# Episode 4: Sudan in the World-System w/ Hassan

An episode of [Turbulence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1847060038), 18 Nov 2025, 1 h 41 min.

Audio: https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/179210323/d3a4c28c5e06f0839e8b66e5a1f21883.mp3

Our friend Hassan joins us to discuss the devastating civil war in Sudan, the geopolitical strategy of the United Arab Emirates, and US counter-rationality as a hegemon in decline. Check out Hassan's 2022 piece on the Sudanese revolution, Where is Sudan? Refracting the Globe Through Bilad al-Dahab. If you are able, please consider donating to one of the following fundraisers to support relief efforts in Sudan: https://www.gofundme.com/f/fight-hunger-in-sudan-the-khartoum-kitchen-appeal https://sudanfunds.com/ https://www.sudansolidarity.com/ We’re committed to independence and will never run ads or have institutional affiliations. That means we’re entirely listener funded. For $5, paid subscribers will get regular bonus episodes, which will usually be news roundups (but may also include bonus interviews). Paid subscribers will also have access to monthly livestreams, book giveaways, and Q&A. Most importantly, our paid subscribers help us keep this project going. Subscribe today at turbulencepod.substack.com Follow along on Twitter/X and Instagram @turbulence_pod Theme: Eye for an Eye, Haram (2017) Art: Vivek Venkatraman Mix: Jasper Saba This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit turbulencepod.substack.com/subscribe

## Transcript

[0:01] SPEAKER_03: For too long,
[0:01] the people of Darfur have suffered at the hands of a government
[0:05] that is complicit
[0:06] SPEAKER_03: in the bombing,
[0:07] SPEAKER_03: murder,
[0:07] SPEAKER_03: and rape of innocent civilians.
[0:11] My administration has called these actions by their rightful
[0:14] name,
[0:16] genocide.
[0:17] SPEAKER_03: The world has a responsibility to help put an end to it.
[0:22] Last month,
[0:23] I announced that the United States was prepared to take new
[0:25] steps
[0:27] if the government of Sudan did not allow the full deployment of
[0:30] a UN peacekeeping
[0:31] SPEAKER_03: force,
[0:33] SPEAKER_03: if the government did not begin living up to its many commitments,
[0:38] SPEAKER_03: that the United States would act.
[0:41] SPEAKER_03: I made clear that the time for promises was over,
[0:45] SPEAKER_03: and that President Bashir had to do something to end the suffering.
[1:24] SPEAKER_01: Hello,
[1:24] SPEAKER_01: dear listeners,
[1:26] SPEAKER_01: friends,
[1:26] SPEAKER_01: comrades,
[1:27] SPEAKER_01: subjects,
[1:28] SPEAKER_01: citizens,
[1:29] SPEAKER_01: insurgents,
[1:30] SPEAKER_01: fugitives,
[1:30] SPEAKER_01: defectors,
[1:31] SPEAKER_01: dissidents,
[1:33] SPEAKER_01: even the haters and losers.
[1:34] SPEAKER_01: Welcome to Turbulence.
[1:36] SPEAKER_01: My name is Dylan Saba,
[1:38] SPEAKER_01: and I'm here with my co-host,
[1:39] SPEAKER_01: Seamus Malikafzeli,
[1:41] SPEAKER_01: and our producer,
[1:42] SPEAKER_01: M.
[1:42] SPEAKER_01: Siniza.
[1:43] SPEAKER_01: We're recording from New York City,
[1:45] SPEAKER_01: the center of a world empire that is dying,
[1:47] SPEAKER_01: but so,
[1:48] SPEAKER_01: so far from dead.
[1:50] This week's episode is about Sudan and the conflict that has
[1:54] devastated the country
[1:55] SPEAKER_01: for the past two and a half years.
[1:57] SPEAKER_01: Many people in the U.S.
[1:58] SPEAKER_01: are likely familiar with Sudan because of the war in Darfur.
[2:02] SPEAKER_01: In early 2002,
[2:03] a rebellion broke out in the region as largely non-Arab
[2:07] pastoralists impacted by
[2:09] climate change-induced desertification and economic hardship
[2:13] attacked positions of
[2:14] SPEAKER_01: the government led by Omar al-Bashir,
[2:17] SPEAKER_01: who they accused of oppressing them.
[2:20] SPEAKER_01: The government responded with a massive counterinsurgency campaign.
[2:24] Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians died either by
[2:27] direct violence or
[2:28] SPEAKER_01: starvation,
[2:29] SPEAKER_01: and the crisis drew massive international attention.
[2:33] SPEAKER_01: For the Bush administration,
[2:34] SPEAKER_01: looking to justify the by then disastrous Iraq war,
[2:38] this was an opportunity to spotlight a situation in which the
[2:41] Arabs were the
[2:41] SPEAKER_01: oppressors.
[2:43] SPEAKER_01: Zionist and Jewish organizations,
[2:45] SPEAKER_01: too,
[2:45] jumped on the chance to accuse Arabs of genocide and were early
[2:49] sponsors of the
[2:49] Save Darfur coalition that garnered massive attention in the
[2:53] United States.
[2:54] But while Sudan ultimately faded from popular consciousness in
[2:59] the United States
[2:59] SPEAKER_01: during the Obama years,
[3:01] SPEAKER_01: the situation remained dire for the Sudanese people.
[3:05] SPEAKER_01: Armed insurgencies continued in the rural peripheries of the country,
[3:08] SPEAKER_01: while the overall economic condition deteriorated.
[3:12] SPEAKER_01: In 2011,
[3:13] SPEAKER_01: following a referendum,
[3:14] SPEAKER_01: South Sudan seceded from the country,
[3:17] SPEAKER_01: taking with it the majority of the country's oil,
[3:20] leaving the North almost entirely dependent on international
[3:23] debts that it was in
[3:24] SPEAKER_01: no position to repay.
[3:27] SPEAKER_01: By late 2018,
[3:28] SPEAKER_01: the economic crisis in Sudan had reached a breaking point,
[3:31] as the price of bread and fuel shot up with the imposition of
[3:34] austerity measures.
[3:36] SPEAKER_01: Decentralized popular resistance committees,
[3:39] SPEAKER_01: in part organized by an underground network of labor organizations,
[3:43] took to the streets in a series of nonviolent protests that
[3:46] resulted in the
[3:47] SPEAKER_01: military ouster of al-Bashir by April 2019.
[3:51] SPEAKER_01: The coup was effectively a joint effort by two rivals,
[3:55] SPEAKER_01: who were the two most powerful generals in al-Bashir's regime.
[3:59] SPEAKER_01: Abdel Fattah al-Berhan,
[4:00] SPEAKER_01: the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces,
[4:03] SPEAKER_01: and Hamedti,
[4:04] SPEAKER_01: the commander of the Rapid Support Forces.
[4:07] SPEAKER_01: But the protest movement was not demanding a new military regime.
[4:12] SPEAKER_01: The people wanted civilian rule.
[4:14] And so a long and complex negotiation ensued between the new
[4:17] junta and the civilian
[4:19] SPEAKER_01: parties representing the street movement.
[4:21] A transitional government was formed with both military and
[4:24] civilian participation,
[4:26] SPEAKER_01: but it wouldn't last long.
[4:28] SPEAKER_01: In 2021,
[4:29] Burhan effectively ended the revolution and re-established
[4:33] exclusive military rule
[4:35] SPEAKER_01: under the dual forces of the SAF and the RSF.
[4:39] SPEAKER_01: But the two rival forces would drive the country into a civil war.
[4:43] SPEAKER_01: In April 2023,
[4:44] SPEAKER_01: the RSF attacked SAF positions,
[4:47] SPEAKER_01: eventually driving them from the capital Khartoum.
[4:51] SPEAKER_01: While the SAF eventually reclaimed Khartoum,
[4:54] SPEAKER_01: RSF has,
[4:55] SPEAKER_01: in the past two years,
[4:56] conquered significant swaths of territory in the countries
[4:59] south and east.
[5:01] SPEAKER_01: Virtually wherever they've gone,
[5:02] SPEAKER_01: they've committed unspeakable atrocities against the civilian population,
[5:07] SPEAKER_01: murdering people en masse and causing hundreds of thousands to flee.
[5:11] SPEAKER_01: How should we understand what's happening in Sudan?
[5:15] SPEAKER_01: Is this part of a larger historical arc stretching from the Arab Spring,
[5:19] SPEAKER_01: or is this a more distinctly African story?
[5:22] Is it a case of neocolonial economic strangulation,
[5:25] or climate change-induced scarcity?
[5:28] Are the armed conflicts the result of regional actors
[5:31] intervening and waging proxy
[5:32] SPEAKER_01: battles,
[5:33] SPEAKER_01: or are these fissures endogenous to Sudan?
[5:36] SPEAKER_01: These are the questions we'll be trying to tackle in this episode.
[5:39] SPEAKER_01: A fair warning.
[5:40] SPEAKER_01: This is an extremely dense episode.
[5:44] Coming into this and researching it,
[5:46] we learned a tremendous amount of fine details.
[5:50] Details that even within left spaces and academic spaces about
[5:55] the Middle East and
[5:56] SPEAKER_01: North Africa aren't typically discussed.
[5:59] Many people likely know about Darfur and the genocide that took
[6:02] place there,
[6:03] SPEAKER_01: the interest garnered by the American public in that during the Bush era.
[6:07] SPEAKER_01: But there are significant gaps in the popular American consciousness,
[6:12] SPEAKER_01: which we are attempting to bridge here to the best of our ability.
[6:16] SPEAKER_01: Hassan was an incredible resource to us,
[6:19] boasting an encyclopedic knowledge of Sudan's history and its
[6:22] political sphere.
[6:24] SPEAKER_01: And we hope you'll benefit as much as we did.
[6:27] SPEAKER_01: But before we turn to that conversation,
[6:29] SPEAKER_01: a reminder,
[6:30] SPEAKER_01: this is a free episode,
[6:31] SPEAKER_01: but we are a wholly listener funded program.
[6:34] SPEAKER_01: That means no ads, no sponsors.
[6:37] SPEAKER_01: We're dependent on listeners like yourself to keep the show going.
[6:41] SPEAKER_01: If you're able,
[6:42] SPEAKER_01: please consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work at
[6:45] SPEAKER_01: turbulencepod.substack.com.
[6:48] SPEAKER_01: If you donate $5 a month,
[6:50] you will get access to news roundup episodes where we will give
[6:54] our more candid
[6:54] SPEAKER_01: takes on the week's headlines.
[6:56] You will also have access to monthly live streams and be
[6:59] automatically entered into
[7:01] SPEAKER_01: our book giveaways.
[7:02] SPEAKER_01: We hope you'll join us.
[7:05] Thank you.
[7:36] SPEAKER_01: Hello and welcome.
[7:37] Today we have the pleasure of being joined by the scholar who
[7:39] goes by Hassan,
[7:41] and who you may have seen online posting under the moniker
[7:45] Vanishing Mediator.
[7:47] Hassan has a wealth of information to share with us about the
[7:49] unfolding crisis in Sudan.
[7:51] SPEAKER_01: Hassan, welcome to Turbulence.
[7:53] SPEAKER_01: Thank you for having me.
[7:55] Much of the crisis we're seeing unfold in Sudan is in effect
[7:58] the disintegration of
[7:59] SPEAKER_01: the regime of Omar al-Bashir,
[8:01] SPEAKER_01: who came into power during a military coup in 1989,
[8:05] and was in power until he was deposed in a military coup in
[8:08] 2019 on the back of
[8:10] SPEAKER_01: popular street uprisings.
[8:12] SPEAKER_01: We'll definitely want to talk about 2019.
[8:14] SPEAKER_01: But first,
[8:14] can you tell us a bit about al-Bashir and how he stayed in
[8:17] power for so long and
[8:19] SPEAKER_01: what some of the features were of Sudan under his rule?
[8:22] SPEAKER_01: So Umar Bashir comes to power in 1989.
[8:25] SPEAKER_01: He's an army official,
[8:26] and he comes to power in this coup just four years after
[8:29] Sudan's prior dictatorship
[8:31] SPEAKER_01: that ended in 1985.
[8:32] That coup is the sort of merger between army officials and
[8:36] what's known as the
[8:37] SPEAKER_01: National Islamic Front,
[8:38] SPEAKER_01: this kind of vehicle led by Hassan Tarabi,
[8:40] SPEAKER_01: who's this influential Muslim Brotherhood theorist in Sudan.
[8:43] And they inaugurate something called the Inghaz,
[8:46] which is a salvation regime.
[8:48] SPEAKER_01: which basically rules over Sudan up until his deposition in 2019.
[8:52] SPEAKER_01: Omar Bashir operates through a couple of different dynamics.
[8:56] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[8:56] one of the things that kept him in power for quite a while was
[8:58] the fact that he was
[8:59] SPEAKER_01: very capable of keeping himself at arm's length between various actors,
[9:04] SPEAKER_01: both domestically and internationally.
[9:06] SPEAKER_01: There was the National Islamic Front,
[9:07] SPEAKER_01: which I mentioned,
[9:09] SPEAKER_01: which was a kind of joint part of this coup in 1989.
[9:12] SPEAKER_01: But Hassan Turabi and Omar Bashir did not always see eye to eye.
[9:16] SPEAKER_01: Just about a decade later,
[9:17] SPEAKER_01: by the end of 1999,
[9:19] SPEAKER_01: December 1999,
[9:20] SPEAKER_01: and then the following months in March of 2000,
[9:22] SPEAKER_01: Omar Bashir basically deposes and strips Hassan Turabi.
[9:27] of a number of positions in fear that Turabi views this regime
[9:32] as an Islamist
[9:34] SPEAKER_01: regime rather than a military regime.
[9:36] And so there's this sort of institutional dynamic which
[9:40] slightly distinguishes the two.
[9:41] SPEAKER_01: Even though Umar Bashir keeps on the Islamism,
[9:44] he separates himself from some of the kind of ideological
[9:47] organs that were
[9:48] SPEAKER_01: spearheading the organization and the movement.
[9:51] SPEAKER_01: He also is able to navigate a number of various conflicts.
[9:55] One is the Second Sudanese Civil War,
[9:57] which starts in 1983,
[9:59] so actually before Murbashir.
[10:01] SPEAKER_01: And its primary belligerent is,
[10:04] SPEAKER_01: in this case,
[10:04] the Sudanese army and various forces organized around the
[10:08] Sudanese People's
[10:09] SPEAKER_01: Liberation Movement,
[10:10] SPEAKER_01: which is a southern-based movement led by a number of different figures,
[10:13] SPEAKER_01: but in particular,
[10:14] SPEAKER_01: John Garang,
[10:15] SPEAKER_01: who is being backed by,
[10:17] SPEAKER_01: at that point,
[10:18] SPEAKER_01: the Durgh.
[10:19] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[10:19] SPEAKER_01: the kind of Marxist regime in Ethiopia,
[10:22] SPEAKER_01: and has a number of support from various actors,
[10:25] SPEAKER_01: both within South Sudan,
[10:27] SPEAKER_01: what is now today South Sudan and Sudan.
[10:29] He's able to stay in power partly through backing various
[10:32] competitors to the SPLM's authority.
[10:35] SPEAKER_01: So he backs the Ani Naya II,
[10:38] which is a kind of successor to a other South Sudanese
[10:42] self-determinationist
[10:43] SPEAKER_01: movement that had emerged in the 1950s.
[10:45] SPEAKER_01: But he kind of plays off of ethnic fissures and tribal fissures,
[10:49] which become quite acute in terms of the power straying and the
[10:52] power structuring
[10:53] SPEAKER_01: of the SPLM.
[10:54] SPEAKER_01: And later, he even plays off of various factions of the SPLM.
[10:57] SPEAKER_01: I mean, the SPLM split into a wide coterie of factions.
[11:02] SPEAKER_01: And then finally,
[11:03] SPEAKER_01: in the North,
[11:04] SPEAKER_01: there's a lot of geographic divides,
[11:06] SPEAKER_01: which become quite important.
[11:07] And he's able to maintain those divides by engaging in this
[11:11] program of outsourced
[11:13] SPEAKER_01: counterinsurgency.
[11:14] SPEAKER_01: In particular, he develops these things called the Popular Defaults.
[11:17] SPEAKER_01: defense forces,
[11:18] which become a kind of core component of the mass mobilization
[11:21] of the Islamist
[11:22] SPEAKER_01: regime under Murbishir,
[11:24] SPEAKER_01: especially in the 90s,
[11:25] SPEAKER_01: who go in and fight in places like the Nuba Mountains and in South Sudan.
[11:30] Nuba Mountains not being in South Sudan,
[11:32] just for people who are unaware of the geography.
[11:34] And some of the fighters associated with the popular defense
[11:37] forces become the
[11:37] SPEAKER_01: kernel of what will later become the Jinjaweed.
[11:40] SPEAKER_01: So,
[11:41] SPEAKER_01: in the 1980s,
[11:42] we see the kind of first really significant uprising in Darfur
[11:46] in contemporary
[11:47] SPEAKER_01: Sydney's history.
[11:48] And it's brought down through a counterinsurgency campaign led
[11:52] by the government,
[11:52] SPEAKER_01: Umar Bashir's government.
[11:54] And it is bloody,
[11:55] but it isn't as severe as what's going to happen in the early
[11:57] 2000s.
[11:58] Part of that has to do with the fact that the Islamic regime
[12:01] had a number of
[12:02] SPEAKER_01: supporters in the Darfur region,
[12:04] SPEAKER_01: in particular because...
[12:06] Islamism was kind of understood as potentially a counterweight
[12:09] to what was seen as
[12:10] SPEAKER_01: a kind of traditional northern riverine elite.
[12:13] So there is a kind of capacity for the National Islamic Front
[12:17] and its civil society
[12:17] connections to kind of keep the insurgency and therefore also
[12:21] the counterinsurgency
[12:22] SPEAKER_01: to a relatively low level.
[12:24] SPEAKER_01: Like I mentioned,
[12:24] Hassan Turabi and the Islamist civil society fabric kind of
[12:28] disappears and becomes
[12:29] SPEAKER_01: much more of a kind of Islamo-militarist dynamic by the late 90s.
[12:34] SPEAKER_01: And we see that really come out in the 2000s.
[12:37] SPEAKER_01: Their answer to various insurgencies,
[12:39] which were led by groups like the Justice and Equality Movement
[12:42] or the Sudanese
[12:42] SPEAKER_01: Liberation Army in Darfur,
[12:44] SPEAKER_01: and center around...
[12:46] SPEAKER_01: livelihood struggles around the agricultural economy,
[12:50] as well as struggles looking for kind of distributional power
[12:53] sharing over the
[12:55] SPEAKER_01: national question,
[12:56] SPEAKER_01: right?
[12:56] The kind of answer there is to rely on a number of already kind
[13:00] of semi-militarized
[13:02] SPEAKER_01: nomadic communities who range between Chad and Sudan.
[13:06] SPEAKER_01: And there becomes this kind of massive influx of weaponry.
[13:09] SPEAKER_01: Part of that is an outcome of actually the Chadian-Libyan war,
[13:13] SPEAKER_01: which introduced just a lot of weaponry into the region.
