# Lebanon pager explosions: Decoding the 'covert op' and understanding what's next | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 40

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 20 Sep 2024, 1 h 05 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/62044161/20_sep_24_iod_ep_40_20_sept_128.mp3

On September 17, hundreds of pagers and walkie-talkies exploded simultaneously across Lebanon and parts of Syria, killing dozens and injuring hundreds. Was this another meticulously planned Mossad operation, echoing their history of high-stakes missions? In the 40th episode, host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor delve into these recent coordinated explosions, dissecting how such an elaborate attack could have been planned and executed. What multiple failures in Hezbollah's security led to this devastating outcome? They also explore the broader implications: How does this operation fit into Israel's regional strategy? What lessons can India draw about protecting its communication infrastructure as tensions escalate? The event is a sobering reminder of India's vulnerabilities tied to foreign-made devices, particularly from China, highlighting the urgent need for localised production. Listen in! Produced by Anna Priydarshini Sound mix by Nitin Rawat

## Transcript

[0:00] Speaker 1: This is India Today podcasts. It sent out a message
[0:04] Speaker 1: because it was shocking to see that, you know, a
[0:07] Speaker 1: mundane item like a pager was exploding in this extremely
[0:11] Speaker 1: coordinated symphony of destruction in different parts of Lebanon. There
[0:16] Speaker 1: would have been a deception as far as export licensing
[0:19] Speaker 1: is concerned. There would have been a deception, as far
[0:21] Speaker 1: as the paperwork for the consignment dispatches concerned. There would
[0:25] Speaker 1: have been some kind of deception as far as receiving
[0:28] Speaker 1: the freight is concerned, or the transport through which these
[0:31] Speaker 1: pages would have gone. There would have been a deception
[0:34] Speaker 1: in terms of the distribution of those pages once they
[0:36] Speaker 1: reached Lebanon. There would have been a deception in terms
[0:39] Speaker 1: of what this front company was, whether it was licensed
[0:43] Speaker 1: to actually conduct these transactions. There would have been a
[0:45] Speaker 1: deception in terms of the retail or distribution of these pages,
[0:49] Speaker 1: and to whom. Who was it who ensured that at
[0:51] Speaker 1: least some of these pages went to the people they
[0:54] Speaker 1: were intended to go to. What happened was terribly complex
[0:57] Speaker 1: to plan. What actually happened was really simple, true, It's
[1:01] Speaker 1: it's almost comical. One hour after the story broke, there
[1:04] Speaker 1: were memes they've I cannot overstate what enormous lessons there
[1:09] Speaker 1: are for India, the Indian military, Indian security agencies.
[1:14] Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on
[1:17] Speaker 2: all things well defense, where I They've Goswami, your host,
[1:22] Speaker 2: along with senior journalist Shivarur, break down the world of
[1:25] Speaker 2: conflicts that range from the subtle to the brute. We
[1:28] Speaker 2: bring you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at
[1:32] Speaker 2: times provoke.
[1:36] Speaker 3: This is in our Defense. Hello and welcome.
[1:39] Speaker 2: This is the fortieth episode of Another Defense. Uh, and
[1:42] Speaker 2: what a crazy, crazy week it has been. Shift in
[1:46] Speaker 2: the world of defense.
[1:49] Speaker 3: Things are blowing.
[1:50] Speaker 1: Up, so to speak, for offense in this case.
[1:52] Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I laughed. But it's actually a quite a
[1:55] Speaker 3: serious topic.
[1:56] Speaker 2: And we will get into the entire game of this topic.
[2:01] Speaker 2: I mean some may have guests already. We're talking about
[2:04] Speaker 2: what's happening in Lebanon for the last two days.
[2:06] Speaker 1: Uh. The world has changed.
[2:08] Speaker 3: The world has changed definitely.
[2:10] Speaker 2: On Tuesday, Tuesday evening in your time, we had reports
[2:14] Speaker 2: of some devices blowing up all over the place in Lebanon.
[2:17] Speaker 2: It was later a little did I found those were
[2:20] Speaker 2: those were pages. I'm sorry, this was Wednesday. Sorry I
[2:23] Speaker 2: start corrected. It was Wednesday when this happened. I had
[2:25] Speaker 2: just left office, I think, and I was in the
[2:28] Speaker 2: gym if I'm not wrong, and I could not.
[2:30] Speaker 3: Just believe what I was seeing. And you know, in
[2:33] Speaker 3: between my workout, I was like, you know, what is
[2:34] Speaker 3: going on? So before we talk about what's happened in
[2:38] Speaker 3: the last.
[2:39] Speaker 2: Two days, before we get into the various speculative theories
[2:42] Speaker 2: that the two of us have read, that the that
[2:45] Speaker 2: you'll have based on experience of having you know, covered
[2:47] Speaker 2: this field for sore so so many years. I want
[2:49] Speaker 2: your first reaction when you came across this piece of news, because, uh,
[2:54] Speaker 2: you know, when you covered the world of defense, when
[2:56] Speaker 2: you host a podcast on defense, when you have an
[2:58] Speaker 2: interest in stuff like stuff like diff and you have
[3:01] Speaker 2: two different forms of literature that you read or different
[3:04] Speaker 2: forms of videos or whatever.
[3:07] Speaker 3: Video films that you that you watch.
[3:08] Speaker 2: One is the hard reality and one is the fiction
[3:11] Speaker 2: and fiction one you enjoy both. I know that I
[3:13] Speaker 2: would never ever have thought that something that happened what
[3:16] Speaker 2: happened this week with pages of hesblah, militants blowing up
[3:20] Speaker 2: in Leminine and mass at the same moment, same second,
[3:23] Speaker 2: and the day later walkie talkies with the same militant
[3:26] Speaker 2: being used with human group again blowing up at the
[3:29] Speaker 2: same moment. What is something that would ever read about
[3:32] Speaker 2: in an actual non fiction book of spy operations. Disclaimer,
[3:36] Speaker 2: we don't know if it a spy operation, but again
[3:37] Speaker 2: we'll get to that. So, like I said, before we
[3:40] Speaker 2: get to what it was, whether it was a spy
[3:42] Speaker 2: operation or not, whether Mozart was involved, et cetera, et cetera.
[3:45] Speaker 2: Your first reaction you came across this news flashing on
[3:47] Speaker 2: your phone.
[3:48] Speaker 1: So the first words that came to my mind when
[3:51] Speaker 1: I heard about this was and so it begins because frankly,
[3:56] Speaker 1: I wasn't I wasn't surprised at all. And I'll tell
[3:59] Speaker 1: you why I wasn't surprised by what was happening. And
[4:02] Speaker 1: since on this podcast we call a spade a spaid,
[4:06] Speaker 1: let's be clear, this was the Mozad. You know, Israel
[4:09] Speaker 1: can deny pill Kingdom come, but this was obviously a
[4:12] Speaker 1: Mozad operation. There may have been other agencies involved. Is
[4:16] Speaker 1: possible that certain other security agencies from other countries. Needless
[4:21] Speaker 1: to say, the United States may have been involved. We
[4:24] Speaker 1: don't know for sure, but this is this particular operation
[4:29] Speaker 1: also didn't shock me very much because it's it's really
[4:33] Speaker 1: just a modern version of stuff that the Mozad has
[4:37] Speaker 1: done in the past in a much more limited manner.
[4:41] Speaker 1: They've you know, dating back to the seventies in fact,
[4:43] Speaker 1: and we'll get into that in more detail, but I
[4:46] Speaker 1: think the the meticulous level of planning that would have
[4:52] Speaker 1: been required to be able to, you know, orchestrate this
[4:58] Speaker 1: kind of a subterfuge an organization like the his Bulla,
[5:01] Speaker 1: which is uh, you know, the Hisbola is not a
[5:04] Speaker 1: rag you know, most people when they hear the word
[5:06] Speaker 1: his Bula, they think of a kind of a ragdag
[5:09] Speaker 1: terrorist organization, you know, you know, a bunch of guys
[5:13] Speaker 1: just running around firing rockets.
[5:14] Speaker 3: Uh.
[5:15] Speaker 1: It's it's it's important to point out that the his
[5:18] Speaker 1: Bulla is as a quasi military force. They they function
[5:23] Speaker 1: like an army. They've got a rank system, they've got
[5:26] Speaker 1: heavy duty conventional weapons, they've got drones, they've got anti
[5:30] Speaker 1: tank missiles. Uh, they've got anti air weaponry.
[5:33] Speaker 2: Uh.
[5:34] Speaker 1: So they are they are very much a you know,
[5:36] Speaker 1: a small army of kinds, and it's important to see
[5:39] Speaker 1: it as that UH, and for an organization like the
[5:42] Speaker 1: his Bulla to be to be deceived at so many
[5:47] Speaker 1: different levels, and we'll get into why this was like
[5:50] Speaker 1: a perfect storm uh is UH would have taken a
[5:54] Speaker 1: lot of work. You know, there's a New York Times
[5:56] Speaker 1: report that's come out just at the time that we're
[5:58] Speaker 1: recording this podcast, which suggests that the the you know,
[6:02] Speaker 1: that the pagers and the devices that were sent into
[6:06] Speaker 1: Lebanon were actually Israeli. They were you know, they were
[6:09] Speaker 1: made by Israel, contracted by Israel, by you know, by
[6:14] Speaker 1: front company H and that the planning stages actually began
[6:18] Speaker 1: sometime in twenty twenty two before you know, everyone is
[6:22] Speaker 1: seeing this in the context of the twenty twenty three
[6:25] Speaker 1: October seventh attacked by Hamas. But the the scary part,
[6:30] Speaker 1: or the unsettling part of all this is that this
[6:32] Speaker 1: these explosions, the seeds for these explosions were planted more
[6:37] Speaker 1: than a year before what happened in Israel last year.
[6:40] Speaker 1: So I think the result of all that planning has
[6:45] Speaker 1: you know, come back to work.
[6:46] Speaker 2: For the Mozad at this point of time, right, Yeah,
[6:49] Speaker 2: it's almost as though, like you know, they've had several
[6:51] Speaker 2: contingency plans or contingency operations that they must have had
[6:54] Speaker 2: filed somewhere. You know, like you have militaries doing war
[6:57] Speaker 2: game scenarios, right, so you you you take a particular
[7:00] Speaker 2: an are you and you wor game it and you
[7:01] Speaker 2: keep it safe somewhere in cases something like this happens
[7:03] Speaker 2: in real life, will perhaps do that.
[7:05] Speaker 3: So perhaps the just like.
