# How Jammu attacks are part of larger conspiracy to destablise region | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 26

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 13 Jun 2024, 52 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/60374158/13_jun_24_iod_13_june_128.mp3

In just three days, Jammu & Kashmir has been struck by four terror attacks. A tragic incident in the Reasi district saw a bus carrying pilgrims from the Shiv Khori temple to Katra targeted, resulting in nine deaths and 41 injuries. The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility. Further terror struck Doda and Kathua, where an attack claimed the life of a CRPF jawan and injured six security personnel. Another operation in Saida Sukhal village, Kathua, led to a civilian injury and the death of a terrorist. Most recently, a policeman was injured in a fresh encounter in Doda. This week’s data is part of a disturbing pattern. In the months leading up to these attacks, deadly ambushes were reported in the volatile districts of Rajouri and Poonch, near the Line of Control. In this episode of "In Our Defence," host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor delve into these incidents, exploring the ground realities and regional complexities. They discuss the terrorists' weaponry, the reasons behind the region's persistent tension, and the larger strategy these attacks may be part of. This analysis is especially pertinent given the recent swearing-in of a new coalition government and the upcoming assembly elections, expected before September. We also discuss the controversy surrounding the Union government's rare move to extend the tenure of Chief of the Army Staff Gen Manoj Pande by one month, debunking speculations of a ‘coup’ and stressing the ‘absurdity’ of such claims. Finally, the duo also quickly examines the complexities surrounding Manipur. Tune in! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound mix by Sachin Dwivedi

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts. I know the people you're talking about. They
[0:07] were senior journalists, one particular magazine editor, a couple of politicians, you
[0:12] know, the usual IT cell types. You know, some influencers who all
[0:17] in unison took that extension to the Army chief to mean that the government is
[0:22] preparing for some kind of you know, military response to the election result.
[0:27] They've exposed themselves to be idiots. Quite frankly, attacks in this south of
[0:33] pir Panjal Range area which separates Kashmir from the Jamu sector, have been happening
[0:39] at alarming regularity since during the pandemic. These are terrorists who have access to
[0:44] weapons like the M four, Like you said, proper frontline assault firearms,
[0:49] which may well have come either from the Pakistan Army or they could even be
[0:52] part of the weapons cachets that flowed in from Afghanistan following the fall of the
[0:56] of the Taliban. I remember just six months after the all of gable night
[1:00] vision goggles, GPS instruments, advanced electronic kit was seen in certain encounters in
[1:07] North Kashmi, et cetera. Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly
[1:12] podcast on all things well defense, where I they've Goswami, your host,
[1:19] along with senior journalist Shivaru, break down the world of conflicts that range from
[1:23] the subtle to the brute. We bring you nuances and perspectives that will inform
[1:27] and at times provoke. This is in our Defense. Hello and welcome.
[1:37] After a two week break, we are back in our Defenses. Back.
[1:40] Shiv and I were off on our election duties, had a respective day jobs
[1:44] at Shive with AV and I online the website. Chif still tired, got
[1:49] some rest? No, not yet, not as you can see from my
[1:52] face. I have had a fortnight of complete sleeplessness, but happy that it's
[1:59] over and in our Defense bounces back. Finally, it's going to be a
[2:02] very interesting season. I think, well, you know, the back half
[2:06] of this season, because there's a new government now, new priorities, new
[2:09] dynamics, there's a new army chief who's going to be taking over very soon,
[2:13] so interesting times. And you know, and look at the way it's
[2:16] begun as well, which is what we're going to be talking about today.
[2:20] They've in fact it actually started right at the time that the new government was
[2:24] being sworn in. So I think that you know, a kind of template
[2:28] has been set as to what we're going to be seeing now. Yeah,
[2:30] yeah, exactly, And I think it was good that we took that two
[2:32] weeks of break, even though our producer and I was after us, please
[2:36] see if you can still do a recording because like I'm telling you, the
[2:38] rough of us well like very very tired. I managed to get some rest.
[2:42] Shift still hasn't got some rest, so still recovering from the election hangover.
[2:46] So let's dive in. Yes, like you said, things are happening
[2:50] on the on the defense front, there several actually topics for us to discuss.
[2:53] You know, you also had an order not an order being placed,
[2:55] but it's sort of a rifle that's sort of being okay the by the Indian
[3:00] Army for production, but we won't do that yet. There's also full new,
[3:04] full separate episode on small arms and firearms. Yes, there's also controversy
[3:07] happening on Anipat with now a coalition government taking shape JDU from Bihar, which
[3:12] is a partner of the b j P at the Center has said that it
[3:15] would like the government to review this game. And it's all entirety another episode
[3:20] on that altogether, but we'll talk about Jamukashmi because there have been a series
[3:23] of attacks in in the last one week. But before we do that,
[3:28] let's talk a bit about the Army chief who actually comes from there, and
[3:31] he's not from there. From there, but he was the commander of the
[3:34] Northern Army before he was moved to the headquarters as Vice Army Chief and now
[3:38] he's going to take over at the end of this month. I want to
[3:40] talk about what happened a few days before the election is supposed to be announced.
[3:45] So when the current Army Chief, Pandi got a one month extension and
[3:50] social media, for god knows what, tried to sort of weave sort of
[3:53] some sort of conspiracy out of it. Oh my god, the the government
[3:57] is sort of preparing for a coup, you know, then go down lightly,
[4:00] etcetera, etcetera. I want to take your take because there was one
[4:04] section and what surprised me was the con the conspiracy theories were not being put
[4:10] forth by random handle. Some of them were journalists whom I've read over this
[4:15] over several years. Who who's who's reporting I've sort of trusted, even if
[4:17] I don't particularly you know, agree with the sort of ideology, but I've
[4:20] sort of agreed and you know, been fascinated by the reporting. They are
[4:25] like you know, veteran journalists in the world of defense, but they themselves
[4:29] were sort of you know, pushing this sort of you know what is going
[4:30] on? Why is though? It? For me it seemed as though just
[4:34] because the government, the results are supposed to come with governments, like,
[4:36] you know, let the new government, whoever that government be, you know,
[4:40] let them decide who the new army chief should be. There was a
[4:43] theory that, you know, maybe the government is trying to step the seniority
[4:46] and you know, you know, get somebody someone out from somewhere else.
[4:49] Your take on this controversy do you think there was so I have a pretty
[4:53] strong view on this, if you'll permit me there, And which is that
[4:56] you know the people and I know I know the people you're talking about.
