: It was what.
[26:44] And in saying what,
[26:45] he's implying that the people of Somaliland constitute a
[26:48] different species.
[26:50] SPEAKER_00: that they're not even human, right?
[26:52] And this is precisely at the time when many people in
[26:55] Somaliland think they have
[26:57] SPEAKER_00: reason to celebrate,
[26:58] SPEAKER_00: right?
[26:58] For those who think that they're prepared to pay this price of
[27:01] aligning with Israel
[27:02] SPEAKER_00: in name of independence,
[27:04] SPEAKER_00: they're ready to celebrate.
[27:05] SPEAKER_00: And no,
[27:05] SPEAKER_00: Trump slaps them back down and says,
[27:07] SPEAKER_00: no,
[27:07] you are still racially inferior and we will continue to treat
[27:11] you as such.
[27:13] So I'd like to bring in kind of the longer story of US's
[27:17] Somalia policy here and
[27:20] kind of get into the question of how it contributed to the
[27:22] breakdown of sovereignty
[27:24] SPEAKER_02: and these different sub-nationalist or nationalist aspirations,
[27:28] SPEAKER_02: right?
[27:28] Because Western interference in Somalia is certainly not a new
[27:31] phenomenon.
[27:33] Many in the US are familiar with our direct military
[27:36] intervention in the 90s,
[27:37] SPEAKER_02: which came to symbolize liberal internationalist overreach,
[27:40] SPEAKER_02: in part through cultural production like Black Hawk Down.
[27:43] But that story very much continued through the so-called global
[27:47] war on terror,
[27:48] SPEAKER_02: even as other theaters took a lot of the spotlight.
[27:51] SPEAKER_02: Can you walk us through US's Somalia policy, perhaps starting with
[27:56] the US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 through the Kenyan
[28:01] invasion in 2011 and
[28:03] SPEAKER_02: bring us up to the present.
[28:05] SPEAKER_02: And I'm wondering,
[28:06] SPEAKER_02: how did this policy in these invasions,
[28:08] SPEAKER_02: direct invasion,
[28:09] SPEAKER_02: and then invasions through partner nations contribute to the breakdown in
[28:13] sovereignty and the rise of separatist efforts that we're
[28:16] seeing in Somaliland and
[28:17] SPEAKER_02: Puntland?
[28:19] SPEAKER_00: Great.
[28:19] SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I'm happy to do that.
[28:20] And I think I just want to seize on that last point you made
[28:23] about how U.S.
[28:25] intervention and meddling has contributed to a breakdown of
[28:28] sovereignty for Somalia.
[28:30] Because if we come back to what we were just talking about in
[28:34] terms of these
[28:35] declarations of the United Nations in the last couple of days
[28:38] in favor of and in
[28:40] SPEAKER_00: protection of Somali sovereignty,
[28:42] all of these declarations fail to account for the ways in which
[28:45] Somali sovereignty
[28:46] SPEAKER_00: has long been compromised.
[28:49] So as we know,
[28:50] in general,
[28:51] Somalia has been presented as a failed state by Western media.
[28:57] SPEAKER_00: And generally,
[28:58] that narrative fails to account precisely for this longstanding
[29:02] history of Western
[29:03] SPEAKER_00: intervention,
[29:04] SPEAKER_00: primarily U.S.-led in the country.
[29:07] And if we start with the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion of
[29:11] Somalia in 2006,
[29:13] perhaps I'll just rewind us by a couple of years to help
[29:16] understand the build up to
[29:17] SPEAKER_00: that invasion.
[29:19] We had,
[29:19] of course,
[29:20] the launching of the war on terror and even prior to 9-11.
[29:24] SPEAKER_00: We saw the attacks by al-Qaeda at the U.S.
[29:27] SPEAKER_00: embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
[29:30] And so that was when al-Qaeda emerged to the fore as an entity
[29:34] of concern and of
[29:36] interest for the United States and made East Africa
[29:38] specifically a region of
[29:40] SPEAKER_00: concern.
[29:42] SPEAKER_00: In the early 2000s, the U.S.
[29:44] began to think that Somalia would be a hub for al-Qaeda and its
[29:49] operations.
[29:50] SPEAKER_00: And they began to fund,
[29:52] the CIA specifically began to fund warlords and militia members
[29:58] in Somalia that
[29:59] SPEAKER_00: they hoped would be able to take on.
[30:02] SPEAKER_00: Al Qaeda in the country.
[30:03] And it's important to state here that there was never any
[30:06] confirmation of an Al Qaeda presence.
[30:09] SPEAKER_00: And in response,
[30:11] you had what became known as the Islamic Courts Union come to
[30:15] the fore roughly in
[30:17] SPEAKER_00: 2005-2006.
[30:20] And the Islamic Courts Union brought a level of stability to
[30:25] Somalia that it hadn't
[30:26] SPEAKER_00: seen in years.
[30:27] SPEAKER_00: So it was welcomed by the population.
[30:30] People saw it as a necessary counterweight to the warlords who
[30:35] had been terrorizing
[30:36] SPEAKER_00: much of the country for many years.
[30:38] So I think what's important here is that the popularity of the
[30:41] courts grew because
[30:44] of this shared desire amongst the Somali population to
[30:47] counteract the warlords.
[30:49] SPEAKER_00: Now, when the United States, it's important to state here that the U.S.
[30:54] SPEAKER_00: had no desire to intervene in Somalia itself,
[30:57] SPEAKER_00: right,
[30:58] SPEAKER_00: because of the embarrassing retreat of the U.S.
[31:01] SPEAKER_00: military from Somalia in the 1990s with the Black Hawk Down incident.
[31:05] So it was for that reason,
[31:06] and of course with mounting critique of the U.S.
[31:09] interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
[31:11] it was for that reason that the U.S.
[31:13] was inclined to rely instead on African states to do the bulk
[31:18] of the fighting.
[31:19] SPEAKER_00: So that's when Ethiopia comes into the equation.
[31:21] SPEAKER_00: It shows a willingness to lead this invasion.
[31:25] SPEAKER_00: And it was in the aftermath of the US-backed invasion,
[31:28] SPEAKER_00: which took place in December 2006,
[31:29] SPEAKER_00: that the Islamic court's leaders were driven into exile.
[31:35] SPEAKER_00: And in that context, more militant factions came to the fore.
[31:39] So in effect,
[31:41] the US planted the seeds for the growth of what we now know of
[31:46] as al-Shabaab.
[31:47] SPEAKER_00: And it is al-Shabaab that has been the basis for the United States and a
[31:53] growing number of countries to legitimate their ongoing
[31:57] security interventions and
[31:59] SPEAKER_00: war making in Somalia.
[32:01] SPEAKER_00: So now as we enter 2026,
[32:04] SPEAKER_00: Somalia has been at the receiving end of an undeclared war for 20 years.
[32:10] SPEAKER_00: What happened then after the invasion?
[32:12] SPEAKER_00: Again, because the U.S.
[32:14] SPEAKER_00: was determined not to rely on its own troops,
[32:16] SPEAKER_00: they asked African troops to step up and Ethiopia had sent in a number.
[32:22] But I think there was kind of an understanding that they would
[32:25] need a greater number of troops.
[32:26] SPEAKER_00: I think that the Ethiopians had sent in about 5,000.
[32:29] SPEAKER_00: And the African Union,
[32:32] what's really important to flag here is we come back to the
[32:35] weaknesses and
[32:37] fundamental flaws of the current international governing
[32:40] infrastructure that is in
[32:42] SPEAKER_00: place,
[32:42] whether it is the United Nations or at the regional level of
[32:45] the African Union.
[32:46] SPEAKER_00: Neither one of those entities condemned the invasion.
[32:50] SPEAKER_00: What they did instead was to authorize a peacekeeping operation.
[32:53] SPEAKER_00: Right.
[32:54] And this is deliberate language that is used to distract us
[32:57] from the fact that this
[32:58] SPEAKER_00: is very much a war making operation.
[33:01] The other thing they did was they pitched this as a temporary
[33:04] small intervention.
[33:06] SPEAKER_00: So temporary being six months.
[33:09] SPEAKER_00: Here we are 20 years later.
[33:10] SPEAKER_00: Small.
[33:11] SPEAKER_00: I think the initial influx of additional forces was around 1600 people.