[13:15] And a lot of it becomes a very kind of intentional policy of
[13:18] the government to have
[13:20] SPEAKER_01: these groups,
[13:20] SPEAKER_01: which later become known as the Jinjaweed,
[13:22] SPEAKER_01: fight the counterinsurgency on their behalf.
[13:25] SPEAKER_01: Hassan, if I can just ask you, what is motivating these insurgencies?
[13:30] SPEAKER_01: So you're talking about sovereign movements, national claims.
[13:34] Can you just speak a bit more to what the national claims are
[13:38] from some of these
[13:39] SPEAKER_01: armed movements in the periphery?
[13:40] SPEAKER_01: Yeah,
[13:41] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[13:41] SPEAKER_01: it's a great question,
[13:42] which is a difficult question because it's not always entirely
[13:45] clear what movements
[13:47] SPEAKER_01: are looking for.
[13:49] So Sudan was the largest country in Africa before the secession
[13:53] of the South.
[13:54] SPEAKER_01: Today, it's the third largest.
[13:55] But if we look at South Sudan,
[13:57] there are a number of different national movements that emerge.
[13:59] SPEAKER_01: The first one,
[14:00] SPEAKER_01: which I mentioned,
[14:00] SPEAKER_01: was the Anya Naya,
[14:02] SPEAKER_01: which emerges in 1955,
[14:03] SPEAKER_01: actually,
[14:04] SPEAKER_01: even before Sudan's independence in 1956.
[14:07] And its goals were fairly straightforwardly separatism,
[14:10] an independent South Sudanese state.
[14:12] It understood a conflict between the Anglo-Egyptian regime that
[14:16] was established in
[14:16] Sudan and South Sudan as a conflict kind of along a kind of
[14:19] racial axis or racial
[14:21] SPEAKER_01: sectarian axis.
[14:22] SPEAKER_01: There are Muslim Arabs in the north,
[14:24] SPEAKER_01: and there are black Christians and animists and pagans in the south.
[14:27] SPEAKER_01: And that movement...
[14:29] SPEAKER_01: did not succeed in large part because,
[14:31] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[14:31] in the early kind of nexus of post-coloniality in Africa
[14:35] becomes a kind of
[14:35] transnational consensus that separatism is something you should
[14:40] kind of avoid at
[14:41] SPEAKER_01: all costs.
[14:41] SPEAKER_01: You know, it'll open up a Pandora's box.
[14:43] SPEAKER_01: It'll be like a fall of dominoes, you know.
[14:46] And so they're not able to get a lot of support amongst a
[14:49] number of African arenas,
[14:50] SPEAKER_01: but they are able to get support from,
[14:52] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[14:52] SPEAKER_01: Israel,
[14:52] SPEAKER_01: for example,
[14:53] SPEAKER_01: which is
[14:54] SPEAKER_01: straightforwardly kind of pursuing this policy of,
[14:56] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[14:57] SPEAKER_01: bifurcating all of its opponents in the region.
[14:59] But the Anya Naya becomes the spring bread of what will later
[15:04] be the SPLM.
[15:05] So the conflict with the Anya Naya ends in 1972 with the Addis
[15:09] Ababa agreements.
[15:10] SPEAKER_01: And in 1983, Jaffer Nimeri implements Sharia law.
[15:14] SPEAKER_01: Jaffer Nimeri was a very peculiar individual.
[15:17] SPEAKER_01: He kind of came in as a socialist, naucerist
[15:21] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[15:21] figure who was flirting with incorporating certain Communist
[15:25] Party members into his
[15:26] SPEAKER_01: administration.
[15:27] And then he becomes a kind of Arabist after he purges and
[15:30] executes many of the
[15:31] SPEAKER_01: communists in 1971.
[15:32] SPEAKER_01: And then by the end of the 1970s,
[15:35] he solidifies his administration against popular revolts by
[15:38] incorporating in the
[15:39] SPEAKER_01: National Islamic Front.
[15:41] SPEAKER_01: Is this nominal implementation of Sharia law?
[15:44] SPEAKER_01: Is this what initially attracts bin Laden to the country in the 1990s?
[15:48] SPEAKER_01: Is this what helps it?
[15:51] SPEAKER_01: No.
[15:51] No,
[15:52] I think what attracts – no,
[15:54] that has to do with Umar Bashir's administration in 1989.
[15:58] SPEAKER_01: So Numeri implements Sharia law.
[16:01] SPEAKER_01: As he says it, there's kind of disputing interpretations.
[16:05] This is actually happening without the full awareness of Hassan
[16:08] al-Tarabi,
[16:09] SPEAKER_01: who is the real kind of ideological Islamist.
[16:13] SPEAKER_01: leading the Islamization campaign in Sudan.
[16:15] But Sharia law kind of abruptly ends,
[16:18] you know,
[16:18] with his deposition in 1985.
[16:20] SPEAKER_01: I mean, there's a kind of ambiguity about the transitional government.
[16:24] SPEAKER_01: If I can just ask about the details of this implementation,
[16:27] SPEAKER_01: when you're talking about Sharia,
[16:28] SPEAKER_01: are you talking about just a full-scale implementation?
[16:31] SPEAKER_01: Full-scale Sharia.
[16:32] Every single person in Sudan,
[16:33] regardless of their religious background,
[16:35] is subject to Sharia.
[16:36] SPEAKER_01: Civil and punishment, everything.
[16:38] SPEAKER_01: Okay.
[16:38] SPEAKER_01: Yes, everything.
[16:39] SPEAKER_01: Interesting.
[16:40] SPEAKER_01: And in fact,
[16:40] SPEAKER_01: part of it's,
[16:41] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[16:42] SPEAKER_01: draped in this language of decolonizing the judiciary,
[16:46] SPEAKER_01: right?
[16:46] SPEAKER_01: So there's colonial civil law and really,
[16:48] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[16:49] Sharia is supposed to be a kind of authentic indigenous
[16:52] counterpart to it.
[16:53] SPEAKER_01: But what attracts bin Laden,
[16:54] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[16:55] has much more to do with the kind of geopolitical orientation
[16:57] of Hassan al-Tarabi.
[16:58] SPEAKER_01: Hassan al-Tarabi was,
[17:00] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[17:01] deeply anti-American in the sense that you get from a lot of
[17:03] the Islamists who come
[17:04] SPEAKER_01: out of the 80s and the 90s,
[17:05] SPEAKER_01: right?
[17:06] SPEAKER_01: There's an orientation that they're fighting...
[17:08] SPEAKER_01: something like a religio-civilizational war against the United States.
[17:12] And despite that actually leading Hassan al-Tarabi to support
[17:16] Saddam Hussein in the
[17:18] SPEAKER_01: invasion of Kuwait,
[17:19] SPEAKER_01: bin Laden was on the opposite side of that equation.
[17:21] SPEAKER_01: However, bin Laden is being expelled from Saudi Arabia, right?
[17:24] SPEAKER_01: And he's being expelled from Saudi Arabia,
[17:26] partly on grounds of condemning Saudi Arabia for bringing in US
[17:29] military bases.
[17:31] SPEAKER_01: So Hassan al-Tarabi effectively invites him into Sudan.
[17:34] SPEAKER_01: And that's why he's there in the 90s.
[17:36] But going back to the desires of various political
[17:40] self-determinationist movements,
[17:43] SPEAKER_01: in 1983,
[17:44] SPEAKER_01: we see this implementation of Sharia spark another civil war.
[17:48] SPEAKER_01: And this time around,
[17:50] we see the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement come into the
[17:52] fore as a primary
[17:53] SPEAKER_01: actor.
[17:54] And unlike the Anyanya,
[17:56] the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement is now being shaped
[17:58] by
[18:00] SPEAKER_01: A cultural and political and social language kind of influenced by,
[18:04] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[18:05] SPEAKER_01: African socialism and Marxism,
[18:07] SPEAKER_01: Leninism and the like.
[18:08] SPEAKER_01: I don't think it goes particularly deep,
[18:11] but it also is reflected in some of the geopolitical and
[18:15] national initiatives that
[18:16] SPEAKER_01: the SPLM starts to encourage under John Garang.
[18:19] SPEAKER_01: There is a kind of nasty set of like factional disputes.
[18:23] SPEAKER_01: He's eventually able to consolidate power.
[18:24] SPEAKER_01: And under his leadership,
[18:26] they eventually come to the conclusion that what they need is a
[18:29] revolutionized
[18:30] SPEAKER_01: national Sudan or a new Sudan,
[18:32] SPEAKER_01: as they call it.
[18:33] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[18:33] SPEAKER_01: So rather than independence for the south or a particular region,
[18:37] SPEAKER_01: you will have a non-racialist,
[18:39] SPEAKER_01: non-sectarian regime implemented throughout all of Sudan.
[18:43] SPEAKER_01: And that becomes the political claims of the SBLM.
[18:47] Whether or not that would have come to have passed if John
[18:49] Guttung survived is,
[18:51] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[18:51] SPEAKER_01: deeply ambiguous.
[18:53] SPEAKER_01: Joseph Guttung,
[18:54] who was probably the highest ranking South Sudanese figure in
[18:58] the Sudanese
[18:59] SPEAKER_01: Communist Party,
[19:00] SPEAKER_01: and he was a member of Jaffer Numeri's administration from 69 to 1971.
[19:05] SPEAKER_01: He was actually composing his policies vis-a-vis South Sudan,
[19:07] which is one of those things that helped lead to the Addis
[19:09] Ababa Agreement in 1972.
[19:11] He makes an argument in 1969 where he's kind of putting forth
[19:15] this argument on
[19:16] SPEAKER_01: behalf of the Sudanese Communist Party for economic distribution,
[19:20] SPEAKER_01: cultural rights,
[19:21] SPEAKER_01: linguistic rights for the entire region.
[19:23] But he makes the argument that the dominant popular tendency or
[19:27] popular perception
[19:28] SPEAKER_01: amongst the majority of South Sudanese,
[19:29] SPEAKER_01: even in the 1960s,
[19:31] SPEAKER_01: is the sort of racialist view that was kind of embodied by the Anya Naya,
[19:35] that there is just kind of incommensurable differences between
[19:37] South Sudan and
[19:38] SPEAKER_01: Sudan.
[19:39] So John Garang's ability to be able to kind of keep the lid on
[19:43] that is a kind of
[19:44] SPEAKER_01: historical what if,
[19:45] SPEAKER_01: because John Garang,
[19:46] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[19:46] SPEAKER_01: eventually dies in a plane crash a number of decades later.
[19:51] SPEAKER_01: So by the time he dies,
[19:52] the political officials who come into the fore within the SPLM
[19:56] are much more
[19:57] SPEAKER_01: embracing of separatism than Garang was.
[20:00] SPEAKER_01: So those are the demands that come out of various SPLM factions.
[20:04] SPEAKER_01: In the North, it's kind of ambiguous.
[20:07] SPEAKER_01: So with a number of the Darfur factions,
[20:11] SPEAKER_01: especially the Justice and Equality Movement,
[20:13] their visions are kind of a notion of a kind of unified Islamic
[20:19] but non-Arabist,
[20:20] SPEAKER_01: non-ethnicized Sudan.
[20:23] And that has to do with the fact that the Justice and Equality
[20:25] Movement was founded
[20:26] SPEAKER_01: by a figure,
[20:26] SPEAKER_01: Khalil Ibrahim,
[20:28] SPEAKER_01: who himself was at one point part of the National Islamic Front.
[20:31] SPEAKER_01: So he had been steeped in that milieu, in that intellectual tradition.
[20:35] And he starts to kind of become attracted to Islamism as an
[20:39] alterity to the kind of
[20:40] geographical power divisions that have defined Sudan in the
[20:45] longer course of
[20:45] SPEAKER_01: history.
[20:46] SPEAKER_01: There are groups like the SPLM North,
[20:50] SPEAKER_01: which initially they emerge as factions of the SPLM.
[20:53] SPEAKER_01: After the SPLM backs independence in 2011,
[20:56] SPEAKER_01: after the referendum and South Sudan splits,
[20:59] SPEAKER_01: these groups are basically left on their own,
[21:01] SPEAKER_01: and they become various factions of the SPLM North,
[21:05] SPEAKER_01: some of them like Al-Hilou and the like.
[21:07] SPEAKER_01: And some of these groups back...
[21:10] SPEAKER_01: self-determination in the abstract.
[21:12] And they've always kind of kept it ambiguous what that might
[21:14] mean in terms of,
[21:16] SPEAKER_01: does that mean like a separate state?
[21:17] SPEAKER_01: Does that mean cultural, linguistic rights and provincial rights?
[21:21] SPEAKER_01: Does that mean something like a federation, a federative state?
[21:24] I think that's one of those things that also is bound up with
[21:27] the fact that these
[21:28] movements have been mobilized for so long that it's sometimes
[21:31] quite difficult to
[21:32] actually understand what their political character is or what
[21:35] their political
[21:36] SPEAKER_01: charter is.
[21:37] To what extent do you see economic and environmental factors
[21:40] shaping the demands of
[21:43] SPEAKER_01: some of the insurgent movements,
[21:45] SPEAKER_01: particularly in the Darfur region?
[21:48] SPEAKER_01: Economics is kind of crucially front and center.
[21:51] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[21:51] a lot of the divisions that exist in Darfur and a lot of the
[21:54] fighting that exists
[21:55] in Darfur is centered around these different forms of kind of
[21:59] livelihood economies
[22:01] SPEAKER_01: between groups like the Masalit and the Fur and the Zagawa,
[22:04] SPEAKER_01: who really have kind of settled agricultural lives.
[22:08] SPEAKER_01: They plant and they farm and they steward the land.
[22:11] SPEAKER_01: And they've been allotted land plots for hundreds of years and the like,
[22:16] SPEAKER_01: even before the modern Sudanese state.
[22:19] And the point of conflict kind of comes about with a number of
[22:23] the kind of nomadic
[22:23] SPEAKER_01: groups,
[22:24] SPEAKER_01: the Bagada and the Ebala,
[22:25] SPEAKER_01: who are respectively the cattle herders and the camel herders.
[22:29] SPEAKER_01: Traditionally,
[22:30] SPEAKER_01: there was some basic social consensus on the idea that there is a mutual
[22:35] SPEAKER_01: compatibility between these two livelihoods,
[22:37] SPEAKER_01: these two living styles.
[22:39] SPEAKER_01: So yes,
[22:39] SPEAKER_01: the Bagada might not necessarily have a subtle plot of land,
[22:43] SPEAKER_01: but nevertheless,
[22:43] SPEAKER_01: they should be able to enjoy some grazing rights.
[22:46] When they bring cattle around,
[22:47] cattle help fertilize the land,
[22:49] et cetera,
[22:49] et cetera,
[22:49] et cetera.
[22:50] And that starts to collapse with the massive influx of weaponry
[22:54] into the region.
[22:55] SPEAKER_01: In some cases, the demand for land that's coming out of the Bagada.
[22:59] SPEAKER_01: Also, you know, there's this speculative question of desertification.
[23:02] SPEAKER_01: How much is desertification driving this process?
[23:05] SPEAKER_01: There are particularly a number of really bad droughts,
[23:07] SPEAKER_01: which help punctuate and accelerate violence in the region.
[23:11] The role of that in understanding everything,
[23:13] I think,
[23:13] is a little bit complicated.
[23:15] It's a little bit hard to say because it's clear that there's a
[23:19] metabolism with
[23:19] SPEAKER_01: nature,
[23:20] which ends up shifting people's economic capacities and their
[23:25] choice to move into
[23:26] SPEAKER_01: violence or struggle or not.
[23:28] But at the same time,
[23:30] sometimes I feel like environmental explanations can...
[23:33] SPEAKER_01: crisscross across political explanations,
[23:35] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[23:35] SPEAKER_01: and there also is like a kind of significant political dimension,
[23:39] which is both the kind of geographic peripheralization of
[23:41] Darfuris as a whole,
[23:43] SPEAKER_01: the perception that the Begara and the Ebala are...
[23:48] being kind of automatically privileged just because of their
[23:51] kind of linguistic
[23:52] SPEAKER_01: fraternity with communities of the core,
[23:55] SPEAKER_01: despite the fact that,
[23:56] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[23:56] otherwise the kind of cultural ties between riverine Arabs in
[23:59] North Sudan and the
[24:01] SPEAKER_01: Bagada and the Abela is quite low.
[24:03] SPEAKER_01: And,
[24:03] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[24:04] SPEAKER_01: racism,
[24:05] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[24:05] which becomes a kind of a powerful way for actors in the region
[24:09] to understand why
[24:11] it is they're allowed to do what they're able to do and why it
[24:13] is they might be
[24:14] SPEAKER_01: allowed to have claims on land in a certain way or not.
[24:17] SPEAKER_01: So it's all kind of interbound with each other.
[24:19] SPEAKER_01: The economic, I think, is really, really crucial.
[24:21] SPEAKER_01: And a number of the kind of demands made by the JEM and the SLA,
[24:25] SPEAKER_01: power sharing and investment,
[24:27] reinvestment across the peripheries becomes a kind of big kind
[24:30] of focal point of
[24:31] SPEAKER_01: their charters.
[24:32] SPEAKER_01: However, they also become peristatal kind of entities, right?
[24:36] SPEAKER_01: There is this kind of complicated dynamic,
[24:38] which contributes to the ambiguity of what it is they might
[24:42] ultimately be seeking
[24:43] in the sense that many of them have effectively become reliant
[24:46] on the fact that
[24:48] SPEAKER_01: their armed force is an independent,
[24:50] SPEAKER_01: autonomous kind of semi-state of sorts,
[24:53] SPEAKER_01: right?
[24:54] And that's what we see much later in Sudan in 2021,
[24:56] after there's a kind of military coup.
[25:01] that overthrows the civilian component of the Transitional
[25:05] Sovereignty Council,
[25:07] which is established after the deposition of Umar Bashir and a
[25:10] few other events in
[25:11] SPEAKER_01: 2019.
[25:12] And a number of armed parties who had traditionally fought
[25:16] against the government
[25:17] SPEAKER_01: choose to stay on board with military kind of coup government in 2021,
[25:22] SPEAKER_01: including figures associated with the SLM and the JEM.
[25:27] You've been talking a little bit about the ginger weed and the
[25:29] ginger weed
[25:30] SPEAKER_01: inevitably became the rapid support forces, the RSF.
[25:35] You're also talking about the opaqueness of a lot of these
[25:40] groups' ideological motivations.
[25:42] SPEAKER_01: I think when we talk about internal power struggles within the military,
[25:46] SPEAKER_01: we think of like these coup attempts or something along those lines,
[25:51] SPEAKER_01: things that are kind of inscrutable.
[25:52] Are there real ideological differences between the Sudanese
[25:57] military government and
[25:59] SPEAKER_01: the RSF that are fighting each other?
[26:01] SPEAKER_01: Or is it purely about who will be able to lead in Khartoum?
[26:05] SPEAKER_01: Yeah, I think there are notable differences.
[26:09] SPEAKER_01: But on one hand,
[26:11] SPEAKER_01: I do agree that there is a clear,
[26:13] there is an element here where you can run into danger if you
[26:16] understand various
[26:17] SPEAKER_01: actors overly ideologically.
[26:21] SPEAKER_01: And with the ginger weed,
[26:22] it becomes a little bit easier to see why when you look at
[26:25] their kind of history,
[26:26] SPEAKER_01: right?
