# Wokeness is Declining Rapidly & My Data Proves it - Eric Kaufmann | #49

An episode of [The Next Generation](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1772698742), 27 Oct 2025, 1 h 38 min.

Audio: https://anchor.fm/s/107851968/podcast/play/110293388/https%3A%2F%2Fd3ctxlq1ktw2nl.cloudfront.net%2Fstaging%2F2025-9-27%2F410083339-44100-2-c2a094fc6b5c6.mp3

Brand new data has gone VIRAL showing a decrease in gender non conforming students in the last couple of years, today I bring on Eric Kaufmann who published the findings in what has now garnered over 19 million views on X alone. Eric is a Professor of Politics at the University of Buckingham, where he directs the Centre for Heterodox Social Science. Born in Hong Kong in 1970, his work focuses on political demography, nationalism, and immigration. His core contrarian view is that "woke" ideology is not a Marxist import but a radicalisation of left-liberalism's own humanitarian instincts. Follow Eric on X: https://x.com/epkaufmSubscribe to my Substack to see bonus questions and send in your own for future guests! https://elliotbewick.substack.com/My Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/elliotbewick/TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@elliotbewickX: https://x.com/elliotbewickABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION: In a world saturated by social media and marked by skyrocketing rates of anxiety, depression, and ADHD among Gen Z, young people are growing up in a landscape of chaos and contradiction. While protests swell in city streets and activists hurl soup at famous artworks to demand climate action, a quieter crisis unfolds within - the mental and emotional battles faced by a generation trying to make sense of it all.The Next Generation is hosted by 20-year-old Elliot Bewick, offering a raw and honest look at the world through the eyes of those living in it. Bringing together insight from professionals and young people on the ground, this podcast isn’t here to complain or chase clout. It’s here to bend the arc of the modern world towards solutions, truth and a love for the beautiful adventure of life itself.

## Transcript

[0:00] Eric Kaufman, welcome to the next generation.
[0:01] Elliott, it's great to be here. Thanks for having me.
[0:04] You recently released a new set of data that shows trans
[0:07] identification is falling amongst young people went viral
[0:11] online. What's happening?
[0:13] Well, it's really quite interesting.
[0:15] This is the first solid indication that we have of a
[0:18] significant decline in trans identification.
[0:21] Now, the data that I released was mainly around people who
[0:25] don't identify as male or female.
[0:27] So what's known as non binary and what so, so the share who
[0:32] say they're I'm who don't say I'm male or female, but take one
[0:35] of the other options, you know, non binary questioning,
[0:39] etcetera. That share rose to a peak in
[0:43] 2022-2023, which was maybe around at least in the in the
[0:48] large scale data the the Foundation for Individual Rights
[0:51] and Expression, which as an annual annual survey of more
[0:54] than 50,000. Their latest wave was almost
[0:56] 70,000 undergraduate students between more or less the ages of
[1:00] 18 to 22. That number peaked at around 7%
[1:04] in 2023 and it's come down to under 4%.
[1:07] It's more or less halved in two years.
[1:11] We also have a number of other data sources.
[1:12] I've looked at a prep school, sort of an independent elite
[1:17] high school, which has a very, a survey which actually captures,
[1:21] you know, at least 3/4 of the student body.
[1:23] So we don't have a sampling issue in that survey.
[1:26] And it shows an even more extreme rise and fall trend,
[1:29] like a peak to 9% in 2023 and it's dropped to 3%.
[1:33] So it's fallen in, you know, by it's only a third of its level 2
[1:37] years ago. Another survey which is again
[1:40] from Brown University, the student newspaper capturing as
[1:42] much as half the student body or the relevant student body
[1:45] showing the same trend. So that's what I put out there.
[1:49] The other part of this too is so it's the trans issue.
[1:53] So trans identification amongst young university students has
[1:56] really dropped in the last two years.
[1:59] It's halved. We also see a big drop in what I
[2:02] call non conforming sexual orientation.
[2:05] So queer, bisexual, questioning and some of these other sexual
[2:10] orientations other than either straight or gay lesbian has also
[2:15] had this pattern of rise and fall.
[2:17] And I think there's actually quite a strong connection
[2:20] between these two things. It's all about gender and sexual
[2:23] nonconformity and that that's peaked in 20/23/2022 and it's
[2:28] really shifted downward in the last couple of years.
[2:31] So that is basically the top line out of the report at, at
[2:35] the at my my center, which is called the Center for Heterodox
[2:39] Social Science at the University of Buckingham.
[2:42] And yeah, that really did, you know, And it got retweeted by a
[2:45] number of big accounts, I mean, mainly on the right, and was
[2:47] picked up mainly by conservative outlets.
[2:51] OK. And that started a whole ball
[2:53] rolling, which I'm sure we're going to get into.
[2:56] Well, this has happened independent of political shifts
[2:59] and social media use. What do you see, first of all,
[3:03] as some of the guesses that people put out there that are
[3:06] wrong as to why this shift has happened?
[3:08] Right. So I think just from the data,
[3:11] which is really reasonably rich, I think we can kind of rule out
[3:14] a couple of things. I mean, 1 is that, you know,
[3:17] Gen. Z are returning to religion.
[3:20] There's no increase in the data. The the data that shows, by the
[3:23] way, this dramatic drop in trans identification and queer
[3:26] identification does not show any drop in, you know, the share
[3:30] that say I have no religion. So there's no real story in
[3:33] terms of a return to religion. There's also not a story in
[3:36] terms of a shift to the right politically.
[3:39] There's no change in this status set over this time period.
[3:43] And likewise, you know, you could say woke attitudes, you
[3:46] know, the belief that somebody who says Black Lives Matter is a
[3:50] hate group, someone who says trans is a mental illness,
[3:53] should they be allowed to speak on campus?
[3:55] That kind of a question. Again, showing stability through
[3:59] this time period from 2020 to 2025.
[4:02] So we're not actually seeing about the trend in, in political
[4:06] attitudes as the explanation for this decline in in trans and
[4:11] queer. And I've seen this in other
[4:14] kinds of data. There's a real decoupling now
[4:17] that and I should be clear about this.
[4:19] Yes, trans and queer people are are going to be massively more
[4:21] left wing, massively more woke than, you know, straight or
[4:25] people who identify as their birth sex.
[4:27] Is there any data on how much more likely they are?
[4:31] They are very, you know, massively more likely to be very
[4:35] left wing and they are massively more likely on certain
[4:39] questions. So to favor shouting down
[4:42] speakers to say that's fine. They're they're much more likely
[4:45] to be in that camp. So that is all true at the level
[4:48] of the individual. But in terms of what I'm
[4:50] interested in is change over time.
[4:52] So yes, it is the the case that, you know, trans and queer are
[4:56] much more likely likely to be very left wing, but that doesn't
[4:59] mean, OK, so there's a difference here.
[5:01] That doesn't mean that the drop in trans and queer is because
[5:06] there was a drop in the share identifying as very left wing.
[5:11] And and this is a tricky thing to understand.
[5:12] It's a so if the way to think about it is some, you know,
[5:17] more, you know, wealthier states in the United States are
[5:21] significantly more Democratic Massachusetts, California and so
[5:25] on than the poorer states, West Virginia.
[5:28] But at the level of the individual, a a very wealthy
[5:31] individual is not more likely to be a Democrat than so you can
[5:35] sometimes get these different relationships.
[5:37] If we're talking about the aggregate versus the individual.
[5:41] And it's what's called the ecological fallacy.
[5:43] It can work for place. So a wealthy state like
[5:46] California, Massachusetts might be more Democratic, but a
[5:50] wealthy individual is not the same way certain time periods.
[5:55] So what I'm talking about here is 2025 is a lot less queer in
[5:59] transit time period than 2023. But at the individual level,
[6:05] that relationship is, you know, there's a different relationship
[6:08] at the end of a queer individual is going to be much more left
[6:12] wing. Sorry, I should also say 2025 is
[6:15] not more left wing a period for students than 2023.
[6:20] It is more or much less queer and transit period than 2023.
[6:24] So you would expect at the level of individuals these
[6:27] relationships to hold, but they don't.
[6:29] So that's just a bit of very technical stuff.
[6:32] So I don't believe it's a political shift.
[6:35] I don't believe it's a religious shift that's accounting for
[6:37] this. Now, what have I found in the
[6:40] data? 1, Is that mental illness?
[6:42] So saying you are anxious or depressed most or all of the
[6:45] time and and there is a somewhat depressingly high number who say
[6:51] that. But that has been dropping in
[6:54] this data for three or for the last two years.
[6:56] So 2023 you see a drop. I mean, they only started asking
[7:00] this question in 2023. So we only have the two years.
[7:03] But other data shows, you know, that there was this rise peak of
[7:07] the pandemic, 2021 mental health among young people was at its at
[7:11] its worst and it's improved there.
[7:13] The 2023 Centers for Disease Control data for this, which is
[7:17] a large high school survey in the US, which is kind of gold
[7:20] standard and it shows a real drop off, you know, in mental
[7:24] health problems, you know, 1012 point drop off.
[7:28] So we have had a drop in mental health or mental illness that's
[7:32] come down. And that does seem to explain
[7:35] part of what we're seeing on the trans and queer.
[7:37] So the the mental health is improving, trans and queer
[7:40] identify identity is dropping and and it seems to be related
[7:45] to some degree to this improving mental health.
[7:47] And how do you work that out? How do you work out that that's
[7:50] related? So how do we work out that
[7:53] that's related? Well, there's a statistical way
[7:56] where you control, you know, in this data, you, what you do is
[8:00] you say controlling for sexual, sexual orientation, what's
[8:05] happened to mental health or vice versa.
[8:07] You say, sorry, the way to do it is saying, I'm going to predict
[8:11] the share of trans in this data set, you know, six years, 50,000
[8:16] a year. And I'm going to predict it and
[8:19] I'm going to put in mental health in that predictive model,
[8:24] which of course mental health is highly correlated with being
[8:27] trans. Absolutely.
[8:28] So those people have worst mental health.
[8:30] But I'm controlling for that. And even when I put in mental
[8:33] health into a model predicting trans identification year is
[8:38] still a significant predictor, even controlling for mental
[8:42] health. So it still shows that 2023 is a
[8:44] peak 24, five have dropped. So those years matter quite
[8:49] apart from mental health of the individuals.
[8:51] So even controlling for this drop in mental health, we still
[8:54] see that year matters independently of that.
[8:56] So that's telling us there's something about the time trend
[9:00] that's independent of the improving mental health.
[9:03] So that's kind of how we do this statistically.
[9:06] Now, what's much more difficult is to say whether it's improving
[9:12] mental health has caused a decline of trans or decline of
[9:14] trans has caused improving mental health.
[9:17] I actually think the evidence shows that both of these things
[9:19] are operating. But what I would caution against
[9:23] is the people who say, aha, you know, people are less trans.
[9:26] That's what's causing the improved mental health.
[9:30] That is not the full story. That's a part of the story.
[9:33] I would say it's probably less than half the story, even
[9:37] considerably less than half the story.
[9:39] So that's sort of where I am on this.
[9:41] Something that fascinates me in this argument and to take it
[9:43] into the mental health lane specifically, you look at data
[9:47] from Jonathan Height and the work of him and the anxious
[9:49] generation. One of the main objections there
[9:52] I often hear, especially when I'm just speaking to mates down
[9:54] the pub or family members, they go OK, but are these things
[9:59] actually the decline in mental health and the creation of the
[10:03] Instagram algorithm in 2012, or the creation of the iPhone or
[10:05] whatever it may be? Are these things actually
[10:08] correlated in the sense that trans or social media or screens
[10:13] make us mentally worse off? Or is it that indirectly, our
[10:18] perception of our mental health has differed and we're just more
[10:22] sensitive to the fact that life's tough and we want to put
[10:26] the label on it, saying, yeah, actually I am persistently
[10:30] anxious, when in reality we're feeling the same way as before.
[10:35] We were so sensitive to these labels.
[10:37] Yes, so I think it is mostly what you say.
[10:41] It is mostly a mission creep in the meaning of a term like
[10:44] mental illness where people are miss diagnosing, mislabeling
[10:49] themselves as mentally ill. Whereas you know, in a previous
[10:54] generation because of the mental health diagnostic manual, you
[10:58] know, you would not be listed, you would, you would not be
[11:01] diagnosed as mentally ill. You'd just be diagnosed as
[11:04] having a bad day or something. So I think the expansion of
[11:07] these categories and there is a whole literature, Nick Haslam,
[11:11] the psychologist, talks about concept creep.
[11:13] So there has been in academia, you know, things which wouldn't
[11:17] have been seen as bullying or as trauma or whatever is abuse now
[11:21] are included in that bucket. I think that's ideological
[11:25] because it has the moral force of being bullying or being
[11:29] trauma or abuse, which carries a sort of real moral punch to it.
