# Episode 5: The Axis of Resistance w/ Rob Ashlar

An episode of [Turbulence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1847060038), 2 Dec 2025, 1 h 15 min.

Audio: https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/180473022/232098bfb861176c532d4cab60663da9.mp3

Our friend Rob Ashlar joins us to discuss the myths and realities of the Axis of Resistance, Iranian grand strategy, and the unifying power of the Palestinian cause. Rob Ashlar is an independent researcher and reporter covering jihadist movements, particularly in West Africa and the Middle East. His primary subjects are Al Qaida in the Sahel and Islamic State during the Iraqi Insurgency. Rob also focuses on Middle Eastern geopolitics, most recently the nature of the US–Israel relationship. Twitter/X: https://x.com/RashmanTheHorse Substack: https://robashlar.substack.com/ For more on Strategic Accelerationism: https://robashlar.substack.com/p/guest-post-strategic-accelerationism If you’re able, please consider donating to Rob’s friend Mahmoud in Gaza. We’re committed to independence and will never run ads or have institutional affiliations. That means we’re entirely listener funded. For $5, paid subscribers will have access to regular new roundup bonus episodes. Paid subscribers will also have access to monthly livestreams, book giveaways, and Q&A. Most importantly, our paid subscribers help us keep this project going. Subscribe today at turbulencepod.substack.com Follow along on Twitter/X and Instagram @turbulence_pod Theme: Eye for an Eye, Haram (2017) Art: Vivek Venkatraman Mix: Jasper Saba This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit turbulencepod.substack.com/subscribe

## Transcript

[0:01] SPEAKER_01: Go back to 1981, 82, and move all the way to 2023, 2024.
[0:10] SPEAKER_01: Give me a single instance.
[0:13] SPEAKER_01: When this resistance operated on Iranian behalf,
[0:18] SPEAKER_01: they always worked for their own cause,
[0:23] SPEAKER_01: even at our expense.
[0:25] SPEAKER_01: They never carried our orders.
[0:29] SPEAKER_01: We didn't know about October 7th.
[0:31] SPEAKER_01: Actually,
[0:32] we were supposed to have a meeting with the Americans on JCPOA
[0:37] renewal on October
[0:38] SPEAKER_01: 9th,
[0:40] SPEAKER_01: which was undermined and destroyed by this operation.
[1:18] SPEAKER_03: Hello,
[1:19] SPEAKER_03: dear listeners,
[1:20] SPEAKER_03: friends,
[1:21] SPEAKER_03: comrades,
[1:22] SPEAKER_03: subjects,
[1:23] SPEAKER_03: citizens,
[1:23] SPEAKER_03: insurgents,
[1:24] SPEAKER_03: fugitives,
[1:25] SPEAKER_03: defectors,
[1:26] SPEAKER_03: dissidents,
[1:27] SPEAKER_03: even the haters and losers.
[1:29] SPEAKER_03: Welcome to Turbulence.
[1:31] SPEAKER_03: My name is Dylan Saba,
[1:32] SPEAKER_03: and I'm here with my co-host,
[1:34] SPEAKER_03: Seamus Malikafzeli,
[1:35] SPEAKER_03: and our producer,
[1:37] SPEAKER_03: M.
[1:37] SPEAKER_03: Siniza.
[1:38] SPEAKER_03: We're recording from New York City,
[1:40] SPEAKER_03: the center of a world empire that is dying,
[1:42] SPEAKER_03: but so,
[1:43] SPEAKER_03: so far from dead.
[1:45] SPEAKER_03: Shortly after October 7th,
[1:47] amidst the sudden and violent explosion in the prominence of
[1:51] the Palestinian issue,
[1:52] SPEAKER_03: actors,
[1:53] SPEAKER_03: both state and non-state,
[1:55] began quickly coalescing to respond to the operation known as
[1:59] Al-Aqsa Flood and to
[2:00] set red lines against what was an imminent Israeli invasion of
[2:04] the Strip in
[2:05] SPEAKER_03: response.
[2:06] What was deemed the axis of resistance had mostly been a media
[2:10] invention up until
[2:11] SPEAKER_03: that point,
[2:12] SPEAKER_03: a rhetorical term used by politicians to describe a rough grouping,
[2:16] SPEAKER_03: certainly nothing like NATO or the Warsaw Pact.
[2:19] SPEAKER_03: But after Hamas launched its attack,
[2:21] that rhetoric shifted focus from political circles in Tehran to
[2:25] the battlefields in
[2:26] SPEAKER_03: Gaza.
[2:27] SPEAKER_03: The axis of resistance suddenly had to become a cohesive unit and fast,
[2:32] SPEAKER_03: and there were certainly significant movements in that direction.
[2:36] Hezbollah began bombing Israel's northern communities in
[2:39] solidarity on October 8th.
[2:41] SPEAKER_03: Yemen began sending missiles against Israel by the end of October.
[2:45] And a grouping of Iraqi militias calling themselves the Islamic
[2:48] resistance in Iraq
[2:49] SPEAKER_03: began firing drones at IDF bases by November.
[2:53] SPEAKER_03: Iran would begin firing drones of its own and missiles as well by April.
[2:57] SPEAKER_03: And by the following October,
[2:59] we'll be firing missiles in retaliation for the deaths of
[3:01] Hezbollah leaders,
[3:03] SPEAKER_03: not only its own soldiers.
[3:05] SPEAKER_03: But the question looms over all of these developments.
[3:08] SPEAKER_03: How,
[3:09] SPEAKER_03: despite all of this initiative,
[3:11] did the Axis not reach the potential that had been discussed
[3:15] before the war?
[3:16] SPEAKER_03: What mistakes did it make,
[3:18] SPEAKER_03: especially in 2024,
[3:20] that led to Israel being able to pick off its factions one by
[3:23] one until it was able
[3:25] to take on Iran in June without anyone except Yemen intervening
[3:29] on its behalf?
[3:31] As usual when I'm thinking about Israel,
[3:33] I'm reminded of the 19th century U.S.
[3:36] SPEAKER_03: During the period of settler expansion,
[3:38] SPEAKER_03: you had both indigenous resistance and indigenous acquiescence.
[3:42] SPEAKER_03: Both, of course, ultimately faced genocide.
[3:45] But for those who resisted,
[3:47] neither the normalization nor the accelerationist strategies
[3:50] worked.
[3:51] SPEAKER_03: You had a sort of axis of resistance of the Plains Indians,
[3:54] SPEAKER_03: the Lakota,
[3:55] SPEAKER_03: the Cheyenne,
[3:56] SPEAKER_03: the Arapaho,
[3:58] SPEAKER_03: and they landed some major blows against the U.S.
[4:00] SPEAKER_03: Army.
[4:01] SPEAKER_03: But those who tried to extract treaty concessions,
[4:04] SPEAKER_03: like Red Cloud,
[4:05] SPEAKER_03: ultimately couldn't enforce them.
[4:08] Red Cloud was a Lakota leader who in 1866 dealt a massive
[4:12] defeat to the US Army.
[4:14] SPEAKER_03: A group of warriors,
[4:15] SPEAKER_03: including Crazy Horse,
[4:16] drew 81 US troops into an ambush in territory that would go on
[4:21] to become Wyoming.
[4:22] Red Cloud and the Lakotas killed all of them,
[4:25] forcing the rest of the US forces to flee.
[4:28] SPEAKER_03: From this victory,
[4:29] SPEAKER_03: he was able to extract a massive concession,
[4:32] SPEAKER_03: the 1868 treaty that established the Great Sioux Reservation.
[4:37] SPEAKER_03: But within a decade, the U.S.
[4:39] would renege on its treaty obligations,
[4:41] expropriating and partitioning much of the land.
[4:44] SPEAKER_03: And those indigenous leaders that resisted until the end,
[4:47] SPEAKER_03: like Sitting Bull,
[4:49] SPEAKER_03: ended up leading to a final battle that was a massacre.
[4:52] SPEAKER_03: In 1876,
[4:53] Sitting Bull led the axis of the Plains Indian forces to
[4:57] victory in the Battle of
[4:59] SPEAKER_03: Little Bighorn,
[5:00] SPEAKER_03: where 268 U.S.
[5:00] SPEAKER_03: troops were killed.
[5:03] SPEAKER_03: This led to the U.S.
[5:04] Congress increasing funding for the military effort and
[5:07] attaching a rider to the
[5:08] SPEAKER_03: Indian Appropriations Act,
[5:10] withholding any food rations to the Indian territories until
[5:13] they surrendered the
[5:14] SPEAKER_03: land.
[5:15] SPEAKER_03: Despite this,
[5:16] Sitting Bull's resistance movement continued up until the 1890
[5:20] massacre at Wounded
[5:21] SPEAKER_03: Knee,
[5:22] SPEAKER_03: when the U.S.
[5:22] SPEAKER_03: slaughtered hundreds of Lakota civilians.
[5:26] SPEAKER_03: All that's to say,
[5:27] the peoples and national liberation struggles on the wrong side
[5:30] of Israeli settler
[5:31] SPEAKER_03: colonial aggression and expansion have very,
[5:34] SPEAKER_03: very difficult choices to make.
[5:36] SPEAKER_03: That's not to be defeatist.
[5:38] SPEAKER_03: There is nothing guaranteed about Israel's success.
[5:41] SPEAKER_03: And Israel is operating under very different conditions than the U.S.
[5:45] SPEAKER_03: during its westward expansion period.
[5:47] SPEAKER_03: That massacre you're mentioning at Wounded Knee,
[5:50] SPEAKER_03: it is still present in the American military imagination.
[5:54] SPEAKER_03: Pete Hexeth,
[5:55] SPEAKER_03: the war secretary,
[5:56] SPEAKER_03: made an announcement,
[5:57] SPEAKER_03: I think a couple months ago,
[5:58] where he said that the medals of honor that the soldiers at
[6:02] Wounded Knee had
[6:03] SPEAKER_03: received would remain with them,
[6:05] SPEAKER_03: despite no lobbying organization,
[6:08] SPEAKER_03: to my knowledge,
[6:09] SPEAKER_03: advocating for this.
[6:10] SPEAKER_03: Under my direction,
[6:11] we're making it clear without hesitation that the soldiers who
[6:14] fought in the Battle
[6:15] SPEAKER_03: of Wounded Knee in 1890 will keep their medals.
[6:19] SPEAKER_03: And we're making it clear that they deserve those medals.
[6:22] You're mentioning obligations,
[6:24] treaties that these indigenous leaders made.
[6:27] SPEAKER_03: What is the analog in the present day, do you think?
[6:29] SPEAKER_03: Is it Iran?
[6:30] SPEAKER_03: Is it Hezbollah?
[6:31] SPEAKER_03: Another faction?
[6:32] SPEAKER_03: What do you mean?
[6:34] SPEAKER_03: I guess I'm thinking about Iranian grand strategy here specifically,
[6:38] but more broadly the political terrain of everyone on the wrong
[6:41] side of US-Israeli
[6:42] SPEAKER_03: belligerence,
[6:43] SPEAKER_03: which really is the entire indigenous population of the region.
[6:47] SPEAKER_03: There's such a strong motivation to normalize with the West.
[6:51] SPEAKER_03: If you're a relatively weak power, you just want to be left in peace.
[6:54] SPEAKER_03: And ultimately,
[6:55] it seems like both the hawkish and dovish poles within the
[6:58] larger resistance sphere
[7:00] SPEAKER_03: are trying to achieve that through different strategic means.
[7:03] SPEAKER_03: But as the Lakota analogy illustrates, there really aren't good options.
[7:08] Syria tried non-confrontation,
[7:10] and what's left of its sovereignty was annihilated.
[7:13] Hezbollah was more aggressive,
[7:15] and southern Lebanon bore the full brunt of Israeli aggression.
[7:19] SPEAKER_03: Iran today remains in a very tough spot.
[7:22] SPEAKER_03: In today's world,
[7:23] SPEAKER_03: it increasingly looks like the only way,
[7:25] SPEAKER_03: as a weak power,
[7:26] SPEAKER_03: to maintain sovereignty is
[7:27] is the garrison model,
[7:29] a la DPRK,
[7:30] which means total isolation from a US-run global economy.
[7:34] SPEAKER_03: And the US knows that the garrison model is hard to dislodge,
[7:37] which is why they fought so hard to prevent Iran from having a
[7:40] nuclear weapon.
[7:42] SPEAKER_03: And also even more surprising that Iran's government,
[7:45] SPEAKER_03: despite this knowledge,
[7:46] SPEAKER_03: is not actually pursuing that path in any meaningful way.
[7:51] But is Yemen the exception to this rule that you're describing
[7:55] with confrontation,
[7:56] SPEAKER_03: non-confrontation?
[7:57] SPEAKER_03: It was also aggressive and confrontational.
[7:59] It struck Tel Aviv before Hezbollah did,
[8:01] despite Lebanon's close proximity.
[8:04] SPEAKER_03: It attempted to strike Netanyahu's plane as a return from New York.
[8:07] SPEAKER_03: It hit Ben-Gurion Airport, as Hezbollah also did.
[8:11] SPEAKER_03: It attacked the American Navy.
[8:12] SPEAKER_03: I could go on.
[8:14] Yet it has undeniably retained its power despite the
[8:19] assassination of its civilian
[8:20] SPEAKER_03: government and its military chief of staff in Israeli airstrikes.
[8:25] Yeah,
[8:25] I mean,
[8:26] it's quite possible Yemen provides a model for navigating this
[8:28] bind.
[8:30] SPEAKER_03: As we talked about in our episode with Laleh,
[8:32] Ansarallah has been able to leverage both its geoeconomic
[8:35] centrality but also its
[8:37] geopolitical marginality to punch far above its weight and
[8:40] actually back down the
[8:41] SPEAKER_03: U.S.
[8:42] SPEAKER_03: empire.
[8:43] SPEAKER_03: But we also have to wait and see how this is going to play out, right?
[8:46] SPEAKER_03: Israel may well turn its full attention to Yemen at some point,
[8:49] SPEAKER_03: and that will be a test of its operational security and its endurance.
[8:53] But I think one thing this conversation that we've had draws
[8:55] out is that the
[8:56] relatively more conservative approach taken by other nodes in
[8:59] the axis has some
[9:00] SPEAKER_03: really significant limitations,
[9:02] and that Israel has been able to exploit those differences in
[9:05] risk tolerance to its
[9:06] SPEAKER_03: own advantage.
[9:07] SPEAKER_03: We wanted to get in the weeds about this.
