# US-South Korea Nuclear Deal: Shouldn't Seoul Have Its Own Nukes & Subs? | Geeta's World Ep 42

An episode of [Geeta's World](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1635741757), 2 May 2023, 57 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/53717513/02_may_23_geetas_world_ep_42_mix_south_korea_128.mp3

The US will now periodically deploy nuclear-armed submarines to South Korea and involve Seoul in its nuclear planning operations. In return, South Korea has committed to not develop its own nuclear weapons. But there is a dissenting voice coming in from the South Koreans, who are skeptical of the deal, why? And given the fact that this dissent is growing among members of South Korea's ruling party too, do we anticipate a growing resentment towards Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration in South Korea?

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts. The US will now periodically deploy nuclear armed submarines
[0:08] to South Korea and involves Soul in its nuclear planning operations. In return,
[0:13] South Korea has committed to not develop its own nuclear weapons. But there is
[0:18] a descending voice coming in from the South Koreans who are skeptical of the deal.
[0:22] Why there's a huge conversation within South Korea about nuclear capability. If it
[0:28] has to be, it has to be our own to deter and given the
[0:31] fact that this descent is growing among members of South Korea's ruling party as well,
[0:36] do we anticipate a growing resentment towards Yun Suk Yule's administration in South Korea.
[0:43] Don't know about his popularity drop per se, but the decision and the
[0:48] visit certainly has been looked at through a more critical prison than any other visit.
[0:56] Hello, I'm anna PREDESSIONI with India Today TV's Foreign Affairs GETA Mohan,
[1:00] where with Geta's astute and incisive crasp of world affairs, we delve into all
[1:07] that is urgent and pressing in world politics and comprehend how these developments in other
[1:11] countries could shape India's global ambitions of being a Vishwa guru. Let's unravel Getha's
[1:19] hoard. President Joe Biden's visit to South Korea, which is considered a historic
[1:26] event after a twelve year gap, marked the culmination of this agreement. The
[1:30] primary objective of the deal is to enhance cooperation between the allies and strengthen their
[1:36] capabilities to deter potential North Korean attacks. President Biden described the agreement as an
[1:42] unprecedented commitment by the US to bolster defense and protect its allies through the use
[1:49] of nuclear weapons. Now, the timing of this agreement is also crucial due
[1:53] to increasing concerns about North Korea's nuclear capabilities. The country North Korea as this
[2:00] tactical weapons that targets South Korea and long range weapons capable of reaching the US
[2:06] mainland. While the US already has a treaty obligation to defend South Korea,
[2:12] there have been questions within South Korea regarding the extent of that commitment, leading
[2:15] to calls for the pursuit of an independent nuclear program. It is also important
[2:22] to note that while the agreement provides the involvement in South Korea sought, it
[2:25] does not guarantee that the US would employ nuclear weapons to defend South Korea in
[2:31] the event of an attack. The US, on its part, emphasizes that
[2:36] South Korea must remain a non nuclear state and advocate for non proliferation. It
[2:42] fears that South Korea going nuclear could set a precedent for other countries to follow
[2:46] suit. So in this episode, Geeta and I will try to understand what
[2:52] this nuclear deal will mean for the Asia Pacific. Can the deal really help
[2:57] South Korea to avert a nuclear threat from North Korea? Or is it,
[3:00] in fact more of an attempt by the US to assert its dominance in the
[3:06] Asia Pacific and keep its enemy China enclosure check Hi, Guayana, that was
[3:12] a lovely in depth introduction to the entire issue that we're going to talk,
[3:17] which is important because you've set the stage for our discussion. You know.
[3:23] Somebody suggested to me that your podcast is so heavily loaded it with information that
[3:30] you need to give a crisp introduction. Yeah, yeah, before we start,
[3:34] because there's so many uninitiated lessons, right, So I think that helps?
[3:38] It? Does it does? Yea to all those who want to understand
[3:42] what we're discussing, And a lot of times when we're discussing something, you
[3:46] ask a question and I start answering. There are a few terms, a
[3:52] few references which I don't explain, And the assumption is that listeners are listening
[3:57] to this might know at least a little which should not be an assumption.
[4:00] So an introduction always helps, exactly, but also good announcement. We have
[4:06] done well. Our podcast has done very well in the government and politics category
[4:13] in the Apple podcasts. Yeah, in the Apple podcasts. List our colleague
[4:18] and they have done very well. Yeah. There's their podcast is called In
[4:25] Our Defense, which is a defense podcast, and we are just a close
[4:30] second to So there's competition there in house, and we shall be irony is
[4:35] that I produce both. He produced both, right, So but I'm like
[4:42] a little bit you know, biased towards my pod obviously obviously there it.
[4:48] Yeah, you and I are. So we've got to beat them. Yes,
[4:53] we have to go yeah Trump Defense. Sure, yes, I mean
[5:00] if you think that our you know, purpose is just like it should be
[5:03] well served, please contribute and help us so join the gang. Yeah.
[5:11] Yeah, but it felt nice, It felt good to see that we've done
[5:15] all right, you've done well. Yeah, And appreciation from HR does help
[5:21] matters. That's that's a long debate, but yeah, I mean on that
[5:30] appreciation from office actually does help, you know. So a lot of people
[5:33] wrote to us congratulating us. It felt good. Yeah, actually yes,
[5:38] And please, I mean listeners, if you want to congratulate us and write
[5:43] to us about the topics that we delve into, please do so. The
[5:46] number is eight five, eight nine, double six, double line six and
[5:50] the email ideas spots at the rate in at date dot com. And after
[5:55] this, I think we expect more inputs from you to come. So interestingly,
[6:00] I think we have a very lovely topic too to discuss this US China
[6:06] again in the picture. But there's a new introduction, which is South Korea.