[7:06] Speaker 2: You know, went to the cupboards of the old old
[7:08] Speaker 2: files and like, okay, this operation, let's give it a
[7:11] Speaker 2: go and let's launch it. So yeah, most of our listeners,
[7:15] Speaker 2: most of you viewers would have definitely read or all
[7:17] Speaker 2: the theories that are out that have been out there
[7:19] Speaker 2: for the last couple of days about what may have
[7:21] Speaker 2: gone down, but just for a refresh for everybody's memory
[7:24] Speaker 2: and to kind of make a conversation easier based on
[7:27] Speaker 2: what you've read, based on your understanding of this world,
[7:32] Speaker 2: understanding of explosives, you're understanding of communication equipment, and of
[7:36] Speaker 2: course the New York Times report that you said, because
[7:38] Speaker 2: that's a very interesting report. Up until an the theory
[7:40] Speaker 2: was that is well, at some point kind of hijacked,
[7:43] Speaker 2: so to speak, a consignment that was meant to be delivered.
[7:46] Speaker 3: To the Hesbola and kind of you know, either.
[7:48] Speaker 2: Swap those those pages, tampered with them, and then you know,
[7:52] Speaker 2: then something something like that. But what we are now
[7:54] Speaker 2: learning from the New York Times report is that they
[7:57] Speaker 2: actually set up a so to speak, factory where they
[7:59] Speaker 2: manafe actured these these these pages ready with explosive and
[8:03] Speaker 2: then send it to leben and for Hesbela to use.
[8:06] Speaker 2: But that's like the source of it. There are obviously
[8:09] Speaker 2: different aspects to it. For example, how did they ensure
[8:11] Speaker 2: the consentment reached the right people, How did they ensured
[8:15] Speaker 2: it at the right moment, and stuff like that, And
[8:18] Speaker 2: would there have been some sort of you know, like
[8:20] Speaker 2: practice run done somewhere. Maybe that's sort of a safe
[8:23] Speaker 2: environment to ensure something like this is actually pulled off
[8:26] Speaker 2: in real world. Your thoughts and your views on this.
[8:28] Speaker 1: So, first of all, they've when it comes to Israel,
[8:31] Speaker 1: almost nothing is a contingency plan. They don't have contingency plans.
[8:35] Speaker 1: Everything is all systems go read alert. Because Israel is
[8:40] Speaker 1: the kind of country which has a security system that
[8:43] Speaker 1: is a hyper alert practically all of the time, because
[8:46] Speaker 1: of the because the circumstances that surround it have never
[8:49] Speaker 1: calmed down even for a moment for the last many,
[8:51] Speaker 1: many decades, which is actually why October seventh last year
[8:55] Speaker 1: became such a big blot on their record. So there
[8:59] Speaker 1: are no old, dusty files, there's no contingency. Everything is
[9:03] Speaker 1: like ready to go at a moment's notice.
[9:07] Speaker 2: Uh.
[9:07] Speaker 1: As far as the you know, the fact that Israel
[9:11] Speaker 1: managed to do something like this, you know, have a
[9:14] Speaker 1: plan of this kind, Uh, one has to remember that
[9:18] Speaker 1: the you know, I made the point that the his
[9:21] Speaker 1: Bulla is not just some small terrorist organization or a
[9:24] Speaker 1: militant organization. They work like a quasi army. But the
[9:28] Speaker 1: history between Israel and the Hisbullah goes back a long way.
[9:32] Speaker 2: Uh.
[9:33] Speaker 1: Israel has fought the his Bullah for decades together. Now
[9:37] Speaker 1: his Bullah is not a new organization. You know, conflict.
[9:40] Speaker 1: Conflict with Lebanon has led to, if I'm not mistaken,
[9:43] Speaker 1: to previous occasions in which Israel has invaded southern Lebanon
[9:47] Speaker 1: and occupied territory over there. So there is a there
[9:51] Speaker 1: is a very violent history between Israel and the Hisbulah
[9:56] Speaker 1: in particular, as far as you know, the larger conflict
[9:59] Speaker 1: is Gon concerned. Now Israel is keenly aware of how
[10:05] Speaker 1: the world is perceiving it right now. Israel is also
[10:09] Speaker 1: very keenly aware of how uh you know, how it's
[10:13] Speaker 1: its reputation as a as an impregnable, resourceful Uh, you know,
[10:18] Speaker 1: very agile country was almost irreparably damaged. And we've done
[10:21] Speaker 1: an episode on that here on in our defense. Uh
[10:24] Speaker 1: and uh, partially for those reasons, but for many more
[10:28] Speaker 1: important reasons, Israel knew that it needed to hit back.
[10:32] Speaker 2: Uh.
[10:33] Speaker 1: And this was not Let's be very clear about one
[10:35] Speaker 1: thing they've this was not. This was not so much
[10:37] Speaker 1: about sending a message. All actions are about sending a message.
[10:41] Speaker 1: There's no doubt about it. And you know, you were
[10:44] Speaker 1: in the gym when you saw it, and you you know,
[10:46] Speaker 1: almost fell off your treadmill, and you know, people were
[10:48] Speaker 1: shocked all over the world. It sent out a message
[10:51] Speaker 1: because it was shocking to see that, you know, a
[10:53] Speaker 1: mundane item like a like like like a like a
[10:56] Speaker 1: pager was was exploding in this extremely coordinated symphony of
[11:02] Speaker 1: destruction in different parts of Lebanon.
[11:05] Speaker 2: Uh.
[11:06] Speaker 1: We'll get to the unanswered questions in just a bit,
[11:08] Speaker 1: but I come back to the point that for Israel,
[11:12] Speaker 1: this was much more about just baddlah, much more about
[11:20] Speaker 1: you know, sending a message, much more than about narrative.
[11:24] Speaker 1: This was operational. This was very very operational because the
[11:28] Speaker 1: depth and complexity of what it would have taken for
[11:32] Speaker 1: Israel to execute something like this.
[11:35] Speaker 3: Uh.
[11:35] Speaker 1: You know, for instance, we don't know if any uh
[11:39] Speaker 1: you know, ground assets of Israel who would undoubtedly have
[11:43] Speaker 1: been required to execute an operation like this. How else
[11:46] Speaker 1: will you know who has the pages? How else will
[11:48] Speaker 1: you know where those people are. There's only so much
[11:51] Speaker 1: you can do with drones and satellites and things. You've
[11:54] Speaker 1: got to have had mols and you know, spies on
[11:56] Speaker 1: the ground. And I mean, you know, only a fool
[11:58] Speaker 1: will tell you that Israel has been nobody on the
[12:00] Speaker 1: ground in Leven. Of course they do so, uh, given
[12:04] Speaker 1: all these huge numbers of complexities for Israel to be
[12:07] Speaker 1: able to actually execute this, uh, you know, I I
[12:10] Speaker 1: see it not only as believable because it is. It's
[12:13] Speaker 1: something that even today, like Wednesday, now we're on Thursday,
[12:18] Speaker 1: were recording this on Thursday. It happened today as well.
[12:20] Speaker 1: We've seen it happen with walkie talkies. I've seen reports
[12:23] Speaker 1: about solar panels. Uh, and uh, you know, and and
[12:27] Speaker 1: in on one in one incident a mobile phone as well.
[12:29] Speaker 1: This takes a kind of coordination that is that is
[12:33] Speaker 1: uh impossible to do without uh an extreme level of infiltration.
[12:39] Speaker 4: Uh.
[12:40] Speaker 1: This is not just about electronic intelligence. This is not
[12:43] Speaker 1: just about you know, keeping an eye with the you know,
[12:46] Speaker 1: satellites or drones. This is about you know, this is
[12:49] Speaker 1: a covert operation. You know, at the beginning of this episode,
[12:51] Speaker 1: you said, we don't know if it was a spy operation.
[12:53] Speaker 1: Hell it was a spy operation. Hell, it was a
[12:55] Speaker 1: covert operation behind quote unquote enemy lines where where where
[13:00] Speaker 1: you know, a very very much Fauda like scenario would
[13:04] Speaker 1: have played out. You know, it may may not have
[13:06] Speaker 1: been as you know, as you know, romanticized as the
[13:10] Speaker 1: show shows us. But I'm saying that it's very much
[13:13] Speaker 1: about Mozart assets having to make sure that this plan
[13:18] Speaker 1: actually plays out in the way that they want to.
[13:20] Speaker 3: Look.
[13:20] Speaker 1: It's one thing to you know, let's let's sort of
[13:23] Speaker 1: boil it down to its basic What basically happened, according
[13:26] Speaker 1: to the New York Times report, is that pages manufactured
[13:31] Speaker 1: by Israel, whether they were manufactured in Israel or else where,
[13:33] Speaker 1: we be hearing about Hungary or somewhere. It was Israel
[13:36] Speaker 1: that manufactured and controlled the manufacture of these pages, and
[13:40] Speaker 1: they were purpose built as pago bombs. They were obviously
[13:43] Speaker 1: not built as pages. They were built as pager bombs.
[13:46] Speaker 1: But we don't know if they were programmed to explode
[13:50] Speaker 1: at some point of time. We don't know exactly what
[13:53] Speaker 1: the trigger was. There are many theories that one particular
[13:55] Speaker 1: text went and at that time it exploded. Nobody knows
[13:58] Speaker 1: for sure how you know what technology actually worked. But
[14:02] Speaker 1: what I'm trying to say is pages are are primitive
[14:06] Speaker 1: enough devices that there would have had to be a
[14:10] Speaker 1: kind of physical presence on the ground to ensure the
[14:15] Speaker 1: delicate dance of destruction that took place in Beirut and
[14:17] Speaker 1: other places happened in a coordinated manner. You know, I've
[14:21] Speaker 1: seen disparate reports of the identities of some of the
[14:23] Speaker 1: people who were killed, and they all appear to be
[14:25] Speaker 1: sort of mid level his Bulla, his Bulah people. Now,
[14:29] Speaker 1: that can't be a coincidence. That cannot be a coincidence.
[14:32] Speaker 1: You very rightly asked, how did Israel know exactly who
[14:35] Speaker 1: the pages are going to go to? You know, how
[14:37] Speaker 1: did how would they be How are they able to
[14:39] Speaker 1: ensure that level of infiltration? You know, were people compromised
[14:43] Speaker 1: within the his Bulah? You know, was there someone on
[14:46] Speaker 1: the inside who was helping Israel? There must have been.
[14:49] Speaker 1: All these questions remain completely unanswered. But uh, I hate to,
[14:55] Speaker 1: I hate to, you know, add romance to something that
[14:58] Speaker 1: involves destruction. But this, this is this is a This
[15:01] Speaker 1: is a terrible and violent business that we're talking about.
[15:04] Speaker 1: If we have to look at it very clinically, as
[15:06] Speaker 1: far as Mozad is concerned, as far as Israel is concerned,
[15:10] Speaker 1: they would regard this as a masterpiece.
[15:12] Speaker 3: Definitely.
[15:12] Speaker 2: I mean, because you know, a parallel to draw for
[15:15] Speaker 2: for for this, even though it's a very simplistic. Perhaps
[15:18] Speaker 2: an example is, you know, you think of, let's say
[15:20] Speaker 2: an iPhone launch, and you know, over the years, you've
[15:22] Speaker 2: you've come to a come to a space where it's
[15:25] Speaker 2: become almost impossible for for Apple not to have any
[15:28] Speaker 2: leaks before a new phone is launched because of the
[15:30] Speaker 2: sheer scale at which their operations work from you know,
[15:33] Speaker 2: where it's designed, to where it's manufactured, to where the
[15:36] Speaker 2: components are source from, and to the fact that they
[15:38] Speaker 2: have to kind of get to third party vendors for.
