# Military Equipment To Conflicts: How India-Russia Friendship Has Endured Ups & Downs | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 30

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 11 Jul 2024, 54 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/60663977/11_jul_24_iod_11_july_mix_128.mp3

PM Modi was in Moscow this week, marking his first visit to Russia since the country invaded Ukraine in 2022. The hug between Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin caused a global stir, drawing particular ire from Western nations and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor delve into the relationship between India and Russia, analysing how it has evolved over various Indian administrations. Looking at it more militarily, the defence duo answers why India heavily relies on Russian military equipment, detailing India's extensive inventory of Russian hardware, from Sukhoi jets and MiG series aircraft to T-90 and T-72 tanks. Russia’s cost-effective and reliable supplies have historically catered to India's defence needs. What do Russia and India gain from this alliance? Is Russian military equipment the best choice for India? What are the challenges India faces in reducing its reliance on Russian arms? Has the Ukraine war exposed vulnerabilities in Russian equipment, prompting India to seek alternatives? ‘India realised this a long time ago,’ says Shiv. So, what does the future hold for the India-Russia defence relationship? This and more in the 30th episode of In Our Defence. Please tune in and share your thoughts at pods@indiatoday.com or text us at 8588966996! Produced by Anna Priydarshini Sound mix by Kapil Dev Singh &nbsp;

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts Russia, Who's basically it's the money, honey.
[0:08] If you can pay the money, show some money upfront, the weapon is
[0:11] yours. They are brutally transactional, and they still are, by the way,
[0:15] in terms of the United States and the kind of protocols they go through
[0:18] in order to export weapons, even to a country like India, which is
[0:21] an ally, is crazy compared to how Russia exports weapons. Russia is like
[0:25] Psa Henlo Marlutalo. I have met contractors, I have met middlemen, I
[0:30] have met agents, I've seen the dark underbelly of the contracting system, and
[0:34] I can tell you that it's as simple as that the West is trying to
[0:38] make Putin out to be this international pariah, globally isolated, almost on the
[0:43] lines of a Kim Jong un, powerful, isolated, unpredictable, unreliable and
[0:47] dangerous, and someone who nobody should do business with. And then the prime
[0:51] minister of the world's largest democracy goes and hugs him at that time, he's
[0:54] hug him before. Let's not forget Western hypocrisy here more. These huged put
[0:58] In many times before. He's gone on boat rides with but to hug him.
[1:00] Now when the West is trying to make put In out to be a
[1:04] Kim Jong Un is excruciating and aggravating for the West, but see the value
[1:08] for Russia. My favorite is the Make twenty one because it's an aircraft that
[1:12] triggers emotions in people because of the associations with it, whether it is you
[1:18] know, Runde Basanti or the Abiji Guard guilt case and many tragic losses that
[1:23] India has suffered in terms of pilots because of the Make twenty one. But
[1:26] it's also a misunderstood aircraft. Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly
[1:32] podcast on all things well defense, where I They've go Swami, your host,
[1:38] along with senior journalist Shivarur, break down the world of conflicts that range
[1:42] from the subtle to the brute. We bring you nuances and perspectives that will
[1:46] inform and at times provoke. This is In Our Defense. Hello and welcome
[1:56] the thirtieth episode of In Our Defense. It's been over a month off the
[2:00] Indian election, since the indionnection results, and you've had a prime s these
[2:05] first foreign trip to Russia, which is going to be a big focus area
[2:08] for US on this on this episode High Shift, how are you going?
[2:12] And I'm well gave, how are you doing? And very very telling that
[2:15] the Prime Minister has made his first foreign visit in his third tenure to Russia,
[2:20] which is the subject of our podcast today, which is actually something we've
[2:23] been touching upon in many of our episodes, but finally we get to do
[2:25] a full chunky episode on just Russia. Because there's so much Russia in our
[2:30] defense. So that's talking all about it today. That's a good phrase by
[2:34] there's so much Russia in our defense. Yeah, And I think you're right,
[2:37] because I think you've been itching to talk about Russia because you've given us
[2:39] glimpses of your frustrations and at times your anger with the overly dependent over dependence
[2:49] that Inn guest sometimes shown in its history towards Asian equipment, military equipment.
[2:53] So we'll keep this episode since the defense focus mostly on the military side of
[2:59] things, because we don't want to talk too much geopolitics, but that is
[3:01] in more. Obviously, this trip also assumed significance because this is the first
[3:06] time PMOD has visited Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine War. Correct the
[3:10] West, some people in the West were not too happy to see Pmode over
[3:15] there, and especially the sort of you know camerati that you saw with between
[3:17] Putin and and pmod the full fledged melt down, and Zero was very,
[3:23] very pissed. His tweet was quite scathing. But I think we had to
[3:27] say that. Yeah, yeah, of course I had to say that.
[3:29] So while we might end up touching upon all these because this is obviously linked
[3:32] to the militaries at larger level, but we'll try to keep that at a
[3:36] minimum. Yeah, but let's start with that. Actually sort of the boring
[3:39] sort of a laying round for this episode because call me, you know,
[3:45] like it's a very maybe a foolish way to put it. But don't you
[3:49] think that this this this idea of non aligned movement that I've been taught in
[3:53] my school that was hyped up or so much that you know, India was
[3:57] this heartbringer of these countries together, you know, not advocating for aligning with
[4:00] either the US or the Soviet Russia during the Cold War. Neh, Whuo
[4:04] sort of led this movement et cetera, et cetera. That this whole idea
[4:08] that we've been taught in school is sort of a misnova, because if you
[4:11] actually see what played out in the real world, you had India kind of
[4:15] aligning with Russia. I'm not saying in terms of let's say that India was
[4:18] supporting Russia or Soviet Russia against the US, but more so they became quite
[4:24] pally you. I think there were several factors behind it, which I want
[4:28] you to kind of give us a a big overview of that. You know,
[4:30] US was signed sort of becoming friendly with Pakistan. You had the Soviet
[4:34] rusuare invading Afghanistan. So US obviously want to counter that because the US back
[4:40] then was very, very very anti communist, and they wanted to ensure that
[4:44] Soviet Russia would be countered and all spheres as far as possible. So tell
[4:47] me about this this sort of clash I see in front of me when I
[4:50] remember my history textbook which talked about nonline movement, and then you do this
[4:56] podcast with you where day after day we talk about this so much pence that
[5:00] India had in Russia. So you know, I think you're right when you
[5:02] say that the so called non aligned movement. And I'll tell you why I
[5:06] call it so called is because it was a you know, the non aligned
[5:11] movement was non aligned relative to you know, other geopolitical moves of that of
[5:16] that time, you know, like you rightly said, Dave, the non
[5:19] aligned movement. You know, one of the leading features of the non aligned
[5:25] movement was a very pronounced alignment. So the fact that the world was being
[5:31] cleaved into by the Cold War, you know, into the free world versus
[5:36] the communist world, you know, was pretty plain to see. And I
[5:40] think one thing that I actually find quite amusing and a little distasteful is the
[5:45] way in which many analysts look back on that time and judge the decisions taken
[5:50] by you know, Nehru and the others as far as India's geopolitical choices are
[5:56] concerned. But if you actually look at it very closely, given given the
[6:00] China factor, given the growing growing power of China at that time, given
[6:04] that the United States was nothing like the United States we know of it now.