[6:11] And it was while you're searching. Also, it was really nice to
[6:14] know because I had hardly read about North Korea. I think everybody knows,
[6:18] you know, notoriously they have a certain identity South Korea. I think I
[6:25] don't know. I'm speaking not on behalf of everyone, but at least for
[6:28] me, it was a new topic to discover. So for starters guitar,
[6:31] I'll just dive right into the topic itself and let's talk about the deal per
[6:36] se as in how do you see this deal coming through? Like how tactical
[6:44] or strategic do you think it is, because you know, the deployment of
[6:48] submarines raises this question, these questions about, you know, their ability to
[6:54] effectively counter the missile threat post by North Korea. Do you think it's more
[7:00] whether you know this move is primarily a cosmetic step to have submarines stationed in
[7:05] South Korean ports, because, after all, if the concern is a nuclear
[7:11] threat, the United States could potentially launch a missile from its main land as
[7:15] well. Right, So is this decision based on the proximity of the country
[7:20] and is it Like it's also worth understanding whether the deployment of submarine's tort really,
[7:25] you know, provides a reliable defense against North Korean missiles or if it
[7:30] just serves a symbolic purpose to it. So, seventy years of ties between
[7:38] the United States of America and South Korea's what is being celebrated, and in
[7:42] the celebration in the recent past, there have been a bit of difficult time
[7:48] that the relationship has faced. Why so because we've had President Trump who actually
[7:58] looking at the scenario, the conversations and the engagement with North Korea went so
[8:03] much, said so much so that he is willing to withdraw troops and the
[8:11] investment, the military investment from South Korea that really made Korean's quite jittery.
[8:18] And it continues because somewhere down the line, I suppose South Korean's also wanted
[8:24] reassurance and assurances from the United States of America. Why because DPRK, that's
[8:31] North Korea continues with its nuclear ambitions and plans in an era in a region
[8:37] where the United States of America since the war. Because this is a relationship
[8:43] that has come out of a war South Korea and the United States of America.
[8:48] So since the war, the US has been South Korea's net security provider,
[8:56] and shift just because of change in presidency did make South Korea jittery.
[9:01] But then there are naysayers and they're also those who are skeptical of this new
[9:07] Washington declaration. Why is because, like you said, if North Korea does
[9:13] something or goes nuclear, then America has the capability to strike from afar.
[9:18] Then why this why a nuclear submarine? Why strategic asset or positioning of your
[9:24] strategic assets in South Korea within South Korea itself. The opposition and some of
[9:31] the leaders have questioned this entire move, saying that deterans is better knowing that
[9:39] you have an ally who will come to your rescue than placing nuclear weapons in
[9:46] a country that would seem like an act of provocation to North Korea for them
[9:52] to act, and should they act. Many Koreans are saying that South Koreans,
[9:58] should they act, and what's the use of an American retaliation, We'll
[10:03] be finished. It's a small place, it's a small country in size.
[10:09] So their idea is that it is not more important to place a submarine or
[10:15] to show your strategic foothold within the region, rather to ensure there's deterans.
[10:22] Now America has a shot surely, so that should Pyongyang act or should there
[10:28] should they be adventurous with their nuclear weapons or missiles, or should they be
[10:35] an adventurous in any which way, that America will be there standing by them,
[10:41] standing beside the South Koreans again having in the last they had this was
[10:50] in forty years of win the nineties, and now you seeing them, you
[10:56] know, place nuclear assets yet again or decide too in itself is a huge
[11:01] decision. So we'll have to wait and see how this really pans out,
[11:05] because it has not gone down well within domestically. Within South Korea as well,
[11:11] there are a lot of people who are questioning the same move, saying
[11:15] that it doesn't seem indent in the US. A lot of mixed signals and
[11:18] messaging too, because they're also looking at China. But all have messaged China
[11:24] that this move is not for you. It is only directed to North Korea.
