# As India Marks 75th Republic Day, How 'Atmanirbhar' Are We In Defence? | In Our Defence, S2, Ep 08

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 25 Jan 2024, 1 h 03 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/58446995/25_jan_24_iod_s2_ep_8_jan_mix_25_jan_128.mp3

In this Republic Day special, host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor analyse the delayed progress of PM Modi's 'Atmanirbharta' in defence. Why the prolonged wait? What's the stark reality we must confront? Why are we still dependent on Russian equipment even now? Why is self-reliance a painful birthing process? The episode starts with reflections on the Republic Day fanfare, notably the annual parade at Kartavyapath. Amidst the grand spectacle, critics question the hefty costs. Is there a valid place for the R-Day parade in modern India? Shiv disapproves of the display of weaponry, citing the irony of India being a major arms importer while reiterating the urgency for self-reliance in defence equipment. The duo also takes us through the history of India's quest for self-reliance. Why is it not a happy story? Why has India faltered despite having huge needs for military equipment? Was it because of political reluctance to go into having a weapons industry? And why do HAL, DRDO and various other organisations still need more accountability and cohesion? What's the stranglehold of government bodies on defence production? And where do the private companies stand in the midst of this? Finally, what pulls and pressures are required to be fully Atmanirbhar? Well, not everything is gloomy, though. While India remains one of the biggest weapons importers, it has made excellent strides in the last decade. What are those? Tune in to listen! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound Mix by Kapil Dev Singh

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts. There are zero excuses for India not being able
[0:09] to develop its own rifle. Tata is building the Sea two nine to five
[0:13] and believe me, they've it's a miracle that Tata finally got that contract because
[0:19] HL fought tooth and nail for that not to become a reality. They said,
[0:24] no way. This is the C two ninety five is basically supposed to
[0:28] replace an aircraft called the Avro HS seven four eight. They burned the midnight
[0:33] oil lobbying the government saying nay as gadhari, he and savai, I mean
[0:38] it. There were meetings where, you know, the words like gadari and
[0:41] treachery came out. Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on
[0:46] all things well defense, where I they've go Swami, your host, along
[0:51] with senior journalist Svarur, break down the world of conflicts that range from the
[0:56] subtle to the brute. We bring you nuances and perspectives that will in form
[1:00] and at times provoke. This is In Our Defense. Hello and welcome to
[1:08] the eighth episode of In Our Defense this season two. And it's so very
[1:12] busy busy week for us joined this ship. You know, guessing you are
[1:18] as caught up as I have been for the last few days. Uh,
[1:21] we can see that you're in your anchor get up, you know between me
[1:23] wonder from the studio. Yeah, straight from the studio, which made me
[1:26] wonder. Do anchors possess the skill set of getting ready very quickly? They
[1:30] have no choice. If you want to be an anchor, you better be
[1:34] able to like jump into your outfit in about about forty seconds wow, if
[1:40] needed. And and believe me, it's not like an emergency thing. It
[1:44] happens all the time. You get used to it, like super many Like
[1:46] you go in the phone booth and jumping into your clothes. Yeah, all
[1:49] the time. Right. So, busy week with the in the India blog
[1:56] exploding absolutely so, lots for us to cover on the politic side side of
[2:00] things, but also something for the world of defense. Friday is a public
[2:06] day, you know. Before we get to our topic of discussion, which
[2:08] is going to be making India adminible but a big focus area for India's military,
[2:13] I want to spend a couple of minutes talking about the day itself and
[2:15] the morning parade that happens, you know, off late for the last few
[2:20] years that have been for I don't know what reason, there's been controversy over
[2:23] it. People some quarter is asking questions, Key, what's they need to
[2:28] spend so much money? What's this you know, display of you know,
[2:30] military might and all that you're going down the path of China or Russia,
[2:34] you know, having this, you know, your grand military parade down the
[2:37] down what was then known as Rush Path and now it's called path. But
[2:40] ever since I've been a child, you know, watching that morning parade has
[2:45] always always always given me goose bumps. More than the part of the Poldy.
[2:49] Actually it's beating the retree that happens a few days later on jan thirty
[2:53] go wrong. But anyway, I've been fascinated by it. It just gives
[2:58] me goose bumps to see the marching contingents, just like you know, walk
[3:01] in that perfect symmetry in order do you show the same sentiment I do?
[3:07] And you know there are those there are naysayers, and there are critics who
[3:10] will say, are republic data cafe? That does it really have a place
[3:15] in a you know, in a in a modern country like ours. Uh?
[3:19] And you know, one part of me has always you know, we
[3:22] can always agree on the fact that something like a Republic Day parade of the
[3:25] kind we see in Russia or China is very much a socialist era, you
[3:30] know, muscle flex it's a show of strength, you know, that harks
[3:34] back to the Cold War era at a time when countries needed to, you
[3:38] know, put on display, like a beauty pageant, all their weapons as
[3:42] a as a kind of you know, very naked kind of message to the
[3:46] world about look, don't mess with us kind of thing. Of course,
[3:50] it's transformed over the years. As a there's a big cultural aspect to it.
[3:53] There's a lot of military regalia which is important. Like you said,
[3:57] the marching contingents is among the most beautiful part of republic date, so there's
[4:02] a great deal of importance to it. I would say that, you know,
[4:05] the the the actual demonstration of those weapons, I personally find it a
[4:11] little outdated in this day and age. But the point is I am a
[4:16] terribly small minority. And also it's a little unfair for my view to be
[4:21] the real view because having covered defense, I have seen these things up close
[4:27] a lot of times, you know, I have flown in some of these
[4:29] aircraft, I have driven some of these tanks literally been inside, you know,
[4:34] almost all of these things. I've seen these missiles being fired, you
[4:39] know. But millions of people out there, they've the Republic Day Perade is
[4:44] the first chance they get to see these things all lined up so beautifully,
[4:48] you know down So I feel my view is not the important one here.
[4:56] It's very important for especially young people, but I mean Indians at large to
[5:01] get to see, you know, what our you know, military has to
[5:04] offer. It's also you know, remember we're in a country where the interface
[5:11] between the public and the military is extremely limited. You never get a chance.