[33:18] SPEAKER_00: And over the years,
[33:19] that quote-unquote small operation morphed into a force that
[33:23] numbered over 22,000,
[33:25] SPEAKER_00: featuring African troop contributions from Uganda,
[33:28] SPEAKER_00: Ethiopia,
[33:29] SPEAKER_00: Burundi,
[33:29] SPEAKER_00: Djibouti,
[33:30] SPEAKER_00: and Kenya.
[33:31] And I think one of the reasons that this has been allowed to
[33:35] last for as long as it
[33:36] SPEAKER_00: has is that it's not only the U.S.
[33:40] that has benefited from contracts for private security
[33:43] companies that have been
[33:44] SPEAKER_00: coming in to quote-unquote train operations,
[33:46] SPEAKER_00: Somali forces,
[33:47] but African governments themselves have become invested in this
[33:51] political economy
[33:51] of war because their forces are earning up to 10 times what
[33:55] they would earn back
[33:56] SPEAKER_00: home.
[33:57] Remittances have now become an integral source of income for
[34:02] the national economy
[34:03] SPEAKER_00: in these countries.
[34:04] And the final point that I just want to make here is that not
[34:08] only are African
[34:09] SPEAKER_00: troops doing the bulk of the fighting and therefore also the dying,
[34:13] But their governments have also been engaged in unilateral
[34:17] military operations in Somalia.
[34:20] SPEAKER_00: In effect, they're bombing Somalia alongside U.S.
[34:23] SPEAKER_00: bombs.
[34:23] So we have a multinational coalition engaged in the destruction
[34:28] of Somalia over the
[34:29] SPEAKER_00: period of the last 20 years.
[34:31] SPEAKER_03: If we're talking about historical context,
[34:34] I wanted to ask specifically about why Somaliland is so
[34:40] insistent on the necessity
[34:42] SPEAKER_03: of it being an independent state.
[34:43] Because when I think of separatist movements that Israel and
[34:47] United States have
[34:48] SPEAKER_03: attempted to press their finger on,
[34:49] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[34:50] SPEAKER_03: there's the Kurds in Iran,
[34:52] SPEAKER_03: in Iraq,
[34:52] SPEAKER_03: there's the Arabs in Ahwaz,
[34:55] SPEAKER_03: the Christians in South Sudan.
[34:57] SPEAKER_03: But
[34:57] SPEAKER_03: Somaliland and Somalia,
[34:59] SPEAKER_03: they both have the same religion,
[35:01] SPEAKER_03: they both have the same ethnic groups.
[35:03] SPEAKER_03: They don't seem to have the wedge issues that can be pressed on.
[35:07] SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
[35:07] So I think the reason that the people of Somaliland and the
[35:11] government feel they
[35:12] have a legitimate basis is their history as a distinct region
[35:19] dates back to the
[35:20] SPEAKER_00: colonial era.
[35:21] So if we think about the ways in which the geography of the
[35:25] land inhabited by the
[35:27] SPEAKER_00: Somali people was portioned up,
[35:29] SPEAKER_00: the northern part of what is considered by the Somali government,
[35:34] SPEAKER_00: Somalia,
[35:35] SPEAKER_00: became a British protectorate known as British Somaliland.
[35:39] SPEAKER_00: And then the southern portion was known as Italian Somaliland.
[35:44] Now,
[35:44] at the time of independence,
[35:46] for a period of about four or five days in 1960,
[35:51] SPEAKER_00: What was originally British Somaliland,
[35:54] SPEAKER_00: now the territory that is being put forward as wanting independence,
[35:59] itself declared independence as a separate entity from Somalia
[36:04] for about four or
[36:05] SPEAKER_00: five days.
[36:07] SPEAKER_00: And during that time,
[36:08] roughly 30 states at the United Nations recognized it as an
[36:14] independent country.
[36:15] SPEAKER_00: But after five days, it made the decision to merge
[36:19] SPEAKER_00: with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia.
[36:23] SPEAKER_00: So it's because of that very,
[36:24] very brief historical window that it believes that its history
[36:30] is unique from that
[36:31] SPEAKER_00: of other secessionist movements.
[36:34] SPEAKER_00: Now,
[36:34] SPEAKER_00: if we think practically about why they're so determined,
[36:38] I think they see the potential for investment and the potential
[36:43] to bypass the
[36:44] SPEAKER_00: national government,
[36:45] SPEAKER_00: which would inevitably impose any number of limitations,
[36:49] SPEAKER_00: restrictions,
[36:51] SPEAKER_00: taxation on agreements with foreign powers.
[36:54] SPEAKER_00: they would prefer to be negotiating directly with foreign powers.
[36:57] SPEAKER_00: So even though they've been operating informally,
[37:00] SPEAKER_00: right,
[37:00] SPEAKER_00: they have their own flag,
[37:01] SPEAKER_00: they have a separate currency,
[37:03] SPEAKER_00: a separate military and police force,
[37:05] SPEAKER_00: and they've established relations with other governments,
[37:08] SPEAKER_00: none of those are formal,
[37:10] SPEAKER_00: right?
[37:10] And so formalizing this would enable them to formalize many of
[37:13] these agreements,
[37:14] SPEAKER_00: they'd be eligible for international loans,
[37:17] SPEAKER_00: for foreign investment,
[37:18] SPEAKER_00: and also to formalize some of the security agreements that they have been
[37:22] SPEAKER_00: negotiating.
[37:23] SPEAKER_02: Yeah,
[37:23] SPEAKER_02: I mean,
[37:23] I just want to get back into that colonial history because I
[37:25] think it's really
[37:26] SPEAKER_02: fascinating,
[37:26] SPEAKER_02: right?
[37:26] Because Greater Somalia extended beyond what is now claimed as
[37:30] Somaliland and the
[37:31] SPEAKER_02: Republic of Somalia,
[37:32] SPEAKER_02: right?
[37:32] There was French Somalia that then became Djibouti and Greater
[37:35] Somalia extended
[37:36] SPEAKER_02: into,
[37:37] SPEAKER_02: correct me if I'm wrong,
[37:38] SPEAKER_02: but what is now Ethiopia and parts of Kenya as well.
[37:41] I'm curious if there are any remaining national aspirations
[37:46] towards a Greater
[37:47] SPEAKER_02: Somalia that extends even further territorially than what we're seeing.
[37:52] SPEAKER_00: Yes.
[37:52] And here I can refer listeners to the work of Safia Aidid at
[37:57] the University of
[37:58] SPEAKER_00: Toronto,
[37:58] SPEAKER_00: who is working on a book,
[38:01] SPEAKER_00: I believe entitled Pan-Somali Dreams,
[38:04] SPEAKER_00: that captures precisely this.
[38:06] SPEAKER_00: So as you mentioned, Dylan, you had British Somaliland.
[38:10] SPEAKER_00: It was five different territories,
[38:11] SPEAKER_00: British Somaliland,
[38:13] SPEAKER_00: French Somaliland,
[38:14] SPEAKER_00: which is now Djibouti,
[38:16] SPEAKER_00: Italian Somalia,
[38:17] SPEAKER_00: Eastern Ethiopia,
[38:18] SPEAKER_00: commonly known as the Ogaden,
[38:20] SPEAKER_00: and then the Northern Frontier District of British Kenya.
[38:24] SPEAKER_00: And so at the time of independence,
[38:27] it was actually incredibly tense because millions of ethnic
[38:31] Somalis in Ethiopia,
[38:33] SPEAKER_00: Kenya,
[38:34] and Djibouti were left out of the territory that officially
[38:37] became the independent
[38:39] SPEAKER_00: state of Somalia.
[38:40] SPEAKER_00: And as a result,
[38:42] ethnic Somalis in these neighboring countries waged campaigns
[38:46] to be reunited with
[38:48] SPEAKER_00: and integrated with Somalia.
[38:49] SPEAKER_00: So in my work on Kenya,
[38:52] I traced how those ethnic Somalis that are primarily located in
[38:56] the northern region
[38:57] SPEAKER_00: of Kenya,
[38:58] SPEAKER_00: bordering Somalia,
[39:00] SPEAKER_00: at the time of Kenya's independence,
[39:02] themselves launched a secessionist struggle in order to be
[39:06] reunited with Somalia.