[26:26] SPEAKER_01: So they're preceded by militarized Bagada groups in Chad in the 90s.
[26:31] SPEAKER_01: The heart of the ginger weed centers around the Rezegat and the Misaria,
[26:37] SPEAKER_01: these two Abala camel herding tribes.
[26:40] SPEAKER_01: And they effectively function as like mercenaries.
[26:43] right and they get their lives around livestock herding as well
[26:47] as like livestock
[26:48] exports smuggling human smuggling in particular and looting and
[26:52] this is you know
[26:53] before the introduction of the minerals economy and gold comes
[26:56] into the equation
[26:57] and for a number of tribal figures actually amongst some of the
[27:01] tribes that feed
[27:03] into the ginger weed historically there was a big kind of
[27:05] complaint in the 2000s
[27:06] SPEAKER_01: right that uh
[27:08] What you were seeing was this kind of new generation of young
[27:12] men who really didn't
[27:13] SPEAKER_01: have any employment status and sat around all day just pursuing women,
[27:19] SPEAKER_01: wine,
[27:19] SPEAKER_01: and war.
[27:20] And that's a choice quote that comes from one of these tribal
[27:22] leaders amongst one
[27:24] SPEAKER_01: of the Ibala groups from 2006 that I remember being drawn to.
[27:27] SPEAKER_01: And they kind of go on to discuss the...
[27:30] SPEAKER_01: idea that these groups are, they feel deeply nihilistic.
[27:33] Some of the participants in these movements feel kind of deeply
[27:35] nihilistic.
[27:36] SPEAKER_01: And,
[27:36] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[27:37] SPEAKER_01: some of them were celebrating in the 2000s,
[27:39] SPEAKER_01: the idea that,
[27:40] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[27:41] SPEAKER_01: Sudan could kind of come apart like Iraq.
[27:44] SPEAKER_01: And their idea there was, you know, they took this as a positive thing.
[27:46] They were like,
[27:47] you know,
[27:47] we are kind of people who've been exiled to the outskirts of
[27:50] the
[27:54] SPEAKER_01: memory or lineage or cultural power of the country.
[27:58] And if we are forced to take on this existence,
[28:00] the entire country should.
[28:02] SPEAKER_01: So there's this kind of deeply amoral or kind of nihilistic worldview,
[28:06] which I think is captured in the kind of political culture
[28:09] surrounding a group like
[28:10] SPEAKER_01: the Jenjawid.
[28:11] SPEAKER_01: The army is a function of social classes and the kind of social class
[28:15] SPEAKER_01: stratification that exists,
[28:17] SPEAKER_01: especially in the heartland of Sudan.
[28:19] And,
[28:19] you know,
[28:20] in the heartland in the sense of like the economic cores of
[28:23] Sudan.
[28:25] SPEAKER_01: Which means that the army is not necessarily one thing.
[28:28] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[28:29] SPEAKER_01: There are segments that I think are deeply committed to Islamism,
[28:34] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[28:34] and there are still these kind of remnant militias in
[28:37] particular that have come out
[28:38] SPEAKER_01: with the war who hold on to this view.
[28:40] But I also think sometimes people overstate that dimension of
[28:44] of the kind of
[28:45] SPEAKER_01: remnants of the old administration.
[28:47] I think the army is also filled with a lot of figures who are
[28:51] kind of nebulous
[28:52] pragmatists who would be willing to basically run a regime like
[28:56] Sisi's in Egypt.
[28:58] SPEAKER_01: Like a nationalist regime that really doesn't stand for much,
[29:03] SPEAKER_01: oversees a lot of poverty and makes passive peace with Israel,
[29:08] but nevertheless acts as a kind of praetorian vanguard of the
[29:13] civilian population
[29:14] SPEAKER_01: and of the economy and everything like that.
[29:16] And I think it kind of comes out in the way the fighting is
[29:20] kind of being conducted
[29:21] SPEAKER_01: between these two actors.
[29:22] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[29:22] the Sydney's army has been committing a number of human rights
[29:26] atrocities,
[29:27] including airstrikes that are being deployed sometimes against
[29:30] civilian populations
[29:31] SPEAKER_01: and pockets there.
[29:32] SPEAKER_01: They're in an RSF held territory.
[29:35] But what's really distinct is that when the RSF comes into a
[29:38] village or they come into a town,
[29:40] SPEAKER_01: they eradicate the town.
[29:42] SPEAKER_01: You know, I'm not being exaggerative here, right?
[29:45] SPEAKER_01: I mean, they really are engaging the campaign of social annihilation.
[29:49] They burn and they loot and they rape down,
[29:52] they assault whoever they can assault.
[29:55] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[29:55] there's just this video that went viral of a female
[29:57] spokesperson for the RSF
[29:59] SPEAKER_01: telling her men that,
[30:01] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[30:01] SPEAKER_01: like,
[30:01] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[30:02] SPEAKER_01: get ready to go to war because once we go into the North,
[30:05] you're going to be able to take your pick of all the Northern
[30:06] women and you're
[30:07] SPEAKER_01: going to rape their lineage out of existence.
[30:09] SPEAKER_01: Jeez.
[30:23] And this is rhetoric that happened when they took over the
[30:25] capital for a time,
[30:26] right?
[30:27] SPEAKER_01: They would upload videos of them sitting in people's homes and saying,
[30:33] SPEAKER_01: bye-bye,
[30:34] SPEAKER_01: you're never coming back.
[30:35] SPEAKER_01: This is our home now, right?
[30:38] SPEAKER_01: And it comes out a little bit when you realize organizationally,
[30:41] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[30:41] SPEAKER_01: a lot of these fighters are not even being paid.
[30:44] SPEAKER_01: salaries.
[30:45] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[30:46] SPEAKER_01: from what we know internally,
[30:48] the only units to sometimes get something like a steady salary
[30:52] in the Janjaweed are
[30:53] SPEAKER_01: the Maharia,
[30:55] SPEAKER_01: which is like a sub-tribal community of the Rezegat,
[30:58] SPEAKER_01: which is associated with Hametti,
[31:00] SPEAKER_01: the current leader of the RSF.
[31:02] Other tribes who participate or other groups that participate
[31:05] in the fighting don't
[31:06] SPEAKER_01: seem to be able to rely on a steady paycheck.
[31:09] SPEAKER_01: So instead, they're kind of encouraged to take their payments
[31:12] SPEAKER_01: in kind, right, from whatever village they take over.
[31:16] SPEAKER_01: So you're not going to get a salary,
[31:17] SPEAKER_01: but if you take over a village or a town,
[31:20] SPEAKER_01: you can loot,
[31:21] SPEAKER_01: or you can find yourself a wife,
[31:23] SPEAKER_01: or multiple wives,
[31:24] SPEAKER_01: or homes,
[31:25] SPEAKER_01: etc.
[31:26] SPEAKER_01: So they're engaging in a campaign of social destruction,
[31:29] SPEAKER_01: which I think is particularly unique to them,
[31:32] SPEAKER_01: and which has meant that there's a lot of,
[31:34] SPEAKER_01: quote unquote,
[31:35] SPEAKER_01: voting
[31:36] SPEAKER_01: with people's feet, you know, that's happening, right?
[31:38] SPEAKER_01: When the RSF comes into a town, everyone basically mass evacuates.
[31:44] SPEAKER_01: And when the army comes back,
[31:45] SPEAKER_01: even if people acknowledge that the army has imprisoned them,
[31:49] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[31:49] SPEAKER_01: three,
[31:50] SPEAKER_01: four or five,
[31:50] SPEAKER_01: six times over the past 30,
[31:52] SPEAKER_01: 40 years,
[31:53] people typically are much more willing to entertain the idea of
[31:55] coming back.
[31:57] SPEAKER_01: And they kind of know what kind of evil the army brings with it.
[32:01] SPEAKER_01: Whereas the RSF really feels like the sort of black box.
[32:04] SPEAKER_01: Hassan,
[32:05] so you've talked about the ideological base of the RSF and like
[32:10] through the
[32:11] SPEAKER_01: Janjaweed as a sort of nihilist,
[32:13] SPEAKER_01: anti-national militia.
[32:15] And we've talked about the Sudanese armed forces as very much a
[32:18] nationalist project
[32:19] SPEAKER_01: rooted in the core.
[32:20] But can we back up a little bit and just talk about the
[32:23] development of the RSF?
[32:24] SPEAKER_01: How did the Janjaweed become the RSF,
[32:27] SPEAKER_01: become integrated into the Sudanese state under Omar al-Bashir?
[32:32] SPEAKER_01: Yeah,
[32:33] SPEAKER_01: so like I mentioned,
[32:34] I think part of the kernel that becomes the Janjaweed is an
[32:38] outcome of the
[32:39] SPEAKER_01: Libyan-Chadian war.
[32:41] This fighting that happens between Libya and Tashad means that
[32:44] Gaddafi is kind of
[32:45] SPEAKER_01: backing a number of various communities in Tashad,
[32:48] SPEAKER_01: and there's massive influx of weapons.
[32:50] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[32:51] Some of those have to do with some of the same kind of nomadic
[32:54] communities that
[32:55] SPEAKER_01: live across and on both sides of the Sydney's Chadian border.
[32:59] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[32:59] SPEAKER_01: In the 2000s,
[33:01] SPEAKER_01: to fight this insurgency that's happening,
[33:03] SPEAKER_01: being led by the SLM,
[33:05] the Sydney's Liberation Army and the Sydney's Liberation
[33:07] Movement and the JEM,
[33:08] SPEAKER_01: the Justice and Equality Movement,
[33:10] SPEAKER_01: respectively,
[33:11] SPEAKER_01: led by Mini Manawi.
[33:13] And Khalil Ibrahim,
[33:15] Mini Manawi,
[33:16] by the way,
[33:16] is part of the coalition fighting with the army.
[33:18] SPEAKER_01: Khalil Ibrahim passed away.
[33:21] SPEAKER_01: He was killed by the army,
[33:22] SPEAKER_01: but his brother,
[33:22] SPEAKER_01: Jibril Ibrahim,
[33:23] SPEAKER_01: is the financial minister of the Sudanese government currently.
[33:27] The SAF and Omar Bashir in particular take an interest in
[33:32] outsourcing counterinsurgency.
[33:34] And this is something that was kind of a through piece of kind
[33:38] of neoliberal logics
[33:39] SPEAKER_01: that even started to emerge in the 1980s with Jeffrey Numeri.
[33:44] SPEAKER_01: The IMF basically had come down hard on Sudan,
[33:47] SPEAKER_01: especially in the 80s and the 90s,
[33:49] SPEAKER_01: saying,
[33:49] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[33:49] SPEAKER_01: your debts are way too high.
[33:51] SPEAKER_01: You need to commit to devaluing your currency.
[33:55] SPEAKER_01: You need to pull out subsidies from the agricultural sector.
[33:59] And a lot of the retreat from the agricultural sector created
[34:02] this economic powder
[34:04] SPEAKER_01: keg,
[34:04] SPEAKER_01: which meant that a lot of people were just kind of left unemployed.
[34:07] SPEAKER_01: And securitization became a livelihood, right?
[34:10] Joining a security force or militia became a livelihood for a
[34:14] number of various communities.
[34:16] SPEAKER_01: So the Sudanese government at this point is thinking it's much easier,
[34:20] SPEAKER_01: especially now that we're dealing with a war in South Sudan,
[34:23] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[34:23] SPEAKER_01: the Sudanese Civil War,
[34:25] to kind of partition these fronts and to allow the Genjuweed to
[34:30] conduct themselves
[34:30] SPEAKER_01: on the ground.
[34:31] SPEAKER_01: They're capable fighters,
[34:32] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[34:32] SPEAKER_01: they have a reputation for being very,
[34:35] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[34:35] SPEAKER_01: kind of amoral,
[34:36] SPEAKER_01: quick,
[34:37] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[34:37] SPEAKER_01: fighters.
[34:38] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[34:38] the Genjuweed kind of operates as a de facto paramilitary
[34:43] leader of significant
[34:44] SPEAKER_01: parts of Darfur in this period.
[34:46] SPEAKER_01: Now, what happens is,
[34:48] SPEAKER_01: After there becomes a little bit of tranquility in Darfur,
[34:51] after some of the rebel groups and the Sydney's government kind
[34:54] of come to a
[34:54] SPEAKER_01: short-term agreement and truce,
[34:56] is that a number of former kind of paramilitary soldiers
[35:00] actually carry out a
[35:01] SPEAKER_01: revolt against the Sydney state.
[35:03] SPEAKER_01: There are a number of kind of really dramatic moments.
[35:05] SPEAKER_01: Like in 2008, the JEM actually rides Interim Derman, which is like the...
[35:10] SPEAKER_01: It's the sister city of Khartoum.
[35:11] SPEAKER_01: It used to be the capital at one point, right?
[35:14] And even Hemeti at one point is basically rebelling against the
[35:17] Sydney's government.
[35:18] SPEAKER_01: And it's draped in this language, which is a little bit peculiar, right?
[35:22] SPEAKER_01: I mean, remember, these people are being accused of genocide.
[35:25] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[35:26] SPEAKER_01: And Hameti is coming to,
[35:28] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[35:29] the Sudanese government and basically draping himself in this
[35:32] language of the
[35:32] SPEAKER_01: margins of the damned.
[35:34] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[35:34] So he's saying we are the people who've been left out from the
[35:38] state of 56,
[35:38] which is the way they kind of refer to this project of
[35:41] institutional continuities
[35:42] SPEAKER_01: between,
[35:43] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[35:44] SPEAKER_01: the independence of Sudan into the present day,
[35:45] SPEAKER_01: regardless of its secular Islamist persuasion.
[35:49] SPEAKER_01: We're the kind of victims of the state of 56.
[35:51] SPEAKER_01: We are the soldiers who you all created and then you all abandoned.
[35:55] And now we're taking our vengeance to transform the world kind
[35:58] of in our vision.
[36:00] SPEAKER_01: And they're playing,
[36:01] SPEAKER_01: ironically enough,
[36:02] with some of the sort of same rhetorical maneuvers that are
[36:05] being deployed by the
[36:06] SPEAKER_01: SPLM with its discourse around New Sudan.
[36:09] SPEAKER_01: But regardless of various kind of atrocities maybe committed by the SPLM,
[36:14] SPEAKER_01: the ginger weed have none of the moral record.
[36:17] SPEAKER_01: Or at least,
[36:17] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[36:17] SPEAKER_01: potentially heroic,
[36:18] SPEAKER_01: romantic orientation or identification that the SPLM has.
[36:23] SPEAKER_01: So this comes out as,
[36:25] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[36:25] SPEAKER_01: a very kind of peculiar maneuver,
[36:27] SPEAKER_01: but it plays out here and here again.
[36:28] Hameti is able to successfully leverage this threat against the
[36:32] Sydney's government.
[36:33] SPEAKER_01: And Omar Bashir basically chooses to bring him in.
[36:36] And there's a number of kind of different understandings as to
[36:38] why this happened.
[36:39] Some people like Alex Dawal make the argument that the Sudanese
[36:42] government at this
[36:42] SPEAKER_01: point didn't really have control over the gingerweed.
[36:45] SPEAKER_01: So if the gingerweed really want to fight them, they could.
[36:48] SPEAKER_01: And,
[36:48] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[36:48] it was kind of ambiguous whether or not things would kind of
[36:51] work out in the
[36:52] SPEAKER_01: Sudanese government's favor.
[36:53] Other people kind of emphasize the kind of cultural lexical
[36:56] ties between the Ibala
[36:58] SPEAKER_01: Arabs and the Riverine Arabs.
[37:01] SPEAKER_01: who are ruling and dominating the Sudanese government at the time.
[37:04] SPEAKER_01: And some people emphasize a kind of coup-proofing narrative,
[37:07] SPEAKER_01: which is that when Omar Bashir brings in Hamiddi,
[37:11] he effectively keeps him at arm's length from the other two
[37:15] really influential
[37:16] poles of the armed forces or the structure of the kind of
[37:19] military in the Sudanese
[37:20] SPEAKER_01: government,
[37:21] SPEAKER_01: which is...
[37:22] the Sydney's Armed Forces,
[37:23] and the NISS,
[37:25] the National Intelligence and Security Services.
[37:28] SPEAKER_01: And this eventually leads,
[37:30] SPEAKER_01: in the early 2010s,
[37:31] SPEAKER_01: the construction of the Rapid Support Forces,
[37:33] SPEAKER_01: the RSF,
[37:34] SPEAKER_01: out of the kernels of the Janjaweed.
[37:37] And what's interesting there is a figure who was at one point
[37:40] actually the foremost
[37:41] SPEAKER_01: leader of the Janjaweed,
[37:41] SPEAKER_01: Musa Hilal,
[37:42] SPEAKER_01: gets sidelined for Hametti.
[37:44] SPEAKER_01: That's partly because Musa Hilal is seen as
[37:47] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[37:47] SPEAKER_01: all these figures are kind of seen as thugs,
[37:49] SPEAKER_01: but he's seen as a particularly untrustworthy thug.
[37:52] SPEAKER_01: But Ermer Bashir takes a liking to Hameti.
[37:54] And so he grants him a formal institutional structure within
[37:58] the government.
[37:59] SPEAKER_01: And at the same time, the RSF becomes kind of licensed outwards.
[38:04] SPEAKER_01: So, you know, there might be an argument there in terms of
[38:07] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[38:07] SPEAKER_01: elements of the Sudanese establishment,
[38:09] SPEAKER_01: even kind of fearing the capacities of the RSF,
[38:11] was partly reflected in the fact that they had the RSF kind of
[38:14] contracted outwards
[38:15] SPEAKER_01: as mercenaries for other parties.
[38:16] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[38:17] SPEAKER_01: So in much of the 2000s,
[38:19] SPEAKER_01: the RSF 2010s,
[38:20] SPEAKER_01: much of the 2000s,
[38:21] SPEAKER_01: the RSF is not just in Sudan,
[38:23] SPEAKER_01: or at least the majority of its forces are not just located in Sudan.
[38:26] SPEAKER_01: They're also located in Yemen.
[38:27] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[38:28] They're being contracted out to the KSA and the UAE who don't
[38:31] want to fight the ground war.
[38:33] SPEAKER_01: right, in Yemen.
[38:34] And that's also where they end up establishing these ties with
[38:37] Saudi Arabia and the
[38:38] SPEAKER_01: Emirates in particular.
[38:40] SPEAKER_01: And the Emirates takes a liking to Hamiddi.
[38:43] SPEAKER_01: And the RSF becomes a kind of core actor in the Mineral Strait,
[38:46] SPEAKER_01: especially in the Darfur region,
[38:49] SPEAKER_01: which is separated between five states,
[38:51] SPEAKER_01: but especially in North Darfur and West Darfur,
[38:53] SPEAKER_01: they start taking over gold mines and the like.
[38:56] SPEAKER_01: And a lot of these mines are...
[38:59] kind of direct bilateral nexuses between regional actors and
[39:05] the United Arab Emirates.
[39:06] I mean,
[39:06] a lot of it actually kind of completely moves around the
[39:09] government entirely,
[39:10] right?
[39:11] And this is part of the financial and corporate extensive ties
[39:15] that start to emerge
[39:16] SPEAKER_01: between the UAE and the RSF as a force.