[5:15] Most people, an overwhelming majority of this country, will never visit a
[5:18] military base. They will never see the military up close. Their closest encounter
[5:24] with the military will probably be bumping into an army soldier in an airport or
[5:28] a railway station, or by chance seeing some army truck or a tank on
[5:31] the road. So for them, you know, having a chance to see
[5:34] this kind of thing is a very big deal, and it's more than just
[5:38] symbolic, it's inspirational. It reminds you that we are, you know,
[5:44] a country that can defend itself. You know. The cynics may dismiss it
[5:48] as like that that's a very cheesy thing, but it's true. These are
[5:51] these are your soldiers, these are your weapons, these are your missiles,
[5:56] these are your tanks. These are precisely what will go into defending the country
[5:59] if there is a three So so I don't think it's outdated in that sense.
[6:02] I, you know, I just have this kind of jaded journalistic view
[6:06] about it. But but I will, I will very frankly say that my
[6:11] view is not important in this case. There is also the fact that it
[6:15] gives the military a chance to actually flex its own regalia. Remember that,
[6:19] you know, military rituals, military you know, marching contingents, you know,
[6:26] the whole aspect of the regalia of military is extremely important. And I
[6:31] can tell you having interacted with military units over the years. The chance to
[6:35] do that on path in front of the country's leadership, the supreme commander of
[6:42] the armed forces, the president of visiting you know, foreign national leader,
[6:46] and the country at large is is a kind of honor that you and I
[6:50] you know, can't really can't really you know, empathize with. That's something
[6:56] only a military person can understand, because they fight for the country and they
[7:00] get a chance to actually be there in public. It's a huge, huge
[7:03] deal. So so I wouldn't change a thing. I mean, as we
[7:06] discuss Republic Day further, maybe I will you know, recommend a few a
[7:11] couple of changes that I'd hope to see, especially since we're talking about Ahman
[7:15] and Barbara. You know, when it comes to Republic Day, showing off
[7:18] all your weapons, showing off all your weapons systems is a great thing,
[7:23] but I have always felt that it's almost like a reminder. It's that annual
[7:28] reminder to the world and to India that we have failed as a country,
[7:32] you know, to stop being the largest importer of weapons in the world.
[7:35] Because an overwhelming number of the aircraft and systems you see on display on Republic
[7:42] Day at the parade, they've are sadly either imported systems or systems that are
[7:47] off foreign origin that are you know, sort of assembled here in India or
[7:51] built here in India under license, et cetera, et cetera. So that
[7:56] aspect needs to change, and I'm sure we're going to talk a little bit
[7:58] more about that, and that's exactly why we are choosing to talk about this
[8:01] subject on this episode. We are recording this on a Wednesday, a couple
[8:05] of days before a public day, and our listeners will you know, get
[8:07] to listen to us on a Thursday, Yeah, Thursday onwards, so spang
[8:11] on time. So I'm glad you brought up the point that you know,
[8:15] this Republic Day as well, like many of the previous ones, not many
[8:18] all the previous ones, a majority of the equipment that will be displayed in
[8:22] this time in front of a part from the President and the French President of
[8:24] Macron who's in town, is of foreign origin. You know. I think
[8:30] a last estimate thing around sixty percent of Indian military hardware sixty to seventy percent,
[8:35] I think that's the number is of foreign origin. I think this also
[8:39] includes the equipment that is built in India but under license from either foreign companies
[8:46] or foreign governments. Now why is it so important for us? I'll give
[8:50] you one figure. For the last budget, the Indian government set aside rupiece
[8:56] five point nine four LACRO for the military, which is thirteen percent of the
[8:58] total. Out of that five point nine five lack crow, one point sixty
[9:03] two LACKCRO was for what is known as capital outlay, which is basically a
[9:07] new acquisitions modernizing your your equipment. I'm pretty sure if a lot of this
[9:13] equipment is built or made in made in India, you can buy much more
[9:18] for the same amount than you could than you are buying when you're buying for
[9:20] important supplies. Before we get to the status of this whole, uh,
[9:26] this whole making India program masters, et cetera, let's kind of let's get
[9:31] an overview from you on when did India decide, not decide, but realize
[9:37] this need for self reliance Because I think I'd briefly mentioned during one of our
[9:39] previous episodes during the one Yes t just one of how the LCA program kind
[9:45] of took shape post the sixty five seventy one Wars and when India kind of
[9:48] realized the need to have its own sort of military hardware. The reason I
[9:52] asked that is that you know, the words make in India, the words
[9:56] have become closely associated within another mode government. Yes, I completely agree that
[10:01] is a very hard push that we've seen in that last ten years, but
[10:05] that's not to say that nothing of this sort was being done altogether before that.
[10:09] So can you pracing from sixty five seventy one onwards one why those wars
[10:13] made us realize this. Can you kind of give us an overarching view of
[10:18] the whole self reliance program and then we'll get do in the specifics of wars.
[10:20] Yeah, So the history of India's self alliance quest is a sadly not
[10:26] a very happy story, and that's the reason why we're still fighting that war.
[10:31] Right now. I'll start off with the with the with the dubious fact
[10:35] that India continues. Now, it's a record that we've held for many,
[10:37] many years, in fact, many decades, that India is currently the world's
[10:43] single largest importer of military hardware, weapons, ammunition, whatever it is.
[10:48] We're the single largest. There is an organization called SIPPRI, which is the
[10:52] Stockholm International Peace Institute, which conducts an audit of this every year, and
[10:56] their report says that India is still by far are the biggest importer of weapons
[11:03] in the world, behind US in Saudi Arabia, Australia and a couple of
[11:07] other countries. Now, this is a this, you know, for a
[11:09] country like India, which has which has been a war fighting country, which
[11:13] is a country that is surrounded by trouble, which is something we've discussed in
[11:16] the past. Uh, you know, a country that has a large military
[11:20] to be so dependent on important systems is uh, is just not a great
[11:26] thing. It's it's at no level is it optimal for a country like India.
[11:31] But like I said, uh, we have such a vast military,
[11:35] such huge weapons reserves. This isn't going to change overnight. It's going to
[11:39] take a long time to change. Now, having established that we are the
[11:43] biggest importer of weapons, who are our three biggest supplier of suppliers of weapons?