[6:10] Uh it was. It was a highly unreliable, you know, a
[6:15] country not worthy of trust kind of country. Uh it was. It was
[6:19] difficult for India to align with any country other than the Soviet Union, the
[6:24] USSR UH and therefore it was it was in the in the fifties, sixties,
[6:29] seventies, that that relationship really really grew organically in many ways. Uh.
[6:35] And we'll get into the you know, we'll get into the imbalance of
[6:39] the relationship as we get into the meat of this episode. But I think
[6:44] the India Russia relationship has has endured. It's it's not it's not a it's
[6:49] not a you know, a relationship that is all you know, all unicorns
[6:55] and candy. It's it's a it's a relationship that is replete with issues.
[6:59] It's a it's a it's relationship replete with the portholes. It's relationship that is
[7:04] replete with ups and downs. But it is a relationship that has endured.
[7:10] It has never had you know, the one thing that one can say about
[7:13] the India Russia relationship that you can almost not say for any other relationship is
[7:16] it has never come to a breaking point. The India Russia relationship has endured
[7:23] across administrations, across governments, across leanings, across you know, the UPA
[7:30] government, the Ndia government, whatever it was, the continuity as far as
[7:33] India Russia friendship and relationships are concerned, has has had an unusual level of
[7:40] endurance. If you look at the India US relationship, it's had ups and
[7:45] downs, it's had breaking points. You know, right now it's going through
[7:47] a particularly troubled phase. You're getting a lot of heat from the West because
[7:51] of the Russia factor. But that again has just emphasized the fact that India
[7:56] Russia has managed to weather many a geopol critical storm. And I think the
[8:01] fact that Modi chose to go to Russia as his first visit post you know,
[8:07] post as Prime minister, for the third time, post the Ukraine War,
[8:13] post the pandemic, et cetera, is a huge message, huge message
[8:18] to the world. And the fact that that summit happened yesterday on the same
[8:22] day that the NATO summit was taking place in Washington. You know, that
[8:26] may not have been that may not have been of Moodie's choosing, That may
[8:30] have been a coincidence. But I'm just saying that in India and Russia have
[8:35] had numerous summits. This was a twenty second friendship summit of the two countries.
[8:39] But I can't think of a single summit in the past that has had
[8:43] the kind of immediate global shock waves and the kind of overt you know,
[8:48] very specific questern interest ever before. So it's it's really really telling that MODI
[8:56] chose to go to Russia. And in fact, I think yesterday in the
[9:00] statements, when Putin was sitting next to him, I think PM did refer
[9:03] to that as well. Yeah, that many world powers, I think,
[9:07] if I'm not wrong, he specifically mentioned Western world powers are looking at this
[9:09] meeting and you know, waiting to see what the comes. And Putin said
[9:13] that the West is looking jealously, yes meeting. Yes, yes, he
[9:16] knows how to push their buttons right, And a very good point that you
[9:20] made over there about the imbalance between the our relationship because and we'll obviously circle
[9:26] back to it later, but I remember reading this piece just before PM the
[9:28] PM's visit to Russia, where I forgot the exact number, but the trade
[9:33] imbalance between Indian Russia is huge, Like you know, we just it's basically
[9:37] we imported stuff and Russia doesn't really take anything from US, Drummos being the
[9:41] prime example in previous episodes we've discussed. But yeah, we will get to
[9:45] that, but before we do, let's talk now about our favorite subject,
[9:48] the Russian equipment. The Russian equipment in our inventory. I had a quick
[9:54] check of what I think is right now in the inventory. So you have
[9:56] the suit hertie, You have the mid twenty nine, You have the mid
[9:58] twenty one, make twenty seven. I'm not sure if twenty seven retire.
[10:03] Yeah, you have the ME seventeen. You have a helicopter as soon as
[10:05] the Camo of KA thirty one and twenty have one more meat helicopter. Yea.
[10:11] You have the T ninety tank if the T has seventy two tank.
[10:13] You have irons became aditya. You have a Kilo class fleet of somebody's you
[10:16] have thenis Chakra? You had it? I think you don't have it.
[10:20] It's gone back, It's gone back. But there is some talk that Sakara
[10:22] too. Might You have the S four hundred recently purchased. You have something
[10:28] known as the BM thirty smirch. You have a line of SAMD systems.
[10:33] You have the K two zero three bought off the shelf and also being produced
[10:35] near Amitia. Now I love this man on your face. And you have
[10:39] the Bramos favorite subject. Yeah, yeah, and if the Brumos. But
[10:41] I think Bromos is, like we discussed in that episode. I think more
[10:45] Indian than Russian because you know, developed here together, even the little together.
[10:48] But yeah, anyway, you get my point. We've talked about the
[10:52] dependence. Were obviously explode that a bit more as well, and you're trying
[10:54] to bean off, especially in the content of the Ukraine world. But first,
[10:56] don't talk about quality. This is something you've briefly truched upon and I
[11:01] think you've been talk about it. Correct me. If I can take this
[11:05] analogy, is it like a case of you know, Japanese car technology versus
[11:09] German car engineering, So you know, you have if you were to compare
[11:13] to Russia versus NATO or Western equipment, so you know, Russian, like
[11:16] the Japanese is rugged, cheap or easy to maintain, et cetera, but
[11:20] not as high tech as modern as German car engineering. Would that be a
[11:24] very crude analogy. I'll try and make it even more specific, because you
[11:30] know that would that would that analogy would somehow make it seem like the Japanese
[11:35] equipment doesn't really you know, lean into ergonomics and things like that. Let
[11:39] me explain it a little bit more specifically. Russian equipment. Uh, you
[11:43] know, there there are there are exceptions to everything, but the general the
[11:46] general reputation that Russian equipment, military equipment, weapons, et cetera. Has
[11:52] is that they are robustly functional, cheap to produce, quick to produce,
[11:58] are very adaptive to different environments, are not particularly focused on the comfort of
[12:07] the operator, require very frequent maintenance and spares. So the ownership cost is
[12:16] high. The cost of acquisition of Russian equipment at the time you're paying for
[12:20] it is low compared to Western equipment, but the life cycle cost, which
[12:24] is actually a better measure of uh, you know, the ownership cost of
[12:28] a weapon system is actually high because of the number of times you need to
[12:31] maintain, overhaul, service repair. Russian equipment is is a is many degrees
[12:39] higher than comparable Western equipment, So availability, serviceability issues are there in terms
[12:46] of In terms of quality, quality is again an issue because of maintainability.
