# 07 - Civil Rights and Equal Protection Cases 1950-1960 by United States Supreme Court

An episode of [Civil Rights and Equal Protection Cases 1950-1960](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1815309543), 16 May 2025, 18 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/66112998/07_civil_rights_and_equal_protection_cases_1950_1960_by_united_states_supreme_court.mp3

Journey into the heart of landmark Supreme Court decisions that shaped civil rights and equal protection in the United States during the transformative decade of 1950-1960, as concisely summarized by Kelli Robinson. This episode includes AI-generated content.

## Transcript

[0:05] Speaker 1: Go Million versus Lightfoot. This is a LibriVox recording. All
[0:10] Speaker 1: LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information
[0:14] Speaker 1: or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording by
[0:20] Speaker 1: Kelly Robinson in Birmingham, Alabama. Gomillion versus Lightfoot an opinion
[0:26] Speaker 1: of the United States Supreme Court decided on November fourteenth,
[0:31] Speaker 1: nineteen sixty. Please note this is a reading of the
[0:35] Speaker 1: opinion of the Court only for ease of listening. This
[0:39] Speaker 1: reading omits legal citations and footnotes found within the text
[0:43] Speaker 1: of the Court's opinion. Mister Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion
[0:48] Speaker 1: of the Court. This litigation challenges the validity under the
[0:53] Speaker 1: United States Constitution of Local Act Number one forty, passed
[0:58] Speaker 1: by the Legislature of Outis, Alabama in nineteen fifty seven,
[1:03] Speaker 1: redefining the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee. Petitioners Negro
[1:08] Speaker 1: citizens of Alabama who were at the time of this
[1:11] Speaker 1: redistricting measure residents of the City of Tuskegee brought an
[1:16] Speaker 1: action in the United States District Court for the Middle
[1:19] Speaker 1: District of Alabama for a declaratory judgment that Act one
[1:24] Speaker 1: forty is unconstitutional. And for an injunction to restrain the
[1:29] Speaker 1: mayor and officers of Tuskegee and the officials of Making County, Alabama,
[1:34] Speaker 1: from enforcing the Act against them and other negroes similarly situated.
[1:39] Speaker 1: Petitioners claim is that enforcement of the statute, which alters
[1:43] Speaker 1: the shape of Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth
[1:47] Speaker 1: twenty eight sided figure, will constitute a discrimination against them
[1:52] Speaker 1: in violation of the due process in equal protection clauses
[1:56] Speaker 1: of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and will deny
[1:59] Speaker 1: them the right to vote in defiance of the Fifteenth Amendment.
[2:04] Speaker 1: The respondents moved for dismissal of the action, for failure
[2:08] Speaker 1: to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
[2:11] Speaker 1: and for lack of jurisdiction of the district Court. The
[2:14] Speaker 1: court granted the motion, stating, this court has no control over,
[2:19] Speaker 1: no supervision over, and no power to change any boundaries
[2:23] Speaker 1: of municipal corporations fixed by a duly convened and elected
[2:28] Speaker 1: legislative body acting for the people in the state of Alabama.
[2:33] Speaker 1: On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
[2:36] Speaker 1: affirmed the judgment, one judge dissenting. We brought the case here,
[2:41] Speaker 1: since serious questions were raised concerning the power of a
[2:45] Speaker 1: state over its municipalities in relation to the fourteenth and
[2:50] Speaker 1: fifteenth Amendments. At this stage of the litigation, we are
[2:54] Speaker 1: not concerned with the truth of the allegations, that is,
[2:58] Speaker 1: the ability of petitioners to sustained their allegations by proof.
[3:02] Speaker 1: The sole question is whether the allegations entitle them to
[3:06] Speaker 1: make good on their claim that they are being denied
[3:10] Speaker 1: rights under the United States Constitution. The complaint charging that
[3:14] Speaker 1: Act one forty is a device to disenfranchise Negro citizens
[3:20] Speaker 1: alleges the following facts. Prior to Act one forty, the
[3:24] Speaker 1: city of Tuskegee was square in shape. The Act transformed
[3:28] Speaker 1: it into a strangely irregular twenty eight sided figure, as
[3:33] Speaker 1: indicated in the diagram appended to this opinion. The essential,
[3:38] Speaker 1: inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries is to
[3:43] Speaker 1: remove from the city all save four or five of
[3:48] Speaker 1: its four hundred Negro voters, while not removing a single
[3:52] Speaker 1: white voter or resident. The result of the Act is
[3:55] Speaker 1: to deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of
[4:00] Speaker 1: residents in Tuskegee, including inter alia, the right to vote
[4:05] Speaker 1: in municipal elections. These allegations, if proven, would abundantly establish
[4:12] Speaker 1: that Act one pin forty was not an ordinary geographic
[4:15] Speaker 1: redistricting measure, even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering. If these allegations,
[4:21] Speaker 1: upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would
[4:26] Speaker 1: be irresistible Tantamont for all practical purposes, to a mathematical
[4:32] Speaker 1: demonstration that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white
[4:37] Speaker 1: and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town
[4:42] Speaker 1: so as to deprive them of their pre existing municipal vote.