[15:40] Speaker 3: Them to be able to build accessities.
[15:41] Speaker 2: Again, like I said, it's sort of simplistic, simplistic example,
[15:45] Speaker 2: But the point I'm trying to get to is that
[15:47] Speaker 2: what I thought that in this world and in this
[15:49] Speaker 2: DNA to do a do an operation like this. You
[15:51] Speaker 2: mentioned at the beginning of this episode that there have been,
[15:53] Speaker 2: or they have been reported to be instances in the
[15:55] Speaker 2: past where it's done something like this, but that was
[15:58] Speaker 2: at the perhaps the individual level, to perhaps one person,
[16:00] Speaker 2: two people, three people maximum. This was a large scale.
[16:03] Speaker 2: This was one thousand pages, is what we are we're hearing.
[16:06] Speaker 2: This is a large consignment. So for them to be
[16:09] Speaker 2: able to keep this hidden from the world when the
[16:11] Speaker 2: manufacturing was happening, for example, when the consignment was being shipped,
[16:14] Speaker 2: for example, when the consignment was being delivered, for example,
[16:17] Speaker 2: when the negotiation was happening. I mean, I'm guessing if
[16:19] Speaker 2: the New York Times reporters we believe, then the person
[16:21] Speaker 2: who sold the pages to Hesbula must have been either
[16:25] Speaker 2: an Israeli agent or must have been compromised by at
[16:28] Speaker 2: some level. Right, So that let's for once focus a
[16:33] Speaker 2: bit on the Hesbula side of things. We've talked about
[16:35] Speaker 2: sophistication that will have existed on Israel side of operations.
[16:40] Speaker 2: They may have been helping sort of help from some
[16:43] Speaker 2: of its Western allies. But for Hesbula, you said, it's
[16:47] Speaker 2: not an actect bunch, it's sort of a quasi military organization.
[16:50] Speaker 2: It has its protocols, it would have had its security
[16:53] Speaker 2: you know, counter intelligence measures, et cetra, stuff like that,
[16:57] Speaker 2: for them to be deceived like this at how many
[17:00] Speaker 2: levels do you think this group must have had to
[17:03] Speaker 2: fail for something like this happened.
[17:04] Speaker 3: I just mentioned a couple of them.
[17:05] Speaker 2: For example, when you're buying a consignment of pages, then
[17:08] Speaker 2: you would obviously try to ensure that the person you're
[17:10] Speaker 2: buying it from is you know, the background checks it
[17:13] Speaker 2: don Etta stuff like that. When the pages arrive, I'm
[17:16] Speaker 2: pretty sure you would be doing some sort of an
[17:17] Speaker 2: anti abotach check, maybe not on every device, but maybe
[17:20] Speaker 2: a couple of them, five to ten. Because you have
[17:23] Speaker 2: to remember that the reason Hesbulla was buying these pages
[17:26] Speaker 2: in the first place was because they had told the
[17:28] Speaker 2: fighters not to use mobile phones because they were scared
[17:31] Speaker 2: that Mozart would be tracking those devices. And you know,
[17:34] Speaker 2: using them to kind of eliminate their fighters. So they
[17:37] Speaker 2: were aware they're under the threat of Mozart, so they
[17:40] Speaker 2: that's the reason they bought these pages. So do you
[17:43] Speaker 2: think it all failed miss spectacularly or you know, I
[17:46] Speaker 2: don't know, how do else do you explain this?
[17:48] Speaker 1: I think there was a level of complacency in the
[17:51] Speaker 1: His Bulla. The question you ask is probably the most
[17:55] Speaker 1: important one. You know, at how many different levels would
[17:58] Speaker 1: they have needed to be fail at his Bulla or
[18:01] Speaker 1: Lebanese level for something like this to actually succeed. Twenty
[18:06] Speaker 1: twenty one twenty twenty two is when his Buller decided,
[18:10] Speaker 1: like you rightly pointed out, they've that they are going
[18:12] Speaker 1: to stop using mobile phones. They started using burner phones
[18:15] Speaker 1: for a while. That also didn't work out for them,
[18:17] Speaker 1: because mobile phones are the easiest things to track, you know,
[18:21] Speaker 1: they're like magnets for surveillance. And this is for all
[18:25] Speaker 1: of our viewers as well. If you've got a mobile phone,
[18:27] Speaker 1: the world knows everything about you, at least if anyone's
[18:29] Speaker 1: looking for information about you, your mobile phone gives you
[18:31] Speaker 1: away one hundred percent of the time. Right, So mobile
[18:34] Speaker 1: phones were like a ridiculous thing for an organization like
[18:38] Speaker 1: the h Buller to use, especially when your adversary is Israel.
[18:42] Speaker 1: I'm actually surprised that they It dawned on them in
[18:44] Speaker 1: twenty twenty one.
[18:44] Speaker 3: To twenty two.
[18:46] Speaker 1: But basically during the pandemic, they decided, we've got to
[18:49] Speaker 1: stop using mobile phones and they thought pagers is the
[18:53] Speaker 1: way to go because Lebanon still has a paging service
[18:55] Speaker 1: and they decided, you know, let's go back to this
[18:58] Speaker 1: because this will be like our you know, our this
[19:01] Speaker 1: will be like a safeguard. This will be like our redundancy.
[19:06] Speaker 3: You know this.
[19:07] Speaker 1: They cannot penetrate. You know, you can't hack a pager.
[19:10] Speaker 1: You can't you can't infiltrate a pager because if the
[19:12] Speaker 1: world has moved on from pager technology, unkaha, how can
[19:16] Speaker 1: they hack a you know, like a landline for a
[19:18] Speaker 1: pager and stuff which is of a bygone era. That's
[19:22] Speaker 1: point number one, point number two. Like you rightly said that,
[19:27] Speaker 1: not only is the his Bola not a ragtag organization.
[19:30] Speaker 1: They they don't just have their own intelligence. They enjoy
[19:35] Speaker 1: intelligence support from Iran, yes, and you know, and possibly
[19:38] Speaker 1: from other countries as well, so they've got real conventional
[19:42] Speaker 1: access to intelligence resources from Iran and elsewhere. So so
[19:46] Speaker 1: they've got it's not a bunch of guys looking through
[19:50] Speaker 1: a telescope at Israel. They've got real data and information
[19:53] Speaker 1: and actionable, actionable material to act on, you know, act
[19:57] Speaker 1: on Israel. Where do you think they get their targeting information?
[20:00] Speaker 1: So Complaisance may have been a part of it, even
[20:03] Speaker 1: though they were they were in a live action situation
[20:06] Speaker 1: with Israel post October seventh last year, where you know,
[20:09] Speaker 1: actual kinetic exchanges were happening between both sides. But that's
[20:12] Speaker 1: not something his bolas not used to. Their exchanges of
[20:15] Speaker 1: missiles and drones and shooting down planes and stuff. That's
[20:18] Speaker 1: a normal that's a pretty normal day on the northern
[20:21] Speaker 1: border of Israel and the southern border of Lebanon. Uh So,
[20:24] Speaker 1: Complaisance and Hubris may have been part of it. They
[20:26] Speaker 1: may have thought that, you know, pages are impregnable, we
[20:29] Speaker 1: are safe point number two. These pages may have been
[20:32] Speaker 1: uh you know, we don't know exactly when the pages
[20:35] Speaker 1: became operational in Lebanon. There are reports suggesting a few
[20:38] Speaker 1: months to a year or so. But this also that
[20:42] Speaker 1: we have to leave room for the possibility that the
[20:44] Speaker 1: users of these pages were using them for a while,
[20:46] Speaker 1: and they were they were working like normal pages. They
[20:49] Speaker 1: were working, you know, like they were supposed to work.
[20:52] Speaker 1: There was a subscription, you know, you get like how
[20:56] Speaker 1: drug dealers use pages, you know in those shows and movies.
[20:59] Speaker 1: You get a page and you go to a local payphone,
[21:01] Speaker 1: use a phone, and you call whoever you need to call,
[21:03] Speaker 1: so that, you know, it's difficult to track. Israel can't
[21:06] Speaker 1: track like millions of payphones and stuff like that. That's
[21:09] Speaker 1: that's how Thehbula, I'm presuming or carrying out their operations complacence, hubris.
[21:15] Speaker 1: But I think what they didn't account for is that
[21:20] Speaker 1: when you stop using a mobile phone, it's not like
[21:23] Speaker 1: Israel's thinking, oh, they've stopped using mobile phones. Now that's it.
[21:27] Speaker 1: You know, you know now that door is closed, and
[21:30] Speaker 1: you know it's no point, there is absolutely no point
[21:32] Speaker 1: trying to track their communications anymore. That that would have
[21:36] Speaker 1: been the most Really, I'm not saying that's what the
[21:39] Speaker 1: Bulla thought, but I'm saying at some level, the complacence
[21:42] Speaker 1: and the laziness keeping your guard down on that aspect
[21:45] Speaker 1: of it must have been one of the layers of failure.
[21:48] Speaker 1: But your question they've is crucial because for that pager,
[21:54] Speaker 1: let's let's just take one. Let's pick up one pager
[21:57] Speaker 1: as an example, one pager that Israel has manufactor you know,
[22:01] Speaker 1: whether it is Hungary or wherever. Let me as a
[22:05] Speaker 1: you know, as a lay person, when it comes to
[22:08] Speaker 1: supply chain and pages, I know nothing about pages and
[22:11] Speaker 1: how countries by them. But let me just hazard a
[22:13] Speaker 1: guess as to how many levels of failure would have
[22:17] Speaker 1: had to be there, how much of the supply chain
[22:20] Speaker 1: would have needed to be compromised there would have had
[22:22] Speaker 1: to be There would have had to be a deception.
[22:25] Speaker 1: As far as the tendering process is concerned, there would
[22:28] Speaker 1: have been a deception. As far as the you know,
[22:31] Speaker 1: order placing is concerned, there would have been a deception.
[22:35] Speaker 1: As far as export licensing is concerned, there would have
[22:38] Speaker 1: been a deception as far as the paperwork for the
[22:41] Speaker 1: consignment dispatches concerned, from wherever, from Hungary to Israel to wherever.