[39:20] SPEAKER_01: And the RSF at the same time is recruiting various people.
[39:23] SPEAKER_01: It's sometimes able to offer them a salary,
[39:25] but other times it's able to offer them these kind of piecemeal
[39:27] contracts where
[39:29] SPEAKER_01: they're like,
[39:29] SPEAKER_01: well,
[39:30] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[39:31] SPEAKER_01: don't look at us for money,
[39:32] SPEAKER_01: but if you want,
[39:32] we can get you in connection with the Emirates and the Emirates
[39:34] can pay you if you
[39:36] SPEAKER_01: want to go and be a mercenary in Yemen.
[39:37] SPEAKER_01: Does the control over resource flows and ties with the Gulf,
[39:41] does that follow from the increased economic slash balance of
[39:47] payments crisis Sudan
[39:48] was under after the secession of South Sudan and the loss of
[39:52] their oil revenues
[39:53] SPEAKER_01: from that period?
[39:54] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[39:55] Yeah,
[39:55] I mean,
[39:56] the government itself also pursues the gold and the minerals
[39:59] trade.
[40:00] SPEAKER_01: And I mean,
[40:00] SPEAKER_01: in some government-held territories in Curtefan right now,
[40:04] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[40:04] SPEAKER_01: you can find gold and mineral mining.
[40:06] SPEAKER_01: And up until,
[40:07] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[40:07] SPEAKER_01: earlier this year,
[40:08] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[40:08] the Sydney's government still actually had exports to the UAE
[40:11] until formally those
[40:13] SPEAKER_01: were cancelled.
[40:15] SPEAKER_01: So in 2011, South Sudan secedes right after a referendum.
[40:20] And with it goes the oil wealth that Sudan had become
[40:24] particularly reliant on.
[40:26] SPEAKER_01: And one of the ways Omar Bashir stayed in power was that he subsidized,
[40:31] pacified a lot of the urban communities by maintaining a
[40:34] minimum threshold of fuel
[40:36] SPEAKER_01: and wheat subsidies.
[40:38] SPEAKER_01: These were not subsidies that were going out to the entire country.
[40:40] SPEAKER_01: I mean, much of the country doesn't even eat wheat.
[40:43] SPEAKER_01: They eat sorghum.
[40:44] SPEAKER_01: But in city areas, this was able to maintain some kind of modicum of...
[40:49] SPEAKER_01: Social stability.
[40:51] SPEAKER_01: And with the secession of South Sudan,
[40:53] SPEAKER_01: even though there are bilateral agreements between South Sudan and Sudan,
[40:56] that oil will continue to flow through the country and that
[40:58] will split the profits.
[41:00] SPEAKER_01: There's a massive collapse.
[41:02] SPEAKER_01: For one,
[41:02] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[41:03] the kind of technical know-how as to how to organize oil
[41:06] extraction in South Sudan
[41:08] SPEAKER_01: collapses with the secession.
[41:09] SPEAKER_01: South Sudan itself finds itself in a civil war.
[41:12] SPEAKER_01: Shortly after its independence.
[41:14] And there is a turn to more and more extractive sectors across
[41:19] the Sydney's
[41:20] SPEAKER_01: geography,
[41:21] regardless of whether or not it's like government held
[41:23] territory or even rebel held
[41:24] SPEAKER_01: territory.
[41:25] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[41:26] Where people are really relying on mineral trade and
[41:29] securitization to basically
[41:31] SPEAKER_01: keep the economy afloat.
[41:33] SPEAKER_01: And one of the kind of victims of all this is the agricultural sector.
[41:36] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[41:36] SPEAKER_01: Umar Bashir ends up kind of agreeing to the kind of thrusts of the IMF
[41:41] SPEAKER_01: recommendations.
[41:43] And he partially starts cutting further and further into the
[41:46] kind of basic
[41:47] SPEAKER_01: subsidies that were keeping Sudan's agricultural metabolism alive.
[41:51] SPEAKER_01: And this is,
[41:52] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[41:52] one of the kind of real core drivers of the uprising that
[41:55] begins in December 2018
[41:56] SPEAKER_01: and eventually leads to the overthrowing of Umar Bashir.
[41:59] You touched briefly on the UAE and the foreign influence
[42:03] networks that the RSF has
[42:04] SPEAKER_01: tried to take advantage of.
[42:05] I wanted to ask you about what you make of their increasing
[42:09] contact with Israel and the Mossad.
[42:13] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[42:13] SPEAKER_01: Burhan,
[42:14] SPEAKER_01: the current head of state of Sudan,
[42:16] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[42:16] he was very much okay with the Abraham Accords and trying to
[42:19] achieve some sort of
[42:20] SPEAKER_01: normalization with Israel.
[42:21] SPEAKER_02: On the phone, we have some terrific people, Chairman Abdel al-Bernhon,
[42:28] SPEAKER_02: and Prime Minister Adela Hamdok of Sudan,
[42:33] SPEAKER_02: a beautiful part of the world,
[42:35] SPEAKER_02: and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
[42:37] SPEAKER_02: I think you mostly know him,
[42:38] SPEAKER_02: the State of Israel and the Republic of Sudan,
[42:41] SPEAKER_02: have agreed to make peace.
[42:43] SPEAKER_02: This is for many, many years they've been at odds, to put it nicely.
[42:49] SPEAKER_01: But Hemeti and the RSF,
[42:52] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[42:52] I do see headlines in Shaker Osset about them talking about
[42:56] Hamas terrorism and
[42:57] comparing the Sudanese army to them or talking about how there
[43:01] might be an October
[43:02] SPEAKER_01: 7th done to them.
[43:04] Like they're really angling for a kind of Israeli support that
[43:09] the Sudanese army
[43:10] SPEAKER_01: and its supporters really don't want to touch.
[43:12] SPEAKER_01: Why do you think that is?
[43:15] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[43:16] I think the language of the Islamic deep state is an
[43:20] opportunity structure that is
[43:22] SPEAKER_01: produced,
[43:23] SPEAKER_01: ironically enough,
[43:23] by many of the kind of civilian contenders who came to power
[43:27] after the overthrow of
[43:28] SPEAKER_01: Urmur Bashir.
[43:29] SPEAKER_01: So I think that requires talking a little bit about,
[43:33] SPEAKER_01: you see,
[43:34] SPEAKER_01: I guess there are two parts of the story.
[43:35] SPEAKER_01: One, what is happening domestically in Sudan, starting in 2018 and 2019.
[43:38] Two,
[43:40] what is happening with the Abraham Accords and the kind of
[43:43] wider world system.
[43:44] SPEAKER_01: And so domestically in Sudan,
[43:46] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[43:47] SPEAKER_01: when the uprisings begin,
[43:48] SPEAKER_01: I think the really explosive initial site is in Atmara.
[43:52] SPEAKER_01: It's not the very first place that has a protest,
[43:54] SPEAKER_01: but,
[43:54] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[43:54] the Sudanese Communist Party has basically called out a protest
[43:58] in December of
[43:59] SPEAKER_01: 2018.
[44:00] SPEAKER_01: And in Atmara,
[44:01] a number of demonstrators kind of come out and they burn down
[44:04] the headquarters of
[44:05] SPEAKER_01: Irma Bashir's party,
[44:06] SPEAKER_01: the National Congress Party.
[44:09] And they requisitioned grain for themselves in response to
[44:13] these kind of sanctions.
[44:15] And this leads to a spark that like really kind of goes through
[44:19] a number of Sudan's
[44:20] SPEAKER_01: urban geographies.
[44:21] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[44:21] And all the kind of major cities,
[44:22] there are massive mobilizations that start to emerge.
[44:25] There are these small horizontal networks called the resistance
[44:29] committees,
[44:30] and a lot of these are sort of built out of like student
[44:33] university politics.
[44:35] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[44:35] these small groups of friends or political clubs who engage in
[44:40] forms of mutual aid
[44:41] SPEAKER_01: and social provisioning.
[44:42] SPEAKER_01: And now in the context of early 2019,
[44:46] SPEAKER_01: start to engage in,
[44:47] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[44:48] really kind of direct political work in terms of calling people
[44:50] out to rallies,
[44:51] SPEAKER_01: calling people out to the streets.
[44:53] SPEAKER_01: And there's something that emerges in the early 2010s,
[44:56] SPEAKER_01: this white collar kind of professionalized movement.
[44:59] SPEAKER_01: coalition of trade unions called the Sydney's Professionals Association.
[45:03] SPEAKER_01: And unlike in prior uprisings in Sudan,
[45:07] SPEAKER_01: this is not a coalition,
[45:08] SPEAKER_01: say,
[45:08] SPEAKER_01: of like the railway workers and,
[45:11] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[45:11] SPEAKER_01: cotton workers.
[45:12] SPEAKER_01: This is an association led by a kind of D-class middle class.
[45:16] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[45:17] SPEAKER_01: Lawyers, doctors, nurses, teachers, you know, white collar labor.
[45:23] And the resistance committees and the Sydney's of Professionals
[45:26] Association start
[45:27] SPEAKER_01: to interplay with each other.
[45:28] The resistance committees don't really have a coherent
[45:31] political line internally.
[45:33] SPEAKER_01: And many of them are kind of committed to this vision of grassroots,
[45:37] SPEAKER_01: bottom-up democracy and horizontalism,
[45:40] which arguably leads them to kind of be allergic to
[45:43] establishing their own
[45:44] SPEAKER_01: political coalition or their own political party.
[45:47] So they end up becoming really reliant on this clandestine
[45:51] Sudanese Professionals
[45:52] SPEAKER_01: Association,
[45:53] which is behind the scenes kind of releasing these messages out
[45:56] to the public,
[45:57] talking about the dignity and the glory of the revolt and
[46:00] various political
[46:01] SPEAKER_01: demands.
[46:03] becomes the kernel for what becomes the FFC,
[46:06] the Forces for Freedom and Change.
[46:09] The FFC is the sort of technocratic civilian organization which
[46:14] joins into the
[46:15] SPEAKER_01: Transitional Sovereignty Council,
[46:17] SPEAKER_01: which becomes the sort of joint establishment between the military,
[46:20] SPEAKER_01: specifically like the Sydney's Armed Forces and the Genjaweed,
[46:23] SPEAKER_01: or the RSF,
[46:25] SPEAKER_01: and these groups of civilian technocrats.
[46:27] And they're supposed to oversee Sudan for a few years before
[46:29] elections happen.
[46:31] SPEAKER_01: The civilian technocrats are,
[46:33] SPEAKER_01: at this point,
[46:34] SPEAKER_01: not led by,
[46:35] SPEAKER_01: say,
[46:35] SPEAKER_01: like people who are in the resistance committees.
[46:37] They're led by a lot of people who are out in the diaspora for
[46:39] a number of years,
[46:40] SPEAKER_01: who are very kind of well-educated,
[46:42] SPEAKER_01: who have experience in and out of the MNGO sectors,
[46:45] SPEAKER_01: right?
[46:45] SPEAKER_01: Many of these groups are,
[46:47] SPEAKER_01: A,
[46:47] SPEAKER_01: very suspicious about the persistence of the Islamist kind of deep state.
[46:53] SPEAKER_01: You know, in Sudan, you kind of refer to them as the Kezan or the Koz.
[46:57] SPEAKER_01: These groups...
[46:59] Seem to have a number of their initial fears confirmed when
[47:03] there is the coup
[47:04] SPEAKER_01: against them in October of 2021,
[47:07] SPEAKER_01: which deposes Hamdok,
[47:09] who is the elected head of the civilian body or the unelected
[47:13] head of the civilian
[47:14] SPEAKER_01: body,
[47:14] SPEAKER_01: I should say.
[47:15] Hamdok actually comes back into the Transitional Sovereignty
[47:18] Council a couple of months later.
[47:21] SPEAKER_01: despite it all.
[47:22] SPEAKER_01: But nevertheless,
[47:23] there becomes this deep perception that the Islamist deep state
[47:26] is still operating
[47:27] SPEAKER_01: behind the scenes,
[47:28] SPEAKER_01: that the Ghaz was in power for 30 years,
[47:30] SPEAKER_01: right?
[47:31] SPEAKER_01: And it's just developed and taken over all these institutions,
[47:34] SPEAKER_01: that the army itself is infested to the core with Islamists.
[47:38] SPEAKER_01: And I think that rhetoric is a little bit overstated.
[47:42] SPEAKER_01: And I think part of it has to do with the fact that,
[47:44] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[47:44] SPEAKER_01: there are a number of evils in Sudan,
[47:47] SPEAKER_01: and the Islamists are not sugenariously,
[47:49] SPEAKER_01: like,
[47:50] SPEAKER_01: producers of all those evils.
[47:53] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[47:54] SPEAKER_01: a lot of the things that Umar Bashir brings into power represents,
[47:58] SPEAKER_01: maybe in its deadliest form up to that point,
[48:01] SPEAKER_01: dynamics that had preexisted in Sudan beforehand.
[48:03] SPEAKER_01: But nevertheless,
[48:05] that imaginary of the kind of persistence of an Islamic deep
[48:08] state becomes a really
[48:10] SPEAKER_01: kind of powerful,
[48:11] SPEAKER_01: discursive kernel.
[48:13] SPEAKER_01: which is exploited from the outside.
[48:15] SPEAKER_01: And for the United Arab Emirates,
[48:17] SPEAKER_01: especially after 9-11,
[48:19] SPEAKER_01: they become a very,
[48:20] very kind of significant war on terror coordinator with the
[48:23] United States.
[48:24] And they have a particular hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood in
[48:27] comparison,
[48:28] SPEAKER_01: as I'm sure everyone who listens to this podcast would know.
[48:31] SPEAKER_01: And to sort of vindicate their connections with the RSF,
[48:35] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[48:35] SPEAKER_01: they had a number of fond connections with Ur-Bashir.
[48:39] But the RSF to them is a sort of more even attractive body
[48:42] because it seems
[48:43] SPEAKER_01: precisely like so non-ideological.
[48:46] SPEAKER_01: I mean, these are kind of like, you know, just random people.
[48:49] SPEAKER_01: Not to be so condescending,
[48:50] SPEAKER_01: but a number of its leaders are kind of,
[48:52] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[48:52] SPEAKER_01: they're literally illiterate human smugglers,
[48:55] SPEAKER_01: right?
[48:56] So these are people who are not really steeped in any
[48:59] particular ideological or
[49:01] SPEAKER_01: associational tradition.
[49:02] SPEAKER_01: And for the UAE,
[49:04] it becomes attractive to use them as a kind of cudgel within
[49:07] the Sudanese country.
[49:08] And so playing up the secret persistence of the Kezan within
[49:14] the Sudanese establishment
[49:16] SPEAKER_01: And seeing Kezan every single location,
[49:18] SPEAKER_01: right,
[49:18] SPEAKER_01: underneath your bed,
[49:19] SPEAKER_01: in the mattress,
[49:20] SPEAKER_01: in the rivers,
[49:21] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[49:22] SPEAKER_01: hiding in plain sight everywhere you go becomes part of this,
[49:27] SPEAKER_01: like,
[49:28] SPEAKER_01: discursive,
[49:29] SPEAKER_01: almost schizoaffective kind of worldview promoted by the UAE.
[49:33] SPEAKER_01: I'm very familiar with this kind of discourse from Iran.
[49:37] SPEAKER_01: I'm very familiar.
[49:38] SPEAKER_01: Yeah, you know, Iran, yes, exactly, right?
[49:40] SPEAKER_01: So in the case of Iran,
[49:41] whenever someone says something that could vaguely be seen as
[49:45] not 110% critical of
[49:46] SPEAKER_01: the government,
[49:47] SPEAKER_01: it's always immediately understood that,
[49:49] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[49:49] SPEAKER_01: this person is secret.
[49:50] SPEAKER_01: You're an agent of the khuns, you're your mullah.
[49:53] SPEAKER_01: Exactly, right?
[49:54] SPEAKER_01: So this thing,
[49:56] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[49:56] SPEAKER_01: this discourse also has cash with elements of the Sudanese community,
[50:00] SPEAKER_01: both domestically and within the diaspora.
[50:02] SPEAKER_01: So the UAE is able to kind of deploy that rhetoric to significant ends.
[50:08] SPEAKER_01: And I mean,
[50:09] SPEAKER_01: the funny thing is,
[50:10] SPEAKER_01: is the Sydney's army was perfectly fine with the Abraham Accords,
[50:13] SPEAKER_01: right?
[50:14] SPEAKER_01: They were more than willing to make good with the Israelis.
[50:18] SPEAKER_01: But the RSF has sort of attempted to really kind of solidify the
[50:25] a almost like ideological and discursive fraternal lineage with
[50:29] the Israelis and
[50:31] with the international community by playing up the idea that
[50:33] they're fighting
[50:34] SPEAKER_01: against an Islamic deep state.
[50:36] SPEAKER_01: And one,
[50:37] that's because for a lot of NGOs and a lot of transnational
[50:39] organizations and for
[50:40] SPEAKER_01: many actors in the West,
[50:42] SPEAKER_01: the worst thing in Sudan is the Islamists,
[50:45] SPEAKER_01: right?
[50:45] Or like the worst thing that you could possibly,
[50:47] plausibly name in Sudan is an Islamist.
[50:49] SPEAKER_01: This is something that does interest me about conversely,
[50:52] SPEAKER_01: like the public Israeli responses,
[50:54] SPEAKER_01: because they're not obviously they're not backing the RSF publicly.
[50:58] SPEAKER_01: That would be insane even for them to attach.
[51:00] So Israel's Arabic state accounts have been talking about the
[51:04] massacre in Al-Fashir.
[51:06] SPEAKER_01: Which happened relatively recently.
[51:08] SPEAKER_01: And then they apply the killings,
[51:10] SPEAKER_01: the images of killings that happened there to Hamas,
[51:14] SPEAKER_01: to the killings that happened there,
[51:15] SPEAKER_01: even though they are completely diametrically opposed.
[51:17] Like they really,
[51:19] I'm just,
[51:20] no,
[51:21] it's a striking level of that word you kept using,
[51:23] nihilism.
[51:25] Yeah,
[51:26] no,
[51:26] I mean,
[51:26] it's absolutely,
[51:27] it's a kind of deeply nihilistic maneuver.
[51:30] There are a number after the coup,
[51:32] sorry,
[51:33] after the war initiates on April 15th,
[51:35] 2023.
[51:35] SPEAKER_01: Hamidi does, I think, a number of meetings with the Mossad.
[51:40] SPEAKER_01: And in particular,
[51:42] SPEAKER_01: I think even more so than the RSF itself,
[51:45] SPEAKER_01: the UAE kind of acts on their behalf.
[51:47] SPEAKER_01: So for quite a while, the UAE has been funding these podcasts.
[51:50] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[51:52] SPEAKER_01: Or these like op-eds that'll sometimes go public in Hebrew,
[51:57] SPEAKER_01: where they're saying,
[51:57] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[51:58] SPEAKER_01: you need to liberate Sudan.
[51:59] SPEAKER_01: There is this Ikhwani axis,
[52:02] this brotherhood axis that stretches and is also part of the
[52:06] Khomeinist axis.
[52:08] SPEAKER_01: And there's a big emphasis on the idea that there's also, you know...
