# Why Arunachal Pradesh gets under China’s skin | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 18

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 4 Apr 2024, 59 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/59293923/04_apr_24_iod_4_april_mix_128.mp3

This week, China released a fresh list of 'renamed' places in Arunachal Pradesh. This was yet another attempt by Beijing to assert its claim over the north-eastern Indian state that for long China has claimed to be its "integral part". India called China's move to rename the places "senseless", saying, "Assigning invented names will not alter the reality that Arunachal Pradesh is, has been, and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India. The development brings into focus the fact that Arunachal Pradesh is, and has been, a core subject of India-China tensions. On this episode of In Our Defence, host Dev Goswami and defence expert and senior journalist Shiv Aroor trace the history of tensions between India and China over Arunachal Pradesh. The two revisit the 1962 war, where India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese army, a defeat that was particularly humiliating in the Arunachal Pradesh, then known as the North-East Frontier Agency, sector. They discuss the lessons learnt from the war and where things stand today. Also on the episode is a dive into why dealing with China - militarily or diplomatically - is such a challenge and, at times, frustrating. Tune in.

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India today podcasts. Unlike Pakistan, you know, which was a
[0:07] part of India. You know, the people are from there, are of
[0:10] you, you know, from the same roots. You regard them. They've
[0:13] got the same language. We look the same for most part, you know.
[0:16] So there are all those cultural similarities as well. China is like this
[0:19] kind of alien other. It's another race, it's another people. It's they're
[0:23] very distant, they're very mysterious about their intentions. Do people know that Arnachal
[0:27] Pradesh became a state as recently as nineteen eighty seven, Nanda da Ji Gandhi
[0:31] as Prime minister. Do people know that before nineteen seventy two, the word
[0:35] Aaronachil didn't even exist for a place in India. It was called the Northeast
[0:39] Frontier Agency. China, by occupying, invading, an annexing Tibet in the
[0:45] nineteen fifties, basically became a neighbor of India by virtue of its actions,
[0:49] not by virtue of India's actions, not by virtue of Tibet's actions, by
[0:53] virtue of its own territorial appetite. China knows that there's no war to be
[0:58] had. You can't win a war here there to be able to take territory
[1:00] because this is the Indian Army. Now, the army knows your game.
[1:03] The Indian Army knows your mental makeup, they know they know all your playbooks.
[1:08] Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on all things well
[1:14] defense where I They've go Swami, your host, along with senior journalist Shivarur,
[1:19] break down the world of conflicts that range from the subtle to the brutal.
[1:23] We bring you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at times provoke.
[1:30] This is In Our Defense. Hello and welcome to the eighteenth episode of In
[1:36] Our Defense. Hello, Shif, how are you basic? Collecting awards these
[1:38] days? Just the usual as the issue. Yeah, it's been a nice
[1:44] awards season here for podcasts in general and for everyone at a group as well.
[1:49] Yeah, so Shiv won the Best Anchor award at the NBA Awards that
[1:53] too, held over the weekend. And one of our podcasts, Nothing but
[1:57] the Truth, hosted by our in your colleague Rach who's the oral rator of
[2:02] publishing for Nearder Group one. So congrats to sir, and congress to another
[2:07] producer of that show as well, by the way and as also our producer.
[2:10] So yeah, so reflected glory for in our defense exactly. Yeah.
[2:15] So have you been have you a week? It's been a good week,
[2:17] but you know, less and less defense and more and more politics. We're
[2:23] in April now, so, which means we're in the same month as the
[2:27] elections actually starting. And every time this happens, I actually have to remind
[2:30] myself, Oh so here you are doing another election when you had promised last
[2:35] year that this would be your last election. So well yeah, yeah,
[2:38] yeah, right, So we are not discussed China this week because of a
[2:44] recent development that happened. Haven't said development per se, but it's just like
[2:47] news headlines of China going along and renaming, uh so to speak around twenty
[2:53] places in Pladesh, which China has historically claimed as part of its territory.
[2:58] It's never been actually physically an occupation of that of that region. It's always
[3:01] been part of India, and India rightfully said that, you know, imaginary
[3:06] changing of names is not going to do. They're basically saying that they are
[3:08] just like living in a dream world. So we won't really spend much time
[3:13] on the optics of fate because there are no optics of it. The national
[3:15] reaction to it also pretty straightforward that you know, it's India sedretary, so
[3:19] I mean generally has no claim over it. And they've been doing this for
[3:22] a while, especially in the last few years. It's been a recent trend
[3:24] of them going out and just like you know, changing names or what they
[3:28] call it, regularizing names of certain regions of what they claim to be part
[3:31] of Chinese seltary. But we'll talk about China and we will not talk like
[3:38] we did in a previous episode of only of the events that have happened in
[3:40] the aftermath of the Galawan Valley clash or the dog club stand up that happened
[3:45] a few year a couple of years before that clash, or the ongoing standoff,
[3:47] because we've spent an entire episode on that. But I actually want to
[3:51] kind of go back to the history, the history of how the tensions between
[3:55] India and China began in the first place, and especially the history of when
[4:00] you've been discussing what we should discuss this year this episode on our WhatsApp group,
[4:03] you had rightfully said that you know, this is a region where India
[4:06] took a severe beating to the sixty two war. The war was for on
[4:10] two fronts. You had the western sector, which was your La dark region,
[4:14] and you had your Eastern sector, which was your region. I think
[4:17] in the western sector, India had some battles to be proud of, including
[4:23] that famous Battle of Razangla, which obviously well we'll get into as we talk
[4:27] deeper in this episode, Butesh. I think India mostly and mostly so defeats
[4:31] China was able to invade quite quite quite far far in before the ceasefire,
[4:36] and then they kind of vacated because they said okay, sexpir etcetera. Before
[4:41] we go to that war, before we talk about the history of tensions,
[4:44] I want to briefly ask you about your journey in the media industry as a
[4:48] defense reporter and you're shifting of reporting from Pakistan to China, because like we
[4:56] discussed, like we mentioned in the first episode of season two that you know,
[4:59] Pakistan is not something that might come up much, China is. How
[5:02] was the journey for you When did your shift in reporting towards China happening?
[5:06] You know, that's a that's a really amazing question that you know, most
[5:10] people don't actually think about a lot from a reporter's perspective, because you know,
[5:15] as a as a military and a defense journalist, Pakistan is that very
[5:18] well well rounded, well you know, well identified, kind of villain of
[5:24] the piece, right, You've got all your stories as far as partition are
[5:27] concerned, the wars that have been fought between India and Pakistan, and you
[5:30] know, all the things that you know, we've been brought up to regard
[5:33] Pakistan with makes Pakistan an easy villain. So the journey from considering Pakistan as
[5:40] India's main sort of strategic adversary to finally evolving to look at China has been
[5:46] a very difficult one, I can tell you that because even now, you
[5:47] know, India continues to be very Pakistan obsessed. I'm talking about in the
[5:51] media media. It's only post twenty twenty that we've started seeing a greater,
[5:56] you know, realization that the country that you know genuinely wishes us harm and
[6:02] has the capacity to cause that harm is China. That's where our competition is.