[39:09] SPEAKER_00: And the response from the Kenyan government,
[39:11] SPEAKER_00: of course,
[39:12] SPEAKER_00: is to criminalize them,
[39:13] SPEAKER_00: to dismiss them as foreigners and as terrorists.
[39:17] And so you have in the region a longstanding vilification of
[39:22] the Somali population
[39:24] by these neighboring states that continues to inform their
[39:28] interaction with Somalis
[39:30] SPEAKER_00: and the Somali state today.
[39:32] SPEAKER_03: When I ask about the necessity of the state,
[39:35] SPEAKER_03: I also wanted to,
[39:37] SPEAKER_03: I guess,
[39:37] ask more specifically about Ziad Berri in that whenever
[39:42] Somaliland officials or
[39:44] SPEAKER_03: supporters of it talk about the state,
[39:47] they talk about the massacres that their country suffered
[39:50] through and that the
[39:53] SPEAKER_03: necessity of the state comes from that.
[39:56] SPEAKER_03: Can you talk about what they're referring to?
[39:59] SPEAKER_00: Yeah,
[39:59] so it was under the rule of Siadbare that people in Somaliland
[40:06] experienced brutal
[40:08] SPEAKER_00: suppression.
[40:09] And this fueled an armed uprising that in turn triggered
[40:13] further violent crackdown
[40:15] SPEAKER_00: by the government.
[40:16] And so when Siadbare was overthrown and the central government
[40:22] collapsed in 1991,
[40:24] It was at that point that Somaliland leaders unilaterally
[40:28] proclaimed independence.
[40:30] SPEAKER_00: So as you mentioned,
[40:32] it's on the basis of that history of oppression at the hands of
[40:36] the national
[40:37] government that Somaliland leaders say they have no desire to
[40:42] be subjected to the
[40:43] SPEAKER_00: rule of the central government again.
[40:45] I also just want to bring in economic factors for some of these
[40:49] nationalist claims
[40:49] SPEAKER_02: and movements.
[40:50] SPEAKER_02: There's kind of two things that I'm thinking of.
[40:52] One is the strategic location of the ports in northern Somalia
[40:57] and their role in
[40:58] SPEAKER_02: international trade and shipping.
[41:01] And then the other is the question of fishing,
[41:04] which I know has become a very prominent
[41:07] economic and political question insofar as it's related to the
[41:11] question or the
[41:11] SPEAKER_02: issue of piracy in Somalia's waters.
[41:14] And I know that Somalia has some of the longest coastland in
[41:18] Africa and really
[41:19] SPEAKER_02: active fishing waters.
[41:20] And so I'm curious where you see the intersection between some
[41:24] of those economic
[41:25] SPEAKER_02: factors and nationalist claims.
[41:28] SPEAKER_00: I think that's absolutely on point in terms of their wish to,
[41:34] SPEAKER_00: as a sovereign state,
[41:36] be able to negotiate access to resources that are located
[41:42] within the territory of
[41:44] SPEAKER_00: Somaliland.
[41:44] SPEAKER_00: So I'm sure that that is one of the motivating factors.
[41:49] SPEAKER_00: In my own thinking,
[41:50] SPEAKER_00: I have been more focused on the interests of the external powers who,
[41:57] SPEAKER_00: again,
[41:57] SPEAKER_00: at the end of the day,
[41:59] SPEAKER_00: seem to be the ones with the most leverage and stand the most to gain.
[42:04] SPEAKER_00: comparatively speaking.
[42:05] The leaders of Somaliland,
[42:08] of course,
[42:08] stand to gain relative to their own people.
[42:12] SPEAKER_00: But given,
[42:13] SPEAKER_00: again,
[42:13] SPEAKER_00: the vast power asymmetries between the leaders,
[42:17] whether we're talking about the leaders of a soon-to-be
[42:20] independent Somaliland or
[42:22] SPEAKER_00: the leaders of Somalia,
[42:24] SPEAKER_00: the extent to which they are so dependent on
[42:28] on investment from external powers necessarily means that at
[42:33] the end of the day,
[42:34] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[42:35] SPEAKER_00: it's those foreign powers that stand to benefit the most.
[42:39] SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
[42:39] SPEAKER_02: So just speaking about those foreign powers and their interests,
[42:42] SPEAKER_02: and this is something that we've kind of already touched on,
[42:44] SPEAKER_02: but I think we can go deeper on is this question of US strategy,
[42:49] SPEAKER_02: right?
[42:50] SPEAKER_02: So you've mentioned that there has been a more recent
[42:54] SPEAKER_02: momentum towards recognition of Somaliland.
[42:56] And I think we can also look back and find some examples of
[42:59] more prominent US
[43:00] SPEAKER_02: individuals expressing support for Somaliland.
[43:03] SPEAKER_02: I'm thinking in particular of Pete Buttigieg,
[43:05] who visited northern Somalia in 2008 during the definitely not
[43:11] affiliated with the
[43:12] SPEAKER_02: CIA part of his life when he was at McKinsey.
[43:16] But for the most part,
[43:17] US's East Africa strategy more broadly has been implemented
[43:22] through
[43:23] SPEAKER_02: The kind of global war on terror commandeering of the interstate system.
[43:27] SPEAKER_02: As we've mentioned,
[43:28] by conscripting partner nations such as Kenya and working also
[43:32] with Ethiopia,
[43:33] SPEAKER_02: but also through AFRICOM,
[43:35] SPEAKER_02: the US's military apparatus in the region,
[43:39] SPEAKER_02: which relies on military infrastructure that's hosted by states.
[43:42] So all of that is very reliant on state sovereignty and the
[43:46] interstate system.
[43:48] SPEAKER_02: And this move,
[43:49] SPEAKER_02: Israel's recognition of Somaliland,
[43:51] SPEAKER_02: this move by a key US ally to undermine Somalia's territorial integrity,
[43:56] SPEAKER_02: feels like a move in a different direction.
[43:59] And I'm wondering if you read this as an evolution in the
[44:05] fundamental logic of the
[44:08] SPEAKER_02: US's global war on terror,
[44:09] SPEAKER_02: or
[44:11] SPEAKER_02: Is it more a sign that some of these regional sub-imperial powers,
[44:16] SPEAKER_02: such as Israel and the United Arab Emirates,
[44:19] are imposing their own strategic imperatives that might even
[44:23] contradict the system
[44:24] SPEAKER_02: of U.S.
[44:25] SPEAKER_02: hegemony?
[44:26] That's an excellent question and one that I am continuing to
[44:31] wrestle with,
[44:32] SPEAKER_00: especially in reaction to this latest news.
[44:36] SPEAKER_00: My assessment,
[44:37] SPEAKER_00: if we're thinking about this region specifically,
[44:41] SPEAKER_00: is that we're seeing a strategic alliance emerge in
[44:47] SPEAKER_00: not only between the U.S.,
[44:50] SPEAKER_00: Israel,
[44:50] SPEAKER_00: and the UAE,
[44:51] SPEAKER_00: but it's an alliance that also includes Ethiopia.
[44:55] SPEAKER_00: And I agree with your characterization, Dylan.
[44:59] SPEAKER_00: I'm not sure if I recall exactly the words you just used,
[45:02] SPEAKER_00: but effectively among these core actors,
[45:07] SPEAKER_00: there will be instances in which the U.S.,
[45:10] continues to be the hegemonic actor to which the other states
[45:15] are responding to,
[45:16] SPEAKER_00: but there will be instances in which it is not.
[45:19] SPEAKER_00: And I think that particularly
[45:23] growing influence of the uae in the region and i want to flag
[45:28] something really
[45:28] important here which is that in the last year or so the uae has
[45:33] surpassed china as
[45:35] the biggest investor in africa wow so that has huge
[45:39] implications and i think this
[45:41] is partly the product of the slowing down of the domestic
[45:45] economy in china but
[45:47] SPEAKER_00: that's huge right and what the uae has done in negotiating
[45:53] SPEAKER_00: agreements with not necessarily governments because,
[45:57] SPEAKER_00: well,
[45:58] SPEAKER_00: we can talk about its arrangement with Somaliland government,
[46:02] SPEAKER_00: despite it not being yet an officially recognized state.