[4:59] They were the you know, senior journalists, you know one particular magazine editor,
[5:04] you know, a couple of politicians, the usual you know, the
[5:08] usual I T. Cell types, you know, some influencers who all you
[5:13] know in Unison took that extension to the army chief to mean that the government
[5:18] is preparing for some kind of you know, military response to the to the
[5:23] election result. Very credible journalists, you know, at least three or four
[5:27] of them, you know, actually, you know, we're suggesting this nakedly
[5:30] on Twitter. They've exposed themselves to be idiots quite frankly. And I don't
[5:34] want to be subtle about this, because these are the kinds of people who've
[5:41] allowed their judgment to be clouded by their political likes and dislikes. You know,
[5:45] For them to you know, either not like the b j P or
[5:47] not like movie is their prerogative, and in a free country, in a
[5:53] democratic country, are allowed to you know, oppose or defend or whatever you
[5:57] like. That's that's your prerogative. But to use that you know, animosity,
[6:01] to to infiltrate your judgment. And both of the people we've are speaking
[6:09] about in terms of senior journalists, some of them are ex ex military persons.
[6:14] For them to even suggest that the reason for this is, you know,
[6:17] a possible coup, and one of them even suggested it quite quite nakedly,
[6:24] it only exposes themselves. I don't think anybody bought it. Apart from
[6:28] you know, the usual sort of cheerleaders on Twitter. There wasn't even a
[6:31] whiff of it off social media, so that tells you what kind of echo
[6:35] chamber they really live in. But it was you know, I'm the kind
[6:40] of person who doesn't believe that the military is some sacred gow. I don't
[6:44] think so. You know, if something is wrong in the military, like
[6:46] we have shown here in our defense, we call it out. You know,
[6:49] when the military does something wrong or the leadership does something wrong as far
[6:53] as defense is concerned, like hell, we will get there and we will
[6:57] call it out. But to cast and spur version on a routine decision and
[7:01] to extrapolate it and make it to mean that there is a coup ahead or
[7:06] this is what the plan is is bizarre. It's absurd. It's demeaning to
[7:13] the service where they don't deserve it, you know, by all means demean
[7:16] the service when they deserve it. But I think it was frankly insulting,
[7:20] and yeah, it exposed them more than anybody else. I think people should
[7:25] be laughing at them right now. Their credibility is hurt. The problem with
[7:29] our country is no matter how much credibility is hurt, people still carry on.
[7:32] So I think it's I think it's terribly sad. The good news,
[7:35] of course, is that the military frankly doesn't care any more about these silly
[7:41] things. They've seen, you know, whiffs and rumors of coups for a
[7:44] long time right now, and I think they just you know, this kind
[7:47] of thing just washes off, and especially from the people who've made these conspiracy
[7:51] theories. Yeah, glad we got that out of the way. So let's
[7:56] jump into a topic before we talk about what's happened in the last one week.
[8:01] Just sort of a view from you of is it even possible for people
[8:07] like me who've never been to Jamukushmi professionally or on a personal visit to even
[8:11] understand the dynamics of the situation of that region. Because I'll tell you what,
[8:16] while preparing for this episode, because these attacks have been happening in relatively
[8:20] newer territory of the district Jummu, I spent around forty five minutes with the
[8:26] map of Jammu and Kashmi, the two districts, to just to understand what
[8:30] was going It took me a while to play such a Rajori a poonchi okay,
[8:33] thereda there okay, along than tasat. It is confusing af you know,
[8:39] just sitting in front of a commuter scheme. So for people like me
[8:43] who've never been there, for you know, so called analysts, you know,
[8:46] who have this knack of just like you're passing judgments and you know,
[8:48] telling us what should be done about jam was sitting in New Is it even
[8:52] possible? Look in a single word, it is possible, but it is
[8:56] definitely complicated. And I feel you in all my years two decades of you
[9:01] know, covering Jammu and Kashmir, and most most you know journalists who cover
[9:07] that area you know from Afar, will tell you the same thing that you
[9:11] know. Understanding the dynamics of Kashmir, and I'm talking about north of the
[9:16] pir Panjal Mountain range, which basically separates Kashmir Valley from you know, from
[9:20] the rest of j and k is a frankly, quite a perplexing thing.
[9:26] You're absolutely right, there are there are far more, far fewer complexities north
[9:33] than there are in the south. And most people would say, what do
[9:35] you mean, Kashmir is terribly complicated? It is, of course, I'm
[9:39] not saying it's not. I'm just saying that when you look look at Jammu
[9:41] in terms of just the map, just the geographical dynamics, uh, the
[9:48] fact that there is an international border as well as the line of control.
[9:50] Uh, the terrain itself. It all it will take you is one visit,
[9:54] they believe me, to the Jummu sector. And I've traveled widely,
[9:58] all across across all of the places that you've just mentioned, uh, you
[10:01] know, in the course of my work. And it is vastly different to
[10:07] the Kashmir Valley. Uh and uh Uh. Not only are the other dynamics
[10:11] different in terms of geography, there are there are of course different cultures,
[10:16] There's a there are different kinds of deployment. The rules of engagement by the
[10:20] security forces there are structured differently than they are in the Kashmir Valley. Uh.
[10:26] You know, there have been some gives and takes in terms of uh
[10:30] uh you know, a presence of the army in the Jamu sector post the
[10:33] abrogation of three seventy because more deployments were needed in in Kashmir. Uh.
[10:39] And therefore, yeah, it's it is most definitely complicated. And also remember
[10:43] that because Jammu also the Jammu sector also has an international border, there is
[10:48] a slightly more complicated matrix of agencies involved in the security there, unlike Kashmir,
[10:54] which is a little simpler by no means at any point am I saying
[10:56] Kashmir is black and white? Jumu is you know, ambiguous. I'm not
[11:00] saying that at all. I'm just saying from a journalist's perspective, understanding the
[11:03] dynamics of the two, I feel you it's really really correct. So you're
[11:07] not alone. Yeah, I'm guessing those complexities are going to play used in
[11:11] what happened in the last one week, and we'll play in the near future.
[11:16] So give us your overview of the last one week. You know,
[11:20] there have been four around four three or four or four attacks and these have
[11:24] been in quick succession. But something's been happening in Jammu for a while.
[11:28] We did an episode before we took the break. I think it was around
[11:31] fifteen episodes ago when there was an ambush, yeah, in a jury where
[11:37] four people four people who quill. There was also an ambush in May this
[11:39] year where one AIRCE personnel, if I'm not wrong, was killed. I
[11:43] think that happened again, yes, and then you come to this week where
[11:48] you have nine pilgrims being killed in riac terrorist open fire at a bus.