[11:33] And so there was, I think this temptation amongst kind of,
[11:36] let's call it left humanitarian oriented scholars to expand the
[11:41] meaning of these categories. And that of course then filters
[11:44] into the the youth population and the the practitioner
[11:47] population. And so, yeah, I think Abigail
[11:50] Schreyer is probably correct. Now, the question then is, of
[11:52] course, if you if you diagnose yourself as having a mental
[11:55] illness, does that then mean you ruminate and become more likely
[11:58] to genuinely work yourself up into a state of mental health,
[12:02] mental illness? I think that's possible too.
[12:05] And it's really difficult in this field where we can't
[12:08] actually see it by a large surgically in your brain
[12:10] necessarily as far as I'm aware, to know exactly what's going on.
[12:14] But I suspect if I were to say, you know, there's been an
[12:18] expansion of categories. So for example, among young
[12:20] people, you'll say a surprisingly number, a large
[12:23] number will say I was emotionally or psychologically
[12:27] abused as a young person. Now the share saying that is
[12:32] really astoundingly high. And that's connected to people
[12:36] saying they have mental health problems.
[12:38] Is that really true? Or is it really the case that
[12:42] younger people are abused more than than people my age where I,
[12:46] I'm very skeptical about that. So I think a lot of it comes
[12:49] from this expansion of categories.
[12:53] And they've been, you know, experiments even where people
[12:57] are asked to look at faces and to say which ones are
[12:59] threatening. And the experimenters reduce the
[13:02] number of threatening faces, but the, the share that's
[13:05] categorized as threatening remains the same because people
[13:09] are now categorizing less threatening faces in the
[13:12] threatening box. So there is this degree to which
[13:14] people are kind of wired to, you know, or if danger drops, if
[13:17] society's less dangerous and, you know, people are wired to
[13:20] just think it's, it's actually as dangerous as it ever was when
[13:23] it, when it really isn't. And there is a, a technical term
[13:26] for this which is escaping my mind right now where people tend
[13:30] to sort of maintain a view of, of threat even when the threat's
[13:35] declining. I think a lot of that is what's
[13:37] what's going on is that in fact, even if if levels of, you know,
[13:42] emotional, you know, you know, abuse and and so on are
[13:45] declining, you would still get the same level being reported.
[13:48] So there's a kind of sensitization to things which
[13:50] would never have been considered to be mental illness now being
[13:55] considered to be. Well, it's so intriguing
[13:58] thinking about this concept and this link between saying that
[14:02] you are something and then potentially becoming it.
[14:06] And we're in a world now where I think in the UK about 23% of the
[14:09] female adult population are on antidepressants.
[14:11] And I don't know if it was about half or less of Jen Zedd has
[14:14] said they were persistently feeling feelings of anxiousness
[14:17] and sadness. It's a sorrow.
[14:21] It's a sad state of affairs, right?
[14:23] And I think there is something in, if you feel a certain way,
[14:28] even if that's been programmed into you by an over sensitivity
[14:31] to that thing, you are still feeling it.
[14:34] It's your mental health. And you kind of almost sigh up
[14:38] yourself into feeling the feelings people imposed on you.
[14:43] Yeah, I mean, I think that's absolutely right.
[14:44] And and and this is one of the problems is we don't know.
[14:48] I mean this is Schreyer's point that to what extent has concept
[14:51] creep in psychotherapy actually created a lot more mental
[14:55] illness then would have been the case if they had stuck to
[14:58] pre-existing diagnostics and definitions.
[15:02] And, and if so, I'd say that field has a lot to answer for.
[15:07] I mean, they thought they were being humane and, and sensitive.
[15:09] And this isn't, you know, can only be a good thing.
[15:13] I mean, this is partly an ideological project that that
[15:15] people have to understand. You know, this is really the
[15:17] outworking of an ideology of humanitarianism, which run
[15:23] through psychotherapy, created this humanistic psychotherapy
[15:26] trend in the early 60s. Carl Rogers was one of the
[15:30] founders of the, you know, always affirm what your patient
[15:34] is telling you. Never sort of say, well, is that
[15:36] really the case? Have you thought about, you
[15:37] know, have you tried to be more resilient?
[15:39] That went out the window with the humanistic psychotherapy and
[15:43] that then became all the rage in academia.
[15:46] And then what happens as we get into the 20 tens with social
[15:49] media? These radical academics are now
[15:53] their ideas are entering into the mass media for the first
[15:56] time and entering the youth culture for the first time.
[15:59] So it's really social media is kind of a gateway.
[16:03] So I, I think there's a lot of, you know, questioning of the
[16:06] height hypothesis around social media and smartphone use and
[16:08] whatever. I think actually a more
[16:11] plausible mechanism. And, and I don't think he's
[16:13] necessarily wrong, by the way, but I do think a more arguably
[16:18] important mechanism for some of these trends is that I radical
[16:21] ideas that were already popular amongst academics actually, but
[16:28] were sequestered on campus and in academic journals in a
[16:31] popularized, vulgarized form, made their way into the media,
[16:34] into the New York Times, into blogs, and influenced the
[16:38] culture. And in that sense, social media
[16:41] really mattered because it conveyed these relatively wonky
[16:47] ideas, radical wonky ideas, and, you know, in a sort of pablum
[16:52] form, sent them into the mass population.
[16:54] It was a catalyst for those ideas.
[16:56] It wasn't the origin of the bad ones.
[16:58] No, it was not the origin. In fact, you can look at
[17:02] academic papers and academic abstracts and look at what they
[17:06] were talking about. And there was this gradual
[17:10] increase from the 80s through to the 2000s in talking about hurt
[17:14] and harm and trauma. All these things had increased
[17:18] substantially already in academic papers.
[17:22] And this was becoming the orthodoxy and so, but it wasn't
[17:26] that way in the general public or the youth population.
[17:29] And it took social media to put the academics and journalists
[17:31] together also at a time, I should say, when a number of
[17:35] things were happening. I mean, 1 is that media itself
[17:38] was shifting to a click bait model and away from a classified
[17:41] ads model. So the incentives were you want
[17:44] to, you want to be viral on social media, you want to drive
[17:46] the emotions. And so media becomes more
[17:49] partisan, more emotional. And so they're very much in the
[17:52] market for these kinds of ideas. And yeah.
[17:55] And so there is just a conduit from academia to the mass media
[18:00] and social media. If you look at, for example,
[18:04] trends on Twitter and trends in the media based on keyword
[18:08] frequency searches, you see an explosion in like the mid,
[18:13] starting in the early mid twenty 10s.
[18:15] All the stuff around LGBTQ, all of the mental illness stuff and
[18:21] the woke stuff, you know, white privilege, white supremacy,
[18:25] patriarchy, all of that stuff really floods up at the at the
[18:29] same time, a lot of this have been talked about already in
[18:33] academic papers. So academia was already big on,
[18:36] you know, patriarchy, systemic racism, all of the critical race
[18:40] and gender stuff. But the media was not The New
[18:43] York Times really did not talk about white supremacy and white
[18:46] privilege and patriarchy much at all prior to the mid twenty
[18:50] 10's. And then suddenly they do and
[18:52] it's just you look at the keyword stuff and it just
[18:54] explodes. So I'd just say in terms of the
[18:58] culture and in terms of politics, all of these things
[19:02] emerge at the same time. But what is really important to
[19:05] understand is very quickly at the level of individuals,
[19:09] there's a decoupling between the politics, the sexuality, the
[19:13] mental health. These things now start to move
[19:15] in different orbits. They're they're still somewhat
[19:17] correlated, but they have a lot more independence.
[19:20] So an individual at the individual level, trends in
[19:23] sexual orientation, trends in politics, trends in mental
[19:26] health aren't are starting to move in separate directions.
[19:29] And that's one of the reasons why if we come to this decline
[19:32] in trans that doesn't it is not necessarily an indication of a
[19:38] major political or religious shift, and it's only partly an
[19:42] indication of a shift in mental health.
[19:43] Well, I want us to get on to why that decoupling has happened.
[19:47] But first of all, the obvious quote that comes to mind for me
[19:50] with the birth of social media is the whole Charlie manga thing
[19:53] of show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome.
[19:55] But you've put forwards that these ideas, and frankly bad
[19:59] ones, were already prominent beforehand within the niche
[20:03] academic circle. They hadn't infiltrated the
[20:06] public conscience yet, so I guess the next question is could
[20:10] they have done so without social media?
[20:13] My view is probably yes, it would have been maybe more
[20:19] gradual, but if you look at how media was changing, becoming
[20:23] more partisan, more emotional, there was a receptivity in mass
[20:26] media. Now, all it would was going to
[20:29] take was to get the sort of, you know, radical feminist, critical
[20:35] race and gender stuff off the Cam.
[20:37] Oh, and also the sort of, you know, call it humanistic
[20:41] psychotherapy, the sensitizing psychotherapy stuff from the
[20:46] campus into the media. I think the receptivity was
[20:49] there. Somebody would have made that
[20:51] link. I still think it would have
[20:52] happened, but it wouldn't have happened as quickly, as
[20:55] dramatically perhaps as as it did.
[20:58] So. So I do think that the die was
[21:01] cast. This is one of the reasons I
[21:02] would argue this is fundamentally an ideological
[21:05] issue and not a technology issue, that yes, the technology
[21:09] made it quicker, made it faster, but I don't believe the
[21:12] technology is the key here. I think the key is the
[21:16] metastasizing of a, of an ideology, which Jonathan Haidt
[21:20] calls, you know, these moral intuitions, which is care harm.
[21:24] On the one hand, one of the moral foundations is, you know,
[21:27] protect people from harm, including psychological harm.
[21:30] That's like #1 #2 is equality of outcome.
[21:34] So those two beliefs, not as they apply to class or income,
[21:39] but as they apply to race, gender and sexuality, had been
[21:42] germinating and expanding. And the logic of those things
[21:46] have been unfolding within the Academy for decades.
[21:50] And I think it was only a question of time before these
[21:52] things just burst the blood Blaine blood brain barrier for
[21:56] between academia and media, because ultimately we're we're
[22:01] going to have to reckon with these this these ideological
[22:04] trends which stem from academics and intellectuals.
[22:08] And and in in some ways we're living through the outworking of
[22:11] the logic of their ideas of the care harm equality, moral
[22:16] intuitions in the culture. And, and in a way, peak woke
[22:20] was, was a bit of of that where those ideas, they were taken up
[22:25] with gusto by elites and intellectuals and by young
[22:28] people via their influencers in the pop culture that surged.
[22:33] And now the problems with those ideas and the and the
[22:37] ridiculous, you know, the absurdities of those ideas are
[22:40] coming home to roost and, and now we're reckoning with them.
[22:44] So yeah, I think this is primarily cultural and
[22:46] ideological and not about technology.
[22:50] We're going to have to unpack that more because you're blowing
[22:52] my brain here as someone who always lambasts social media and
[22:55] sort of puts that at the root of all our problems.
[22:58] And even someone that has engaged with Jonathan Heights
[23:01] work and he's written about, I think it's called the emotional
[23:03] dog and it's rational tail. How we're all sort of
[23:06] intuitively working our way through the world and we think
[23:10] that our moral judgments are based off of taking the data,
[23:14] analyzing it and going, oh, that's wrong, based on this,
[23:18] this and this reason. Whereas actually it's the
[23:20] reverse. It's that we have these
[23:22] visceral, emotional, intuitional, intuitionist
[23:25] judgments and we map on the logic after the fact.
[23:30] I was reading that and I was going social media is the
[23:32] perfect place to weaponize this and spread it on mass.
[23:37] But it seems that, and he would have written this before social
[23:40] media really took off, that that was the case already beforehand.
[23:44] It just didn't have the vehicle, as you said, to spread wider in
[23:49] society. So break this down for me a bit
[23:51] further. The difference between the
[23:53] technological struggles that we're currently holding and the
[23:56] ideological ones that run deeper and older in time.
[24:00] So the first thing I would say is let's look at the phenomenon
[24:04] of woke, for example, when and. I'll define that here quickly,
[24:07] as I do in a sentence which is really make the making sacred of
[24:11] historically marginalized race, gender and sexual identity
[24:15] groups. That is woke from which comes,
[24:18] you know, if you offend or offend the most hypothetically
[24:22] sensitive member, one of these groups, you must be
[24:24] excommunicated, cancelled. That is sort of where what woke
[24:28] is. Now.
[24:29] Let's look at the key sacred categories, race, gender, sexual
[24:31] orientation. Those were the key sacred
[24:34] categories when I was going to university during the era of
[24:37] political correctness in the late 80s, early 90s.