[9:10] So,
[9:10] of course,
[9:11] we had no one else that we wanted to turn to but our friend Rob
[9:15] Ashlar.
[9:16] Ashlar is a writer who speaks about the history of jihadism and
[9:22] also the acts of
[9:22] SPEAKER_03: resistance's grand strategy.
[9:24] SPEAKER_03: He writes a great subsect that publishes very regularly.
[9:29] For by art is created that great Leviathan,
[9:31] if you remember that quote from Thomas Hobbes.
[9:33] He just had a great piece about the history of Chechen jihadism
[9:39] that he has been
[9:39] starting on that I've been reading and it has been very
[9:42] informative and we had a
[9:43] SPEAKER_03: great discussion with him.
[9:45] SPEAKER_03: I'm very excited to have Rob on the show.
[9:47] He is a great friend of ours,
[9:49] a very excellent researcher,
[9:51] an organic intellectual.
[9:53] SPEAKER_03: And when we started this show,
[9:54] SPEAKER_03: I think we knew it was only a matter of time before we would have him on.
[9:58] SPEAKER_03: One of the first guests we ever discussed having on this, for sure.
[10:01] SPEAKER_03: That's right.
[10:02] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[10:03] SPEAKER_03: I always learn a tremendous amount from our conversations.
[10:06] SPEAKER_03: And he is extremely thorough and very thoughtful.
[10:10] Before we get into this conversation,
[10:11] Turbulence is committed to independence.
[10:14] SPEAKER_03: So we will never run ads or have institutional affiliations.
[10:18] SPEAKER_03: That means we're entirely listener funded.
[10:20] SPEAKER_03: For $5,
[10:21] SPEAKER_03: paid subscribers will get regular bonus episodes,
[10:24] SPEAKER_03: which will usually be news of the week.
[10:26] paid subscribers will also have access to monthly live streams
[10:29] with q and a and
[10:30] also book giveaways most importantly our paid subscribers help
[10:35] us keep this project
[10:36] SPEAKER_03: going
[10:37] SPEAKER_03: Subscribe today at turbulencepod.substack.com.
[11:12] SPEAKER_03: Today, we are speaking with Rob Ashlar.
[11:15] He is an independent researcher whose work has appeared in
[11:18] Cosmonaut magazine.
[11:20] SPEAKER_03: He has also appeared many times on Radio War Nerd.
[11:23] SPEAKER_03: He's here speaking with us today.
[11:26] SPEAKER_03: Rob, how are you doing?
[11:27] SPEAKER_03: I'm good, guys.
[11:28] SPEAKER_03: You?
[11:29] SPEAKER_03: We're all right.
[11:30] SPEAKER_03: Doing okay.
[11:30] SPEAKER_03: Thanks so much for having me.
[11:32] SPEAKER_03: So,
[11:33] SPEAKER_03: Rob,
[11:34] SPEAKER_03: I know you,
[11:36] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[11:37] primarily through your takes on the acts of resistance during
[11:42] the course of the
[11:42] SPEAKER_03: war,
[11:42] SPEAKER_03: especially through 2024,
[11:45] SPEAKER_03: as things started to really disintegrate on the Lebanese front.
[11:50] SPEAKER_03: I was witnessed,
[11:51] I bore witness to a lot of takes that were centered around the
[11:56] idea that the acts
[11:57] SPEAKER_03: of resistance would save the day,
[11:59] SPEAKER_03: it would come together in the end.
[12:01] SPEAKER_03: And admittedly, I also, I think, fell prey to a lot of those predictions.
[12:07] I think that was amplified by the fact that I was in Lebanon
[12:10] and I really did not
[12:10] SPEAKER_03: want there to be a war coming.
[12:13] But you were someone who took a very skeptical angle from an
[12:19] early period,
[12:20] SPEAKER_03: not out of criticism for the general aim of it to oppose Israel,
[12:24] SPEAKER_03: but from the fact that there were clear structural deficiencies.
[12:29] SPEAKER_03: Can you explain why the acts of resistance is different in reality?
[12:36] Why was it different in reality than in how it was portrayed in
[12:39] the media and how
[12:40] SPEAKER_03: its propaganda portrayed it?
[12:42] SPEAKER_03: There's a lot to that answer.
[12:45] The big thing is that the media portrays the axis as pretty
[12:47] tightly bound,
[12:49] SPEAKER_03: very closely coordinated,
[12:51] SPEAKER_03: and in-concert organization that's centered in Tehran.
[12:55] Basically,
[12:56] Iran is orchestrating all the key events,
[12:58] all the key access partners.
[13:00] SPEAKER_03: While they may have some autonomy, they're getting direction from Iran.
[13:04] SPEAKER_03: They're all also structured pretty similarly.
[13:06] SPEAKER_03: That's the perception.
[13:07] SPEAKER_03: Very fanatically devoted to resistance or Muqarama.
[13:11] SPEAKER_03: But in reality, the axis of resistance is far more incoherent than that.
[13:16] SPEAKER_03: There's a lot of moving parts to it.
[13:18] SPEAKER_03: Each of the different axis partners were different from each other.
[13:21] You have state powers like Iran and Ansar al-Azhar,
[13:24] basically the Yemeni state.
[13:25] SPEAKER_03: But then you also have loads of militias that comprise...
[13:29] SPEAKER_03: More broadly, the PMF or Hashtag Shabbat.
[13:32] SPEAKER_03: You have Hezbollah in Lebanon,
[13:33] SPEAKER_03: and then you have the former Assad regime,
[13:36] SPEAKER_03: which the Syrian Arab Republic,
[13:38] SPEAKER_03: which wasn't really a state.
[13:39] SPEAKER_03: Through the course of the Syrians of war, descended into a militia state.
[13:43] SPEAKER_03: And through this, there was never any key command center for the Axis.
[13:47] There wasn't actually a process of direction or ordering from
[13:50] Tehran or any one of
[13:51] SPEAKER_03: the Axis partners.
[13:53] SPEAKER_03: And I think we can sort of do a bit of compare and contrast here,
[13:55] SPEAKER_03: which is there is an organization like that in the Middle East.
[13:58] SPEAKER_03: Where it is super tightly bound,
[13:59] where it is like very extensive intelligence sharing and it
[14:02] basically acts as like
[14:03] SPEAKER_03: one body,
[14:04] SPEAKER_03: but like with a division of labor.
[14:05] SPEAKER_03: And that organization is CENTCOM, Central Command.
[14:08] SPEAKER_03: The U.S.
[14:09] SPEAKER_03: 's military skeleton and muscle in the region.
[14:12] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[14:12] SPEAKER_03: through CENTCOM,
[14:13] SPEAKER_03: the coalition,
[14:14] SPEAKER_03: the full title of it is the Global Coalition Against ISIS,
[14:17] SPEAKER_03: but all of that coordinated...
[14:19] SPEAKER_03: Oh,
[14:20] SPEAKER_03: C-J-T-F-I-O-R,
[14:22] SPEAKER_03: the Global Coalition.
[14:23] SPEAKER_03: They're still active?
[14:24] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, they're still active.
[14:27] SPEAKER_03: What are they doing?
[14:29] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[14:29] SPEAKER_03: officially,
[14:30] SPEAKER_03: they launch airstrikes against ISIS positions,
[14:32] SPEAKER_03: but they also...
[14:33] SPEAKER_03: It's like Arab countries working with Israel.
[14:35] SPEAKER_03: Ah, I see.
[14:36] SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
[14:37] SPEAKER_03: Which leads to my main point,
[14:38] SPEAKER_03: which is that the coalition,
[14:39] SPEAKER_03: obviously,
[14:40] SPEAKER_03: it does actually fight ISIS.
[14:41] SPEAKER_03: It does launch air missiles and does ground raids.
[14:43] SPEAKER_03: But all of that coordination,
[14:45] it doubles to benefit and shore up the Israeli and American
[14:49] position in the region.
[14:50] SPEAKER_03: It isn't just a sort of regional policing action.
[14:53] SPEAKER_03: It isn't that benign.
[14:55] SPEAKER_03: And if the Axis ever wanted to fight American power in the region,
[15:00] SPEAKER_03: that meant fighting CENTCOM and the coalition.
[15:03] SPEAKER_03: which means having to mirror its structure, which it never did.
[15:06] That's the long and short of why wasn't the Axis able to come
[15:10] together and really
[15:11] SPEAKER_03: fight this final showdown.
[15:13] SPEAKER_03: This question of allyship,
[15:15] SPEAKER_03: increasing coordination,
[15:17] SPEAKER_03: increasing intelligence sharing,
[15:19] SPEAKER_03: what interested me about it was,
[15:20] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[15:22] SPEAKER_03: in the summer of 2024,
[15:24] there were reports in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar about
[15:29] strategists in Sana'a
[15:31] talking about a fully coordinated response in which they would
[15:35] overwhelm Israeli
[15:36] SPEAKER_03: air defenses from
[15:38] SPEAKER_03: Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and that obviously did not come to pass.
[15:41] SPEAKER_03: It was staggered out.
[15:42] SPEAKER_03: It didn't work.
[15:43] SPEAKER_03: A lot of that pressure seemed to be coming from Yemen,
[15:46] but it also seemed when Yemen took the initiative to try and
[15:51] increase that,
[15:51] SPEAKER_03: it seemed to undermine them as well.
[15:53] Something that I haven't seen anyone really study and I would
[15:56] want to know more
[15:57] SPEAKER_03: about is when,
[15:58] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[15:59] SPEAKER_03: you and I both know this.
[16:01] Ansar Allah,
[16:02] it maintains an extremely tight ship around its main
[16:05] leadership.
[16:06] SPEAKER_03: things like the Central Jihad Council, other institutions like that.
[16:10] But when they started coordination with the Iranian military
[16:14] after the war broke
[16:15] SPEAKER_03: out with Israel,
[16:17] SPEAKER_03: only days after they did their first coordinated strike,
[16:19] SPEAKER_03: that's when the IDF first tried to assassinate the Yemeni chief of staff,
[16:24] SPEAKER_03: Mohammed al-Qamari,
[16:24] who recently passed away from his wounds in another
[16:28] assassination attempt.
[16:29] SPEAKER_03: It really feels like when they try to coordinate elsewhere,
[16:34] They run into the massive intelligence penetration that Israel
[16:39] and America have
[16:40] SPEAKER_03: achieved,
[16:41] SPEAKER_03: which makes countering Israel so difficult.
[16:44] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[16:45] these huge decapitation strikes that happened in Lebanon with
[16:48] Hezbollah and with
[16:50] SPEAKER_03: the IRGC in Iran,
[16:52] SPEAKER_03: things that would never have been able to happen with Yemen.
[16:54] SPEAKER_03: It seems like it's a very insurmountable obstacle at the moment for me.
[16:58] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, no, that's a really great point.
[16:59] SPEAKER_03: And I think that's the biggest reason,
[17:02] SPEAKER_03: I believe,
[17:03] that Hamas never shared the plans for October 7th to the rest
[17:06] of the Axis,
[17:07] SPEAKER_03: because they were afraid that if they did,
[17:09] SPEAKER_03: it would either be intercepted along the way,
[17:12] SPEAKER_03: or if that didn't happen,
[17:13] SPEAKER_03: once it got to the rest of the Axis,
[17:15] SPEAKER_03: someone would find out before the operation could commence.
[17:18] SPEAKER_03: Then that leads to the next question,
[17:20] SPEAKER_03: which is,
[17:20] SPEAKER_03: why are so many Axis partners so deeply infiltrated?
[17:24] SPEAKER_03: And why isn't Ansar allowed?
[17:26] SPEAKER_03: One easy answer would be, oh,
[17:28] SPEAKER_03: Ansar a lot is the Yemeni state, so they have more capabilities.
[17:31] SPEAKER_03: They can get away with a bit more, but that doesn't really...
[17:34] SPEAKER_03: You have Iran as a glaring rebuttal to it.
[17:37] SPEAKER_03: And there,
[17:37] SPEAKER_03: I think the answer is due to the political vision,
[17:41] SPEAKER_03: or perhaps even lack thereof,
[17:43] SPEAKER_03: of the Axis.
[17:44] SPEAKER_03: The name of it is Axis of Resistance.
[17:46] SPEAKER_03: One part of the project is fighting the West,
[17:49] SPEAKER_03: fighting Israel,
[17:50] SPEAKER_03: freeing Palestine,
[17:51] SPEAKER_03: which is very compelling.
[17:51] SPEAKER_03: But on the other hand, why are you doing this?
[17:54] SPEAKER_03: Obviously,
[17:55] SPEAKER_03: Israel and American imperialism are horrific,
[17:57] SPEAKER_03: and anyone who wants a decent Middle East would want to get rid of them.
[18:01] SPEAKER_03: But like, I mean, Norm Finkelstein raised this like over 20 years ago.
[18:04] Some people are just willing to live on their knees because at
[18:07] least they're still alive.
[18:09] SPEAKER_02: I'm not telling you what to do with your lives.
[18:12] SPEAKER_02: I'm not telling you.
[18:14] SPEAKER_02: And if you'd rather live crawling on your feet, I could respect that.
[18:20] SPEAKER_02: I could respect that.
[18:21] SPEAKER_02: People want to live.
[18:23] SPEAKER_02: How can I deny you that right?
[18:26] But then how can I not respect those who say they'd rather die
[18:30] on their feet?
[18:32] SPEAKER_02: How can I not respect that?
[18:34] SPEAKER_03: Asking people to fight and die, that's a really tall order.
[18:38] SPEAKER_03: And you have to have a very compelling reason to do it.
[18:42] SPEAKER_03: And the Axis wasn't really able to provide that.
[18:44] And this,
[18:44] again,
[18:44] ties into the structure of the Axis and rather each of its
[18:48] components.
[18:49] Ansarullah was able to seize the Yemeni state in essentially a
[18:52] revolution after a
[18:53] SPEAKER_03: brutal civil war slash international intervention,
[18:56] SPEAKER_03: which was basically genocidal against the Yemeni people.
[18:59] But if we look at other access partners like the PMF or Haish-e
[19:02] Shadda in Iraq,
[19:04] SPEAKER_03: they are a sort of mutated creature of both Iran and the U.S.
[19:09] SPEAKER_03: Because the hashtag Shabeh, what is it?
[19:11] It's an agglomeration or a grouping of a bunch of different
[19:16] militias in Iraq that
[19:18] SPEAKER_03: are pro-Iran and pro-US.
[19:20] And many of these militias first originated as anti-Baathist
[19:25] militias during the Iran-Iraq War.