[11:50] Number one, by far is Russia. Number two used to be the
[11:54] United States. It was unseated last year in the number two position by France,
[11:58] and in the number three position is the United States. Now since nineteen
[12:03] forty seven, India pretty early on realized that we're not going to have a
[12:09] peaceful existence. We are going to have to fight wars. It fought its
[12:13] first war in nineteen forty seven. You know, barely twenty years later there
[12:18] was its biggest war in nineteen sixty two. Then there was sixty five,
[12:22] there was seventy one, by which time the Indian government had decided that yes,
[12:28] we do need our own weapons and weapon systems because by then, you
[12:33] know, the non aligned movement. Dependence on Russia and stuff meant that Pakistan
[12:37] for a large part was getting you know, high performance equipment, good aircraft,
[12:45] good weapon systems, et cetera, and India simply was not, which
[12:48] is why the nineteen sixty five war is a great example of the huge mismatch
[12:54] between the weapons that India had and what Pakistan had, which is why the
[12:58] Indian Air Force viilots of that time are considered especially great heroes because they were
[13:03] going up against fast, superior aircraft being flown by Pakistan. We were flying
[13:07] Gnats and Hunters and things, and they were flying things like you know,
[13:11] the super Sabers and uh, you know star Fighters, and those are those
[13:16] are much better performance combat aircraft. So that that mismatch kind of started there.
[13:22] The problem was India did not move fast enough to really establish any kind
[13:28] of local industry of the kind that China did. China very aggressively, in
[13:31] a in an almost a very much authoritarian way, decided that we are going
[13:37] to have a military industrial complex because we are a war fighting country, we
[13:41] are going to have territorial ambitions, we are going to have enemies, and
[13:46] we need to have our own industry. Now, the route that China took
[13:50] was a dubious one. They decided, we're going to steal stuff from others.
[13:54] We're going to reverse engineer all of those things, but we'll do it
[13:58] in such a damn good way that it will still work out for us,
[14:01] which is why much of their equipment is of Russian origin. They will steal
[14:05] some Russian junk, reverse engineer it, and make it their own. A
[14:09] large part of the fighter aircraft in Chinese inventory are either stolen or taken under
[14:16] license from Russia and then made into their own. So so that's how China
[14:20] built their industry. Now, the Chinese industry is formidable because it's large,
[14:24] but it suffers greatly in terms of quality. So if ever there is like
[14:28] a really really big war, you know, nobody knows what the reliability of
[14:33] Chinese equipment is. So that's a that's a terrible reputation to have. On
[14:37] the other hand, India has faltered significantly despite having these huge needs for military
[14:41] equipment a because of political reluctance to you know, actually go into having a
[14:48] weapons industry because as usual, there is that Indian sentiment, oh no,
[14:54] we should not be seen to be building weapons to March Jo Chaim import KNG
[14:58] wars. But otherwise we shouldn't be a we shouldn't be seen as a belligerent
[15:03] nation that's building hundreds of tanks and stuff like that. So that was that
[15:07] ridiculous, shortsighted era of the you know, the fifties, sixties, seventies,
[15:13] And I'm not commenting on the political aspect of it. I'm just saying
[15:16] that the system did not realize the importance of having your own military industrial complex.
[15:22] And you had hl, you had DRDO, you had some of these
[15:26] organizations that still suffer from a complete lack of accountability, a complete lack of
[15:33] you know, cohesion. So that didn't work out. Now, look at
[15:37] the way the United States went. The United States after World War Two decided
[15:41] that they would have a certain amount of government oversight, but they were going
[15:45] to energize their private sector. Their private sector was going to be the driving
[15:50] force for self reliance, which is why from the post war years you had
[15:54] companies like Lockheed and Boeing and Northrop and General Dynamics, and these are all
[15:58] post war hems which made their made all their money over you know, selling
[16:04] equipment to the India, to the US military. India didn't have any of
[16:08] that. And the problem for India is it got caught in a kind of
[16:14] self reliance whirlpool. They made small steps towards self reliance. They established the
[16:19] Ordnance Factory Board, the DRDO was started, All these things were started.
[16:23] But then there was a quick series of big wars. And since none of
[16:27] these agencies could turn out equipment of a reliable nature or in large enough numbers
[16:33] quickly to fuel those those fights, India needed to keep importing stuff. Now,
[16:37] the more you import, the more you need to support. And importing
[16:41] is a is a is a cat chasing its own tail. The more you
[16:45] import, the more you're going to have to import more to support what you've
[16:48] imported already. Okay, because when you import equipment, it creates an ecosystem.
[16:53] That's why we're so dependent on the Russians even now. So so,
[16:59] moving from that, you know, a horrible phase for India to now,
[17:03] which is a time when the government has decided It started under the UPA and
[17:08] earlier as well, but it's assumed a kind of very aggressive, no nonsense
[17:14] form under the Modi government, which is that we don't have a choice,
[17:17] we have to do this, you know, how long are we going to
[17:21] continue to import stuff. That's the reason why some important decisions have been taken.
[17:25] A couple of them. They've are things like import negative lists, which
[17:29] I think three lists have been published so far by the mod which are very
[17:32] important. It basically says officially, the Ministry of Defense will not clear any
[17:37] deals that pertain to the so and so equipment if they're coming from abroad,
[17:41] they will only be purchased from India. Then you've got newer aspects of how
[17:47] to purchase stuff in India where when you float a requirement, like when you
[17:51] say I want aircraft, you can stipulate now. And it's very important that
[17:57] while a small part of those craft can be bought from abroad, the rest
[18:02] have to be built here in India underlicense, So that that kind of compulsory
[18:07] structure forcing that made an India element onto these programs has made a difference.
[18:14] It's the reason why India has smashed its defense export records, which are going
[18:19] to hit twenty thousand crore next year. Unbelievable for India. Nobody ever thought
[18:23] this was possible. We still import our defense production hit one lack crore last
[18:30] year big record, which means that Indian production is really really ramping up,
[18:34] but that import ghost is still hanging over our heads. But it's still a
[18:38] cause for worry. But it will take some time to solve. It will
[18:41] take maybe another decade decade and a half to actually see some visible results and
[18:47] hopefully India will no longer be the biggest important right. You know when you
[18:52] mentioned the part about because you import stuff, you are stuck in this wopool
[18:56] of importing, that kind of brought my attention to an episode we'd done on
[19:00] us, the season one of In Our Defense, and I wanted to talk
[19:03] to you about that anyway, but I'll just like, you know, go
[19:07] to that seguee right now. You know, we have been able to develop
[19:11] a nuclear submarine. Yea, we have, and this is in India.