[4:47] Speaker 1: It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way
[4:50] Speaker 1: of adjudging a statute having this inevitable effect invalid. In
[4:55] Speaker 1: light of the principles by which this Court must judge,
[4:58] Speaker 1: and uniformly has judged, statutes that, howsoever speciously defined, obviously
[5:05] Speaker 1: discriminate against colored citizens. The Fifteenth Amendment nullifies sophisticated as
[5:11] Speaker 1: well as simple minded modes of discrimination. The complaint amply
[5:16] Speaker 1: alleges a claim of racial discrimination. Against this claim, the
[5:20] Speaker 1: respondents have never suggested either in their brief or in
[5:24] Speaker 1: oral argument any countervailing municipal function, which Act one forty
[5:29] Speaker 1: is designed to serve. The respondents invoke generalities expressing the
[5:34] Speaker 1: state's unrestricted power, unlimited, that is, by the United States Constitution,
[5:39] Speaker 1: to establish, destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion, its
[5:44] Speaker 1: political subdivisions to it cities, counties, and other local units.
[5:50] Speaker 1: We freely recognize the breadth and importance of this aspect
[5:53] Speaker 1: of the state's political power. To exalt this power into
[5:57] Speaker 1: an absolute is to misconceive the reach and rule of
[6:01] Speaker 1: this Court's decisions. In the leading case of Hunter versus
[6:04] Speaker 1: City of Pittsburgh and related cases relied upon by respondents,
[6:09] Speaker 1: the Hunter case involved acclaim by citizens of Allegheny, Pennsylvania,
[6:14] Speaker 1: that the General Assembly of that state could not direct
[6:17] Speaker 1: a consolidation of their city in Pittsburgh over the objection
[6:21] Speaker 1: of a majority of the Allegheny voters. It was alleged
[6:25] Speaker 1: that while Allegheny already had made numerous civic improvements, Pittsburgh
[6:30] Speaker 1: was only then planning to undertake such improvements, and that
[6:33] Speaker 1: the annexation would therefore greatly increase the tax burden on
[6:38] Speaker 1: Allegheny residents. All that the case held was number one,
[6:42] Speaker 1: that there is no implied contract between a city and
[6:45] Speaker 1: its residents that their taxes will be spent solely for
[6:48] Speaker 1: the benefit of that city, And number two, that a
[6:51] Speaker 1: citizen of one municipality is not deprived of property without
[6:56] Speaker 1: due process of law by being subjected to increased taxi
[7:00] Speaker 1: burdens as a result of the consolidation of his city
[7:03] Speaker 1: with another. Related cases upon which the respondents also rely,
[7:08] Speaker 1: such as City of Trenton versus State of New Jersey,
[7:12] Speaker 1: City of pah Husca versus paw Huska Oil and Gas Company,
[7:16] Speaker 1: and Laramie County Commissioners versus Albany County Commissioners, are far
[7:22] Speaker 1: off the mark. They are authority only for the principle
[7:25] Speaker 1: that no constitutionally protected contractual obligation arises between a state
[7:32] Speaker 1: and its subordinate governmental entities solely as a result of
[7:37] Speaker 1: their relationship. In short, the cases that have come before
[7:40] Speaker 1: this Court regarding legislation by states dealing with their political
[7:45] Speaker 1: subdivisions fall into two classes. Number one, those in which
[7:49] Speaker 1: it is claimed that the state, by virtue of the
[7:52] Speaker 1: Prohibition against Impairment of the Obligation of contract Article one,
[7:58] Speaker 1: Section ten, and of them, the due process clause of
[8:01] Speaker 1: the Fourteenth Amendment is without power to extinguish or alter
[8:06] Speaker 1: the boundaries of an existing municipality, and number two, in
[8:11] Speaker 1: which it is claimed that the state has no power
[8:14] Speaker 1: to change the identity of a municipality whereby citizens of
[8:18] Speaker 1: a pre existing municipality suffer serious economic disadvantage. Neither of
[8:24] Speaker 1: these claims is supported by such a specific limitation upon
[8:29] Speaker 1: state power as confines the states under the fifteenth Amendment.