[19:26] SPEAKER_03: That's where the relationship with Iran is established.
[19:29] SPEAKER_03: For example,
[19:30] SPEAKER_03: the Badr Brigade,
[19:31] which is the paramilitary or emerged as the paramilitary of the
[19:34] Dawa Party.
[19:36] SPEAKER_03: this like Shiite Islamist party.
[19:37] It's not quite Khomeini's,
[19:38] but it's still very close to the Shiite Islamist project.
[19:41] And the Badr Brigade after 2003,
[19:43] it came in from Iran and was a very close ally to the U.S.
[19:48] Like the Ministry of Interior in Iraq has basically always been
[19:52] the preserve of the
[19:53] SPEAKER_03: Badr Brigade.
[19:53] SPEAKER_03: And that means fighting like in the Iraqi,
[19:56] SPEAKER_03: in the Iraq war,
[19:57] SPEAKER_03: that means fighting the Iraqi insurgency on behalf of the U.S.,
[20:00] SPEAKER_03: which involves a lot of really horrific sectarian violence,
[20:03] SPEAKER_03: which politically stains them.
[20:05] SPEAKER_03: A lot of people don't want to be associated with that.
[20:07] SPEAKER_03: And there is this post-2003 order,
[20:10] which the Father Brigade and several other ancestors of the PMF
[20:13] helped construct.
[20:15] SPEAKER_03: The U.S.
[20:15] broadly constructs a 2003 order and the Butter Brigade and all
[20:18] these other
[20:19] SPEAKER_03: militias,
[20:20] SPEAKER_03: they fill in the gaps.
[20:21] SPEAKER_03: They become the actual agents in this order.
[20:23] SPEAKER_03: In 2014, this order is threatened by the Islamic State sweep.
[20:27] SPEAKER_03: Initially, the U.S.
[20:28] SPEAKER_03: was pretty ambivalent towards it,
[20:30] SPEAKER_03: had grown sick of all these militias' allegiance to Iran,
[20:32] SPEAKER_03: thought maybe,
[20:32] SPEAKER_03: hey,
[20:33] SPEAKER_03: we'll let these guys do this.
[20:34] SPEAKER_03: This is the Islamic State.
[20:36] SPEAKER_03: But then once they realize,
[20:36] SPEAKER_03: oh,
[20:37] SPEAKER_03: no,
[20:37] SPEAKER_03: they also really just hate the American project in the region,
[20:41] SPEAKER_03: or at least in Iraq,
[20:41] we're going to resume our alliance with these Iranian-backed
[20:44] militias and fight
[20:45] SPEAKER_03: Islamic State.
[20:46] SPEAKER_03: And again,
[20:46] what that in practice means is that you have these parties and
[20:50] organizations which
[20:50] have come to power on American tanks and are now defending
[20:52] their power with
[20:53] SPEAKER_03: American jets.
[20:54] All of that in practice means that they have zero reason to
[20:57] fight America,
[20:58] SPEAKER_03: like actually fight America.
[20:59] SPEAKER_03: They can launch some bottle rockets.
[21:01] SPEAKER_03: They can protest and complain.
[21:03] SPEAKER_03: But when it comes to the real moment,
[21:05] they're not going to fight because they have far too much
[21:07] invested in the system.
[21:09] SPEAKER_03: I want to jump in and just take a moment to back up a bit,
[21:12] SPEAKER_03: because we've been talking about the axis of resistance as a loosely or
[21:18] non-coordinated network of different actors with different
[21:23] interests and different
[21:24] SPEAKER_03: national contexts.
[21:25] SPEAKER_03: That's very different than how the axis of resistance is portrayed.
[21:30] SPEAKER_03: in the Western media.
[21:31] Usually if it's referenced,
[21:33] it's referenced as a network of Iranian proxies.
[21:38] And I think that gets to some of the core contradictions in
[21:42] assessing the axis.
[21:44] SPEAKER_03: So can we just speak a bit about what is it actually?
[21:47] SPEAKER_03: What is the axis of resistance?
[21:49] SPEAKER_03: Is it Iran's forward defense?
[21:52] SPEAKER_03: Are they proxies of Iranian foreign policy interests?
[21:56] SPEAKER_03: Or are these national groups,
[21:59] national resistance movements and state actors that have
[22:02] formatively chosen to ally
[22:04] SPEAKER_03: with Iran to advance their interests?
[22:06] SPEAKER_03: Or is it some combination of both?
[22:08] SPEAKER_03: It's that last answer.
[22:09] SPEAKER_03: It's some combination of both.
[22:10] SPEAKER_03: And this,
[22:11] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[22:11] is another flaw of the axis in that there isn't one binding
[22:15] reason that all of
[22:16] SPEAKER_03: these actors have come together with Iran.
[22:18] Some actors,
[22:19] like their initial relationship with Iran was formed purely
[22:21] ideologically.
[22:22] We can see this most clearly with Iran's backing of Hezbollah
[22:26] in Lebanon and the
[22:27] SPEAKER_03: Palestinian resistance.
[22:28] SPEAKER_03: This began in the 1980s under Ayatollah Khomeini himself.
[22:32] SPEAKER_03: And this is like during the sort of zeitgeist
[22:34] SPEAKER_03: of spreading the Islamic revolution militarily,
[22:37] like sweeping all of these Arab regimes and creating like a
[22:40] Khomeini's Middle East
[22:40] SPEAKER_03: or like a revolutionary Middle East.
[22:42] SPEAKER_03: Like that was the actual belief of the Iranian government at the time.
[22:44] SPEAKER_03: That's how they acted.
[22:45] SPEAKER_03: Very ideological foreign policy.
[22:48] SPEAKER_03: But once the Iran-Iraq war ended, once Khomeini himself died,
[22:53] SPEAKER_03: More moderate leadership came to power,
[22:56] SPEAKER_03: and they saw that Iran was devastated by the war,
[22:59] SPEAKER_03: and they urgently needed economic relief.
[23:01] SPEAKER_03: And the only way they were going to get that was from the West,
[23:03] SPEAKER_03: which placed a very brutal sanctions regime.
[23:06] SPEAKER_03: And this is when relationships start to shift a bit,
[23:10] SPEAKER_03: particularly with the 1997 election of Mohammed Khatami,
[23:14] SPEAKER_03: the leader of the reformist movement,
[23:15] SPEAKER_03: which is like the,
[23:16] SPEAKER_03: in quotes,
[23:17] SPEAKER_03: liberal or more moderate wing of the Iranian political system.
[23:20] SPEAKER_03: Under Khatami and like more broadly during the 90s,
[23:22] Iranian backing of Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance
[23:24] diminishes in the hopes of
[23:26] SPEAKER_03: rapprochement with the West.
[23:28] But then Israeli aggression against Iran really commences after
[23:31] the Oslo Accords.
[23:32] The logic of which was the Oslo Accords ostensibly is like a
[23:35] path to the two-state
[23:37] SPEAKER_03: solution,
[23:37] SPEAKER_03: which is obviously,
[23:38] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[23:38] SPEAKER_03: that's like bullshit,
[23:40] SPEAKER_03: but that was the stated aim of it.
[23:42] SPEAKER_03: Israel realized that they're going to have to make a real concession,
[23:45] SPEAKER_03: which is a two-state at some point.
[23:47] SPEAKER_03: There's a powerful enough wing of the West which wants to pursue this.
[23:51] SPEAKER_03: For instance, Brzezinski, he was fairly favorable to this.
[23:54] SPEAKER_03: It seems like that's a theme that we see throughout history, right?
[23:57] SPEAKER_03: If we talk about the long trajectory of this,
[23:59] there are strong Iranian interests to normalize with the West
[24:04] and enter into a
[24:05] SPEAKER_03: state of peaceable coexistence to facilitate their development.
[24:10] SPEAKER_03: It seems like
[24:11] SPEAKER_03: No one wants a suicidal or joint suicidal war.
[24:17] SPEAKER_03: But the problem with that plan is Israel.
[24:20] SPEAKER_03: Israel has existential or ideological or settler colonial motivations for
[24:28] SPEAKER_03: maintaining a permanent enemy.
[24:30] SPEAKER_03: Definitely.
[24:31] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[24:52] SPEAKER_03: Like,
[24:52] SPEAKER_03: for instance,
[24:53] SPEAKER_03: to continue the thought from earlier,
[24:55] SPEAKER_03: like Israeli aggression against Iran,
[24:56] SPEAKER_03: the whole premise of it was basically,
[24:58] SPEAKER_03: if we can paint Iran as like this expansionist enemy,
[25:00] then we can secure normalization from the Arab states without
[25:02] having to concede on
[25:03] SPEAKER_03: Palestine.
[25:04] SPEAKER_03: That was the whole logic of it.
[25:05] SPEAKER_03: And what that essentially forces it,
[25:07] SPEAKER_03: it spoils the reformist plan that the broader Islamic Republic's aims of
[25:11] SPEAKER_03: normalizing with the West.
[25:12] SPEAKER_03: They can't do that while Israel is still there.
[25:15] SPEAKER_03: So they have to fight Israel,
[25:16] SPEAKER_03: even if they don't want to,
[25:18] SPEAKER_03: which again leads to this very,
[25:19] SPEAKER_03: it's an inherently contradictory political position.
[25:21] SPEAKER_03: They want to get closer to the West, but they're totally unable to.
[25:26] This was the whole thing that really bothers the shit out of me
[25:32] when looking back
[25:33] SPEAKER_03: on the Khatami administration.
[25:35] SPEAKER_03: Because when I was growing up,
[25:37] SPEAKER_03: the reformist movement and Khatami's image in particular was very strong.
[25:43] SPEAKER_03: He showed a different way,
[25:45] SPEAKER_03: ostensibly,
[25:46] SPEAKER_03: he showed a different way forward in which Iran could move.
[25:50] And when Musavi and the Green Revolution failed,
[25:54] that was considered a major setback.
[25:56] SPEAKER_03: When Rouhani came into power and the JCPOA was able to be achieved,
[26:00] SPEAKER_03: that was a huge achievement.
[26:02] SPEAKER_03: But looking back on it,
[26:03] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[26:03] you see these interviews where Khatemi is talking to C-SPAN
[26:07] about the dialogue
[26:09] among civilizations and assuming that Americans have all read
[26:13] Tocqueville.
[26:13] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[26:14] This civilization is best described by the renowned French
[26:18] sociologist Alexis de
[26:21] SPEAKER_00: Tocqueville,
[26:22] who spent some two years in the United States in the 19th
[26:25] century and wrote the
[26:27] SPEAKER_00: valuable book entitled Democracy in America,
[26:31] SPEAKER_00: which I am sure most Americans have read.
[26:33] SPEAKER_03: He fundamentally assumes that the American people as a whole,
[26:40] SPEAKER_03: that the very image of America is misunderstood and can be reasoned with.
[26:45] And every American administration since then has proven that
[26:50] assumption wrong.
[26:52] SPEAKER_03: And now, I mean, you see the reformist administration currently in power.
[26:56] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[26:57] they're forced into this position in which they engaged in that
[27:01] war with Israel
[27:02] SPEAKER_03: that people always assumed that the conservatives would be leading and
[27:05] SPEAKER_03: spearheading.
[27:06] SPEAKER_03: It's been completely stripped of its purpose in any way, shape or form.
[27:11] SPEAKER_03: It's a meaningless political distinction at this point.
[27:13] One point that I would also add is that although there is this
[27:17] perception that the
[27:17] conservatives or the principalists would be leading that
[27:20] confrontation with Israel,
[27:22] I think there is an unhelpful assumption amongst a lot of
[27:24] Western observers is that
[27:26] SPEAKER_03: the principalists,
[27:27] SPEAKER_03: there's this huge distinction,
[27:29] SPEAKER_03: fundamental divide between the principalists and the reformists.
[27:31] SPEAKER_03: I think in my view,
[27:32] SPEAKER_03: both of them want to secure normalization with the West,
[27:34] but they differ on the strategy because the principalists have
[27:37] always recognized
[27:39] SPEAKER_03: the legitimacy of negotiations as such.
[27:41] SPEAKER_03: They don't view it purely tactically.
[27:43] SPEAKER_03: They view negotiations as something that is valid in and of itself.
[27:46] SPEAKER_03: And we can see this with the late leader, Ibrahim Raisi.
[27:51] He was trying to continue negotiations with the Gulf and with
[27:53] the US during his
[27:54] SPEAKER_03: entire administration.
[27:56] SPEAKER_03: So you'll have this weird dynamic where principalists will complain about
[28:00] SPEAKER_03: reformists being duped by negotiations,
[28:02] SPEAKER_03: which they are,
[28:03] SPEAKER_03: but they will still continue negotiations when they are in power.
[28:06] pointing to the fact that the Islamic Republic at a deep level
[28:10] views negotiations
[28:11] SPEAKER_03: and normalization with the West as an existential interest,
[28:15] SPEAKER_03: differing only on how exactly to do it.
[28:17] SPEAKER_03: We've now seen that the reformist position,
[28:19] SPEAKER_03: the reformist strategy is totally bankrupt,
[28:22] SPEAKER_03: leaving only a sensibly the principlist position.
[28:24] But the problem with that is the principlist position is tied
[28:27] up with a lot of
[28:28] SPEAKER_03: regressive social policy,
[28:29] which undermines their political legitimacy domestically within
[28:32] Iran and therefore
[28:33] SPEAKER_03: constrains what they can do abroad.
[28:36] SPEAKER_03: For example,
[28:36] SPEAKER_03: one big reason that Raisi,
[28:38] SPEAKER_03: we can maybe unpack this a bit later,
[28:40] wasn't or felt reluctant to really enter the fray after October
[28:44] 7th is that he
[28:45] SPEAKER_03: likely didn't feel that he had the legitimacy to get away with it,
[28:47] SPEAKER_03: to endure the hardship that that would have entailed.
[28:50] SPEAKER_03: Now,
[28:51] my position is always – anyone who knows me knows that I think
[28:54] that Iran should
[28:55] SPEAKER_03: have entered the fray much sooner.
[28:56] SPEAKER_03: It would have been better even if it was costly.
[28:59] SPEAKER_03: But that's the rationale that was operating.
[29:00] SPEAKER_03: It's a direct consequence of principless governance in Iran.
[29:04] No,
[29:04] I mean during the election,
[29:05] the last election after Raisi died in a helicopter crash –
[29:09] There was this whole kerfuffle within the principalist camp
[29:12] where they were talking
[29:13] SPEAKER_03: about how the reformists were enemies of the country,
[29:15] SPEAKER_03: that they would sell out the acts of resistance.