[6:06] So so to move moving from that kind of obsessive hyphenation with Pakistan to
[6:12] looking at us as a far bigger you know, Pakistan is somewhere in the
[6:16] rearview mirror, whereas China is looming in front of us. Has been something
[6:20] of a journey now once you acknowledge that China is your main adversary. It's
[6:27] been as a reporter, I can tell you it's a it's a far more
[6:29] difficult thing to process because unlike Pakistan, you know, which was a part
[6:33] of India. You know, the people are from there, are off you,
[6:36] you know, from the same roots, you regard them, You've got
[6:40] the same language, we look the same for most part, you know,
[6:44] so there are all those cultural similarities as well. China is like this kind
[6:47] of alien other. Right, it's another race, it's another people. It's
[6:51] they're very distant, you know, they're very mysterious about their intentions. And
[6:57] therefore covering China is a completely completely different ballgame. No similarity is whatsoever.
[7:02] You know. Even the even you know, Pakistan for instance, has a
[7:06] kind of has had a kind of outreach. I've I've been to many uh
[7:11] uh you know events at the Pakistan High Commission. There have been efforts to
[7:14] try and you know, talk to journalists and kind of cultivate people, et
[7:16] cetera. Not that I who's ever cultivated, but I'm just saying, uh,
[7:20] and but as far as the Chinese are concerned, they're They're very different
[7:24] in the way they do things. So those cultural differences, obviously, the
[7:28] geographical distance, the fact that India and China have only fought one major war,
[7:32] they have very little in common apart from these these links obviously made it
[7:36] a very very distant kind of journey. Right, So let's get to it.
[7:41] Then let's get to a topic of discussion, and again before we go
[7:45] to the genesis of tensions, the history of the war, et cetera.
[7:48] And understanding, uh, someone who like you, who's been covering the world
[7:53] of strategies or strategic defense, et cetera for for so many years, the
[7:57] importance for China of laying lay to those two regions Excite Chain, which it
[8:01] occupies and Arona British, which it does not. Historically, since we read
[8:05] about India ten attentions, it's historically been said that China has always claimed these
[8:09] these two territories, even though there is there is some argument that there is
[8:15] no proof of China actually having any links with Accession altogether. It's just after
[8:18] it initid Tibet and took that over, then it was Let's and it was
[8:22] the British Tibert Agreement, the McMahon line, which China refuses to acknowledge anyway,
[8:28] So why does China lay claim to British Why does it lay claim and
[8:33] occupy axcessation? What is so important for it? It's almost like a sort
[8:35] of a pincer on India, right, two opposite ends of your luc sorry
[8:39] lac, and you have no not much disagreement. There are some, but
[8:43] not much disagreements in the middle at all. So let's go back a few
[8:46] decades to you know, first put things into perspective as far as our natural
[8:50] are concerned. And I can tell you that most people are very surprised when
[8:54] they read about the history of our natural Pradesh because it's for large part it's
[8:58] not what they, you know, perhaps thought was the reality. For instance,
[9:01] do people know that Arnachal Pradesh became a state as recently as nineteen eighty
[9:05] seven? It became a state in nineteen eighty seven under Rajiv Gandhi as Prime
[9:09] minister. Do people know that before nineteen seventy two, the word Arnachial didn't
[9:15] even exist for a place in India. It was called the Northeast Frontier Agency.
[9:20] It was converted into a Union territory under Indira Gandhi right after the seventy
[9:24] one War and renamed Arunachal jess Arunachal and that was a Union territory. And
[9:28] then almost fifteen years later under Rajiv Gandhi, it was named Arunachal Pradesh and
[9:33] it became, you know, a full Indian state. That journey has been
[9:37] a difficult one because since the fifties and again going back to the fifties,
[9:41] now with China's invasion and occupation of Tibet, the huge spillover of the you
[9:48] know, of Tibetan citizens, including the Dalai Lama into India basically meant and
[9:52] this is this is once again something that a lot of people, you know,
[9:54] don't realize about China is. India and China have never been neighbors.
[9:58] We were never name we don't have a common border. China is noway close
[10:03] to India. There's this huge, massive country called Tibet right in the middle
[10:07] between India and China. China, by occupying, invading, an annexing Tibet
[10:13] in the nineteen fifties basically became a neighbor of India by virtue of its actions,
[10:20] not by virtue of India's actions, not by virtue of Tibet's actions,
[10:24] by virtue of its own territorial appetite. It's kind of insatiable appetite for expansion,
[10:31] geographic expansion, using all manner of you know, all manner of maps
[10:37] and civilizational nuggets and all kinds of very dubious and questionable elements and proof to
[10:43] justify this whole thing, which is the same way that it you know,
[10:48] that it justifies its hold on axceechin the same way that it justifies its claim
[10:54] on Arnachal Pradesh, which it calls Southern Tibet, and it has a name
[10:58] for it called Zangnag. I agree with you, Dave, when you say
[11:00] that, you know, China releasing an official list of names of rivers and
[11:03] mountains and towns and et cetera in Arunachal Pradesh is very much part of the
[11:09] old tired Chinese playbook, which is that, you know, short of military
[11:13] action, do everything else to occupy the enemy, frustrate them, play mind
[11:18] games with them, psychological operations, propaganda, you know, confuse them,
[11:22] bogged down their resources into replying to every one of your provocations, which we
[11:26] so gamely do with press releases and maa, you know, press conferences.
[11:31] But that's their job. I'm not saying it's wrong. But with China,
[11:35] India tends to be reactive and defensive. That has actually changed since twenty twenty,
[11:41] even though it actually began with a reaction to Chinese aggression. But since
[11:46] we're talking specifically about Arunachal Pradesh, since since the nineteen fifties, after the
[11:52] annexation of Tibet, when China basically became a de facto neighbor of India.
[11:56] And remember this was forty years after the McMahon line was drawn by the British
[12:01] in nineteen fourteen, nineteen fifteen, if I'm not mistaken, which they never
[12:03] regarded as correct. There were lots of dubious things said, even by the
[12:07] Tibetans about what that line really meant, but these were cleared up later between
[12:13] you know, representatives of the British and the Tibetans, and the McMahon line
[12:16] was drawn. Now shortly after the annexation of Tibet. We all know what
[12:20] happened between India and China in nineteen sixty two, a war was fought,
[12:24] and it was a war where India won many battles, small battles, but
[12:30] we lost the war very badly. There's no two ways of saying what the
[12:33] result of that war was. It was a major and profound defeat of the
[12:35] Indian military in nineteen sixty two at the hands of China. The reason why
[12:39] Arunachal is very important as far as the sixty two war is concerned is the
[12:43] Chinese invaders. The Chinese invading force controlled a part of Tawang which is the
[12:48] you know, which is the Tawang Corridor for a few days at the end
[12:52] of the war. They controlled territory inside Arunachal Pradesh for a few days.