[46:06] The UAE has established relationships with leaders across the
[46:12] region that are so vital to
[46:16] SPEAKER_00: the projection of imperial power, right, on which the U.S.
[46:20] SPEAKER_00: now depends.
[46:22] SPEAKER_00: And so that's the context in which I often wonder to myself,
[46:26] SPEAKER_00: can we think of them purely as a sub-imperial power?
[46:30] The other context in which I am inclined to question that
[46:34] framing is that certainly
[46:36] SPEAKER_00: in the case of Sudan,
[46:38] SPEAKER_00: and here the work of Nasreen El-Amin I think is really important,
[46:42] SPEAKER_00: from the perspective of the Sudanese,
[46:45] SPEAKER_00: the UAE is an imperial power in its own right.
[46:49] And I think it's important to take seriously the assessment and
[46:53] experiences of the
[46:54] people most directly affected by these forms of power and to
[46:58] think about how it
[46:59] SPEAKER_00: might inform our own thinking and our own analysis.
[47:03] Perhaps we can spend some time talking about Israel-Africa
[47:07] policy in general and
[47:09] SPEAKER_00: how it has evolved
[47:11] SPEAKER_00: over the years, because I think that is something that is understudied.
[47:16] And if there is ever a moment to be thinking more seriously and
[47:19] more deeply about it,
[47:20] it's now.
[47:21] SPEAKER_00: And then finally,
[47:23] SPEAKER_00: I wanted to flag Ethiopia,
[47:25] which has been a longstanding security ally of Israel and which
[47:30] has long viewed
[47:32] SPEAKER_00: Somalia as a threatening neighbor for a number of reasons,
[47:37] SPEAKER_00: primarily domestic reasons.
[47:39] SPEAKER_00: And part of it ties into some of that history we were just talking about,
[47:43] whereby there are ethnic Somali populations in neighboring
[47:46] countries that feel a
[47:48] SPEAKER_00: greater alliance and allegiance with Somalia.
[47:52] SPEAKER_00: So Ethiopia has been also working closely with the Emiratis and the
[47:58] sought to negotiate its own arrangement with Somaliland for
[48:02] access to a port in the
[48:04] last year that generated so much controversy that it kind of
[48:08] was squashed.
[48:09] SPEAKER_00: But I think what Ethiopia is now hoping is that if Israel paves the way,
[48:13] that it will then be able to gain access to these ports in
[48:18] Somaliland too.
[48:19] So all that to say that I think that the Red Sea arena in
[48:24] general is a very,
[48:26] very important space from which to be thinking about shifts in
[48:31] the global order and
[48:31] to be thinking about shifts in the nature and extent and scope
[48:35] of US empire and
[48:37] really pushes us to think about the growing role of some of
[48:42] these other entities.
[48:44] And what that means then for those of us who are wanting to
[48:48] push back and counter
[48:49] SPEAKER_00: these forms of power.
[48:51] SPEAKER_03: If we're speaking about the Red Sea,
[48:54] SPEAKER_03: I did want to ask about Yemen and the Houthis and Ansarullah.
[48:59] Something you mentioned earlier in this conversation is about
[49:03] the relevance of
[49:05] SPEAKER_03: these messages of solidarity from other governments with Somalia.
[49:10] Something that I immediately clock as being distinct was the
[49:14] response from
[49:15] SPEAKER_03: Abdelmelek al-Houthi,
[49:16] SPEAKER_03: the leader of the movement,
[49:18] SPEAKER_03: who said in a statement shortly after the recognition,
[49:20] SPEAKER_03: quote,
[49:21] We affirm our steadfast position alongside the brotherly Somali
[49:25] people against the
[49:26] Israeli enemy and that we will take all possible supportive
[49:30] measures to stand with
[49:31] SPEAKER_03: them.
[49:31] Among these measures is considering any Israeli presence in the
[49:36] Somaliland region a
[49:37] military target for our armed forces as it constitutes
[49:42] aggression against Somalia
[49:44] and Yemen and a threat to the security of the region that
[49:48] requires firm action.
[49:50] SPEAKER_03: One,
[49:50] do you believe that Israel wants to use Somaliland as a
[49:54] military staging ground
[49:56] SPEAKER_03: against Yemen?
[49:57] SPEAKER_03: And two, do you believe that Yemen will be able to counter that?
[50:03] SPEAKER_00: Yes, I do.
[50:05] SPEAKER_00: I think that Israel is seeking to expand its arena of control,
[50:11] SPEAKER_00: that the motivation for the recognition of Somaliland
[50:18] first and foremost is informed precisely by its desire to
[50:21] monitor and counter the
[50:23] SPEAKER_00: actions of the Houthis.
[50:25] And perhaps more broadly than that,
[50:27] to prevent them from consolidating control in Yemen.
[50:29] SPEAKER_00: They want to keep Yemen fragmented.
[50:32] I think secondary to that is wanting to monitor and counter the
[50:36] rising influence of Turkey.
[50:38] And so if we were to use the language of an Israeli commentator
[50:43] who is responding
[50:44] SPEAKER_00: to the news of the last few days,
[50:47] SPEAKER_00: they want proximity,
[50:48] SPEAKER_00: they want access,
[50:49] SPEAKER_00: and they want cooperation.
[50:51] And so they're ready to align with leaders who are willing to
[50:53] make this happen.
[50:55] I want to come back to think more about what else Israel is
[50:59] interested in.
[50:59] But to answer your second question,
[51:02] I think this is a threat that's relevant to Somaliland.
[51:06] SPEAKER_00: I just I would never trust the Israelis to be careful.
[51:11] SPEAKER_00: I think that they're thinking out of their own self-interest.
[51:15] And so I think that there is a real risk of the expansion of
[51:20] this war into the horn of Africa.
[51:24] SPEAKER_00: I think that's why we've seen such a flurry of responses.
[51:29] SPEAKER_00: The part that doesn't make sense to me,
[51:31] SPEAKER_00: if we were to come back to,
[51:33] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[51:34] SPEAKER_00: our earlier part of the conversation again,
[51:37] SPEAKER_00: is that had Israel not made a public declaration,
[51:41] SPEAKER_00: it might have pursued these various strategies with much less scrutiny.
[51:47] SPEAKER_00: So,
[51:48] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[51:48] I don't want to entirely discount the value of these
[51:55] international fora like the UN
[51:57] SPEAKER_00: and the Security Council,
[51:59] where I think in part because Somalia itself holds a seat on
[52:04] the Security Council
[52:05] that made it possible for them to convene this emergency
[52:08] session and made it
[52:09] SPEAKER_00: possible for the Somali government to
[52:13] to force Israel and the United States to listen to their
[52:18] response,
[52:19] right?
[52:19] SPEAKER_00: To respond to what they had to say.
[52:22] SPEAKER_00: Where else would we have such a fora, right?
[52:25] Where they would be compelled to listen both to the Somalis and
[52:28] to other government responses.
[52:30] SPEAKER_00: With that said,
[52:32] and this is why I wanted to come back to the question of
[52:36] declarations in these kind
[52:38] SPEAKER_00: of international fora,
[52:39] SPEAKER_00: is I want us to think about
[52:41] SPEAKER_00: the shift in language that is used in these fora.
[52:46] SPEAKER_00: And,
[52:46] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[52:47] what you just read in terms of the statement from the Houthis
[52:50] is perhaps the
[52:51] closest that we might find to the kind of language that we saw
[52:55] in the 60s and 70s,
[52:58] SPEAKER_00: which was much more explicit
[53:02] SPEAKER_00: in identifying the kinds of power that they are resisting, right?
[53:08] So what we see at the United Nations today is just continuous
[53:11] invocation of the
[53:12] SPEAKER_00: rule of law,
[53:13] SPEAKER_00: of international law,
[53:15] SPEAKER_00: of territorial integrity,
[53:16] SPEAKER_00: of national sovereignty.
[53:18] SPEAKER_00: We have zero reference to imperialism and colonialism.
[53:22] And I dug up a quote from a Somali government document that was
[53:27] published by the
[53:28] SPEAKER_00: Ministry of Information in 1974 that stated the following.
[53:32] And this was in the immediate aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war
[53:36] breaking out in October of 1973.
[53:38] SPEAKER_00: They said, this is the Somali government.
[53:42] SPEAKER_00: Israel's role in our continent has been revealed.