[22:45] Speaker 1: There would have been some kind of deception. As far
[22:48] Speaker 1: as receiving the freight is concerned, or the transport through
[22:51] Speaker 1: which these pages would have gone, there would have been
[22:55] Speaker 1: a deception in terms of the distribution of those pages
[22:58] Speaker 1: once they reached Lebanon, there would have been a deception
[23:00] Speaker 1: in terms of what this front company was, whether it
[23:04] Speaker 1: was licensed to actually conduct these transactions. That would have
[23:07] Speaker 1: been one of the key deceptions. Of course, there would
[23:09] Speaker 1: have been a deception in terms of the retail or
[23:12] Speaker 1: distribution of these pages and to whom. Who was it
[23:15] Speaker 1: who ensured that at least some of these pages went
[23:18] Speaker 1: to the people they were intended to go to. There
[23:20] Speaker 1: would have been a deception, you know, in terms of
[23:25] Speaker 1: actual subscription plans to use those pages. Who was providing
[23:29] Speaker 1: that service? You know, how are these pages compatible with
[23:33] Speaker 1: that service? There would have been a deception on the
[23:36] Speaker 1: inside to share whatever details Lebanon uses for its paging technology,
[23:41] Speaker 1: so that Israel, your biggest enemy country, is able to
[23:44] Speaker 1: manufacture compatible pages for that time. There would have been
[23:47] Speaker 1: a deception in terms of any kind of fail safe
[23:50] Speaker 1: If someone checks with Taiwan key a front company upcab
[23:53] Speaker 1: On there, there would have been a deception there because
[23:56] Speaker 1: what the hell I mean now we're finding out as
[23:58] Speaker 1: a front company. There would have been a decept in
[24:00] Speaker 1: terms of uh, you know, uh payments, all transactions as
[24:04] Speaker 1: far as the page, as are concerned, money would have
[24:06] Speaker 1: changed hands. And I I don't think I've even scratched
[24:09] Speaker 1: the surface in terms of the number of number of
[24:12] Speaker 1: places which which would have been compromised.
[24:15] Speaker 3: It would have.
[24:15] Speaker 1: It must have been a perfect storm of compromise and
[24:18] Speaker 1: deception for something like this to work, because even if
[24:21] Speaker 1: even one of these layers, or the many layers which
[24:24] Speaker 1: I haven't mentioned, if one person in any of these
[24:27] Speaker 1: layers had a bit of a doubt, this whole thing
[24:30] Speaker 1: would have collapsed like a house of cards. If there
[24:32] Speaker 1: was even one tiny bit of doubt, they would have,
[24:35] Speaker 1: you know, figured it out, if they could maybe opened them.
[24:40] Speaker 1: I mean, it's it's difficult to figure out something like
[24:42] Speaker 1: something of this depth very very quickly. But I'm saying
[24:45] Speaker 1: that it would have taken a single layer of failure
[24:50] Speaker 1: for this whole thing to to to slip out of
[24:53] Speaker 1: Israel's hands. And remember that it required a perfect fail
[24:59] Speaker 1: safe comp promise of the entire supply chain, not in
[25:02] Speaker 1: one go on one day for one minute, but over
[25:05] Speaker 1: many months, months exciting, many many months, which means agency
[25:09] Speaker 1: after agency, his Bula leader after his BULLA leader, government
[25:13] Speaker 1: official after government of visual trader after trader, shopkeeper after shopkeeper,
[25:18] Speaker 1: service provider after service provider, customs guy after customs guy,
[25:22] Speaker 1: border security guy after border security guy, all the entire
[25:26] Speaker 1: chain had to have failed for something like this happened
[25:29] Speaker 1: for a tiny little pager to be where it's not
[25:31] Speaker 1: supposed to be here. And so I mean, like I said,
[25:34] Speaker 1: this is like the this is like the Mona Lisa
[25:36] Speaker 1: of deceptions. It's it doesn't get bigger than this.
[25:41] Speaker 2: You know, every deception that you spoke about right now
[25:44] Speaker 2: that almost read like a chapter of a screenplay that
[25:47] Speaker 2: would be this perfect movie that would recount.
[25:50] Speaker 3: This entire operation.
[25:51] Speaker 2: And I'm pretty sure a decade or two from now,
[25:53] Speaker 2: like you have had movies on the on the famous
[25:57] Speaker 2: operation that was lost by Mozart after the attack on
[25:59] Speaker 2: the Olympics, for the name of the operation that most
[26:01] Speaker 2: had had named it, but anyway they launched it, so
[26:04] Speaker 2: you have movie on that. Similarly, I think there'll probably
[26:06] Speaker 2: be a movie on this. But something interesting that you
[26:09] Speaker 2: mentioned over there, that this was so secretive, this had
[26:13] Speaker 2: to be so secretive over so many months, and that
[26:16] Speaker 2: one mistake at one level, even for a day, could
[26:19] Speaker 2: have spoiled you know, months, months of effort which is
[26:21] Speaker 2: why I was a bit surprised at how quickly we
[26:25] Speaker 2: in the media have been able to understand what happened.
[26:29] Speaker 3: Mota Mota.
[26:30] Speaker 2: It happened on a Wednesday, and we had just two
[26:32] Speaker 2: days after that, and you have seventy person of the
[26:35] Speaker 2: operation figured out in terms of key what Moti moota happened,
[26:39] Speaker 2: not the actual who was involved, where the manufacturing happened, exactly,
[26:42] Speaker 2: what exact number explosive was used, the number of grams
[26:45] Speaker 2: used in it, the way that happened, stuff like that.
[26:48] Speaker 3: But you have this operation moral less figured ou.
[26:50] Speaker 2: Which is which is quite shocking because I thought on
[26:53] Speaker 2: that that day that you know, if it's real is involved,
[26:54] Speaker 2: we're going to it's going to take years for someone
[26:57] Speaker 2: to dig out, you know, some investigative journalists to you know,
[27:00] Speaker 2: talk to hundreds of people and figure out this entire operation.
[27:03] Speaker 2: But within a matter of days you had sources from
[27:05] Speaker 2: both the sides, has Bulla as well as uh from
[27:08] Speaker 2: the from the west, not so much from the from Israel,
[27:10] Speaker 2: but you know, kind of coming from the West telling
[27:13] Speaker 2: you how this operation was was structured and framed. How
[27:16] Speaker 2: do you see that do you see that as part
[27:18] Speaker 2: of the modern day psychological warfare or do you see
[27:21] Speaker 2: that just you know, much much better better reporting.
[27:24] Speaker 1: Oh, there's a there's a great deal of psychological warfare
[27:26] Speaker 1: at play. And and remember that, even though Israel has
[27:28] Speaker 1: not come on record about you know this, except for
[27:32] Speaker 1: saying that they had nothing to do with it, Uh,
[27:35] Speaker 1: there are a huge amount of off record briefings taking place,
[27:39] Speaker 1: you know, officials briefing the press you know, and telling them,
[27:43] Speaker 1: you know, painting a narrative over something like this, because remember, uh,
[27:48] Speaker 1: this is a situation like so many others that we've
[27:50] Speaker 1: seen recently, where where Israel or any other country in question, uh,
[27:55] Speaker 1: doesn't want to admit to having done something, but obviously
[27:59] Speaker 1: is enjoying the it because they know that that's exactly
[28:01] Speaker 1: what sends a message, the assassination of a smile honey.
[28:05] Speaker 1: Even now Israel has not taken formal credit for it,
[28:08] Speaker 1: but we all know who did it, right, which country
[28:11] Speaker 1: did it? So, so psychological warfare is most definitely one
[28:15] Speaker 1: one part of it. Of course, there is better reporting.
[28:18] Speaker 1: That are better resources to report. There is there is
[28:20] Speaker 1: the ability to uh uh to to look at circumstantial evidence.
[28:24] Speaker 1: There are more subject matter experts in journalism today, you know,
[28:28] Speaker 1: all across the world who can look at you know, photographs, video, transcripts,
[28:32] Speaker 1: you know, audio even and all kinds of things and
[28:36] Speaker 1: piece together angles to stories which may otherwise be missed. Uh.
[28:42] Speaker 1: And the Israel the West Asia conflict particularly has always
[28:46] Speaker 1: had a great deal of uh, you know, of a
[28:50] Speaker 1: journalistic spotlight from all over the world, so there is
[28:52] Speaker 1: never a shortage of expert journalistic attention to what's happening there.
[28:57] Speaker 1: So you usually have really good uh people looking at
[29:00] Speaker 1: the stories. Apart from the you know, apart from the
[29:02] Speaker 1: two sides warring over the propaganda issues, the there are
[29:07] Speaker 1: really credible you know ascent and subject matter experts for
[29:11] Speaker 1: looking at these things and speaking credibly about them. You're right,
[29:16] Speaker 1: it took hours for people to paint pretty much a
[29:20] Speaker 1: pretty credible picture of what may have actually happened. But
[29:26] Speaker 1: the reason for that, also, Dave, is because because at
[29:29] Speaker 1: the heart of it, what happened, it's a bit of
[29:32] Speaker 1: a paradox. What happened was terribly complex to plan, but
[29:37] Speaker 1: what actually happened was really simple, true, what I mean,
[29:41] Speaker 1: what happened was was laughingly simple. A bunch of guys
[29:46] Speaker 1: with pages and those pages just blew up in their
[29:50] Speaker 1: pockets or in their hands or whatever it is. It's
[29:53] Speaker 1: almost comical. You know, I don't want to make light
[29:56] Speaker 1: of something that's this serious, but it's almost comical what happened.
[30:00] Speaker 1: So let's never forget that the gargantuan levels of planning
[30:07] Speaker 1: and meticulousness that would have gone in from Israel's side
[30:10] Speaker 1: to be able to achieve something like this in the
[30:12] Speaker 1: coordinated way that it happened and the targeted way that
[30:14] Speaker 1: it happened. The cause the planning was complex, but the
[30:18] Speaker 1: effect was crazy simple. It was like a comic book.
[30:22] Speaker 1: So Israel understands that, they understand. They also understand the
[30:27] Speaker 1: power of that simplicity. It took a matter of minutes
[30:31] Speaker 1: for newsrooms to understand exactly what happened. Pager pager would
[30:34] Speaker 1: get people, hundreds of people carrying pages and the pages
[30:38] Speaker 1: blew up. How did that happen?
[30:40] Speaker 4: Oh?
[30:40] Speaker 1: Message, you must have sent a message, you know, one
[30:43] Speaker 1: particular message came and there was a bit of a
[30:45] Speaker 1: twenty grams of explosives in each page and it blew up.
[30:48] Speaker 1: And the thing is another reflection of what a simple
[30:52] Speaker 1: issue it is. Is that the fact that one hour
[30:55] Speaker 1: after the story broke, there were memes. There were memes,
[30:59] Speaker 1: Internet memes about what happened, and cartoons and things like that.
[31:03] Speaker 1: I mean, that's a matter of taste. I mean, let's
[31:05] Speaker 1: let's be clear, because this is a serious, serious, violent business,
[31:09] Speaker 1: no laughing matter at all. But I'm just saying that
[31:11] Speaker 1: this was this was simple to digest. It was shocking
[31:15] Speaker 1: because of the audacity of it. Of man, how did
[31:18] Speaker 1: they do that? But there was no question of what happened.