[12:56] But as we all know, at the end of the war, they completely
[13:00] we drew after after the war ended, they completely withdrew because the result of
[13:03] the war was so so plain to see, you know that it was such
[13:07] a one sided affair, especially in that particular area, that the Chinese finally
[13:11] we drew. The reasons for there we draw all are still a matter of
[13:16] debate right now. Why didn't they just continue to stay there? There are
[13:18] various many theories for that. But they withdrew from a place which they now
[13:24] call zang Nang, right, which they now call South Tibet, which they
[13:26] now are naming places in et cetera. So while we do say that China
[13:30] has never occupied Arunachal Pradesh during the nineteen sixty two war, their military did
[13:35] control the Tawang sector. So that is a very very important thing to remember
[13:39] because that goes into the heart of why Arunachal is such a such a flashpoint
[13:43] issue as far as China is concerned. In the Chinese psyche, especially the
[13:48] Chinese military psyche, they've Arunachal Pradesh ta Wang, this sector, this area
[13:54] is seen as a you know, was seen as a low hanging fruit for
[13:56] China saying you know, we we we whack to you here once. The
[14:01] way they see it is telling India, we wacked you here once. Don't
[14:03] provoke us too much because then we'll just take warts hours. Now, India
[14:07] between the nineteen fifties and now is a vastly different India. The kind of
[14:11] India that the Chinese saw in nineteen sixty two when they fought was a brave
[14:16] was a very brave military as we saw in you know, battle after battle,
[14:20] including in Walong in Arunachal or Azanghla, as you said, were vastly
[14:26] smaller numbers of Indian soldiers. You know, out fought huge swarms of Chinese
[14:31] regiments and you know, held them off from strategic locations, which are amazing
[14:35] battles. But you know, as as fine as the fighting was, ultimately
[14:39] those those battles were lost and we lost hundreds of really really brave soldiers Kuma
[14:43] Regiment, Dratchpooth Regiment, et cetera. And the reason why I bring that
[14:48] up is because China has always believed that this is an easy place for us
[14:52] to win, except that post seventy two, after the seventy one war,
[14:56] when Bangladesh was liberated, and when the Indian military kind of you know,
[15:01] the Indian military was always seen as a brave and capable force. But we
[15:05] have to understand that post seventy one, that the identity and the reputation of
[15:09] the Indian military was sky high. It was a global reputation. It was
[15:13] no longer just a regional army or a regional air force. It was like,
[15:16] these guys mean business. They can liberate countries. You know, these
[15:20] are these are not the guys we fought in nineteen sixty two, so we
[15:22] have to play safe, which is when all the other things started happening,
[15:26] which is when China realized, Okay, we cannot fight a full fledged conventional
[15:31] war again with these guys because they've learned their lesson. Now they know how
[15:35] to fight a war. And if we fight a war, we're gonna lose
[15:37] a lot with these guys. So Aaronachal is no longer going to be something
[15:41] that we can you know, smack and grab. So we'll have to start
[15:45] playing some mind games. We will deploy in a big way. We will
[15:48] send in small infiltrators here and there, you know, the pinpricks here and
[15:52] their psychological mind games renamed towns and rivers and mountains, et cetera. And
[15:56] that's basically it right now. That is that is that is China as whole
[16:00] angle. As far as our Lachal pradation is concerned, there is nothing they
[16:03] can do about it. Yeah, right. Staying on the topic of the
[16:06] sixty two war, I want to bring in some politics over here now,
[16:08] And why not? I mean the selections cycle after all, and although the
[16:12] juicy in nineteen sixty two politics, Yeah, and I'm brittish, sure,
[16:15] this is going to get raked up at some point or the other during the
[16:18] during the the election campaign, bring it up even when they're not talking over
[16:23] But that's the second part of what I'm about to ask you to discuss.
[16:26] But the first part is slightly juvenile. But it may seem I'm not saying
[16:30] it is, but it may seem to be a bit of a juvenile question.
[16:33] Is was it or is it fair to expect the Indian army or the
[16:38] Indian military to have overcome Chinese forces in sixty two, because remember we were
[16:42] just a fifteen year old nation by then, fourteen fifteen year old nation.
[16:45] I'm not saying the army was The army is obviously older. It was part
[16:48] of the British Army. But the systems, the civilian systems that were overseeing
[16:52] the army. So I'm pretty sure the soldiers were welterrained, they were brave.
[16:55] The officers were weltered and they were brave. The internal army structure was
[16:57] there, but you had the civilian oversight right the Defense ministry, the Defense
[17:03] Minister of the day, etcetera, etcetera. That was fairly new. So
[17:06] the interaction between the civilians and the military officers was still sort of a work
[17:11] in progress. Like I said, forty to fifteen years just old. So
[17:14] before we get to the politics on this particular aspect, do you think we
[17:17] should perhaps give the military a benefit of the doubt because of that? Well,
[17:21] most definitely, you know. But the thing is, I don't believe
[17:25] that the Indian military should be blamed at all. I don't think they ought
[17:29] to take any share of the blame for what happened in nineteen sixty two,
[17:33] because, like you rightly said in your opening part of that question, it
[17:37] was very much, you know, the compounding of many reasons, including decisions
[17:41] taken at the civilian leadership level. And you know, as a student,
[17:45] as a student of war and a defense correspondent, I'm not one of those
[17:49] people who is going to sit here and say, oh, Nehru took all
[17:52] these terrible decisions, and oh he was foolish by not deploying the air force
[17:56] and things like that, because having Red War reports, having read you know,
[18:02] detailed, you know, detailed logs of how these things happened, these
[18:06] are incredibly complicated things. Okay, they only seemed sentimental and emotive if you
[18:11] sort of distill and reduce them into you know, little tamasha, you know,
[18:15] nuggets for social media. It's not like that at all. I'm not
[18:18] saying that bad decisions weren't made. Of course, bad decisions were made,
[18:22] and that's the reason why we India you know, lost the war, so
[18:27] you know, so convincingly. But the reason why the Indian military in many
[18:32] ways tactically was not prepared for the Chinese Chinese operations was they were ill prepared.
[18:38] They were not equipped. Well, let me go down to the tiniest
[18:42] nuts and bolts and then I'll talk about the larger decisions. They didn't have
[18:45] good high altitude equipment, going down to shoes that are famous anecdotal stories,
[18:52] many of them real about how in the Chushul sector many soldiers simply didn't have
[18:57] you know, reserve kits in terms of special clothing and this we're talking about
[19:02] freezing temperatures when this war was fought, right, they didn't have enough equipment
[19:07] to cross rivers like in the Eronatural sector. There were ammunition shortages in many
[19:12] areas. There were huge logistical problems in terms of delivering troops rapidly into places
[19:18] where the Chinese were coming in from as a result, they were able to
[19:22] pour in across the border in many places. So the military was simply not
[19:26] prepared for this. And the reason why it wasn't prepared is because we have
[19:30] to remember that after the forty seven conflict with Pakistan, there had been no
[19:36] war. The first war to be fought was the sixty two war, which
[19:38] means that the Indian military was not yet a war fighting military. It was,
[19:44] like you said, a freshly independent country. Fifteen years is a decent
[19:48] amount of time of peace, of relative piece of no real threat to you
[19:52] to think that you're not going to be a war fighting nation. All of
[19:55] that changed after sixty two. Sixty two is the war and the conflict that
[19:57] changed all of that, because then you sixty two, then you had sixty
[20:00] five, then you had seventy one, then you had ninety nine. Then
[20:03] you've got had all the you know, all the other militancy and terrorism in
[20:06] Kashmia, et cetera. So sixty two was a was a the heralder of
[20:11] what India would become as a war fighting nation. And therefore, I think
[20:15] the evolution of India and how it actually saw these things at that time changed
[20:19] very dramatically. The civilian leadership was caught completely off guard by the Chinese operations.
[20:25] Now, you know, we can we can sit here and make this
[20:27] about Nehru and others and personalities and stuff, but we all know that governments
[20:33] are large structures, and of course terrible, terrible errors of judgment were made,
[20:38] including not deploying the air force you know, for offensive operations. Many
[20:44] other similar anecdotal you know, nuggets exist of you know, bad decisions that
[20:49] were made. Certain promotions within the armed forces have become scandalous in nindsight about
[20:56] who was made the army chief, who was made the Eastern commander. All
[20:59] of these are very well done documented Dave, in terms of you know,
[21:00] how hindsight gives us clarity as of oh it's because of this that you know,
[21:06] we got whacked in our Nachal. Oh it's because this guy was sent
[21:08] there and the air force was not sent with him. That this is what
[21:11] happened in in La dark sector. So these are these things are easy to
[21:15] do. But I can tell you that there was there was an overt level
[21:19] of trust between Nehru and his counterpart in China. Uh. There was the
[21:26] Hindi Chini bye bye uh, you know, echoing between the two countries very
[21:30] prominently across uh. You know, the media such as it was at that
[21:34] time, radio et cetera, rudimentary television, and therefore the kind of sense
[21:38] of trust between India and China culturally speaking, publicly speaking was actually quite strong,
[21:44] which meant that the country was caught completely off guard when China moved in.