[11:52] The bus driver was hit at the bus fire into a gorge and then you
[11:56] know they kept shooting and then nine people, some of them kids, young,
[11:58] young infants, have been killed. The suspicion is that the same people
[12:03] who were behind the May attack were behind the Dic attack. Then you had
[12:09] a sort of an encounter bicking out in Kahua where once RPF personal was killed,
[12:13] and then you had one encounter happening simultaneously in Doda when you had thing
[12:18] around three or four injured. Again like so many different districts, all in
[12:22] Jummu. First, before we dive into Jumu and why Jammu and what's the
[12:26] difference between Sushim Jummu, what's happening there? Your overview of what's happened in
[12:30] the last four or five days on the ground, what's happened? Was The
[12:33] response been like what have you gathered so far? So two very important points
[12:37] before we get into the meat of the issue. They one is that this
[12:41] particular spike in attacks in Jammu Jamu sector, which includes started with Riasi,
[12:48] which let's remember happened just a couple of hours before the swearing in ceremony in
[12:54] Delhi. I see that one hundred percent as not a coincidence that was timed,
[12:58] you know, to create a headline at a time when the movie government
[13:03] was you know, being sworn in the and the two attacks that happened thereafter
[13:07] were obviously to to to light the area up and create the impression that you
[13:13] know, things were going out of control in Jammu. Now, just for
[13:16] a little bit of perspective, these were very very serious attacks. These were
[13:20] targeted attacks, these were planned attacks. I see. There is definitely a
[13:24] pattern here where the we'll come to the who these people are and how they
[13:28] infiltrated in a bit. But these are basically small terror outfits which are part
[13:33] of a larger design, larger plan obviously to test this government and send out
[13:39] a message even before the government has had a chance to sort of you know,
[13:45] kick off its shoes and begin work that that things are going to be
[13:48] rough in the Jummu sector. Now, the message here is that that the
[13:52] games that have been made in the Kashmir Valley, especially post the abrogation of
[13:58] Article three seventy, you know, something that is visible, something that is
[14:01] quantifiable, something that the government has rightfully you know sort of trumpeted Pakistan is
[14:07] under pressure to make sure that that is not true in the Jummu sector,
[14:11] and we'll get into the dynamics of that in just a bit. So there
[14:13] is no question that this is a pattern to test the government and to send
[14:18] out a message that terror is not has not been contained in this area.
[14:22] The second point that I wanted to make is that that this particular spike that
[14:28] began with Riaci and then you know Katuwa here another and Doda for four separate
[14:33] attacks over four days, like you rightly pointed out, is not the first
[14:37] time this has happened in the Jummu sector. Now, the Jummu Rajori Pooch
[14:41] sector. You know, basically, you know, if our listeners and viewers
[14:46] look at a map, a part of the Jummu sector has the international border
[14:50] and then north of Negrota Orknur, which is the chicken's neck is where the
[14:54] line of control starts. And then Rajori and Poont sector are have the line
[14:58] of control fence and and then it goes north towards the pir Panjal and then
[15:01] you've got you know, Uri and Baramulla and the rest which is basically Kashmir
[15:05] attacks in this south of pir Panjal Range area, which separates Kashmir from the
[15:11] Jamu sector, have been happening at alarming regularity since during the pandemic. It
[15:20] started in twenty twenty one. That was the first major attack I think.
[15:24] I remember, you know, five Special Forces men you know were killed in
[15:28] action in Rajori last year, and we've discussed this on a previous episode.
[15:31] In two separate attacks in the Rajori punch area. I think I think seven
[15:39] Paraspecial Forces men in two separate incidents lost their lives in an operation in the
[15:43] raj Rajori area. The attack on the air force bus in May this year
[15:50] has happened. So this is a pattern. This is most definitely a pattern.
[15:52] I think since twenty twenty one, they've the infiltrating groups obviously with the
[15:58] training and support of the Parkas Army in the ISI, have managed to have
[16:03] managed to create a kind of you know, a logistical footprint in Jamu which
[16:08] was which was not there earlier, in the same kind of form. And
[16:12] now that they've settled in, they're able to conduct these attacks at a time
[16:18] and place of their choosing. Now we'll come to why it's so easy for
[16:21] them to target so easily in Jammu, et cetera. In a bit,
[16:23] but basically, what I'm trying to say is post twenty nineteen, what you're
[16:29] seeing right now, since about twenty twenty three twenty four now is the fruition
[16:33] of a larger strategy to light up the Jamu sector. The Pakistan Isi and
[16:38] the Pakistani deep state has realized that with the abrogation of Article three seventy and
[16:45] the changed dynamics in the Kashmir Valley, you know, profits being bring peace,
[16:48] et cetera, which we've spoken about in detail, their elbow room for
[16:53] operations in the Kashmir Valley are vastly reduced, and the indicators are all there.
[16:59] You know, these cannot manufactured. There is a drop in violence levels
[17:02] visibly speaking in Kashmir. You know, General VP Malik just tweeted that he's
[17:07] back from a holiday in Kashmir and he says he couldn't believe it. You
[17:11] know, I had a word with them as well. He says he couldn't
[17:12] believe it. He says he couldn't believe how. You know, normal and
[17:17] normal is such a lovely word when you talk about Kashmir, right how everything
[17:19] is and this makes Pakistan look bad and that's the reason why you're seeing this
[17:25] spike. Yeah, I'm glad you mentioned that this is part of a larger
[17:29] strategy, a larger threat, because that was going to be a point I
[17:32] want to discuss that Sam are just seeing what's happened in the last one week,
[17:36] et cetera as sort of sort of an aberration or a flash in the
[17:38] pan Keihana government just to like, you know, as a show of strength
[17:42] they've done that, or like, you know, because there's a very strong
[17:45] indigation that assembly elections will happen very very soon in Jamu and Kashmi, this
[17:48] is sort of to put those off. It could be part of the plan
[17:52] that you know, Yes, there's a new government, so let's you know,
[17:55] create some trouble there. Yes, assembly elections might be coming upcoming,
[17:59] so let's see if we can kind of you know, tried to postpone goes.