[11:28] But allies, allies China and North Korea are allies, Yes, definitely,
[11:33] And like you said, to add to that, the descending voice is
[11:35] coming from um, you know, influential group of academics and scientists and members
[11:43] of South Korea's ruling party who I've been advocating for to you know, acquire
[11:48] its own indigenous nuclear weapons. And also this fear for you know, USS
[11:54] promising promises. Actually, I mean, do you think these are well found
[12:00] it? Because ultimately, if you see, and I will quote some data
[12:05] from an Ursayan's study which said that almost fifty three percent of South Koreans they
[12:11] want an indigenous deterrent, and this also goes in several studies like the percentage
[12:16] of people who want the South Koreans who want an indigenous deterrent is almost like
[12:22] it can go up to seventies. And you know, because this fear of
[12:26] the US not delivering to its promises, because we can see what happened in
[12:30] Afghanistan, we can see what happened in Iraq, and now, like we
[12:35] discussed in one of our earlier episodes, also the Pentagon leagues that had also
[12:39] suggested that US can even spy on its allies, right, so I think
[12:43] it just adds to the kind of descent that is, you know, quelling
[12:48] in South Koreans. Also whether this promise that US will be there in case
[12:54] of a threat from North kotas it is and it is the most alarmed situation
[13:01] and it comes right, so I will we will talk about the importance that
[13:07] US attaches to this region Visavi, Ukraine and Europe. But it just comes
[13:13] after the Russia Ukraine War where the world has seen that NATO, particularly led
[13:18] by the United States of America, did not really enter the war. So
[13:22] the reluctance to enter a war. But again Ukraine is not a NATO ally
[13:30] so but over here it's quite clear with the as Treaty partners that should there
[13:37] be an attack on South Korea that the United States of America will stand by
[13:43] them and will provide them security. But that as a treaty partner is an
[13:48] assumption there is, It is not a guarantee, and which is why the
[13:56] most irritated lot who are looking at this Washington declaration as one that could provoke
[14:05] Pyongyang yet again is a serious one. Now why so, I say,
[14:09] is because last year Pyongyang conducted more missile tests than in any previous year,
[14:16] and it was because of all the provocation with regards to China and the United
[14:22] States of America and how relations and ties between the two countries were at their
[14:28] lowest. China does use North Korea as upon it is a satellite state of
[14:35] China, the reason why it has survived so many years of sanctions and yet
[14:41] has not come crumbling down as a state. Yeah, actually, like you
[14:45] said, I mean it makes much more sense because as the discussion, Progressive
[14:48] will be discussing also the political dynamics of South Korea, which will kind of
[14:54] substantiate what happened last year, because you know, we saw the most number
[14:58] of threats and provocations from North Korea to South Korea. And on that note,
[15:05] let's also discuss about the important question that emerges here is about the relations
[15:09] between North Korean South Korea, like we're discussing and gither. What seems off
[15:15] here to me is that, you know, we know for a fact that
[15:18] North Korean South Korea, they had been in talks for a peace treaty when
[15:24] Moon Jaying was South Korea's president, and there were reports the previous president,
[15:30] I mean, and there were reports in twenty twenty one of South and North
[15:33] Korea, China and the US agreeing quote unquote in principle to declare a formal
[15:41] end to the Korean War, which was almost like seventy years after the conflict,
[15:46] basically implying that the then president Moon believed it was important to end the
[15:50] unstable armistice that had been placed for almost you know, seven decades, and
[15:56] he also believed that a peace declaration could improve the prospects for a breakthrough on
[16:02] beyond Gang's you know, nuclear weapon program. But they didn't stop. They
[16:07] didn't stop. Yes, But there are two factors here. Firstly, in
[16:11] twenty twenty one, during the peace talks, North Korea insisted on an end
[16:15] to US hostility as a precondition, which hindered progress through, you know,
[16:21] a peace treaty, and now with the US's involvement, doesn't it entirely then
[16:26] forfeit the chances of the reinforcement of the peace treaty itself. Then well,
[16:33] in geopolitics, and now you can never say never, okay, And nobody
[16:37] thought that we would see Kim Jong un shaking hands with Donald Trump, but
[16:41] it happened, So you can never say never. But yes, you're right
[16:45] in the in the natural assumption that if US is planning on placing US strategic
[16:55] assets and looking at strategic acid deployment in the peninsula, then that will only
[17:00] act as provocation to North Korea and to China rather than diffuse tensions. Has
[17:08] the United States of America looked at diffusing tensions or is there is this also
[17:15] a way to maybe look at the larger picture of South Korea and Taiwan.
[17:22] Now the tensions in Taiwan Strait are really really at reaching alarming levels. China
[17:30] has its plan. This might not be to contain China's What Washington, DC
[17:34] has been saying repeatedly that this is to do with South Korea and the United
[17:41] States of America and South Korea's national and security interests reason in North Korea.
[17:48] But the fact is that there is always a larger picture, and in that
[17:51] is it diversionary? Is it? Because too much of US's energies were focused
[17:56] in the past year on Russia Ukraine and they could not really focus on and
[18:03] they still cannot and they cannot afford a war in the Taiwan Straits. But
[18:07] anything to do with the Korean Peninsula and having your assets there is one.
[18:12] You already have your forces there, you've always had in South Korea. You're
[18:17] strengthening your position there. You in all probability, are ensuring that China starts
[18:22] looking towards this region as well, now that they've not focused. It's always
[18:26] a focus area, but a bit more because we are looking at nuclear nuclear
[18:32] submarines over here. So that certainly is one way to look at it.
[18:37] But for North Korea it will be considered direct provocations. So are they going
[18:44] to go towards peace? Not really? But but the flip side now another
[18:48] there's another conversation that's happening to do with North Korea is looking at nuclear capability.
[18:55] Yeah, right, and and it seems like they have been working on
[19:00] it and they're closer to it. They've been preparing for their first nuclear tests
[19:06] since twenty seventeen, so they're quite they are quite ahead. When it comes
[19:11] to the entire program. South Korea does not have one. Now what happened
[19:17] not so long ago, Not so long ago, there was a conversation that
[19:19] took place where the President hinted at saying that whether if South Korea should look
[19:27] at nuclear capability. Now, when when you say that, when South Korea
[19:33] says that nuclear capability would mean that you are you are if you're not going
[19:38] to be part of the Non Proliferation Treaty, if you're not going to honor
[19:41] the NPT. Yeah, non Proliferation Treaty basically says that those who already have
[19:48] nuclear nuclear capability for military use, not civilian countries can have nuclear capability for
[19:53] civilian use, right nuclear energy, which is but if you have nuclear capability
[20:00] for military then you're not supposed to share the technology and the research and the
[20:07] weapon system with other countries. That other countries should not have nuclear capability if
[20:14] they're not part of the grouping Yea, India and Pakistan. That's why I
[20:18] was sanctioned because we went outside of that and yet conducted our tests, so
[20:25] it in North Korea, and now if South Koreans are talking about that,
[20:30] that certainly was something that the United States of America had to look into,
[20:36] and which is why the US now says that, Okay, if you're so
[20:40] jittery and so worried, then we will provide you. But then the conversation
[20:45] goes back. It goes back to the fact that South Korea has now in
[20:49] this Washington Declaration, recommitted to disavowing any intention to develop domestic nuclear weapons,
[20:57] and that certainly has not gone down well with certain quarters, which is already
[21:03] a part of its obligation as a signatory to Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which
[21:07] we've said, but not having the ambitions, not having the room, not
[21:11] having the conversation is something that now it's almost like nipped in the bud after
[21:17] the Unit administration had been hinting at and looking at, you know, this
[21:23] entire conversation. So giving strengthening the nuclear umbrella works well for the United States
[21:30] of America's advantage US. It certainly could be advantage South Korea, but it
[21:33] is not advantage South Korea to have after forty years, nuclear capable submarines in
[21:41] the Korean peninsula because that certainly would mean that North Korea will get provoked.