[12:50] Now this this has become a bit of an emotive issue because when you look
[12:56] at weapons and equipment again, there are you know, there are poor There
[13:00] are people who say, you know, if it can get the job done,
[13:01] then why are we sitting here and talking about quality and things like that.
[13:05] Well, because it goes to the heart of being able to wage war
[13:09] and you know, and actually you know, conduct offensive operations, because it's
[13:16] not just about what equipment can do, but how available it is to you.
[13:20] If it's going to be sitting at an airbase for seven days to be
[13:22] maintained and overhauled, and the weapon and the engine to be serviced, what
[13:28] uses its amazing offensive capabilities? Right, that's just an example. So the
[13:31] Russian equipment is low on that, it's bad in terms of serviceability, availability.
[13:37] It's a greater much more needs to be done to keep those equipment in
[13:43] ship shape and in working condition. Number Two. Russian contracts, by their
[13:48] nature, and this has been a historical issue right through is these contracts are
[13:52] cheap at the signing point, but there are hidden costs which the Russians will
[13:58] supply. You would laterally, you know, if you want additional stuff,
[14:03] separate contract you want you want to repair this, okay, but let's sign
[14:09] a larger repair contract which will take care of all these things. You know.
[14:13] I'm obviously saying it simplicitically now, but this has been how it has
[14:18] been over the decades. Now things have vastly improved because Russia has realized that
[14:22] India is not playing around. They've got other sources of equipment, like France
[14:24] in the United States, and they've put their money where their mouth is.
[14:28] Russia has always looked at India as you know, also a reliable partner.
[14:33] It's a symbiotic relationship. But let's not forget that. In many ways,
[14:37] and I don't mean this disrespectfully, Russia has also seen India as a cash
[14:39] cow. You know, India is a country with you know, surrounded by
[14:45] conflict, surrounded by quote unquote enemies and problems, you know, Pakistan,
[14:48] China, et cetera. And therefore, so it's it had an appetite for
[14:52] military hardware. At the same time, it had a complete lack of a
[14:56] domestic industrial base to feed its military with modern or reasonably modern weapons. So
[15:01] Russia filled that huge void. And how fifties, sixties and seventies it poured.
[15:07] I mean, of course there was equipment from other places also, but
[15:09] starting from the sixties really with the mid twenty ones onward, and even before
[15:13] that, Russian equipment basically sort of poured into India at a time when you
[15:20] know, few other countries were willing to actually do that. France was one
[15:24] of those countries of course the UK, but there was no American equipment and
[15:26] therefore Russia equipment which was cheap, easily available. You know, there were
[15:31] no Nakaras in terms of export licensing and things that some of these other countries
[15:35] had. Russia was basically, you know, it's the money, honey.
[15:39] You know, if you can pay the money, show some money upfront,
[15:43] the weapon is yours. They are. They are brutally transactional, and they
[15:46] still are by the way, you know, unlike other countries like the United
[15:50] States. I mean, it's unfair to compare the US and Russia when it
[15:54] comes to selling of weapons. But in terms of the United States and the
[15:58] kind of protocols they go through in order to export weapons, even to a
[16:02] country like India, which is an ally, is crazy compared to how Russia
[16:06] exports weapons. Russia is like Psilo Marlutalo's. It's literally like that. I
[16:11] have met contractors, i have met middlemen, i have met agents, I've
[16:17] seen the dark underbelly of the contracting system, and I can tell you that
[16:21] it's as simple as that. Russia when it comes to a country, like
[16:23] I'm not saying to anyone, but I'm saying to a country like India,
[16:26] it's about the money. In many cases, India has funded those projects in
[16:30] Russia and then been a customer. Two thirty MKI is a prime example,
[16:36] the mid twenty one upgrade is a prime example. The Bramos is a prime
[16:40] example. So absolutely Russia has benefited very, very richly from India's appetite for
[16:48] military hardware. Yeah right, you know, slightly tangential extension of that previous
[16:53] previous question about the quality of equipment, because when I was researching, I
[16:59] just like you know, called something that Bala had mentioned season one of fine
[17:02] defense. And this was I think when he was reporting from from from Ukraine
[17:07] during the initial few weeks or months of the Russia Ukraine War. Things have
[17:11] definitely changed in hindsight, you know, you will have a bit more and
[17:17] a lot more clarity on what I'm about to ask you. But we were
[17:19] talking about the failure or what it seemed to be back then, the failure
[17:23] of the Russian tanks. He recalled seeing roads after roads lined up with Russian
[17:29] tanks. Because of what he told me back then, was it not defect
[17:33] per se, but like a flaw in the engineering of the I forgot which
[17:37] which tank it was, But basically what he said was that the munition of
[17:41] the tank was kept under the turret, which made it sort of a very
[17:45] easy for Ukrainian Ukrainian just to strike because of which you had all these tanks
[17:49] failing. Then you had, like we've discussed previously in another episode, but
[17:53] you know, you had you had different thoughts on that that the air force
[17:57] was missing, leading to a lot of questions, a lot of suspicion about
[18:00] whether the Russians were not confident of their air force. And I remember asking
[18:04] you back then as well, then wouldn't that have sparked some worries in India
[18:07] considering like a large part of the air force is Russian. So when you
[18:11] talk about the tanks as well, you know, in respect to the Ukraine
[18:15] Russia war, do you think that that war has kind of exposed some,
[18:19] if not all, of Russian Equipment's quite so? So, Look, it
[18:25] didn't take the Ukraine War to teach the Indian military about the quality of Russian
[18:30] equipment. Okay, India has been saddled. That's a rude word. India
[18:34] has operated Russian equipment for a long time and and look, nobody, nobody
[18:41] should even for a moment sit and say that this is crappy, crappy stuff.
[18:45] Russian equipment is good equipment. It has it has been part of our
[18:48] wars we fought was with Russian equipment. We've won war with Russian equipment.
[18:55] Russian equipment continues to be the mainstay of our Indian military. You were talking
[18:57] about tanks. The overwhelming actually almost our entire armored force is of Russian origin.