[29:18] SPEAKER_03: That Jalili,
[29:19] SPEAKER_03: Saeed Jalili,
[29:20] SPEAKER_03: who was the once failed nuclear negotiator,
[29:22] SPEAKER_03: now turned,
[29:23] SPEAKER_03: I don't know what the right word would be,
[29:25] SPEAKER_03: scion,
[29:26] SPEAKER_03: prophet of how America betrayed everybody.
[29:29] SPEAKER_03: He was gaining in the polls.
[29:30] SPEAKER_03: But even then,
[29:31] SPEAKER_03: like the thing that I thought about is like,
[29:33] SPEAKER_03: okay,
[29:33] SPEAKER_03: Pazeshkian is now the president.
[29:35] SPEAKER_03: He's engaging in this war.
[29:37] SPEAKER_03: He's doing things, I guess, more intense than I used to would have done.
[29:41] SPEAKER_03: Maybe Jalili would have been more forceful,
[29:45] but he was also somebody who wanted to increase the enforcement
[29:50] of mandatory hijab.
[29:51] SPEAKER_03: He wanted to engage more in culture wars.
[29:54] And I think part of the reason why there wasn't any protests at
[30:00] all during the war
[30:01] SPEAKER_03: with Israel,
[30:02] SPEAKER_03: the kind of protests that the Shah outside in Maryland wanted,
[30:07] was because Pesachian had kind of kept the lid on things by not
[30:10] going all out in
[30:12] SPEAKER_03: those policies.
[30:13] Meanwhile,
[30:13] Jalili would have been a much easier president to advocate
[30:18] against.
[30:19] SPEAKER_03: No, I totally agree.
[30:20] And I think more broadly to the earlier point about
[30:22] intelligence and infiltration,
[30:23] SPEAKER_03: like a lot of principles,
[30:24] SPEAKER_03: like their whole thing is like,
[30:25] SPEAKER_03: you know,
[30:25] SPEAKER_03: if we don't do the mandatory hijab and all this other stuff,
[30:29] SPEAKER_03: why are we an Islamic republic?
[30:30] SPEAKER_03: Why aren't we just a republic?
[30:31] SPEAKER_03: Like for them, it's like a, it's like a deeply ideological thing.
[30:33] But the problem is that creates a lot of people who hate the
[30:36] Islamic republic.
[30:37] and have an incentive or perceived incentive to collaborate
[30:40] with Israel and sell
[30:43] SPEAKER_03: shitloads of information or act as moles or double agents.
[30:46] SPEAKER_03: We saw the scale of that in the 12-day war.
[30:48] SPEAKER_03: It was enormous.
[30:50] And there was recently a Ricey appointed intelligence chief was
[30:54] talking about,
[30:55] there are dozens of countries that intelligence agencies that
[30:57] were fighting against
[30:58] SPEAKER_03: Iran during that 12-day war.
[30:59] SPEAKER_03: Yes, that's true, but they're always fighting against Iran.
[31:02] SPEAKER_03: It's sort of your job to make sure that they don't succeed.
[31:05] And the reason that they didn't succeed in preventing this is
[31:08] because of this sort
[31:09] SPEAKER_03: of regressive social policies,
[31:10] which again ties into the root issue of even if the Axis did
[31:13] have like a distinctly
[31:14] like properly like Khomeini's vision and forced Khomeinism on
[31:17] all of its partners.
[31:17] Khomeinism doesn't appeal to everybody because not everyone is
[31:20] a particularly
[31:21] SPEAKER_03: ideological or fanatical 12 or Shiite.
[31:23] SPEAKER_03: No, no, no.
[31:23] I mean,
[31:24] mandatory hijab hasn't been a popular position in probably,
[31:28] I think,
[31:28] close to a decade.
[31:29] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[31:30] there was a recent poll by the parliament's own polling agency
[31:34] where Islamic
[31:35] SPEAKER_03: governance as a whole is no longer a popular position.
[31:38] SPEAKER_03: It's difficult.
[31:40] I think if we're talking about miscalculations in terms of
[31:45] maintaining the acts of resistance—
[31:47] SPEAKER_03: I think it would benefit us,
[31:49] SPEAKER_03: however thorny that might be,
[31:50] SPEAKER_03: to start talking about Syria and how that has proceeded.
[31:53] SPEAKER_03: What I should say is that when Assad fell,
[31:59] I think there were many deep opinions about what this meant for
[32:03] Palestine.
[32:04] But the actual opinion of Hamas and Palestinian factions
[32:08] throughout the war –
[32:10] I think was discounted and was not included because that made
[32:15] discussing it quite complicated.
[32:17] SPEAKER_03: Can you detail what that complexity is?
[32:20] SPEAKER_03: First off,
[32:20] SPEAKER_03: Hamas and PIJ,
[32:22] SPEAKER_03: the two big resistance factions in Palestine,
[32:25] SPEAKER_03: were officially neutral about the Syrian civil war.
[32:29] SPEAKER_03: And Hamas, the important wings of it were straight-up anti-Assad regime.
[32:33] SPEAKER_03: PIJ was a bit more,
[32:34] SPEAKER_03: they stuck to a more neutral line,
[32:36] SPEAKER_03: which is not the same thing as the dogged support for the Assad regime,
[32:41] SPEAKER_03: which was the position of other Axis partners in which a lot of Western
[32:44] SPEAKER_03: observers...
[32:46] SPEAKER_03: also had taken.
[32:47] SPEAKER_03: And this complexity is largely because of,
[32:49] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[32:49] SPEAKER_03: first off,
[32:50] SPEAKER_03: Palestinian factions have a pretty ugly history with the Assad regime,
[32:54] SPEAKER_03: mostly because the Assad regime has fucked them over quite a few times,
[32:57] particularly in Lebanon with the War of the Camps and for a
[33:00] time backing the
[33:01] SPEAKER_03: Lebanese forces.
[33:02] SPEAKER_03: Lebanese forces, you mean the Christian militia?
[33:05] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[33:07] SPEAKER_03: The faction of Bashir Jumayel.
[33:09] SPEAKER_03: And more broadly,
[33:10] the Assad regime has had an instrumentalist position or view of
[33:14] the Palestinian
[33:15] SPEAKER_03: cause.
[33:16] So that's why a lot of Palestinian movements are pretty sort of
[33:19] ambiguous.
[33:19] SPEAKER_03: And even when the regime fell...
[33:22] SPEAKER_03: Hamas' statement was they didn't want to upset their Axis allies,
[33:26] SPEAKER_03: so they couldn't gloat about the fall of the Assad regime.
[33:28] SPEAKER_03: But they also, if you read it, they weren't that sad about it either.
[33:32] They said,
[33:32] we congratulate the Syrian people in their revolution,
[33:35] in their victory.
[33:36] SPEAKER_03: We hope it goes well for you.
[33:37] SPEAKER_03: That was like a pretty sort of bog-standard diplomatic statement,
[33:40] which is a huge far cry from a lot of the sort of limitation
[33:44] that was seen on a lot
[33:45] SPEAKER_03: of social media or even like in Axis media at the time.
[33:48] SPEAKER_03: And again, this...
[33:50] This is still sort of skirting around the issue of,
[33:52] like,
[33:52] what was the Assad regime?
[33:54] SPEAKER_03: What was its flaws?
[33:55] SPEAKER_03: It sort of captures everything wrong with the Axis.
[33:58] SPEAKER_03: The Assad regime was not a real state.
[33:59] SPEAKER_03: It rotted into a militia state.
[34:02] SPEAKER_03: Like the SAA, it wasn't a real army to speak of.
[34:05] SPEAKER_03: There were a couple of units or divisions which were key,
[34:08] SPEAKER_03: like the Tiger Forces under Suhail al-Hassan.
[34:11] SPEAKER_03: But the overall army was not reliable.
[34:13] SPEAKER_03: And there was a huge network of militias,
[34:15] SPEAKER_03: for example,
[34:16] SPEAKER_03: the National Defense Forces,
[34:18] SPEAKER_03: which are a descendant of the so-called Shabbiha,
[34:22] SPEAKER_03: which the whole concept of the Shabbiha is like pro-state gangsters.
[34:26] SPEAKER_03: To close off on this thread,
[34:27] SPEAKER_03: there's a really great piece by Aaron Lund in 2013 where he says that
[34:31] SPEAKER_03: the militification of the regime's forces basically spells its doom.
[34:36] SPEAKER_03: Because at some point,
[34:36] these militias will realize they have more power than the
[34:39] central government,
[34:40] SPEAKER_03: and the opposition will be able to cut them a better deal.
[34:43] SPEAKER_03: And that's exactly what happened.
[34:45] SPEAKER_03: 12 years later,
[34:45] SPEAKER_03: or rather 11 years later,
[34:47] SPEAKER_03: in December 2024,
[34:47] HCS and the other rebels had basically got a bunch of regime
[34:54] forces to defect or
[34:55] SPEAKER_03: lay down their guns and let them walk into Damascus.
[34:59] SPEAKER_03: And again,
[34:59] this is more broadly rooted in the fact that the Assad regime
[35:02] didn't really have an
[35:03] SPEAKER_03: ideology.
[35:04] It marketed itself as a secular republic,
[35:06] but sectarianism was still an element of the regime.
[35:08] SPEAKER_03: And more broadly, the regime's hideous conduct during the
[35:12] SPEAKER_03: The civil war grossly delegitimized it to tons of people.
[35:16] One could reasonably argue that they're a lesser evil to the
[35:20] extreme jihadist
[35:21] SPEAKER_03: freaks in the opposition.
[35:22] SPEAKER_03: Okay, yeah, that isn't a real selling point of the regime as such.
[35:25] SPEAKER_03: It's basically lesser evilism.
[35:27] SPEAKER_03: You're still recognizing this as an evil.
[35:29] SPEAKER_03: This is, I think, what makes Hezbollah's intervention...
[35:33] SPEAKER_03: such a difficult pill to swallow.
[35:36] And it leaves a lot of difficult questions to answer because
[35:39] when it happened,
[35:41] SPEAKER_03: the way that Nasrullah advertised it,
[35:44] the way in which he advocated for it and saw it as necessary
[35:46] was that he said
[35:47] SPEAKER_03: explicitly,
[35:48] SPEAKER_03: if Syria falls,
[35:50] SPEAKER_03: Palestine will fall.
[35:54] SPEAKER_03: Hezbollah's weapons, its supply lines run through Syria.
[35:57] SPEAKER_03: They did.
[35:58] SPEAKER_03: Since the government fell, it's been a much more constricted line.
[36:02] If that happens,
[36:02] then Hezbollah will not be able to defend Palestine as well.
[36:06] SPEAKER_03: It represents a huge threat.
[36:07] And of course,
[36:08] talking about shrines that were being destroyed by jihadists
[36:11] and this and that.
[36:13] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[36:13] SPEAKER_03: the fact that that was all for ultimately nothing is,
[36:16] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[36:17] SPEAKER_03: difficult for supporters of Hezbollah to still comprehend.
[36:20] SPEAKER_03: But also,
[36:20] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[36:21] something that I think a lot of supporters of the opposition
[36:25] are not reckoning with
[36:27] SPEAKER_03: is the fact that this new neoliberal republic,
[36:33] SPEAKER_03: I don't even know how you would describe it,
[36:34] SPEAKER_03: a neoliberal quasi-Islamist republic led by a
[36:41] SPEAKER_03: has completely abandoned,
[36:43] SPEAKER_03: almost completely abandoned,
[36:44] SPEAKER_03: any sort of even rhetorical support for the Palestinians.
[36:48] I mean,
[36:48] arresting members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
[36:52] detaining people in Hamas.
[36:54] SPEAKER_03: How is it that Jolani,
[36:57] SPEAKER_03: or how he's talking about himself as Ahmed al-Shara'a,
[37:00] SPEAKER_03: how did it get from where he was to where it is now?
[37:04] And if I can just add,
[37:04] too,
[37:05] it also begs the question of Hamas' strategy with October 7th.
[37:11] SPEAKER_03: Right.
[37:11] SPEAKER_03: Because the Hezbollah position for intervention can say that it failed,
[37:16] SPEAKER_03: but it also did make sense.
[37:18] SPEAKER_03: Right.
[37:18] SPEAKER_03: If that is their supply lines from Iran.
[37:23] SPEAKER_03: The way that Hamas has talked about the strategy of October 7th,
[37:27] SPEAKER_03: since October 7th,
[37:28] SPEAKER_03: is to ignite a regional conflict.
[37:31] SPEAKER_03: Presumably,
[37:32] that would depend on a forceful intervention from Hezbollah in
[37:37] their defense,
[37:38] SPEAKER_03: which we can say didn't come.
[37:40] SPEAKER_03: But if that was part of Hamas's original strategy, why would support for
[37:46] the Assad regime as a conduit for Hezbollah's armament not be
[37:50] more central and not
[37:51] SPEAKER_03: more important?
[37:52] SPEAKER_03: Is it that this is a calculated PR position given the
[37:59] SPEAKER_03: sectarian tensions inflamed by conduct during the Syrian civil war,
[38:02] SPEAKER_03: kind of trying to keep their house in order?
[38:05] Or does it reflect that the strategy that Hamas declared
[38:10] following October 7th was
[38:12] SPEAKER_03: actually much bolder than what the actual strategy of the operation was?
[38:17] SPEAKER_03: That's a tough question.
[38:18] I think my interpretation is that the operation on October 7th
[38:22] was partially in
[38:23] SPEAKER_03: reaction to this kind of stalemate that had gone on in Syria,
[38:28] SPEAKER_03: not directly in reaction to it,
[38:30] SPEAKER_03: but rather that was part of the broader stasis that the Axis had entered.
[38:33] The intervention in Syria was justified as,
[38:36] oh,
[38:36] we got to do this to fight Israel.
[38:39] But the actual fighting of Israel prior to October 7th didn't
[38:41] seem like it was ever
[38:42] SPEAKER_03: going to come.
[38:43] SPEAKER_03: The Axis position was basically strategic patience,
[38:46] this sort of euphemism to justify Iran and the Axis never
[38:49] really responding to
[38:51] SPEAKER_03: Israel in the West killing Axis.
[38:53] Or I should say another term that Khamenei invented was heroic
[38:57] flexibility.
[38:58] SPEAKER_03: It's like nonsense, but that's a different thing.
[39:01] SPEAKER_03: That's a different agreement.
[39:03] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, yeah.