[53:46] The Somali government has always maintained at all African
[53:49] conferences that there
[53:51] SPEAKER_00: was no difference between Israel and Rhodesia or South Africa.
[53:55] SPEAKER_00: Theirs is a colonialist and imperialist policy.
[53:59] SPEAKER_00: From the outset,
[54:00] Somalia was convinced of the common goal of the Arab and
[54:03] African struggles,
[54:04] so that a victory on the one front also represents a victory
[54:08] for the other.
[54:09] The Palestinian cause cannot be separated from the African
[54:12] cause in the south of our continent.
[54:15] we have always been convinced that the Israeli threat in North
[54:18] Africa and the
[54:19] racist government in South Africa are but two facets of the
[54:24] same phenomenon,
[54:25] SPEAKER_00: i.e.
[54:26] an imperialist attempt at escalation of hostilities in Africa
[54:31] to recover a hold
[54:33] SPEAKER_00: over the whole continent.
[54:35] So I was incredibly struck by that statement because we don't
[54:38] see that kind of
[54:39] SPEAKER_00: rhetoric in the halls of the UN today.
[54:42] SPEAKER_00: And I think we have to ask ourselves why that is the case.
[54:45] SPEAKER_02: I think you brought up something really interesting.
[54:47] And earlier you mentioned the Red Sea as a theater of a kind of
[54:54] decline or
[54:55] SPEAKER_02: transition in the world order,
[54:57] as a place to watch in thinking about these sort of larger
[55:01] shifts in hegemony.
[55:02] And I've just been kind of chewing on this question that you
[55:05] raised of why did
[55:07] SPEAKER_02: Israel go and say outright what they have been doing for a while now,
[55:12] SPEAKER_02: which is to undermine
[55:14] the international order,
[55:15] the interstate system,
[55:16] the kind of premise of sovereignty.
[55:18] SPEAKER_02: And, you know, the Israelis are doing it and the Emiratis are doing it.
[55:25] SPEAKER_02: And I wonder if this is a moment in which you have
[55:32] SPEAKER_02: Imperial powers,
[55:33] SPEAKER_02: and we've kind of seen signals of this in the United States,
[55:37] where they have decided that the post-World War II
[55:40] international order is no longer
[55:43] SPEAKER_02: necessary.
[55:44] SPEAKER_02: Whether that on some level,
[55:46] there is an attempt both rhetorically and in action to hasten
[55:51] the decline,
[55:52] SPEAKER_02: to say the quiet part out loud and able to open up
[55:56] SPEAKER_02: these diplomatic opportunities so that they don't have to pussyfoot,
[56:00] SPEAKER_02: so that they can simply pursue the destruction of national sovereignty,
[56:05] SPEAKER_02: what they've been doing in Yemen,
[56:08] SPEAKER_02: in Sudan,
[56:10] SPEAKER_02: now in Somalia,
[56:11] SPEAKER_02: in Syria,
[56:13] SPEAKER_02: et cetera.
[56:14] SPEAKER_02: I guess my question too is,
[56:17] SPEAKER_02: Against that backdrop,
[56:18] SPEAKER_02: how are Somalis in the North,
[56:22] SPEAKER_02: but also elsewhere in the country,
[56:24] SPEAKER_02: receiving this kind of intervention,
[56:27] SPEAKER_02: right?
[56:27] SPEAKER_02: I mean,
[56:27] I have to imagine that there's discourse about both the
[56:31] benefits and the risks of
[56:34] this kind of intervention that may even breathe some life into
[56:38] national claims,
[56:40] SPEAKER_02: but at the same time come at the tremendous cost of
[56:45] SPEAKER_02: sovereignty,
[56:46] SPEAKER_02: especially when,
[56:46] SPEAKER_02: as you say,
[56:48] Israel is not going to act with care for any blowback that
[56:51] comes back upon the
[56:53] SPEAKER_02: domestic population.
[56:55] SPEAKER_00: Well,
[56:55] I think part of what makes this moment challenging to make
[57:02] sense of is that there
[57:04] SPEAKER_00: is a natural inclination,
[57:06] SPEAKER_00: as we've been talking about,
[57:08] SPEAKER_00: to rally in defense of the sovereignty of the Somali government.
[57:13] And yet there is a deep awareness among Somalis themselves that
[57:21] their government
[57:22] SPEAKER_00: has been the first to sell them out
[57:25] SPEAKER_00: to foreign powers, right?
[57:27] So I think that part of the reason that al-Shabaab as an entity
[57:32] has lasted as long
[57:34] SPEAKER_00: as it has,
[57:35] is that it has maintained steadfast in its resistance to
[57:40] foreign intervention.
[57:42] SPEAKER_00: And,
[57:42] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[57:43] there's enough recognition on the part of the Somali people
[57:46] that there's some
[57:49] SPEAKER_00: truth,
[57:50] SPEAKER_00: right,
[57:51] SPEAKER_00: to the need to kick the foreigners out,
[57:53] that it is precisely decades of foreign intervention that have
[57:58] contributed to the
[57:59] SPEAKER_00: very instability that plagues them on a daily basis.
[58:02] SPEAKER_00: Now,
[58:02] SPEAKER_00: with that said,
[58:04] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[58:05] the Somali state has become this bloated entity thanks to the
[58:09] influx of foreign
[58:11] SPEAKER_00: aid,
[58:11] which means that there are more and more people who are
[58:14] dependent upon the
[58:17] SPEAKER_00: continued engagement slash meddling of foreign powers.
[58:21] SPEAKER_00: And so when it comes to the UAE or Turkey, which is actually...
[58:26] SPEAKER_00: much more active than the UAE in recent years within Somalia itself.
[58:31] Each of these governments is investing in a huge amount of
[58:35] energy and soft power in
[58:37] SPEAKER_00: order to convince the Somali people that they are their friends,
[58:40] SPEAKER_00: that they are their allies,
[58:41] SPEAKER_00: that they're there to help.
[58:43] SPEAKER_00: And so it's not necessarily black and white.
[58:47] SPEAKER_00: Hopefully that starts to answer your questions.
[58:50] SPEAKER_02: Definitely.
[58:50] SPEAKER_02: And I actually did want to continue with the interests of Turkey,
[58:53] because I think that's another major player here that we
[58:55] haven't brought into the
[58:56] SPEAKER_02: conversation fully.
[58:57] SPEAKER_02: And as you mentioned, right, Turkey has its own regional ambitions here.
[59:01] SPEAKER_02: Its largest overseas military base is in Mogadishu,
[59:05] SPEAKER_02: where it has trained Somali troops to counter al-Shabaab,
[59:08] SPEAKER_02: I think sometimes even in competition with AMISOM.
[59:12] SPEAKER_02: But also across the wider map,
[59:14] SPEAKER_02: we're seeing escalating Israel-Turkey confrontation,
[59:18] SPEAKER_02: most explicitly in Syria,
[59:19] SPEAKER_02: where both countries are intervening,
[59:21] but also Israel in recent days entering into a trilateral
[59:25] military agreement with
[59:26] SPEAKER_02: Greece and Cyprus and trying to box Turkey out of the Gaza negotiations.
[59:32] SPEAKER_02: So in light of this latest recognition,
[59:34] do you foresee Somalia increasingly becoming an arena for this
[59:40] broader conflict
[59:42] SPEAKER_02: between Israel and Turkey?
[59:43] SPEAKER_00: I think it's very likely, yes.
[59:46] SPEAKER_00: You know,
[59:47] SPEAKER_00: we saw immediately the first place,
[59:49] SPEAKER_00: I think,
[59:49] that the president of Somalia flew to in the aftermath of this
[59:54] announcement about
[59:55] SPEAKER_00: the recognition was Turkey.
[59:56] SPEAKER_00: I think that trip was planned well in advance.
[59:59] But there was a joint press conference with Erdogan in which
[1:00:02] Erdogan then announced
[1:00:03] SPEAKER_00: his support for,
[1:00:04] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:00:05] SPEAKER_00: protection of national sovereignty of Somalia.
[1:00:08] SPEAKER_00: And there's a lot at stake for Turkey.
[1:00:10] It's been over 15 years now that they've been investing in
[1:00:14] various forms in Somalia.