[52:13] SPEAKER_01: As people are talking more and more about the UAE's really,
[52:16] SPEAKER_01: really kind of crucial ties to the RSF,
[52:19] SPEAKER_01: their response is to say that,
[52:21] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[52:21] SPEAKER_01: well,
[52:21] SPEAKER_01: actually,
[52:22] SPEAKER_01: and this is a response that also a number of civilian figures have said,
[52:25] SPEAKER_01: and I think kind of incorrectly on both counts,
[52:27] that what's happening in Sudan is this sort of like parallel
[52:30] dynamic of outside
[52:32] SPEAKER_01: parties interfering.
[52:33] SPEAKER_01: So yes,
[52:33] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[52:33] SPEAKER_01: even though the UAE might have ties with the RSF,
[52:36] SPEAKER_01: did you know the Iranians have ties with the Sydney's army?
[52:39] SPEAKER_01: And look,
[52:40] Omar Bashir cut ties with the Iranians in the middle of the
[52:44] 2010s because of what
[52:44] SPEAKER_01: happened with the Arab Spring,
[52:46] SPEAKER_01: right?
[52:46] SPEAKER_01: When things were being squeezed,
[52:47] SPEAKER_01: he chose his Gulf backers much more than he chose the Iranians,
[52:50] SPEAKER_01: right?
[52:51] Despite the fact that there are fraternal ties between these
[52:53] two groups back in the day.
[52:54] And also was the first Arab leader to do a rapprochement with
[52:58] Bashar al-Assad
[52:59] SPEAKER_01: before any of the Gulf people,
[53:01] SPEAKER_01: which I always found quite interesting.
[53:02] SPEAKER_01: Yeah, yeah.
[53:03] SPEAKER_01: You know, so it's...
[53:05] SPEAKER_01: It's really kind of striking, right?
[53:10] SPEAKER_01: But yeah, so the Iranians come back into the equation around 2024.
[53:16] SPEAKER_01: Part of what's happening is that as fighting breaks out,
[53:21] SPEAKER_01: One of the first things the RSF does is in Meadoway Airport,
[53:26] SPEAKER_01: right before April 15th,
[53:28] SPEAKER_01: 2023,
[53:28] they basically bring in a bunch of Humvees and soldiers around
[53:32] the airport.
[53:33] One of the army commanders at the airport calls in to the
[53:37] headquarters and he's like,
[53:38] hey...
[53:40] Are a bunch of ginger Wheaties supposed to be rolling up to the
[53:42] airport right now?
[53:43] SPEAKER_01: And he gets this non-response from the army,
[53:45] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[53:45] SPEAKER_01: which is like a testament to the fact that the army,
[53:48] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[53:48] I think something that a lot of people can agree on is that the
[53:50] army is deeply
[53:51] SPEAKER_01: incompetent,
[53:53] SPEAKER_01: right?
[53:54] You know,
[53:54] people were saying that as the war was breaking out,
[53:56] they were all in their savinjas.
[53:57] SPEAKER_01: They were all like wearing slippers and drinking like milk tea.
[54:00] SPEAKER_01: And they had like no real idea of what was going on.
[54:03] But anyways,
[54:04] the RSF takes over Meadoway Airport and they kidnap Egyptian
[54:08] soldiers.
[54:09] SPEAKER_01: Wow.
[54:09] SPEAKER_01: And this really freaks out the Egyptian government,
[54:11] SPEAKER_01: which has no trucking,
[54:12] SPEAKER_01: right,
[54:13] SPEAKER_01: with the Sudanese establishment,
[54:16] SPEAKER_01: especially or Bashir or the Kezan.
[54:19] But it does freak out the Egyptians and the Egyptians kind of
[54:22] know how the SAF operates.
[54:24] They kind of know what it is they say and what it is they
[54:27] actually do and what it is they mean.
[54:29] So the Egyptians start backing the SAF with military and
[54:33] logistical support,
[54:34] SPEAKER_01: even though they don't want to do anything like a direct intervention.
[54:38] SPEAKER_01: This,
[54:39] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[54:39] largely kind of collapses as the Egyptians are broke and the
[54:44] United Arab Emirates
[54:45] SPEAKER_01: buys up a lot of real estate in Egypt.
[54:47] And I think a lot of those purchases behind the scenes are
[54:50] probably linked to
[54:51] SPEAKER_01: political demands.
[54:52] So the Egyptians start kind of slowing the tide of their
[54:56] matriculation of weaponry
[54:57] SPEAKER_01: and logistical support to the Sydney's army.
[54:59] SPEAKER_01: So the Sydney's army has to look elsewhere.
[55:01] SPEAKER_01: And they start looking to the Iranians to sell them weaponry.
[55:05] SPEAKER_01: They are able to develop ties with the Russians,
[55:08] SPEAKER_01: who are accused early on of having backed the RSF.
[55:11] But especially after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's
[55:15] government in Syria,
[55:17] SPEAKER_01: the Russians,
[55:18] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[55:18] SPEAKER_01: they leave Tantura and they basically come to Port Sudan,
[55:22] SPEAKER_01: which is now being held by the army.
[55:24] SPEAKER_01: And the army says,
[55:25] we'll give you port ties in return for you giving us some
[55:27] military and logistical
[55:29] SPEAKER_01: support.
[55:30] SPEAKER_01: And they also rely on the air trains.
[55:32] SPEAKER_01: But all of these actors are, I think, much more opportunistic.
[55:36] And a lot of the connections between them are much less
[55:39] significant,
[55:39] respectively,
[55:40] right?
[55:40] The way the Sudanese army has been able to survive is through
[55:44] mass mobilization.
[55:46] SPEAKER_01: It's been through much more than the Sudanese army's rhetoric.
[55:49] It's been much more the actions of the RSF basically convincing
[55:53] a lot of people
[55:54] SPEAKER_01: that this is an existential threat.
[55:56] and that they're not looking at a political war between two
[56:00] co-belligerents,
[56:00] SPEAKER_01: they're looking at potential social annihilation.
[56:04] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[56:05] And that's led to a kind of significant amount of mobilization
[56:08] of these various
[56:09] SPEAKER_01: groups fighting either in or alongside the army in various small,
[56:14] SPEAKER_01: low network militias.
[56:16] SPEAKER_01: The UAE,
[56:16] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[56:17] uses these international ties of the SAF to kind of portray
[56:22] themselves as a kind of
[56:23] SPEAKER_01: innocuous actor.
[56:24] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[56:25] SPEAKER_01: like,
[56:25] SPEAKER_01: look,
[56:25] SPEAKER_01: we might be having support for one actor or another,
[56:27] SPEAKER_01: but really everyone's interfering in Sudan.
[56:30] SPEAKER_01: The Iranians are interfering in Sudan,
[56:32] SPEAKER_01: and Sudan is really becoming subordinate to outside influences.
[56:36] I think that is something that catches on with some of the
[56:40] particular opponents of
[56:42] SPEAKER_01: the SAF,
[56:43] SPEAKER_01: civilian opponents of the SAF,
[56:44] SPEAKER_01: who are calling for a truce or a ceasefire,
[56:47] SPEAKER_01: no matter the costs.
[56:48] SPEAKER_01: But I also think it's not very convincing.
[56:51] I think there is something that's wrong about a certain current
[56:55] political discourse
[56:56] SPEAKER_01: that's pro-SAF,
[56:57] SPEAKER_01: which is to say that this war is purely imperial.
[57:00] SPEAKER_01: It was purely imposed upon us from the outside.
[57:03] I mean,
[57:03] the gingerweed,
[57:04] unfortunately,
[57:05] is very much bound up with Sudan's history.
[57:09] And bound up with the structures of power and arm sharing and
[57:14] political economies
[57:15] SPEAKER_01: that were fostered by a number of Sydney's governments.
[57:18] But as the war has gone on,
[57:20] the Emirates has emerged as the existential pipeline for the
[57:24] RSF.
[57:25] The RSF has really been unable to mobilize and really unable to
[57:29] recruit people
[57:30] SPEAKER_01: without threatening to just massacre them,
[57:32] SPEAKER_01: right?
[57:33] And I think that really comes out now in this international
[57:35] pipeline of mercenaries
[57:37] SPEAKER_01: who are joining the RSF and associated forces.
[57:40] I'm curious what you see as the purpose of this attempted
[57:45] formalization by the RSF.
[57:48] SPEAKER_01: I think at the beginning of this year,
[57:49] they started this rival government called the Government of
[57:53] Peace and Unity.
[57:56] And like Hameti has been trying to style himself as the head of
[58:01] this presidential
[58:02] SPEAKER_01: council,
[58:03] that it's a real rival to the Sudanese government as something
[58:06] that other states
[58:08] SPEAKER_01: can invest in.
[58:09] SPEAKER_00: In February,
[58:10] the Sudanese military leader Al Burhan announced plans to form
[58:13] a technocratic
[58:14] cabinet which would be led by a civilian prime minister and
[58:18] include independent
[58:19] SPEAKER_00: experts when the war ends.
[58:21] SPEAKER_00: Weeks later,
[58:22] the RSF and its allies signed a political charter that aims to
[58:26] create a breakaway
[58:27] SPEAKER_00: government in rebel-controlled areas.
[58:30] But the African Union says it will not recognize the purported
[58:33] parallel government
[58:34] SPEAKER_00: and the UN warns that it risks partitioning the country.
[58:37] SPEAKER_01: Do you think this will work?
[58:38] SPEAKER_01: Do you think this will help them?
[58:40] SPEAKER_01: Or do you think this is a futile measure?
[58:43] Yeah,
[58:43] I mean,
[58:44] I think they're really,
[58:45] really relying on a couple of dimensions.
[58:49] SPEAKER_01: But all those dimensions are connected to them by the UAE.
[58:53] So as I just mentioned,
[58:55] that the RSF has a big issue in terms of domestic legitimacy.
[58:58] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[58:59] SPEAKER_01: And they tried to recruit throughout wider swaths of Sudan.
[59:04] SPEAKER_01: And I think a lot of those attempts,
[59:06] SPEAKER_01: especially ethnic recruitments outside of the Ebala and Begara,
[59:10] SPEAKER_01: have kind of ended up failing.
[59:12] SPEAKER_01: So they've instead started recruiting a number of foreign fighters,
[59:16] SPEAKER_01: both in the region and across the world.
[59:19] SPEAKER_01: So you have,
[59:19] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[59:20] SPEAKER_01: maybe the thing that has captured the most attention,
[59:22] SPEAKER_01: the Colombians coming in.
[59:24] SPEAKER_01: who are being brought in through an Emirati corporation.
[59:26] SPEAKER_01: You have Libyans who are coming in and fighting with them.
[59:30] SPEAKER_01: You have the Shadians who are coming in and fighting with them.
[59:33] You sometimes even have the case of South Sudanese refugees or
[59:37] South Sudanese
[59:37] SPEAKER_01: residents of Sudan who are coming in and fighting with them,
[59:41] SPEAKER_01: sometimes at gunpoint,
[59:42] SPEAKER_01: right?
[59:43] SPEAKER_01: But I think this massive inability to mobilize and to recruit
[59:47] SPEAKER_01: has led them to become reliant on the UAE strategy,
[59:50] SPEAKER_01: which is to say if we can't develop a domestic consensus within Sudan,
[59:55] we can kind of make a ring of fire outside of Sudan and take
[59:59] over the country by
[1:00:00] SPEAKER_01: basically cutting off the country,
[1:00:02] SPEAKER_01: placing the entire country under siege.
[1:00:04] And this becomes a little bit clearer when you look at just a
[1:00:07] number of the kind of
[1:00:08] SPEAKER_01: investment in corporate and political ties the Emiratis have,
[1:00:11] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:00:11] They have significant investments in the Egyptians,
[1:00:13] who again,
[1:00:14] who are broke.
[1:00:15] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:00:16] SPEAKER_01: The Egyptians have an army, but they don't have much else.
[1:00:19] SPEAKER_01: And that army is not allowed to do anything besides,
[1:00:21] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:00:21] SPEAKER_01: disappearing people for,
[1:00:22] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:00:23] SPEAKER_01: waving a Palestinian flag or whatever.
[1:00:24] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:00:25] SPEAKER_01: The Libyans,
[1:00:27] SPEAKER_01: the Emiratis are quite close to the Libyans through Haftar,
[1:00:30] SPEAKER_01: through this kind of paramilitary warlord.
[1:00:33] SPEAKER_01: They're close with the Tashadian government,
[1:00:34] SPEAKER_01: as well as various paramilitary groups that exist in Tashad.
[1:00:37] SPEAKER_01: They are now close with Puttland.
[1:00:40] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:00:40] Which is has become a kind of de facto breakaway state of
[1:00:43] Somalia and Somaliland.
[1:00:46] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:00:47] SPEAKER_01: And they've been developing ties with Kenya,
[1:00:50] which has been a long time also kind of co-conspirator in the
[1:00:53] kind of war on terror
[1:00:54] SPEAKER_01: securitization strategy that the U.S.
[1:00:56] SPEAKER_01: picks up after 2001.
[1:00:57] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:00:59] SPEAKER_01: And with Uganda and with South Sudan,
[1:01:02] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:01:02] SPEAKER_01: Salva Kiir,
[1:01:03] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[1:01:04] SPEAKER_01: was just in the United Arab Emirates.
[1:01:07] SPEAKER_01: And there is a number of critics,
[1:01:09] SPEAKER_01: especially associated with Nuer ethnic groups,
[1:01:11] who have been arrested in the Emirates on what I think is
[1:01:14] probably the political
[1:01:15] SPEAKER_01: demands of Selva Kir.
[1:01:16] So the Emirates has been able to establish this ring across
[1:01:19] basically all of
[1:01:20] SPEAKER_01: Sudan's more Indian countries.
[1:01:21] SPEAKER_01: I should also mention Ethiopia as well,
[1:01:24] where the Emirates became really crucial for bringing in the
[1:01:26] drones that allowed
[1:01:27] them to turn the tide of the wars between Ethiopia and Tigray
[1:01:32] and the eventual
[1:01:33] SPEAKER_01: destruction of Tigray.
[1:01:35] This has meant that the RSF has been able to do a kind of PR
[1:01:41] round by working off
[1:01:43] of these various governments or these various parastatal
[1:01:46] entities who give it some
[1:01:48] SPEAKER_01: level of legitimacy.
[1:01:49] SPEAKER_01: This government of peace and unity, tahsis, is usually what we call it.
[1:01:55] SPEAKER_01: because it was made by the founding alliance, was established in Kenya.
[1:01:59] SPEAKER_01: It's a government that weds the RSF with a faction of the SPLM,
[1:02:03] SPEAKER_01: the SPLM North,
[1:02:05] SPEAKER_01: Al-Hulu's faction,
[1:02:06] SPEAKER_01: Abdulaziz Al-Hulu.
[1:02:07] SPEAKER_01: And currently,
[1:02:08] SPEAKER_01: right now,
[1:02:08] SPEAKER_01: they're actually shelling a part of Kurdifan,
[1:02:12] SPEAKER_01: quite ironically,
[1:02:12] SPEAKER_01: one of the bases originally of the SPLM North.
[1:02:16] SPEAKER_01: and also civilian officials.
[1:02:18] SPEAKER_01: And this also has to do with the afterlife of the civilian technocrats.
[1:02:22] SPEAKER_01: So I mentioned there is the FFC.
[1:02:24] SPEAKER_01: Hamdok briefly comes back into power in 2022 as part of the TSC.
[1:02:30] And this discredits him actually even further in the eyes of
[1:02:33] much of the public,
[1:02:34] SPEAKER_01: because they're asking,
[1:02:35] SPEAKER_01: why are you legitimizing what is clearly the sort of military government?
[1:02:39] SPEAKER_01: And since the FFC, the FFC later became Tegeddam, you mean Ford.
[1:02:46] SPEAKER_01: And then they later changed their name to Samud.
[1:02:48] SPEAKER_01: And part of Samud became Tahsis.
[1:02:50] And Tahsis became the civilian body associated with the
[1:02:54] government of peace and
[1:02:55] SPEAKER_01: unity,
[1:02:56] SPEAKER_01: which is the moniker attributed to the kind of fake state led by the RSF.
[1:03:01] And these spokespeople,
[1:03:04] I think,
[1:03:04] have a lot of influence,
[1:03:05] not internally.
[1:03:07] They have a lot of influence amongst the international
[1:03:09] community and in providing a
[1:03:11] SPEAKER_01: kind of ideological face to the RSF,
[1:03:13] SPEAKER_01: which,
[1:03:13] SPEAKER_01: as I mentioned,
[1:03:14] SPEAKER_01: the way the RSF fights,
[1:03:16] SPEAKER_01: I do not think the RSF is capable of producing a Sudanese state.
[1:03:20] I think that is like one of these basic misunderstandings is
[1:03:22] that it's not a
[1:03:23] SPEAKER_01: question of one bad regime versus another bad regime.
[1:03:27] SPEAKER_01: It is a question between the state or this kind of complete breakdown,
[1:03:34] something that might look more like China back during the early
[1:03:38] 20th century,
[1:03:39] or like Afghanistan after the proliferation of warlords across
[1:03:44] the country.
[1:03:45] And I think that's really something that is kind of bound up
[1:03:48] with the RSF strategy
[1:03:49] SPEAKER_01: of just non-ideological nihilistic violence
[1:03:53] recruiting orphans or bringing in people on threat of execution
[1:03:58] or basically
[1:03:59] attracting criminals and bandits to do whatever they want and
[1:04:02] take whatever they
[1:04:02] SPEAKER_01: want.
[1:04:03] There is no kind of organizational or ideological glue within
[1:04:06] the RSF that is
[1:04:06] SPEAKER_01: capable of producing an administrative body.
[1:04:09] So the civilians and this government of peace and unity play
[1:04:12] this really big PR
[1:04:13] SPEAKER_01: campaign to go to the international community and say,
[1:04:15] SPEAKER_01: well,
[1:04:16] SPEAKER_01: look,
[1:04:17] Now you can't accuse this – I mean one of the claims of the SAF
[1:04:21] is that this is a
[1:04:21] SPEAKER_01: war between the army and a militia.
[1:04:25] SPEAKER_01: It's not a war between two equal partners.
[1:04:26] SPEAKER_01: So now they say, no, no, no.
[1:04:27] SPEAKER_01: This is a war between a government and a government.
[1:04:32] This is a war between the Sudanese government or the Port Sudan
[1:04:35] government or the
[1:04:36] SPEAKER_01: state of 56 and the government of peace and unity.
[1:04:39] And so they've been able to make some inroads in terms of the
[1:04:42] international community.
[1:04:43] The African Union has largely played either a neutral or
[1:04:48] vaguely actually pro-RSEF
[1:04:49] SPEAKER_01: role in their interventions vis-a-vis Sudan.
[1:04:52] SPEAKER_01: And we see now with the ceasefire negotiations, quote unquote,
[1:04:56] They're positioned in such a way that you would really imagine
[1:05:00] everything that's
[1:05:00] going on in Sudan really is the sort of civil war between these
[1:05:05] two respective
[1:05:06] SPEAKER_01: co-equal factions.