[19:04] The T ninety tanks before that, the T seventy two tanks before that,
[19:08] we had had, you know, other tanks of British origin, et
[19:11] cetera. But the fact that the Indian urguent tank, you know, never
[19:17] really managed to find favor with the Indian army. That's that's a whole new
[19:21] episode which we will do, believe me, you know, because because that
[19:25] paints India in a very bad picture. Is the fact that Russian equipment almost
[19:30] entirely dominates your armored force. The b MPs, you know, the infantry
[19:34] carriers, those are of Soviet origin as well. So you've got a situation
[19:41] where your entire tank strength is of you know, Soviet slash Russian vintage.
[19:47] Sure, you're building those tanks here in India, but Ultimately, the message,
[19:51] as far as industry is concerned, is something as as apparently rudimentary as
[19:56] a tank still needs to be of Soviet twintage technology. There's still building those
[20:02] tanks, mind you, in India. They're still building them. So the
[20:06] fact that Russia has a hold not only on advanced equipment like S four hundreds
[20:12] and you know, surface to our missile systems and nuclear submarine and things like
[20:18] that, but also things as basic as tanks and infantry carriers and you know,
[20:23] your nuts and bolts of your military just is just a sad deal.
[20:29] We're still operating on Mike twenty ones, and you know, again, apart
[20:33] from the Arjun, we will do a Mike twenty one special as well,
[20:34] because the Big twenty one is now finally, thankfully in its final stretch.
[20:41] You know, another squadron is going to be retiring very soon. They've served
[20:45] amazingly through their time. But each one of these things is the reminder of
[20:49] the kind of octopus like grip Russian equipment has with the Indian military. Everywhere
[20:56] you look, there is Russian equipment from the smallest thing to the biggest thing,
[21:00] from from a bullet ammunition to a firearm built in a mete, like
[21:04] you said, all the way to iron and it's it's it's fascinating. And
[21:11] for all the you know, twenty plus billion dollars worth of contracts that the
[21:15] United States has done, you know, since two thousand and seven, two
[21:18] thousand and eight, it's still not a scratch on the kind of hold that
[21:22] Russia still has on the Indian Narsenal. But then why is that so?
[21:27] And more than you know, just sitting here and talking about the past and
[21:30] talking about this went wrong? That went wrong? Obviously we will you can
[21:34] talk a bit about it, But one why is that? So? How
[21:37] did we reach it in the first place? Like the laundryest of equipment that
[21:41] I read out, why are we there? I love that you mentioned a
[21:44] K two zero three. You've bought them off shelf from Russia, a big
[21:48] batch, and now you're going to be co producing them in a factory in
[21:49] a AIGHTI this was supposed to happen a couple of years earlier, but I
[21:52] think the UK, what kind of kind of lead delayed that. So that
[21:56] for me E, when researching the episode, was the best example of the
[21:59] sort of equipment for which you don't need Russia anymore. I mean, I'm
[22:02] pretty sure you can do a rifle on your own. But again, rifle
[22:04] is a separate topic, and we've been mentioning that for a while, so
[22:07] we'll do that very soon. But yeah, to the larger question, how
[22:11] did we end up reaching you've kind of briefly explored that, but talking about
[22:15] how even though you had France willing to give wakeming, but you know,
[22:18] you had this sort of international geopolgies playing out with US Westina, so you
[22:23] kind of had India going towards towards Russia's side. But apart from just how
[22:27] we ended up preaching here, what do you think now are the challenges to
[22:33] get to wean ourselves of Russian equipment? Because India seriously considering that with various
[22:37] making programs like we've seen, we've bought jets from from France, we were
[22:42] signing many deals with the US and guessing one reason is also the Ukraine WLL
[22:47] sort of made India realize that so much dependency on Russia, especially for what
[22:51] happens after you buy equipment with respect to maintenance and space, is going to
[22:55] be dangerous for your military. So that what are the other challenges that people
[23:00] like me, people that you know who watch in our defense don't know that
[23:03] India faces when it comes to kind of going off Russian equipment. So there's
[23:07] a three pronged answer to that. First of all, let's be very clear,
[23:10] there is no weaning of Russian equipment. We live in a world where
[23:14] Russia happens to be our most trusted ally. And to very quickly segue and
[23:18] answer your question as to how did we reach here, Let's remember that this
[23:22] is not like India is this damsel in the forest with no choice but to
[23:26] buy Russian equipment. It's not like that. It's these things are much more
[23:30] complicated. The reason India has chosen to buy Russian equipment repeatedly and has therefore
[23:37] resulted in this hugely you know, Russia colored military is because India has seen
[23:44] Russia as a reliable supplier, a supplier who will not pull the plug during
[23:49] war, a supplier who can be relied upon not to you know, throw
[23:55] you know, rules or protocols or geopolitical compulsions in your face when push comes
[24:00] to shove, when the balloon goes up, when war breaks out, and
[24:04] you cannot put a price on that. That is something that India values very
[24:08] highly because this is a country that has fought a number of wars and it
[24:12] sees reliability during war as having no price. You know, you cannot put
[24:18] a price on that. We live in a country where after we conducted nuclear
[24:22] tests, the United States pull the plug on diplomatic relations, practically killing many
[24:27] defense projects in the water, including the Tajas, which we've spoken about before.
[24:33] The kind of body blow that had on many different military hardware projects is
[24:40] something that is still being written about, and it's one of the reasons why
[24:42] India is still in some ways suspicious of the United States. It's one of
[24:47] the reasons why India still insists on Indian equipment, even on American products.
[24:52] It's one of the reasons why India still doesn't go the whole hog in terms
[24:56] of jointness and nominality agreements with the United States. Even though the world has
[25:03] changed, India is much closer to the United States now, vastly different from
[25:08] the years gone by. But even now, that kind of the kind of
[25:12] faith that India has in Russia and vice versa in terms of this kind of
[25:17] thing is is a you know, it's difficult to it's difficult to convey how
[25:22] how much value India attaches to that. So it's not like, you know,
[25:26] we've arrived here because we had no choice and things like that. But
[25:30] to answer your question, weaning away from this is going to be like a
[25:33] three prong thing. A. It's never going to be fully weaned away from
[25:37] because we are still buying Russian equipment. We still have collaborative uh you know,
[25:42] agreements with Russia to co produce stuff, Bromos being one example, and
[25:45] Bromos has a long future. There are many more things India and Russia doing
[25:49] together. The follow on to the S four hundred may be something that India
[25:53] and Russia might actually do in a collaborative way. So Russia is never going
[25:57] to be sort of ex sponged from the Indian military. It's always going to
[26:02] be part of the Indian military. But reducing dependence, which is a word
[26:06] which you're very correctly used, is something that India recognized the need for long
[26:11] before the Ukraine War. Long before the Ukraine War. What was the MMRCA,
[26:15] What was India's contest to get new fighter jets all about? It was
[26:19] in recognition of the fact that, look, we have an air force that
[26:23] is saddled with Russian fighter jets. We've got over two hundred Sukhoys. We've
[26:29] got, you know, over one hundred mid twenty nine, we've got all
[26:32] these, you know, other make twenty threes, make twenty seven's, make
[26:36] twenty ones. You know, in our inventory we need our next generation of
[26:41] fighters to be Western, more reliable, three four times as expensive as Russian
[26:45] jets. But you know, you get what you paid for that kind of
[26:49] thing. Russia, the Raphaal, for instance, is exorbitantly more expensive than
[26:56] you know, any comparable jet in Russia. Russia is always played on cost.