[31:23] Speaker 1: Nobody was asking Eric, Yeah, what gay. Everyone understood what
[31:26] Speaker 1: happened because there's almost an elegance, elegance to you know,
[31:33] Speaker 1: meticulous plans of violence. You talked about nineteen seventy two
[31:37] Speaker 1: Operation Bayonet, Wrath of God, you know, the revenge operation
[31:41] Speaker 1: mounted by the Mozard for the for the Black September
[31:45] Speaker 1: killings in seventy two where Israeli Olympians were, you know,
[31:50] Speaker 1: massacred by Black September, which was the Palestinian organization that time.
[31:55] Speaker 1: The Mozard mounted what was what turned out to a
[32:00] Speaker 1: two decad revenge operation. Two decades. It's it's one of
[32:06] Speaker 1: a handful of operations that actually gave Mosad it's fearsome
[32:09] Speaker 1: reputation of you know, once it decides on revenge, it
[32:13] Speaker 1: doesn't let go no rest until revenge has been you
[32:17] Speaker 1: know taken. And the Munich, the Munich massacre and the
[32:22] Speaker 1: revenge operations that followed Operation Wrap of God took two decades,
[32:26] Speaker 1: and I think, you know, see, the thing about Mosad
[32:29] Speaker 1: is also most people remember that Mosad managed to wipe
[32:33] Speaker 1: out most of the people who were responsible for the killings.
[32:36] Speaker 1: They killed one with a phone bomb, they killed another
[32:39] Speaker 1: with somebody something else. One guy was killed in a
[32:42] Speaker 1: phone booth, one guy was killed in a restaurant, one
[32:45] Speaker 1: guy was killed in his bed, one guy was honey trapped,
[32:48] Speaker 1: one guy was killed somewhere in Europe somewhere else. But
[32:51] Speaker 1: the kingpin of that operation, they didn't. They still Abudau,
[32:54] Speaker 1: if I remember correctly, was his name. They didn't manage
[32:57] Speaker 1: to kill him. He still escaped the Mozart and he
[33:00] Speaker 1: died of a kidney failure in twenty ten. He escaped
[33:03] Speaker 1: the world's most fearsome intelligence covert operations assassination of organization,
[33:10] Speaker 1: and died peacefully of renal failure in his eighties. Most people,
[33:14] Speaker 1: that's the ironic part of you know, Mozart history as well.
[33:19] Speaker 1: But yeah, so I think the fact that the last
[33:24] Speaker 1: few days in some ways sees some of that damage
[33:29] Speaker 1: that was done to Mosad's reputation come back is also
[33:33] Speaker 1: something we should talk about because remember in this realm
[33:39] Speaker 1: where not just violence but the threat of violence or deterance,
[33:44] Speaker 1: which we talk so much about, and what Israel can do.
[33:47] Speaker 1: You know, don't you dare do anything to Israel, because
[33:50] Speaker 1: this is what can happen to you. It's all about reputation,
[33:52] Speaker 1: it's all about smoke and mirrors, and in many ways,
[33:56] Speaker 1: that's what Mozard is about. It's about what they will
[33:58] Speaker 1: do to you if you mess with them. And that
[34:00] Speaker 1: was severely damaged last year in October when the Hamas hit,
[34:03] Speaker 1: because it showed it. It revealed Mozart to be like
[34:10] Speaker 1: any other organization that can be caught sleeping, that can
[34:13] Speaker 1: be compromised, that can be caught with its pants down.
[34:17] Speaker 1: And this is the beginning of building that back. And
[34:19] Speaker 1: also remember the very important thing is that with these
[34:25] Speaker 1: pages and mobile phones and whatever it is, these devices exploding,
[34:29] Speaker 1: it's a it's a new era of warfare for us,
[34:32] Speaker 1: but it's also a turning point in the battle. What
[34:35] Speaker 1: the hell is his bulla going to do now? Any army,
[34:38] Speaker 1: quasi army organization, whatever it is, even a terrorist organization,
[34:42] Speaker 1: needs to be able to communicate. How do you communicate
[34:44] Speaker 1: reliably if all your if you can't trust any of
[34:48] Speaker 1: your devices, are you going to make a mountain of
[34:50] Speaker 1: all your mobile phones and devices of all kinds and
[34:53] Speaker 1: burn them? How do you check? How do you even
[34:55] Speaker 1: begin to check? And what do you do in the
[34:57] Speaker 1: meantime while you check everything? How do you know what's
[35:00] Speaker 1: compromised and not compromised? It's it's, it's it's a it's
[35:05] Speaker 1: it's absolutely hell right now as far as.
[35:07] Speaker 3: The hy bulus concerned.
[35:08] Speaker 2: And we'll just come right to that, Uh, the objectives
[35:13] Speaker 2: of what Digital may have wanted to achieve with this
[35:16] Speaker 2: operation and what that's what's.
[35:18] Speaker 3: Going to do to the situation in the Middle East?
[35:19] Speaker 3: Per after a quick.
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[36:05] Speaker 1: Tune in now, Welcome back.
[36:12] Speaker 2: Shave and I are discussing the last couple of days
[36:15] Speaker 2: in the Middle East, not that we've been there, but
[36:17] Speaker 2: what has been happening in Middle East. UH pages blew
[36:20] Speaker 2: up and the day later walkie talkies.
[36:22] Speaker 3: Blew up in Lebanon.
[36:23] Speaker 2: UH the these devices were being used by the Hesbula
[36:26] Speaker 2: members of the Hezbollah. Shi made a very interesting point
[36:29] Speaker 2: that these were mostly middle level, middle level.
[36:33] Speaker 3: Operators of the of the of the of the group.
[36:36] Speaker 2: We've spent the first half talking about how the operation
[36:38] Speaker 2: may have been planned wide media reports, but there's more
[36:42] Speaker 2: or less a clarity and most reports sort of agree
[36:45] Speaker 2: on the sort of the the larger picture of what
[36:48] Speaker 2: may have happened, if they kind of disagree on the
[36:50] Speaker 2: operational aspect of what what may have had had to.
[36:53] Speaker 3: Take place to for this for this to be achieved.
[36:55] Speaker 2: We've talked about the sheer complexity of launching this sort
[36:58] Speaker 2: of a trojan horse operation in the modern world. Uh.
[37:01] Speaker 2: And touched briefly also on the many failures on the
[37:04] Speaker 2: side of Hebula that would have had to happen for
[37:06] Speaker 2: something like this to succeed.
[37:07] Speaker 3: Not just Hasbula Bay, they've also Lebanon and Iran.
[37:09] Speaker 2: The backer of Hezbula, which has been given in monetary
[37:12] Speaker 2: and intelligence.
[37:13] Speaker 3: Support, et cetera. Let's not focus.
[37:16] Speaker 2: Briefly on what's this going to do to the ongoing
[37:19] Speaker 2: conflict in the Middle East? The conflict like we know
[37:21] Speaker 2: began as in, not the present conflict, because the Middle
[37:24] Speaker 2: East has seen various, various conflicts, and not in so
[37:26] Speaker 2: many conflicts that we can't even cover them over I
[37:28] Speaker 2: think several episodes, but the present conflict, which will be
[37:32] Speaker 2: you know, reaching a year a couple of weeks from
[37:34] Speaker 2: now October seven, when Hammas launched an attack on Israel,
[37:38] Speaker 2: killed more than thousand civilians or citizens, and then Israel
[37:41] Speaker 2: has launched a war on too Hamas, and you've had
[37:44] Speaker 2: all these regional powers being pulled in Israel.
[37:47] Speaker 3: Sorry, Iran, et cetera.
[37:49] Speaker 4: Uh.
[37:50] Speaker 3: Now it's Hezbula.
[37:52] Speaker 2: Before the break, you mentioned how this is going to
[37:54] Speaker 2: be sort of this new phase in this war. And
[37:57] Speaker 2: that's actually the exact phrase level that was used by
[38:00] Speaker 2: Israel's defense minister yesterday when it is so far as
[38:03] Speaker 2: not comment on this operation at all, but he said
[38:05] Speaker 2: that there is a new phase in the war, and
[38:07] Speaker 2: then he spoke about how I don't know if he
[38:09] Speaker 2: spoke about it, but there have been reports of Israel
[38:11] Speaker 2: moving a large contingent of his forces north towards Lebanon.
[38:15] Speaker 3: Towards Lebanon.
[38:16] Speaker 2: We don't know yet if it will invade, We don't
[38:18] Speaker 2: know what will happen. We don't know how has Bula
[38:20] Speaker 2: will will kind of react to it, et cetera. But
[38:22] Speaker 2: we'll kind of see what this attack does to the
[38:25] Speaker 2: larger picture. So one shive, what do you think was
[38:29] Speaker 2: is its objective? You've you know, I think in the
[38:31] Speaker 2: first half kind of touched upon the various aspects. One
[38:33] Speaker 2: that this was about sending a message to that, this
[38:35] Speaker 2: was about Mozart trying to regain it's it's its image,
[38:38] Speaker 2: it's Legacich was severely.
[38:41] Speaker 3: Tarnished after the October seven attack.
[38:43] Speaker 2: And the third thing you mentioned, I also want quite
[38:45] Speaker 2: interesting is that even though you know, journalists may not
[38:49] Speaker 2: choose to report on it because it's kind of you know,
[38:51] Speaker 2: not it's not kosher, it's not nice, but it did
[38:55] Speaker 2: cause a lot of ridicule on social media. It led
[38:57] Speaker 2: to means, like you said in the news room itself,
[39:00] Speaker 2: you are quite divided. You know, this is not really
[39:02] Speaker 2: in good taste. But you know, at the same time,
[39:04] Speaker 2: people were having fun. And when you were saying that,
[39:07] Speaker 2: I thought perhaps this was also an objective for Israel
[39:09] Speaker 2: that you know, reduce Hasbula to this, you know, sort
[39:13] Speaker 2: of ridicule, ridicul Hesbula basically at the global level. Uh,
[39:18] Speaker 2: those perhaps could have been some objectives and the larger
[39:21] Speaker 2: military strategic objective because at the end of the day,
[39:23] Speaker 2: if you look at the operation in the number of
[39:25] Speaker 2: deaths of Hesba of operators, we don't know the exact number,
[39:30] Speaker 2: but a couple of dozen, not something that you'd expect
[39:32] Speaker 2: in a large military operation. The injuries, I'm guessing must
[39:35] Speaker 2: will not be that major because these are very low
[39:38] Speaker 2: level explosives. Right, What do you think was the larger
[39:41] Speaker 2: objective when it plan an operation like this?
[39:44] Speaker 1: So, you know, it's interesting that you mentioned ridicule because
[39:49] Speaker 1: in the in the world of psychological operation, psychological warfare.