[21:48] Now we have not seen heard, we have not seen direct impact of Washington
[21:55] declaration yet from DPRK, but expect something. And why do I say that?
[22:00] Like I said, it's not just the number of missile tests. Earlier
[22:06] in April, North Korea also launched its first solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile,
[22:11] which is a major advance in its nuclear capabilities. So you already know that
[22:17] they are increasingly looking at being more belligerent militarily as also territorially. You're seeing
[22:29] more of a very aggressive North Korea. They have China support. But how
[22:36] does this entire thing play out for just North Korea? It's not just North
[22:40] Korea. The details of the conversations that have that have taken place, you
[22:45] see, one part of it is nuclear. The other part is strategic economic,
[22:51] which is America asking South Korea not to sell Samsung the microchips to China.
[23:00] Microchip industry is the future. We've discussed this many leons ago when we're
[23:06] discussing Taiwan, that if China is looking at Taiwan, it's not just for
[23:11] land, is for their biggest microchip industry, and similarly over here, asking
[23:19] South Korea not to provide is a gain for whom and a loss for whom.
[23:25] They've also asked South Korea to invest more in the United States of America,
[23:30] set up shops over there, so on and so forth. But at
[23:33] the end of the day, the rare earth metals and the raw material that's
[23:38] required to make these micro chips. Also, China has a China as a
[23:45] major stakeholder there, so how do you how do you fill that gap?
[23:52] How where do you look to and look at which country where. So these
[23:56] are huge economic decisions that South Korea has to take in terms of commitments to
[24:02] the United States of America, leaning away from China and listen until their resilience,
[24:06] supply chains and there is more that other countries can provide. There is
[24:11] no way that these countries will not be looking at China. Look interestingly,
[24:15] we talk about South Korea and Taiwan and how they're you know, taking on
[24:21] China and Taiwan is standing against China all and all that and more. But
[24:26] if you see the trade between the two, yeah, it's unimaginable. It's
[24:33] unimaginable to even think that Taiwan's economy can survive without China exactly. In fact,
[24:37] the other factor that I was, like I try to stress upon concerning
[24:42] with the peace treat itself Githa is the point of differing political ideologies at play
[24:52] here, which I think was very interesting to note. And you know,
[24:56] the previous South Korean precedent, Moon Jane from the Democratic Party, he favored
[25:03] a peace treaty like I discussed, like I said, while the current administration
[25:07] just led by Yun sukyol of the People Power Party, he holds a different
[25:15] stance. Like upon taking office in twenty twenty two, Yun explicitly stated that
[25:19] he would prioritize denuclearization progress over an end of war declaration and adopt a former
[25:27] response to North Korean provocations. Now, I want to understand from Yu Gita
[25:33] that how the right and left positions on the political spectrum function in a country
[25:40] like South Korea which shares a border with the with you know, notoriously stringent
[25:45] North Korea. Because you know, considering the divergent political ideologies between former president
[25:52] Moon Jane, who advocated for a peace treaty and the current administration led by
[25:57] President Yun Shook kol which prioritizes deeply nuclearization progress. How might these differences impact
[26:06] the prospects for you said never say never, But in terms of the political
[26:11] ideologies, how these differences would or might impact the prospects for peace and stability
[26:18] on the Korean peninsula? Is there? I mean, I want to understand
[26:22] that is the political difference identified by being pro or anti North Korea, because
[26:27] that seems to be the ultimate archival for them. See, neither party in
[26:33] South Korea can be pro Neither party in South Korea can be pro North Korea.
[26:41] Yeah, okay, but there is a certain belief and that comes from
[26:47] the past, that there could be There are people who still hold the idea
[26:51] of reunification. There are still those who say that engagement is the only way
[26:55] forward. There are still many families who still have you know, people on
[27:00] the other side. This is a homogeneous community where they're all same, They
[27:08] speak similar language, they their food culture, everything is similar. They were
[27:18] one and separated because of the the ideologies that they follow. But within South
[27:26] Korea itself domestic politics, politically, they are a very vibrant country. They
[27:32] fight, the elections, are vibrant, the campaign very hard, so it's
[27:37] a very vibrant democracy, and parties have very strong ideologies and viewpoints like you've
[27:45] just spelt out. But in all of that, the domestic politics does not
[27:52] trump their continuum and foreign policy. Foreign policy remains a continuum. It does
[27:59] not changed drastically. Yes, there will be some changes. Like when they
[28:03] were dealing with Trump, they were dealing with the whole issue very differently.