[27:00] You know, you know, we give you bang for your buck,
[27:03] cheaper, et cetera. Now India has not now, but in the last
[27:07] fifteen twenty years is woken up to the idea that Western equipment is better quality
[27:11] and the monetary value that you're attaching to that actually means something. If you're
[27:18] paying more for something, it's probably a better quality. It's not the best
[27:21] way to see defense equipment. But in this case it actually is true.
[27:25] And so the Ukraine War here so many people and I've heard analysts talk over
[27:30] and over again of how Ukraine War is a wake up call. Because of
[27:33] the Ukraine War, India now should hedge its risk and stop buying from Russia.
[27:40] India started that process a long time ago. My friend, Ukraine War
[27:44] was Ukraine War. Can't take the credit for India's need to reduce dependence on
[27:48] Russia. That has been happening for a long time. If that had not
[27:52] been happening for a long time, India would not buy C seventeen jets from
[27:56] the United States. India would not buy PIGHTI aircraft for its navy from the
[28:00] United States. India would not buy Chinook helicopters from the United States as opposed
[28:04] to Russian. India would not buy Apache helicopters from from the United States as
[28:11] opposed to Russian equipment. India would not be looking at, you know,
[28:17] harpoon missiles from the United States instead of comparable Russian equipment. These things would
[28:22] not happen if India was not taking a concerted decision to spread its defense equipment
[28:27] sources. As a rising power, it could no longer be seen as being
[28:33] heavily dependent on Russia. That's why it's got the rafailes from France. Its
[28:37] big ticket, you know, combat aircraft acquisition is from France, not from
[28:42] Russia, not from the United States. From France very interesting because it is
[28:48] investing geopolitical capital in Europe as well and basically signaling to both Russia and the
[28:52] United States that we are independent. We are not going to throw big contracts
[28:57] your way, because as you think that we attached geopolitical value only to both
[29:03] of you, we attach it also to a country like France, which represents
[29:07] Europe. So the shift that has taken place of India weaning itself away from
[29:14] Russia began, i would say, a good two decades before the Ukraine War,
[29:18] and it will continue and Russia recognizes that. That's the reason why Russia
[29:22] is also professionalized in a very big way. Now they realize that Boss,
[29:26] it can't be any more. No more of the cash and carry weapon culture
[29:30] with India. That era is gone. Now you have a country that is
[29:34] a giving very big contracts which Russia earlier felt should have come to it are
[29:42] going to countries like France and the United States. India is for the first
[29:45] time in its history very seriously building domestic industry, very very seriously. For
[29:52] the first time, no more namkewaste projects here and there. Now real stuff
[29:56] is happening. Tata is building the C two ninety five, They're building the
[30:00] Apache fuselages in Hyderabad. Other things are going to happen right now. So
[30:03] domestic industry is coming up in a very big way. And with India's uh,
[30:07] you know, startup, startup ecosystem getting into AI and drones, we
[30:12] won't even we won't need the cutting edge of the future battlefield from God.
[30:15] We'll have it right here. So that that that that entire curve has come
[30:21] full circle now and Russia is going to feel the pinch because they don't have
[30:23] that, and India is not the country anymore that will fund Russian projects.
[30:29] We can just find our own. So that's that's where things are at,
[30:32] right right right, Glad you give us that very vivid and like sort of
[30:36] a longish but you know, very give us a very extensive answer or answer
[30:40] to that, because I think that really answers a lot of questions that I
[30:42] had in mind. We'll talk a bit now about the Impala that he spoke
[30:47] about earlier, something that we've spoken about in the past, that how much
[30:51] of a friend Russia really has been in India. But after a quick break
[30:59] India like podcast Today. Welcome to India Today Podcasts, a repository of thoughtful
[31:04] audio discussions for the comfort of those who want to consume information on the go.
[31:11] Catch us on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts and other audio platforms.
[31:17] Tune in now Welcome back Shaven a discussing Russia and India's long standing partnership
[31:27] with Russia. Fifty sixty more than that actually is against the background of PI
[31:32] and going to Moscow this week his first visit, his first foreur and tour
[31:36] after taking oath for the third time in India. Very significant. We'll talk
[31:40] now about how Russia has always been perceived and seen as India's friend, rightfully
[31:48] so in many parts a shive you know before the break gave us like a
[31:52] very real answer of how Russia has actually stood by India when it mattered the
[31:56] most, has unlike the other countries, not the plug on on a defense
[32:01] contract or whatever at that times of war. In fact, during the seventy
[32:06] one War, Russia famously sent a fleet of ships towards the Indian Ocean.
[32:09] I'm not sure if they reached the Indian Ocean over entel inputs that India had
[32:14] received that the UK and the US were planning on sending I think at least
[32:17] one aircraft carrier in the region when India or was it full flushed war with
[32:22] Pakistan. So I think India had requested in worked some treaty that it had
[32:27] with with Russia to you know, ask them to send us in a fleet
[32:30] of ships, and they did so. But you know, is it always
[32:34] just because of the goodness of it of its hard because you know, you
[32:37] also in a previous episode talked about the suit her Tea and the MCIN and
[32:40] K the Navial variant, and how it wasn't something that India or Indian the
[32:45] military of India wanted in the first place. Though you were you did mention
[32:50] that that that does not make it bad equipment, but that just tells you
[32:53] something about the way such negotiations that done when it comes to defense contracts and
[32:57] military contacts, especially between Russia and India. You also have the fact that
[33:01] even though it's a good aircraft carrier is not brand new, it was secondhand
[33:06] when India bought it, though, and when it comes to mility equipment,
[33:08] I'm pretty sure secondhand also has you know, great quality because it is completely
[33:13] refurbished. If I'm not wrong, but you get my larger question because you've
[33:16] said that there are no free lanches in the world. So Russia has been
[33:20] the stead fast partner good ally you know, has been there for US,
[33:22] et signed these deals for US. Some of the deals you've when you've described,
[33:27] you know, there was some sort of shadingness involved, like with the
[33:30] Suite thirty and the mid twenty nine K some seem pretty pretty good. So
[33:34] this and then sort of you know, throws this pitch like I don't really
[33:37] understand this relationship then, and like the balance between the two sides, can
[33:42] you like define this. Has Russia been a good friend only from the goodness
[33:46] of its heart or is there something more to it? Obviously not. No
[33:51] relationship is out of the goodness of anyone's heart. There's no altruism in diplomacy.