[18:02] But it is definitely part of a larger, larger strategy. And yeah,
[18:04] the point you mentioned about, you know, normalcy in Kashmia. I
[18:07] think we spoke about this on the previous episode when we discussed Jody Pooch is
[18:11] one of a colleagues who works out of Jamon Cashmira. He is again back
[18:17] in office and I was discussing this with him. He repeated what he said
[18:18] back then to me that you know, at the local level, the youth
[18:22] over there, they just done with it. They don't want anything to do
[18:25] with militancy. They just want, you know, just you know, education
[18:27] and it's like a good job, profits, like you said, and just
[18:32] lead a normal life. Because that's something that is now in front of this.
[18:34] It's tangible, you know, they can see it. This is actually
[18:37] you know, quite gettable. Yeah. Who are these guys? I keep
[18:41] hearing the word TRF, the Resistance Front Apparently it's an offshoot off the last
[18:48] and the Riac attack guys. I think they were carrying some high tech weapons.
[18:52] I think there were some reports of them carrying him for the US rifle,
[18:56] which is fairly advanced. They had night waris in scopes. They also
[18:59] had some sort of nyper equipment tools. I'm not sure you can confirm what
[19:03] they had. Who are these guys, where are they coming from and where
[19:06] are they getting this height tech equipment? So so, you know, I
[19:10] hate giving credence they've to you know, names like trf and stuff. You
[19:15] know, this is for their own self aggrandizement, because of their own little
[19:18] uh. You know, the kind of internecine battles that are being fought between
[19:22] small terror groups in Pakistan, they're all basically the lush career tayba. Okay,
[19:27] All of these different terror outfits, these small groups that have infiltrated are
[19:33] all basically spores, fungal spores coming out from the mother fungus. That is
[19:38] the lush Carey taiba or the Jeshi moment. So let's not kid ourselves,
[19:41] let's not kid our listeners about them having some kind of separate ideology or identity.
[19:45] They're terrorists. They're very basic terrorists hired from the interland. The difference
[19:52] in this particular case, and I'm glad you mentioned the weapons they're using is
[19:55] two things. What they are most definitely better trained. These are not your
[20:00] ragtag. These are not your ragtag uh. You know a terrorists of the
[20:03] kind you see lobbying gredades in the Kashmir Valley. These are most definitely of
[20:08] a of a higher caliber in terms of training. Even even a cursory understanding
[20:15] of the kinds of attacks that have taken place. And remember it's not easy
[20:18] to attack a military convoy. Okay, you can't. It's it's not simple,
[20:22] especially in the post Pulwama kind of scenario. Uh, protection to military
[20:26] convoys has become extremely uh, extremely high. So therefore in May they still
[20:33] managed to kill you know, an air force Air Force Javan. Uh.
[20:37] So these are these are military trained terrorists, directly trained obviously by the Pakistan
[20:41] ARMI and I si uh and and this is not some outline dish claim these
[20:44] are these are verifiable claims. Uh. These are people. These are terrorists
[20:48] who are who have access to weapons like the M four, like you said,
[20:52] you know, proper proper frontline assault firearms, which may well have come
[20:56] either from the Pakistan Army or they could even be you know, part of
[21:00] the weapons cachet is that flowed in from Afghanistan following the fall of the of
[21:03] the Taliban. You remember how we at that time, you and I reported
[21:07] they've about how the huge numbers of weapons abandoned, you know by the retreating
[21:15] American Army. Uh. You know, all of these weapons that had been
[21:18] taken by the Taliman would in some form or the other find its way into
[21:22] areas where they needed to be used. Uh, you know, and most
[21:25] definitely India would see those weapons. And we I remember just six months after
[21:29] the fall of Kabul, night vision goggles, you know, GPS instruments,
[21:33] advanced electronic kit was seen in certain encounters, uh, you know, in
[21:38] in North Kashmi, et cetera. So and so that that that's totally normal.
[21:41] I mean, why wouldn't they just think about it from their perspective.
[21:45] If they have all this equipment, where else will they use it? They
[21:48] use it against India? Right, So, so, uh, these guys
[21:51] having M four night vision goggles, I can confirm that's correct. They do
[21:53] have advanced equipment. Uh, they have a certain uh you know, it's
[21:57] it's almost a you know, a special operations kind of training that they have
[22:03] because these are terrorists who are moving in very small groups. There are two
[22:06] or three terrorists, you know, armed to the teeth obviously, lots of
[22:10] ammunition, lots of different firearms, knapsacks, protein foods, and rations,
[22:15] with the ability to you know, survive in the hinterland for a long time,
[22:18] obviously, able to withstand the terrain and live off the land if they
[22:22] need to. So that is that is bread and butter special forces training.
[22:26] So these are very very you know, purpose purpose trained terrorists who've been infiltrated
[22:33] into the Jummu region since since twenty twenty twenty one, taking advantage of the
[22:40] you know, the of the chaos during the early early months of the pandemic
[22:44] is when many of these terror you know groups have actually infiltrated. So that
[22:48] is what who these people are. You know, we can we can spend
[22:52] a lot of time talking about you know, y traf et cetera. They're
[22:56] all the lush you know inside Pakistan right now. There is a great deal
[23:02] of push and pull between many of these terror groups because of the chaos in
[23:06] Pakistan, because of the economic, commercial, cultural, political sort of splintering
[23:14] of Pakistan, historic you know, collapse of Pakistan. Many of these Serra
[23:18] groups see their you know, their ilaka shrinking their hold on the government,
[23:22] shrinking, their resources shrinking. So there's a lot of intimacy and warfare happening
[23:26] there. They're bumping each other as people. Of of course, India's roy
[23:30] is blamed for that. You know, the whole unknown gunment thing comes partially
[23:33] from there as well, because they're killing each other and India of course,
[23:37] is blamed for it, but we've done many episodes on that. So so
[23:41] these are these are groups that are under pressure right now and they've found that
[23:45] their ability to demonstrate impact violence attacks, their ability to bleed is exponentially more
[23:56] difficult post the abrogation of three seventy than it is now. And this is
[24:00] and this is not propaganda, you know, like I said, all one
[24:03] needs to you know, be persuaded about what has happened post three seventy is
[24:07] go to Kashmir and see it for yourself. It's it's quantifiable, it's visible.
[24:11] Why would tourists go to a place where you know, things are even
[24:15] slightly slightly you know, unsafe for uncertain So so yeah, so these are
[24:22] these are terrorists who've obviously been given very very specific orders. Key up.