[21:48] So so so it was it was a violent and a bloody wake up
[21:52] call. But the brutal and you know, difficult thing to admit and most
[21:56] people will not admit it is that we were completely unprepared. The military was
[22:00] not. The military fought bravely. Remember, being unprepared is not the same
[22:03] thing as not being brave. They were even braver than normal because they didn't
[22:07] have what it really took to fight the huge hords of the Chinese, and
[22:11] thousands of soldiers paid with their lives because the system had not equipped them enough,
[22:18] had not perhaps given them adequate training, Perhaps deployments were not in tune
[22:22] with what the threat perception ought to have been. But you know, that's
[22:26] the sad reality of it, right. I'm glad you addressed that part about
[22:30] TURNHERU because whenever we use that term Neuki Galti. The most prominent one is
[22:37] the sixty two war, and not just the fact that India lost the war,
[22:40] but also the fact that the war happened in the first place. Because
[22:44] when I was reading and while I've been reading about this, one thing that
[22:47] stood very that stood a contrast with what people say that it was Nehru's fault
[22:51] at the war happened, is the fact that he always was firmly opposed to
[22:56] talking to China or negotiating with China on issue of giving up territory. Right.
[23:00] There was this proposal I think by Jau and Lai for India to seat
[23:04] control of excite chain and return for which China would say, okay, you
[23:07] can keep this with you. But Nero was completely against against it. Some
[23:11] people say that if he had actually agreed to that proposal, perhaps sixty two
[23:15] war may not have happened. So can you tell us can give us your
[23:21] overview of the lead up to the sixty two war, the fifties, the
[23:26] late fifties, and the couple of years. The so called Forward Policy of
[23:30] ninety sixty one that apparently was the one that you know kind of sparked the
[23:33] ultimate war with China, because China saw India's movement as part of the policies
[23:37] very aggressive. So do you think those were follies and or like what,
[23:41] we were a completely off guard, But do you think that those were follies?
[23:44] And do you think this is a good example of what China does Because
[23:47] there's also the counter argument that all this allies offer was just a way to
[23:52] kind of lull India into this. You know, it's a sort of a
[23:56] sub profuse ki. We are not doing anything. We're there to you know,
[23:57] parlay with you, make friends with you. But at the back,
[24:00] you know they were still planning this offensive. I agree the nineteen sixty two
[24:04] war was an act of war by China taking complete advantage of India's complacence,
[24:10] complete advantage of India's total sense of security visit ly China. That sense of
[24:15] security didn't exist Visivi Pakistan very importantly, it never existed after forty seven.
[24:19] But with China, that security existed because of the political you know, connections
[24:25] that Nehru had with the Chinese leaders Jauan La and the others. And therefore,
[24:30] you know this kind of strategic give and take. You know, you
[24:33] give us Excitechin and you keep Arnachal Pradesh. That didn't even really enter the
[24:37] equation because India was very far from realizing that China is not a country to
[24:41] be trusted. You know, those those offers were were hardly even taken seriously
[24:47] because because India had not yet woken up to the fact that this is a
[24:51] country that a never keeps its word, is only a country that respects strength,
[24:56] has an almost insatiable appetite for geographical expansion, which is justified through you
[25:02] know, a litany of falsehoods, historical falsehoods, false maps, false civilizational
[25:07] suggestions, et cetera. All of these things were brand new to India.
[25:11] I mean, India didn't even know these things, and the Indian leadership didn't
[25:14] know these things, and therefore China saw its opportunity. There was no provocation
[25:18] from India, There was no act of war from India that China responded to
[25:22] by invading. It was the Chinese seeing and and and probably correctly from their
[25:29] side, that this was a country that was not expecting war. This was
[25:33] a country that was not just complacent, but had been lulled thanks to Chinese
[25:38] you know, political you know, double speak into a false sense of security,
[25:44] and China saw its chance to to uh, you know, complete some
[25:48] of its objectives as far as territory is concerned, but also to also to
[25:52] kind of and and this goes to the point of why they didn't stay in
[25:56] a natural pradesh after occupying Tawang controlling the for a while they withdrew is that
[26:02] they wanted to show whose boss. It was a violent act of and remember
[26:06] there was no occupation of territory after that. This was China basically telling India
[26:10] we are not equals, so you better stay in your place. This can
[26:14] happen again if you push our buttons or you you know, speak out of
[26:18] place. That's what this was about, because China had control of Tawang.
[26:22] And the question of why they withdrew is still not I mean, many people
[26:26] have theories for it, but you know, if they've ever since claimed Arunachal
[26:30] pradeshas South Tibet and our territory and zang Nang and naming places out of it,
[26:33] why didn't they simply complete their campaign from there on? There are theories
[26:37] that the Chinese were so battered, you know, we think that we got
[26:41] it was a humiliating defeat for India. But China lost a lot in that
[26:45] war. They won a convincing, you know, military operation finally at the
[26:49] end of it a campaign, but they suffered enormous damage at the hands of
[26:53] a far less prepared, far less equipped India. So it's not like they
[26:56] didn't lose. They lost a lot, but they met their military objectives,
[27:00] and their military objectives was to occupy a very strategic part of India and to
[27:06] convey a political message to India that this is not an equal relationship. We
[27:11] are infinitely more powerful than you, and should push come to shove, we
[27:17] will employ this very same brute force to push you to the side and meete
[27:22] our military objectives. That's what the nineteen sixty two was, right. One
[27:26] of the theories for them drawing from from Tawanga, like you said, I
[27:32] was actually going to come to this point a bit later in the episode,
[27:34] but since you mentioned theories about them with drawing from there, one of the
[27:37] theories is that the winter was fast approaching, because I think it was November
[27:40] when the CES five renounced, and the Chinese were basically scared that they might
[27:42] not be able to make it through the winter. So you know, I
[27:45] think Abhishik Bala was on the season one of this podcast. I think he
[27:48] had perhaps one said it, and I want your thoughts on it, just
[27:52] a very brief side today. Let's not talk about sixty two but today,
[27:56] and I think I've heard this, you know, from some other defense journalists
[27:59] as well. Is India's mountain fighting capability and winter fighting capability better than China
[28:06] because I've heard about China not being able to survive well during the winter,
[28:10] even during the current stand up that India, even if it's a strategical advantage
[28:14] in some places, China still faces much greater losses in terms of people because
[28:18] of the weather. They have to rotate that troops at a much faster rate
[28:22] than India has to. Is that one hundred And I'll start with the Tawang
[28:27] example, and then i'll talk talk about Ladak because I've actually seen this myself.