[24:41] It was race. It was sex in the sense of
[24:44] women, and it was also to some degree about, yeah, it was also
[24:47] about LGBT. At that time it was gay and
[24:50] lesbian more than trans, but those categories were the same
[24:55] back in the what I would call the second Awokening, and I
[24:57] would say this 20 tens 20s is the third awakening.
[25:01] Let's go back to the first Awokening in the late 1960s, OK?
[25:04] We didn't have as much on the sexuality, but we had race and
[25:08] sex. So you'd radical feminism, you
[25:10] had the Black Panthers and critical legal studies.
[25:14] In the origins of critical race theory.
[25:17] Race was an absolute key category for the New Left of the
[25:19] late 60s. So there's continuity in the
[25:23] last 60 years in the sacred categories of in particular,
[25:27] race and sex, but sexuality already beginning, let's say, in
[25:31] the early 70s. But yeah, not as prominent in
[25:33] that first awakening. But certainly by the time I was
[25:36] going to university, you know, racist, sexist, anti-gay, that
[25:39] was the chant of the left. And and so these are already
[25:43] well established. All the speech codes that were
[25:46] coming into place in universities at that time in the
[25:48] 80s and 90s were based around these categories.
[25:52] And so there's a lot of continuity ideologically, if you
[25:57] look at the questions and and what I would say is you get
[26:01] social media, a lot of stories there are cycled in from the
[26:04] media. You know, if the media didn't go
[26:07] for this stuff, you know, the peer-to-peer stuff on its own
[26:11] without validation from the media, I just don't think it
[26:16] would have gone in the same direction.
[26:18] I think this kind of needed elites in the media to come on
[26:23] board and to say, yeah, this is the if you want to be really
[26:26] cool and modern and have the most virtuous opinions, these
[26:30] are the opinions to have. And there's a whole intellectual
[26:34] backing to it. So I think this is an
[26:36] intellectual movement which swept through, you know, the New
[26:39] York Times. These are established
[26:41] institutions. It swept through the mainstream,
[26:43] established institutions, mainstream universities.
[26:46] This is not just some fringe youth peer-to-peer phenomena.
[26:50] So my view on this is, you know, social media may be a delivery
[26:53] device that might have accelerated it, but ultimately
[26:57] it would have happened anyway in my view.
[26:59] Looking at this data, yeah, back to the polls here.
[27:03] Non binary dropped from 9% to 2% in two years.
[27:08] Is it fair to say that non binary is basically just a fad
[27:12] that's going out of existence? Yeah, I think that there was a
[27:16] huge element of fashion to this and that that, that in fact, so
[27:20] I don't I'm what I'm saying I'm decoupling it from, you know,
[27:23] shifts to the right, even mental illness that that these are not
[27:27] really or to religion. I don't think this is really
[27:29] what's behind. I think this is quite an
[27:31] independent dynamic. And that's risen and fallen and
[27:34] it's a it looks like a fashion the the way a fashion would
[27:38] behave. You know, a certain kind of
[27:40] running shoe, a certain kind of, you know, it's kind of had a had
[27:42] a an increase and a drop. Now, of course, maybe at the
[27:46] beginning there were political and mental health drivers of
[27:49] this, but right now I'd say it's relatively independent and it's
[27:54] declined a lot. The fact that queer and
[27:57] questioning and other kind of sexual orientations that are non
[28:00] conforming have also dropped at the same time.
[28:03] I just think there is a shift back to more conventional, more
[28:06] conforming gender and sexuality in in Gen.
[28:10] ZI mean that is the way it looks.
[28:11] I should also say, by the way, there is A and, and Gene Twenge
[28:15] who's done a piece following mine, sort of confirming the
[28:18] results, but did some interesting generational
[28:21] analysis, which which I did as well, which does suggest there
[28:26] is in part a generational component.
[28:29] So the youngest Gen. Z, or maybe they're Gen. alpha,
[28:32] I don't know, are less likely to be trans and queer than the
[28:35] older members of Gen. Z.
[28:37] And so there's partly a, a generational replacement effect.
[28:41] There's also partly a, what's called a period effect.
[28:43] So anyone of any age is affected by these shifts.
[28:46] I think both things are going on, but yeah, I think it's a
[28:50] fashion. I think it's decline.
[28:52] Now, of course, the you know, you know, that the opposite
[28:55] explanation, which is only now surfacing among people who say,
[28:59] OK, when they they first said, oh, no, this this isn't this
[29:01] isn't real. This is just his methodology is
[29:04] wrong. Now that Gene Twenky has has
[29:06] weighed in and they're kind of like, OK, well, yeah, it's
[29:08] happening, but the reason it's happening is because of Trump
[29:12] and the climate of fear around, you know, trans and all this
[29:15] sort of stuff. So that is their their counter
[29:17] explanation. Do you think that could be a
[29:19] valid one? What do you think are some of
[29:21] the problems that could be there with the research?
[29:24] So, yeah, my view is that that's not the explanation.
[29:27] And I think there's a number of reasons why I would say that.
[29:30] I mean, I looked at survey data from the most progressive places
[29:35] you can imagine. Yeah, Ivy League universities,
[29:38] Brown, which is about even within the Ivy League would be,
[29:41] you know, pretty much the most progressive even of the Ivy
[29:43] League. Andover Phillips Academy, you
[29:45] know, extremely woke private school.
[29:48] Now I'm looking at these places. You could not imagine a place
[29:52] that is more tolerant of, of, of trans and queer than these
[29:55] places. And there we're seeing this
[29:57] drop. So we're we're seeing the drop
[30:00] in even the most incredibly tolerant places.
[30:04] If you look at a question like, do you self censor your
[30:07] opinions? That is much higher amongst
[30:10] conservatives and Jews than it is amongst other students.
[30:14] It is not higher amongst, you know, trans and queer students
[30:16] compared to other students really.
[30:18] I mean, so, so they're not really feeling that they've got
[30:22] to shut their mouths and they got to be in the closet.
[30:23] So I'm really skeptical that that's playing much of A role.
[30:27] What Trump does, I mean, in a way, what Trump does almost
[30:30] fires the students up against him.
[30:31] You know, you'd almost be more popular if you were going in the
[30:33] face of Trump than if you were going along with him.
[30:36] So yeah, I think this is really not a serious explanation.
[30:39] We've kind of skirted around the edges of this, but clearly
[30:44] generationally we are different as Gen.
[30:47] Z and this was all going on beforehand before Gen.
[30:51] Z, before the iPhone, but stuffs very different now.
[30:56] So can we go into that a bit deeper, the bigger differences
[30:59] generationally here with these woke causes and what you see is
[31:03] the trajectory? Yeah, it's, it's, it's really
[31:06] interesting. And the first thing I mean, I
[31:09] must preface this by saying that it is incredibly hard to poll
[31:13] young people in particularly the 18 to 24 age group, especially
[31:18] if they're not in university. They are very slippery to pull.
[31:22] And so there's a lot of noise in the data.
[31:24] So that's the first thing I want to say.
[31:27] And just to give you an example of this, if on most surveys up
[31:31] until recently, the sort of share of Gen.
[31:36] Z who identify as not heterosexual is simply 25 to 30%
[31:41] thereabouts in the census data, one in Canada, one in Britain,
[31:45] where we've been able to get at this question, the share who are
[31:50] who, who select that option on the census is only 1/3 as high
[31:55] as we're finding on the surveys. So given that the census is much
[32:00] more reliable and we see this also politically, exit polls
[32:05] where you're getting people coming out of polling booths
[32:08] show Gen. Z to be more conservative than
[32:11] polling does. And to the extent therefore,
[32:14] that the Gen. Z people who I actually answer a
[32:17] poll are more interested in politics, more open to
[32:21] experience, which is kind of cycle and personality trait that
[32:25] could be skewing the data in this kind of progressive
[32:27] direction for Gen. Z.
[32:29] So I'm always a little bit cautious, but but let's just
[32:33] look at some broader trends. I would say, you know, in my
[32:38] view, there's no question that Gen.
[32:39] Z in a lot of the polling is less pro free speech and more
[32:44] pro emotional safety than other generations.
[32:48] And now how would I back that up?
[32:51] There have been studies where they asked the same question in
[32:54] 2000 and 2016 at Smith College, which is a liberal arts college,
[33:00] they asked about free speech questions into in in 2000 and
[33:04] 2016, exact same questions. And we see a big drop in the
[33:07] support for free speech in the same age, 18 to 22.
[33:12] It's just 16 years later, other surveys, again from the US,
[33:17] which is the best data If you look at questions around you,
[33:21] should you allow a racist to speak in public to teach, you
[33:26] know, there are other questions, Should we allow a homosexual, a
[33:28] militarist, A socialist, etcetera.
[33:29] But of these questions, the one about a racist really does stand
[33:35] out from the other 5 categories. And that really moves in the, in
[33:38] a direction of, of, of not allowing such people to speak.
[33:42] And young people are less tolerant than that.
[33:45] Other surveys have found, yeah, young people are more likely to
[33:47] say there's absolute right or wrong now.
[33:49] Whereas when I was, you know, at university, young people were
[33:52] more likely to say, well, values are relative and, and there's
[33:55] neither good nor bad. There's been a shift to this
[33:57] very more absolutist type of morality.
[34:00] OK, so that's kind of some basic trends.
[34:03] More likely, less likely to be pro free speech.
[34:05] I think that's real. And I think that that is a
[34:09] feature of, of of Gen. Z.
[34:10] Now this is particularly note if you are conservative, if you are
[34:14] Gen. Z conservative, then you are
[34:17] somewhat you're not as likely to be you're you're more pro free
[34:20] speech and there's not as much difference between a, a, a
[34:23] boomer conservative and a Gen. Z conservative on that.
[34:26] The big difference is the boomer leftist and the Gen.
[34:29] Z leftist is a big, big difference.
[34:31] So what it means to be on the left has shifted.
[34:35] And to the extent A Gen. Z person identifies as on the
[34:38] left, they're pretty intolerant of speech.
[34:40] So I think that is a real thing. And I do think it's generational
[34:44] and it's stamped so that, you know, we know that people's
[34:47] brains stop growing in their early 20s.
[34:49] We know that many things, like musical taste crystallize in the
[34:53] early 20s. So I would expect there to be a
[34:55] lot of persistence in these views.
[34:57] That's not to say they're etched in stone there.
[34:59] There can be sudden changes. So even boomers change their
[35:03] views on, you know, gay marriage and and things when the culture
[35:07] shifted. So it's not impossible you get a
[35:08] shift. I do, however, think that by the
[35:11] time the boomers are the median voter and institutional leader,
[35:15] we're going to have less tolerance for free speech just
[35:18] for generational replacement reasons.
[35:20] So I think that is something that's real and I think it is AI
[35:26] think it's a crisis and I think it needs a lot more attention.
[35:30] But of course, it's not the whole story.
[35:32] So there is also another thing that has been noticed just in
[35:35] the last few years, which is that actually Gen.
[35:39] Z are the most polarized on cultural war issues.
[35:42] Yes, they are more woke, but they're also more polarized than
[35:45] other generations. So there's now quite a strong
[35:48] anti woke element in Gen. Z and it's not it is more male
[35:53] than female, but it's not just male.
[35:56] And that seems to have developed.
[35:59] And so actually what we see in a lot of countries is the young
[36:03] people are both vote, they're both voting for the populist
[36:07] right and for the Green Party more than established.
[36:10] And you see it last year in the general election here in the UK,
[36:12] the majority of men and women, 16 to 24 I think it was, they
[36:16] voted for Labour. That was a 2% difference, 42%
[36:19] for women and 40% for men. The real heart of this divide
[36:23] that you're speaking about is on the fringes.
[36:25] It's reform, it's green. It's not in a silent majority,
[36:30] right? Talk to me more about that.
[36:32] Well, I think the first thing I would say is that the populist
[36:36] right and green vote, or let's say the the left extreme and the
[36:40] right extreme are going to be greater amongst Gen.
[36:42] Z than amongst other generations.
[36:45] So that is seems to be there in every country.
[36:48] You know, if you're Gen. Z and you're on the right,
[36:50] you're voting reform, you're not voting Tory much more so than if
[36:53] you are a, a boomer and you're on the right, you're much more
[36:56] likely to be a Tory. This is not a new finding.
[36:59] I should say. First of all, young people are
[37:01] always more rebellious against the established, you know,
[37:04] authority and, and it's worth saying that for the populist
[37:09] right. Another established finding is
[37:11] that men are something like twice as likely to vote populist
[37:14] right as women, even controlling for everything else across
[37:17] countries. So that is a established finding
[37:20] because women are are partly more likely to uphold the
[37:24] established moral order and the whatever you're supposed to
[37:29] conform to that's prestigious, they will uphold that much more
[37:32] than men will. Men will be much more or more
[37:34] non conforming. But even given all that, you
[37:38] know, of course it's different by different countries.