[19:14] By that, I'm not saying, you know, as though we've bought plans
[19:15] from outside and you know, kind of built them away. We've made our
[19:19] own aircraft carrier, I think seventy eighty percent of which is completely indigenous.
[19:25] We have our own light combat aircraft in service. More to come. Like
[19:29] we discussed in one of our previous episodes, we have the link for do
[19:30] you in the show notes. Yet somehow we've not been able to develop a
[19:34] rifle that would satisfy the Indian Army or I don't know if any police force.
[19:38] You had this experiment of insas. I remember it was a huge deal
[19:42] when I was growing. I don't know why, but maybe it was.
[19:45] It was also because I was already fascinated by the world of military extstert stuff
[19:48] like that, so I remember reading a lot about it. I think they
[19:51] were widely used during the Cargill conflict, but there were lots of complaints.
[19:55] I think also during the Carget conflict, you know, not being able to
[19:56] stand up to the cold conditions that it is kind of boastaying the guns,
[20:02] sort of jamming, et cetera. So where does the import thing come in?
[20:04] During the China standoff, you had to go for an emergency purchase of
[20:07] sixty six thousand, if not wrong six or rifles from the US company.
[20:12] That order has been repeated I think twice or three times now, all emergency
[20:17] orders, because you know, yeah, so let's take this segway. What
[20:19] is it that you just cannot develop a simple dam rifle? Now, this
[20:22] is this is an amazingly important question. And I'm going to be really scathing
[20:29] in my answer to it. There are no excuses are There are zero excuses
[20:34] for India not being able to develop its own rifle. And one of the
[20:40] reasons for that is a complete lack of planning. And let me list these
[20:45] excuses, and I hope the people listening also hear it because they know who
[20:48] they are. A complete lack of planning, be completely confused, you know,
[20:56] sort of foresight in terms of what are your priority in terms of procurement,
[21:00] be basic incompetence, see complete lack of accountability, the incredible ego clashes
[21:08] and turf wars between competing laboratories in our military industrial complex who simply don't want
[21:14] to see the private sector come in. What if I told you they've that
[21:18] at least three private sector companies, not small ones, not startups, not
[21:25] little labs. Here I'm talking about big companies have in the last ten years
[21:29] come forward with either plans or prototypes of assault rifles, saying why the hell
[21:34] are you guys buying AK forty sevens and stuff. We can make this.
[21:38] It's no big deal. You know, We've got partners abroad, We've got
[21:42] partners in Bulgaria or wherever they make these rifles. Not a lot of people
[21:47] know that many Ak forty sevens are not have been made in Russia and made
[21:49] in the other former Soviet nations, and they said, why are we doing
[21:53] this? So that brings me to the other point, which is that and
[21:57] we'll discuss this further, which is that never never underestimate the power of the
[22:02] import lobby. You know, if imports come down, a lot of people
[22:06] lose money. You know, whether it is the commission agents, whether it's
[22:08] the middleman, whether it's the corrupt, you know who, you know who
[22:12] gain from you know, the such deals. That ecosystem still exists. For
[22:18] a large part, oversight has ensured that defense corruption has come down drastically because
[22:23] you have government to government deals and things like that. But the ecosystem of
[22:27] defense corruptions still exists. The famous Russian defense mafia is a reality. You
[22:33] know. You would always see some indigenous weapon system. Suddenly there would be
[22:38] a lot of negative reports about some Indian weapon system that's being developed, and
[22:41] then a couple of years later, once big deal would be signed with the
[22:45] Russians. Interesting, okay, And it was a pattern through the eighties and
[22:49] nineties. I've heard about it before I became a journalist that this was a
[22:52] pattern. If you if you ever saw stories a suddenly appearing about how it
[22:57] is cut delay, Oh yeah, you can guarantee that in one year the
[23:03] same equipment is going to be signed in a deal with Russia. So the
[23:06] import lobby, whether it is Russia, whether it's the United States, whether
[23:08] it's government lobbies, are very important because it is their gain if India does
[23:15] not produce its own stuff. Now, sig I'm not taking any names to
[23:19] say that they've done this, but I'm saying, for instance, if India
[23:22] develops a fabulous rifle of its own, then SIG soil, where will they
[23:26] get deals for five hundred thousand rifles. It's a huge windfall for them.
[23:30] They don't get such big orders even from the United States Army or the Marine,
[23:33] so getting such a huge deal is a massive thing for them. And
[23:37] these are companies which a great deal of influence through governments, through commission agents,
[23:41] through whatever it is. And I'm not even referring to any specific company,
[23:45] so let's keep that at the back of our minds when we're talking about
[23:49] this. The import lobby is a powerful, influential, resource rich lobby that
[23:56] does not like what it's seeing when it sees India making real progress in terms
[24:00] of NATA, because then they're like, hey, what are we sitting here
[24:03] for? Then amarakyagahmka. So that is a very important thing. Now three
[24:10] companies come forward and say, we've made rifles. Give us a chance.
[24:14] We'll, you know, make us partner with dr DU if you want to.
[24:18] You know, it doesn't matter the the original equipment manufacturer sitting in Israel
[24:22] or Czech Republic or Bulgaria or whatever. They've given us the technology saying we
[24:26] don't need any royalty. You take the tech, you build it, you
[24:30] just buy it for as you take a flat fee from us for the tech
[24:32] you do it. It has not happened. Why because the d R d
[24:36] O or the Ordnance Factory Board saying q COM, why should we get the
[24:41] private it damma, the same guys who completely messed up the insas and and
[24:45] look, let's let's call u spade a spade. There there's no there's no
[24:48] baratmataki j when it comes to weapons of war, okay, weapon a weapon
[24:52] of war has to work. If it doesn't, if it fails once you're
[24:56] dead. Okay, The Insas rifle was supposed to be a rugged, you
[25:00] know, workhorse infantry assault rifle that could withstand high altitudes, cold desert,
[25:07] ocean, salty air, whatever it is, and it was a suboptimal rifle.