[39:54] Speaker 1: And believe me, I not only studied this, but I
[39:57] Speaker 1: was there last year after the after the attack by
[39:59] Speaker 1: the Hamas. Psychological mind games and operations are not a
[40:04] Speaker 1: side show in this battle. They are very very important
[40:08] Speaker 1: to how Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, you know, conduct themselves. They
[40:12] Speaker 1: know what the worth of a message is, they know what,
[40:16] Speaker 1: you know, how powerful mind games can be. You know,
[40:19] Speaker 1: Israel has been frequently accused of, you know, creating facts
[40:24] Speaker 1: to justify you know, violent offenses, et cetera. So this
[40:29] Speaker 1: has happened. You know, Palestine has been accused of using
[40:31] Speaker 1: human shields. So the claims counterclaims war continues endlessly between
[40:36] Speaker 1: Israel and its adversaries. In the case of his Bulah,
[40:40] Speaker 1: like I said, the conflict between Israel and the his
[40:43] Speaker 1: Bullah has is not new. It's been going on for
[40:46] Speaker 1: a very long time. It's shape shifted in many ways.
[40:49] Speaker 1: But the fact of the matter is apart from the ridicule,
[40:53] Speaker 1: and I think ridicule would very much have been part
[40:56] Speaker 1: of it. The memes, the laughter and the cartoons and
[40:59] Speaker 1: the common and everything about you know, His Bulla fighters
[41:02] Speaker 1: getting getting their essentials blown off, et cetera. It boils
[41:07] Speaker 1: down to a matter of taste. But this is a
[41:08] Speaker 1: this is a terrible and polarizing subject. So you know,
[41:12] Speaker 1: people have the freedom to find such things funny because
[41:16] Speaker 1: we live in a world where you know, there are
[41:19] Speaker 1: issues of are they terrorists or are they freedom fighters?
[41:22] Speaker 1: Or are they militants? And you know you have people
[41:24] Speaker 1: who have all of those thoughts. So people should be
[41:26] Speaker 1: allowed to find what they want funny. And I think
[41:29] Speaker 1: Israel would enjoy it very much that people are finding
[41:31] Speaker 1: it funny that his Bulla has like been caught in
[41:35] Speaker 1: this ridiculous manner, in this manner with these pages. But
[41:39] Speaker 1: apart from that, let's be very clear about one thing.
[41:42] Speaker 1: This wasn't a psychological operation. There was something distinctly operational about,
[41:50] Speaker 1: you know, targeting the middle rungs of the his Bula.
[41:54] Speaker 1: When you're talking about the middle rungs theyve you're talking
[41:56] Speaker 1: about the you're talking about the kernels and brigadiers. You know,
[42:02] Speaker 1: let's not compare, uh, the his Bullah with the real army.
[42:07] Speaker 1: But since we since we're since we're presenting them as
[42:10] Speaker 1: a quasi army, they've got a rank structure, they've got uniforms,
[42:14] Speaker 1: they've got uh, you know, they've they've got a lot
[42:17] Speaker 1: of military regalia and military rituals and things like that,
[42:20] Speaker 1: and they've got commanders and everything. So so by targeting
[42:24] Speaker 1: your your mid rung, which are your colonels and brigadiers,
[42:28] Speaker 1: you're basically targeting the layer of the organization that basically
[42:34] Speaker 1: does most of the heavy work, that does most of
[42:37] Speaker 1: the situational planning, most of the execution. We're not talking
[42:41] Speaker 1: about the creamy layer, which is the which is the leadership,
[42:45] Speaker 1: you know, of the of the His Bulla, some many
[42:48] Speaker 1: of whom are in Lebanon, many who aren't in Lebanon.
[42:52] Speaker 1: You know, the creamy layer. This is not targeting them
[42:54] Speaker 1: because because those people very rarely get into actual tactical planning,
[43:00] Speaker 1: you know, the military aspect of what the His Bulla does.
[43:03] Speaker 1: But by targeting these mid level guys who are supremely
[43:07] Speaker 1: well trained, you know, military style operatives of the His Bulla,
[43:12] Speaker 1: you're you're breaking the organization's teeth. You're going after the
[43:16] Speaker 1: organization's teeth. You're going after them where it actually hurts.
[43:21] Speaker 1: You're not going after their foot soldiers. Your foot soldiers
[43:23] Speaker 1: are cannon fodder. The guys who are out there, not
[43:26] Speaker 1: very well trained there to do most of the dirty work,
[43:30] Speaker 1: easily expendable, easily replaceable, steady stream of you know, discontent
[43:35] Speaker 1: youth who will join an organization like the his Bulla.
[43:39] Speaker 1: Targeting them means nothing because there's a steady flow of
[43:41] Speaker 1: such guys. Targeting the senior leadership also doesn't really make
[43:45] Speaker 1: much sense because it's mostly symbolic. Yes, it does affect
[43:49] Speaker 1: command and control, et cetera. But his Bulla does have
[43:53] Speaker 1: you know, replacements for senior leaders or reasonably senior leaders
[43:57] Speaker 1: as well. But the mid rung, the middle class of
[44:00] Speaker 1: the his Bulah are your guys who are who have
[44:04] Speaker 1: military experience, who've actually been out there fighting, who've seen
[44:08] Speaker 1: the worst of these operations, who have a history within
[44:11] Speaker 1: the organization of fifteen twenty years, who are you know,
[44:15] Speaker 1: maybe in their forties, thirties, forties or later, who are
[44:19] Speaker 1: still physically fit to actually be in operations. Who are
[44:23] Speaker 1: who are heading teams of operatives to actually conduct these
[44:27] Speaker 1: offensive operations on Israel. These are the These are the
[44:32] Speaker 1: these are the actual offensive edge of the of the
[44:36] Speaker 1: of the his Bulah. They're not your pawns, and they're
[44:39] Speaker 1: not your king and queen they are knights, and they
[44:42] Speaker 1: are you know, the other the other chess pieces that
[44:46] Speaker 1: are actually holding for it and being part of actually
[44:49] Speaker 1: what's going out there. So this was not a coincidence.
[44:51] Speaker 1: This was not This was not a shotgun effect by
[44:54] Speaker 1: Israel saying let's just spray thousand pages into levelin and
[45:00] Speaker 1: who knows who's going to use them. But ultimately some
[45:03] Speaker 1: his Bullah guys will die here, you know, dead his
[45:06] Speaker 1: bulla guy is a good is good news for us.
[45:09] Speaker 1: That's not what it was. They've killed at last count,
[45:12] Speaker 1: like you said, twenty twenty five, mostly mid Rung his
[45:15] Speaker 1: Bulla guys. There's a pattern here. It would be too
[45:18] Speaker 1: much for it to be a complete coincidence. So, you know,
[45:22] Speaker 1: while a section of the world laughs at the memes,
[45:25] Speaker 1: in Israel they're giving high fives to each other because
[45:29] Speaker 1: at least one part of this operation has gone exactly
[45:31] Speaker 1: how they wanted it to operationally, because they've been able
[45:35] Speaker 1: to take the sting out of his Buller's tale in
[45:38] Speaker 1: terms of what it can do. Now how his Bulla reacts,
[45:42] Speaker 1: that's a different story. I'm not saying that these people
[45:44] Speaker 1: are not replaceable, of course they are, But I'm just
[45:47] Speaker 1: saying that. It's a huge message. It means that not
[45:50] Speaker 1: only can we hurt you, but we can hurt you
[45:52] Speaker 1: where we want to hurt you.
[45:54] Speaker 3: That's the message.
[45:55] Speaker 2: And this also means that the conflict over there is
[45:58] Speaker 2: not ending any time soon. And uh, with the assassination
[46:03] Speaker 2: of the Hamas chief recently a couple of a few
[46:05] Speaker 2: weeks ago, now this, you've also had some instances in
[46:08] Speaker 2: between where you had rockets being fired and drones kicking
[46:11] Speaker 2: them down and stuff like that. Every moment for you know,
[46:15] Speaker 2: a world watchers, people like you and me, has been oh,
[46:18] Speaker 2: this is it when there's a full fledged war on
[46:20] Speaker 2: the ground. Oh, this is when there's a full fidget
[46:22] Speaker 2: war on the ground. Even this one has been like, oh,
[46:24] Speaker 2: this is it. Now there's a full edged war on
[46:26] Speaker 2: the ground. I think it's pointless to kind of predict
[46:29] Speaker 2: when that will happen because it just depends on reactions
[46:32] Speaker 2: and counter reactions. But what I'm so we won't get
[46:34] Speaker 2: into that that speculation. But what I want to understand
[46:37] Speaker 2: is Israel knows there's going to be a reaction in
[46:40] Speaker 2: some form or the other, maybe not a conventional reaction,
[46:43] Speaker 2: something or the other will happen it's probably prepared for it.
[46:46] Speaker 2: So it basically also means that it's prepared for this
[46:48] Speaker 2: for the long haul. It's prepared for this to you know,
[46:50] Speaker 2: escalate and God of control. Even though it will probably
[46:54] Speaker 2: have the West, you know there there will be like
[46:57] Speaker 2: source based reports like they always are, that the best
[46:59] Speaker 2: is very angry with this l but you know on
[47:00] Speaker 2: the ground will be kind of supporting.
[47:02] Speaker 3: It, et cetera.
[47:03] Speaker 2: Then does this go back to your large your previous
[47:06] Speaker 2: not Alsi's theory, but you've consistently maintained this every time
[47:09] Speaker 2: I've discussed is the Palestine conflict right now that after
[47:13] Speaker 2: October seven, after what happened last year, Israel is prepared
[47:17] Speaker 2: to do everything to kind of resolve this once and
[47:20] Speaker 2: for all. As in at least that's what they think
[47:22] Speaker 2: they're doing. Whether they will practically be able to do
[47:25] Speaker 2: we don't know that, but their thought process right now,
[47:27] Speaker 2: no matter what it takes, whether it's you know, Hamas
[47:30] Speaker 2: to the south or east of us, or whether it's
[47:33] Speaker 2: has Bullator the north of us, We're going to just
[47:36] Speaker 2: like take this opportunity when we have the backing of
[47:38] Speaker 2: the West because of what happened on October seven, stuff
[47:41] Speaker 2: like that, and we're just going to do whatever is
[47:43] Speaker 2: in our power to once and for all solve this issue.
[47:46] Speaker 3: And do you think this is where it's coming from.
[47:47] Speaker 1: Look, you know, it's been a year. It's hard to
[47:51] Speaker 1: imagine that it's already been a year since what happened
[47:54] Speaker 1: in October seventh last year. And no matter what experts
[47:59] Speaker 1: say about this so called illusive endgame for Israel is concerned,
[48:05] Speaker 1: I don't see this ending in any other way other
[48:08] Speaker 1: than some kind of a ceasefire, a broker ceasefire of
[48:12] Speaker 1: some kind, because look at the reality on the ground, Dave,
[48:16] Speaker 1: the Hamas in Gaza is decimated. Gaza is basically the
[48:21] Speaker 1: world's biggest humanitarian catastrophe right now. Thousands upon thousands of
[48:26] Speaker 1: people and civilians have been killed. You know, thousands of
[48:30] Speaker 1: children and babies have been killed there. It's an unmitigated
[48:33] Speaker 1: human catastrophe and there is no other way to put it.