[37:40] Britain's young people are the most left-leaning.
[37:42] Actually I'm from Canada. The Canadian young people are no
[37:46] more left-leaning than the older people.
[37:49] Whereas in Britain there's a massive generation of
[37:51] difference. US is somewhere in the middle,
[37:54] Europe is somewhere in the middle.
[37:56] Maybe it's more like Canada a little bit.
[37:58] So there's quite a large young populist right vote in
[38:02] continental Europe, much larger than here, for example.
[38:06] So there was something here when I'm, I'm happy to talk about why
[38:08] Britain is maybe a bit different.
[38:10] So I think the way this looks is that we're just going to see
[38:15] more polarization amongst Gen. Z.
[38:20] And I suspected as they get older they will bring that kind
[38:23] of anti establishment polarization.
[38:26] So they're going to be more on towards the Greens and towards
[38:28] reform that I suspect will will happen more and more as we move.
[38:32] You think they'll uphold it? I think so, yeah.
[38:34] I think that they will alter the political map so that and we're
[38:39] already seeing this fragmentation.
[38:41] It depends on the country and it depends on a number of things.
[38:44] But the willingness to break with traditional party labels
[38:48] and to move to alternatives to express their views, the
[38:51] volatility, I think there's going to be more volatility.
[38:54] They're just not as moored. They're not members of their
[38:56] local labor club and Conservative Club.
[38:59] They are willing to change their vote.
[39:01] Well, are they willing? They're willing to change their
[39:04] vote within ideological blocks. And so I just think we're going
[39:08] to see more of this fragmentation and volatility in
[39:12] the electorate as a whole as Gen.
[39:13] Z becomes the median voter. That would be my prediction.
[39:16] Well I wonder how much of that is 1 due to the incompetence of
[39:19] current parties on both sides. I just had Charlie Downs in that
[39:22] seat and he describes Labour and the Tories as two sides.
[39:26] One side of the same coin or two sides of the same coin.
[39:30] And I think that's true. Both sides have shown that
[39:33] they're incompetent in the Uki feel that I feel politically
[39:36] homeless as a 20 year old that can vote in this country.
[39:40] I also wonder if it's perhaps something deeper than that and
[39:43] more cultural than political. This skepticism towards
[39:47] institutions as a whole, including the church.
[39:50] Even when people are less atheist than ever, they're not
[39:54] more religious, they're more floating in between spiritual
[39:57] but not religious. And to take it into politics, I
[40:01] wonder if amongst this individualism that we have
[40:05] present. We're just happier to sort of
[40:08] tailor make our parties to fit our best interests, and we don't
[40:12] really care about going. Yeah, but my whole family's
[40:15] Labour or my whole family's Conservative, it's me, me, me.
[40:18] What's personally best and fits exactly how I want the world to
[40:22] be. Could that be playing into this
[40:24] too? Yeah, yeah.
[40:25] And I think what you're describing is the kind of
[40:27] individualism which I think this Gen.
[40:30] Z exemplifies, although I will say that that trend's been going
[40:33] on for a long time. This individualism trend has
[40:35] been going on like it it started or people were talking about,
[40:38] you know, oh, so many people are living alone in Manhattan in the
[40:41] 1980s. You know, so this has been going
[40:43] on for 60 years. These trends.
[40:46] It started with the rise in divorce, sex before marriage,
[40:49] then it's like single living. And now we are having
[40:51] alternative genders. And so, yeah, So I think this
[40:53] has been going on for a long time.
[40:54] And Gen. Z simply represents a more
[40:57] extreme end point of this individualism.
[41:00] And so they will be even less moored to tradition and party
[41:05] than my generation Gen. X was.
[41:07] We we were already on more on more than the Boomers were, and
[41:10] they were more on more than silence.
[41:12] So is a continuation of this pattern of expressive
[41:17] individualism. That's, that's was, was already
[41:19] being noted even in the 60s, but especially in books like, you
[41:24] know, Alan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind in the 80s,
[41:28] you know, and so I just, you're right.
[41:31] So it's an individualism. I will pick and mix my religion.
[41:34] I'll pick and mix my political party.
[41:37] I'm not a member of my local labor club, my local church, my
[41:41] local union. So I'm much more detached.
[41:43] Part of that detachment, of course, involves lower trust in
[41:48] institutions, in the media. And young people are the least
[41:51] trusting of of all the generations.
[41:55] But that's been going on for a long time.
[41:56] I mean, I would say this book Bowling Alone by Robert Putnam
[42:00] on, there's a whole literature on what's called social capital.
[42:04] How how often do you go to dinner with your neighbors?
[42:07] If you bowl, do you bowl alone or do you bowl in a league?
[42:12] The more you know. What Putnam was noticing was
[42:14] bowling leagues were declined. Bowling was not.
[42:17] People were not members of associations like the
[42:21] Freemasons. They were writing checks to
[42:24] causes they support. So they'll click on A cause and
[42:26] donate, but they won't be be at A at a board meeting for their
[42:31] association going once a month. What that means, of course is,
[42:35] is, is as a group, you know, younger people are less
[42:38] connected. I mean, this is again, the
[42:41] extreme end point of a trend that's been going on for 60
[42:43] years. You know, Putnamarge television
[42:46] was the beginning of this, that that it detached people from
[42:49] socializing. The Internet and and social
[42:53] media are, are even more extreme examples of this longer running
[42:57] phenomenon. So yeah, I think you have a low
[42:59] trust, very individualized atomized generation.
[43:03] But, but I, I want to stress that my generation was also very
[43:07] individualized and anatomized. So it's, it's just a little bit
[43:10] further along the same path. And that's where modern
[43:14] societies have been moving in the for 60 years.
[43:18] And so all of the trends which were already picked up for
[43:21] earlier generations are just more extreme, I think for Gen.
[43:24] ZI. Really want us to unpack this
[43:27] ideological side and then the technological side because what
[43:31] you've just outlined there, that seems explicitly technological,
[43:35] the television, the development of all these different mediums
[43:38] of communication. So let's get this crystal clear
[43:42] here. What are the key elements that
[43:44] are ideological and what parts do you think are actually novel
[43:49] for Gen. Z?
[43:50] What are we facing that's new? Because at the moment, I feel
[43:53] like a bit of a victim here sort of going, we have it so uniquely
[43:56] tough when we haven't. And these trends have been
[43:59] developing for decades, like you're saying.
[44:01] Yeah, I mean, and, and so it's, it's very important I think to
[44:04] my view is the technology can accelerate these trends.
[44:10] You know, even if you go back to to the television, Yeah.
[44:13] So there, there is a social isolation that is bred by, it's
[44:16] bred by general affluence too. And if you can afford to have
[44:19] your own place apart from your parents or your extended family,
[44:23] that's a kind of technology too. You know, wealth is allowing you
[44:27] to separate and have your own place.
[44:29] And, and you know, you can live alone because you maybe get
[44:31] government support, government healthcare and maybe you have
[44:34] your own money. You can get leisure outside the
[44:36] church. You don't need to go to church
[44:38] to have socialization. So there's a whole bunch of
[44:40] technologies that allowed for greater individualism.
[44:43] I think that the the television was one of those.
[44:46] I think the Internet and social media are also.
[44:49] So they do accelerate the process.
[44:51] I mean, the printing press aren't, you know, it was argued
[44:53] that that was a source of individualism.
[44:55] Everyone could read the Bible for themselves.
[44:57] They didn't have to take the interpretation from the priest.
[45:00] That was the origin of the Reformation.
[45:02] OK. So, you know, these things
[45:03] matter. Undoubtedly they matter.
[45:05] I still more am more of a culturalist.
[45:08] I believe that the outworking of the logic of ideas ultimately is
[45:13] more important. I think if you introduced social
[45:17] media in Afghanistan or in, in a, in a culture that was much
[45:22] more conservative, I just don't think it would have the same
[45:24] effects as we see here. And you can in fact see that
[45:28] that East Asia hasn't had the same mental health.
[45:31] You know, they, they don't have the same trajectory around woken
[45:34] mental health that we see in the West, even though they've got
[45:37] social media and they've got smartphones.
[45:39] So what is it about that culture?
[45:42] The culture is essentially 1 of expressive individualism is very
[45:46] important. So you should not listen to
[45:49] tradition. You should, you know, reject
[45:51] tradition and make your own life.
[45:53] That's sort of 1 core element. And there's a whole literature
[45:56] on this. Christopher Lash, Robert Bella,
[45:58] there's a whole bunch of people who've written on this.
[46:00] The other part of it is, you know, looking at your own
[46:03] feelings and analyzing your own feelings.
[46:07] A lot of the time myself focusing on myself, that that is
[46:09] part of this mentality as well. So the rise of the therapeutic
[46:13] therapy culture is part of this individualism.
[46:16] So that's one strand of modern, particularly post 1960s.
[46:20] Although again, you know, we can trace this back into the even
[46:23] into the 19th century with bohemian intellectuals.
[46:26] We're doing a lot of these same things, but it took a long time
[46:29] for that to be coming into the mass of the population.
[46:33] That's a kind of older trend, but then the other one is these
[46:36] more what I would call leftist trends around the care, harm and
[46:40] equal outcomes. You know, we can't have, you
[46:43] know, any race gaps, any sex gaps in the boardroom in
[46:46] admissions to Harvard in in in this is this mentality comes
[46:50] more from a shift of the left away from Marxism and and social
[46:54] class to race, sex, sexual orientation.
[46:57] That happens in the 60s. That's the sort of independent
[47:01] ideological development, and I think that's percolated into the
[47:05] mentality of a large chunk of Gen.
[47:07] Z, starting with academia, moving into mainstream media,
[47:12] moving through to pop culture, into the youth culture.
[47:15] Now that's influenced them. So I would say this is a long
[47:20] standing cultural development. Cultures, you know, it's like
[47:23] DNA over your lifetime, it'll express itself over your
[47:27] lifetime. Likewise cultures, they, they're
[47:29] like programs that have to unfold and the implications
[47:32] aren't always obvious at the beginning.
[47:35] As they unfold, the more radical implicate they they're always
[47:38] taking it to the next level, the next level where we did gay, now
[47:41] we're going to do trans, we did psychotherapy, Now we're going
[47:45] to do, you know, you, you, you, you ADHD and whatever it is.
[47:49] So they're always moving it to the next level to keep it fresh.
[47:52] And that's that's how you see the ideology unfold.
[47:55] And so now we're seeing the the very radical implications of
[47:59] these ideologies and the pathologies which might have
[48:02] been concealed by, you know, there was enough legacy interest
[48:05] in having two kids and having a family.
[48:09] Gradually some of those legacy vestigial beliefs decay enough
[48:14] that you start to see, oh, this is really what happens when you
[48:17] institutionalized maximal expressive individualism.
[48:21] This is where it goes. And so we're starting to see
[48:24] more of the pathologies and fewer of the benefits and the
[48:27] the balance between these two things is now shifted to the
[48:30] point I think that the culture is actually entering a the
[48:33] progressives had it all their own way for 60 years.
[48:37] All the attitude trends went their way.
[48:39] And now all of a sudden, just in the last two years, oh, we've
[48:42] lost on gender ideology. Like, you know, actually the
[48:46] public is now public opinion has shifted against the idea of
[48:49] Natal men in women's sports and women's bathroom just in the
[48:52] last two years. That's the first loss, the first
[48:55] proper loss that the cultural left has recorded in 60 years of
[48:59] attitude trends. I think something important is
[49:01] changing. There are so many questions, and
[49:04] I want to ask you a couple of big ones here.
[49:06] They'll be horrible to answer, so I'm sorry, but that's
[49:09] terrifying, the idea of these ideologies getting implemented.
[49:13] And they're compassionate and they reduce harm, and they're
[49:17] all good for us. And then 60 years down the line,
[49:20] they poison our societies from within.
[49:24] How do you avoid that? How do you smell the carbon
[49:27] monoxide gas that you physically can't taste before it's too
[49:31] late? I mean, the thing that terrifies
[49:33] me that we speak about all the time on the show is the
[49:36] fertility crisis that's unfolding.
[49:37] And Stephen Jay Shaw's research on this is phenomenal.
[49:39] And he was in that seat a couple of months ago.
[49:42] And the trouble is, it's kind of wrapped up in all of these very
[49:46] compassionate and genuinely good progressive ideas.
[49:51] The liberation of women entering the workplace and therefore
[49:54] having long and illustrious careers, prioritizing those
[49:56] rather than family. It's so hard to untangle all of
[50:01] these different problems without opening up new ones or returning
[50:04] to a genuinely oppressive past. So first of all, how do we smell
[50:11] the carbon monoxide gas early on?
[50:14] And second of all, if we're already in a position where it's
[50:17] about to kill us, how do we go about tackling that?
[50:22] Yeah, these are really good points.