[1:00:16] As you mentioned,
[1:00:17] they set up their largest overseas military base in Mogadishu
[1:00:20] in 2017.
[1:00:22] SPEAKER_00: They first became active,
[1:00:23] SPEAKER_00: I would say,
[1:00:24] SPEAKER_00: roughly in 2011 in response to a humanitarian crisis in the country,
[1:00:29] SPEAKER_00: a famine.
[1:00:31] And they position themselves primarily as a humanitarian
[1:00:35] partner of the Somalis.
[1:00:37] SPEAKER_00: And despite the fact that actually roughly around that time,
[1:00:41] SPEAKER_00: they were already negotiating security agreements with Somalia.
[1:00:45] SPEAKER_00: And over the years,
[1:00:46] SPEAKER_00: they have,
[1:00:47] SPEAKER_00: I think,
[1:00:48] SPEAKER_00: within this military base,
[1:00:50] they have a massive military training facility for Somali
[1:00:53] security forces.
[1:00:55] SPEAKER_00: They've signed a major maritime agreement, a defense agreement.
[1:00:59] SPEAKER_00: At this press conference with the Somali president,
[1:01:03] SPEAKER_00: I believe it was yesterday,
[1:01:04] SPEAKER_00: they announced that they would begin drilling for oil.
[1:01:07] SPEAKER_00: So they have an agreement along those lines.
[1:01:11] And so all that to say that I think Somalia has been Turkey's
[1:01:15] primary leader.
[1:01:16] SPEAKER_00: entry point into Africa.
[1:01:18] SPEAKER_00: It has been a major, major investment for them.
[1:01:21] SPEAKER_00: And I think there's too much for them to lose,
[1:01:24] SPEAKER_00: such that they would be willing to give up much space to the Israelis.
[1:01:29] SPEAKER_00: So I think we can anticipate some tensions there.
[1:01:33] SPEAKER_00: And Egypt is another player that has come into play,
[1:01:38] SPEAKER_00: especially in the last year or two,
[1:01:41] SPEAKER_00: worrying about its tensions with Ethiopia,
[1:01:45] SPEAKER_00: and then aligning itself with Somalia.
[1:01:47] And it's likely that Egypt is going to be sending troops to
[1:01:50] Somalia in the next
[1:01:51] year as part of the latest phase of this African Union
[1:01:56] so-called peacekeeping
[1:01:57] SPEAKER_00: mission.
[1:01:58] Turkey,
[1:01:59] they've really led the diplomatic effort to ring the alarm bell
[1:02:05] on this.
[1:02:05] SPEAKER_03: There was something that the Prime Minister,
[1:02:07] SPEAKER_03: Ahmed Davutoglu,
[1:02:09] SPEAKER_03: wrote when Israel recognized Somaliland.
[1:02:12] SPEAKER_03: He said,
[1:02:13] Israel is not only dividing Somalia and risking an internal war
[1:02:18] with Sudan-like
[1:02:19] SPEAKER_03: mass atrocities,
[1:02:20] but also getting access to the critically strategic port of
[1:02:23] Berbera at the exit of the Red Sea.
[1:02:26] SPEAKER_03: This move effectively encircles Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well as Turkey.
[1:02:31] That such a development is taking place while the genocide in
[1:02:35] Gaza continues is
[1:02:37] SPEAKER_03: nothing short of a humiliation for the Islamic world.
[1:02:40] SPEAKER_03: With every move,
[1:02:42] Israel is attempting to establish a hegemonic order stretching
[1:02:46] from the Caspian to
[1:02:48] SPEAKER_03: the Aden,
[1:02:48] SPEAKER_03: from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf.
[1:02:52] All countries and leaders who fail to act against this will
[1:02:55] bear a grave historical
[1:02:58] SPEAKER_03: responsibility."
[1:02:59] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[1:03:00] we've talked about all of the different implications of this
[1:03:05] and all the different
[1:03:06] SPEAKER_03: ways that this confrontation is expanding.
[1:03:10] SPEAKER_03: Does the alarm level in this analysis strike you as correct,
[1:03:16] that this has extraordinarily far reaching implications beyond
[1:03:21] just Somalia or
[1:03:23] SPEAKER_03: Israel?
[1:03:24] So I'm torn on that,
[1:03:27] largely because I'm inclined to be skeptical of alarmist
[1:03:30] rhetoric.
[1:03:31] SPEAKER_00: Mm-hmm.
[1:03:34] we've seen a lot of alarmist rhetoric in relation to the region
[1:03:39] in the last couple
[1:03:40] SPEAKER_00: of years coming from a slightly different angle.
[1:03:43] SPEAKER_00: And so I think it's important that I qualify my skepticism on that basis.
[1:03:49] SPEAKER_00: So here I'm referring to
[1:03:50] the alarmist rhetoric in the Western press in response to the
[1:03:54] Houthi attacks that
[1:03:56] SPEAKER_00: says,
[1:03:56] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:03:56] SPEAKER_00: this is a region in crisis.
[1:04:00] SPEAKER_00: But the question is, who is it a crisis for, right?
[1:04:02] SPEAKER_00: It's a crisis for global capitalism, right?
[1:04:05] SPEAKER_00: What you have just described in this quote is very different, right?
[1:04:10] SPEAKER_00: And it's a direct response to the threat posed by Israel's
[1:04:15] warmongering and expansion of the war against the Houthis into
[1:04:20] the wider region.
[1:04:21] SPEAKER_00: And I think there absolutely is reason to be alarmed by that potential.
[1:04:28] But the final point I'll make is that Turkey obviously has its
[1:04:31] own vested interests
[1:04:34] SPEAKER_00: in sounding that kind of an alarm, right?
[1:04:36] Precisely because it has made these kinds of investments in the
[1:04:39] Somali government,
[1:04:40] they want to make sure that the infrastructures they have set
[1:04:44] in place will remain
[1:04:45] SPEAKER_00: in place so that they can continue to benefit.
[1:04:47] SPEAKER_00: So that's the one caveat I would make.
[1:04:50] There was something that occurred yesterday after I had written
[1:04:54] many of these questions that
[1:04:56] SPEAKER_03: gave me pause about the larger implications of this.
[1:04:59] There was a report on Israel's public broadcaster that Southern
[1:05:04] Yemeni separatists
[1:05:05] in closed talks were very hopeful that because of Somaliland's
[1:05:11] recognition,
[1:05:13] SPEAKER_03: that if South Yemen or South Arabia,
[1:05:15] SPEAKER_03: as they seem to be calling it now,
[1:05:17] SPEAKER_03: if that declares independence,
[1:05:19] SPEAKER_03: then
[1:05:20] SPEAKER_03: they would get recognition from Israel.
[1:05:22] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[1:05:23] SPEAKER_03: when they're talking about the threat of Israel fragmenting,
[1:05:29] SPEAKER_03: further fragmenting Arab countries or Iran,
[1:05:33] does that strike you as something that is a very real threat
[1:05:37] expanding beyond
[1:05:38] SPEAKER_03: Somaliland in the near future?
[1:05:41] SPEAKER_00: I think the way I want to answer your question is in a more general way.
[1:05:47] SPEAKER_00: And by that,
[1:05:47] I mean that I think that one of Israel's explicit objectives is
[1:05:53] to divide and rule
[1:05:57] SPEAKER_00: wherever in the global south we are talking about.
[1:06:01] SPEAKER_00: And I have kind of mapped it out along three levels in my own thinking.
[1:06:07] The first,
[1:06:09] and there's a fantastic piece that I can recommend for your
[1:06:12] listeners to read,
[1:06:14] called Israel,
[1:06:15] Ethiopia,
[1:06:16] and the Somali Question by Abdelmalik Ali Warsam.
[1:06:20] SPEAKER_00: It was published in Giska magazine.
[1:06:23] And so the first level at which Israel wants to divide and rule
[1:06:27] is Somalia,
[1:06:28] right?
[1:06:29] SPEAKER_00: That's fairly obvious.
[1:06:30] But what this author describes in this article is that Israel
[1:06:34] has long viewed
[1:06:35] SPEAKER_00: Somali nationalism as a threat.
[1:06:38] SPEAKER_00: This is where Ethiopia comes into play.
[1:06:40] SPEAKER_00: It's worked very, very closely with Ethiopia to contain
[1:06:44] SPEAKER_00: Somali nationalism.