[28:32] The theory that the Chinese, you know, felt the need to withdraw
[28:34] from Tawang because of the winter months, I feel it's only partially explains the
[28:41] withdrawal because what it took for the Chinese to actually meet that military objective was
[28:47] an enormous loss. Enormous loss at the hands of India. India lost much
[28:52] more, but I'm saying that the Chinese lost as well, and they had
[28:55] huge reserve forces, you know, on the Tibetan plateau, so it's not
[29:00] I know, this is sounding very simplistic and easy for me to say that
[29:03] they could have easily you know, you know, rotated troops faster in order
[29:07] to maintain control of the Tawang sector. But that explains at least part of
[29:11] it that I agree with. Now, if you cut forward all those years
[29:15] now to twenty twenty onwards, I have seen not only pictures and videos which
[29:21] I was not allowed to take unfortunately, during the writing of my books post
[29:25] Galwan, post the you know, the skirmishes that have happened in Pangong,
[29:29] et cetera. Not only do the Chinese have a faster degree of rotation of
[29:33] troops, but their rate of high altitude pulmonary edema or HAPPO, which is
[29:40] the most common high altitude sickness which can be fatal, is to an order
[29:45] of about ten to fifteen times that of Indian troops. And in the weeks
[29:49] following the Gualwan clash, Indian observation posts on top of the mountains which had
[29:55] telescopic sites observing what was happening on the Chinese side, would see new a
[30:00] constant stream of soldiers on stretchers being brought down from the mountains, and you
[30:06] know, and every day, nearly six helicopter ambulances taking these stretchers to lower
[30:11] lying areas where they could be treated, and this would happen daily, Like
[30:14] daily, there would be like tens of soldiers being taken away with high altitude
[30:18] sickness, which meant that hundreds of Chinese soldiers were either getting sick. We
[30:23] don't know what their fate was, but it's it's quite likely that many of
[30:26] them, you know, succumbed to those to those symptoms, and they were
[30:30] simply not prepared for it because a the Chinese had probably thought that after the
[30:34] Galvant clash, the Indians would you know, sort of withdraw and give them
[30:37] that space and they'd be able to bring in their sort of mountain brigades and
[30:41] stuff. But after the clash that happened, and after the kind of huge
[30:45] mobilization that followed across the entire eastern Ladak sector, the Chinese were completely And
[30:51] China is not a country that is caught off guard. Very often, but
[30:53] they were caught off guard in the sense that they completely underestimated how India would
[30:57] respond. Their sense of India is a bit of a peace snake, a
[31:02] pushover, you know, let's talk and resolve this kind of country. That
[31:06] changed completely and we saw that in the especially in the manner in which India,
[31:11] you know, occupied territory on what China claims is their territory across the
[31:17] line of control, line of actual control, and which, as we've discussed
[31:19] in a previous episode, they continue to hold. It's just not reported,
[31:22] yes, and I'm not permitted to reveal what those posts are. But in
[31:26] terms of high altitude survivability, the experience that they've had, one has to
[31:33] remember that the Chinese Chinese experience as far as high altitude warfare is extremely small.
[31:40] Their entire tradition of having mountain divisions is practically non existent. India has
[31:45] had not only had mountain divisions for the longest time, but has a permanent
[31:49] presence in schines eighteen thousand feet super high altitude areas, and you have soldiers
[31:56] from the Madras Regiment there. It's not like you have people only from hilly
[32:00] states who are deployed there. You have soldiers from all over the country deployed
[32:06] in places like Tawang Bumla, Siachin, And these are super ilitude areas thirteen
[32:09] fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen thousand feet and they deployed there.
[32:14] It's not like they go there and come back. They deployed there for
[32:15] like months together. And I can tell you that being deployed on a mountain
[32:20] for a long time rarefied air, you know, difficult to fight. It
[32:23] creates a new kind of warrior. It creates a new kind of culture,
[32:28] It creates a new kind of warrior. So there is no doubt that the
[32:30] Indian Army is far better prepared for mountain warfare than the Chinese. Yeah.
[32:35] In fact, in some of the documentaries about the sciatch in Glaysia, I've
[32:37] heard officers and soldiers say that the biggest enemy at that place is actually the
[32:42] weather at the mountain, not Pakistan or China, which by the way,
[32:45] is quite close to Siatchan the border at least. Right, we'll discuss now
[32:50] a bit about the years after the war and where we are at today,
[32:53] especially in terms of councial because that doesn't really come up very often unless China
[32:58] goes and does what it did this week, but after a quick click,
[33:06] pany pany panyo, so beautiful, so elegant, just looking like a wow
[33:14] eh bang? Was that enough crunch for you? Because this cringe fest doesn't
[33:21] stop here. Yes, And if by watching such reals and viral videos you
[33:24] think your life is becoming moem, then I cost them and me Anna will
[33:30] bring the most puke worthy, nauseating and repulsive trends on social media and will
[33:37] maybe enact some of them, but most of all discuss and seriously dissect these
[33:42] trends. So get ready to laugh, cringe and question humanity. Dropping soon
[33:47] on Spotify, Apple Podcasts and wherever you get your cringe I mean audio entertainment
[33:52] from So let's talk cringe. Welcome back, Shiv and I are discussing India
[34:04] and China once again, but this time we are talking a bit more of
[34:07] the history of India and China's relationship and the tensions along the lc. We've
[34:12] talked about the sixty two War in the years after, so obviously, like
[34:15] Shift said in the first half of this episode, that the sixty two War
[34:19] was a huge wake up call that you cannot trust China that even if you
[34:22] want to be friendly with China, you have to keep your guard up at
[34:24] least while you go about doing your negotiations. That was a wake up call,
[34:30] obviously. However, the shift that I have seen in my lifetime from
[34:35] Pakistan to India, the shift that you described at the beginning of this episode,
[34:37] the shift that several military officers and veterans will tell you has happened maybe
[34:43] in the last decade decade and a half. It didn't happen immediately after the
[34:46] sixty two war. I'm pretty sure at the tactical level, maybe there were
[34:52] changes being brought to, you know, kind of ensure that the Chinese threat
[34:55] was taken care of, but it did not happen at the larger level.
[35:00] Do you blame that on the fact that we had to go to war with
[35:02] Pakistan a few years later and then in seventy one have to liberate Bangladesh,
[35:07] which automatically led towards sort of a politics that kept India Pakistan obsessed. Or
[35:12] do you think it was just it was just something that would naturally take its
[35:16] take a very long cost to You're right, Dave, that the sixties were
[35:20] basically a war fighting decade India for two very destructive, was one in which
[35:24] it lost, you know, against China, the sixty five war. Even
[35:30] though India sort of tactically won that war, it ended with a ceasefire,
[35:35] un mandated seasfire. But it was the seventy one War that actually had a
[35:40] very very profound effect, not just in terms of India's obsession, as you
[35:45] said, with Pakistan's concerned, which is totally true, but it also triggered,
[35:50] you know, the history of what we now know as Arunachal Pradesh,
[35:53] because, like I said at the beginning of this podcast, Arunachal Pradesh became
[35:59] a Union territory only after the nineteen seventy one war. There was a recognition
[36:05] that this was a part of the country that was that was vulnerable and it
[36:08] needed, you know, it needed a greater amount of political capital, because
[36:13] in a country like ours, everything flows from political capital. If you don't
[36:16] give it political capital, political identity, attention, state borders, et cetera,
[36:22] you know, it will always be seen obscurely as Northeast Frontier Agency and
[36:25] Northeas Frontier Agency was such a sort of anodyne name for a place as beautiful
[36:30] as Arnacho. So that's a side note. Of course, Nachal is an
[36:34] absolutely gorgeous part of the country, well connected. Now there are flights to
[36:38] another et cetera. So if you haven't been there, you must go coming.