[24:27] So that's who these people are, right. Good. So that you mentioned
[24:30] Afghanistan because that suddenly reminded me of a conversation that I had at the ashik
[24:34] Balan Season one defense when the rise of the fall of the Afghanistan government basically
[24:40] after the US had sort of just left the area, uh and the lightning
[24:44] speed to Thaibant to cover the two of US discussed one the weapons, how
[24:48] they would end up coming to Christian and also the trained fighters, what will
[24:52] they do now op kakaing. So the national choice was there is a front
[24:56] over here that can be opened up so that they're very well trained, have
[25:00] been fighting the US for God's sake, so you know, might as well
[25:03] send them over here. So I'm guessing perhaps that might also be something that
[25:07] we will see are already seeing in Jamu and Kashmir. Since we are talking
[25:11] about Jammu and you mentioned the different dynamics of this region compared to Kashmir,
[25:17] I want to talk about the dynamics of how does the security apparatus change then
[25:21] and deal with this threat because throughout my you know, medoles since and throughout
[25:26] my initial half of the of my career, the traditional approach of the security
[25:32] establishment to dealing with militancy and Jamu and Kashmir was what you had. You
[25:36] tap into the networks, you have a range of informers because it was a
[25:41] large part of it was local. It was in Gron. You had obviously
[25:44] funding and support from across the border from Pakistan, but it was in grond
[25:48] so you had networks within KASHMIRI you had networks within Jamu and Kashmir, so
[25:52] you had security agencies trying to tap into those networks, and then they would
[25:56] throw what was called the infamous KASO theory coordinant search operation where they would you
[26:02] know, targeted on that one particular village and one particular house where they knew
[26:07] a group of miilietants were hiding, and then an encounter would happen and then
[26:11] you know, they would and end a being killed. Sometimes encounters would last
[26:15] for days, day, days on end. A lot of the famous UH
[26:18] terrorists of jam that in famous photo of Hanani and his gang were killed in
[26:23] similar similar operations. UH. That I'm guessing needs to change now because what
[26:27] like you've described now, what we are seeing is precision level two or three
[26:30] guys being sent from across the border with some high high tech equipment who will
[26:36] probably not have local support either in Jammu or in Kashmir. So how does
[26:40] the security setup change to address this threat? How do you see the security
[26:44] establishment dealing with this threat in the near in the next few months. You
[26:47] know, you've you've raised on you know, the probably the nub of the
[26:49] issue. You've hit upon it. They've because human intelligence from the ground from
[26:55] each village, especially villages which are close to the you know, close to
[26:59] the border like here, are other you know, the speaking just specifically,
[27:02] of the three places we're talking about right now here, another is very close
[27:06] to the frontier, it's very close to the border, whereas Riaci and Doda
[27:10] are are quite on the inside. There's a fair distance between them and the
[27:14] you know, either the lloc or the border. So the dynamics are different
[27:17] in all these three places. But the disturbing aspect of it is that human
[27:21] intelligence, and anyone who's covered Janek will tell you this is everything. Human
[27:26] intelligence is everything. You can deploy as many drones or satellites or you know,
[27:32] sort of covert operations as you want, but if you don't have a
[27:36] reliable, robust, seamless human intelligence network on the ground, you know,
[27:42] across the hinterland, you're in trouble. Now. The army does have a
[27:47] really good intelligence network, human intelligence network, and there these are people who
[27:52] are just reporting to the army. These are people who want to tell the
[27:56] army about what's going on, result in a huge number of operations or a
[28:03] huge number of attacks being foiled. We never hear about those okay about intelligence
[28:07] revealing the presence of people people being arrested. You know. Also, an
[28:11] another sort of misconception people have about Jamun Kashmir is that everything ends in an
[28:17] encounter and a gunfight. Not not necessarily so there are many times when things
[28:21] end end in an arrest. People will be just detained and taken in.
[28:25] But in this particular case, for instance, in the case of in the
[28:29] case of of Katua and Ira Nagar, you had villagers who had spotted I
[28:34] think it was in Katua where the villagers had spotted the two terrorists and then
[28:37] they called the security forces and then there was a gunfight. Now that is
[28:41] an example of human intelligence working in your favor, even though unfortunately, you
[28:47] know, a CRP of Javan lost his life in that encounter. But the
[28:52] reality that needs to be faced is that the human intelligence enjoyed, and I've
[28:56] said this on a previous episode, Dave, is that the terror grew have
[29:00] for a long time enjoyed an advantage in terms of human intelligence. The reason
[29:06] for that is the terror groups are able to are able to kind of spread
[29:11] more easily into the hinterland, into the villages. They don't have the burden
[29:17] of being the security forces which are in some cases and places you know,
[29:22] regarded with suspicion. There is in the border areas of Rajori and Poos,
[29:27] like you said, where people are tired of this stuff. If you go
[29:30] a little north, then that the Pakistani I SI and the intelligence agencies from
[29:36] that side and their terror groups enjoy a very very distinct advantage as far as
[29:41] human intelligence is concerned. Now, I'm not saying At no point am I
[29:44] saying this is because the people in those villages prefer the Pakistanis or prefer the
[29:48] terrors. They are forced to help them under a call of fear. They're
[29:52] forced to help them because if they don't, their families will be at risk.
[29:56] There. Of course, I'm being realistic. I'm not going to chest
[29:59] thump about. There will of course be some people in the internet who will
[30:02] help the other side because they believe that they are better. But I'm just
[30:06] saying that in terms of human intelligence, this is a game that has to
[30:08] constantly be updated. Burhanvani was a was was a you know, an incredible
[30:15] example of of of getting it wrong for a long time and then and then
[30:21] you know, failing to see the rise or popularity of a person in a
[30:26] in a kind of local level, and your moves making him almost an outsized
[30:30] character by which time it was too late. Right. It's a textbook example,
[30:36] and the Army is going to hate me for saying this, but it
[30:37] was a textbook example of getting everything wrong. The only thing you did right
[30:42] was kill him, right, and even that ended up making you look terrible
[30:45] because you had a huge funeral. It helped, it helped, you know,
[30:49] countless recruitment drives for the terror agencies over there locally and in Pakistan.
[30:55] So he became a poster boy for quote unquote militancy. Right. So I'm
[31:02] just saying that the challenges for human intelligence since we're speaking about Jummu, and
[31:07] like I said, Jummu, the Jaumu demographic is different from Kashmir as well.