[1:06:45] SPEAKER_00: So that's part one.
[1:06:48] SPEAKER_00: Part two,
[1:06:49] I think what this announcement has done is both expose and
[1:06:55] threaten an already
[1:06:56] SPEAKER_00: fragile unity among Africans and within the global South more broadly.
[1:07:03] SPEAKER_00: We've known for months,
[1:07:04] SPEAKER_00: as I said at the opening of our conversation,
[1:07:06] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:07:08] SPEAKER_00: and I say we,
[1:07:09] for those of us who are following developments in the region
[1:07:12] relatively closely,
[1:07:14] SPEAKER_00: the writing has been on the wall,
[1:07:16] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:07:16] SPEAKER_00: That both the U.S.
[1:07:18] SPEAKER_00: and Israel have been courting Somaliland.
[1:07:21] And yet we have no evidence that there's been any kind of
[1:07:25] coordinated action by the
[1:07:26] African Union or any other global South body to mobilize an
[1:07:31] effective response.
[1:07:33] SPEAKER_00: And the very way in which we've seen on social media,
[1:07:38] SPEAKER_00: people tracking,
[1:07:39] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:07:40] SPEAKER_00: who has condemned Israel,
[1:07:41] SPEAKER_00: who has stood up for Somalia,
[1:07:44] SPEAKER_00: all of this is itself the source of further divisions,
[1:07:47] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:07:47] SPEAKER_00: Where do people stand?
[1:07:48] SPEAKER_00: Do you stand with us or do you not?
[1:07:50] SPEAKER_00: And all of this,
[1:07:52] SPEAKER_00: I think,
[1:07:54] is a calculated assessment and a calculated assault on the part
[1:07:59] of the Israelis to
[1:08:01] destroy the momentum gained for South-South solidarity by South
[1:08:06] Africa's case at
[1:08:07] SPEAKER_00: the ICJ.
[1:08:09] So that's my kind of broader sense of what is driving one of
[1:08:14] the objectives of the Israelis.
[1:08:17] SPEAKER_02: I think that still leaves open a question that we opened earlier in this
[1:08:20] SPEAKER_02: conversation,
[1:08:21] SPEAKER_02: which is,
[1:08:21] SPEAKER_02: how do we make sense of the US's response here?
[1:08:24] SPEAKER_02: Because that all is a very compelling logic,
[1:08:28] SPEAKER_02: and it is one that is not an obvious reason why the US
[1:08:33] SPEAKER_02: would be opposed to it.
[1:08:34] SPEAKER_02: And as you've said,
[1:08:35] SPEAKER_02: there's indications that the US has been courting Somaliland,
[1:08:38] SPEAKER_02: is open to this move.
[1:08:40] SPEAKER_02: But so far,
[1:08:41] SPEAKER_02: the Trump administration's reaction,
[1:08:43] SPEAKER_02: as we've noted,
[1:08:44] SPEAKER_02: has been pretty understated,
[1:08:45] SPEAKER_02: at least publicly.
[1:08:47] SPEAKER_02: Trump,
[1:08:47] SPEAKER_02: I think,
[1:08:48] SPEAKER_02: told the New York Post that he,
[1:08:49] SPEAKER_02: quote,
[1:08:49] wasn't ready to recognize Somaliland and kind of indicated that
[1:08:53] they would be
[1:08:53] SPEAKER_02: looking into it.
[1:08:55] And then,
[1:08:55] as you said,
[1:08:55] he also made a public comment that he doesn't know what
[1:08:58] Somaliland is.
[1:08:59] You seem to have Netanyahu maybe trying to dangle another
[1:09:03] Abraham Accords member in
[1:09:05] SPEAKER_02: front of him,
[1:09:06] SPEAKER_02: but the response basically has been just kind of abject racism,
[1:09:11] SPEAKER_02: which does align with how he's discussed Somalis in other contexts,
[1:09:16] SPEAKER_02: like Somali migrants to the United States.
[1:09:19] I'm just curious if you want to say more about what you make of
[1:09:22] Trump's response here.
[1:09:23] Do you read that as an indication of a kind of strategic
[1:09:26] ambivalence in U.S.
[1:09:28] policy or is this a more particularly Trumpian way of
[1:09:32] responding to the moment?
[1:09:34] SPEAKER_00: I see it as strategic ambivalence.
[1:09:36] SPEAKER_00: Absolutely.
[1:09:36] SPEAKER_00: I think they want to make them sweat.
[1:09:39] I think they want to make both parties sweat,
[1:09:41] the Somalilanders and the Somalis.
[1:09:44] SPEAKER_00: That's my analysis.
[1:09:45] And we've seen that in the case of the Somali government over
[1:09:48] the last year in
[1:09:50] SPEAKER_00: various forms,
[1:09:51] SPEAKER_00: very clearly anticipating and dreading this very moment.
[1:09:57] SPEAKER_00: It was exactly a year ago, a month after the U.S.
[1:10:01] SPEAKER_00: elections.
[1:10:02] SPEAKER_00: So the Somalis knew Trump was coming into power.
[1:10:05] SPEAKER_00: I don't know if they were reading Project 2025.
[1:10:09] SPEAKER_00: but they had reason to worry.
[1:10:12] And it was at that time that they hired a DC public relations
[1:10:15] firm in the amount of
[1:10:17] SPEAKER_00: $600,000 to do lobbying for them in Washington.
[1:10:21] SPEAKER_00: In March or April of this year,
[1:10:23] the Somali government declared to Trump that the US could have
[1:10:28] access to Berbera
[1:10:30] SPEAKER_00: Port in Somaliland,
[1:10:32] SPEAKER_00: despite the fact that he doesn't have the authority to grant that access,
[1:10:36] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:10:37] And then in November at the UN Security Council in Resolution
[1:10:42] 2803 on Palestine,
[1:10:45] SPEAKER_00: Somalia,
[1:10:45] SPEAKER_00: which again sits on the UN Security Council,
[1:10:47] SPEAKER_00: voted in favor of that resolution in a clear slap to the Palestinians,
[1:10:54] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:10:55] SPEAKER_00: And I interpret that as a measure of desperation.
[1:10:58] I think we've seen one act after another of desperation on the
[1:11:02] part of Somalis
[1:11:03] SPEAKER_00: anticipating US recognition.
[1:11:05] SPEAKER_00: So I think
[1:11:06] SPEAKER_00: It's just a matter of time rather than if.
[1:11:10] And there is a figure within the Trump administration that I
[1:11:14] see as at least partly
[1:11:15] SPEAKER_00: responsible for the shift in policy.
[1:11:18] SPEAKER_00: It's not only Marco Rubio and certain figures in Congress who
[1:11:22] SPEAKER_00: J.
[1:11:22] SPEAKER_00: Peter Pham,
[1:11:24] SPEAKER_00: who at one point was,
[1:11:26] SPEAKER_00: I believe,
[1:11:26] SPEAKER_00: undersecretary,
[1:11:27] SPEAKER_00: no,
[1:11:27] SPEAKER_00: he wasn't undersecretary of state under Bush,
[1:11:29] but he held a position under Bush and it was rumored that he
[1:11:33] would assume the
[1:11:34] SPEAKER_00: position of undersecretary of state for African affairs under Trump.
[1:11:37] SPEAKER_00: For one reason or another, I don't know, that never came to be.
[1:11:40] But he has been a vocal,
[1:11:42] vocal advocate of recognizing Somaliland and dumping Somalia.
[1:11:47] SPEAKER_00: He says the U.S.
[1:11:48] SPEAKER_00: has just dumped far too much money into Somalia,
[1:11:51] SPEAKER_00: that it hasn't amounted to anything,
[1:11:53] SPEAKER_00: and it's time to move on.
[1:11:55] SPEAKER_03: I will just make one comment.
[1:11:57] SPEAKER_03: I've looked up a photograph of J. Peter Pham.
[1:12:00] I am intensely distrustful of any State Department official who
[1:12:03] has a bow tie.
[1:12:05] SPEAKER_03: in their official photograph.
[1:12:08] SPEAKER_03: But that's neither here nor there.
[1:12:10] SPEAKER_03: I couldn't help but notice that government officials,
[1:12:13] SPEAKER_03: they've done this whole media offensive talking about the threat,
[1:12:17] SPEAKER_03: the threat of war and the threat of instability.