[28:07] They were reluctant with the engagement with Kim Jong own, but they saw some
[28:11] hope of maybe forward movement and and doing away with nuclear weapons in the peninsula,
[28:18] which is a real scare for them. It's a it's an existential scare.
[28:22] Classes No, I get it with it, just to you know,
[28:25] substantiate a bit, because I was reading an article by the Diplomat that suggested
[28:30] that when I think it wasn't twenty seventeen, if I'm not wrong, when
[28:33] President Park June High correct me if I'm pronouncing it wrong, when she was
[28:40] impaged those who were anti Park. The article suggested that those who were anti
[28:45] Park, they were considered to be North Korea sympathizers by the far right.
[28:51] So that's why this question question by means tempt you know that like you said,
[28:55] But no, no, so a lot of them do have the idea
[28:59] of engaging with North Korea, which is what I'm saying. A lot of
[29:03] them say that, no, this is the only way forward is engagement.
[29:06] A lot of them still harbor the idea and feeling of reunification. A lot
[29:11] of them still still look at the whole situation with some sort of hope that
[29:17] Okay, this needs to be resolved, but it should be resolved peacefully and
[29:22] with engagement. But again, like I said, domestic politics will not trump
[29:27] your continuement foreign policy. Why because the decision of how your government is going
[29:33] to behave is not It's not upon you, it's on the other side.
[29:38] When North Korea becomes belligerent, there is no other way but to look at
[29:42] it ally yourself or your allies to say that, well, this is what
[29:47] is happening. There is always presence of American soldiers on South Korean soil,
[29:52] and there's a reason why, because they come within the umbrella of that net
[29:57] security. Provided that the US is in this peninsula, particularly for South Korea,
[30:03] the politics. The politics changes domestically, and in that you will see
[30:08] regional which is North Korea, South Korea, some wanting to be closer to
[30:14] North Korea, some wanting engagement, some saying that, well, they cannot
[30:18] be engaged because look at their look at their entire you know, how they
[30:23] have aligned themselves to not just the nuclear program, but their foreign policy,
[30:30] and how they aligned themselves to China. South Korea is absolutely pro United States
[30:36] of America. They are strategic allies, and in that a lot of people
[30:41] don't see the need to engage North Korea. But even in the current dispensation,
[30:49] for all the opposition for that matter that has been questioning, but even
[30:53] in the current dispensation, there are many who questioning the Washington declaration, only
[30:59] saying is that this is not veterans. What is nuclear deterans If you're going
[31:04] to place nucleus strategic assets on our soil and provoke North Korea? Because should
[31:11] North Korea do something? And this is exactly what they keep saying, should
[31:15] North Korea, because it does not seem like a responsible nation do something.
[31:21] What is the use of retaliation? There is no use of retaliation, and
[31:26] that's where the entire conversation stops. So a lot of them who have been
[31:30] writing and talking about it are not very happy about this, although it is
[31:34] a huge it's historic. After forty years, you'll be seeing America's maybe nuclear
[31:41] presence in the Korean peninsula. So it will have major ramifications should that happen,
[31:49] and should they actually send a nucle submarine there. But also remember,
[31:55] for America, a nucleus submarine in the Korean Peninsula is a sitting duck.
[32:00] Yeah, you know, it's a lot of waste of a lot of money.
[32:05] Should the strategic acid be attacked by North Korea, the aftermath nobody's talking
[32:10] about. But just that in itself is going to be a huge loss.
[32:15] That's a very valid point, I think. But you know, a crucial
[32:19] perspective We've been talking about North Korea's nuclear program, but I wanted to focus
[32:23] a bit on this crucial perspective that I feel that it's missing here is that
[32:29] of North Korea itself. People are still not being told why North Korea is
[32:32] so insistent on having a nuclear program, And the answer, I think goes
[32:37] back to two thousand and six when North Korea performed its first underground nuclear test,
[32:44] and that happened in response to US provocation. Because in two thousand and
[32:49] two, the then US President George W. Bush, he would label North
[32:54] Korea as part of the Axis of Evil alongside Iraq and Iran. And after
[33:00] the invasion of Iraq and the execution of Saddam Hussean, North Korea believed that
[33:07] the US was next going to try and force a regime change in their country,
[33:14] which is why they embarked on this weapon's program. And since then,
[33:17] the nuclear deterance has become nuclear nationalism in North Korea. And in twenty eighteen,
[33:25] Trump, for all his faults, came perhaps the closest to brokering peace
[33:31] with North Korea. But even then, if you see, the talks broke
[33:36] down because Kim jongon claimed that he had asked for the lifting of sanctions in
[33:40] return for North Korea shutting down a nuclear complex. But the most that the
[33:46] US could do was not hold military exercises with South Korea around that time.