[1:05:07] SPEAKER_01: It's the neutral mediators or the Quad,
[1:05:09] SPEAKER_01: which is the United States,
[1:05:10] SPEAKER_01: which is Egypt,
[1:05:11] SPEAKER_01: which is Saudi Arabia,
[1:05:12] SPEAKER_01: and which is the United Arab Emirates.
[1:05:14] SPEAKER_01: And I think really to negotiate an end to this war,
[1:05:16] you would need the United Arab Emirates to be sitting in the
[1:05:19] chair across from the
[1:05:20] SPEAKER_01: Sudanese army.
[1:05:21] SPEAKER_01: You wouldn't need the RSF sitting there.
[1:05:23] SPEAKER_01: So unfortunately,
[1:05:24] I do think this government of peace and unity will provide them
[1:05:28] some international
[1:05:29] claims to legitimacy or at least the capacity to appear as a
[1:05:33] organizational
[1:05:34] SPEAKER_01: administrative body capable of ruling a kind of functioning state.
[1:05:38] It will not actually establish anything like an administrative
[1:05:41] body,
[1:05:41] I don't think,
[1:05:42] right?
[1:05:43] SPEAKER_01: We can just take a look at what's happening in the fascia.
[1:05:45] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:05:46] SPEAKER_01: Where thousands have been executed.
[1:05:48] SPEAKER_01: We're through satellite imagery.
[1:05:49] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:05:50] We're able to see pools of blood swelling around the cities
[1:05:53] where 250,000 people
[1:05:54] SPEAKER_01: have basically been locked in and slaughtered on mass.
[1:05:58] SPEAKER_01: And that,
[1:05:58] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:05:59] I think is a kind of testament to the particular type of
[1:06:03] economies that can foster
[1:06:04] a state and the particular type of economies that can
[1:06:06] disintegrate a state.
[1:06:08] Part of the story of Sudan and the longer dere is that you have
[1:06:12] something that's
[1:06:13] SPEAKER_01: very typical to a lot of the Middle East and in Africa,
[1:06:15] SPEAKER_01: which is this growing non-governance of the state.
[1:06:18] SPEAKER_01: Especially under neoliberalization,
[1:06:20] the state retreats from further and further significant
[1:06:23] segments of the economy,
[1:06:25] SPEAKER_01: from providing certain services that are key to social reproduction,
[1:06:28] SPEAKER_01: from being able to...
[1:06:30] SPEAKER_01: even kind of have the fiction of having a border or something like that.
[1:06:33] SPEAKER_01: And now, in turn, the RSF is basically dealing the final blow.
[1:06:38] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:06:38] they're really just kind of breaking apart the idea of any kind
[1:06:41] of functioning
[1:06:42] SPEAKER_01: state existing in Sudan from now on.
[1:06:45] SPEAKER_01: And it's fine with Hameti and his brothers,
[1:06:46] SPEAKER_01: because Hameti and his brothers are,
[1:06:48] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:06:48] SPEAKER_01: they're hanging out in the Emirates,
[1:06:50] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:06:50] SPEAKER_01: They're in like Abu Dhabi.
[1:06:52] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:06:53] SPEAKER_01: And with a number of the mercenaries who are fighting in the RSF,
[1:06:59] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:06:59] they can go back to their tribal community or they can leave
[1:07:03] Sudan's formal borders
[1:07:05] SPEAKER_01: to one respective territory or another.
[1:07:07] SPEAKER_01: Or they don't really have future.
[1:07:09] SPEAKER_01: They don't really think about the future in that way.
[1:07:11] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:07:11] SPEAKER_01: Besides kind of immediate gains.
[1:07:14] SPEAKER_01: All of this raises the question of the United States, right?
[1:07:17] SPEAKER_01: We've talked about a lot of foreign involvement, Russia, Iran.
[1:07:22] SPEAKER_01: Where are the Americans in all of this?
[1:07:24] SPEAKER_01: Because on the one hand,
[1:07:27] you have a situation where it seems like the US has not really
[1:07:31] taken much of an
[1:07:32] SPEAKER_01: interest in Sudan,
[1:07:33] or at least just contracted out its policies to some of its
[1:07:38] sub-imperial players in
[1:07:40] SPEAKER_01: the region.
[1:07:41] SPEAKER_01: On the other hand,
[1:07:42] you have the Biden administration declaring what the RSF is
[1:07:47] doing as a genocide.
[1:07:49] Everyone knows that the RSF is a sponsored group of Emiratis
[1:07:52] who are our ally in
[1:07:54] SPEAKER_01: the region,
[1:07:54] SPEAKER_01: our sub-imperial player.
[1:07:55] SPEAKER_01: So what are the Americans doing?
[1:07:57] Is the breakdown of the Sudanese state in their interest,
[1:08:01] or is it simply not a priority?
[1:08:03] And are they oriented towards defensive Israel and advancing
[1:08:07] their objectives
[1:08:09] SPEAKER_01: vis-a-vis the Gulf states?
[1:08:10] SPEAKER_01: I think this is a moment of hegemonic fraying and transition.
[1:08:15] SPEAKER_01: So I think sometimes when we talk about interests,
[1:08:18] SPEAKER_01: we talk about the idea of like,
[1:08:20] SPEAKER_01: here's a coherent,
[1:08:21] unified body with different fractions of the economic elites or
[1:08:25] different fractions
[1:08:25] SPEAKER_01: of the bourgeoisie,
[1:08:27] kind of agreeing that there is something that mutually benefits
[1:08:31] all of the
[1:08:31] SPEAKER_01: respective parties.
[1:08:33] And I think in the case of something like a hegemonic collapse
[1:08:35] or a hegemonic
[1:08:36] SPEAKER_01: transition,
[1:08:37] SPEAKER_01: all that glue starts to fray or starts to disappear,
[1:08:40] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:08:40] SPEAKER_01: It's like a solvent.
[1:08:42] SPEAKER_01: And there is...
[1:08:44] Not necessarily a notion of at least one singular rationality
[1:08:47] or reason,
[1:08:48] right?
[1:08:49] SPEAKER_01: Where the U.S.
[1:08:50] SPEAKER_01: strategically is kind of thinking is that to ameliorate its issues,
[1:08:54] SPEAKER_01: to resolve its hegemonic decline,
[1:08:56] it really needs to be able to wage a successful triumph over
[1:09:00] the East in Eurasia,
[1:09:02] SPEAKER_01: basically,
[1:09:02] SPEAKER_01: Russia and China in particular.
[1:09:05] And I think China,
[1:09:07] China,
[1:09:07] China,
[1:09:07] especially right now is kind of coming to be the like
[1:09:10] converging glue between both the Democrats and the Republicans
[1:09:14] as this like entity,
[1:09:15] SPEAKER_01: which it is,
[1:09:16] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:09:16] fair to blame all of your ills on manufacturing decline and
[1:09:20] fentanyl and drug abuse
[1:09:21] SPEAKER_01: and everything,
[1:09:22] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:09:22] everything in the world is basically the fault of the Chinese
[1:09:24] from the American
[1:09:25] SPEAKER_01: perspective.
[1:09:26] SPEAKER_01: And that realization,
[1:09:27] I think it arguably in the kind of inchoate form starts to
[1:09:31] emerge in the 2000s.
[1:09:32] SPEAKER_01: There's this big discourse around the pivot to Asia, but
[1:09:35] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[1:09:36] constantly the pivot to Asia just becomes another round of
[1:09:39] extending the war on
[1:09:39] SPEAKER_01: terror.
[1:09:40] SPEAKER_01: But definitely by the first Trump administration and then by the Biden
[1:09:44] SPEAKER_01: administration,
[1:09:45] SPEAKER_01: there are a number of high ranking strategists,
[1:09:48] executive officials who really believe that pursuing an all out
[1:09:52] competition or
[1:09:53] potentially war against China is the thing that will be able to
[1:09:56] reestablish the
[1:09:57] SPEAKER_01: U.S.'
[1:09:57] 's role in the world and its role in the grander kind of
[1:10:01] cosmology,
[1:10:02] you know.
[1:10:03] SPEAKER_01: And in that respect,
[1:10:04] Africa becomes a sort of second fiddle terrain in the sense
[1:10:08] that there are a few
[1:10:10] things that can motivate the Americans about the African
[1:10:13] continent or African
[1:10:14] SPEAKER_01: states on their own.
[1:10:16] SPEAKER_01: Unlike the Europeans,
[1:10:16] SPEAKER_01: for example,
[1:10:17] SPEAKER_01: the Americans don't even share a small negligible oceanic border,
[1:10:22] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:10:23] So migration is not a particular concern to the Americans in
[1:10:26] the same way that it
[1:10:26] SPEAKER_01: might be for the Europeans.
[1:10:28] SPEAKER_01: And there are places,
[1:10:29] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[1:10:29] SPEAKER_01: where if there are corporate ties,
[1:10:31] SPEAKER_01: like direct corporate investments of American companies,
[1:10:33] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:10:33] maybe that's something that makes a country in Africa quite
[1:10:36] important for the
[1:10:36] SPEAKER_01: Americans.
[1:10:37] But lo and behold,
[1:10:38] their corporate investments in Africa are actually quite
[1:10:41] middling,
[1:10:41] right?
[1:10:42] SPEAKER_01: US corporate investments in Africa are actually quite middling.
[1:10:45] There are moments in which African states can become important
[1:10:48] because they become
[1:10:50] SPEAKER_01: territories or they become conflict zones of American opponents.
[1:10:56] If China develops extensive ties with an African administration
[1:10:59] or something like
[1:10:59] SPEAKER_01: that,
[1:11:00] that African administration gains preeminence in American eyes
[1:11:04] solely because it's
[1:11:05] associated with an enemy of ours or we perceive it to be
[1:11:07] associated with an enemy
[1:11:08] SPEAKER_01: of ours.
[1:11:10] SPEAKER_01: I would also caution people to think about
[1:11:12] a lot of these African regimes are not necessarily ideological
[1:11:16] in the sense we
[1:11:16] SPEAKER_01: might think of the 1960s and the 1970s either,
[1:11:19] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:11:19] SPEAKER_01: And then finally,
[1:11:21] there also becomes a sort of importance given to these African
[1:11:24] territories if
[1:11:26] SPEAKER_01: crucial nodes in the American network perceive them as relevant.
[1:11:30] And especially if it's crucial for maintaining these nodes as
[1:11:32] kind of purchase in
[1:11:33] the greater kind of Cold War dynamic that the US is kind of
[1:11:36] leading right now.
[1:11:37] SPEAKER_01: And I think that's where Sudan kind of falls into this last category.
[1:11:40] SPEAKER_01: where Sudan is not an important country for the United States.
[1:11:44] SPEAKER_01: The UAE is an important country for the United States.
[1:11:46] SPEAKER_01: The UAE is an important country for the United States.
[1:11:48] SPEAKER_01: Not only is it a petro state,
[1:11:49] SPEAKER_01: not only is it a massive,
[1:11:51] massive conduit of financial capital and a massive kind of
[1:11:53] entrepelt in the current
[1:11:55] SPEAKER_01: world system,
[1:11:55] SPEAKER_01: but it's also a state that wields two geopolitical pieces of leverage.
[1:12:01] One is that it's the Arab state that seems to be most
[1:12:04] explicitly associated with a
[1:12:05] SPEAKER_01: Zionist entity.
[1:12:06] SPEAKER_01: I mean, Israel is...
[1:12:08] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[1:12:09] one of the maybe the only places you can find Zionists to go
[1:12:12] crazier than Ben Gavir
[1:12:13] SPEAKER_01: is maybe the United Arab Emirates,
[1:12:14] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:12:15] SPEAKER_01: And they've really gone out of the way,
[1:12:17] SPEAKER_01: especially over the course of this genocide,
[1:12:19] SPEAKER_01: the Gaza genocide,
[1:12:20] to place themselves front and center as the greatest
[1:12:24] coordinators and backers of
[1:12:26] SPEAKER_01: the Israelis.
[1:12:26] SPEAKER_01: Can you find common ground with this administration on Gaza?
[1:12:30] SPEAKER_01: We're going to try.
[1:12:31] SPEAKER_01: I think the current approach is going to be difficult.
[1:12:35] SPEAKER_01: But at the end of the day, we're all in the solution-seeking business.
[1:12:38] SPEAKER_01: We just don't know where it's going to land yet.
[1:12:40] SPEAKER_01: Is the UAE trying to work on a plan?
[1:12:44] SPEAKER_01: An alternative?
[1:12:46] SPEAKER_01: Not yet.
[1:12:47] SPEAKER_01: Not yet.
[1:12:48] SPEAKER_01: I don't see an alternative to what's being proposed.
[1:12:51] SPEAKER_01: I really don't.
[1:12:52] SPEAKER_01: And two,
[1:12:53] SPEAKER_01: actually has to do with the fact of kind of Sino-Emirati integration,
[1:12:57] SPEAKER_01: which is also just a broader feature of Sino-Khaliji integration,
[1:13:00] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:13:01] SPEAKER_01: An integration between the Gulf economies and China.
[1:13:03] SPEAKER_01: The Gulf economies operate not just vis-a-vis the United States,
[1:13:07] SPEAKER_01: they operate across the entire world.
[1:13:08] And many of the people who lead these Gulf states are quite
[1:13:11] interested in China,
[1:13:11] right?
[1:13:12] SPEAKER_01: Not necessarily for ideological reasons,
[1:13:14] SPEAKER_01: but as an economic powerhouse,
[1:13:16] SPEAKER_01: as a productive powerhouse,
[1:13:18] SPEAKER_01: as an investment powerhouse,
[1:13:19] SPEAKER_01: and also as a technological powerhouse.
[1:13:21] This also kind of comes out from the sort of security
[1:13:24] perspective of the Emirates,
[1:13:25] which is that it's unclear what the future of the fossil fuel
[1:13:29] economy will hold.
[1:13:31] SPEAKER_01: So we want to get out ahead of it.
[1:13:32] We want to get out ahead of it by,
[1:13:34] for example,
[1:13:35] greenwashing the Emirati state.
[1:13:37] SPEAKER_01: The Emirates hosted one of the more recent COPs, right?
[1:13:41] SPEAKER_01: I think it was COP28.
[1:13:42] And they're a big investor in these sort of fossil dependent
[1:13:46] so-called kind of
[1:13:47] SPEAKER_01: green investments around hydrogen,
[1:13:50] SPEAKER_01: for example.
[1:13:51] SPEAKER_01: But they've also kind of integrated themselves with Chinese development.
[1:13:55] SPEAKER_01: And they worry,
[1:13:56] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[1:13:58] SPEAKER_01: and we might say this is an exaggeration on their part,
[1:14:01] but I think it is a worry definitely on the part of the
[1:14:03] Emiratis that a US
[1:14:06] government or a Western government that falls into the hands of
[1:14:10] Islamogochisma,
[1:14:11] SPEAKER_01: this coalition of Islamists and leftists,
[1:14:14] SPEAKER_01: really could turn their backs on them.
[1:14:15] They've been,
[1:14:16] for example,
[1:14:17] talking about the UK being overrun by the Muslim Brotherhood.
[1:14:20] There will come a day that we will see far more radical
[1:14:25] extremists and terrorists
[1:14:28] SPEAKER_02: coming out of Europe because of lack of decision-making,
[1:14:35] SPEAKER_02: trying to be politically correct,
[1:14:38] or assuming that they know the Middle East and they know Islam
[1:14:43] and they know the
[1:14:44] SPEAKER_02: others far better than we do.
[1:14:46] And I think a lot of that fear really does seem to be that if
[1:14:48] there is a government
[1:14:49] SPEAKER_01: that comes into power in one of these states,
[1:14:51] SPEAKER_01: which at least even nominally starts talking about human rights again,
[1:14:56] this could mean frayed ties and particular sanctions for what
[1:14:59] is basically a series
[1:15:00] SPEAKER_01: of small city-states connected by desert.
[1:15:04] SPEAKER_01: So there is this attempt to territorially expand themselves.
[1:15:08] SPEAKER_01: And the Emirates is not just a massive gold purchaser from Sudan,
[1:15:11] SPEAKER_01: they're a massive gold purchaser from all of Africa.
[1:15:15] They might be the single biggest purchaser of gold from the
[1:15:17] African continent.
[1:15:19] SPEAKER_01: They've become really geopolitically active in a number of areas.
[1:15:23] I mean,
[1:15:24] they're there front and center in the siege and destruction of
[1:15:26] Yemen.
[1:15:29] SPEAKER_01: And they become really important actors in Libya.
[1:15:33] SPEAKER_01: And they end up becoming not drivers,
[1:15:35] but they become really important actors for turning the ties of
[1:15:37] war in Ethiopia in
[1:15:39] SPEAKER_01: favor of Rabbi Ahmed.
[1:15:40] So I think also part of this from the Emirati perspective has
[1:15:43] to do with the
[1:15:45] perception that this is also their opportunity to finally get
[1:15:49] out from under the
[1:15:49] SPEAKER_01: shadow of Saudi Arabia.
[1:15:52] And that they're no longer going to have their foreign policy
[1:15:54] being kind of
[1:15:54] dictated to them or their position in the world dictated to
[1:15:56] them by the big
[1:15:57] SPEAKER_01: powerhouse in the Khalij.
[1:15:59] SPEAKER_01: So the American perspective,
[1:16:01] SPEAKER_01: right,
[1:16:01] SPEAKER_01: getting back to the Americans here,
[1:16:03] SPEAKER_01: is that the Emirates is an important country.
[1:16:05] It is important to have an Emirati purchase for the Zionist
[1:16:08] extermination of the Arab region.
[1:16:10] It is important to have an Emirati purchase for a potential
[1:16:13] Cold War against China.
[1:16:15] SPEAKER_01: It is important to keep the Emirates at a certain arm's length.
[1:16:17] SPEAKER_01: This is especially true of the Biden administration.
[1:16:19] SPEAKER_01: It might be a little bit different with the Trump administration.
[1:16:21] To keep them at arm's length from the Russians,
[1:16:23] who they also have ties with,
[1:16:24] right?
[1:16:24] Sudan has nothing that elevates itself to a geostrategic value
[1:16:30] in the eyes of
[1:16:30] American populists or imperialists or these kind of State
[1:16:35] Department millenarians,
[1:16:36] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:16:37] I think that's something that's become really kind of
[1:16:39] significant in shifting the way the U.S.
[1:16:42] SPEAKER_01: intervenes or chooses not to intervene in a number of African theaters.
[1:16:46] These theaters really can't justify themselves off of
[1:16:50] humanitarian grounds.
[1:16:51] SPEAKER_01: They can't justify themselves off of moral grounds.
[1:16:53] They can't justify themselves usually even off of their
[1:16:55] economic capacities,
[1:16:56] right?
[1:16:57] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:16:57] SPEAKER_01: one of the things with even rare earth minerals,
[1:16:59] SPEAKER_01: even though a lot of people talk about rare earth minerals,
[1:17:00] SPEAKER_01: is that a lot of these things are substitutable.
[1:17:03] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[1:17:03] you can usually find another place to get rare earth minerals
[1:17:06] if you can't find it
[1:17:07] SPEAKER_01: in one location.
[1:17:07] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:17:08] SPEAKER_01: So they don't have a choke point quite like oil.