[39:04] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[39:04] SPEAKER_03: we can get into like the substance of those terms in a bit,
[39:07] SPEAKER_03: because I actually do think it's a bit worth unpacking.
[39:08] SPEAKER_03: But from Hamas's perspective,
[39:10] SPEAKER_03: from the Palestinian resistance perspective,
[39:13] SPEAKER_03: like the Axis was never going to really initiate this confrontation,
[39:15] SPEAKER_03: this showdown with Israel of its own initiative.
[39:18] SPEAKER_03: Their whole plan was like,
[39:19] SPEAKER_03: oh,
[39:19] SPEAKER_03: we're going to wait for Israel to attack and then we're going to respond.
[39:22] SPEAKER_03: But the Palestinian cause couldn't wait that long.
[39:24] SPEAKER_03: It was dying before, like on October 6th, it was totally silent.
[39:28] There was no real,
[39:29] like a lot of people,
[39:30] including me,
[39:31] like this is pretty fucking bleak.
[39:33] It was the deadliest year for Palestinians in the West Bank
[39:36] before October 7th,
[39:38] SPEAKER_03: and it received very little coverage in the West,
[39:41] SPEAKER_03: if at all.
[39:41] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, no one gave a fuck.
[39:42] SPEAKER_03: The axis,
[39:43] SPEAKER_03: even vocally,
[39:44] SPEAKER_03: wasn't as loud as you'd expect,
[39:45] SPEAKER_03: given the cost that Palestinians were enduring.
[39:47] SPEAKER_03: And normalization was proceeding.
[39:49] SPEAKER_03: Yeah,
[39:49] SPEAKER_03: and normalization,
[39:50] there was a lot of talk about Saudi-Israeli normalization
[39:53] continuing at pace and
[39:54] SPEAKER_03: even being imminent.
[39:57] SPEAKER_03: So Hamas couldn't wait on that.
[39:58] SPEAKER_03: And I think Syria was a large part of this access complacency.
[40:01] I want to briefly address Hezbollah's intervention,
[40:06] sort of what to make of it.
[40:07] SPEAKER_03: For me,
[40:07] SPEAKER_03: this is what made Hezbollah's capitulation in November so painful,
[40:14] because they had justified their intervention in Syria on the
[40:17] grounds of Palestine.
[40:18] But what ended up happening is that Hezbollah suffered a
[40:20] crushing defeat.
[40:21] SPEAKER_03: I think now enough time has passed.
[40:24] SPEAKER_03: Basically, most people can admit that Hezbollah lost.
[40:27] SPEAKER_03: It severely miscalculated, and it paid an extremely high price.
[40:31] SPEAKER_03: And Naam Qasim,
[40:33] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[40:33] he had tried to save face in the aftermath of that by saying it
[40:37] was an even larger
[40:38] SPEAKER_03: victory than what had been achieved in 2006,
[40:40] SPEAKER_03: because the IDF hadn't reached as far into Lebanon,
[40:44] SPEAKER_03: and Hezbollah did much better combat-wise.
[40:47] And we are in front of a big investigation,
[40:50] which happened in August 2006.
[41:02] SPEAKER_03: But it wasn't about just southern Lebanon.
[41:05] SPEAKER_03: It was about a much larger thing.
[41:07] SPEAKER_03: And it precipitated the disconnecting of the fronts,
[41:10] SPEAKER_03: which Nasrullah,
[41:11] SPEAKER_03: up until his death,
[41:12] SPEAKER_03: constantly refused.
[41:14] SPEAKER_03: Because of that, we can say justifiably, Nasrullah died for Gaza.
[41:18] SPEAKER_03: He categorically refused to break the fronts.
[41:20] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, I just, you know, we can say that Hezbollah miscalculated.
[41:24] SPEAKER_03: And I think, you know, we could talk specifically about what that means.
[41:27] SPEAKER_03: But I think we have to just acknowledge the difficulty of the posture.
[41:32] SPEAKER_03: And I think it speaks to the basis for what the axis is.
[41:38] SPEAKER_03: We are talking about a group of effectively quasi-state actors,
[41:44] SPEAKER_03: and some of them are state actors,
[41:46] but none of them are a kind of traditional anti-colonial
[41:51] resistance movement,
[41:52] SPEAKER_03: as we are familiar with from history,
[41:55] SPEAKER_03: in part because of the particularities of Zionism.
[41:58] SPEAKER_03: Right.
[41:59] SPEAKER_03: If we say that Palestine acts as a unifying cause here,
[42:03] SPEAKER_03: which I think does make sense,
[42:05] especially if we are situating this historically in the
[42:09] aftermath of the Naxa in
[42:11] SPEAKER_03: 1967,
[42:12] SPEAKER_03: we are starting from a place of exile of resistance,
[42:16] of Israel successfully exiling the Palestinians and from a
[42:20] resistance being born in
[42:22] SPEAKER_03: camps.
[42:23] SPEAKER_03: of other countries in other places.
[42:26] SPEAKER_03: And we're talking about those exiled Palestinians and their allies.
[42:30] The key distinction that I'm drawing here is that when we talk
[42:34] about anti-colonial
[42:35] SPEAKER_03: resistance,
[42:36] we are historically generally talking about indigenous
[42:40] resistance in land,
[42:42] SPEAKER_03: and the fight is for sovereignty.
[42:44] SPEAKER_03: And so when state power is amassed, it is amassed in relationship
[42:48] SPEAKER_03: to liberated territory.
[42:51] That is the basis then for launching a war of attrition against
[42:55] a colonial enemy.
[42:57] SPEAKER_03: Here,
[42:57] we're talking about a dispersed group of quasi-state actors who
[43:02] have some degree of
[43:03] SPEAKER_03: state power,
[43:04] SPEAKER_03: but not actually liberated territory vis-a-vis Israel.
[43:09] SPEAKER_03: It makes it much harder for any of them
[43:11] to wage attritional war against Israel when they have to deal
[43:16] not just with a
[43:16] SPEAKER_03: colonial enemy,
[43:18] but also they're existing within a totally separate regime of
[43:21] sovereignty.
[43:22] I should say my vocal frustration that is,
[43:25] I think,
[43:26] pretty evident,
[43:27] its roots are in...
[43:29] The kinds of discussions that I saw when I was in Lebanon and
[43:33] also the discussions
[43:34] SPEAKER_03: that I saw happening in Iran while all of this was happening.
[43:37] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[43:37] this just stringent refusal to acknowledge that there was a war
[43:44] going on in the
[43:45] SPEAKER_03: south,
[43:46] SPEAKER_03: in Junoub,
[43:47] SPEAKER_03: that there were strikes happening in Dakhir.
[43:51] SPEAKER_03: You could go,
[43:51] SPEAKER_03: like when I was living in Beirut,
[43:53] the thing that was very strange was that you could go about
[43:55] your life and the fact
[43:57] SPEAKER_03: that Israel was bombing maybe a few miles away sometimes was completely a
[44:03] SPEAKER_03: non-object to certain people,
[44:05] SPEAKER_03: especially to people who supported phalangist parties,
[44:08] SPEAKER_03: which was the majority in the neighborhood that I lived in.
[44:11] SPEAKER_03: This refusal to see that these issues were connected,
[44:13] SPEAKER_03: this desperate want to normalize,
[44:16] SPEAKER_03: to believe that you,
[44:18] SPEAKER_03: as a member of a very weak state of the Lebanese Republic,
[44:22] SPEAKER_03: speaking just frankly,
[44:23] could normalize with Israel on equal terms and that you would
[44:26] be respected as
[44:27] SPEAKER_03: equals.
[44:28] SPEAKER_03: It's a fanciful assertion.
[44:30] And it led to this undermining of this position where outside
[44:34] of areas that were
[44:35] SPEAKER_03: very supportive of Hezbollah,
[44:37] you would see less mobilization for Palestine than existed in
[44:42] New York City or in
[44:43] SPEAKER_03: different Western cities,
[44:44] SPEAKER_03: because it was considered something that was only the responsibility,
[44:48] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[44:48] SPEAKER_03: by a lot of people to parties like Amal,
[44:52] SPEAKER_03: to Hezbollah,
[44:53] SPEAKER_03: to sectarian concerns.
[44:55] SPEAKER_03: And then in Iran, I mean, God,
[44:59] The bloviating that I would see from politicians or from media
[45:04] figures talking
[45:04] SPEAKER_03: about,
[45:05] SPEAKER_03: you know,
[45:05] SPEAKER_03: if Israel does this,
[45:07] SPEAKER_03: if America does this,
[45:08] SPEAKER_03: we'll hit them back,
[45:09] SPEAKER_03: we'll hit them in the face,
[45:10] SPEAKER_03: we can do this,
[45:11] SPEAKER_03: we can do that.
[45:12] SPEAKER_03: The belief that...
[45:15] Iran would be capable of a massive,
[45:18] overwhelming response,
[45:21] and it just never did it.
[45:22] SPEAKER_03: And then when the war inevitably came,
[45:25] SPEAKER_03: that there was no one who would be willing to fight on Iran's behalf.
[45:28] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[45:29] SPEAKER_03: why is it that the southern Lebanese,
[45:32] SPEAKER_03: why is it that people in Dahya,
[45:34] SPEAKER_03: why is it that people in Gaza...
[45:37] SPEAKER_03: were forced to bear the brunt of this,
[45:40] SPEAKER_03: to have their homes destroyed,
[45:42] SPEAKER_03: their cities demolished because of the inaction of others,
[45:48] SPEAKER_03: because of the want to disconnect from the world by others.
[45:54] SPEAKER_03: It frustrates me deeply.
[45:56] I mean,
[45:56] it is also,
[45:57] though,
[45:57] just speaks to Israel's strategic advantage,
[46:00] right?
[46:01] SPEAKER_03: By fighting against an exiled population, Israel can say,
[46:05] SPEAKER_03: to other nationals,
[46:06] SPEAKER_03: they can say,
[46:07] SPEAKER_03: these people are your problem,
[46:08] SPEAKER_03: that we're not actually after you or your land,
[46:11] SPEAKER_03: that if you just abandon these Palestinians,
[46:16] SPEAKER_03: then we'll leave you alone.
[46:17] SPEAKER_03: And we know, of course, that that's not true, right?
[46:19] SPEAKER_03: We've known from history that that's not true.
[46:22] SPEAKER_03: And I think that that does
[46:23] call into question some of the strategic divides that we were
[46:27] talking about earlier,
[46:28] right?
[46:28] SPEAKER_03: If we're talking about the principlist versus the reformist,
[46:31] the problem with both of those ideological postures is that
[46:35] they assume some level
[46:37] SPEAKER_03: of rationality
[46:39] SPEAKER_03: on behalf of the empire,
[46:40] SPEAKER_03: on behalf of the US and on behalf of Israel,
[46:43] SPEAKER_03: that there is a way out,
[46:44] SPEAKER_03: that there is a way towards de-escalation that eventually,
[46:47] SPEAKER_03: even if you are negotiating from a position of force,
[46:51] SPEAKER_03: right,
[46:51] SPEAKER_03: that does also require some level of rationality from your antagonists.
[46:57] SPEAKER_03: I think that what calls all of that into question is the war on terror.
[47:00] SPEAKER_03: Exactly.
[47:01] SPEAKER_03: That from 2003,
[47:03] SPEAKER_03: we saw a United States that was not interested in settlement,
[47:06] SPEAKER_03: that was interested in
[47:08] SPEAKER_03: large-scale destruction and world-making,
[47:12] SPEAKER_03: a very dark form of world-making,
[47:15] SPEAKER_03: that was about holding onto American power.
[47:17] And I think that Iranians very rightly anticipated that they
[47:22] might be next in terms
[47:23] SPEAKER_03: of regime destruction,
[47:24] SPEAKER_03: and that has oriented a lot of the policy.
[47:27] SPEAKER_03: But I think it fundamentally calls into question the assumption that
[47:31] of rationality on behalf of the US and on behalf of Israel and
[47:35] everything that
[47:35] SPEAKER_03: we've seen since 2003 is two powers that are fighting to fight,
[47:41] that are fighting to create new enemies because that's their
[47:43] raison d'etre.
[47:45] SPEAKER_03: I think 2003,
[47:45] SPEAKER_03: that was the year when Iran proposed the Grand Bargain,
[47:49] SPEAKER_03: which was first revealed,
[47:50] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[47:51] SPEAKER_03: by Trita Parsi,
[47:51] SPEAKER_03: but then popularized by Nick Kristof of The New York Times.
[47:54] SPEAKER_03: And the Grand Bargain basically was Iran's normalization deal.
[47:58] It was a document authored by several key reformist politicians
[48:02] and approved by
[48:03] SPEAKER_03: Khamenei himself.
[48:05] SPEAKER_03: which said that Iran will recognize a two-state solution.
[48:08] SPEAKER_03: It'll stop support for the axis of resistance.
[48:10] SPEAKER_03: It'll play ball, essentially.
[48:11] And it won't pursue nuclear weapons if the West ends regime
[48:15] change efforts against
[48:17] SPEAKER_03: the Islamic Republic.
[48:18] SPEAKER_03: And the key lesson of that was Iran,
[48:21] the Islamic Republic was willing to sell the rest of the axis
[48:24] to preserve itself,
[48:25] SPEAKER_03: to preserve its own reign.
[48:26] SPEAKER_03: in the hopes of cutting its own independent deal with the U.S.
[48:28] But the problem that becomes immediately apparent from that
[48:31] same year is that the U.S.
[48:33] SPEAKER_03: is not operating on a rational terrain.
[48:35] SPEAKER_03: Like, yes, it's like operating.
[48:36] SPEAKER_03: There's like an internal logic to it.
[48:38] SPEAKER_03: But from an outside perspective,
[48:39] SPEAKER_03: these people are insane and their project is destruction and mass murder.
[48:43] SPEAKER_03: And with that, I think that should have probably caused...
[48:47] a real mindset shift in Iranian leadership that,
[48:51] no,
[48:51] these people,
[48:51] we can't reason with them.
[48:52] SPEAKER_03: We just have to get ready to fight.
[48:54] But there was this perennial attempt to cut a deal and a
[48:58] constant assumption that
[48:59] SPEAKER_03: these people are in fact rational,
[49:00] SPEAKER_03: which persisted not just through the height of the global war on terror,
[49:04] SPEAKER_03: But through the genocide,
[49:06] SPEAKER_03: like earlier this year,
[49:08] SPEAKER_03: Iran was still trying to negotiate,
[49:10] was negotiating with the US as the genocide in Gaza entered its
[49:13] worst phases.