[33:52] But there have been military exercises recently which included Japan. So it's not even
[33:59] not not like you know, you're only riling China and North Korea. With
[34:02] South Korea and military exercises, you've included Japan, which is which is almost
[34:07] like China's better, No, Yeah, And China has also accused the US
[34:13] of cheating, you know, our tensions in the quote in Peninsula for its
[34:17] own narrow games, and there's this question of whether South Korea is playing into
[34:22] US hats. Now, this is the tenth largest economy in the world,
[34:27] like you said, home to Samson and LG. Ideally it should have its
[34:30] own nuclear program to defend itself, but it is having to rely on the
[34:36] US for the same. How do you see the altho I've discussed, you
[34:39] know, but in reference to all this, all these points, how do
[34:42] you see these counter narratives coming along? This is it's very interesting that you
[34:45] put it in perspective because this is important. But let's just go back a
[34:50] little. And this is important because in twenty seventeen when Moon jay in,
[34:58] that's before Park parkyn High, before before her, when he took over,
[35:05] when he became president, there was a mark shift in the in the policy
[35:14] towards North Korea. It was only during Park going high who had who had
[35:21] a dear to a very adversarial approach to North Korea, which again you have
[35:25] spelt out in terms of how the conservatives in South Korea looked at North Korea
[35:32] and the existential threat they felt with North Korea's increasing customed approach to continuing their
[35:43] nuclear program. So that really happened back then, but in a move that
[35:47] echoed Kim day Junk's Sunshine Policy, which was advocated, which advocated engagement with
[35:53] North Korea and opposed these defensive measures that were being put forth by the by
[36:01] the previous governments. It just seems like the rhetoric that we're talking about,
[36:08] the launching of the ICBMs, the continuing of the nuclear program, and the
[36:16] testing that was done by or the testing that is being planned by North Korea
[36:22] are areas that South Korea has to live with. It's it's for them a
[36:30] question of daily existence, the kind of and we talked about allies snooping on
[36:36] each other and the leaks for South Korea. For them, it is absolutely
[36:43] essential to know exactly who in North Korea is deciding what and that's the kind
[36:49] of penetration they have in terms of getting information out. So the approach,
[36:54] political approach, also, irrespective of what your ideology is, changes when you
[37:00] see North Korea's stand change, whether it is becoming more belligerent or or or
[37:08] softening its approach. When did that softening of approach happen, like you said,
[37:15] when the conversations and the engagement began, and this was during Trump's time,
[37:19] but it did not last long. It ended very badly with more exchange
[37:24] of words between the two leaders, Kim John One and Donald Trump making fun
[37:30] of each other, the memes, so on and so forth. So we
[37:35] saw a lot of exchange of words between the between the two sides. Having
[37:39] said that, at the end of the day, when when a country is
[37:45] looking at engagement with the United States of America South Korea and you're talking about
[37:51] nuclear capability and having your own for America, that certainly does not look like
[37:58] an option. Why because I go back to the earlier conversation where even the
[38:04] hinting that the president's President's office had said that they might be looking at nuclear
[38:12] capability. We are looking at a Washington declaration which reemphasizes South Korea disavowing its
[38:19] intent for any nuclear capability, that America will continue to be their security provider,
[38:25] and that they are going to after forty years, be looking at placing
[38:30] strategic assets nuclear assets in the Korean peninsula. So the conversation has gone beyond
[38:37] Anna. It no longer can be in the realm of whether if South Korea
[38:39] can have its own nuclear capability. We're looking at now at a stage where
[38:46] America and the current dispensation in South Korea have already decided for an entire population.
[38:54] But like you said, the politics of the country is very different.
[38:59] Within South Korea, there are a lot of people who are questioning this declaration.
[39:02] They're saying, this is not a deterrent. A lot of them are
[39:06] saying there's a huge conversation within South Korea about nuclear capability. If it has
[39:12] to be it has to be our own to deter, yes, if it
[39:15] is from yeah, it has to be our own to deter rather than a
[39:20] strategic asset coming and going, you know, depending on their threat assessment.
[39:28] So right now we have passed that conversation on whether if South Korea can be
[39:34] nuclear capable on its own or not, because this declaration actually seals the deal.
[39:39] There is no ceiling the deal, but for now it really does saying
[39:43] that America is going to be the net security provider and South Korea will refrain
[39:51] from any such nuclear capability that is, weapons systems and military capability. Yeah,
[39:59] And stemming from what you said about the dissent in South Koreans regarding the
[40:04] deal. And you know, there's one piece by the Diplomat itself where the
[40:07] writer Joan Echo, he had done a survey and the findings of which he
[40:14] says in his piece that indicate that most South Koreans they support the idea of
[40:19] a piece treaty with North Korea. I agree, yea, even though with
[40:22] the missiles and everything. But I was just limiting it to the political domestic
[40:29] political dimensions of the country. Do you think that now with the current deal
[40:34] which has urged North Korea? Of course, do you anticipate a growing resentment
[40:38] towards Yun's administration because you know, like I was reading about South Korea's democracy,
[40:45] and it's a country that has a hyperactive civil society and a weekly institutionalized
[40:52] political party system, and it's considered, it's dubbed as one of the most
[40:57] successful third wave democracies. You know, we have seen a lot of impeachments,
[41:00] we have, like we said, and they were peaceful, peaceful protests
[41:05] like um the impeachment we were talking about of President Park. She owned high.
[41:10] She was found to be corrupt, unjust, and undemocratic, and this
[41:14] impeachment happened as a subsequent effort of a series of peaceful candle light protests.
[41:20] So I mean of a country that has such a strengthened, robust, you
[41:25] know, civil society, art and democracy. I am actually a very vibrant
[41:30] democracy. Like I was saying. They question their government, they question corruption.