[33:55] Uh. This this holds true for every single relationship, including the US
[34:01] Israel relationship, which people say is out of the goodness of hearts and things
[34:06] like that. It's not all countries act in self interest. All countries see
[34:09] benefit in bilateral relationships. UH. And UH, the India Russia relationship has
[34:15] by no means been a one way relationship. UH. You know, Russia
[34:19] has gained hugely and UH. Part of it is reflective in the continuing trade
[34:23] imbalance as well, you know, from doing doing business and having this very
[34:29] sustained relationship with India. But like I said, and I repeat, having
[34:32] a reliable strategic partner, UH is not something you can quantify or put a
[34:37] price tag on that. You know, for a country like India newly independent,
[34:43] you know, just after the World War UH, you know, with
[34:45] all these uncertainties before it a young country having a steadfast UH superpower. Russia
[34:52] is Soviet superpower as you're you know, by your side in terms of UH,
[35:00] you know, in terms of strategic requirements, equipment, even even guidance,
[35:05] et cetera. Is not something you can put a price tag on.
[35:07] And I and and that's the reason why you know, when you say that
[35:12] you know this is a one way relationship or India has not gained as much.
[35:15] You have to recognize the amount of value India attaches to having that level
[35:20] of reliability, which is which is which is disconnected from the fact that India
[35:24] is paying for that reliability. It's not free. That reliability is being paid
[35:29] for and then some but it's still reliability. It is still reliability. It's
[35:34] it's the kind of reliability, transactional reliability that you can trust. It's the
[35:38] kind of reliability where you're not going to spend You're not going to have geopolitical
[35:45] insomnia over whether you're going to wake up the next day and see that country
[35:50] change its mind over over certain commitments. You cannot put a price tag on
[35:54] that. And now I've used the word price tag about seventeen times in this
[35:58] answer. So I will go to the next point, which is that which
[36:00] is that India has the fact that India is also seen. You know,
[36:06] we are so since we're sitting in India and talking about the relationship, we're
[36:08] so focused on how how India sees Russia reliable partner. Let's for a moment
[36:15] imagine that you and I are sitting in Moscow and I hope one of these
[36:17] episodes, I hope Anna funds our next episode in Moscow. Maybe at some
[36:21] point, is that is that look at how Russia sees India. Russia sees
[36:27] India as a as an absolute bulwark of a partner, reliable, dependable,
[36:34] respected, globally, seen as an oasis of democracy. Uh, you know,
[36:39] a country that has a huge market. So it's economically beneficial, hungry
[36:44] for energy as represented in all the oil deals. And it makes Russia look
[36:49] good, yes, very important. Please never forget these, these these uh
[36:53] intangibles that people don't talk about. Putin looks great, hugging movie, Putin
[36:59] looks fabulous, putting that Saint Andrew's mala on Modi. It validates Russia.
[37:05] It has validated everyone in the past of the Russian leadership doing business with India,
[37:10] because India is a credible country that is seen as a responsible democratic power.
[37:15] Russia is not. So. India has validated Russia geopolitically and strategically.
[37:21] If India can be such good friends with Russia and Russia can't be so bad,
[37:24] you get what I'm saying. So so all all of these this this
[37:29] kind of uh intangible benefit that Russia has gained from India on the strategic sphere,
[37:36] geopolitically speaking, in international forums, its ability to you know, do
[37:40] business with other countries in Europe, et cetera, is of massive value to
[37:45] to Russia. Huge for a country that I mean, just look at how
[37:50] Russia. Russia has looked at right. Now, let's take forget the past.
[37:53] Forget forget history, forget what has happened in the past, look at
[37:58] how things Let's talk about just the last Potidas theve. Vladimir Putin is perhaps
[38:04] the most globally reviled leader. And when I say globally reviled, I mean
[38:08] forget forget India, forget China, everywhere else. He's practically reviled because he's
[38:14] seen as a country that is attacked Ukraine. He's invaded Ukraine, He's he's
[38:19] brandished his nuclear weapons, he's threatened world peace. NATO hates him. Most
[38:23] of Africa is like wondering what the hell is going on? In the Middle
[38:27] East, some countries like him, some think that he's unreliable. Israel hates
[38:30] him. Uh, you know, Southeast Asia basically goes with what you know
[38:37] the West thinks. As far as Russia is concerned, so he's he.
[38:40] The West is trying to make Putin out to be this international pariah, globally
[38:45] isolated, you know, almost on the lines of a Kim Jong wun.
[38:50] They want him to the world to see him as a Kim Jong wun,
[38:53] powerful, isolated, unpredictable, unreliable and dangerous and someone who nobody should do
[38:59] besiness with and then the prime minister of the world's largest democracy goes and hugs
[39:02] him at that time, He's hugg him before. Let's not forget Western hypocrisy
[39:07] here. Modi has helped put In many times before, He's gone on boat
[39:09] rides with him, he's gone to his farm, all that bromance has happened.
[39:14] But to hug him now when the West is trying to make Putin out
[39:19] to be a Kim Jong un is is excruciating and aggravating for the West.
[39:24] But see the value for Russia, which is why when when when Modi gets
[39:28] that Order of Saint Andrew's the highest honor in Russia, the benefit is not
[39:32] for Maudi. The benefit is for lad Putin. Putin is validating himself by
[39:37] giving the leader of the world's largest democracy Russia's highest honor. Russia is gaining
[39:44] from this. So so this is this is Russia sees great benefit from this
[39:50] relationship, beyond the paess of our weapons and things like that. And India
[39:53] see is a reliable partner. It's a it's a many people will say,
[39:59] we'll see this as a an imbalanced relationship, a complicated relationship. No relationship
[40:02] is not complicated. There will be places where India needs to do much more
[40:07] to equalize what it's getting from Russia. A long way to go as far
[40:09] as that is concerned. But these two things I've mentioned show that even during
[40:15] the biggest upheaval of our time, probably Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, Russia,
[40:20] this relationship has actually endured and it goes beyond Sokhoy's and MiGs and tanks
[40:24] and things like that. Believe me, I think that's a very that's a
[40:29] brilliant answer because it also answers some of the questions that I've been having since
[40:31] I saw the visuals of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Putin, just thinking
[40:37] about how it turned out to be a much grander affair than what people initially
[40:40] thought it would be the fact that you had Russia sending I think the first
[40:45] deputy Prime Minister to to to see Modi at the to meet Modi at the
[40:50] airport, arrived there, which was a great hire than whom they sent for
[40:54] to meet presidentijinping from when he was there. That said something. So it's
[41:00] of asking about how you saw the meeting, because you've more or less answered,
[41:04] Have you saw the meeting. I'll then talk about the one thing that
[41:07] a few people have been talking about some on social media. A few geopoltic
[41:10] experts have also written about it, and it holds a very significant military value
[41:15] for India. Is the China connection. We won't spend a long answer on
[41:21] it, but there have been growing talks. There has been growing murmurs of
[41:24] Russia China getting closer. You've given us this very good example of how over
[41:30] the fifty sixty seventy years of our relationship, Russia has been spreadfastly with Us.