[49:14] And they didn't mention Gaza during April,
[49:16] May,
[49:17] and then right up until the war.
[49:19] SPEAKER_03: We were watching this video,
[49:20] SPEAKER_03: Dylan and I,
[49:21] SPEAKER_03: of one of Iran's vice presidents,
[49:24] SPEAKER_03: Javad Zarif,
[49:25] SPEAKER_03: at the Global Economic Forum,
[49:27] SPEAKER_03: talking about how,
[49:29] SPEAKER_03: with clear frustration,
[49:32] SPEAKER_03: almost condescension,
[49:34] SPEAKER_03: I would say,
[49:35] SPEAKER_03: talking about how Hamas undermined JCPOA negotiations,
[49:40] which they did not know about because they were going to go
[49:42] back on October 9th.
[49:43] SPEAKER_03: And he's speaking as if, like...
[49:46] SPEAKER_03: God,
[49:46] this was a real – this was a real setback for them as if Biden
[49:50] was ever going to
[49:51] SPEAKER_03: really go back on this.
[49:52] Throughout all of those years that he was – that Blinken was
[49:56] actually going to give
[49:57] SPEAKER_03: them any sort of relief.
[50:00] SPEAKER_03: And Javad Zarif,
[50:01] SPEAKER_03: when he was ambassador to the UN,
[50:02] I mean this is someone who was involved in that grand bargain
[50:04] that you're talking
[50:05] SPEAKER_03: about.
[50:05] SPEAKER_03: his viewpoints don't change.
[50:08] SPEAKER_03: The people inside the Iranian political establishment,
[50:10] SPEAKER_03: conservative or reformist,
[50:12] SPEAKER_03: their viewpoints don't seem to shift with...
[50:15] SPEAKER_03: I'm sorry,
[50:15] SPEAKER_03: I'm jumping around these old points.
[50:16] SPEAKER_03: I'm remembering this interview with one of the people in the Pesachian
[50:20] SPEAKER_03: administration,
[50:21] SPEAKER_03: literally the morning of the first bombings of the Israel war.
[50:26] SPEAKER_03: They find him,
[50:27] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[50:27] SPEAKER_03: in a government building and he gets asked about negotiations,
[50:30] SPEAKER_03: not Zarif,
[50:31] SPEAKER_03: but a different person.
[50:32] SPEAKER_03: And one of these people in the administration is like,
[50:35] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, well, we're going to have to talk with the Americans about this.
[50:38] SPEAKER_03: And it's like, dog, they're bombing you right now.
[50:44] SPEAKER_03: The entire IRGC major leadership is dead.
[50:48] SPEAKER_03: How can you still be on this point?
[50:52] And you would see the evolution among some people in the
[50:57] clerical sphere,
[50:57] in the media sphere.
[50:59] SPEAKER_03: They saw the response of the Yemenis during their war with America.
[51:04] SPEAKER_03: And they openly said Iranians need to be more like the Yemenis.
[51:09] SPEAKER_03: You even saw the replication of Yahya Sari.
[51:13] in the IRTC-owned communications where they actively tried to
[51:17] mirror how he speaks,
[51:19] SPEAKER_03: the ways in which he speaks,
[51:22] SPEAKER_03: the backdrop was entirely the same.
[51:26] There are elements in that system that want to evolve on this
[51:30] and take a much more
[51:31] SPEAKER_03: confrontational and stringent attitude.
[51:35] But they're going up against people who – like 70-year-old IRGC
[51:41] generals who are
[51:41] SPEAKER_03: like,
[51:42] SPEAKER_03: no,
[51:42] SPEAKER_03: we're not going to make a nuclear weapon.
[51:44] SPEAKER_03: We're not going to do that.
[51:45] SPEAKER_03: We have a nuclear program, but we're not going to make a nuclear weapon.
[51:47] SPEAKER_03: How can you say that?
[51:50] SPEAKER_03: It doesn't serve anything.
[51:51] SPEAKER_03: How does that not serve anything?
[51:53] SPEAKER_03: Sorry.
[51:53] SPEAKER_03: That's just a –
[51:56] SPEAKER_03: So I got pissed off.
[51:57] No,
[51:57] Amwaj Media had a really great report after Hezbollah's
[52:00] capitulation in November.
[52:01] SPEAKER_03: And basically,
[52:02] SPEAKER_03: like,
[52:02] SPEAKER_03: one of their key discussion points was that,
[52:04] SPEAKER_03: like,
[52:05] SPEAKER_03: in Hezbollah,
[52:05] SPEAKER_03: there's now a lot of soul searching.
[52:06] SPEAKER_03: This is speaking, like, December 2024.
[52:09] SPEAKER_03: But within Iran, there wasn't that kind of soul searching.
[52:11] SPEAKER_03: There's still a lot of,
[52:12] SPEAKER_03: like,
[52:13] SPEAKER_03: stubborn conservative leadership,
[52:14] SPEAKER_03: which just doesn't want to learn.
[52:15] SPEAKER_03: And I think partially,
[52:16] SPEAKER_03: like,
[52:17] some of the changes that are ongoing now are just a result of
[52:19] the fact that a lot
[52:20] SPEAKER_03: of those people are dead.
[52:21] So now there's,
[52:22] as a function of replacement,
[52:23] like,
[52:23] the newer guys are a bit younger and
[52:25] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, let's say 60 versus 70-year-old.
[52:29] SPEAKER_03: But yeah, I know what you mean.
[52:30] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, yeah.
[52:30] SPEAKER_03: And again,
[52:31] SPEAKER_03: this still fundamentally comes back to the core problems of the Axis,
[52:35] SPEAKER_03: which is that they're unable to pick a side on what they wanted to do.
[52:39] There was a fascinating piece that I read from Combating
[52:42] Terrorism Center,
[52:43] which is the U.S.
[52:44] SPEAKER_03: government's basically anti-terror think tank.
[52:46] SPEAKER_03: It's from April, 2024.
[52:48] SPEAKER_03: And it was an assessment of the Houthi, the Ansar Allah support front.
[52:53] SPEAKER_03: And the author is this fucking ghoul, but he's a very rigorous scholar.
[52:56] SPEAKER_03: And he says, what's his name?
[52:58] SPEAKER_03: Michael Knights.
[52:59] SPEAKER_03: Oh, yeah.
[52:59] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[53:00] SPEAKER_03: That's a good description.
[53:01] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[53:02] SPEAKER_03: And he says, the Houthis, they threw down the gauntlet and
[53:08] SPEAKER_03: they were operating on a completely new set of rules,
[53:10] whereas Hezbollah was desperately sticking to the rules of the
[53:13] game in the hopes
[53:14] SPEAKER_03: that Israel would recognize that and de-escalate.
[53:18] SPEAKER_03: This comparison he draws,
[53:19] this was a direct consequence of that was the Pudis were
[53:22] getting more and more
[53:23] SPEAKER_03: bold,
[53:24] SPEAKER_03: were willing to take much greater risk,
[53:25] SPEAKER_03: and therefore,
[53:26] SPEAKER_03: he doesn't explicitly say it,
[53:28] but the unsaid conclusion is they're reaping greater and
[53:30] greater rewards with this
[53:32] SPEAKER_03: approach of embracing risk.
[53:33] SPEAKER_03: Whereas Hezbollah, we could see in early 2024, one could see
[53:37] SPEAKER_03: that their strategy was not paying off,
[53:39] that they should have begun escalating on all fronts and begun
[53:42] more tightly
[53:43] SPEAKER_03: coordinating.
[53:44] SPEAKER_03: I wanted to tie back to your point,
[53:46] SPEAKER_03: Seamus,
[53:46] SPEAKER_03: from earlier,
[53:47] where there's a lot of people in Lebanon who simply didn't even
[53:50] think about the
[53:50] bombing of South Lebanon and viewed it essentially like this is
[53:53] Hezbollah's
[53:53] SPEAKER_03: problem.
[53:54] SPEAKER_03: This isn't our shit.
[53:55] SPEAKER_03: This isn't our country.
[53:57] SPEAKER_03: I think that, again, this ties to the
[54:00] SPEAKER_03: confessional nature of not only Lebanon, but also Hezbollah itself.
[54:03] SPEAKER_03: It is a confessional party.
[54:05] SPEAKER_03: It represents Shiites in the South and the Baqa Valley.
[54:09] SPEAKER_03: That is its main constituency.
[54:11] SPEAKER_03: And over its existence, over its four decades of existence,
[54:14] SPEAKER_03: It has steadily integrated into the Lebanese state and system.
[54:17] SPEAKER_03: So it's now party to all of this.
[54:19] SPEAKER_03: It is literally a party in the Lebanese parliament.
[54:21] So it has obligations based to play along in the internal
[54:24] political rivalries.
[54:25] And what Hezbollah agrees on most of the Lebanese confessional
[54:29] systems functioning,
[54:30] SPEAKER_03: except on national defense,
[54:32] because its own people are on the front lines and they will
[54:35] bear the brunt of
[54:36] SPEAKER_03: Israeli aggression.
[54:37] SPEAKER_03: And this position is fundamentally contradictory.
[54:39] SPEAKER_03: If you want to have a proper national defense in Lebanon,
[54:41] SPEAKER_03: that means eliminating the confessional or sectarian political system.
[54:45] SPEAKER_03: But Hezbollah can't do that because that risks its own existence.
[54:49] The confessional system,
[54:50] it creates the need for something like Hezbollah.
[54:52] SPEAKER_03: If the government is now totally secular,
[54:54] SPEAKER_03: it's basically,
[54:55] SPEAKER_03: you know,
[54:55] SPEAKER_03: a kumbaya regime,
[54:57] SPEAKER_03: the appeal of Hezbollah is severely diminished.
[55:00] SPEAKER_03: Lebanese Shiites can vote for something else.
[55:02] Now,
[55:02] of course,
[55:03] does this diminish Hezbollah as the righteousness of their
[55:05] cause?
[55:05] SPEAKER_03: No, absolutely not.
[55:07] SPEAKER_03: But it imposes a very severe constraint on what they can do.
[55:09] SPEAKER_03: And that,
[55:09] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[55:09] SPEAKER_03: was a really big reason of why they couldn't,
[55:11] SPEAKER_03: why they felt they couldn't escalate post-October 7th.
[55:14] SPEAKER_03: I think the conservative strategic posture of some of these actors,
[55:19] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[55:19] SPEAKER_03: we're contrasting with Ansarallah,
[55:20] SPEAKER_03: but
[55:21] SPEAKER_03: of Hezbollah and Iran in the face of Israeli aggression against Gaza,
[55:26] SPEAKER_03: against Palestine,
[55:27] SPEAKER_03: once again raises the question of Hamas' strategy with October 7th.
[55:31] SPEAKER_03: So I think one way to conceptualize it,
[55:33] if we can think about the axis of resistance as a
[55:38] counter-systemic movement in the
[55:40] SPEAKER_03: world system that is aiming to
[55:43] achieve some degree of harmony or normalization or at least
[55:47] prevent its own
[55:48] destruction right i think we can think of hamas as a
[55:53] counter-systemic movement
[55:54] within that counter-systemic movement hamas is in the
[55:57] palestinian people's demands
[55:59] as you laid out were more urgent and they saw themselves on the
[56:04] chopping block
[56:05] particularly in gaza conditions in gaza were worsening
[56:08] normalization was proceeding
[56:10] SPEAKER_03: ahead and
[56:11] SPEAKER_03: The Palestinian cause felt like the card that was going to be played.
[56:15] SPEAKER_03: I should add to what Dylan is saying.
[56:18] There was an Al Jazeera documentary in which commanders within
[56:21] Al Qassam were
[56:22] talking about how Izzur was planning its own preemptive strike
[56:25] against Palestinian
[56:27] SPEAKER_03: military leadership.
[56:28] SPEAKER_03: So they felt that there was a time run on what they needed to act on.
[56:31] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[56:32] SPEAKER_03: And so in a sense,
[56:32] SPEAKER_03: right,
[56:33] SPEAKER_03: the act of attack itself,
[56:35] SPEAKER_03: October 7th itself,
[56:37] SPEAKER_03: was an attempt to scramble that strategic calculation,
[56:41] to scramble the strategic calculation of conservative response
[56:46] of strategic
[56:46] SPEAKER_03: patients.
[56:48] SPEAKER_03: And it sort of worked.
[56:50] SPEAKER_03: But it ultimately failed.
[56:52] SPEAKER_03: And I think it speaks to the bind that the Palestinian people are in,
[56:56] SPEAKER_03: the bind that they're in in Gaza,
[56:58] but also potentially the limits of strategic acceleration
[57:02] within a counter-systemic
[57:03] movement that doesn't have the backing of a global superpower
[57:08] counterbalance to
[57:09] SPEAKER_03: American power.
[57:10] SPEAKER_03: Two quick points there.
[57:11] SPEAKER_03: First,
[57:12] I don't think we can say it's definitively failed because the
[57:14] post-October 7th
[57:15] SPEAKER_03: aftermath is still in motion.
[57:17] SPEAKER_03: Israeli aggression hasn't definitively ended yet.
[57:19] SPEAKER_03: I think there's decent signs that they may attack Lebanon or Yemen next.
[57:23] SPEAKER_03: Secondly, I think this would be a good segue into Hamas' calculation.
[57:27] SPEAKER_03: What is the whole logic of strategic accelerationism?
[57:30] As you put it so well,
[57:30] an anti-systemic movement within a broader anti-systemic
[57:33] movement.
[57:34] SPEAKER_03: My interpretation of this,
[57:35] SPEAKER_03: and I got this from a friend who pointed it very well,
[57:37] was that Hamas wanted to reorient the strategic center of the
[57:41] axis away from Tehran
[57:43] SPEAKER_03: to Gaza.
[57:44] SPEAKER_03: And October 7th was the way it did that.
[57:47] SPEAKER_03: We touched on this during this discussion.
[57:48] The patron client or like sponsor proxy relationship is usually
[57:53] held as like it
[57:53] SPEAKER_03: goes in one direction.
[57:54] SPEAKER_03: The big power tells the little power what to do.
[57:57] But we've seen that like with the imitation of Yahya Sari in
[58:00] Iran,
[58:01] it shows that the
[58:02] the so-called proxy can exert its own influence back onto its
[58:05] own patron.
[58:06] SPEAKER_03: And October 7th was the most ultimate form of that.
[58:09] The logic essentially was igniting a regional civil war,
[58:13] but what does that mean in practice?
[58:14] It means dragging the rest of the Axis by its feet into this
[58:18] wildfire that...