[25:12] It's time to call it out that it was a crappy rifle. It
[25:17] was a crappy product. With no disrespect to scientists or the people who built
[25:19] the rifle. It was a rifle that simply did not meet the requirements of
[25:23] a of a rugged infantry force on the ground. Now, if you mix
[25:30] things like, oh, but it's an Indian rifle, so much time has
[25:33] gone into making it, you know, if you bring those sentimental aspects into
[25:37] it, then it takes a different route altogether, as a result of which
[25:42] a certain amount of leniency is given to the DRDO and the OFB saying oh,
[25:48] okay, okay, fine, let's give you another chance. Let's give
[25:49] you another chance. You're a war fighting country. Your infantry needs rifles.
[25:52] And it goes back to your question, which is that if you can build
[25:55] an aircraft carrier, for God's sake, if you can build fighter aircraft,
[26:00] if you can build nuclear submarines. If you can build some of the if
[26:06] I may say so myself, some of the finest warships in the world,
[26:10] the envy of the world, are destroyers of the envy of the world.
[26:12] And you can't build a drone or a or an assault rifle. Is obviously
[26:18] there's something wrong. It's not about tech, it's not about competence. There's
[26:22] something else. And what I've listed for you are basically it. It's incompetence.
[26:26] It is ego battles. It's a complete lack of accountability and it's a
[26:30] shame. Not a single person's heads rolled for the fact that taxpayer money has
[26:33] been spent and overfaced in buying six soyl you know, six seven to one
[26:37] six battlefield rifles. It's ridiculous at a time when you know you've got war
[26:42] at your doorstep in Ladakh, you're being forced to buy rifles from abroad.
[26:45] The second big thing is we're going to build one lack Aka two zero three
[26:52] rifles in a Meiti. You know, there are there are Indian companies that
[26:56] are holding their head in their hands and saying, after all this, after
[27:00] denying private sector, after you know, after the insas failed in front of
[27:06] you. After everything is crashed and burned, you've gone to the Russians again.
[27:11] Is that what your solution was? What I mean, they're like crying,
[27:14] They're like, my god, we've done everything for you. There's a
[27:17] company in sitting in Bangalore called SSS Defense, one small private company, SSS
[27:22] Defense. They've used their own money, They've got investor money, They've used
[27:26] their own money to build their own Indian assault rifle, Indian designed Indian assault
[27:32] rifle. They've said, we don't even want any commitment from the army.
[27:36] Let us just you know, let's just demonstrate it for you guys. We'll
[27:38] spend our own money to test testing assault rifles. Very expensive business. They've
[27:42] done the whole thing themselves and they haven't got a single order for that rifle.
[27:47] So far. The Amiti facility has not taken off because Russians being the
[27:52] Russians have still not agreed to work share. Blah blah blah. They're busy
[27:56] with Ukraine. They're busy with Ukraine. So it's a great time to actually
[27:59] take one of these hard decisions now who this government certainly seems like it can
[28:03] take those hard decisions, but will they be taken because, like I said,
[28:07] not not a single defense acquisition or production program is a purely defense thing.
[28:12] It's a political decision. You know, if you pull the plug on
[28:15] the a K two zero three factory in Amiti, it's going to piss the
[28:19] Russians off. So so all these things have to be taken into account when
[28:23] you talk about this. That's the reason why self reliance is such a it's
[28:26] such a painful birthing process because every little step you make, you know it,
[28:32] it it kind of changes the game in a huge number of ways.
[28:36] If you if you make something yourself, you're going to anger the Americans.
[28:38] If you make something else yourself, you're going to anger somebody else. So
[28:41] that that legacy of dependence, we've got to wean ourselves away from that,
[28:47] you know, in a careful and independent way. That's the problem. Yeah,
[28:49] I'm glad I've got a chance to speak with you on this topic because
[28:52] you know, I'm from Bombay, and I mean not that this had that
[28:56] has got anything to do with what I'm about to say, but those images
[28:59] of ten Lemon attack and that the CS determined as one railway corp then whole
[29:04] taction rifle fighting against a terrorists with AK forty seven's I mean that was just
[29:08] a side and this is not that far ago, by the way. So
[29:14] yeah, the case of the missing I feel like we discussed in season one
[29:15] again a link will be there in the show notes that case still persist,
[29:18] and I think Shave has once again given us a nice insight into what just
[29:22] like has gone wrong with that whole whole aspect. You know, you mentioned
[29:27] the private sector twice now in this during the course of a conversation, and
[29:32] obviously that was going to come up at some point. There are rays of
[29:36] hope when it comes to the private sector, because you know, when I
[29:37] was doing my resa is the one thing that constantly struck me was I obviously,
[29:41] because of your experience in covering defense, you have the idea about the
[29:45] import lobby, et cetera. But my thing was also about the government lobby.
[29:51] When I say government lobby, I mean organizations like the HL the DRDO,
[29:55] the Ordnance Board factories. I got a feeling that, you know,
[29:57] they would be kind of opposed to bring it up to the private sector at
[30:00] the same time not delivering. We spoke about the tages in one of our
[30:04] previous episodes and you said how Hil took a really long time to deliver the
[30:08] aircraft, which you said was a feeling on its part. How do you
[30:14] see this? Uh, see the stranglehold that the government bodies have on defense
[30:18] production in India? And can you give us a brief view of what's happening
[30:22] with the private sector kind of slowly and steadily coming. And you have the
[30:26] L and t's, you have, you have the controversial but you still have
[30:30] them and a few other companies. These are companies with a lot of resources,
[30:34] a lot of money to spend, and obviously they don't have the legacy
[30:38] of the government red tape, which obviously delays everything in almost any country.
[30:42] By the way, red tape is just you know, a bi product of
[30:45] bureaucracyan governance. What do you Let's just take the example of hl in the
[30:49] Sala not exhibited legacy company. It's it's actually a very good textbook example,
[30:55] Dave, of precisely the kind of disease that you're talking about. It's a
[31:00] company that has nearly one hundred percent monopoly over the Indian Air Force's requirements.