[1:12:20] that would come of this,
[1:12:22] but only Ansarullah has actually promised any sort of military
[1:12:27] action.
[1:12:28] Can you speak about what the Somali government can actually do
[1:12:34] in this regard?
[1:12:35] And I guess give some context as to what they might be dealing
[1:12:38] with that would
[1:12:39] SPEAKER_03: limit their response.
[1:12:43] SPEAKER_00: Yeah,
[1:12:43] I'm glad you brought that up because one factor that I didn't
[1:12:47] account for in my
[1:12:48] last response that does need to be considered and that the US
[1:12:54] is undoubtedly
[1:12:55] weighing is that the US does still have a small number of
[1:12:59] troops in Somalia itself.
[1:13:01] SPEAKER_00: I think it's about 500 or 600.
[1:13:04] And there would obviously be real risks that come with dumping
[1:13:09] Somalia as a partner.
[1:13:12] SPEAKER_00: in that regard, right?
[1:13:13] SPEAKER_00: So I think they have to think carefully about the potential consequences.
[1:13:20] SPEAKER_00: And I think the extent of my own thinking in terms of
[1:13:25] the Somali government's actions has gone only as far as January
[1:13:31] 1st being the start
[1:13:32] SPEAKER_00: of Somalia's presidency of the UN Security Council.
[1:13:36] And I've just been wondering how will they maximize that role
[1:13:41] and that position,
[1:13:41] SPEAKER_00: right,
[1:13:42] SPEAKER_00: given what they're facing?
[1:13:45] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:13:45] the narrative that we're told is that there is a very clear two
[1:13:51] sides to the
[1:13:52] SPEAKER_00: conflict in Somalia itself.
[1:13:54] You have the Somali government on the one hand and Al-Shabaab
[1:13:56] on the other.
[1:13:57] SPEAKER_00: But of course, the truth is far more complicated, right?
[1:14:00] SPEAKER_00: It's far more messy.
[1:14:02] SPEAKER_00: And the U.S.
[1:14:04] has empowered through its trainings of Somali security forces
[1:14:09] so many different
[1:14:11] SPEAKER_00: units,
[1:14:12] SPEAKER_00: including some elite units,
[1:14:15] SPEAKER_00: that it starts to get really,
[1:14:17] really muddy in being able to clearly identify who is the
[1:14:20] Somali government and who
[1:14:22] SPEAKER_00: is working for something else,
[1:14:24] SPEAKER_00: whether that may be Shabab or any other non-state armed actor,
[1:14:29] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:14:30] SPEAKER_00: So it's not out of the question that
[1:14:34] There could be an effort to incite some members of any number
[1:14:39] of violent factions
[1:14:41] SPEAKER_00: to respond,
[1:14:42] SPEAKER_00: whatever that may look like,
[1:14:44] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:14:45] SPEAKER_00: in terms of the U.S.
[1:14:46] SPEAKER_00: targets.
[1:14:46] SPEAKER_00: I mean, the U.S.
[1:14:47] has been very careful about maintaining a very small presence
[1:14:52] precisely to avoid
[1:14:53] SPEAKER_00: this kind of targeting.
[1:14:54] But I would imagine that all these kinds of assessments are
[1:14:57] being factored in,
[1:14:59] SPEAKER_00: certainly on the part of the U.S.
[1:15:00] SPEAKER_00: government right now.
[1:15:02] I wanted to close out by asking about my fears about what
[1:15:07] Israel is getting out of
[1:15:09] SPEAKER_03: this arrangement beyond just military arrangements.
[1:15:12] SPEAKER_03: When I first heard the news,
[1:15:13] SPEAKER_03: I immediately knew being this public about this,
[1:15:17] SPEAKER_03: it could only have come about for a bad reason.
[1:15:20] And I had heard rumblings last year about a litany of different
[1:15:24] countries in Africa
[1:15:26] SPEAKER_03: being approached by Israel to take in perhaps a million
[1:15:29] SPEAKER_03: of forcibly displaced Palestinians from Gaza,
[1:15:31] SPEAKER_03: places like Sudan,
[1:15:33] SPEAKER_03: places like the Congo,
[1:15:34] SPEAKER_03: but also Somaliland was one of those countries that was approached.
[1:15:38] SPEAKER_03: They've denied any official confirmation of this,
[1:15:41] SPEAKER_03: but they have also been remarkably evasive in their statements.
[1:15:46] SPEAKER_03: And when they're directly questioned about not just this issue,
[1:15:49] SPEAKER_03: but any issue related to what Israel will get out of this recognition,
[1:15:54] SPEAKER_03: what do you make of the possibility of this?
[1:15:56] At the very least,
[1:15:57] being on the cards,
[1:15:58] not just its viability,
[1:16:00] God forbid.
[1:16:02] SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I honestly don't have an answer about the likelihood.
[1:16:06] SPEAKER_00: If we're talking just about Somaliland,
[1:16:08] SPEAKER_00: which very clearly has been approached with this proposal,
[1:16:12] SPEAKER_00: they absolutely have been evasive.
[1:16:14] SPEAKER_00: And that is not a good sign.
[1:16:16] SPEAKER_00: That's not a good sign.
[1:16:18] SPEAKER_00: Again,
[1:16:19] I just come back to the structural factors that are at play
[1:16:25] that are absolutely
[1:16:27] SPEAKER_00: central in pitting people against one another,
[1:16:31] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:16:32] SPEAKER_00: So this idea now that for Somalilanders,
[1:16:36] their self-determination would be contingent on the forced
[1:16:40] removal and denial of
[1:16:41] SPEAKER_00: the self-determination of the Palestinians is horrible.
[1:16:47] SPEAKER_00: How is that a way to gain your independence?
[1:16:51] SPEAKER_00: And yet,
[1:16:52] SPEAKER_00: again,
[1:16:53] SPEAKER_00: coming back to the structural forces,
[1:16:56] the circumstances under which African states are navigating
[1:17:00] their position on the
[1:17:01] SPEAKER_00: global stage are circumstances of incredible constraint.
[1:17:09] SPEAKER_00: They have so few options, they have so few strategies to pursue,
[1:17:16] SPEAKER_00: that they're forced into these alignments that are so devastating,
[1:17:20] that have such devastating consequences that pit people against
[1:17:23] each other.
[1:17:24] SPEAKER_00: And I think if there's one,
[1:17:26] SPEAKER_00: you know,
[1:17:27] incredibly important message for us to be sitting with in
[1:17:33] response to this news,
[1:17:34] SPEAKER_00: which all it does is make it seem like the Somalis are different from the
[1:17:40] SPEAKER_00: Somalilanders,
[1:17:41] SPEAKER_00: are different from the Palestinians,
[1:17:43] SPEAKER_00: they all have these separate struggles.
[1:17:44] SPEAKER_00: No.
[1:17:46] They all have far more in common with one another in terms of
[1:17:50] the forms of power
[1:17:52] SPEAKER_00: that they are subject to.
[1:17:56] SPEAKER_00: then certainly then with Israel.
[1:17:58] SPEAKER_00: And again,
[1:17:59] one of the most insidious things that Israel is doing is
[1:18:02] feeding into this
[1:18:03] exceptionalist rhetoric that the Somaliland government itself
[1:18:07] has been putting
[1:18:08] SPEAKER_00: forward in order to be recognized,
[1:18:10] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:18:11] SPEAKER_00: That they are different, right?
[1:18:12] SPEAKER_00: That they're not like their neighbors because they're democratic,
[1:18:16] SPEAKER_00: because they're peaceful,
[1:18:18] SPEAKER_00: and therefore they're deserving of recognition,
[1:18:21] SPEAKER_00: right?
[1:18:21] I think we have to think especially about the kind of rhetoric
[1:18:24] that's used
[1:18:26] SPEAKER_00: again, to divide.
[1:18:27] And I really don't know what to say about the feasibility of
[1:18:32] this proposal other
[1:18:33] SPEAKER_00: than that it's horrendous.
[1:18:35] SPEAKER_03: Dr. Abelushi, thank you so much for speaking with us.
[1:18:38] SPEAKER_00: Thanks so much for having me.
[1:18:39] Thank you.
[1:19:17] Bye.

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