[58:19] SPEAKER_03: the Hamas leadership set off.
[58:22] SPEAKER_03: That,
[58:22] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[58:22] SPEAKER_03: was the overall strategic rationale to start a regional civil war,
[58:25] SPEAKER_03: but there is some dispute on,
[58:27] SPEAKER_03: like,
[58:27] SPEAKER_03: was that the specific aim of this operation,
[58:30] SPEAKER_03: or was this operation meant to set the dominoes or something like that?
[58:33] I think one argument could be that this is meant to be a
[58:36] penultimate confrontation
[58:38] to unify the Palestinian national liberation leadership by
[58:41] releasing all these
[58:41] SPEAKER_03: high-profile prisoners like Marwan Barghouti,
[58:43] SPEAKER_03: Abdullah Barghouti,
[58:44] SPEAKER_03: et cetera,
[58:45] SPEAKER_03: so that for the next round,
[58:45] SPEAKER_03: they're all on a tight ship.
[58:47] SPEAKER_03: They have everybody involved.
[58:48] SPEAKER_03: I think after the initial ceasefire in November was broken,
[58:52] SPEAKER_03: if not earlier,
[58:53] SPEAKER_03: Hamas leadership realized – this is,
[58:55] SPEAKER_03: of course,
[58:56] SPEAKER_03: my interpretation.
[58:57] SPEAKER_03: I can't really read their minds.
[58:58] SPEAKER_03: But I think they realized that, no, this is the final confrontation.
[59:03] SPEAKER_03: And now our job,
[59:05] the role of Gaza and Hamas is basically to keep this fire going
[59:08] until it burns the
[59:09] SPEAKER_03: entire Middle East through a regional war.
[59:11] And there was this incredibly evocative piece that I read in
[59:15] July 2024 after the
[59:17] SPEAKER_03: assassination of Haniyeh by this Arab commentator.
[59:20] SPEAKER_03: And he described Gaza as a human matchstick,
[59:22] SPEAKER_03: the role of which is to burn,
[59:24] SPEAKER_03: is to keep the flame going until it catches in the rest of the region.
[59:28] And with that will be the final confrontation that ultimately
[59:30] ends Israel,
[59:31] SPEAKER_03: with Hezbollah theoretically unleashing its entire arsenal,
[59:34] SPEAKER_03: with Iran unleashing its entire arsenal,
[59:37] SPEAKER_03: and breaking the pro-US status quo that we discussed earlier,
[59:41] SPEAKER_03: because that's what a regional war would do.
[59:43] SPEAKER_03: If it's truly a total conflict,
[59:45] SPEAKER_03: if it is a total war,
[59:46] SPEAKER_03: it would involve attacking American forces,
[59:48] SPEAKER_03: American bases.
[59:49] SPEAKER_03: It would involve attacking energy infrastructure,
[59:51] SPEAKER_03: blocking the Strait of Hormuz,
[59:53] SPEAKER_03: as some Iranian officials threatened during the 12-day war.
[59:56] SPEAKER_03: And this,
[59:57] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[59:57] SPEAKER_03: although the cost would be enormous,
[59:59] SPEAKER_03: I think this is something that I believe very deeply that Yahya Senwar,
[1:00:03] SPEAKER_03: Mohamed Dev,
[1:00:04] SPEAKER_03: and Marwan Aisha,
[1:00:05] SPEAKER_03: they were really gunning for this.
[1:00:07] SPEAKER_03: If they achieve this,
[1:00:09] SPEAKER_03: and it may still happen,
[1:00:10] I think there is some possibility that it may happen further
[1:00:12] down the road.
[1:00:12] SPEAKER_03: October 7th will have succeeded.
[1:00:14] SPEAKER_03: I think that was the strategic rationale that they had in mind.
[1:00:17] SPEAKER_03: I think if we're speaking about things that remain down the road...
[1:00:23] You've talked a little bit about the potential for something
[1:00:27] new erupting in
[1:00:29] SPEAKER_03: Lebanon or in Yemen before something will happen with Iran,
[1:00:32] SPEAKER_03: which I'm sure is on the chopping block as well.
[1:00:34] Could you describe the scenarios you foresee where a new war
[1:00:39] could erupt with
[1:00:40] SPEAKER_03: Lebanon and with Yemen?
[1:00:41] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[1:00:42] SPEAKER_03: I think I'll start with Yemen because it's a bit of a simpler case.
[1:00:45] The reason there is that the Western campaigns there have been
[1:00:47] an abject failure.
[1:00:49] The Ansar Allah is further in bold,
[1:00:50] and they basically have had no real losses.
[1:00:52] SPEAKER_03: They've lost some top people.
[1:00:54] SPEAKER_03: Like, there have been meaningful intelligence advances in the West.
[1:00:57] SPEAKER_03: Like, they killed Abdul Karim al-Ghammari.
[1:01:00] SPEAKER_03: and the civilian leadership of Ansar Allah.
[1:01:03] But broadly,
[1:01:03] the organization remains very robust,
[1:01:05] and it can continue to.
[1:01:07] SPEAKER_03: I would say,
[1:01:07] SPEAKER_03: just as an explanation for listeners,
[1:01:11] SPEAKER_03: Muhammad al-Ghamari is the chief of staff of the Yemeni military,
[1:01:15] and the prime minister in the cabinet of the Yemeni government
[1:01:19] that Ansar Allah
[1:01:20] SPEAKER_03: controls.
[1:01:20] SPEAKER_03: Yeah,
[1:01:21] SPEAKER_03: and he sits on the Jihad Council,
[1:01:23] SPEAKER_03: which is like a very,
[1:01:24] SPEAKER_03: that is the central leadership of Ansar Allah.
[1:01:26] SPEAKER_03: So that was a very significant and pretty alarming assassination.
[1:01:30] SPEAKER_03: And it's precisely because of that,
[1:01:31] SPEAKER_03: the fact that Ansarullah is broadly robust,
[1:01:34] SPEAKER_03: but the Israelis finally managed to get some intelligence,
[1:01:36] SPEAKER_03: some real intelligence on Ansarullah.
[1:01:37] They want to go for the kill,
[1:01:40] or at least try to degrade it like they have with Hezbollah.
[1:01:42] SPEAKER_03: And we can see this in Israeli media.
[1:01:43] SPEAKER_03: They've been warmongering about Yemen,
[1:01:46] SPEAKER_03: that Yemen is the strongest tentacle of the Iranian octopus.
[1:01:50] And the logic is basically,
[1:01:51] we need to fight Yemen first before we attack Iran.
[1:01:54] SPEAKER_03: This comes up in a lot of Israeli newspapers.
[1:01:56] SPEAKER_03: Which is such a change from how it was before this.
[1:02:00] The fact that – I mean now there are Hamas snipers dedicating
[1:02:04] their kills of IDF
[1:02:05] SPEAKER_03: soldiers to Abdel Malik al-Houthi.
[1:02:07] SPEAKER_03: Yeah,
[1:02:08] SPEAKER_03: and then Israel's defense minister is directly threatening him,
[1:02:11] saying that he'll be killed and they'll raise the Israeli flag
[1:02:15] over a united Yemen
[1:02:16] SPEAKER_03: in Sana'a.
[1:02:17] SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
[1:02:18] SPEAKER_03: Like, no, that's crazy.
[1:02:19] SPEAKER_03: And again,
[1:02:19] SPEAKER_03: it shows the power of the Axis partners to use the concept of strategic
[1:02:24] SPEAKER_03: accelerationism.
[1:02:25] SPEAKER_03: Ansar Allah was the only one to really embrace it.
[1:02:27] SPEAKER_03: I want to make a side comment.
[1:02:29] I don't want to discount Hisbalah's sacrifices because they put
[1:02:31] a lot of very
[1:02:32] SPEAKER_03: significant pressure on Israel.
[1:02:34] SPEAKER_03: And they sacrificed a lot.
[1:02:35] SPEAKER_03: They played a very key role in the effort,
[1:02:37] SPEAKER_03: which made the breaking of the support front so tragic.
[1:02:39] But again,
[1:02:40] as you were saying,
[1:02:41] the emphasis now on Yemen is a total contrast to October 6th.
[1:02:44] SPEAKER_03: Or even...
[1:02:45] SPEAKER_03: last year.
[1:02:46] Now,
[1:02:46] that's how I foresee,
[1:02:47] how I imagine a renewed Israeli aggression against Yemen would
[1:02:50] work.
[1:02:50] SPEAKER_03: Second, now against Lebanon, they smell blood in the water.
[1:02:53] SPEAKER_03: They see that Hizballah is very weak or has been considerably weakened,
[1:02:56] SPEAKER_03: and they want to go for the kill because,
[1:02:58] SPEAKER_03: well,
[1:02:58] SPEAKER_03: Hizballah has disarmed south of the Latani,
[1:03:00] SPEAKER_03: and there's now renewed occupation of South Lebanon.
[1:03:03] SPEAKER_03: That has returned.
[1:03:04] We're no longer,
[1:03:04] this is not status quo October 6th,
[1:03:06] this is status quo 1999.
[1:03:08] SPEAKER_03: I should just say for people who aren't aware of this,
[1:03:11] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[1:03:12] SPEAKER_03: right now the IDF is technically in control of,
[1:03:15] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[1:03:15] SPEAKER_03: five different positions,
[1:03:17] SPEAKER_03: strategic positions in South Lebanon.
[1:03:19] But the way that they are enforcing this quasi-occupation is
[1:03:22] not through the South
[1:03:24] SPEAKER_03: Lebanon army,
[1:03:24] SPEAKER_03: like you're talking about in the 1990s,
[1:03:26] SPEAKER_03: or any militias.
[1:03:29] SPEAKER_03: What they're doing is that they're bombing reconstruction equipment.
[1:03:33] SPEAKER_03: They're bombing cafes,
[1:03:34] SPEAKER_03: they're bombing bulldozers,
[1:03:35] SPEAKER_03: they're bombing anything that could return civilian life to these areas.
[1:03:39] And I can only assume it's in preparation for what you're
[1:03:41] talking about,
[1:03:42] a renewed offensive.
[1:03:43] SPEAKER_03: If we were to count the whole unofficial occupation...
[1:03:46] SPEAKER_03: It runs one to two miles across the entire southern border.
[1:03:50] SPEAKER_03: It's a very significant belt.
[1:03:51] SPEAKER_03: And the five strategic points that you mentioned,
[1:03:53] they're now commencing the construction of six more or seven
[1:03:56] more strategic points.
[1:03:57] SPEAKER_03: So this occupation is here to stay, and it's here to expand.
[1:04:01] SPEAKER_03: Now, more broadly, there is a lot of internal pressure on Hezbollah.
[1:04:04] Nawaf Salaam,
[1:04:05] the prime minister,
[1:04:06] is very big and adamant on their disarmament.
[1:04:09] The other parties have a lot of beef with Hezbollah,
[1:04:12] and they want to see it gone.
[1:04:14] I just want to tell a brief anecdote about Salem in order to
[1:04:16] tell people about what he's like.
[1:04:18] SPEAKER_03: I saw him at a conference in Beirut about two years ago.
[1:04:22] SPEAKER_03: He was doing it in French.
[1:04:24] SPEAKER_03: And when he was up with other panelists,
[1:04:26] he was told to hold the microphone and he kept pointing it away
[1:04:31] from his mouth for
[1:04:33] two hours to the point where people in the audience started
[1:04:38] shouting at him to
[1:04:39] SPEAKER_03: place it by his mouth.
[1:04:41] And this man is now the leader of the Lebanese Republic,
[1:04:45] leading the disarmament of Hezbollah.
[1:04:47] SPEAKER_03: I just find that incredible.
[1:04:49] SPEAKER_03: With all that said,
[1:04:50] SPEAKER_03: there's a lot of pressure on Hezbollah to disarm,
[1:04:52] SPEAKER_03: but they have refused to disarm categorically.
[1:04:54] SPEAKER_03: Although like south of Latani,
[1:04:55] SPEAKER_03: they're no longer a major presence,
[1:04:57] SPEAKER_03: but elsewhere they are,
[1:04:58] SPEAKER_03: like north of the river and especially in the Beqai Valley.
[1:05:01] And now there's a recent report from Le Figaro basically
[1:05:03] describing they're in the
[1:05:04] SPEAKER_03: process of a significant regrouping and restructuring.
[1:05:07] SPEAKER_03: And they've learned a lot of very key lessons from this defeat.
[1:05:09] SPEAKER_03: They have taken the right lessons.
[1:05:11] SPEAKER_03: That's like the main point of the report.
[1:05:13] SPEAKER_03: And Israel,
[1:05:14] SPEAKER_03: their position is basically,
[1:05:15] SPEAKER_03: OK,
[1:05:15] SPEAKER_03: yeah,
[1:05:15] SPEAKER_03: Hezbollah is weakened,
[1:05:16] SPEAKER_03: but why settle with a weakened Hezbollah?
[1:05:18] SPEAKER_03: Why can't we just get rid of Hezbollah entirely?
[1:05:20] And that,
[1:05:20] I think,
[1:05:21] is the strategic basis of why there will be another war against
[1:05:24] Lebanon.
[1:05:25] SPEAKER_03: I'm not sure when it will be.
[1:05:26] And we've also seen this forecasted by American officials like
[1:05:28] that fucking freak Tom Barak.
[1:05:30] SPEAKER_03: is saying, I can't stop another war.
[1:05:33] SPEAKER_03: I'm not Jesus.
[1:05:34] SPEAKER_03: I can't walk on water.
[1:05:36] So the US and Israel are both saying there's going to be
[1:05:39] another conflict at some point.
[1:05:41] SPEAKER_03: What do you make of these reports of Israeli agents that are,
[1:05:47] SPEAKER_03: this is reported,
[1:05:47] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[1:05:47] SPEAKER_03: in the Jerusalem Post,
[1:05:49] who are right now going around the Saudi government controlled
[1:05:55] areas of Yemen,
[1:05:56] SPEAKER_03: meeting with leaders in that government?
[1:05:59] Do you think they're trying to formulate some sort of
[1:06:01] reigniting of the civil war?
[1:06:03] SPEAKER_03: Or is that outside of their abilities?
[1:06:06] SPEAKER_03: I think that's what they want to do,
[1:06:07] but I don't think they can do it because Saudi Arabia's
[1:06:10] intervention in Yemen has a
[1:06:12] SPEAKER_03: lot of trauma from that because its intervention,
[1:06:15] SPEAKER_03: although it was horrific against the Yemeni people,
[1:06:17] SPEAKER_03: was a categorical failure on any strategic front.