[31:07] Its major customer is the Indian Air Force. It has never needed to deal
[31:12] with accountability issues because you know, hey, Indian Air Force, where else
[31:17] are you going to go? Right, So they've never had an accountability issue,
[31:21] And you're absolutely right when you say that for companies like HL, opening
[31:25] up the private sector is a is an existential threat because it means that that
[31:30] they go from a paradigm of luxurious monopoly to market competition. Right, they
[31:37] have to compete for their orders for the first time in AHL's history tender document
[31:42] and they have to compete for orders which is which is not there in their
[31:45] DNA. They're like, what the hell, what what are you talking about,
[31:48] hl Man, We just get the order right so that that that sunscar
[31:52] is not there in HL. So it's going to take a whole generation for
[31:56] them to wake up and smell the coffee of competition. It's not going to
[31:59] happen soon. So they've already got one shock with this CEA two ninety five
[32:01] deal. Now, the C two ninety five is a production program where India
[32:07] is basically buying sixteen C two ninety five transport aircraft from air Bus in Spain
[32:14] which I visited last year, and the remaining forte are going to be built
[32:16] between Hyderabad and Vadudra by Tata. Okay, now just a small segue here
[32:22] to tell you that while all these private sector companies still don't build big things
[32:28] except for Tatar Lent, like you just said, all of them do fabulous
[32:31] amounts of outsourcing work for all the big defense companies. Like many of our
[32:36] listeners may not know that between Tata Lent and some of the other big ecosystem
[32:40] companies stretched between Hyderabad and Bengaluru, they build fuselages, airframes, doors,
[32:49] floorboards of almost all Boeing aircraft, almost all Lockheed Martin aircraft, almost virtually
[32:53] every airbus aircraft. A large part of the fabrication main parts heads are built
[33:00] between Hyderabad and Bengaluru. So India is is not The Indian private sector has
[33:07] not emerged as a big you know, final integrator of the final product.
[33:10] But we are a huge, uh you know, parts manufacturer. Just like
[33:15] India had that revolution in automotive components defense equipment components, we've had a We've
[33:22] got an amazing, amazing share and it's only growing. But so Tata is
[33:27] building the C two nine to five and believe me, they've it's a miracle
[33:30] that Tata finally got that contract because HL fought tooth and nail for that not
[33:39] to become a reality. They said, no way. This is the C
[33:44] two ninety five is basically supposed to replace an aircraft called the Avro HS seven
[33:49] four eight. We have a fabulous project where we can upgrade the Avros.
[33:53] They were so cynical that they actually told the Air Force forget about buying new
[33:58] stuff. We'll upgrade old stuff and you can you can have them, okay.
[34:01] And the Avro is an old it's a beautiful aircraft, but it's an
[34:04] old, vintage, you know, piece of junk now in in in the
[34:07] modern context. So h they they burnt the midnight oil lobbying the government saying
[34:14] nay as Gadari and I mean it. There were meetings where you know,
[34:20] the words like Gadari and treachery came up because Ahl said this is you know,
[34:23] you are threatening our existence. Uh And and Manuver Particle, who was
[34:28] one of the it was the Defense minister at that time. And I love
[34:30] how Manova Parker keeps coming up, you know, you know, from beyond
[34:34] the grave. And I'm sure he'll have a you know, good laugh about
[34:36] that. But He was one of those people who said, let's move forward
[34:38] to this. Why why do we need to listen to all these silly misgivings.
[34:43] You know, if we're supposed to do big things, we have to
[34:45] take hard decisions. And that's why the C two ninety five deal went to
[34:49] Tata. It's a you know, if you like me, have spent time
[34:52] watching the DRDO in the HL and the kind of absolute you know, arrogance
[34:59] and confidence with which they have sat back without any audit, no accountability.
[35:04] Jub deliver oga kajaaga, that kind of ethic and work ethic. Having competition
[35:10] on your floor is is is like armageddon. It's the end of the world.
[35:16] You know, it's the beginning of the end for them because they're like,
[35:20] what the hell, Like I said, we have to compete. So
[35:22] so now HL has realized that boss, this is now. Now these guys
[35:27] mean business, this government. Until the last minute, HL thought, okay,
[35:30] find maybe they is threatening us because they want to push us a little
[35:34] bit. Now they have to do it now, you since you mentioned the
[35:37] lca as, they have to ramp up production rates of the lcatags or you'll
[35:40] have another private sector come in and soup down and get it going. The
[35:45] Ordnance factory Boards has been corporatized. Now now they got their own big shock
[35:49] because the government gave up the license production of the the canine Wadra, you
[35:54] know, the self propelled howitzers from Korea. They gave it to Identity which
[35:59] are being built in in in Nazira, in Gujrat. So so these these
[36:04] difficult decisions, which are you know, which are not compatible with how India
[36:09] has operated in the past, are happening. They're controversial decisions, but they
[36:13] are happening. And uh, if this doesn't wake up your h's and drdos
[36:20] to a to a new you know, the easy days of socialism are gone.
[36:25] You know, how much money have you spent? Where has that damn
[36:30] money gone? What have you delivered? Whether it is a rifle, whether
[36:34] it is a nuclear submarine, whatever it is, there has to be AABA
[36:37] at the end of the day because people are much more aware now, you
[36:39] know, and and and you know, Modi famously says this is not an
[36:43] era of war. This is an era of peace. It's true, but
[36:45] we need we need instruments of war to ensure peace is there. And we
[36:50] can't do it if we have lazy, you know, egotistical laboratories warring with
[36:55] each other. Now, let's be very clear, all of these laboratories and
[36:59] all of these companies are you know, manned and womaned by very very capable
[37:05] people. This is not a commentary on them. They are very very good
[37:07] people. But it is organizational leadership that has led us down this black hole
[37:12] where self alliance has become such a big problem. Right. You know,
[37:16] we've talked a lot of gloom about the state of India's defense, but there's
[37:21] a lot of good news. There's a lot of good news, Yeah,
[37:22] exactly, and we want to now focus on that a little bit. And
[37:25] so of the good news that will see along the public day periods of the
[37:29] Indian made equipment and developed and made equipment. But we do that at a
[37:32] quick break. Eat eggs, no eat fiber, sleep, no take short
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[38:14] Google, Spotify, and the India Today podcast website. Tune in now,
[38:25] Welcome back. Shiv and I are discussing the status of India's the state rather
[38:30] of India's defense industry when it comes to manufacturing production for its own forces,
[38:35] and the whole controversy about importing too much equipment, whether it's from Russia,
[38:39] France or the US. We're discussing this a couple of days before the Republic
[38:45] Day. The Republic Day parade usually has the military showing its stars, so
[38:50] to speak, the star equipment that it has, and Hiv mentioned how for
[38:55] years, most of that equipment, if not all, war was of foreign
[38:59] origin. However, I think in the last couple of years, couple to
[39:02] three public parades, I think we've seen a lot a lot of Indian developed,
[39:07] made made products. One was launched last year, I swick Rand completely
[39:13] not completely indigenous, but seventy eighty percent indigenous aircraft carrier, a huge achievement.