[50:23] And and I think you put your finger on it that a lot of these
[50:27] cultural trends are things that were good in the beginning and
[50:29] did a lot of good, but have a falling diminishing return and
[50:35] where the negatives outweigh the positives.
[50:37] And that's always very difficult because someone who's arguing in
[50:39] favour of, let's say, you know, gender ideology will, will, will
[50:43] always go back to the past when there was intolerance, you know,
[50:47] people didn't tolerate gays and blacks and, and, and now they're
[50:51] doing the same with trans. So they're always try and
[50:54] legitimate the next step by drawing on the cultural capital
[50:58] of the civil rights movement and the gay rights movement and
[51:01] things where where you really did have, you know, prejudice
[51:03] against gay people, you couldn't be gay, right?
[51:06] So, so they were, they were right back then, but now they're
[51:09] wrong. And that's really always a hard
[51:11] argument because they'll just say, no, you're just like the
[51:13] people who were against gay rights, you're against trans
[51:15] rights. And it's very hard to to say,
[51:18] well, there's an optimum here, right?
[51:20] You've gone too far. Now, in some cases, we have been
[51:24] able things that are less sacred, like crime.
[51:27] Now crime does touch on race in the US, for example, but there
[51:31] was a soft on crime trend, you know, in the sort of 70s and 80s
[51:36] and that was to some degree reversed with, you know, and,
[51:41] and people came to see that that wasn't a good idea that we have
[51:44] to do something about the crack cocaine epidemic and what it's
[51:48] the damage it's doing to black neighborhood, you know, and,
[51:52] and, and a lot of black politicians very much wanted
[51:54] this crackdown. So we have had these things go
[51:58] up and down in the past. However, I think it's a little
[52:01] tougher with anything that is purely cultural where it's not
[52:05] having a very clear material effect if it is destroying
[52:09] neighborhoods. So now we've seen, you know,
[52:11] there this idea of safe supply, give the addicts the drugs they
[52:14] want that because it's essentially destroyed a lot of
[52:17] lives. Very clear.
[52:18] It doesn't work. Something concrete like that.
[52:20] It doesn't touch on race, gender, sexuality.
[52:23] OK, we can, we can give on that. Progressives can give on that
[52:26] without really touching the core sacred values as much.
[52:29] But to actually back off on, for example, our our past is it's a
[52:34] systemically racist patriarchal society.
[52:38] You know, it's not obvious that those policies.
[52:41] I think they are doing a lot of concrete damage, but it's not as
[52:44] in your face as, you know, as crime and drugs.
[52:47] So they don't have to back off on it as much.
[52:50] So I do think that one question will be, So if you look at
[52:54] trans, for example, you know, I think the evidence is pretty
[52:59] good that it's damaged a lot of lives.
[53:01] However, you know, we're talking about a small number of people.
[53:04] There's still some dispute over exactly how extensive the damage
[53:08] is and how much it is it a social contagion versus not.
[53:12] And so they're still digging in there.
[53:14] They're still not willing to give up.
[53:15] Like if you look at the Democrats in the US, they still
[53:18] don't want to give up the trans activist position and say, yeah,
[53:21] sex is kind of biological binary.
[53:25] It's just very hard because this is a kind of belief system where
[53:28] it's like almost like a religion.
[53:30] Like history's moving towards justice.
[53:32] We are on the right side of history.
[53:34] History is the progressive agenda is about being nicer to
[53:38] people who are less fortunate and having equality between the
[53:42] fortunate and the unfortunate. We just have to have those two,
[53:45] the care, harm and equality moral foundations that Height
[53:47] talks about. We just have to click into those
[53:50] intuitions and push, push down the gas pedal and go forward.
[53:53] And we got the we're on the right side of history.
[53:56] Of course, the negatives of that are showing up.
[53:59] People are expressing skepticism, but people are so
[54:02] people on the progressive left are so emotionally invested in
[54:06] this care, harm equality narrative around the the race,
[54:08] gender, sexuality. I just think for them to back
[54:11] off on anyone's strand, it's like riding a bike.
[54:14] If you stop pedaling, you're going to fall over.
[54:16] And I just think it's just impossible.
[54:18] I don't I think for the true believers, they cannot back off
[54:22] on any of these things. The narrative is just one more
[54:24] push and it'll be like civil rights and gay rights.
[54:27] We're on the right side of history.
[54:29] We this is a set back, but we just have to keep going.
[54:32] We can. To actually concede to the other
[54:34] side would be to unruly unravel, to pull all the strings apart on
[54:38] this ball of twine, and I just don't think it's going to work.
[54:41] It's this kind of chronic, toxically empathetic addiction
[54:45] that just shoves us down the wrong path.
[54:48] I'd be intrigued to hear your thoughts on this rise in Gen.
[54:51] Z men, specifically going back to church, converting to
[54:54] Christianity. What do you make to that rise in
[54:57] the last decade? Well, again, this, this is quite
[55:01] disputed and, and I mean, there was one survey which showed it
[55:05] and I think we're going to need more data.
[55:07] I don't want to go out on a limb and say there definitely is a
[55:10] religious revival. I I think the poll is strong
[55:14] data. It's contradicted by other data.
[55:17] I think I really would have to say I want to wait and see on
[55:21] this before I confirm that that's a trend.
[55:25] So the data from 4% in 2018 to 21% Bible Society report.
[55:31] I saw this. I'm no statistician, but I
[55:34] thought this is complete bullshit, right?
[55:36] Right. That was my intuition.
[55:39] And, and I think that's a good and healthy intuition.
[55:41] And it is one survey and it's contradicted, contradicted by
[55:45] other surveys until all the surveys are moving the same way.
[55:48] So on this trans decline, we have a whole bunch of surveys
[55:51] saying the same thing. Until that's the case on
[55:55] religion, I am hesitant to say this is happening.
[55:59] I think it's plausible, but I'm hesitant.
[56:02] I mean, similarly, I would say on woke attitudes, there's some
[56:07] quite strong survey evidence in the US that has shown a decline
[56:12] in, you know, the share of young women saying that they are
[56:15] liberal, which in the US is basically left, you know, has
[56:18] gone down 15 points in the last two years in, in a quite a large
[56:23] student survey. It is not gone down in the fire,
[56:28] which is a very large student survey.
[56:30] So we now have two separate data.
[56:32] Now it's true that the HERI college data it it pulls
[56:37] students at all institutions down to very low ranked
[56:41] institutions. And so is it picking up people
[56:45] who are less elite and is this is the trend, the shift to the
[56:48] right more amongst people who are less elite?
[56:51] That's certainly what the data kind of seems to show, like the
[56:53] non university, less elite population of young people are
[56:58] the ones who seem to be the ones who've moved, right.
[57:01] And maybe that's the trend. Where is the elite young people
[57:04] are continuing to be woke and they're continuing to to support
[57:07] the left. That could be the pattern.
[57:11] So with a lot of these things, until we see confirmatory survey
[57:15] responses, So on the religion one, I think it's just too early
[57:18] to say. Yeah.
[57:20] I mean, it makes sense to me that there would be a rise, I
[57:23] don't know, about 4% six years ago to 21%.
[57:27] There was one theory that posted that the data was actually wrong
[57:31] at the start and there was a higher percentage initially, so
[57:35] it increased less, but it was still that prominent.
[57:39] It does make sense to me though, with young men feeling
[57:41] increasingly disenfranchised and sort of just checking out of the
[57:45] game completely. Of course, more and more,
[57:49] especially young guys who feel demonized by this recent liberal
[57:54] mutation, they're going to go more conservative like the date
[57:58] shows. And I think tied to that,
[58:00] they're going to go more religious because they want
[58:01] something everlasting. They want something that just
[58:04] transcends themselves and actually connects to something
[58:07] higher. And I struggle with this because
[58:10] I'm not religious. I'm kind of agnostic.
[58:12] I have a lot of Christians on the show and I talk to them
[58:14] because I'm very interested in their world view and whether
[58:17] it's true or not. And that's because I feel like
[58:20] that's what I need in today's world.
[58:23] I'm struggling to find bedrock. Right.
[58:26] It's nowhere to be seen. Everything's subjective,
[58:29] everything's emotional, and I don't like that and I don't like
[58:33] that the logical conclusions of a lot of the world views.
[58:36] I actually hold leafy down dark paths that clearly don't work
[58:40] for society, or at least haven't in recent times.
[58:44] So I just wonder what's next for young men?
[58:48] Yeah, I mean, there's such, so many good questions there and I
[58:51] think what is next? I'm one thing I will say, I
[58:53] mean, I did an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal on this
[58:57] theme of post progressivism. So what if, you know, the
[59:01] Progressive Era is starts in 196465 and goes to the early
[59:07] twenty 20s? And what if that's an era in the
[59:10] culture that's over, right? So so I think there's some
[59:14] indications of this that we might be entering into a new
[59:19] dispensation, a new what I call the post Progressive Era.
[59:23] And and I use, for example, a number of data sources.
[59:26] I mean, one is, you know, the shift against transactivist
[59:30] positions on women are, are biological males and women's
[59:33] sports. That's concrete is real.
[59:36] It is it is dramatic and it is the first real enduring loss
[59:41] that the cultural progressives have had in public opinion in 60
[59:45] years. I would argue.
[59:46] I know there are a few blips around crime and a few, you
[59:48] know, but I think it's very important.
[59:51] I also think that, you know, the fact that Trump gets elected,
[59:56] when Trump got elected in 2016, you know, and you had millions
[1:00:00] marching around and you had this, you know, explosion of
[1:00:02] resistance. He then gets elected in 2024
[1:00:06] and, and the resistance is just muted.
[1:00:08] So the cultural left really has lost a lot of its emotional
[1:00:13] punch. I think that's telling us
[1:00:15] something, you know, left wing cancellations way down the
[1:00:19] mainstream media talking about white supremacy and white
[1:00:22] privilege and patriarchy and all these things way down.
[1:00:26] There are a number of indications that I think that
[1:00:28] serious leftist, you know, and people like, you know, Matthew
[1:00:31] Iglesias and Noah Smith and and, and even Ezra Klein and some of
[1:00:34] these people are, are saying, look, you know, if the
[1:00:38] progressive utopia is the West Coast cities, the Seattle's and
[1:00:42] San Francisco, that's not a really good advertisement for
[1:00:45] civilization. It's kind of, I think there was
[1:00:48] A at the elite level of serious thinking, people on the left,
[1:00:53] particularly the center left, I think are questioning a lot of
[1:00:56] things they didn't question before, whereas they they just
[1:00:58] were in this right side of history mentality.
[1:01:01] History is moving inevitably in this more cultural progressive
[1:01:04] direction. I think that's now being
[1:01:05] questioned by the serious people, not just because they
[1:01:08] lost the election, but but all for other reasons.
[1:01:10] Yeah, before the election and you're saying the reaction's
[1:01:13] more muted, there are less left wing cancellations and you open
[1:01:17] up that kind of worms of what it tells us.
[1:01:19] Yeah. What does it tell us?
[1:01:21] Well, I think it tells us that their confidence, the activists
[1:01:25] confidence, the movements confidence has really been
[1:01:27] damaged. This idea that we're on the
[1:01:30] right side of history, we just have to push the pedal down
[1:01:33] because we have the right beliefs.
[1:01:34] The resistance will be overcome. They're just the reaction
[1:01:37] reactionaries. I just think that mentality and
[1:01:41] world view and historical consciousness has been damaged.
[1:01:45] I think it's the boy who cried wolf as well.
[1:01:47] When you cry wolf too many times, people are going to stop
[1:01:49] listening. And then when something bad
[1:01:51] happens, they're not going to notice it.
[1:01:53] And this is the problem that's happened.
[1:01:55] I mean, you see it manifest in something like the assassination
[1:01:59] of Charlie Kirk, where for years people have gone, you know, you
[1:02:05] disagreeing with me, you saying your opinion openly, that's
[1:02:08] violence, right? Hate speech, whatever it may be.
[1:02:12] Then you don't embrace Black Lives Matter.
[1:02:14] You don't post a black square on your Instagram and they go,
[1:02:17] silence is violent. And then finally it's like, oh,
[1:02:21] violence is violence. So it's this thing of the boy
[1:02:25] who cried wolf and people, especially from the left
[1:02:29] initially. But I see anecdotally on the
[1:02:31] Internet the rights doing this just as much now, throwing
[1:02:34] around these labels of communist, fascist Nazis, far
[1:02:38] right, far left. What happens is you dilute the
[1:02:41] meaning to the point where the actual far right, the actual
[1:02:46] Nazis can slip through the cracks, right?
[1:02:50] So no wonder the left are more muted when they've been trying
[1:02:55] their games for years and they've failed.
[1:02:58] They've used up all of their cards and I wonder if the same
[1:03:01] is going to be true for the right in a few years if they're
[1:03:04] going to use up all of their trump cards too.