[36:43] But coming back to my point, the seventy two war not only triggered
[36:45] the creation of Arnachal as a Union territory, but also, like I said,
[36:51] opened the kind of political pipeline to that state. The tyranny of distance
[36:57] started to end. That tyranny of distance still exis, of course, but
[37:00] it started to end because there was a recognition that what we've done now with
[37:05] Bangladesh is in a part of the country where India will be vulnerable going forward.
[37:09] You know, we've we've done the unthinkable. We've liberated a country,
[37:14] We've split Pakistan into two, and therefore we now have more enemies. And
[37:20] remember that this was also the time when the China Pakistan access was forming and
[37:23] consolidating and becoming much closer. They were they were friends even before that,
[37:29] but the seventies is when China and Pakistan started to become much closer than normal.
[37:34] So and this was a strategic problem for India because they had they had
[37:37] split Pakistan into two. They had managed to liberate Bangladesh. But then you
[37:40] had this looming presence of China allying with Pakistan in order to meet strategic objectives
[37:47] as far as India was concerned, you know, access to the Arabian Sea
[37:52] and all those other things we've discussed in a previous podcast as far as the
[37:54] Indian Ocean is concerned. So therefore Arunachal became politically important. It got its
[38:00] own identity, it got its own name. Fifteen years later, in eighty
[38:05] seven, it became Arnachal Pradesh as an actual state. And if we cut
[38:09] forward, it was in the seventies that the importance of fortressing Arnachial Pradesh.
[38:15] Obviously, India already knew that China had ambitions as far as Arnachial Predesh was
[38:20] concerned. China had already started playing mind games. The annexation of Tibet was
[38:23] complete. You know, there were exercises happening very close to the border as
[38:29] they currently are as well right now. And therefore, India began investing around
[38:34] the seventies and eighties in large scale infrastructure projects in Arunachal Pradesh. And the
[38:39] reason for this is Arnachil Pradesh sits on terrain which, unlike the Tibetan plateau,
[38:45] is much more difficult terrain. China has a huge advantage on the Tibetan
[38:51] side of the McMahon line because it's much flatter terrain, unlike Arnachel, which
[38:54] is just valleys and mountains and you know, ravines and stuff. It's extremely
[39:00] hostile terrain. Rachal Pradesh where it is where it is profoundly difficult to build
[39:06] infrastructure. An example is the Seila Tunnel which the Prime Minister inaugurated last month.
[39:10] It has taken a long time to build that tunnel and India is had
[39:15] to overcome huge engineering challenges to actually build, unlike China, which has been
[39:20] building airfields, you know, building building roads, RoadHead tunnels all the way
[39:24] up to the border with a greater sense of ease because the Tibetan plateau on
[39:29] their side is actually far gentler terrain, less unpredictable, et cetera, less
[39:35] mountainous, and it's more plataui ish as it's called. And therefore India realized
[39:38] that this is a place that's going to be vulnerable and we have to we
[39:42] can't let it. We can't let this be a place where a real big
[39:46] attack will happen. And the post nineteen sixty do trust deficit fueled India into
[39:52] action and was energized even more by the nineteen seventy one victory to pay a
[39:59] greater deal of a tension to Arnachal, so political capital, huge amount of
[40:02] infrastructure, you know, a kind of consolidation of military deployments over there in
[40:07] a very big way. That's when you've got you know, mountain divisions deployed
[40:10] there in a big way, equipment being frontline equipment, and aircraft being deployed
[40:15] in this particular sector in a big way. Advanced landing grounds being built.
[40:21] All of this started way back then. It's only become visible now because it
[40:24] moved very slowly in the seventies and eighties. It started picking up speed in
[40:29] the you know, in the nineties, in the nineteen nineties under PIVN,
[40:31] Narsimaraw and others and then a post that you know under the UPA government.
[40:36] Also, a lot of work was done as far as advanced landing grounds are
[40:38] concerned. And if you look at if you look at Arunachal Pradesh, now
[40:43] Ladak is like a place where you know, it's it's easier in the headlines.
[40:46] You know, you can relate to what's happening there because it's closer to
[40:50] Delhi and you know, the Chinese are sitting there. You know about Ladad
[40:52] most many more people have been to Lada than they've been to Arnachal Pradesh and
[40:57] therefore it's easier to process mentally. In Anes You've got the Chinese sitting there
[41:00] in the big numbers as well. They're infiltrating and creating tamasha there as well.
[41:06] We've seen viral videos of them getting whacked by Indian soldiers as well from
[41:08] the Punjab Regiment of I remember correctly, with lots of you know, colorful
[41:14] words being said as those Chinese soldiers are beaten. But so so India's focus
[41:20] on Naal Pradesh has taken a long time to build up. And China knows
[41:24] that. Uh, you know, Brahmacelani was on my show, very well
[41:29] respected strategic thinker, and he said, China knows that there's there's no war
[41:34] to be had. You can't win a war here. They're not going to
[41:36] be able to take territory because this is the Indian Army. Now, the
[41:38] Indian Army knows your game. The Indian Army knows your mental makeup, they
[41:43] know they know all your playbooks, they know you salami. You know Salami
[41:46] slicing sort of strategies and methodologies. So there's nothing that you could to achieve
[41:52] here. You can continue to kind of bog down India with your mind games,
[41:57] but Nachal will not be touched. I'm already brought that up because actually
[42:00] I was going to go to that, but since you've completed the whole I
[42:05] don't need to the fact that things are quite hot there as well, because
[42:07] like you said in the media, we tend to focus, at least for
[42:09] the last four years post the Galvana Valley incident, the clash, we tend
[42:15] to focus on Ladak and even in the few years before that, you know,
[42:19] we used to focus mostly on Adak when it came to an India China
[42:21] standard. But things are quite hot over there, and like you said,
[42:23] the Army has built up its strength there as well. I'll move to back
[42:29] to what you had said at the beginning of this episode when I asked you
[42:31] about your journey and your change of reporting focus from Pakistan to China. As
[42:36] far as India's main strategic enemy is concerned what was it like for the military
[42:42] and what was it like for the military officers, because you know, there's
[42:45] also a fun question there. Actually, I remember one of those viral videos
[42:50] where you know, there was a lot of a lot of jostling involved,
[42:53] some pushing involve et cetera, and the Indian Army officer was kind of trying
[42:59] to calmly tell his Chinese counterpart that you know, this is artillery whatever whatever
[43:02] something. Uh, the Chinese officer did not know English to hear a translator.
[43:07] That guy looked, sounded and behaved both of them, the interpreter and
[43:13] the officer very rudely, very obnoxiously. I've heard from people like you,
[43:17] from people like Abishi Bala that whenever these guys sit down for their you know,
[43:22] whenever it happens the four comander level meetings, the Chinese officers are usually
[43:25] very frustrating, brash, Sometimes they get angry, they try to provoke you,
[43:30] et cetera. At the beginning of the episode, you had talked about
[43:34] how understanding a new culture because Pakistan, at the end of the day,
[43:37] we come from the same sort of a sort of a culture, so we
[43:39] kind of you know, but this is a new culture. They have a
[43:44] new way of operating, They have a foreign language that we don't know,
[43:45] et cetera. For the army, even the army does not do much talking.
[43:49] I mean there's always fighting, but still for the army, for the
[43:52] for these officers. This is also that problem for cultural shift barrier that comes
[43:58] when it comes to dealing with Chinese army. There has been that cultural challenge.
[44:01] But I can tell you that India has overcome that cultural challenge by giving
[44:06] it right back on the only way to deal with bullies is to give give
[44:08] it to them right back, which is what has been happening since twenty twenty.
[44:12] Now. You're absolutely right, because I've also seen this that Chinese soldiers.