[39:19] Aircraft carriers are very difficult to to to develop and build you've had the
[39:23] TAGES, which has been around for a few good few years now. Air
[39:27] Force is kind of going the full going going with it now with in terms
[39:30] of big purchases chev In the first sort of a geeky question, the Indian
[39:37] made equipment that excites you the most? And why, Well, the Indian
[39:42] made equipment that excites me the most is actually something that's not yet arrived,
[39:46] but it's in the works, and those are India's nuclear powered attack submarines.
[39:52] Now it was actually indianed a magazine that had broken the story a few years
[39:55] ago. But that's something that excites me more than anything else because because everything
[40:01] about submarines is awesome as far as I'm concerned. Uh, And for a
[40:06] country like India, which has a you know, which has a which has
[40:12] a neighbor like China, which is doing lots of things in the Indian Ocean,
[40:15] there's nothing we need more than you know, very very silent, very
[40:22] very fast moving, well armed, reliable, nuclear powered attack submarines. It's
[40:28] it is the instrument that you need right now, and we simply do not
[40:31] have enough of them. In fact, we don't have any of them,
[40:35] okay, because the only nuclear submarine that we have right now is a ballistic
[40:37] missile submarine, and a ballistic missile submarine is not a is not a is
[40:43] not a weapon of combat. It's a weapon of nuclear deterrents. So it's
[40:45] it's a strategic instrument, it's not a fighting instrument. Right, So a
[40:50] nuclear power attack submarine is what we need desperately. I understand that that program
[40:54] is moving forward quite rapidly, so there might be something good to see in
[40:59] the next two three years, which in my view is very very exciting.
[41:01] But like you rightly observed, they've the Republic Day Parade has visibly become a
[41:08] more dasy affair in terms of the weapons and equipment. Uh, in terms
[41:15] of the ground equipment, you know, the the equipment that rolls by on
[41:17] Kapath, it's almost largely either Indian equipment or Indian made equipment. You know,
[41:25] I was looking at the Republic Day rehearsals this year. You've got the
[41:29] nag missile, which is about to enter service with an anti tank missile.
[41:34] You've got the Akash surface to our missile, which is a fabulous success story
[41:37] from our missile program. You've got the Bromos, which is an Indo Russian
[41:42] joint venture also very successful. We've just exported UH, you know, the
[41:46] bromos to both the Philippines and to h I think Armenia. You've got you've
[41:52] got the T nine T tank, which is a Soviet era tank which is
[41:55] licensed built by India. Outside Chene, UH, you've got a host of
[42:00] other equipment which is UH which is either Indian built or Indian Many of the
[42:06] things that are not very sexy but are in my view, even more important
[42:10] than your you know, HATA and your missiles, are your radars and sensors
[42:15] and electronic UH equipment and those vehicles. You know, they are very innocuously
[42:21] kind of rolled by you know, Swati radar and this radar, and nobody
[42:23] really gives it too much power. But those are fabulous pieces of equipment.
[42:28] India's, you know, for all the for all the gloomy things that we
[42:31] just spoke about, UH, India's scientific brilliance in the defense where really pops
[42:37] when it comes to sensors, radars, you know, avionics, electronic warfare
[42:44] hardware, that kind of stuff and that and that that's the kind of stuff
[42:47] that kind of gets a short shrift on Republican is rolled by that just looks
[42:51] like a truck with a dish antenna on it, and you know, what
[42:53] the hell, it's like some silly antenna and you know who cares really because
[42:57] it doesn't look sexy like with big missiles and stuf. But that's where India's
[43:00] teeth really is, because that's what's going to allow you to detect your enemy.
[43:05] That's what's going to allow you to communicate during war. That's that's what
[43:07] will probably even prevent conflict from breaking out, so hugely important. Let's let's
[43:15] move from the ground to the air. You mentioned the Irons wick Rant.
[43:19] Absolutely, you know, no words can describe what an incredible achievement the Irons
[43:23] Vikrant is. I have visited. I've had the privilege of visiting the Irons
[43:29] Vikrant site at the Coachin shipyard at a time when metal was being cut so
[43:34] from its birth, and I haven't seen her yet in all her glory,
[43:38] sadly, but I hopefully will be going sometime later this year. But to
[43:42] build a ship of that kind they've is is truly a truly phenomenal achievement because
[43:50] you know, you know, apart from the what everybody knows that you know,
[43:52] it's not easy to build a ship like that, but to not just
[43:55] put it together, but to build a very capable ship that's you know,
[44:01] chocolate block with Indian equipment, lots of Indian radars, an Indian combat system,
[44:07] an Indian aviation uh you know complex Uh you know, an Indian communications
[44:12] hub, an Indian war room, Indian radars, some of which are Indian
[44:15] radars. Is is is uh is a bit of a magical process in my
[44:21] view. You know, it's it's it's very humans, men and women did
[44:23] it, but there's there's a lot of magic involved in that. So I
[44:27] think that's that's something to be super proud of. Move into the air now,
[44:30] Uh, you're going to see four PAGES fighters flying over the Republic Day
[44:37] parade, which a lot of people have wanted. Hey, those are single
[44:39] engine fighters. Are they allowed in the air over Republic Day? I think
[44:44] whoever has taken this decision and you know, made an exception perhaps so the
[44:49] THEAGES has done beautifully because the tagas is a is a fabulous fighter. It
[44:53] has had an accident free run. Touch Wood uh. You know, has
[44:59] is the beloved aircraft of Indian Air Force pilots and for Indians on the ground
[45:04] to be able to see the tags in the flesh as it were. You
[45:07] know, buzzing over is going to be a beautiful sight. But the Tagus
[45:13] is where it kind of ends, right. The theages is beautiful, but
[45:15] almost But yes, everything else is either imported or built under license. The
[45:21] SOO thirties are Russian built under license in Nashik. Mid twenty nine's built in
[45:27] Russia, the PATI naval submarine hunter maritime reconnaissance built in the United States.