[1:03:08] Nice pun there by the way. No God, there's so much in that
[1:03:12] question. I mean, the first thing to say
[1:03:15] is I think there is a obviously a populist anti woke resist.
[1:03:19] There's an anti woke resistance online.
[1:03:20] And then there's also been populism that is one kind of
[1:03:24] challenge. And so you have populist
[1:03:28] resistance to the establishment woke left narrative, progressive
[1:03:33] narrative. I don't think that was
[1:03:36] necessarily a fatal thing for the woke left narrative.
[1:03:40] They could just say, you know, these people are the
[1:03:42] reactionaries and they don't know anything and they're just a
[1:03:45] bunch of idiots and their moral reprobates and whatever
[1:03:48] deplorables. OK, However, you know, when you
[1:03:53] lose election at, you know, a number of elections, then that
[1:03:56] induces at least again in the thinking center leftist.
[1:04:00] Why are we losing these elections?
[1:04:02] Actually, maybe the populist have a point in on some things
[1:04:07] and not others. So I think that I would place
[1:04:11] the ACT, you know, and so yes, it's the case that the left has
[1:04:14] been calling people racist for for decades and doing it
[1:04:17] successfully. People would would run into to
[1:04:19] the corner that taboo was very powerful.
[1:04:22] I think some of that has worn off partly due to the audacity
[1:04:26] of the the populist right. A Trump figure was obviously
[1:04:29] pretty important, a Musk figure. You know, clearly the right has
[1:04:33] been willing to challenge the left's cultural power, the power
[1:04:37] of these taboos and has helped to erode with them to some
[1:04:39] degree. I still think they have pick up
[1:04:42] in the elite institutions actually.
[1:04:44] So they're not completely they haven't completely lost their
[1:04:47] power. They still matter.
[1:04:50] But I guess what I'm talking about is more let's just forget
[1:04:52] about the right for a minute and the populist and just look at
[1:04:55] the left. I just think the thinking people
[1:04:59] on the left are less confident and and the movement is less
[1:05:02] confident and splitting now between the double down true
[1:05:06] believers, democratic socialist of America, and they're also
[1:05:11] controlling the the Democratic Party in many ways.
[1:05:15] But then you have the center left group who are actually much
[1:05:18] more open and calling out woke and saying this is a disaster.
[1:05:21] Our position on trans is a disaster, questioning California
[1:05:26] can't build a train line anywhere.
[1:05:28] You can't build anything. You can't build houses.
[1:05:31] They're all these addicts everywhere.
[1:05:32] You know, this is clearly not where civilization needs to go.
[1:05:35] And so I actually think this is deeper, A deeper crisis for the
[1:05:39] left. I think it's an intellectual
[1:05:40] crisis. And one of the questions for
[1:05:41] young people is the elites that are now maybe going to read help
[1:05:45] to redefine the left. We'll have to see what happens
[1:05:48] to the left. Who wins this factional fight
[1:05:51] between the moderates and the radicals.
[1:05:54] And will the woke left be marginalized by the the sensible
[1:05:57] centrist is a question. And will that even percolate?
[1:06:01] There are even, believe it or not, some green shoots in
[1:06:04] academia. Like, you know, the university
[1:06:07] presidents are obviously saying yes to put political neutrality,
[1:06:11] no to mandatory diversity statements, you know, no to
[1:06:13] being essentially political actors.
[1:06:16] And even amongst academics, I think there's been a slight
[1:06:20] shift. They're sort of saying, yeah,
[1:06:22] DEI wasn't a great idea, getting all political maybe wasn't a
[1:06:25] great idea. Now, I'm not saying all
[1:06:28] academics, but there's a chunk of the center left.
[1:06:30] The chunk of the center has shifted against the woke agenda.
[1:06:33] I think that's very real. One of the questions is my, my
[1:06:37] view is this is going to change the high elite culture.
[1:06:40] For so long now the elite culture has been you got to be
[1:06:43] on the left to be a good person. This is where history is going.
[1:06:46] I now think there is more questioning of that and it's a
[1:06:49] very uncertain time of transition.
[1:06:52] And I think that will affect young people.
[1:06:54] And I don't exactly know how, but I think the message that
[1:06:57] young people have been getting that woke is the way you, this
[1:07:00] is the enlightened ways, the virtuous way.
[1:07:02] I think there is now more of a challenge to that in their
[1:07:05] ecosystem. So how are they going to reflect
[1:07:08] that? I don't know.
[1:07:09] I suspect it'll be reflected in a real polarization within young
[1:07:13] people going forward. Well, I want us to tie all of
[1:07:17] these ideas together now to to wrap up.
[1:07:20] We've got a lot going on here with data and polls and
[1:07:24] intergenerational stuff. Let's take it back home to Gen.
[1:07:28] Z here. Right.
[1:07:30] Where does the left go from here in Gen.
[1:07:33] Z? In the next few years?
[1:07:35] Where does the right go? And ultimately, what do you see
[1:07:38] as the future in the West for Gen.
[1:07:41] Z? Wow.
[1:07:45] You know, obviously there is a variation, but within between
[1:07:47] countries in what's going to happen.
[1:07:50] I think that Gen. Z is going to be more divided
[1:07:54] politically around these cultural issues.
[1:07:57] Think of the cultural issues are more important for the young
[1:08:00] left than the older left, and they're more important for the
[1:08:03] young right than the older right.
[1:08:05] So the boomer right was still the old Thatcher Reaganite right
[1:08:09] that focused a lot on, you know, getting government out of the
[1:08:12] economy and so on. I think those concerns are less
[1:08:15] important. I think the young right is much
[1:08:17] more concerned about, you know, preserving national identity,
[1:08:21] including the ethnic character, not ethno nationalism, but
[1:08:25] saying, well, there's a majority, there's a minority.
[1:08:26] Do we, we, we, we want to maybe talk about that since there's
[1:08:29] rapid demographic shifting. We want to talk about birth
[1:08:31] rates, which you mentioned. We want to talk about these
[1:08:34] taboo topics around free speech, around our history, around
[1:08:40] sexuality. So I think that's more important
[1:08:42] for the right and it's more important for the left.
[1:08:44] And that's one of the reasons, so the left, the young left is
[1:08:47] really not focused that much on the older, you know, economic.
[1:08:51] I mean, that still matters, but I'm not, it's not the main
[1:08:53] driver. And so I see the cultural, the
[1:08:57] the process of moving from politics of left, right
[1:09:01] economics to a politics of the globalist, nationalist cultural
[1:09:05] issues, to put it in crude terms, that realignment of the
[1:09:09] key dividing lines in society. I think that process is going to
[1:09:12] continue and that the young, the Gen.
[1:09:15] Z population is really going to reflect that more than any other
[1:09:18] generation. They're going to be voting on
[1:09:20] these issues and they're going to be sorting on these issues.
[1:09:23] And I think that I think that's not a bad thing in a way because
[1:09:26] I do think these issues are probably are the most important
[1:09:29] ones that need to be sorted out. I mean, on the economy, you
[1:09:32] don't have much wiggle room. You can't just, you know,
[1:09:35] redistribute all your money or the bond markets will attack
[1:09:38] your currency. You know, you have very little
[1:09:39] room to move there. You can't on the other hands,
[1:09:42] you know, say we're not going to spend any money on the public
[1:09:44] services and let the NHS waiting times.
[1:09:46] So I think the economic questions are, if not settled,
[1:09:50] they're moving within a tight band.
[1:09:52] It's it's a technocratic set of issues.
[1:09:54] The cultural issues are much more positional.
[1:09:56] And those are I think are actually the right issues to be
[1:09:59] debating politically. So I think actually Gen.
[1:10:01] Z has that right. I think those issues we need to
[1:10:03] come to an accommodation on and I think those are the right
[1:10:06] issues to be talking about. So that's yeah, where I see Gen.
[1:10:09] Z going is just they're going to be voting and thinking in in a
[1:10:13] more polarized way. There is no sing singular trend.
[1:10:16] Yes, they are on average going to be more woke, less pro free
[1:10:19] speech, but on the other hand they're going to be fighting
[1:10:21] about those issues quite a bit. Is there anything else that
[1:10:24] concerns you? I mean, just listening to you
[1:10:26] speak today and kind of looking back at this cultural evolution
[1:10:30] that's happened so rapidly the last 100 years, let's say, it's
[1:10:36] unfolding at a much faster pace than biological evolution,
[1:10:39] obviously. And this has been on my mind so
[1:10:42] much recently since being to David Pintsoff, who's a
[1:10:44] professor at UCLA, evolutionary psychologist.
[1:10:46] And he laid this out to me, this battle between evolution
[1:10:51] biologically and evolution culturally.
[1:10:53] And ultimately, he thinks that the biological evolution always
[1:10:58] wins that race. You get slapped in the face by
[1:11:01] the biological brick wall eventually, and that's probably
[1:11:06] the biggest thing that I think about now is what are these
[1:11:10] things that are noble and liberal and progressive that we
[1:11:14] embrace? They could be right wing and we
[1:11:16] think they're noble too, and we hold them up so highly and hold
[1:11:19] them so dearly to ourselves. What are those things that are,
[1:11:22] 60 years down the line, going to screw us over?
[1:11:28] It's just terrifying how much stuff has changed so fast, not
[1:11:32] only with culture, but with technology that we've outlined
[1:11:35] today, speeding up that entire process, expediting massively.
[1:11:41] I can just imagine there are so many things.
[1:11:43] Not to get too pessimistic here because I'm quite an optimistic
[1:11:45] person generally, but there's so much room for error here.
[1:11:50] But the amount of change we've incurred on ourselves, is there
[1:11:53] anything else that you kind of see going forwards that maybe
[1:11:57] isn't a problem, won't be for 20304050 years, but could open
[1:12:01] up down the line as a result of other things?
[1:12:04] Wow, wow. I, I think we can kind of spot
[1:12:07] the things that might be problems, you know, and I'll try
[1:12:11] and tie this in, you know, because we could have talked
[1:12:14] about technology and I'm not as much of A, of a pessimist around
[1:12:18] things like AI and I mean, and even social media and
[1:12:21] smartphones. I would say there's actually
[1:12:24] quite a debate over whether in fact that is causing the mental
[1:12:27] health problems. So I don't think that's by any
[1:12:29] means a done deal, even though I slightly lean to the Jonathan
[1:12:34] Hyde position. But I'm not sure what I would
[1:12:37] say is let's just deal with something that is also relevant
[1:12:39] to your point about evolution, which is birth rates and
[1:12:42] fertility rates. The fact that Gen.
[1:12:45] Z appears again, early days, we don't know.
[1:12:48] But it appears that their fertility rate, that is the
[1:12:51] number of children the average woman will have in her lifetime
[1:12:54] is going to be very lower than in previous generations, well
[1:12:58] below the replacement level. We're seeing this trend around
[1:13:01] the world. And this then means if we're
[1:13:05] talking about evolution, evolution is really about
[1:13:07] fertility rates in a way, and survival.
[1:13:09] It's also about mortality, but mortality is not as much of an
[1:13:13] issue. We've got modern medicine and
[1:13:15] people live to the same rough ages, I mean, within a certain
[1:13:18] band. So we don't have a lot of young,
[1:13:20] you know, babies dying, whatever.
[1:13:22] It's all about fertility differences.
[1:13:25] Who is going to be populating the planet in the future if
[1:13:29] we're talking about evolution Now, on the one hand, what we
[1:13:32] know in developed countries is if you are religious and you
[1:13:35] attend services weekly, you roughly speaking will have a
[1:13:39] replacement level fertility rate.
[1:13:42] If you say you don't have a religion and you don't go to
[1:13:44] church or services, roughly speaking, your fertility rate
[1:13:49] will be around one point O. So a child, 1/2 child to a
[1:13:54] child. I think it's more like a child
[1:13:55] difference than between those two groups.
[1:13:59] And compounding means, you know, more children, more mothers,
[1:14:02] more children, fewer children, fewer mothers, fewer children.
[1:14:04] So you take these lines, it takes only a few generations for
[1:14:09] these trends to lead to quite rapid compositional shifts in
[1:14:13] the population. Now, I know that a lot of kids
[1:14:16] of religious people become secular.
[1:14:18] So the question is, is going to be how quickly are the kids of
[1:14:22] religious people becoming secular versus the birth rate
[1:14:25] differential and any weakening of the secularization trend of
[1:14:31] kids of religious people becoming secular is going to
[1:14:34] mean that the religious are going to take over faster.
[1:14:39] I would say let's I'll give you a couple of examples of where
[1:14:42] the religious have taken over. 1 is Israel, where the ultra
[1:14:45] Orthodox Jews have a birth rate of between 6:00 and 7:00 kids,
[1:14:50] which they've maintained that's not in decline.