[41:37] If anybody's got there will be a mass movement to get the person out
[41:40] of office. And that has yielded also, But thal this is a little
[41:45] early to say whether if this is going to have the kind of impacts in
[41:50] a year. Also it's yes, since he has taken power. Yes,
[41:53] no, not not him coming to power. This decision, Washington declaration and
[41:58] this summit and this what kind of impact it's going to have on his government
[42:06] is something that we have to wait and see, wait a bit for the
[42:12] public opinion to come out. Right now, I can tell you this for
[42:15] sure that not everybody's happy in South Korea. In fact, most of them
[42:19] have been criticizing it because even they read the fine print of the declaration and
[42:23] they see what is at stake. There is a lot And then you know,
[42:28] information coming out now, news coming out about conversations on how US wants
[42:34] South Korea to distance itself from China in doing business, so on and so
[42:38] forth are things that will impact them, will impact South Korean businesses, so
[42:45] that also will not go down well. Don't know about his popularity drop per
[42:50] se, but the decision and the visit certainly has been looked at through a
[42:55] more critical prison than any other visits. It was an important visit, but
[43:00] it is also one that has been really talked about. There's a lot of
[43:05] conversation, a lot of chatter about the visit and the deal and the nuances
[43:14] of the visit. Where the conversations that are coming out now about what the
[43:17] US asked of South Korea is something that has not just not gone down well
[43:22] with the political dispensation but also with people. So if you hear a lot
[43:27] of these conversations and other podcasts or read the comments of people from South Korea,
[43:35] it doesn't seem like they were They're absolutely excited about this visit. So
[43:40] can we call this visit a real success from a South Korean's point of view,
[43:45] I don't know. I don't think so. From the US's point of
[43:49] view, certainly a success. But again, you know, there are a
[43:53] lot of conversations wherein one conversation or one interaction, the president was our about
[44:00] whether if it's directed to China. They said, no, China can do
[44:02] what it wants to, but it wants to become a superpower. There's that
[44:06] and the rest you know, talking about, Oh, China is not a
[44:09] democracy, and then they say that, so we will never let that happen.
[44:15] Okay, So that's the message that So it is a fight for supremacy
[44:19] between China and America, with the world's two largest economies, and in that
[44:27] all these regional players are getting somewhere. If you see pressured into taking certain
[44:34] positions, pressured into taking certain decisions, sometimes it might not be in the
[44:39] best interest of their own country. We'll have to wait and see whether this
[44:44] will work for them. But if you ask me whether it's a it's a
[44:47] it's a real nuclear deterent, I don't think so. They're looking at it
[44:52] as an extended deterance. But then again, last year we've seen the maximum
[45:00] number of missiles you know, from the North Korean side, and this certainly
[45:07] is an act of provocation that North Korea is already said. So what is
[45:13] going to be the response is something we'll have to keenly watch. Yeah,
[45:16] and just Lastly, to end to wrap the conversation with you know two more
[45:22] things that I just want to slightly touch upon it. And we have discussed
[45:27] also the effort of the US to increase its footprint in the Asia Pacific and
[45:32] you know, keeping it such travel China up close. Do you think that
[45:37] the US's allies in Asia will see through this factor and will rightly call for
[45:45] more USS engagement in the region, ensuring that the US is more committed to
[45:51] the region and not just militarily. What do you think so, because I
[45:54] mean, do you think this is the time to address this that you know,
[45:59] we want USS presence beyond the military presence that it holds any specific per
[46:06] se. See for the United States of America, their interests are paramount.
[46:10] What US normally says is that our interests and here in this case, South
[46:15] Korea's interests are aligned. And therefore when we say we are working for our
[46:21] interests, we're working for South Korea's interests as well. Now that's a very
[46:24] nice simplistic explanation to give to a very complicated situation, but it does not
[46:30] work that way. So in acting as a security provider, if you're going
[46:38] to take more yeah, so what is happening over here? They don't want
[46:43] South Korea to have their own nuclear weapons. They certainly are they can see
[46:47] their tension and the increased heightened situation within the in the peninsula. So they
[46:54] want China. They want to contain China. They want to ensure that Not
[47:00] Korea is deterred and in providing the security in return, what are we also
[47:05] asking. We're saying, well, the North Korea is an alliant partner of
[47:09] China. China is the enemy here. China is a problem. Decrease your
[47:15] engagement with China. Will that help South Korea? But it certainly is going
[47:19] to help America, of course, And they really want South Korea to set
[47:23] up shops so far away in America, you know, with Taiwan. One
[47:30] of the biggest concerns that Taiwan also they said the same thing. Move your
[47:34] big manufacturing TSMC, the biggest micro chip company, move you're manufacturing their Why
[47:39] are you in this place? It's a threat? So on and so forth.
[47:43] So very reluctantly, finally they're opening one. But the problem is distance,
[47:47] The problem is culture. A lot of people in Korea, whether it's
[47:52] North or South, are comfortable working there there. You know, there is
[47:57] increased engagement. A lot of South Koreans have to America, study there,
[48:01] live there, so on and so forth. But yet when it comes to
[48:05] your own government, in your own place, you're more comfortable working closer home
[48:09] rather than so far away. That certainly is has been an issue, you
[48:15] know, the distance with America. But that aside, your question was very
[48:20] different. So let's just go back to that America can and is looking if
[48:24] you're thinking America is not, they are looking at aligning their interests with allies
[48:30] and partners to the extent that military is not in isolation. That they are
[48:37] looking at it becoming a strategic cooperation where military is one aspect, economic is
[48:43] the other, and your foothold in the region wherever you are is another very
[48:49] important aspect, including culture. Over here, you see America say that they
[48:57] are fully invested, and they are economically as well. But for South Korea
[49:02] to survive right now, we do not have a resilient alternative supply chain.