[44:16] It's a cultural thing because it's not their personality. They've been trained to
[44:20] be bullies because you know, like in India, the system, the system
[44:27] will shape what your military is like. And the military culture in China is
[44:30] is to only respect strength. China does not respect diplomacy. China does not
[44:37] respect rules of engagement. China does not respect rules of war. China does
[44:40] not respect you know, a man's word or a soldier's word. China only
[44:45] respects strengths, which is why if they get whacked, they will stand in
[44:51] their place. That's the reason why nothing has happened in Galwan or Hot Springs
[44:53] or any of those places post the Galwan clash, because when you lose forty
[44:58] soldiers in one night, it to them because they were not they were not
[45:01] expecting something like that to happen. Now, I'll give you a couple of
[45:05] examples of my own when I visited Nathula. I visited Natula in two thousand
[45:07] and six to report on the pass opening after many many decades uh and the
[45:14] Chinese soldiers there. I remember seeing the Chinese soldiers. They're speaking very very
[45:17] rudely to tourists and whoever was coming there. You just rudely think back and
[45:22] back, and the Indian soldiers that there were no obviously there were no Chinese
[45:24] tourists. The only Indian tourists like going to Nathula and stuff, and the
[45:30] Chinese soldiers were, you know, were very very rude and yelling at Indian
[45:34] tourists, I mean, including children and stuff, and just being really brash
[45:37] and for no reason at all. I can imagine if people were like being
[45:38] unnecessarily you know, crossing the barrier or something. Everybody was just chilling out
[45:43] over there, and they were being very extremely rude to them. I've heard
[45:45] stories of how, uh you know how Chinese soldiers when they come for meetings
[45:50] they shout, officers shout and yell, like you said, during border meetings,
[45:53] expressed their frustration, stand up, up and down, you know,
[45:57] bang their fist on the desk, things like that, which is real because
[46:00] it's again, like I said, it's not their personality. That's the way
[46:02] they've been trained to get results. Saying, you know established right away that
[46:09] you're you are. You know, you're a volatile, unpredictable, stronger kind
[46:15] of person, and you will get your way. And if you extrapolate from
[46:20] the from the unpredictable, volatile, violent soldier and sort of conflated with the
[46:24] entire country, it completely makes sense. It's a country that's volatile, it's
[46:29] a country that is unpredictable. It's a country that doesn't keep its word.
[46:32] It's a country that does not keep to its international commitments. It's a country
[46:36] that never keeps its word as far as diplomatic assurances are concerned. So that's
[46:43] a cultural thing. And and and the United States learned this, you know,
[46:47] quite early enough. India obviously learned it the hard way. But I
[46:52] can tell you with with with only a reporter's word that I can give having
[46:57] seen the army both in a natural pradition as well as in leather and also
[47:00] in the sector. We always forget that we share a border with Tibetan Utrakund
[47:05] as well, which is that that India has rapidly, rapidly transformed its military
[47:12] culture to realize what, you know, what talking to a bully looks like
[47:16] uh, and you might think that that means bullying them back. He doesn't,
[47:21] which is why in the video that you were talking about, which I
[47:23] think was in Sikkim, if I'm not mistaken, it was in the snow
[47:28] the video the snow, the very rude so yeah that that was in Nakula
[47:30] and video, yeah that was. That was in Sikim, if I'm not
[47:34] mistaken. And the goldga Pa video correctly, which famously became the Goldgapa video.
[47:38] Yeah, that was in sik for sure, and that happened shortly after
[47:42] Galvan, if I remember. And the reason that in that video it's actually
[47:47] very very typical of how things happen the Indian side is usually very very sober,
[47:52] initially very very sober, and that that, and that the video actually
[47:55] captures it beautifully, how nicely the Indian guys are talking, and right from
[48:00] the get go, the Chinese guys are rude and shouting and you know,
[48:04] throwing their fists about and you know, basically creating a huge shandy while the
[48:07] Indian guys are pre talking like normally sober and stuff. Now we don't know
[48:13] what happened late. Obviously some guys got dashed up later. But once once,
[48:16] once the fists fly, then there are no more niceties that I can
[48:21] assure you, and that you've seen that in the Taang videos. I always
[48:24] take the example of the Tawang video, which is that it's maybe Payo the
[48:30] guys who are you know, using those wonderful, colorful Punjabi words in that
[48:35] video. I'm sure they spoke very nicely to the Chinese soldiers initially, but
[48:38] we don't have that part of the video. We only have the part of
[48:42] the video where those four Chinese solds are being beaten to pulp right with sticks.
[48:45] So so it's it's all, it's not only about culture, it's also
[48:50] also about respect. For rules of engagement under the under your border rules of
[48:53] engagement when two petrols pass each other, India and China have very specific cruise
[48:59] You're not supposed to carry firearms, which which is which both sides obey be
[49:02] You're not supposed to escalate the situation by raising your voice. The rules which
[49:07] say don't raise your voice, don't show anger, don't you know, make
[49:09] your eyes big, and you know, and and and try and provoke any
[49:15] kind of violent reaction. Don't use expletives, you know, anything of that
[49:19] kind. The Chinese never obey that. You've seen that in video after video.
[49:22] Forget about Nakula, you've seen it Nan Nachal, You've seen it in
[49:25] Pangong, all of the Pangong videos, all provoked by the Chinese. One
[49:30] guy will throw a rock, or one guy will you know, uh,
[49:34] take his bag and slam it on the ground right in front of an Indian
[49:36] Indian soldier or something provocative like that. And these are soldiers, these,
[49:39] for God's sake, these are these are men of war. You know,
[49:44] a provocation before a soldier who is trained to kill you is not a provocation
[49:49] before a civilian. So if you if you mess around, you're gonna get
[49:52] hit, and that's usually what happens. The Chinese are very good at tailoring
[49:55] those videos to show see it seems like the Indians getting act because they you
[50:00] know, provoke the Chinese, et cetera. It's never like that. I
[50:04] can tell you. I've I've seen these patrols, I've seen video off the
[50:07] video, I've met these soldiers. Their respect for rules of engagement are far
[50:12] far higher than the Chinese. And I'm not saying this because I'm Indian.
[50:15] It's because there's a cultural difference, and that's what it is. In fact,
[50:19] I think our readers and listeners should watch that go. We'll have a
[50:22] link in the show notes. Because you're right when you say that, you
[50:25] also see a very good the kind of the military those that that we have.
[50:30] You know, there are two moments that I recall. One is where
[50:34] I can overhear someone saying so that that sort of respect by he's our officers
[50:39] stay away from him. And the other is I think it probably was a
[50:42] Jacu. Of course of his commanding voice. He then structed every Javan that
[50:45] you know, our line k basically stay away from the Chinese. Right it's
[50:50] done now, argument is over now, please fall back and let's kind of
[50:52] go home, right. Uh, just an extension on this as we end
[50:57] this episode. This was going to be my last point with you, the
[51:00] anecdotal bit that we do every every episode linked to what we just discussed right
[51:05] now. I don't really want to, you know, bring up Galwan once
[51:07] again and go into this controversy, but I do want to talk about this.