[1:14:53] The secular Jews, it's around 2:00 because of that, and
[1:14:57] there's also the Modern Orthodox who are in between because of
[1:14:59] that. Israel has become a much more
[1:15:01] religious conservative society as a result of this.
[1:15:06] In other cases, the evangelicals in America, 3/4 of the growth of
[1:15:11] evangelical Protestants is because they had a one child
[1:15:13] birth rate advantage over the mainline.
[1:15:15] Protestants kept it up for several generations.
[1:15:19] Now you could imagine a situation in Western countries
[1:15:22] where if the religious become more conscious of themselves as
[1:15:26] a group and are not as likely to switch to become secular, then
[1:15:32] the religious will expand as a share of the total.
[1:15:34] You can see this already and the Mormons are a larger share of
[1:15:37] the young population of of white America, much larger than they
[1:15:41] are the older. So one way this works out in
[1:15:44] evolutionary terms is we just become more religious as a
[1:15:47] population as the non religious are die off out of this
[1:15:50] population bottleneck. Another way is, well, people who
[1:15:54] like kids and like families, like having kids biologically
[1:15:59] who value that more than let's say pursuing a career that's
[1:16:02] very time consuming, you know, are eventually going to be
[1:16:06] Korea's population. So, so maybe Korea will will
[1:16:09] shrink through this bottleneck and they'll fall to 100,000
[1:16:11] people. I don't know how how small
[1:16:13] they'll get. Well, I think South Korea have a
[1:16:15] 96% extinction rate in the next two generations or something
[1:16:19] absurd because of the compounding effect.
[1:16:21] It's terrifying what's going on there.
[1:16:23] Yes, so, so part of the thinking through this in evolutionary
[1:16:26] terms, the population shrinks to a hardcore of people who really
[1:16:31] like kids and, and, and, and then those people reproduce and
[1:16:34] then the population expands. But the genes that that these
[1:16:38] people represent are the ones that survived the bottleneck.
[1:16:41] Now, OK, that's now well before we get there, of course, other
[1:16:45] problems. The problem with low birth rates
[1:16:49] is not only the low birth rates in the population decline, it is
[1:16:53] the political ramifications. So it shifts the composition of
[1:16:58] the population when some groups are shrinking and others are
[1:17:00] not. And so you obviously Koreans
[1:17:05] ethnically are going to decline if they bring in immigrants.
[1:17:07] The immigrants are going to make up a larger share of the total
[1:17:09] as they are here in other Western countries.
[1:17:12] And that shift in the composition causes political
[1:17:15] conflict. As we're seeing all populism is
[1:17:18] really the outgrowth of shifts in ethnic composition.
[1:17:23] And so we're going to have a lot of political turmoil as a result
[1:17:26] of going through this bottleneck.
[1:17:29] It would be better if we could somehow turn around this
[1:17:33] declining fertility rate and get it back up to 2.1.
[1:17:38] The problem is it's much harder to to increase fertility than to
[1:17:42] decrease it with government incentives.
[1:17:45] And no, you know, there've been some minor successes.
[1:17:48] I would say France, and you know, France has been worrying
[1:17:52] about their birth rate for 200 years.
[1:17:53] And it does seem like all of those government policies over
[1:17:56] this period has maybe made some impact.
[1:17:58] Or the massive influx flux of Islam.
[1:18:01] That could just be the other solution.
[1:18:03] Yeah, but yeah, exactly. But, but, but look, I think, you
[1:18:06] know, even in Arab Muslim countries, North Africa and, and
[1:18:09] and South Arabia, there's been a lot of a decline in.
[1:18:13] You see it in everywhere apart from sub-Saharan Africa.
[1:18:15] Yeah, Yeah, exactly. I think they will also decline
[1:18:18] once they get better educated, more money, more urbanized.
[1:18:22] But but yeah, I think, but this is again, something that
[1:18:24] academia should be taking the lead on.
[1:18:27] And yes, demographers do study fertility a lot.
[1:18:30] I will give them that. But policy makers and certainly
[1:18:34] a lot of the social sciences, they will that they're not
[1:18:36] particularly interested because they think it's a feminist
[1:18:39] issue. And you don't want to, you know,
[1:18:40] don't don't want to talk about anything traditional gender role
[1:18:43] because that's offensive to feminism.
[1:18:45] And so a lot of the, you know, the left doesn't really want to
[1:18:48] talk about this in many countries.
[1:18:50] Yeah, I haven't thought about it in that way before.
[1:18:54] I had a conversation about this and I kind of just realized, you
[1:18:59] know, if you don't like the current woke agenda, just have
[1:19:04] kids. Don't tell the woke people to
[1:19:06] have kids. They won't anyway because
[1:19:08] they're too busy pursuing their careers and getting educated.
[1:19:11] And at least your grandkids will live in a world where everyone's
[1:19:15] conservative and religious if that's what you want.
[1:19:18] But the question is what happens before that because of the
[1:19:22] massive shifts societally? Could it be the case that you
[1:19:26] get more old people, which you will less younger people, and
[1:19:31] then suddenly for some reason the society actually shifts left
[1:19:34] and there's this massive diversion before you get to the
[1:19:37] conservative religious people that are the only ones still
[1:19:40] reproducing? I don't know.
[1:19:41] There's so much there. I don't know how much you have
[1:19:44] to say on this topic, and I hate to get people to extrapolate and
[1:19:48] make predictions, but what would you see happening and unfolding
[1:19:53] along this path to returning towards biological evolution,
[1:19:58] say the next hundred 200 years? Where it does favor people that
[1:20:02] are religious, especially fundamentalists, they have
[1:20:04] higher birth rates, and it does favor a more conservative
[1:20:09] worldview, both large C and small C that people like myself
[1:20:14] perhaps don't want to see. Yeah.
[1:20:16] And then, and that is, that is a risk, of course, is that we
[1:20:18] don't necessarily want fundamentalist, while we don't
[1:20:21] want fundamentalist to be in control of the society either.
[1:20:24] And in fact, in Israel, for example, Jerusalem is now run by
[1:20:27] the ultra Orthodox and you can't have a woman's face on a
[1:20:30] billboard within the city limits.
[1:20:32] You've got to be outside the city limits.
[1:20:33] You can't drive on Saturdays. So yeah, I mean, that's
[1:20:37] shouldn't be something, you know, we don't want that either.
[1:20:40] But the, the issue is, of course, we can't have a
[1:20:43] situation of, of crashing birth rates where, where you know,
[1:20:46] and, and so I think one way the left seems to be dealing with is
[1:20:50] to say, well, what we'll do is we will encourage immigration
[1:20:53] and we will ally ourselves with conservatives as long as they're
[1:20:57] not white and Christian. And so we'll ally ourselves with
[1:21:00] conservative Muslims and, and Hindus and, and others.
[1:21:04] And that will be our, our rainbow coalition.
[1:21:06] It'll be, you know, the the queers for Palestine thing where
[1:21:10] you kind of have, you know, Islamists and LGBT or or woke
[1:21:15] left in in one tent against the the mainstream ethnic majority
[1:21:20] conservatives. Now, of course, the problem with
[1:21:22] that strategy is it can easily break down.
[1:21:26] We saw in Detroit, for example, where this is in, in an area of
[1:21:31] Detroit which became majority Muslim or became Muslim run the
[1:21:36] local government said, well, we're not doing pride parades
[1:21:39] anymore. We're not going to commemorate
[1:21:41] that anymore. And the the sort of woke left
[1:21:44] came out and they were just like they said, how we've been
[1:21:47] supporting you for and all all of a sudden you, you're
[1:21:49] betraying us. We've seen this in Canada too,
[1:21:52] where the the leader of the protests against gender ideology
[1:21:56] in schools was a Muslim allied with sort of white Christians.
[1:22:00] There was a kind of, we've seen it on gay rights in California,
[1:22:03] Prop 8, conservative Muslims were in with evangelical
[1:22:06] Christians opposing gay marriage.
[1:22:08] So I think that this is not a stable strategy for the left.
[1:22:13] But that's the strategy they're going to go with is like we're
[1:22:16] going to, we're going to sort of try and break off the the non
[1:22:19] white religious conservatives and put them into our tent and
[1:22:23] try and scare them into thinking they're going to be
[1:22:25] discriminated against. And so they must come in with
[1:22:27] us. I think it's a short sighted
[1:22:29] strategy and it's not something that's going to work long term
[1:22:32] for them. But that's sort of one way you
[1:22:34] could see the politics evolving. Now, of course, long, long term,
[1:22:38] you might see a not, you know, you might actually see sort of
[1:22:43] secular right wingers. You know, at some point if they
[1:22:47] really are worried about the fundamentalist taking over, then
[1:22:51] they may say, OK, we'll form an alliance with the left.
[1:22:54] You could kind of have all kinds of interesting new alliances
[1:22:57] forming as a result of these changes.
[1:23:00] Israel's an interesting place. Like you will see secular
[1:23:04] nationalists sort of moving again saying we've got to worry
[1:23:09] about these ultra Orthodox. They don't serve in the
[1:23:11] military. They're economically not very
[1:23:13] productive. We got to crack down on them and
[1:23:16] stop a lot giving them benefits. And so sometimes when the battle
[1:23:21] with the Palestinians is, is at A at a low ebb, this internal
[1:23:26] fracture line between who, you know, these populations live
[1:23:29] totally apart, the fundamentalist Jews and the
[1:23:32] secular and even moderate Jews are, are living in quite
[1:23:34] separate lives. And they will raise the alarm
[1:23:37] and say these guys, they're a third of their first grade
[1:23:39] class, they're going to be taking over.
[1:23:41] So I expect. So you have these two different
[1:23:43] things. There's the Jew Muslim thing and
[1:23:46] then you have cutting across that the Jew versus Jew.
[1:23:50] And you could imagine the Jew versus Jew becoming more
[1:23:52] important. And I think we're going to see
[1:23:54] these sorts of strange little cross cutting tensions also in
[1:23:59] Western societies. Like there could come a point
[1:24:02] where, you know, people who support MAGA and some
[1:24:06] conservatives at some point way in the future, they say,
[1:24:10] actually, do I want this coalition of fundamentalists to
[1:24:14] take over my society and, and, and threaten my freedoms, or do
[1:24:19] we form an alliance with the kind of cultural left?
[1:24:22] They may say, actually we do form an alliance with the
[1:24:25] cultural left. So, so yeah, I think it, it, it
[1:24:27] will be a very interesting time because really the, the big
[1:24:30] demographic replacement, if you like, if we want to use that
[1:24:33] term, is, is ethnic right now, white decline in, in, in white
[1:24:36] majorities in decline. The next replacement is going to
[1:24:40] be seculars in being replaced by very religious people cutting
[1:24:45] across race, cutting across ethnicity.
[1:24:48] And so it's a different politics that would emerge in that
[1:24:52] distant future. And just to give you a nice
[1:24:53] little demographic number, the US in the 20 mid to late 22
[1:24:59] hundreds, there will be 300 million Amish in America because
[1:25:05] they have a doubling time of 2530 years.
[1:25:08] Their fertility rate remains pretty much what it was.
[1:25:12] So and and if you, if you think that's fanciful, right, well,
[1:25:16] Israel is, is undergoing this right now where the ultra
[1:25:19] Orthodox are a third of the Jewish first graders.
[1:25:22] They were maybe like a a few percentage points in 1960 in
[1:25:26] these things. They're going to be the majority
[1:25:27] of observant Jews in the US and Britain from from again, a small
[1:25:31] minority, fringe minority to the to the majority in a few
[1:25:34] generations. So that is, I think that kind of
[1:25:38] politics will be an interesting one to watch.
[1:25:41] But it's not going to be in Western countries for for, you
[1:25:45] know, a century or two because the way these trends work is
[1:25:47] there, there's nothing going on. It's like the parable of the
[1:25:51] rice grain on the chess board, you know, 1 rice grain, double
[1:25:54] it is 2, double it is 4. There's still basically nothing
[1:25:57] happening. And then suddenly when you
[1:25:58] double it, it goes like this and then it's off the scale.
[1:26:01] So, so it's going to be dormant for a long time, you know, in,
[1:26:05] in Western countries and it, it's not going to be an issue
[1:26:09] that we're going to face until 102 hundred years from now.
[1:26:13] You do see it in small pockets like in, in the countryside,
[1:26:16] certain communities will suddenly be taken over by the
[1:26:18] Amish or ultra Orthodox and that the whole town will go what,
[1:26:22] what just happened? We just added an entire village
[1:26:24] and they're now running the government here.
[1:26:26] And so it's happening in isolated little points, but it's
[1:26:30] not national yet, and it won't be for quite a while.