[8:34] Speaker 1: As to the first category, it is obvious that the
[8:37] Speaker 1: creations of municipalities clearly a political act, does not come
[8:42] Speaker 1: within the conception of a contract under the Dartmouth College case.
[8:47] Speaker 1: As to the second, if one principle clearly emerges from
[8:51] Speaker 1: the numerous decisions of this Court dealing with taxation, it
[8:56] Speaker 1: is that the due process clause affords no immunity against
[9:00] Speaker 1: mere inequalities and tax burdens, nor does it afford protection
[9:05] Speaker 1: against their increase as an indirect consequence of a state's
[9:09] Speaker 1: exercise of its political powers. Particularly in dealing with claims
[9:14] Speaker 1: under broad provisions of the Constitution which derive content by
[9:19] Speaker 1: an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative
[9:24] Speaker 1: that generalizations based on and qualified by the concrete situations
[9:29] Speaker 1: that gave rise to them must not be applied out
[9:32] Speaker 1: of context in disregard of variant controlling facts. Thus, a
[9:38] Speaker 1: correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and
[9:42] Speaker 1: Kindred cases is not that the state has plenary power
[9:47] Speaker 1: to manipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose,
[9:53] Speaker 1: the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that the
[9:57] Speaker 1: state's authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the
[10:02] Speaker 1: Constitution considered in those cases. The Hunter opinion itself intimates
[10:09] Speaker 1: that a state legislature may not be omnipotent even as
[10:14] Speaker 1: to the disposition of some types of property owned by
[10:18] Speaker 1: municipal corporations. Further, other cases in this Court have refused
[10:23] Speaker 1: to allow a state to abolish a municipality, or alter
[10:28] Speaker 1: its boundaries, or merge it with another city without preserving
[10:32] Speaker 1: to the creditors of the old city some effective recourse
[10:37] Speaker 1: for the collection of debts owed them. For example, in
[10:41] Speaker 1: Port of Mobile versus United States ex Relacione Watson, the
[10:46] Speaker 1: Court said, where the resource for the payment of the
[10:49] Speaker 1: bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of taxation,
[10:54] Speaker 1: existing when the bonds were issued. Any law which withdraws
[10:58] Speaker 1: or limits the taxing power and leaves no adequate means
[11:02] Speaker 1: for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the
[11:06] Speaker 1: Constitution of the United States and is null and void.
[11:10] Speaker 1: This line of authority conclusively shows that the Court has
[11:14] Speaker 1: never acknowledged that the states have power to do as
[11:17] Speaker 1: they will with municipal corporations, regardless of consequences. Legislative control
[11:24] Speaker 1: of municipalities no less than other state power, lies within
[11:28] Speaker 1: the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.
[11:34] Speaker 1: The observation in Graham versus Fulsom becomes relevant. The power
[11:40] Speaker 1: of the state to alter or destroy its corporations is
[11:44] Speaker 1: not greater than the power of the state to repeal
[11:47] Speaker 1: its legislation. In that case, which involved the attempt by
[11:51] Speaker 1: state officials to evade the collection of taxes to discharge
[11:55] Speaker 1: the obligations of an extinguished township, Mister Justice Macay, writing
[12:00] Speaker 1: for the Court, went on to point out, with reference
[12:04] Speaker 1: to the Mount Pleasant and Mobile cases, it was argued
[12:07] Speaker 1: in those cases, as it is argued in this that
[12:11] Speaker 1: such alteration or destruction of the subordinate governmental divisions was
[12:15] Speaker 1: a proper exercise of legislative power to which creditors had
[12:20] Speaker 1: to submit the arguments did not prevail. It was answered,
[12:24] Speaker 1: as we now answer it, that such power, extensive though
[12:27] Speaker 1: it is, is met and overcome by the provision of
[12:31] Speaker 1: the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a state
[12:35] Speaker 1: from passing any law and pairing the obligation of contracts.
[12:40] Speaker 1: If all this is so in regard to the constitutional
[12:43] Speaker 1: protection of contracts, it should be equally true that, to paraphrase,
[12:49] Speaker 1: such power extensive though it is, is met and overcome
[12:52] Speaker 1: by the fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
[12:57] Speaker 1: which forbids a state from passing any law which drives
[13:00] Speaker 1: a citizen of his vote because of his race. The
[13:03] Speaker 1: opposite conclusion urged upon us by respondents would sanction the
[13:08] Speaker 1: achievement by a state of any impairment of voting rights whatever,
[13:12] Speaker 1: so long as it was cloaked in the garb of
[13:14] Speaker 1: the realignment of political subdivisions. It is inconceivable that guarantees
[13:20] Speaker 1: embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus
[13:23] Speaker 1: be manipulated out of existence. The respondents find another barrier
[13:28] Speaker 1: to the trial of this case in Coal Grove versus Green.