[51:12] During the Galban clash no shots for fire, I'm not. I have
[51:15] read your book, but I'm not. I'm not. I can't recall if
[51:17] you've written about this or not. But the Amy had said that, yes,
[51:21] when this team went there, they had arms with them. Captain sayingh
[51:25] was on a show I think with Ras a couple of days after Galwan,
[51:30] while he was there as a politician. When he spoke when I'm about to
[51:34] say, I think he was speaking as a former army officer. He basically
[51:37] said that there's two why the second in command should be court martialed for not
[51:40] ordering his troops to open fire. Because if you have your colonel falling down,
[51:44] colonel of the regiment falling down, uh, you just have to open
[51:49] fire. Someone who covered military so closely, one do you agree with that
[51:52] sentiment. Second, how difficult is it to remember that I forgot which agreement
[51:59] it was? Basically forbids opening fire along the lac in moments like this.
[52:04] This is not your typical fist fight, vise, This is not someone giving
[52:07] you an abuse of garden. This is your CEO was just falling in front
[52:09] of you. And so a couple of clarifications. There were no firearms.
[52:13] Okay, okay, the firearms were not brought by the Chinese, but that
[52:16] does not mean they did not violate the protocol. The manner in which they
[52:21] violated the protocol they was they brought in riot gear. Yes, they brought
[52:25] spiked clubs of the kind that the Chinese police used in Hong Kong during the
[52:30] protests, you know, the long the long batons with with spikes at one
[52:35] end. They brought those. They brought these blinding lights which would flash from
[52:39] their baitans and in the night, which can actually blind you. And the
[52:44] protocol which forbids the use of firearms also concurrently forbids the use of any such
[52:51] equipment. You're not supposed to carry any any weaponry of any kind during these
[52:55] during these meetings or these confrontations. So carrying those spiked clubs and those knuckle
[53:00] dusters and things as for the protocol was just as much of a violation as
[53:06] if they had brought firearms. So that's just a technicality. The violation was
[53:10] as bad as carrying firearms or rifles or whatever. That's number one. Number
[53:15] two, I'm in there saying. Saying that the second in command should be
[53:19] court martialed is in my view BS, and I'll tell you why. Because
[53:23] in Galvan, the two groups that had clashed were actually two groups that had
[53:30] met just the previous day as part of a border meeting. They knew each
[53:32] other, they knew each other on a first name basis, they knew each
[53:36] other well, they had a proper, proper professional connection as to armies,
[53:39] so there was no expectation of this actually happening. The trigger point was when
[53:45] the Chinese had set up an observation post unexpectedly, totally typical of the Chinese,
[53:49] unpredictable after a very normal meeting. Now you set up an observation post
[53:52] where the river bend is that fabous place in Galvan? Why have you done
[53:57] this? And when the Indian side where Indian group of soldiers went there once
[54:00] again, like in the Golgapa video. They were speaking soberly, saying,
[54:04] why you guys doing this? We just talked about this, please move this
[54:07] thing back, and then the stone started flying. That's what and this is
[54:09] what I've recorded in my book because it's part of the operational you know,
[54:14] report of what happened. The stones started flying, and a stone hit one
[54:17] of the soldiers, after which Santos Babu, the commanding officer, was pushed
[54:22] by a Chinese officer. He was pushed because they were talking in a raised
[54:25] voice, in a aggressive kind of voice, and Santos Babu being santoch Babu
[54:30] and the others were the soldiers were Indian soldiers were being aggressive, but santoch
[54:34] Babo is being very concing. Guys. Guys, guys, let's calm down,
[54:36] let's calm down. Let's let's chill and talk. Let's let's let's have
[54:39] some China, let's talk. And then one of those guys pushed. Now,
[54:42] like we've discussed in our Galvan episode, seeing your commanding officer being pushed
[54:46] is like watching your mother being slapped, and you know, the rest is
[54:50] history. That push off Colonel Suto Babu was the it signed the death warrant
[54:55] for forty Chinese soldiers and twenty Indian soldiers. As it turned out very tragically.
[55:00] But that whoever that guy is, we still don't know who that guy
[55:04] is, But whoever it was who pushed colonels and those Babu is the man
[55:07] responsible for what happened in Galfan. Because after that the Indian soldiers could not
[55:12] be stopped. Then they pound there. There were no orders that were going
[55:15] to be listened to. After that, then there was no respect for protocol.
[55:17] Then they went after the Chinese and beat them like animals. So then,
[55:22] so that's what I'm trying to say. I'm saying that in Galvan,
[55:25] protocols were serially violated by the Chinese in terms of acting aggressively, in terms
[55:32] of bringing unauthorized equipment and weapons, riot gear, shields and things like that,
[55:38] lights to blind you and dazzle you in the night. Those were things
[55:42] that were not at all authorized as far as peace and tranquility agreements and border
[55:46] protocols are concerned. The Chinese violated them and they paid a price for it.
[55:52] Who would have thought that we'd be talking like this for two countries that
[55:54] have nuclear weapons. I know. Yeah, so final brief thought from you,
[56:00] not thought like it's sort of some input inside gossip if you mean,
[56:06] I'm pretty sure the army may not want this recorded officially. But then but
[56:08] it is a practical army. So then are there, like, is this
[56:12] special training for the Indian soldiers for such situations, whether it is defensive training
[56:16] for how to deal with such and such with such weapons or offensive training of
[56:21] how to use such weapons. Well, there's absolutely there's absolutely training. And
[56:25] you know, you know, when I say that the Indian Army was caught
[56:29] off guard in Galvan, I don't mean that they were not able to resist
[56:34] the Chinese. As we saw. They were able to not only resist the
[56:37] Chinese, but they most of the fighting, which most people don't know,
[56:39] and it's recorded in my book. Most of the fighting happened on the Chinese
[56:43] side. That's how badly they were beaten, that the Chinese were chased to
[56:46] their side and they were most of the violence happened over there. The brawl
[56:50] happened on the Chinese side. But the training is absolutely there. There's no
[56:53] question of not being prepared for any kind of subterfuge or you know, deception
[57:00] by the Chinese. So yeah, in terms of training, in terms of
[57:06] you know, standard operating procedures in case the Chinese bring weapons, all those
[57:08] things are actually there. The reason why, the reason why this weapons thing
[57:14] was not seen as a problem is because the last time shots were fired between
[57:19] India and China was in nineteen seventy five Yeares in Sikkim in the Sikim sector,
[57:23] which is actually a which is actually a mini conflict that India won decisively
[57:30] against the Chinese. It was a Chinese aggression. It was a watershed moment
[57:35] between India and China, far long after the nineteen sixty two war, where
[57:38] the Chinese attempted aggression in the sixties in Sikkim, and there the Indian army,
[57:45] fully prepared for the Chinese, having learned their lessons, gave the Chinese
[57:49] a very very bloody nose. And there's a book that's been written by about
[57:52] it, by a person called Probo Segupta, which is fabulous on precisely that
[57:57] it's called the Forgotten Wares because everyone thinks about nineteen sixty two, nobody talks
[58:00] about this particular battle of Sickim, so absolutely sixty two Ky bad. India
[58:07] has been ready for anything as far as right, I think we'll ard it
[58:09] right there. Thanks Shiver once again get Insight saying very glad we covered a
[58:14] Michal courage because that again, like as well keep discussed, is not really
[58:16] not dominate headlines when it comes to stand up with China. Accept when China
[58:21] does what it does like it did this week. And to our listeners and
[58:24] viewers, once again, thank you for your comments that have been coming in
[58:27] every episode. Remember that we do make notes about what you want us to
[58:30] discuss. So if you have anything for us to discuss, If you have
[58:34] any questions for us, do let us know. We'll bring them into the
[58:37] flow someway or the other. Thanks as always to our producer. And that's
[58:39] it for this week's defense. Does for more tune in next week till then,
[58:43] stay safe and not for us any boundaries for passport

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