[1:26:34] Are you religious? I, I, I am somewhat religious,
[1:26:37] but I'm not, I, I don't know. I, I'm kind of, I'm not a member
[1:26:42] of any religion and, but I can see that it's probably, you
[1:26:49] know, that it has a lot of benefits for society, for
[1:26:52] individuals. So I think we're going to have
[1:26:55] to reckon more seriously with it than we have over the last 200
[1:26:59] and 5300 years since the Enlightenment.
[1:27:02] I think it, I just think the challenge it poses to the
[1:27:06] Enlightenment world view is, is much more profound now that the
[1:27:10] birth rate population collapse crisis is well and truly in
[1:27:14] training. I don't think it's one you can
[1:27:16] just brush aside anymore. And so I think there are going
[1:27:20] to be more and more compelling reasons to to adopt parts of it.
[1:27:27] How much of it is going to be interesting?
[1:27:29] So I don't know. Yeah, this makes me think there
[1:27:31] might be something to being Amish, looking at that data.
[1:27:34] I mean, I'm not religious, but certainly I look at what you're
[1:27:38] saying and what's unfolding, unfolding.
[1:27:40] And I go, OK, either it's true whatever religion you end up
[1:27:45] choosing, or certainly at very least these are incredibly
[1:27:50] powerful fundamental frameworks that change entire societies and
[1:27:55] culture and history like they have done throughout all of
[1:27:57] time. And we need to start taking them
[1:27:58] more seriously. Yeah, I, I, I think absolutely.
[1:28:01] I and this I think kind of links to my point about post
[1:28:04] progressivism. I think that Progressive Era was
[1:28:06] really maybe the last final expression and outworking of
[1:28:10] enlightenment trends reaching a sort of fever pitch.
[1:28:14] But I think I don't think we're going to be there anymore.
[1:28:16] I think from now on, it's now about, you know, the left will
[1:28:21] be playing defense, the, the the liberal left will be playing
[1:28:23] defense. And it'll all be about, OK, how
[1:28:26] much of the conservatism do we need to bring back in?
[1:28:30] And where do we compromise and where do we not?
[1:28:32] And we're going to have to actually wind things back a
[1:28:35] certain, not not in the exactly the same way, but this idea that
[1:28:39] history is moving in, in this linear direction.
[1:28:41] And we're on, we're, we're on the right side of it.
[1:28:44] I just think that confidence is, is, is increasingly going to
[1:28:47] fall apart. And so things will be much more
[1:28:49] fluid and up for grabs in a way they really haven't been through
[1:28:53] the Enlightenment. I, I, and I know there's been a
[1:28:55] lot of ups and downs and whatever, but I just think that
[1:28:58] that confidence is, is going to be shaken by, by these trends.
[1:29:02] Now I will raise another possibility, and that is the
[1:29:05] authoritarian possibility. Like what will China do with its
[1:29:09] one point O or one 1.2 birth rate?
[1:29:13] You could imagine a powerful enough authoritarian enough
[1:29:15] state saying what we're going to do is we're you, you.
[1:29:18] We're going to make it so difficult for you you to exist
[1:29:21] without having kids. We're almost going to force the
[1:29:24] birth rate up to a replacement level.
[1:29:26] So if you don't have children and you can, you will
[1:29:29] essentially be punished in so many different ways.
[1:29:32] Or at least your life will be so miserable.
[1:29:34] What would that look like? Well, it might look like, you
[1:29:37] know, huge taxes, you have no access to services.
[1:29:41] Maybe you are you don't even shamed in certain way.
[1:29:44] I, I don't know what the Chinese government would do.
[1:29:47] I also think they can certainly clamp down on the growth of
[1:29:50] religious fundamentalism too. So they can go in both
[1:29:52] directions because they're authoritarian.
[1:29:54] So I think the outcome of it's going to be interesting to watch
[1:29:57] where China goes as a sort of laboratory of the authoritarian
[1:30:01] world. You know, it's one I, I, I think
[1:30:03] it's horrendous. But I mean, that is another
[1:30:05] evolutionary strategy is the state is simply authoritarian
[1:30:09] and regulates fertility in, in, in, in population in a way that
[1:30:14] the West cannot. Whether that'll work, I've no
[1:30:18] idea, but that's just another wild card to think about.
[1:30:22] What does the world look like then, when you have evolution
[1:30:25] selecting on one hand for religious fundamentalists and on
[1:30:28] the other hand for communist authoritarian states to keep the
[1:30:34] birth rate above replenishment? Well, I'd say look at what what
[1:30:38] is Israel going to do about its mushrooming ultra Orthodox
[1:30:42] population? That's according to some
[1:30:44] predictions, is going to essentially make the country
[1:30:48] insolvent, crash the welfare state in in a decade.
[1:30:52] The central Israeli central banker has made that statement
[1:30:55] that if we don't do something about this, yeah, our our birth
[1:30:59] rates going to, you know, sorry, the, the budget is going to
[1:31:03] fail, we won't have a welfare state.
[1:31:05] And once you get the relatively secular moderate Israelis
[1:31:10] leaving, all of the tech sector and all the dynamic aspects of
[1:31:15] the Israeli economy will unravel.
[1:31:17] You won't have a tax base. So there is a scenario under
[1:31:19] which Israel collapses because of the fundamentalist birth
[1:31:22] rate. And so one one way is to say,
[1:31:24] well, what's Israel going to do about this problem?
[1:31:27] And many are in denial or they like to think, well, you know,
[1:31:31] the birth rate's coming down or they're in simulating into the
[1:31:33] mainstream. But I think those are all very
[1:31:35] weak trends. So watch China, watch Israel to
[1:31:39] say what is the next solution going to be?
[1:31:42] They don't. They kind of define two
[1:31:44] extremes. The West I think is a little
[1:31:48] different. We have the the cultural
[1:31:50] progressivism and the wokeness, which is contributing to falling
[1:31:53] birth rates here. It's not a factor so much in
[1:31:55] East Asia, but it is in the West.
[1:31:58] I think the West, what we'll see is more soul searching and we're
[1:32:01] going to see more questioning of this narrative of progress, of
[1:32:06] cultural progressivism. I, I, I, I can't see any other
[1:32:09] way around it. Their model isn't working in so
[1:32:11] many ways. And I think the smart ones
[1:32:13] amongst them know it, which is one reason why you look at the
[1:32:17] universities under attack by Trump.
[1:32:19] You know, there's resistance. God, it's it's nothing Like
[1:32:22] you're not, they're not fighting to preserve DEI.
[1:32:25] They're more or less saying, yeah, we're going to actually,
[1:32:27] we're going to fold that one. I think that's indicative of the
[1:32:30] fact that a lot of them, you know, they're fighting amongst
[1:32:33] themselves. There's a group who thinks the
[1:32:35] woke thing was a terrible idea and we got to get rid of it.
[1:32:38] And another group that's like, no, this is religion and we got
[1:32:41] to have it. So in many ways, I think we're
[1:32:44] going to see really interesting stuff in the next 10 years.
[1:32:46] I think I would confidently predict that the, the, the
[1:32:51] cultural progressive trajectory of the last 60 years is done.
[1:32:56] I, I would really, I'm quite confident that that's finished.
[1:33:00] I'm not saying we're going to suddenly lurch in the other
[1:33:02] direction, but I think the, the further progress, I don't think
[1:33:06] trans is ever going to be accepted in, in public opinion,
[1:33:10] this access to women's spaces thing.
[1:33:12] I just think that's the Waterloo of this ideological movement.
[1:33:18] So to put all of these click baity titles together that have
[1:33:24] been going on for the last decade now, is this the end of
[1:33:28] woke, The death of wokeness, blah blah blah.
[1:33:33] Is this past peak woke now? Is that where we're?
[1:33:38] At yes we are. We are past peak woke.
[1:33:40] Now let me just put in a few. No, no, I don't dispute that.
[1:33:44] So what I'd say is in the high elite culture where past peak
[1:33:48] woke, peak woke in terms of the movement activism where past
[1:33:51] peak woke. But it is true that woke managed
[1:33:54] to call it brainwash, call it socialize a much larger share of
[1:33:59] of Gen. Z than other generations, more
[1:34:01] of the millennials as well. And they are going to have to
[1:34:04] work their way through the electorate.
[1:34:06] And so there is going to be some generational turnover cohort
[1:34:11] change effect. So a certain what's the word as
[1:34:15] a certain woke momentum will move through the electorate even
[1:34:20] as the merit or or or at least even if the idea has lost
[1:34:24] currency. Well, I suppose it's like a
[1:34:26] roller coaster where you've got the momentum that's been powered
[1:34:28] up the hill, it's stopped, yet the momentum's still there, and
[1:34:32] it kind of carries the roller coaster along for a bit further
[1:34:34] until it eventually drops rapidly.
[1:34:36] Yes, yeah. And so that's why I think there
[1:34:39] will be some momentum from past socialization moving through the
[1:34:43] population. Now, that's not 100% set in
[1:34:46] stone in the sense that if people really, if the culture
[1:34:49] really turns against something the way they accepted gay
[1:34:53] marriage, you know, if that is a big cultural shift, it will it
[1:34:57] will overcome and override the generational effect and the
[1:35:02] momentum. And so that is a possibility is
[1:35:05] that that the culture changes so dramatically that Despite that
[1:35:09] generational socialization, all of that is knocked off course.
[1:35:14] And so I think, but regardless, I just think in terms of what's
[1:35:18] most important, which is the esteem and the confidence of
[1:35:21] these ideas, I think that's, I think that's been dented
[1:35:24] irreparably. And so I just think that's I
[1:35:27] think that's very important how that plays out because the other
[1:35:31] thing of course is woke has become institutionalized as DEI
[1:35:34] in in the NHS and universities and civil service that will
[1:35:39] carry on as a zombie force even if the culture changes.
[1:35:44] The only way that gets removed is through government action, as
[1:35:49] we're seeing in the US. So in Britain, for example, if
[1:35:53] reform got in, they would have to surgically go into all these
[1:35:55] departments and say, can't you do do DEI?
[1:35:58] If you do it, you will be, you will lose your job and
[1:36:02] essentially scrape it out of all the institutions.
[1:36:04] Once it's scraped out, I don't think it's coming back in.
[1:36:06] I actually don't think even if the Democrats got in in 2028,
[1:36:11] that they would suddenly roll the EI out the same way it was.
[1:36:14] And I just think it's lost its prestige in a way that means
[1:36:20] that it won't be easy to just put it back in.
[1:36:22] But it still needs to be surgically removed because it
[1:36:26] won't just go on its own. There are too many people with
[1:36:28] an interest in perpetuating the system in the institutions.
[1:36:33] And therefore I think it is also going to take political parties
[1:36:38] that take these issues seriously and act on them in order to to
[1:36:42] change the texture of our institutional life.
[1:36:45] I completely agree. And that's something that I
[1:36:48] think about a lot is these entrenched ideas where the
[1:36:51] battle may have been lost or won by one side, yet they're kind of
[1:36:56] there hiding under the floorboards and you need to RIP
[1:37:00] them up with a hammer and actually surgically remove them.
[1:37:04] And everyone's going to agree with you.
[1:37:05] They're not going to resist, like you said, but that action
[1:37:08] still needs to be taken. And that's why I'm grateful to
[1:37:11] have you on the podcast and that Gen.
[1:37:13] Z are moving in this direction of actually speaking about these
[1:37:15] issues, even if at the same time, we're skeptical of free
[1:37:19] speech and we're trying to suppress people from coming to
[1:37:22] our campuses. I do think there is this
[1:37:24] emergence of media where people are openly actually discussing
[1:37:27] ideas, engaging in this battle of ideas where you can root out
[1:37:32] these issues. Go past the slope Hugins that
[1:37:34] are sort of keeping them at Bay and surgically remove them.
[1:37:38] So I appreciate the conversation today.
[1:37:40] It's blown my brain in quite a few different ways.
[1:37:42] I have to reflect on that. Where can people find more of
[1:37:45] your work? Thanks, Ellie.
[1:37:46] Yeah, that's that's very, very kind of you.
[1:37:48] Yeah, you can find me in several places.
[1:37:50] I mean, I my Twitter or X is just at EP KAU FM.
[1:37:58] I have my website, www.snapssneps.net.
[1:38:03] You can also look up the, well, my book, which is entitled Taboo
[1:38:07] in Britain and the Third Awakening in North America.
[1:38:11] And also, I suppose you can look at the Center for Heterodox
[1:38:14] Social Science at the University of Buckingham, and I've got a
[1:38:17] website there. Please do check it out, Elliot.
[1:38:20] It's been a pleasure. And heading over to sub SAC
[1:38:22] where Eric's going to answer some of your questions.

Shows are listed from Apple Podcasts' charts and directory, and Podcast Index where it is used. Every show and episode belongs to its publisher and plays from the publisher's own feed; this site hosts none of them.