[48:36] Speaker 1: And it's not something that Israel is unused to. Israel,
[48:42] Speaker 1: you know, has been in this situation before. But at
[48:44] Speaker 1: some point of time, it's going to have to step
[48:47] Speaker 1: back on what's happened in Gaza. One of the signs
[48:51] Speaker 1: of that is you're looking at the government now saying
[48:54] Speaker 1: we've turned our gaze up north. Now, Now that gives
[48:57] Speaker 1: you a sense that perhaps there could be some kind
[48:59] Speaker 1: of a ground operation on foot as far as Lebanon
[49:02] Speaker 1: is concerned. Could be very much part of something that
[49:05] Speaker 1: Israel it's it's it's it's part of the Israeli playbook.
[49:09] Speaker 1: You know, Invading southern Lebanon is something that Israel has
[49:11] Speaker 1: done twice before, uh, you know, during very similar conflicts.
[49:16] Speaker 1: So there's no reason to believe Again, if if if
[49:19] Speaker 1: a limited ground operation of some kind happens in southern
[49:23] Speaker 1: Lebanon with Israeli forces crossing and taking territory, I wouldn't
[49:27] Speaker 1: be surprised even slightly because that would be another message
[49:30] Speaker 1: to the Hbolah and Iran. But I think in terms
[49:34] Speaker 1: of in terms of actionable, you know, very specific, identifiable, uh,
[49:41] Speaker 1: you know, a kind of checklist of things to achieve
[49:43] Speaker 1: before Israel says huh, okay, now we've completed our operation
[49:47] Speaker 1: and now we're willing to stop the operations. I don't
[49:50] Speaker 1: think even Israel knows what that is right now, because
[49:53] Speaker 1: even for Israel, that checklist looks like this, the complete
[49:57] Speaker 1: decimation of hamas, the complete de summation of who is,
[50:01] Speaker 1: the complete decimation of his bulla rescue of all our hostages,
[50:06] Speaker 1: and none of these four things that I've mentioned is
[50:09] Speaker 1: ever going to be a reality as far as Iran
[50:11] Speaker 1: continues to exist. Okay, So so it is in even
[50:16] Speaker 1: is the thing is from the outside, it's it's it's
[50:19] Speaker 1: sometimes tempting to think of Israel as this kind of
[50:23] Speaker 1: a country with a with a limitless appetite to get
[50:26] Speaker 1: even and a you know, and an insatiable thirst to
[50:31] Speaker 1: keep this conflict running. But no, Israel, Israel does most
[50:35] Speaker 1: definitely doesn't want to do that, you know. On the
[50:37] Speaker 1: surface of it, of course, the message is no, you know,
[50:39] Speaker 1: we won't stop until these things are achieved. But believe me,
[50:43] Speaker 1: countries will be looking for that exit ramp, whether it
[50:48] Speaker 1: is in the form of a ceasefire, whether it is
[50:50] Speaker 1: in the form of a you know, a broker peace deal,
[50:53] Speaker 1: whether it is in the form of a US president
[50:56] Speaker 1: flying down and holding a camp, you know, and maybe
[50:59] Speaker 1: winning a Nobel peace price on the side, you know.
[51:01] Speaker 1: Nadje nudge, wink wink. I'm just saying, I'm just saying,
[51:05] Speaker 1: all of those things are our options. And possibilities that
[51:09] Speaker 1: even a country like Israel looks for. None of these
[51:12] Speaker 1: countries are saying nine A, bring it on, We'll keep
[51:16] Speaker 1: this on forever. They can't do it. It's not possible.
[51:19] Speaker 1: That's why no Israeli operation has lasted, you know, for
[51:21] Speaker 1: years and years and years and years. It's never like that.
[51:25] Speaker 1: So this time the escalation has been a big one.
[51:29] Speaker 1: For the first time, the possibility of it actually exploding
[51:32] Speaker 1: into a regional conflict has been large because of the
[51:37] Speaker 1: very overt Iranian factor in this case. Not like Iran
[51:40] Speaker 1: has not been involved before. I'm just saying it's very
[51:42] Speaker 1: overt this time. They have been attacks from Iranian territory.
[51:45] Speaker 1: There have been air strikes in Iran killing the Hamas chief.
[51:48] Speaker 1: So the level of escalation is, you know, on the
[51:52] Speaker 1: brink of a wider conflict. But that hasn't happened yet.
[51:56] Speaker 1: And I think that's the biggest message they've that now
[51:59] Speaker 1: it needs to end in some way or the other.
[52:01] Speaker 1: It's just a question of identifying what the terms of
[52:04] Speaker 1: that ends are really going to be.
[52:06] Speaker 2: Yes, And I guess a lot also depends on what
[52:08] Speaker 2: happens on November five in the US, when you where
[52:11] Speaker 2: you have Donald Trump and Kamala Harris facing off, and
[52:14] Speaker 2: depending on who comes to power at the White House,
[52:17] Speaker 2: that also.
[52:18] Speaker 3: Maybe uh change a lot of things.
[52:22] Speaker 2: Right, So final thought on this, and we'll come back
[52:25] Speaker 2: home now because I have complained during the break, by
[52:27] Speaker 2: the way.
[52:27] Speaker 3: To our listeners and viewers.
[52:28] Speaker 2: But then if you're also you know, annoyed with a
[52:30] Speaker 2: producer and complaining that we keep you know, going into
[52:33] Speaker 2: her territory because she also hosts a podcast on our
[52:36] Speaker 2: network called Gita's World where they explodes your politics too.
[52:40] Speaker 2: Let us know in the comments so that we have
[52:41] Speaker 2: some you know, like you know, sort of firepower to
[52:44] Speaker 2: go against her.
[52:45] Speaker 1: Let's make our listeners compare now. Yeah, I'm sure they'll
[52:48] Speaker 1: be doing an episode on Israel and Lebanon and.
[52:51] Speaker 2: I might have done it because we have one day
[52:53] Speaker 2: late in recordings.
[52:53] Speaker 3: I don't know i'd done that or not. Yeah, we'll
[52:55] Speaker 3: just check with her.
[52:56] Speaker 2: Yeah, anyway, coming to my question, yeah, coming back home,
[53:02] Speaker 2: lessons from this for India And when I asked this,
[53:05] Speaker 2: I first want to actually ask is the is this
[53:08] Speaker 2: this conflict sort of a conflict that you know India
[53:11] Speaker 2: would even be taking lessons from? And I'll tell you
[53:13] Speaker 2: why I'm asking this because for most people actually in India,
[53:17] Speaker 2: we are quite far removed from this conflict, and we
[53:19] Speaker 2: are also we don't picture ourselves ever being in such
[53:22] Speaker 2: a conflict because the Israel conflict at the Middle East
[53:25] Speaker 2: conflict historically.
[53:26] Speaker 3: Has been a very unconventional one.
[53:27] Speaker 2: It's not the wars that we fought, those are conventional
[53:30] Speaker 2: wars across this, you know, one clear demarketed line of
[53:33] Speaker 2: boundary between two proper proper nations, whether it's India Pakistan
[53:38] Speaker 2: or India China. The standard that we're involved in right
[53:40] Speaker 2: now is also against a conventional you know, a neighbor,
[53:44] Speaker 2: a proper army with you know, with hopefully some sort
[53:46] Speaker 2: of sense of professional matter of stuff like that. Whereas
[53:49] Speaker 2: for most people, what's happening in the Middle East is
[53:51] Speaker 2: one quite quite quite confusing.
[53:53] Speaker 3: The lines are very blurred.
[53:54] Speaker 2: You have this, you know, all these influences from the
[53:56] Speaker 2: West and the regional powers, the regional factors, et cetera, cetera.
[54:00] Speaker 2: So for many people would think something like this, for like,
[54:03] Speaker 2: for example, let's put it like this, for example, communication
[54:07] Speaker 2: devices of you know, uh Indian officers in an army,
[54:11] Speaker 2: officers being rigged with explosive. I'm not saying being tempered
[54:13] Speaker 2: a bit too spy on them. Explosive is not something
[54:16] Speaker 2: that could would happen in a stand up with China,
[54:18] Speaker 2: for example. So one, are there lessons even to be
[54:23] Speaker 2: learned for India from something that happened that like like
[54:26] Speaker 2: what happened this week with the pages glowing up? And second,
[54:30] Speaker 2: if there are, then what would they be for.
[54:32] Speaker 1: They've I cannot overstate what enormous lessons there are for India,
[54:38] Speaker 1: the Indian military, Indian security agencies in this small operation
[54:43] Speaker 1: that's happened in Leven. If there ever was, if there
[54:47] Speaker 1: ever was a case for sensitive communication equipment, sensitive you know,
[54:55] Speaker 1: electronic equipment being sourced only from within your country. This
[55:02] Speaker 1: is it, Okay, you know, I don't want to sound
[55:06] Speaker 1: like a you know, a sort of unhinged China basher,
[55:11] Speaker 1: but our country is a wash with Chinese phones. I'm
[55:14] Speaker 1: not saying I'm please, I'm not being alarmist and unreasonable.
[55:18] Speaker 1: I'm not saying that Chinese phones are there's an explosive risk.
[55:22] Speaker 1: I am just saying that it is not far fetched
[55:24] Speaker 1: at all for a country that you are at war with,
[55:27] Speaker 1: for hell's sake, literally at war.
[55:29] Speaker 3: With in Ladakh.
[55:30] Speaker 1: You know, you know, for something like this to happen,
[55:33] Speaker 1: is it so unconceivable? Inconceivable? Is it so inconceivable that,
[55:38] Speaker 1: you know, China, which controls a staggering portion of your
[55:44] Speaker 1: mobile phone market, Is it so far fetched to think
[55:47] Speaker 1: that that's a supply chain in some way or the
[55:50] Speaker 1: other cannot be compromised. Do we know how many Chinese
[55:54] Speaker 1: phones are there in the Indian military? Do we know
[55:56] Speaker 1: how many Chinese drones are used, even though there's a
[55:58] Speaker 1: ban within the forge? Do we know how many Chinese
[56:02] Speaker 1: devices of any kind are being used within the Indian
[56:05] Speaker 1: security agencies, including US by agencies we don't know for
[56:08] Speaker 1: sure Israel. Israel would have conducted, you know, many months,
[56:14] Speaker 1: perhaps years, of surveillance on the Lebanese to find out
[56:17] Speaker 1: where those gaps are. Are we sitting here and saying
[56:20] Speaker 1: that the Chinese aren't studying where our gaps are. They
[56:23] Speaker 1: are spending months, years, decades hunting for our vulnerabilities. This
[56:29] Speaker 1: is the reality. We are a country at war with
[56:34] Speaker 1: another country and phones from that country flood our nation.