[31:12] It's demographically geographically different. But if you lose the advantage you have as
[31:18] far as human intelligence is concerned in Jummo. In Kashmir, you understand that
[31:22] you have a challenge, you understand that you're up against a huge human intelligence
[31:26] challenge there. But in Jummu you've always had a human intelligence advantage. If
[31:30] you lose that to the terror groups in Jumu sector. It's going to be
[31:34] disastrous for India. And this spike in terror since twenty twenty one demonstrates that
[31:40] there are questions to be asked. How are these people coming in? How
[31:44] are they able to be here for such a long time. How are the
[31:47] small groups of terrorists who've infiltrated since twenty twenty one able to operate without being
[31:52] caught for so long? How is it that the same group of terrorists that
[31:56] attacked your air force convoy in Punch in May is with impunity attacking you know,
[32:02] pilgrims in Rayasi. You are entering a season they've where you're going to
[32:07] have the vesh No Deviatra. The Jammu sector has is is just full of
[32:13] pilgrimage sites and temples. You're gonna have people and pilgrims in buses criss crossing
[32:19] that place throughout the July to August season. What are you going to do?
[32:22] How are you going to you know, ensure that you can't have road
[32:25] opening parties in every mountain bend and these people are out there, it's a
[32:30] huge, huge challenge. General Wade Malik, you know who was on GOREV
[32:36] Show last night, said that the you know, the reason why talking about
[32:40] the terrain differences you know, bears repeating over and over again, is because
[32:45] you have to see to believe it. Just go on to Google maps to
[32:47] see it. To see what Jammu sector looks like. It's it's low hills,
[32:52] thick forests, lots of caves, lots of hiding places, enormous number
[32:59] of practically countless numbers of hiding places, and not the same levels of deployment
[33:06] and security as there are in the Kashmir ray. The reason for that is
[33:08] because Jammu was never that much of a problem so far. It was not
[33:13] frontier in that sense, closer demographically different, closer to you know, Himachal,
[33:17] Punjab, et cetera. And it was never seen as that much of
[33:21] a problem. But now it really really has last few years post abrogation,
[33:25] it's it's become the new flashpoint. It's not JNK anymore, it's j Yeah.
[33:30] Because you know, back then, when you had encounters or attacks happening
[33:37] percent of the time, if we wrote a headline saying just Kashmir instead of
[33:40] the full name Jamu custry, technically we would be wrong because it would be
[33:44] happening in the Kashmi district of jam But now, like you said, it's
[33:47] also happening in Jamu. So a quick question from you then, are you
[33:52] then saying that the security of Paratus has been taken by surprise that they did
[33:55] they did not see this coming and that if so, so are they now
[34:00] aware of this threat and are do you foresee changes happening quickly to deal with
[34:05] this threat? So I don't think they've been caught off guard at all.
[34:07] The the army and the security forces operating in Jamu are not you know,
[34:12] are not spring chickens. They've been operating there for a long time. At
[34:15] no point, you know, are they unprepared. Have there been you know,
[34:20] intelligence lapses or failures in terms of you know, at the tactical level
[34:24] to see these particular movements. You know, it's easy for us to sit
[34:28] here and say intelligence labs Oka, intelligence vailuer rogia. You know, seriously,
[34:32] try it out for yourself, just see how complicated it is. How
[34:36] do you keep track of every single little movement? Imagine you know, a
[34:40] state sized you know, canvas for terror groups and you've got, uh,
[34:45] you know, you've got these these small terror terror companies of two to three
[34:52] men, two to three men traveling around on foot, on foot in the
[34:57] hinterland, waiting, waiting for a eating for a bus. Okay, you
[35:01] want to call that an intelligence failure. Technically you are right, because what
[35:06] else is the security forces. Therefore, they're supposed to be able to,
[35:08] you know, intercept and preempt something like that. It's true, but I'm
[35:12] just saying that it's more than that. It's more than that they are aware
[35:15] of it. They have not been caught off guard because, like I said,
[35:19] you know, if you theoretically, if you really want to talk about
[35:21] the Rajori Punch area, way back since twenty thirteen post you know, two
[35:25] thousand and three is when the ceasefire came into effect. There have been phases
[35:30] of lots of cross border TRANSCELOC violations and there have been you know, many
[35:37] years of no violations whatsoever. In twenty thirteen you saw beheadings take place in
[35:40] the mainter sector near Punch. Then you've got all these incidents that have happened
[35:46] in the Rajori Punch area. So it's not like it's not like the army
[35:51] has been saying, oh no, no, all our attention has been you
[35:52] know, on Kashmir, and we don't know anything about you. They know
[35:54] exactly what's going on. It's the issue here is not about the army being
[36:00] unprepared or being caught off guard, et cetera. It's about how complex these
[36:05] are, and and and let's let's also and and not to not to downplay
[36:08] the the the tragic consequences of each of these attacks. But these are pin
[36:13] pricks, These are small, small pin pricks. H you know, the
[36:16] ability to target a temporary operating base shows that the groups are trying to send
[36:22] out a message saying, look, even your temporary operating base is not beyond
[36:27] our range, we'll be able to fire even there. They've they've managed to
[36:30] kill a CRP of Javan by, you know, by shooting pilgrims. That
[36:34] is also a you know, that's a that's a that's a you know,
[36:37] almost like a kind of religious religious cultural message, which is which which Pakistan
[36:43] always wants to do. They always want to foment that kind of communal tension
[36:47] in German Kashmia. They've tried, they've tried to do that for a very
[36:51] very long time. So so I think I think the army and with the
[36:54] new Army Chief Latin General open Vedi, who takes over at the end of
[36:59] this month. Like you said, he's been the army commander in in Udumpur.
[37:04] He knows a thing or two. He's been. He's from the German
[37:06] Kashmi Rifles Regiment. Uh, he's been DG Infantry. So so he is
[37:10] uh, you know, a very fine officer person who knows German Kishmi in
[37:15] and out, and without a doubt, this is going to be the first
[37:19] thing on his plate. It's going to be the first thing on his plate.