[13:32] Speaker 1: In that case, the court passed on an Illinois law
[13:35] Speaker 1: governing the arrangement of congressional districts within that state. The
[13:39] Speaker 1: complaint rested upon the disparity of population between the different districts,
[13:44] Speaker 1: which rendered the effectiveness of each individual's vote in some
[13:48] Speaker 1: districts far less than another's. This disparity came to pass
[13:53] Speaker 1: solely through shifts in population between nineteen o one, when
[13:57] Speaker 1: Illinois organized its congressional didsays, and nineteen forty six, when
[14:02] Speaker 1: the complaint was launched. During this entire period, elections were
[14:06] Speaker 1: held under the districting scheme devised in nineteen oh one.
[14:10] Speaker 1: The Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the
[14:13] Speaker 1: ground that it presented a subject not meet for adjudication.
[14:18] Speaker 1: The decisive facts in this case, which at this stage
[14:21] Speaker 1: must be taken as proved, are wholly different from the
[14:25] Speaker 1: considerations found controlling in Coal Grove. That case involved a
[14:30] Speaker 1: complaint of discriminatory apportionment of congressional districts. The appellans in
[14:35] Speaker 1: Coalgrove complained only of a dilution of the strength of
[14:39] Speaker 1: their votes as a result of legislative inaction over a
[14:42] Speaker 1: course of many years. The petitioners here complained that affirmative
[14:47] Speaker 1: legislative action deprives them of their votes and the consequent
[14:51] Speaker 1: advantages that the ballot affords. When a legislature thus singles
[14:56] Speaker 1: out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for
[15:01] Speaker 1: special discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment. In no
[15:06] Speaker 1: case involving unequal weight in voting distribution that has come
[15:10] Speaker 1: before the Court did the decision sanction a differentiation on
[15:15] Speaker 1: racial lines, whereby approval was given to unequivocal withdrawal of
[15:21] Speaker 1: the vote solely from colored citizens apart from all else.
[15:25] Speaker 1: These considerations lift this controversy out of the so called
[15:29] Speaker 1: political arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation
[15:35] Speaker 1: in some as mister Justice Holmes remarked when dealing with
[15:38] Speaker 1: a related situation in Nixon versus Herndon, of course, the
[15:43] Speaker 1: petition concerns political action, but the objection that the subject
[15:49] Speaker 1: matter of the suit is political is little more than
[15:52] Speaker 1: a play upon words a statute which is alleged to
[15:55] Speaker 1: have worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioner's rights. It is not
[16:00] Speaker 1: immune to attack simply because the mechanism employed by the
[16:04] Speaker 1: legislature is a redefinition of municipal boundaries. According to the
[16:09] Speaker 1: allegations here made, the Alabama legislature has not merely redrawn
[16:14] Speaker 1: the Tuskegee City limits with incidental inconvenience to the petitioners.
[16:20] Speaker 1: It is more accurate to say that it has deprived
[16:23] Speaker 1: the petitioners of the municipal franchise and consequent rights, and
[16:29] Speaker 1: to that end, it has incidentally changed the city's boundaries.
[16:33] Speaker 1: While informed, this is merely an act redefining meats and bounds.
[16:37] Speaker 1: If the allegations are established, the inescapable human effect of
[16:42] Speaker 1: this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens,
[16:47] Speaker 1: and only colored citizens of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.
[16:52] Speaker 1: That was no coal grove versus green. When a state
[16:56] Speaker 1: exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it
[17:00] Speaker 1: is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is
[17:04] Speaker 1: not carried over when state power is used as an
[17:08] Speaker 1: instrument for circumventing a federally protected right. This principle has
[17:13] Speaker 1: had many applications. It has long been recognized in cases
[17:17] Speaker 1: which have prohibited a state from exploiting a power acknowledged
[17:21] Speaker 1: to be absolute in an isolated context to justify the
[17:26] Speaker 1: imposition of an unconstitutional condition. What the Court has said
[17:32] Speaker 1: in those cases is equally applicable here. That acts generally
[17:37] Speaker 1: lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end,
[17:43] Speaker 1: and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of
[17:46] Speaker 1: condition to attain an unconstitutional result. The petitioners are entitled
[17:52] Speaker 1: to prove their allegations at trial. For these reasons, the
[17:56] Speaker 1: principal conclusions of the District Court and the Court of
[18:00] Speaker 1: Appeals are clearly erroneous, and the decision below must be reversed.
[18:07] Speaker 1: Reversed end of Gomellion versus Lightfoot, an opinion of the
[18:13] Speaker 1: United States Supreme Court

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