[1:06:20] SPEAKER_03: And the most dramatic moment for them was the 2019 Aramco strike,
[1:06:23] SPEAKER_03: which wiped 5% of all Saudi oil production.
[1:06:27] SPEAKER_03: And Saudia does not want to experience that again.
[1:06:30] SPEAKER_03: And we can see this more broader.
[1:06:31] SPEAKER_03: There is like a more political sort of
[1:06:33] SPEAKER_03: with Iran.
[1:06:34] SPEAKER_03: Of course,
[1:06:34] SPEAKER_03: they still view Iran as hostile,
[1:06:36] SPEAKER_03: given the recently expressed collaboration with Israel,
[1:06:38] SPEAKER_03: as reported by Washington Post.
[1:06:40] SPEAKER_03: But reigniting the Yemeni civil war would put Saudi on the front lines.
[1:06:46] SPEAKER_03: They don't want drones hitting them like before,
[1:06:48] especially now with a much more robust and much stronger and a
[1:06:51] much more risk-prone
[1:06:53] SPEAKER_03: Ansar Allah.
[1:06:54] We've seen Ansar Allah is like,
[1:06:55] they have no reason to be afraid of Saudi.
[1:06:58] SPEAKER_03: So why wouldn't they hold back?
[1:06:59] SPEAKER_03: I don't think there's any real possibility of that happening.
[1:07:02] SPEAKER_03: But I do think the more meaningful consequence of those meetings is that
[1:07:05] SPEAKER_03: intelligence sharing is expanding between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
[1:07:10] SPEAKER_03: There is some question of the quality of Saudi intelligence in Yemen,
[1:07:14] SPEAKER_03: given the fact that the fucking U.S.
[1:07:15] SPEAKER_03: is reusing old Saudi target banks.
[1:07:18] SPEAKER_03: So I doubt that they have much new shit.
[1:07:21] SPEAKER_03: But it's still like you don't want more collaboration.
[1:07:23] SPEAKER_03: It can only lead to bad things.
[1:07:25] SPEAKER_03: I mean, I think this just raises the strategic question though, right?
[1:07:28] SPEAKER_03: If we can read the map and say that sooner or later,
[1:07:32] SPEAKER_03: acceleration is coming on the Yemen front,
[1:07:35] SPEAKER_03: on the Lebanon front,
[1:07:36] SPEAKER_03: on the Iranian front.
[1:07:37] SPEAKER_03: And it just raises the question of like,
[1:07:39] SPEAKER_03: okay,
[1:07:39] SPEAKER_03: even if we acknowledge that,
[1:07:41] SPEAKER_03: what realistically can Iran and the Axis do in anticipation of that?
[1:07:48] SPEAKER_03: And I want to just identify, right, that there are some really core...
[1:07:54] SPEAKER_03: material advantages that Israel has.
[1:07:56] SPEAKER_03: So there's the coordination that you named, right?
[1:07:59] SPEAKER_03: The role of CENTCOM, the information sharing.
[1:08:02] SPEAKER_03: But there is also the intelligence infiltration that we've talked about,
[1:08:07] SPEAKER_03: which makes coordination difficult among the Axis,
[1:08:11] SPEAKER_03: and the overwhelming power of the Israeli Air Force and air dominance.
[1:08:16] And we really saw that in the engagement with Iran and that
[1:08:20] strike before the 12-day war
[1:08:23] SPEAKER_03: where Israel went in and disabled Iranian air defense.
[1:08:27] And I think we've seen some reports of Iran asking Russia for
[1:08:32] upgraded air defense.
[1:08:34] Russia doesn't seem that willing to go in and buttress Iranian
[1:08:39] defenses or
[1:08:40] SPEAKER_03: intervene because they're playing their own geopolitical game.
[1:08:42] And so it just raises the question of,
[1:08:44] okay,
[1:08:44] we can say acceleration is coming,
[1:08:46] but
[1:08:47] SPEAKER_03: where does that leave Iran?
[1:08:49] SPEAKER_03: I mean,
[1:08:49] we can laugh at the attempts to pursue normalization or a deal
[1:08:53] or to return to the
[1:08:54] SPEAKER_03: negotiating table,
[1:08:55] SPEAKER_03: but what realistically is the alternative?
[1:08:57] SPEAKER_03: It's a very good question.
[1:08:58] SPEAKER_03: This may come as sort of a surprise to hear from me,
[1:09:01] SPEAKER_03: but I think like Abbas Aravchi,
[1:09:03] SPEAKER_03: whom I've insulted many times before,
[1:09:05] SPEAKER_03: I think part of his strategy is actually not that irrational.
[1:09:09] SPEAKER_03: If you look at his statements and his interactions with Western media,
[1:09:12] SPEAKER_03: He's basically trying to cleave a split,
[1:09:15] SPEAKER_03: a political split between Israel and Europe,
[1:09:17] SPEAKER_03: less so Israel and the US.
[1:09:19] SPEAKER_03: This is what his piece in Financial Times was really marketed towards.
[1:09:22] SPEAKER_03: That was the thesis of it.
[1:09:23] SPEAKER_03: And I think that's actually pretty intelligent,
[1:09:24] SPEAKER_03: though the consequences of that will come more long term.
[1:09:27] SPEAKER_03: Really what Iran can tangibly be doing, I don't think it can afford...
[1:09:32] SPEAKER_03: initiating confrontation.
[1:09:33] SPEAKER_03: It can't afford that politically.
[1:09:34] SPEAKER_03: But what it can do is,
[1:09:36] SPEAKER_03: first off,
[1:09:36] really clean house internally and really buckle down on moving
[1:09:41] the country to a war
[1:09:42] SPEAKER_03: footing.
[1:09:42] SPEAKER_03: Like, look, war is going to come again and we need to be ready for it.
[1:09:46] SPEAKER_03: Because although...
[1:09:48] SPEAKER_03: The 12-day war had a lot of costs,
[1:09:49] SPEAKER_03: and the Israeli Air Force had significant air supremacy or air dominance.
[1:09:55] Iran was still able to launch really significant hits
[1:09:58] throughout the whole war.
[1:09:59] SPEAKER_03: The ballistic missiles program actually bore serious fruit.
[1:10:03] And I think they should lean into that in the event of another
[1:10:06] confrontation.
[1:10:06] And I also think if there is another confrontation,
[1:10:09] they should be willing to go all the way.
[1:10:11] SPEAKER_03: And I don't just mean against Israel.
[1:10:12] SPEAKER_03: I also mean more regionally, willing to block the Strait of Hormuz,
[1:10:16] SPEAKER_03: And I've explained this before,
[1:10:17] SPEAKER_03: I think Iran's role,
[1:10:19] SPEAKER_03: it's a lot of Atlantis' writers describe Iran as a regional arsonist,
[1:10:23] SPEAKER_03: because every accusation is a confession.
[1:10:25] SPEAKER_03: But I think Iran would do well to embrace that role in another war,
[1:10:30] SPEAKER_03: with the message basically being,
[1:10:33] SPEAKER_03: if we're going to go down,
[1:10:34] SPEAKER_03: if you really want to destroy us,
[1:10:36] SPEAKER_03: then okay,
[1:10:37] SPEAKER_03: we're going to give everything we've got.
[1:10:39] SPEAKER_03: And that means...
[1:10:40] SPEAKER_03: setting fire to regional energy infrastructure.
[1:10:43] SPEAKER_03: And that turns this regional crisis into a truly global crisis.
[1:10:47] SPEAKER_03: But this is still a hypothetical.
[1:10:49] This is more future of like what strategic decisions they can
[1:10:51] make during a war.
[1:10:53] SPEAKER_03: The time being,
[1:10:54] I think the most practical thing that they can do is buy their
[1:10:56] time and really lock
[1:10:57] SPEAKER_03: in,
[1:10:58] SPEAKER_03: especially now that there is an ostensible so-called ceasefire in Gaza,
[1:11:01] SPEAKER_03: or more realistically,
[1:11:03] SPEAKER_03: a less active phase of the genocide.
[1:11:05] SPEAKER_03: I would also say,
[1:11:07] SPEAKER_03: building off of that,
[1:11:08] that Israel right now is also learning lessons from its
[1:11:13] confrontation with Iran.
[1:11:15] SPEAKER_03: They formed what they call a Supreme Armaments Council.
[1:11:19] And they're attempting to reach a level of self-sufficiency in
[1:11:24] weaponry and arms
[1:11:25] SPEAKER_03: that Iran has,
[1:11:27] in which it doesn't have to rely so much on American supplies
[1:11:32] and American
[1:11:32] SPEAKER_03: approvals for the confrontations that it engages in.
[1:11:35] SPEAKER_03: So this stuff is coming one way or the other.
[1:11:38] SPEAKER_03: You can't avoid what's happening.
[1:11:40] SPEAKER_03: Yeah, the big thing is having the right political mindset.
[1:11:43] SPEAKER_03: And I think that there are signs of it.
[1:11:46] SPEAKER_03: within Iranian political leadership.
[1:11:48] SPEAKER_03: Like Paz Ashkian,
[1:11:49] SPEAKER_03: I think he said maybe a month or two ago that we've regrouped,
[1:11:53] SPEAKER_03: we've restructured.
[1:11:54] SPEAKER_03: Now there's like five or six lines of replacement.
[1:11:56] SPEAKER_03: So if I'm gone and if my replacement is gone and his replacement is gone,
[1:12:00] SPEAKER_03: we still have people who can take this role and fulfill these tasks,
[1:12:04] SPEAKER_03: which is,
[1:12:05] SPEAKER_03: I think,
[1:12:05] SPEAKER_03: a pretty positive indication.
[1:12:06] SPEAKER_03: But again,
[1:12:07] my default assumption is not really to trust Iranian
[1:12:10] leadership's rhetoric because
[1:12:12] SPEAKER_03: we've seen that it is pretty empty.
[1:12:14] SPEAKER_03: We need to see the actions.
[1:12:16] SPEAKER_03: Are they really properly preparing?
[1:12:18] SPEAKER_03: By very nature of warfare, we can't really see that.
[1:12:20] SPEAKER_03: That's meant to be secret.
[1:12:21] SPEAKER_03: So this is a good amount of speculation, although hopefully informed.
[1:12:25] SPEAKER_03: This has been a really fascinating discussion.
[1:12:27] SPEAKER_03: I do want to make one final point by way of conclusion,
[1:12:32] SPEAKER_03: which is to say that we've done a lot of analysis,
[1:12:35] SPEAKER_03: a lot of speculation in this conversation,
[1:12:37] and I just really don't want to minimize the sacrifices that so
[1:12:42] many people have
[1:12:42] SPEAKER_03: made for Palestine in the region.
[1:12:45] SPEAKER_03: And the purpose of this conversation really is about analysis,
[1:12:50] SPEAKER_03: it's about understanding,
[1:12:52] SPEAKER_03: it's about informing people of the reality as it is.
[1:12:56] SPEAKER_03: That involves cutting through a lot of rhetoric,
[1:13:01] But I think it's also just important to note that we are
[1:13:04] talking about actors and
[1:13:06] movements that have sacrificed so much and so much more than we
[1:13:09] have in the West.
[1:13:11] And I just think that's really an important thing to
[1:13:13] acknowledge here is that we
[1:13:15] SPEAKER_03: can talk about missteps,
[1:13:16] SPEAKER_03: miscalculations.
[1:13:18] SPEAKER_03: We have also failed tremendously.
[1:13:21] SPEAKER_03: And we have failed in our...
[1:13:24] historic responsibility to constrain our governments and their
[1:13:29] active participation
[1:13:30] SPEAKER_03: in genocide,
[1:13:31] SPEAKER_03: which is not to discount anything that's been said here,
[1:13:33] but I do think that it's important because there's only a
[1:13:36] limited use to the kind
[1:13:38] SPEAKER_03: of armchair speculation that we're engaging in,
[1:13:40] SPEAKER_03: and it is to provide useful analysis for folks.
[1:13:44] SPEAKER_03: I definitely totally agree.
[1:13:46] SPEAKER_03: I should say,
[1:13:47] I think a lot of my frustration comes out of my own regret for
[1:13:51] leaving Lebanon on
[1:13:52] SPEAKER_03: the even the invasion after the Patriot attacks.
[1:13:55] SPEAKER_03: I think leaving on the strong advice of friends and then seeing Dahia,
[1:14:00] SPEAKER_03: where I'd spent a lot of my time when I was in Lebanon,
[1:14:04] SPEAKER_03: bombed significantly.
[1:14:05] Neighborhoods that I recognized get thrown about like,
[1:14:10] you know,
[1:14:11] there were rocks on a beach.
[1:14:13] SPEAKER_03: seeing hundreds,
[1:14:14] SPEAKER_03: if not more than a thousand people get killed in Iran,
[1:14:17] SPEAKER_03: worrying about my own cousins back in Tehran,
[1:14:21] SPEAKER_03: wondering if their neighborhoods were bombed.
[1:14:23] It frustrates me because I could have foreseen a different path
[1:14:27] happening.
[1:14:29] And when a much more negative path emerged,
[1:14:32] being faced with that is quite difficult.
[1:14:34] SPEAKER_03: I don't know.
[1:14:36] SPEAKER_03: It's a very bitter place to be in.
[1:14:39] SPEAKER_03: I'll just say that much.
[1:14:40] SPEAKER_03: sort of building off of what you both said,
[1:14:42] SPEAKER_03: the immense sacrifices of many peoples and many movements in the region,
[1:14:45] I think really that is the core impetus for having a clear
[1:14:49] analysis of what's going
[1:14:50] SPEAKER_03: on.
[1:14:50] I personally really hate it and still hate a lot of bluster
[1:14:55] from a lot of access
[1:14:55] SPEAKER_03: media,
[1:14:56] SPEAKER_03: whether here in the West or regionally,
[1:14:58] SPEAKER_03: is that I find it to be
[1:15:00] SPEAKER_03: Essentially turning these sacrifices into a stage show drama,
[1:15:03] SPEAKER_03: whereas recognizing the reality of it is,
[1:15:04] SPEAKER_03: for me,
[1:15:05] SPEAKER_03: a critical point,
[1:15:07] SPEAKER_03: an essential part of recognizing the suffering of so many people,
[1:15:10] SPEAKER_03: foremost being Gaza.
[1:15:12] Rob,
[1:15:12] it's been really informative to have you here and really
[1:15:15] appreciate your time.
[1:15:16] SPEAKER_03: Thanks so much for having me, guys.

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