[49:08] And everything that South Korea produces quite a bit of that they require the raw
[49:17] materials aparts from China, and that cannot be something one should ignore because these
[49:25] are economies emerging economies, developed economies, and they are not going to compromise
[49:32] on their on their own economy just because the country wants it to. This
[49:37] is a very important partnership. So let's see what the Unit administration is going
[49:40] to do. No, but in hindsight, like you said, Guitar,
[49:45] do you think that I mean, it might sound a bit far fetched,
[49:47] But the growing allie I mean the US and its Asian allies like Japan,
[49:53] South Korea, etc. Do you think it could potentially raise apprehensions in China?
[50:00] Of course it is, it already has it can definitely, But in
[50:04] terms of like do you think it would translate into some stringent actions given the
[50:09] kind of country China is, China has always sent warnings Anna, China has
[50:15] already sent warnings saying that, well, we are seeing what you're doing,
[50:19] and it is aimed against us, to which America actually sent out a message
[50:22] saying that this is not aimed against you, it is aimed against a North
[50:29] Korea. And over here China makes a distinction. China says, Okay,
[50:31] well, they're their own government. We only our partners allies. Maybe,
[50:37] but we don't have whole sway and influence. I mean that's their argument.
[50:45] But if you look at the if you look at China, China has already
[50:49] warned the Americans and South Koreans that you're working against Chinese interests, and this
[50:55] whole thing of asking South Korea to move away from China, and it comes
[51:00] to the microchip industry, you will see a very strong reaction from China on
[51:05] that front. So the reason I said this because that you know, the
[51:08] recent developments between indicate that South Korea and Japan, traditionally they are distant neighbors,
[51:15] and they're now seeking to establish a new partnership in which both the countries
[51:19] are reevaluating their security strategies, recognizing the necessity to counter China's escalating regional expansion
[51:28] and assertiveness. So I was thinking that this shift in alliances and the recognition
[51:32] of a common challenge could potentially raise apprehensions in China. Of course it does,
[51:37] yes, but with Japan, picture, with other countries in Asia region
[51:43] in picture, I mean, how do you think it could deter If it
[51:47] could, China's there is only so what is happening overay. You can't deter
[51:52] China. You can contain China, you can counter China, and which is
[51:58] what is happening over here? What are they doing? America is trying to
[52:01] contain China. That we are the superpower. There can be no other.
[52:06] You're trying to contain China. You're challenging China, You're counting China by all
[52:13] these moves. After this visit, the next visit to America is of Philippines,
[52:19] another very important country in the region, one that takes on various countries
[52:22] as well, including China. Has been very clear on Chinese claims to Filipino
[52:29] Islands, and Philippines is very clear on that front. So they are a
[52:35] very small country, but they have been taking on China and their visit will
[52:38] not go down well with China. So China, So China will get provoked.
[52:44] There are so many visits and meetings happening that they will get provoked.
[52:47] After South Korea, Philippines a visit is going to be yet another example of
[52:52] how there is a systematic way of looking at containing and country in China.
[53:00] Can they deter China? The veterans can only come not militarily, as much
[53:07] more so economically because unless and the only way you can deter China, which
[53:13] is so big economically is by counter supply chains, counter manufacturing units, counter
[53:21] asking countries and allies not to do business. But who's anybody to ask South
[53:28] Korea or any country not to do business with China. Look at America and
[53:31] China's trade. Yeah, yes, yes, and you'd wonder, you know
[53:37] why America's asking others when they haven't been able to That's only because the world,
[53:44] the global community that wants to come together to counter China, has not
[53:47] really or is not really working towards actively working towards a supply chain and alternative
[53:53] supply chain. And unless and until that happens, there is no way to
[53:58] counter China. China. China has become very, very fundamental and basic to
[54:04] your supply chain. It's one of the key cogs in that entire supply chain
[54:09] machine, and you cannot do away with it unless and until there's somebody else
[54:15] making the parts that you need and you don't need to take it from China.
[54:21] So that has not happened. So, yeah, South Korea, any
[54:24] country, all of these countries put together, cannot deter China. There's a
[54:30] massive, massive move to contain China. You can say that they're bad because
[54:36] their government is bad and autocratic, but I always say this, there are
[54:39] autographic governments everywhere in many other places for strategic allies. Look at that.
[54:46] In that perspective, China's started calling itself a democracy and that they are their
[54:52] own kind of democracy tagline. But in all fairness, South Korea is actually
[54:58] a very vibrant democracy. So let's see how the people of South Korea and
[55:04] the politicians and the political parties are really going to look at this agreement,
[55:09] the nuances of the conversations which are not part of the agreement but took place
[55:14] between Biden and Yune, and then see whether if you actually grows in popularity
[55:22] or his popularity dips. Yeah, makes so much sense. Now, Okay,
[55:27] well, thank you Gita for such a lovely and wonderful discussion and the
[55:32] way you narrowed it down to me. And I'm sure the listeners out there
[55:36] would have found it really helpful. And if you did let us know,
[55:40] would reiterate the number is eight nine six, double line six and the email
[55:46] idea of spots at the rate in there to day dot com. Please let
[55:50] us know how it's a discussion and how has how have the other discussions been
[55:54] so that we improve And I think We're soon to be near fifty episodes,
[56:00] completely fifty episodes, so we'll try. If your inputs come in, um
[56:05] you know, will it will give us an idea to ideate and brainstorm as
[56:09] to what we can do for the fiftieth episode if that's to be done.
[56:15] So thank you either and I'll thank you Anna, and thank you to our
[56:17] listeners. Yes, keep us, keep us going and make us number one
[56:23] soon across categories, across categories, very powerful. Thank you,

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