[1:17:11] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:17:11] SPEAKER_01: You know,
[1:17:11] SPEAKER_01: back in the 70s and the 60s,
[1:17:13] there are all these like third world dependency economists who
[1:17:16] are suggesting these
[1:17:17] SPEAKER_01: kind of really kind of radical nationalization maneuvers,
[1:17:20] SPEAKER_01: kind of like OPEC.
[1:17:22] And there was at one point an OPEC or a cartel for bananas,
[1:17:25] and it completely failed.
[1:17:27] And it was because you can actually find bananas in a number of
[1:17:30] locations.
[1:17:30] SPEAKER_01: And even if you can't find them there,
[1:17:32] you can create the right kind of GMOs to grow bananas in
[1:17:36] particular locales.
[1:17:38] And so I think a lot of these states struggle with making
[1:17:41] themselves important to
[1:17:42] the Americans without weaving themselves into the narrative of
[1:17:46] grand messianic
[1:17:47] SPEAKER_01: American war.
[1:17:49] And that's why the Emirates is kind of such a crucial actor
[1:17:51] here is that it's
[1:17:52] SPEAKER_01: basically been able to say,
[1:17:53] we need you and you are going to have to basically look the
[1:17:57] other way when it comes
[1:17:59] SPEAKER_01: to the RSF.
[1:18:00] SPEAKER_01: And so what the Biden administration did,
[1:18:02] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[1:18:02] SPEAKER_01: they produced this report basically saying there's a genocide happening,
[1:18:05] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:18:07] And then the way they responded to that is that they put
[1:18:10] sanctions on one of these
[1:18:12] SPEAKER_01: brigades,
[1:18:13] SPEAKER_01: Qatayb Barah ibn Malik or whatever,
[1:18:16] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:18:16] SPEAKER_01: One of these Islamist brigades associated with the Sydney's army.
[1:18:19] SPEAKER_01: Like that was the like direct one,
[1:18:21] SPEAKER_01: two was to say,
[1:18:22] SPEAKER_01: well,
[1:18:22] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:18:23] SPEAKER_01: the RSF is committing genocide.
[1:18:24] SPEAKER_01: So we've sanctioned this like paramilitary associated with the opposite
[1:18:28] SPEAKER_01: belligerent,
[1:18:29] SPEAKER_01: right,
[1:18:29] SPEAKER_01: or the opposite actor in this war.
[1:18:31] SPEAKER_01: And so I think that really kind of came out of this need for the Biden
[1:18:35] SPEAKER_01: administration to maintain,
[1:18:37] SPEAKER_01: in their own view,
[1:18:38] SPEAKER_01: at least some,
[1:18:40] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:18:40] SPEAKER_01: ounce of rules based international orderism,
[1:18:43] SPEAKER_01: whatever that might mean.
[1:18:44] SPEAKER_01: In a statement,
[1:18:45] Blinken said the RSF and allied militias have systematically
[1:18:48] murdered men and boys,
[1:18:50] SPEAKER_01: even infants,
[1:18:51] on an ethnic basis and deliberately targeted women and girls
[1:18:55] from certain ethnic
[1:18:56] SPEAKER_01: groups for rape and other forms of brutal sexual violence.
[1:19:00] Blinken accused those same militias of targeting and murdering
[1:19:03] innocent people,
[1:19:04] escaping conflict and preventing civilians from accessing
[1:19:08] life-saving supplies.
[1:19:10] SPEAKER_01: But it doesn't translate to anything significantly.
[1:19:14] And I think it won't translate to anything significantly for
[1:19:16] the simple fact that
[1:19:17] SPEAKER_01: the Emirates is actually an important state for U.S.'
[1:19:20] SPEAKER_01: 's geopolitical strategic interests,
[1:19:22] SPEAKER_01: vis-a-vis Israel,
[1:19:23] SPEAKER_01: vis-a-vis China,
[1:19:25] SPEAKER_01: and also just as a financial hub.
[1:19:26] SPEAKER_01: I mean, with the Trump stuff, it's also true.
[1:19:28] SPEAKER_01: The Emirates could also probably buy Trump some very nice private jets.
[1:19:32] SPEAKER_01: And that might be enough.
[1:19:34] SPEAKER_01: I don't think Sudan could afford something like that.
[1:19:37] So I think that's how the US kind of acts vis-a-vis these
[1:19:40] entire dimensions.
[1:19:42] SPEAKER_01: And now in the sort of like Nobel Peace Prize push,
[1:19:45] SPEAKER_01: we're not going to be a war of government,
[1:19:46] SPEAKER_01: blah,
[1:19:47] SPEAKER_01: blah,
[1:19:47] SPEAKER_01: blah,
[1:19:47] SPEAKER_01: blah,
[1:19:49] SPEAKER_01: shenanigans brought forth by the Trump administration.
[1:19:51] The Emirates has dangled forth the idea that they could win
[1:19:54] another ceasefire.
[1:19:56] SPEAKER_01: They could win another peace negotiation, right?
[1:19:58] SPEAKER_01: And as we've seen in Gaza,
[1:20:00] SPEAKER_01: The ceasefire is a farce.
[1:20:02] SPEAKER_01: It's entirely asymmetrical, like the ceasefire in Lebanon.
[1:20:07] The Trump administration has been doing this weird victory
[1:20:09] round of collecting ceasefires.
[1:20:11] I don't know if you also saw the skirmishes between Cambodia
[1:20:13] and Thailand.
[1:20:15] SPEAKER_01: But I believe that was negotiated in Malaysia.
[1:20:17] SPEAKER_01: And I think they went to Malaysia and they said, hey...
[1:20:20] SPEAKER_01: no,
[1:20:21] we're not going to negotiate tariffs with you unless you give
[1:20:24] us the credit for the
[1:20:24] SPEAKER_01: negotiations you negotiated between Cambodia and Thailand.
[1:20:30] And so now the Emirates are saying,
[1:20:32] well,
[1:20:32] look,
[1:20:33] you could get another PR victory.
[1:20:35] You could be one step closer to getting the Nobel Peace Prize
[1:20:38] if you are able to
[1:20:39] SPEAKER_01: negotiate a truce in Sudan.
[1:20:40] SPEAKER_01: And that's certainly being backed by a number of these,
[1:20:43] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[1:20:44] SPEAKER_01: highly discredited technocratic civilian officials.
[1:20:47] SPEAKER_01: But the ceasefire in the case of Sudan,
[1:20:50] SPEAKER_01: you know, in the case of Palestine, is a cover.
[1:20:55] SPEAKER_01: It's not a ceasefire that actually resolves anything.
[1:20:58] SPEAKER_01: It's not a ceasefire that seems to actually advance peace, right?
[1:21:01] What I think the ceasefire is meant to do is to consolidate the
[1:21:04] RSF's victories,
[1:21:05] SPEAKER_01: recent victories in Al-Fashir,
[1:21:07] SPEAKER_01: the taking over Baara in Kordofan,
[1:21:09] which was taken back by the Sudanese army in September and then
[1:21:13] taken back by the
[1:21:13] SPEAKER_01: RSF,
[1:21:14] SPEAKER_01: basically right after Al-Fashir.
[1:21:16] SPEAKER_01: And now the RSF is looking to consolidate its logistical chain.
[1:21:21] And there are lots of shipments coming in from Bosasa,
[1:21:24] the city in Putland.
[1:21:25] SPEAKER_01: You know, I think it's being transported to Chad.
[1:21:28] SPEAKER_01: And then from Tishad, it's being brought into the RSF's holdings.
[1:21:31] SPEAKER_01: So they want time to reconsolidate,
[1:21:34] SPEAKER_01: especially now that they have Bada,
[1:21:35] SPEAKER_01: because they're saying quite openly in Arabic,
[1:21:38] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:21:38] SPEAKER_01: now that we have Bada,
[1:21:39] SPEAKER_01: we can go for Al-Obeyid in Khurzufan.
[1:21:41] SPEAKER_01: And from Al-Obeyid, we can go back to Umdurman.
[1:21:44] SPEAKER_01: And we can go back to the capital.
[1:21:46] SPEAKER_01: So the ceasefire here is a cover.
[1:21:50] SPEAKER_01: It's a cover.
[1:21:52] And that's the thing that I think is also really kind of
[1:21:54] dispiriting because,
[1:21:55] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[1:21:56] SPEAKER_01: everyone wants peace.
[1:21:57] SPEAKER_01: Everyone wants justice and equity.
[1:21:59] SPEAKER_01: Everyone wants this war to end.
[1:22:01] But at the same time,
[1:22:04] this feels like an extension of the war rather than its
[1:22:07] opposite.
[1:22:08] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[1:22:09] SPEAKER_01: Which is a dynamic that, yeah, as you mentioned, we're very familiar.
[1:22:12] SPEAKER_01: Gaza ceasefire from the Iranian,
[1:22:14] SPEAKER_01: quote unquote,
[1:22:14] SPEAKER_01: ceasefire,
[1:22:15] SPEAKER_01: which people are expecting to reignite any day now,
[1:22:17] SPEAKER_01: you know.
[1:22:18] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[1:22:18] And I think,
[1:22:19] yeah,
[1:22:19] I mean,
[1:22:19] you're naming something very significant about this moment.
[1:22:23] SPEAKER_01: And we've been talking about war and armed conflict,
[1:22:26] but I think it's also important to bring in that these are not
[1:22:29] the only threats to
[1:22:30] SPEAKER_01: the Sudanese people right now,
[1:22:31] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:22:32] We have widespread famine,
[1:22:34] the outbreak of a number of diseases,
[1:22:36] cholera,
[1:22:37] malaria,
[1:22:38] dengue.
[1:22:39] And so what does the continuation of hostilities mean also for
[1:22:43] the civilian
[1:22:44] SPEAKER_01: population that's facing all of these other threats as well?
[1:22:46] SPEAKER_01: By the beginning of the war,
[1:22:48] the weight of associational organizations had shifted away from
[1:22:51] the resistance
[1:22:52] SPEAKER_01: committees to these emergency response rooms,
[1:22:54] SPEAKER_01: which had some connections with the resistance committees and the like,
[1:22:56] SPEAKER_01: but
[1:22:57] really were kind of created to directly address the forms of
[1:23:01] violence being
[1:23:02] inflicted directly or indirectly in many of the cities and
[1:23:05] countrysides of Sudan.
[1:23:07] And these would sometimes be like kind of bottom-up
[1:23:09] associational clinics where,
[1:23:11] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:23:12] people would kind of volunteer their efforts to be able to help
[1:23:15] people to provide
[1:23:15] SPEAKER_01: grain,
[1:23:17] sometimes to kind of engage in voluntary work visa agricultural
[1:23:22] production,
[1:23:22] SPEAKER_01: especially in places like Ejizira and Qasara.
[1:23:25] The current dynamic is that much of Sudan is facing a massive
[1:23:31] kind of crisis of famine,
[1:23:32] right?
[1:23:33] SPEAKER_01: I mean, hunger is a defining feature of this war.
[1:23:36] The RSF has been able to cut off so many choke points to bring
[1:23:40] in international aid.
[1:23:42] SPEAKER_01: The Sydney's army is not particularly...
[1:23:46] SPEAKER_01: They're there to help drive or develop, to push for agricultural yields.
[1:23:50] SPEAKER_01: Their capacity to import in grains is quite limited.
[1:23:54] SPEAKER_01: Many people have been left to fend for themselves.
[1:23:58] SPEAKER_01: On one hand,
[1:23:59] the international community sees this as an issue that's
[1:24:03] divorced from the politics
[1:24:04] SPEAKER_01: of war and from...
[1:24:06] maybe the war itself so sometimes weirdly enough you just read
[1:24:08] these reports where
[1:24:09] you know the entire emphasis seems to be like we need to be
[1:24:11] able to get in
[1:24:12] fertilizers into sedan and we need to be able to address
[1:24:16] certain seasonal droughts
[1:24:17] and the like and all these very kind of technical scientific or
[1:24:21] engineering kind of
[1:24:22] dilemmas which are posing a question for agricultural
[1:24:25] production many of them are
[1:24:26] SPEAKER_01: kind of disinterested in the popular campaigns being led by farmers
[1:24:32] SPEAKER_01: to really try to feed the country as best as they can,
[1:24:37] SPEAKER_01: especially when they've been able to reclaim territory from the RSF.
[1:24:41] SPEAKER_01: Meanwhile,
[1:24:41] SPEAKER_01: in RSF territory,
[1:24:43] SPEAKER_01: the RSF,
[1:24:44] I mentioned this about the kind of extractive economies that
[1:24:46] are bound up with it.
[1:24:47] SPEAKER_01: They simply can't facilitate agricultural production.
[1:24:50] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:24:50] SPEAKER_01: agricultural production is absolutely compatible with exploitation,
[1:24:55] SPEAKER_01: capitalist exploitation.
[1:24:57] SPEAKER_01: But there are certain limits, right?
[1:24:59] SPEAKER_01: You need things like water.
[1:25:01] SPEAKER_01: You need irrigation.
[1:25:02] SPEAKER_01: You need seeds.
[1:25:04] SPEAKER_01: You need, most importantly, people.
[1:25:07] SPEAKER_01: You can't be mass displacing everyone.
[1:25:10] or mass slaughtering everyone and expect agricultural yields to
[1:25:14] sustain themselves,
[1:25:15] right?
[1:25:16] SPEAKER_01: So agriculture has collapsed everywhere where the RSF has taken over.
[1:25:19] SPEAKER_01: And in particular,
[1:25:20] also because of the way livelihoods and social reproduction are
[1:25:25] bound up with
[1:25:26] SPEAKER_01: so-called tribal identities in parts where the RSF is strong,
[1:25:29] SPEAKER_01: like Darfur,
[1:25:30] they have a particular interest in making sure farmers can't
[1:25:33] come back to their
[1:25:34] SPEAKER_01: land.
[1:25:34] If it's agricultural yields are allowing a Zagawa or Mesali to
[1:25:39] come back and lay
[1:25:41] SPEAKER_01: claim to their land,
[1:25:42] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:25:42] SPEAKER_01: they're going to choose to sacrifice the agricultural yields.
[1:25:45] SPEAKER_01: The army,
[1:25:46] SPEAKER_01: on the other hand,
[1:25:47] SPEAKER_01: really is not interested so much in,
[1:25:50] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:25:51] SPEAKER_01: really making this grand mobilization around agricultural production.
[1:25:55] SPEAKER_01: So a lot of it has kind of come up from the bottom.
[1:25:57] SPEAKER_01: The army where it's kind of intervened in economies,
[1:25:59] SPEAKER_01: ironically enough,
[1:25:59] SPEAKER_01: has been in the minerals economy,
[1:26:01] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:26:03] SPEAKER_01: where they've established, and Conda as well.
[1:26:05] SPEAKER_01: There have been a number of contracts where they've established basically
[1:26:10] military-connected contractors to come back to foster
[1:26:15] quote-unquote official
[1:26:16] SPEAKER_01: above-ground mineral mining,
[1:26:18] which doesn't look that different from unofficial below-ground
[1:26:22] mineral mining under
[1:26:23] SPEAKER_01: the RSF,
[1:26:24] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:26:25] SPEAKER_01: But at least agricultural production has,
[1:26:28] SPEAKER_01: by bottom-up energies,
[1:26:29] SPEAKER_01: really come back in parts held by the army,
[1:26:33] SPEAKER_01: reclaimed against the RSF.
[1:26:36] SPEAKER_01: Medically, Sudan is facing this large coterie of medical ills.
[1:26:43] SPEAKER_01: Disease is obviously being fostered for a number of reasons.
[1:26:46] SPEAKER_01: People don't have shelter.
[1:26:48] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:26:48] SPEAKER_01: People are living in tents and camps.
[1:26:50] SPEAKER_01: People don't have access to medical aid.
[1:26:53] SPEAKER_01: And also, you know, it's just a country which is now filled with corpses.
[1:26:56] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:26:57] SPEAKER_01: Which is where there have been reports of scavenger birds,
[1:27:06] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:27:06] SPEAKER_01: being widely seen kind of eating people's corpses or dogs,
[1:27:09] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:27:10] SPEAKER_01: like what happened after the Rwandan genocide.
[1:27:13] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:27:14] SPEAKER_01: And these are perfect kind of, you know, infestation grounds.
[1:27:18] SPEAKER_01: for diseases to transmit to the local population.
[1:27:21] SPEAKER_01: Clean water is completely inaccessible to many people, right?
[1:27:24] They drink what they can,
[1:27:25] but what they can is not great for them,
[1:27:27] similar to Gaza,
[1:27:28] you know?
[1:27:29] I think that has meant that we have a real kind of medical and
[1:27:32] social catastrophe.
[1:27:33] SPEAKER_01: People are fighting back against it, you know?
[1:27:37] SPEAKER_01: But nevertheless, it is a kind of uphill battle.
[1:27:39] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[1:27:39] SPEAKER_01: When you say people are fighting back,
[1:27:41] SPEAKER_01: do you mean like there's political organizing happening or mutual aid?
[1:27:45] SPEAKER_01: It looks like a mix of the two.
[1:27:47] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:27:47] a lot of it seems to rely on this decentralized communal mutual
[1:27:50] aid dynamic,
[1:27:52] which itself has its own kind of legacies embodied in prior
[1:27:57] eras of Sydney's
[1:27:59] SPEAKER_01: resistance,
[1:27:59] SPEAKER_01: but also,
[1:28:00] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[1:28:00] SPEAKER_01: in the revolution of 2018,
[1:28:01] SPEAKER_01: 2019.
[1:28:02] SPEAKER_01: There are political attempts to
[1:28:07] SPEAKER_01: And they're so soft.
[1:28:08] You know,
[1:28:08] their ability to gain – I mean,
[1:28:11] these things run into basic contradictions,
[1:28:12] right?
[1:28:13] Like the government of Sudan is interested in international
[1:28:16] revenue because the
[1:28:17] SPEAKER_01: country is broke.
[1:28:18] SPEAKER_01: And, you know, to wage war, you need to be able to gain money, right?
[1:28:21] But international revenue is not going to come out from
[1:28:24] Sudanese people feeding themselves.
[1:28:26] SPEAKER_01: In fact,
[1:28:28] much of the IMF's recommendations is that you move away from
[1:28:32] certain staples of the
[1:28:33] SPEAKER_01: Sydney's diet to water-intensive,
[1:28:36] SPEAKER_01: export-oriented agriculture.
[1:28:38] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:28:41] SPEAKER_01: And that, again, is not something that's going to feed people.
[1:28:44] SPEAKER_01: Right.
[1:28:44] Making alfalfa so that like cattle in the Gulf can be raised or
[1:28:48] whatever is not the
[1:28:49] SPEAKER_01: same thing as producing sorghum,
[1:28:51] SPEAKER_01: which is,
[1:28:52] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:28:52] SPEAKER_01: used in,
[1:28:53] SPEAKER_01: sorry,
[1:28:54] SPEAKER_01: acida or mullah,
[1:28:55] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:28:56] like sort of tapioca based dishes that are that are common in
[1:28:59] Sudan or kisra,
[1:29:00] SPEAKER_01: which is kind of like injera,
[1:29:02] SPEAKER_01: quite widely eaten across much of the countryside.