[37:22] Obviously, the Army chiefs you know, to do list cannot be like
[37:25] one, a one page affair. There are many many things that he has
[37:29] to do and this can't be the only thing. But I'm saying that his
[37:31] wealth of experience in that area, UH will will ensure that this is one
[37:37] of his priority problems to solve as soon as he takes off. And just
[37:42] to extend on your thought, I think what also does not help is that
[37:45] perhaps at the tactical level, the security apparadise has not yet been tested to
[37:50] the level it has been testing Kashmir. So the lapses that we're talking about
[37:53] will probably happen because they theoryally, they've been prepared for it, they've learned
[37:58] the theory of what to do. But life such make another obviously you could
[38:00] go wrong here in there. Uh. One final point on the topic of
[38:05] Jampot Kashmir. Sort of a weird question, but what does the interestal boarder
[38:09] actually look like? Because you know, we're talking about infiltrations, so obviously
[38:14] they're coming from somewhere. And the question then, I just because if you
[38:17] search for l os here, if you search for India Pakistan border and Google
[38:21] and go to Google images, you will probably have the stalk Pta photos of
[38:24] you know, barbed wire and you know, soldiers with rifles slung on their
[38:28] shoulders marching the BS marching next to like sort of wired fence. Is it
[38:34] like that? It's like that. It's absolutely like that. If you if
[38:37] you go you know, in the southern Jammu sectors, like you know,
[38:39] the run Be sing Pura, shath Gird kind of student coat areas of uh,
[38:45] you know, basically south of you know, south of Aknu, they're
[38:47] all it's all just fence, barbed wire fence and concertina wire and uh and
[38:53] you know, and the bsf Obviously, man's that man's and woman's that place
[38:58] because it's it's it's it's the international border. The army only comes into play
[39:04] when it's the line of control, which is you know, Rajori pounch and
[39:07] northward. So absolutely the dynamics are of obviously different as well because the BSF
[39:12] guards it there. Uh. Ironically, of course, the line of control
[39:15] is also a fence you know under NCVG General and c, which is the
[39:20] Army chief who under whose tenure of the LC fence had come up many years
[39:24] ago. So yeah, it's not very it's not very different in terms of
[39:28] the kind of fencing that happens there, but it's vastly different obviously in terms
[39:31] of the terrain. The yelloc uh you know, basically is in almost entirely
[39:38] in undulating mountainous terrain. The line of control the international border is pretty flat.
[39:44] You you see fields and kind of pretty plain flat terrain, which is
[39:47] where the international border is. Yeah. Right, We'll move to another pressing
[39:52] issue for India's influence security, which is the state of money poor. But
[39:55] we'll talk about that a quick break. Pany pany, pany, so beautiful,
[40:07] so elegant, just looking like a wow eh bang was that enough cringe
[40:13] for you? Because this cringe fest doesn't stop here. Yes, And if
[40:17] by watching such reals and vile videos you think your life is becoming moem,
[40:22] then I cost them and me Anna will bring the most fuke worthy, nauseating
[40:29] and repulsive trends on social media and well maybe enact some of them, but
[40:34] most of all, discuss and seriously dissect these trends. So get ready to
[40:39] laugh, cringe and question humanity. Dropping soon on Spotify, Apple Podcasts and
[40:45] wherever you get your cringe, I mean audio entertainment from So let's talk cringe.
[40:57] Welcome back. This is the first episode of In Our Defense under the
[41:01] Government three point zero. We're back after a two week break. The first
[41:06] half we discussed Jamu and Kashmir. We discussed what's happened there in the last
[41:09] one week, and we thought we thought of, you know, club it
[41:13] together with the two pressing issues that would be on the plate of Home minist
[41:16] drama because they have to do with indigimental security, which is obviously a situation
[41:22] in Jammu and Kashmir where the government also plans to hold assembly elections very soon,
[41:27] the first time that will happen after the abbrogation of Article three seven zero
[41:30] and money Pour, money Poor. I think it's unfair to just devote one
[41:34] half of a an episode. It deserves a full episode on its own.
[41:37] So we'll do that very soon. But I still want to talk about it
[41:38] because, like I said, how much Amisi is taking charge for the second
[41:43] time. He was the Home minist in the previous government as well before which
[41:47] he was the bug President. So second time he's the Homeinist of India and
[41:52] I'm guessing these two will be the two top issues on his on his file.
[41:54] Like you said, obviously these guys have many other issues obviously, but
[41:58] the top two issues, Uh, straight, very direct question, because I
[42:02] have strong opinions on this. Do you get the feeling that nobody seems to
[42:07] give it damn about money Pool? No, I don't. I don't agree
[42:09] with that. I think I think it's more of a things having reached us
[42:15] such an extent in Moneypour, that nobody is quite clear about what the what
[42:22] the solution is in the in the in the near term. I think there
[42:27] is a realization within the government and and no, and and let's let's face
[42:30] it, Uh, there's a huge amount of politics involved in in moneypour in
[42:35] in the sense that when the money poor issue broke out last year, and
[42:38] it's been now more than a year since Moneypour has been burning, it was
[42:43] a year from elections. Uh, you know, and I think I think
[42:45] attentions in many ways were diverted towards what the next election is going to look
[42:52] like, et cetera. That may have had its own pressures on the government.
[42:55] Uh. It was a powder keg. It was burning, so there
[42:59] would have been a certain degree of reluctance, which you and I both disagree
[43:02] with strongly about. How about you know, the government simply refusing to step
[43:08] in and try and do something. You know, there may have been things
[43:13] happening in the background, but there was no active, active effort by the
[43:16] government to actually quell what was going on. Uh. There were terrible,
[43:21] terrible war crimes that were taking place in money Pour and it's been burning for
[43:24] a year now. Uh. Now that this government has come in, I
[43:29] think they have a little bit of a little bit of more elbow room less
[43:34] of the kind of pulls and pressures that were on them at that time,
[43:37] you know, to actually get into it and do it. You saw the
[43:38] you saw even the r SS chief talk about how you know moneypour has been
[43:43] going on for so long, it need it needs to be the priority right
[43:45] now to get in and solve it. And and remember the Northeast is a
[43:50] is you know, has been something that the Modi Sarka has been very proud
[43:53] of uh and and justifiably so what what what the you know to get to
[43:59] give credit where it is due. The Modi government, its policy as far
[44:02] as the Northeast was concerned, was a very very steady, robust policy of
[44:07] the kind India had really never seen before. And then moneypour happened, which
[44:12] which kind of just blurred the smoke arising from moneypour almost tore down the good
[44:19] work done in the rest of the Northeast and rightly so, because this is
[44:22] your state and this state has burned. There is a terrible level of distrust
[44:29] between communities that exists even now. Not enough has been done to rebuild that
[44:34] trust. And I think now hopefully the government will you know, get back
[44:39] into it. Like you said, amateur is back as Home Minister. You
[44:42] know, there were some doubts during government formation about whether it would happen or
[44:45] not, and I think the government and Prime Minister Modives sent out a message
[44:50] saying that continuity. This may be a coalition, but continuity is the message.