[56:38] Speaker 1: You're talking about communication. Please, let's be very very realistic
[56:42] Speaker 1: with ourselves. It's not like It's not like, at the
[56:45] Speaker 1: end of the day in the military, all communication happen
[56:47] Speaker 1: on these strange, high tech encrypted devices. A lot of
[56:52] Speaker 1: communication happens on off the shelf equipment like phones, normal
[56:55] Speaker 1: mobile phones, WhatsApp and Messenger and things like that. Banned TikTok,
[57:00] Speaker 1: you've banned a whole bunch of apps, But what about
[57:03] Speaker 1: the damn hardware? Now, I am not I am not
[57:07] Speaker 1: saying let the hammer fall and just ban Chinese devices.
[57:11] Speaker 1: There are a huge number of things to consider before
[57:14] Speaker 1: anyone can make that kind of a move in terms
[57:16] Speaker 1: of trade, in terms of commerce, in terms of all
[57:19] Speaker 1: these things. India and China are deeply interlinked. We maybe
[57:23] Speaker 1: it were, but we are deeply into linked. But it's
[57:25] Speaker 1: something to think about, isn't it. It is something to
[57:27] Speaker 1: think about. All these phone companies and at I don't
[57:31] Speaker 1: want to take any brand names lest little podcast gets sued.
[57:34] Speaker 1: But but there are there are big Chinese companies that
[57:38] Speaker 1: make phones for India and they come into India and
[57:41] Speaker 1: there are many mid level ones that flood are rural markets. Yes,
[57:44] Speaker 1: our rural markets are a wash with Chinese phones. So uh,
[57:48] Speaker 1: you know, so many people from the Indian military come
[57:52] Speaker 1: from the rural areas. So you know, I'm just wondering
[57:56] Speaker 1: whether these are vulnerabilities that we can think is far
[57:59] Speaker 1: fetched and kind of postpone until it's too late, or
[58:03] Speaker 1: are we going to look at it right now. I'm
[58:04] Speaker 1: sure this has been a very rude wake up called
[58:07] Speaker 1: to something that has already been a fear within the system.
[58:11] Speaker 1: You know, there have been we being we In India,
[58:13] Speaker 1: all decisions are piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc, so until something
[58:18] Speaker 1: big happens, the country never wakes up. But I fear
[58:21] Speaker 1: that something like this should wake a country like India
[58:24] Speaker 1: up because if another country is uh, you know, controls
[58:28] Speaker 1: the hardware, the hardware that is the lifeline of your communications.
[58:33] Speaker 1: I don't know what that percentage market share of Chinese
[58:35] Speaker 1: phones in India is, but I suspect it must be
[58:38] Speaker 1: eye watering. That is not you know, that's not going
[58:41] Speaker 1: to let me sleep easy.
[58:43] Speaker 3: Yeah, let's not forget that.
[58:45] Speaker 2: Apart from phones that are made by Chinese companies that
[58:49] Speaker 2: are all China also has factories for many phone manufacturers
[58:53] Speaker 2: that are not based in China. Per see, they may
[58:55] Speaker 2: be based in other countries. They design those phones there,
[58:58] Speaker 2: but they're assembled in China and then exported to many
[59:02] Speaker 2: parts of the world, including India. So a supply chain
[59:06] Speaker 2: hack is like what this attack in lebren has been
[59:09] Speaker 2: has been described. If that were to happen, I'm guessing
[59:11] Speaker 2: that's very much in the realm of possibility, if we
[59:14] Speaker 2: can put it.
[59:15] Speaker 1: And this is strictly about possibility, because you know, I'm
[59:20] Speaker 1: not making a claim or even asking our listeners to
[59:22] Speaker 1: think about, you know, big established, reputed companies risking their
[59:27] Speaker 1: reputations with you know, clandestine operations of this kind. I'm
[59:30] Speaker 1: not saying that. But this is China, a totalitarian state
[59:34] Speaker 1: which controls many of these companies, and should push come
[59:38] Speaker 1: to shove in a an all out conflict scenario, all
[59:41] Speaker 1: state owned assets will be weaponized. And if your adversary
[59:45] Speaker 1: is using hardware that's been manufactured by you, under your
[59:48] Speaker 1: scrutiny and with whatever you wanted in those phones, it
[59:52] Speaker 1: basically gives your adversary a hand on your most vulnerable
[1:00:00] Speaker 1: That's that's that's the scary part.
[1:00:02] Speaker 2: In fact, and I when you were talking about this
[1:00:05] Speaker 2: is just kind of recalled a conversation with an no
[1:00:07] Speaker 2: one of our colleagues, a crime reporter. It happened quite
[1:00:09] Speaker 2: a few months ago where he spoke like we're talking
[1:00:12] Speaker 2: about the risks, not risks per se, but like how
[1:00:15] Speaker 2: easy to surveil your your mobile phones. And he spoke
[1:00:19] Speaker 2: about how around eighty to ninety percent of police investigations
[1:00:22] Speaker 2: are just based on call data records. Like you know,
[1:00:24] Speaker 2: if you go to a police with a complaint about somebody,
[1:00:26] Speaker 2: they will get his phone number, they will trace his location,
[1:00:29] Speaker 2: and ninety percent of times the crime is solved just
[1:00:32] Speaker 2: with that because that's all they need. Yeah, everything is
[1:00:36] Speaker 2: just available to them in one p a piece of
[1:00:37] Speaker 2: suit of paid.
[1:00:38] Speaker 1: You can map a person's life.
[1:00:39] Speaker 2: When question that person, and then that's it. That's that's
[1:00:42] Speaker 2: all that happens, right, Okay, Just as we end this though,
[1:00:46] Speaker 2: because I think this aspect communication devices and our reliance
[1:00:49] Speaker 2: on China and other countries is I think another episode
[1:00:52] Speaker 2: altogether now because I want to talk about something something
[1:00:54] Speaker 2: that happened just yesterday. One of the drones being used
[1:00:58] Speaker 2: by the Indian Navy and alexpin why I'm talking about
[1:01:01] Speaker 2: in this episode in this context, being leased by the
[1:01:04] Speaker 2: Indian Navy from General Atomics, the Sea Guardian rone suffered
[1:01:07] Speaker 2: a malfunction while it was in flight over the Indian
[1:01:09] Speaker 2: Ocean and it had to be like ditched out at sea,
[1:01:12] Speaker 2: a euphemism for basically saying it crashed.
[1:01:14] Speaker 3: Yeah.
[1:01:15] Speaker 2: I love how they just like you know, use these
[1:01:17] Speaker 2: terms in their press releases. Smooth, yeah, smooth. We won't
[1:01:20] Speaker 2: talk about that in this episode in terms of what happened.
[1:01:23] Speaker 2: But why I'm bringing this up is because I caught
[1:01:26] Speaker 2: a tweet somewhere where this is what kind of interested
[1:01:29] Speaker 2: me was that because it was a leased drone. Apparently
[1:01:33] Speaker 2: whatever it mapped off the Indian Ocean, that is something
[1:01:37] Speaker 2: that could be used by the US.
[1:01:39] Speaker 3: Is that true?
[1:01:39] Speaker 1: So it's a little complicated. But the two drones that
[1:01:44] Speaker 1: were leased by the Indian Navy starting in September twenty twenty,
[1:01:48] Speaker 1: they were based in an airbase on in Coastal Ladu.
[1:01:52] Speaker 1: These are drones which are not operated by the Indian Navy. Yes,
[1:01:56] Speaker 1: which means that the drone operators, the hand the maintainers,
[1:02:01] Speaker 1: the crew all are employees of General Atomics, the company
[1:02:06] Speaker 1: that makes these drones. So the Indian Navy obviously has
[1:02:09] Speaker 1: access to the drones and access to the data, but
[1:02:12] Speaker 1: the Indian Navy is basically the customer in this case,
[1:02:15] Speaker 1: which provides it provides the mission outlines saying that we
[1:02:19] Speaker 1: need this area mapped for this amount of time with
[1:02:22] Speaker 1: so and so criteria, and that data is harvested and
[1:02:26] Speaker 1: provided to the Indian Navy. Now, the thing is, it's
[1:02:31] Speaker 1: a bit of a non sequitor to say that that
[1:02:33] Speaker 1: information can also go to the US. The US already
[1:02:36] Speaker 1: has that information. There is nothing about that information that
[1:02:39] Speaker 1: the US doesn't already have. So I wouldn't be too
[1:02:42] Speaker 1: troubled about anyone saying, oh, this information can also go
[1:02:44] Speaker 1: back to the US. Technically speaking, under the terms of
[1:02:47] Speaker 1: this contract, it can't go back to the US because
[1:02:50] Speaker 1: this is the data is owned by the Indian Navy. Okay,
[1:02:54] Speaker 1: the data that the feeds, the video feeds, the photographs,
[1:02:56] Speaker 1: the synthetic aperture, radar imagery, whatever it is from the
[1:03:00] Speaker 1: rones are the property of the Indian Navy because it's
[1:03:03] Speaker 1: the Indian Navy has asked for that data. And this
[1:03:05] Speaker 1: is all you know, Indian waters, the Indian Ocean and stuff.
[1:03:09] Speaker 1: So it's it's it's highly classified material. There may be
[1:03:12] Speaker 1: some sharing protocols as far as Indian Navy, US Navy,
[1:03:16] Speaker 1: et cetera, but those are specific and case to case bases.
[1:03:19] Speaker 1: But like I said, that would be a fairly trivial
[1:03:24] Speaker 1: concern in my view, because the United States has a
[1:03:28] Speaker 1: huge surveillance assets, including drones like the Sea Guardian operating
[1:03:32] Speaker 1: in the Indian Ocean at all times anyway, So this
[1:03:35] Speaker 1: is not something that they don't have access.
[1:03:37] Speaker 2: To, right, just something I thought of we could talk
[1:03:39] Speaker 2: about because we talk on the only subject.
[1:03:41] Speaker 1: But we should do a definite episode on the drones
[1:03:44] Speaker 1: because that deal is also looming less it should be
[1:03:47] Speaker 1: concluded in a month or so.
[1:03:48] Speaker 2: We will be will and one on communication devices and
[1:03:52] Speaker 2: what's happening in India. Thankshift, great chats, lots of fun,
[1:03:56] Speaker 2: good insights, and again subject I think we'll end up
[1:04:01] Speaker 2: coming back to UH sometime soon. UH and that endgame
[1:04:05] Speaker 2: that will use ave endgame or whatever that is. Once
[1:04:07] Speaker 2: it becomes a bit clearer, perhaps we'll discuss this once again.
[1:04:11] Speaker 2: Thanks to our listeners and viewers, and thanks as always
[1:04:13] Speaker 2: to our producer and once again to.
[1:04:15] Speaker 3: Our listeners and viers. Please keep on commenting.
[1:04:17] Speaker 2: We love your comments and whatever ideas you have that
[1:04:19] Speaker 2: you want us to discuss, do let us know we
[1:04:21] Speaker 2: will definitely find a slot for them at some point
[1:04:24] Speaker 2: that's it for this week's defense rose for more tune
[1:04:26] Speaker 2: in next week. Till then, stay safe and not cost
[1:04:28] Speaker 2: any boundies to the passport

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