[41:34] You mentioned how in times of war and conflict it has been with US.
[41:37] Our wars and conflicts so far have you been Pakistan? Now? If
[41:43] I hope they don't happen, but if they happen, they are most definitely
[41:45] going to China. There's already been had. The stand up has been there
[41:47] for three four years. You've had the Kalban Many clash, which was a
[41:50] full fledged physical conflict. So any hypothetical war of the future India has ninety
[41:55] percent, my guesses, it would be with China. Do you think this
[42:00] sort of relationship that Russia has with India that it steadfast he stands with India
[42:07] would hold true even then, Or do you think that the people who are
[42:12] worried, the people who are saying that PM they needs to visit Moscow to
[42:15] counter Russia is growing a friendship with China just being you know, you know,
[42:20] being worried too soon and there's nothing that we should be seeing right now.
[42:22] Maybe we should wait for a couple of more. Look, you know,
[42:27] again, it's very tempting to look at you know, diplomacy and geopolitics
[42:31] in terms of binaries. You know, you know, if war breaks out
[42:35] between India and China, will Russia choose India or China? You know,
[42:38] if war breaks out between uh, you know, Russia and the US,
[42:43] will India choose Russia or US? It never works like that. Take take
[42:46] take an even more immediate example of Russia and Ukraine. We don't even need
[42:52] to go into hypotheticals and philosophies because the beauty or the actually the terrible thing
[42:58] about our world is we've got live examples in front of US. Russia and
[43:00] Ukraine is a live example of that. India has close relationship with both these
[43:06] countries. Please remember that Ukraine used to be a part of USSR. Ukraine
[43:09] became a separate country after the breakup of the USSR, and India has had
[43:15] close political, economic, cultural, and strategic and military relations with both these
[43:22] countries separately. We've discussed this in the past. Are Antonov three two aircraft,
[43:28] the engines that power our warships. Many different kinds of military electronics are
[43:34] manufactured in Ukraine. They are of Ukrainian origin. And the fact that Russia
[43:40] and Ukraine are at war has not for a moment meant that India has felt
[43:45] the need to take aside. In fact, India has exposed this Western predilection
[43:52] of US versus them, demonstrate on whose side you are you commit to a
[43:59] cause by not visiting Russia and all these myopic stupidities that the West is obsessed
[44:05] with because they can't they can't digest not having control over the rest of the
[44:09] world. For them, it is it is indigestible to see Modi going and
[44:14] meeting Putin. But Modi also met Zelenski just last month, yes on on
[44:19] on June the fourteenth, if I'm not mistaken, at the G seven he
[44:22] met Zelensky and he hugged him their first meeting. After after after a while,
[44:27] but they've been speaking regularly so there is no there is no yaa WO
[44:31] as far as India is concerned, And India has completely exposed Western hypocrisy visibly
[44:37] Russia and Ukraine by showing that India has a demonstrable, active, organic diplomatic
[44:45] relationship and dialogue with both these countries. And Modi visiting Russia does not mean
[44:51] that Modi doesn't have a relationship with Zelenski. Of course, Zelenski had,
[44:54] you know, bitter things to say about the hug between Modi and Putin.
[44:59] But what I this is the guy going to say on a day like that.
[45:01] Of course he's going to say it. He has to say it,
[45:04] because anyone meeting Putin, you know, shows up Zelenski. So so I
[45:08] don't think I don't think India has anything to prove as far as Russia is
[45:14] concerned. The examples are there right in front of it. India has made
[45:17] many missteps, many foreign policy mistakes. We can do a whole episode on
[45:22] what I think, you know, are the mistakes that India has made,
[45:24] especially in our neighborhood. But as far as Russia and Ukraine is concerned,
[45:28] I think that stands and speaks for itself in terms of how to how to
[45:34] handle a situation where you are friends with two countries who are at war.
[45:38] The only country, the only country and the only leader to stand face to
[45:43] face with Putin and say the solution is not on the battlefield. Who else
[45:46] has done that? And and please, this is not about MDI. This
[45:51] is about the office of the Indian Prime Minister. Forget forget about whether it's
[45:54] Modi or Man more on whoever it is. An Indian prime minister has student
[45:59] in front of Putin and said the solution is not on the battlefield. War
[46:04] is not an option in his face, yes, okay, And you've got
[46:07] the West melting down saying why you are guing, why are you signing deals?
[46:10] That is the truth of the Indian Russia relationship, the ability to look
[46:15] Russia in the eye and say these things. In fact, I think we've
[46:17] mentioned this once before, that the Russia Ukraine War, the entire episode has
[46:22] I think been the is a great example of Indian diplomacy being at its finest
[46:28] because even at the during Pmod's meeting with Putin this week, I don't know
[46:32] if many people noticed it, but there was a reference to children dying in
[46:37] Ukraine. That reference was worded very nicely. It was not worded in reference
[46:43] to the Ukraine War, by the way. It was worded in reference to
[46:45] conflicts and terrorist attacks. But it came a day after Ukraine accused Russia of
[46:50] bombing a children's hospital and killing a few children, and attack Russia has denied,
[46:53] so obviously India could not have made a straight reference direct. However,
[46:58] I was quite quite truck to hear him say it live, for him to
[47:01] say it, but put sitting right next to him, that was quite something.
[47:05] So that that I think gives you an example of how diplomacy was working.