[44:55] But if continuity is that message, then the continue needs to be in
[45:00] terms of actually getting into the difficult areas and figuring them out and not thinking
[45:07] about them in terms of consequences, but thinking about them purely in terms of
[45:14] national security and you know, and citizens safety issues. And I think hopefully
[45:17] that will happen now. And I'm guessing what makes money poor so complex?
[45:22] And I mean this is a I think this is actually even more complex than
[45:28] something that something that happens in Jan Kashmir is that this is not a case
[45:31] of a group trying to create untress. This is not a case of a
[45:35] group of fighting against the state. This is a case of two groups fighting
[45:38] amongst each other. It's an open war between the Meiti community and the Cookie
[45:44] community and also the other communities that are involved. They are fighting each other
[45:49] and you as the government have to figure out a way to stop them from
[45:52] fighting and causing more violence. So then how does the unit that we talk
[45:57] about most on this on this podcast, Army, get into the picture.
[46:01] Because we've seen some viral videos over the last one year confrontations between the people
[46:07] and Assam Rifles. So Asam Rifles is not technically the Indian Army. It's
[46:10] officer by the in Army, but it's operated by the Home Ministry. A
[46:14] different complexity complexity altogether, and then some phase off between Rum Rifles and the
[46:21] local police. There's allegations of both the police and that Assam Rifles being apparently
[46:24] being biased towards one community and the other, et cetera. And the inter
[46:28] Army also operates in the region because you have sort of some sort of incidencey
[46:31] happening there as well. So when you have all these agencies involved, how
[46:36] difficult is it for the Army, for the Assam Rifles, for the money
[46:39] poor police to operate in a situation like the good work of many decades by
[46:44] the army and the very difficult good work by the army in a complex state
[46:50] where these community divisions have existed so far peacefully and for the last one year
[46:53] with terrible violence. You know, has all gone up in smoke. There's
[46:58] only one way to put it. The Army has operated in Maneypur not only
[47:02] because of the insurgencies that have existed in the NSC and I am et cetera.
[47:07] Uh, and various other groups that operate in that in that part of
[47:12] the country. But also because that you've got a huge border with Mayan Mar.
[47:15] Uh, it's a frontier state. Let's not forget that Myanmar has an
[47:19] international border. Maneypurur has an international border with Manmar So it's a place that
[47:24] needs to be protected. China has interests in Mayanmar. China has a direct
[47:30] interest in what's happening in Maneypour right now. Uh. There is there is
[47:35] more than enough reason to believe that China will be, you know, stoking
[47:38] tensions in Maneypour. Uh, and that that is simply unacceptable right now.
[47:43] So the army's position in Maneypour is a is is uh. You know,
[47:46] like you said that the Assam Rifles is officered by the Army. It comes
[47:51] out of the Home Ministry. You've got other agencies also operating there, especially
[47:53] on the international border. So it's a it's a complicated Uh, it's a
[47:59] it's a complicated and very messy, messy kind of situation that the army is
[48:04] not only not familiar with, but should never be put into a position off
[48:08] The army is there because it provides a kind of overriding clarity in terms of
[48:14] command and control. The army sees things in black and white. The army
[48:17] does not see meThe or Kuki. The army does not see a SAM rifles
[48:22] or CRPF. The army does not see meythe police and Kuki police. So
[48:27] for the army units in Moneypour to be thrust into a situation where they're being
[48:31] pulled in different directions based on community or which community you know a soldier or
[48:37] an officer is is is not only difficult, it's completely unfamiliar. They're not
[48:43] trained for that kind of thing, and they should never be. You know,
[48:45] when we talk about an army flag march after a riot or after a
[48:50] you know, some kind of violence, that is the whole point because the
[48:52] army basically washes away those divisions. When the army comes in, people say,
[48:57] ah, these people don't mess around. They don't see Hindu, Muslim,
[49:00] they don't see meythy Cook, they don't see anything. When the army
[49:04] is here, it overrides everything else. It's one unite, one force.
[49:08] Now, when you trust the army, or when the Army is present in
[49:14] a place where all this terrible communal community churn is taking place, and religious
[49:21] churn is taking place, the command and control breaks down, and they're still
[49:24] managing to hold on and do a difficult job. I'm not saying the army
[49:28] has not operated in these difficult jobs. They've been in the Northeast for since
[49:31] the beginning. But I'm just saying that this kind of inter community you know,
[49:37] warfare and civil war that's taking place in money Pour is it's just terribly
[49:43] unfair for the army to have to be one of the stakeholders. And it
[49:45] is what I'm saying, but they will have to play their role in the
[49:47] solution. Of course. I think that was a very very good way to
[49:52] illustrate what your point, because I think that just give me a clarity.
[49:55] I mean, even though I had some of it, but I think that
[49:58] was the best criticent to sort of put like you know that that discussed the
[50:00] situation money poor and also just how complex it is because it also then comes
[50:06] to the question of key. Even if you want to bring peace, then
[50:08] which force do you use to bring peace? And I don't think ever in
[50:12] India's history a government has to grapple a bit of question like that when it
[50:15] comes to violence and key force, because the force that you use is actually
[50:19] going to make a huge difference in this particular case. Uh So, I
[50:22] think we'll end it there. Because moneypool, like you said rightly at the
[50:25] beginning of your the beginning of the second half of this episode, is very,
[50:29] very complex and for a change, even the people who are calling for
[50:32] the government to do something don't really have an answer when you ask. You
[50:37] know, with Jamshidi, you will always have people say, kahah, this
[50:39] is the right way, this is that is the right way, this is
[50:42] what should be done. But with money poor, the situation is so complex
[50:45] that people who rightfully so are saying that some attention needs to be given don't
[50:50] have answers about what should be a solution, which is what even Ships at
[50:52] the beginning of this episode that the reluctance perhaps comes from a bit key hah,
[50:57] but what do we do? But now that things are the government is
[51:00] in homs, damage has taken charge. Now the setup is I'm guessing I'm
[51:06] going to figure out Now, let's bring them to a table and just sort
[51:07] this mess out one way or the other, and we'll watch that. We'll
[51:12] keep a track of that, and we'll discuss more on that when we have
[51:15] some new developments coming in. Thanks Shift, I hope you get some rest
[51:19] after this long ruling election cycle, and we'll see you next week, hopefully
[51:22] a bit more refreshed. So thanks Lovely Chat, great insights as always,
[51:29] Thanks as always to our producer, and thanks to all our listeners and viewers
[51:31] who've been waiting for us for the last two weeks. That's it for this
[51:35] week's defense. Does for more tune in next week. Till then, stay
[51:37] safe and do not toss any BOUNDCI to their passport.

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