[1:29:04] That's a really difficult dynamic because it poses these
[1:29:07] civilian or agricultural
[1:29:09] SPEAKER_01: interests,
[1:29:10] these kind of working class agricultural interests against both
[1:29:13] the Sydney's
[1:29:15] SPEAKER_01: government and the international community,
[1:29:17] even though these communities also rely on both the Sydney's
[1:29:21] government and the
[1:29:21] SPEAKER_01: international community.
[1:29:23] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:29:24] SPEAKER_01: So it's this weird contradictory relationship.
[1:29:26] SPEAKER_01: And again,
[1:29:27] I'd make the tie somewhat to UNRWA and its relationship to the
[1:29:30] Gossam population,
[1:29:31] where there's a relationship of dependency that is both
[1:29:35] parasitic and negative,
[1:29:36] SPEAKER_01: but also kind of essential.
[1:29:37] SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
[1:29:38] SPEAKER_01: Is there organizing happening in the diaspora,
[1:29:41] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:29:41] SPEAKER_01: either political or aid-based organizing that people should be aware of?
[1:29:45] SPEAKER_01: I think there are lots of strands.
[1:29:47] And part of the difficulty of parsing through these strands is
[1:29:50] that people simply
[1:29:52] SPEAKER_01: just have very different,
[1:29:53] radically distinctive images of what should be done and what is
[1:29:57] even the issue.
[1:29:58] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:29:58] SPEAKER_01: so there's,
[1:29:59] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[1:29:59] SPEAKER_01: a lot of this talk around like,
[1:30:01] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:30:01] SPEAKER_01: Sudan's a civil war or no,
[1:30:02] SPEAKER_01: no,
[1:30:02] SPEAKER_01: no,
[1:30:02] SPEAKER_01: no,
[1:30:03] SPEAKER_01: no,
[1:30:03] SPEAKER_01: Sudan's an imperial war.
[1:30:04] SPEAKER_01: Or no, no, no, no, no.
[1:30:05] Sudan's like a illegitimate war,
[1:30:07] you know,
[1:30:07] whatever,
[1:30:08] a war against civilians.
[1:30:11] I think that has created a lot of difficulties in trying to
[1:30:15] communicate with the
[1:30:16] SPEAKER_01: outside community as to what it is Sudan needs or Sudan wants.
[1:30:21] The most successful campaign that I've seen to some extent is
[1:30:26] the political and the
[1:30:28] SPEAKER_01: cultural campaign against the Emirates.
[1:30:30] SPEAKER_01: For the simple fact that,
[1:30:31] SPEAKER_01: A,
[1:30:31] a lot of people have a lot of good reason to hate the Emirates
[1:30:34] to begin with.
[1:30:35] which are also happening concurrently to Sudan and sometimes
[1:30:38] preceding what's
[1:30:39] SPEAKER_01: currently going on in Sudan,
[1:30:41] but also because it places this indirect pressure on the
[1:30:46] international community,
[1:30:47] SPEAKER_01: which is mediating so much of Sudan through the Emirates.
[1:30:50] I think there was just this video this morning of a masjid in
[1:30:54] the Emirates,
[1:30:55] SPEAKER_01: it must have been Dubai or Abu Dhabi,
[1:30:56] SPEAKER_01: where the imam is basically telling everyone in the audience,
[1:31:01] SPEAKER_01: stop watching outside news about the Emirates.
[1:31:04] It's not good for your mental health to see people besmirch
[1:31:08] this wonderful country
[1:31:09] SPEAKER_01: and everything like that.
[1:31:10] SPEAKER_01: So it's getting to them.
[1:31:11] SPEAKER_01: It really is getting to them.
[1:31:13] Even if I think there are grounds to dispute a kind of
[1:31:17] understanding as to how
[1:31:18] SPEAKER_01: Sudan has gone to the position where it's at right now,
[1:31:20] SPEAKER_01: I think the campaign against the Emirates is really quite important.
[1:31:23] There are a number of donation campaigns online,
[1:31:26] very similar to what you've seen with Gaza.
[1:31:27] SPEAKER_01: A lot of these are sometimes just as simple as a chuffed account.
[1:31:30] SPEAKER_01: Please donate to this person's rec link.
[1:31:32] SPEAKER_01: But I do think the difficulty here is that I don't think neither...
[1:31:36] SPEAKER_01: is the solution going to come from the international community,
[1:31:39] nor is it necessarily desirable for it to come from the
[1:31:41] international community.
[1:31:43] SPEAKER_01: And I think that's part of the...
[1:31:47] SPEAKER_01: big dividing line that exists politically within Sudan.
[1:31:50] I think there is a big segment of the diaspora as well as of
[1:31:53] various middle class
[1:31:55] figures and politicians in Sudan or exiled from Sudan who
[1:32:00] really kind of believe
[1:32:01] that the resolution to Sudan is that Sudan should kind of come
[1:32:05] under kind of a
[1:32:06] SPEAKER_01: colonial tutelage.
[1:32:08] SPEAKER_01: You bring in the UN peacekeeping forces,
[1:32:12] SPEAKER_01: you get rid of both the RSF and the army,
[1:32:15] SPEAKER_01: and Sudan becomes this kind of humanitarian project,
[1:32:18] SPEAKER_01: which will slowly be brought back into the international community.
[1:32:22] SPEAKER_01: I think that is not desirable on its own grounds.
[1:32:24] SPEAKER_01: I think it's a recipe for disaster and destruction.
[1:32:28] SPEAKER_01: Like I've mentioned before,
[1:32:29] I think it produces a sort of opportunity structure for a
[1:32:32] number of the RSF or at
[1:32:34] least the RSF's proponents to be able to kind of push further
[1:32:38] the RSF's own goals
[1:32:39] SPEAKER_01: in the war.
[1:32:40] I think that's one of the things that kind of runs as a through
[1:32:43] line beyond so much
[1:32:45] SPEAKER_01: of the international messaging is that there are just –
[1:32:48] SPEAKER_01: very,
[1:32:48] very widely divergent political interpretations of what's
[1:32:51] happening in Sudan,
[1:32:51] SPEAKER_01: which is why I say,
[1:32:52] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:32:53] SPEAKER_01: it's not that it's a civil war or it's not that it's an imperial war.
[1:32:56] It's that civil war and an imperial war are kind of interjoined
[1:32:58] with each other,
[1:33:00] right?
[1:33:00] SPEAKER_01: When Al-Fashir fell, there is a video of a...
[1:33:06] SPEAKER_01: a University Khartoum professor in geology,
[1:33:09] SPEAKER_01: a feminist professor who drapes herself in the language of medania,
[1:33:12] SPEAKER_01: civilian rule,
[1:33:14] SPEAKER_01: just dancing on TikTok,
[1:33:15] SPEAKER_01: celebrating it all,
[1:33:16] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:33:17] SPEAKER_01: Yasser Arman,
[1:33:18] who is one of these rebel leaders who has been fighting as one
[1:33:23] of the factions of
[1:33:24] SPEAKER_01: the SPLM North,
[1:33:25] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:33:25] SPEAKER_01: Basically puts out a statement on Afasher saying like,
[1:33:29] SPEAKER_01: hey,
[1:33:30] SPEAKER_01: now we see the end of the fighting in Afasher,
[1:33:33] SPEAKER_01: which was bravely fought by both sides.
[1:33:35] SPEAKER_01: And it's kind of shocking, right?
[1:33:37] SPEAKER_01: And he's not a figure, by the way.
[1:33:39] SPEAKER_01: He is not a figure who is formally associated with the RSF.
[1:33:42] But you absolutely see a lot of these kind of neutral broker
[1:33:46] figures who...
[1:33:49] SPEAKER_01: have an RSF leaning to their discourse, right?
[1:33:52] SPEAKER_01: Really,
[1:33:52] they kind of view the RSF as a useful cudgel to basically
[1:33:56] destroy the capacities of
[1:33:58] SPEAKER_01: the Sudanese army,
[1:33:59] SPEAKER_01: which,
[1:33:59] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:34:00] SPEAKER_01: they have a lot of reason to hate the Sudanese army.
[1:34:02] SPEAKER_01: Simultaneously,
[1:34:03] I'd also think it would mean the kind of total extinction of
[1:34:05] the Sudanese nation.
[1:34:07] SPEAKER_01: and the Sudanese National Project, right?
[1:34:09] SPEAKER_01: Which also just means an extinction of any form of reproduction,
[1:34:12] SPEAKER_01: social reproduction,
[1:34:13] SPEAKER_01: or livelihood in Sudan's geographic regions,
[1:34:15] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:34:16] So I think that's part of the difficulty with thinking about
[1:34:20] the international campaigns.
[1:34:22] SPEAKER_01: There are really different split images as to what should happen.
[1:34:26] SPEAKER_01: Many people are,
[1:34:27] SPEAKER_01: of course,
[1:34:27] SPEAKER_01: quite cautious about a massive influx of individuals going into the army,
[1:34:31] SPEAKER_01: and for good reason.
[1:34:32] SPEAKER_01: I mean, the army has been a...
[1:34:36] power broker or midwife of sydney's capital and of sydney's
[1:34:39] power interests for the
[1:34:41] entire existence of the sydney state um but simultaneously one
[1:34:45] of the really big
[1:34:45] flaws i think that came about with the resistance committees
[1:34:48] that came about with
[1:34:50] the decentralized orientation that came about with uh
[1:34:53] definitely with the spa and
[1:34:55] all of these like a civilian technocrats is a allergy to
[1:35:01] producing the organs able
[1:35:02] SPEAKER_01: to put their politics forward
[1:35:06] So even now,
[1:35:08] the RECs,
[1:35:09] the resistance committees have basically split significantly.
[1:35:12] There are lots of people who used to be with the resistance
[1:35:16] committees who are now
[1:35:17] SPEAKER_01: fighting with the Sydney's army.
[1:35:19] This despite the fact that the initial position of the
[1:35:20] resistance committees after
[1:35:22] SPEAKER_01: the fighting broke out on April 15th was to say,
[1:35:25] SPEAKER_01: this is a war against civilians,
[1:35:26] SPEAKER_01: no to war on both sides.
[1:35:28] SPEAKER_01: This isn't an ideal situation,
[1:35:30] but I think this is a situation that comes about from the
[1:35:33] allergy much of the
[1:35:34] SPEAKER_01: Sudanese uprising had in 2018,
[1:35:36] SPEAKER_01: 2019,
[1:35:36] SPEAKER_01: which again,
[1:35:37] SPEAKER_01: I want to stress,
[1:35:38] SPEAKER_01: it was a very largely urban uprising.
[1:35:42] The political economy of Sudan's cities is very different than
[1:35:45] the political
[1:35:46] SPEAKER_01: economy of its countrysides.
[1:35:48] A cut to bread subsidies is not going to harm so many people in
[1:35:53] the countryside,
[1:35:54] too.
[1:35:55] SPEAKER_01: weren't really getting a lot of subsidies to begin with,
[1:35:56] SPEAKER_01: but don't even really eat bread,
[1:35:58] SPEAKER_01: right?
[1:36:00] SPEAKER_01: But it was going to be quite significant for the cities.
[1:36:03] SPEAKER_01: And that was the thing that made it capable of dislodging Amr Bashir,
[1:36:06] because he had always kept the cities pacified by other means
[1:36:09] than physical
[1:36:10] SPEAKER_01: warfare,
[1:36:12] SPEAKER_01: unlike the countryside.
[1:36:13] SPEAKER_01: But the consequence of that is that in the 2018-2019 uprising,
[1:36:18] SPEAKER_01: so much of the emphasis was on unarmed democratic resistance.
[1:36:23] SPEAKER_01: And I think to a fault,
[1:36:26] it ignored the fact that once you move for a revolution and
[1:36:30] once you move for a
[1:36:31] SPEAKER_01: deep revolution,
[1:36:32] SPEAKER_01: you are going to pose really,
[1:36:34] SPEAKER_01: really deep,
[1:36:36] SPEAKER_01: incommensurable political pathways,
[1:36:38] which are going to simultaneously mobilize certain groups of
[1:36:41] people and really
[1:36:42] SPEAKER_01: antagonize other groups of people.
[1:36:44] SPEAKER_01: And warfare is going to be an outcome of that.
[1:36:46] SPEAKER_01: And now, because these organizations did not have...
[1:36:51] SPEAKER_01: I mean, didn't really even engage with the question of armed struggle.
[1:36:53] They largely understood armed struggle rightfully from a
[1:36:56] critical perspective as
[1:36:57] something that bogged down and created a lot of these
[1:37:00] non-ideological paramilitary
[1:37:01] SPEAKER_01: groups in Sudan.
[1:37:03] SPEAKER_01: But nevertheless,
[1:37:04] SPEAKER_01: now when fighting has become existential,
[1:37:06] they've basically had to rely on joining either the army or
[1:37:10] relying on the army and
[1:37:11] SPEAKER_01: one of its militias as a source of defense.
[1:37:14] SPEAKER_01: So there is no ability to independently express one's politics.
[1:37:19] SPEAKER_01: in this fashion.
[1:37:20] SPEAKER_01: So it requires a really kind of domestic transformation.
[1:37:23] SPEAKER_01: Well,
[1:37:23] SPEAKER_01: let's hope that the next moment of fissure,
[1:37:25] SPEAKER_01: the next moment of opportunity for a new civilian movement,
[1:37:30] SPEAKER_01: incorporates some of those lessons.
[1:37:33] SPEAKER_01: And we see formations that are not only capable of taking down a military
[1:37:38] SPEAKER_01: government,
[1:37:38] SPEAKER_01: but taking over the state as well.
[1:37:40] SPEAKER_01: We need a revolution.
[1:37:41] SPEAKER_01: And I think a lot of states in the region need a revolution.
[1:37:46] You mentioned that you don't see really the end of this
[1:37:51] conflict anytime soon.
[1:37:52] SPEAKER_01: So where do things then go for Sudan politically from here?
[1:37:57] SPEAKER_01: It's quite open.
[1:37:58] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:37:59] SPEAKER_01: it's hard to predict,
[1:38:00] but I will say there are a couple of pathways that I think are
[1:38:02] more likely,
[1:38:03] SPEAKER_01: or at least are statistical likelihoods.
[1:38:06] SPEAKER_01: One of them is that the Sydney's army wins.
[1:38:10] SPEAKER_01: It defeats and dismantles the RSF.
[1:38:13] You have an issue where you've now matriculated a lot of
[1:38:17] weapons for the purposes
[1:38:18] SPEAKER_01: of general mobilization,
[1:38:19] SPEAKER_01: and now you have some other militias.
[1:38:21] SPEAKER_01: But theoretically,
[1:38:22] maybe you either make peace with those militias or you go to
[1:38:25] war with them again.
[1:38:26] But the Sudanese state and the Sudanese people exist to fight
[1:38:31] another day.
[1:38:32] It's likely a return to the kind of top-down authoritarian
[1:38:36] structure that defines
[1:38:37] SPEAKER_01: Sudan throughout much of its history.
[1:38:40] SPEAKER_01: But it also means the capacity for future rounds of struggle.
[1:38:44] SPEAKER_01: If the RSF wins, I think Sudan will no longer exist as a state.
[1:38:49] SPEAKER_01: I think if the RSF,
[1:38:51] SPEAKER_01: for example,
[1:38:51] SPEAKER_01: gets a total victory,
[1:38:53] there will be a civil war amongst the RSF itself for the simple
[1:38:56] fact that there's
[1:38:57] nothing that actually brings together these RSF commanders and
[1:39:00] their soldiers
[1:39:00] SPEAKER_01: together.
[1:39:01] SPEAKER_01: into unity besides fighting against the army.
[1:39:05] SPEAKER_01: And we've already seen that, by the way.
[1:39:06] SPEAKER_01: There's been a lot of targeting of someone on tribal lines, right?
[1:39:09] SPEAKER_01: Inter-tribal targeting amongst even at the Abala,
[1:39:12] amongst even Cabal herding tribes who compose the RSF and
[1:39:18] fighting over the spoils
[1:39:19] SPEAKER_01: of war and everything like that.
[1:39:20] And that's just something that you can kind of naturally expect
[1:39:22] with brigand fighting.
[1:39:24] SPEAKER_01: And finally,
[1:39:25] SPEAKER_01: in the kind of larger regional context,
[1:39:27] SPEAKER_01: it's a question of whether or not – what will be the kind of final gift
[1:39:32] neoliberalism and the kind of hegemonica system is going to
[1:39:35] impart on the African
[1:39:36] continent as well as I also think connected to the dynamics of
[1:39:40] the Middle East.
[1:39:41] SPEAKER_01: Which is to say, are these states going to be able to exist, right?
[1:39:44] SPEAKER_01: I mean,
[1:39:45] SPEAKER_01: neoliberalism from an economic perspective has really pushed them into
[1:39:48] SPEAKER_01: non-governmentality to the extreme.
[1:39:50] SPEAKER_01: And simultaneously,
[1:39:52] SPEAKER_01: they've also encouraged really some of the most noxious,
[1:39:55] SPEAKER_01: revanchist,
[1:39:56] SPEAKER_01: sovereignist regimes.
[1:39:58] SPEAKER_01: who do not care about a lot of questions that they should care about,
[1:40:02] SPEAKER_01: but really want to assert national authority in the worst way possible.
[1:40:05] SPEAKER_01: And we saw that,
[1:40:06] SPEAKER_01: for example,
[1:40:06] SPEAKER_01: in Tigray,
[1:40:07] SPEAKER_01: right,
[1:40:07] SPEAKER_01: where,
[1:40:08] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:40:08] Abiy Ahmed effectively laid siege and starved the entire
[1:40:11] country in collaboration
[1:40:13] SPEAKER_01: with ISIS-Furki Eritrea,
[1:40:15] SPEAKER_01: which is now,
[1:40:16] SPEAKER_01: ironically enough,
[1:40:16] SPEAKER_01: they're now fighting on opposite sides of the Sudanese war.
[1:40:19] SPEAKER_01: So Sudan,
[1:40:20] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[1:40:21] holds a little bit of a kind of lens for the fate of the
[1:40:24] African continent,
[1:40:25] SPEAKER_01: you know,
[1:40:25] SPEAKER_01: and we'll kind of see how that plays out.
[1:40:27] SPEAKER_01: That,
[1:40:27] SPEAKER_01: I think,
[1:40:28] is going to be a real kind of crucial story that'll set up the
[1:40:30] story of what's
[1:40:31] SPEAKER_01: going to succeed American hegemony.
[1:40:33] Is this going to be a grand renaissance of like,
[1:40:35] you know,
[1:40:36] sovereign test?
[1:40:36] SPEAKER_01: Everyone's getting rich together,
[1:40:38] which is sometimes the kind of weird kind of imaginary fostered
[1:40:41] by the BRICS
[1:40:41] SPEAKER_01: community.
[1:40:42] Is it going to be a mix between sub-imperial actors becoming
[1:40:47] massive power brokers
[1:40:48] SPEAKER_01: in the world system?
[1:40:49] SPEAKER_01: Is it going to just be total collapse?
[1:40:51] SPEAKER_01: Is nothing going to replace it?
[1:40:53] SPEAKER_01: I mean, those are kind of open-ended trajectories to think about.
[1:40:57] SPEAKER_01: Hassan, this has been a really fantastic and informative conversation.
[1:41:00] SPEAKER_01: Thank you so much for joining us.
[1:41:02] SPEAKER_01: Thank you so much for having me.

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