[47:09] Right now, Right as we end this episode, we'll just go back
[47:13] to sort of a nerdy moment because we've spent a large part of this episode
[47:16] talking about Russian equipment. One, a personal question for you, what is
[47:21] your favorite, absolute favorite Russian piece of equipment that is there, perhaps in
[47:25] a military or perhaps it's not in there somewhere else. And second, you
[47:30] must you must have met several generations of officers, you know, who've operated
[47:34] all these Russian piece of Russian equipment. You must have also met the newer
[47:37] bunch who are now being exposed to some Western equipment that we have rushly inducted
[47:42] or maybe you know they've come across at you know, the joint exercise and
[47:45] stuff like that. Uh. And this is just a personal question for them
[47:49] as well. I'm not asking in terms of because obviously we've discussed this.
[47:52] The officers or the even the high senior officers, they don't decide matters of
[47:55] military deals. That's a this didn't take Indian governments. I'm not talking about
[47:59] you or I'm talking about their personal favorites. They must be like a plane
[48:02] on would you have a one look to you that looks so sexy? Yeah,
[48:06] they have these preferences. So my favorite, and you know it's a
[48:09] controversial choice, but I'll qualify it. My favorite is the Make twenty one
[48:14] because you know, it's an aircraft that has you know that that triggers emotions
[48:19] in people because of the associations with it, whether it is you know Raan
[48:23] de Basanti or the ABJ Guard guilt case, so many many tragic losses that
[48:29] India has suffered, you know, in terms of pilots because of the Make
[48:32] twenty one. But it's it's also a misunderstood aircraft because this is an aircraft
[48:37] that was operated in such large numbers and with so many flights every day that
[48:43] the rate of accidents was good. Point was was, you know, commence
[48:47] with the amount it was being used and the numbers which were actually being operated.
[48:52] So in terms of accident rate, many of our listeners and viewers would
[48:57] be perhaps shocked to know that the Make twenty one wasn't actually India's unsafest aircraft.
[49:02] It was actually the mid twenty three slash Make twenty seven that was many
[49:07] degrees more unsafe in terms of accident rate, commensurate with the number of aircraft
[49:10] that you had. So the mid twenty one was called the Flying Coffin and
[49:15] the widow Maker and you know, all these all these horrible, horrible things,
[49:19] which has given it a kind of sticky reputation as an unsafe aircraft service
[49:22] may a BBQ, Atador, retired Kardo and and you know, a part
[49:28] of it is not unreasonable. The mid twenty one is a is an old
[49:32] piece of equipment that doesn't belong in any modern air force. But it's not
[49:37] like the mid twenty one has remained in the force because someone loves it,
[49:40] or because of sentimental reasons, or because of you know, some you know
[49:46] some intangible emotion in somebody's head. It's not that the Air Force has a
[49:51] very difficult job to do in terms of maintaining numbers. The other the other
[49:54] point is that the mid twenty one, after it was upgraded, was actually
[49:59] transformed into a really formidable, you know, frontline interceptor aircraft. Bible.
[50:06] We saw it, you know, the mid twenty one Bison, with the
[50:08] kind of intercept radar that it has, you know, the kind of equipment
[50:13] that it has, actually became a you know, you know, a fighter
[50:16] aircraft that you wouldn't want to go up against because you can barely see it
[50:20] in a you know, in a visual environment. It had beyond visual range
[50:24] weapons, very very agile, et cetera. So we saw what happened with
[50:30] the Abinandan, et cetera. I mean, that's a completely controversial issue,
[50:34] you shut down. But the very fact that the Indian Air Force would send
[50:37] up a mid twenty one in that kind of battle tells you everything about the
[50:40] faith that the Indian Air Force has in that aircraft. Beautiful aircraft. They're
[50:44] retiring very soon. I'm hoping to get a flight in one before it,
[50:46] before they finally you know, fold up their wings. But yeah, probably
[50:50] won't happen. But yeah, the mid twenty one is foreign pilots, especially
[50:53] American and European pilots, when they come for joint exercises in India, their
[50:59] big twish is that they get to fly one of the Indian aircraft. Not
[51:02] everyone else, not every not every one of them gets a chance, but
[51:07] some of them do. So some of them do fly backseat in a Sirkoy
[51:09] or Mike twenty nine. Uh and and for them it's a it's a rollicking
[51:15] big moment for them. And it's not it's it's it's not novelty value.
[51:19] It's not like a Amaripa's body Shanda aircraft. But let me do it just
[51:23] for fun, like you know at an amusement park. It's not at all
[51:28] Pilots have you know, you and I can talk down and up about aircraft,
[51:31] but pilots have very, very you know, ironclad respect for what these
[51:37] aircraft can do because these are these are things that kill. And there is
[51:39] a respect for military hardware, you know. You know, we can go
[51:44] all boys with toys and nerd out and geek out about aircraft, but for
[51:46] these men and women, now, these are weapons that that destroys cities or
[51:52] destroy countries, and therefore there's a huge amount of respect for Russian equipment.
[51:57] And I've had long conversations with American pilots about Russian equipment. And I had
[52:00] a conversation with one senior American pilot in Kalakunda and in West Bengal during the
[52:06] one of the COPE India exercises India US exercises, and and he'd just flown
[52:10] in a Soukhoi and he was like, he's like, this is better than
[52:14] anything I've ever flown. He said, I love I loved it, you
[52:16] know, And I probed. I said, you're just saying that because it
[52:21] was like novelty, right because Cold War. You know, you're an old
[52:23] guy, you're like a major general, and you you've flown American fighters all
[52:27] your life, probably been trained against Russian fighters, and now you're flying the
[52:30] enemy fighter. He said, all that is true, but this is a
[52:34] fabulous aircraft. And I managed to do things in it that you know,
[52:37] I'd only heard soukoys could do in terms of maneuverability and things like that.
[52:42] And you know, it's all true, the legend is true. And he
[52:44] had to sparkle in his eye and stuff. So that kind of thing is
[52:46] real. The level of interest and respect for Russian equipment, you know,
[52:52] despite all these differences that I've just described, is definitely there. Yeah right,
[52:55] I think we'll ended there a fun episode once again, fun Chat.
[52:59] Love your last answer, and I think it's also an important one on a
[53:02] serious note, because the way you describe the technical fact of make twenty lines
[53:07] and the number of aircraft you operated one sorry, and the subsequent crash trade
[53:13] is very important because I, yeah, I remember because I have grown up
[53:15] reading those headlines that you talked about. I've grown up seeing those phrases,
[53:20] and as a child I didn't understand them obviously, but then I joined journalism
[53:23] and I was able to make sense of it. And then you, you
[53:25] talk to a journalist like you, make even greater sense of it. So
[53:30] thanks, thanks for that answer, and thanks for the episode, fun Chat.
[53:32] Thanks as always to our producer additionally, and to our listeners and viewers.
[53:37] That's it for this week's defense. Does for more tune in next week
[53:38] till then, stay safe and not toss any boundaries that passport

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