[45:32] Rauphiles of course built in France. Jaguars built under license, you know,
[45:37] Anglo French technology built by hl SO. Apart from the Tagus, virtually everything
[45:43] else that will be flying is of foreign origin. In terms of fixed wing
[45:46] aircraft helicopters, of course, you know we've got all apart from the ME
[45:50] seventeens, all the other helicopters that we have are you know, either Indian
[45:53] or Indian built, so much to be proud of in terms of air power.
[45:58] Hopefully that will become an even big thing very very soon. But the
[46:02] Indian complexion the Republic day, I think is a very good thing. Yeah.
[46:06] In fact, you know you mentioned radars and sensors and the helicopters.
[46:08] I think certain kinds of helicopters and I think certain kinds of sense of radars
[46:14] are on that no import list that Ministry of Defense has here. These are
[46:19] items you just buy in the country because you already have them, and they
[46:23] are very very good quality. You know, while you were talking right now,
[46:28] and while all those also doing my research, I kind of got this
[46:31] impression you I can you know, correct me if I'm wrong, or you
[46:36] can explain a bit more on this, is that the Navy somehow has I
[46:40] won't say lion's share, but seems to have a fairly large number of equipment
[46:45] that is Indian made. You mentioned the destroyers at the dainning of this episode.
[46:49] We have some excellent I think shipyards again also PSUs by the public sector
[46:52] and undertakings. I think I'm not sure how much of private sector involvement is
[46:57] there in the shipbuilding industry. And you can tell us a bit more about
[47:00] that. But how has this been the case that you know, between your
[47:05] army, your air Force, and your navy, the Navy somehow has this
[47:07] ability to build your ships, build your the most advanced ships, nucleus submarine.
[47:13] Obviously you built it in house, because no country is going to sell
[47:15] you nuclear nuclear subs, but the nuclear attack submarines, like, like you
[47:20] said, a different story. Again, something that you're saying is a fast
[47:22] moving project that we might see sometimes soon will be a great achievement. I
[47:27] completely forgot about that by this, so thanks for bringing it up. So
[47:30] how has this been the case disparately? Have you also seen it as a
[47:32] defense observer and a reporter, and how do you explain it? So there's
[47:36] a very good reason for that. Yes, I have observed it over the
[47:38] years, and there are there's a very good reason for that. It's actually
[47:43] a very simple reason. The Navy. Just remember that the Army and the
[47:47] kind of equipment it uces. If it orders something, it will come within
[47:52] a year, two years, maybe even a few months if it's rifles and
[47:55] things like that. The Air Force orders a couple of you know, if
[47:59] the Air four orders aircraft from another country, they can start arriving anywhere between
[48:05] next year to maybe two three, four years. But if the Navy orders
[48:08] a ship, it's going to take seven, eight, nine, ten or
[48:12] more years to deliver. And that's because a ship is one hell of a
[48:16] big thing to build. Okay, No matter what kind of ship it is
[48:20] is minimum it's going to take four or five years to build, which means
[48:22] this thing called lead time lead time till delivery is very large, which means
[48:27] that the Navy has no choice but to get it right the first time.
[48:31] Now, the reason why the Navy prefers indigenous technology, indigenous projects, stuff
[48:39] that's built by Indian ship builders is the Navy is realized, you know,
[48:44] when we order something, we have no elbow room. We have to get
[48:46] it right the first time. Failure is not an option because once we've ordered,
[48:50] it will start being built and if after seven years it's something that we
[48:53] don't want, then it's going to be a problem. Now, the Navy
[48:57] can't send representatives to sit in foreign companies to oversee what they're building. The
[49:01] foreign companies have a product saying yeah, elena aguiney Navy will say yes,
[49:06] we wanted, and that's the Indian Navy's job there is done. Then they
[49:09] have to twiddle their thumbs and wait until the damn thing is delivered a decade
[49:13] later. But if it's built here in India by an Indian shipyard, the
[49:17] Navy gets to embed a team with the project, overseeing every aspect of it
[49:23] from the get go, from the first piece of metal that's cut till the
[49:30] delivery, a Navy team is there monitoring every aspect of it, cost correcting,
[49:35] fine tuning, improving, updating, upgrading, changing requirements mid coast to
[49:39] make sure that over that lead time seven eight, nine, ten years,
[49:45] what they finally get maybe even better than what they had initially imagine, because
[49:49] that lead time is too big. That lead time spans people's careers, spans
[49:52] spans generations. It will certainly span, you know, the leadership of the
[49:57] Navy then, mean the delivery of the aircraft carrier, for instance, would
[50:02] have consumed the tenures of five or six Navy chiefs. Right. So,
[50:07] so that continuity, that kind of streamlined predictability in what they're going to get
[50:14] has forced the Navy. It's not it's the Navy. The Navy is.
[50:16] You know, I don't want to, I don't want to not give the
[50:20] Navy credit. But it's not out of some kind of sentimental or emotional love
[50:23] for Indian stuff that the Navy does. It's it's a it's it's it's the
[50:27] force of necessity. It is that if it's Indian I get to keep a
[50:30] watch on it. If it's coming from abroad, I can't do it,
[50:34] and I can't afford to take that risk with foreign equipment. Couple that with
[50:37] the fact that India's notoriously slow procurement process means that even arriving at an order
[50:44] is difficult. But arriving at an order with an Indian company, since its
[50:46] government owned, is much simpler. You know, concluding a contract with the
[50:51] Hindustan Shipyard or Mazagon Shipyard or Garden Reach or whoever it is, which are
[50:55] state owned shipbuilding units, is far simpler and most straightforward then signing a deal
[51:01] with Fincantierry in Italy or General Dynamics Shipyards in US or Vicars or or you
[51:09] know, the day Wu Shipyard in Korea. You know, it's just much
[51:13] more complicated. So so, what has worked in the Navy's favor is from
[51:19] the time that they started this culture of embedding their teams in these companies,
[51:24] so much so that chairman chairmen of these companies are ex naval officers. Wow,
[51:30] you know, many of the people who work for these companies are x
[51:31] Navy. So people retire from the Navy and join these companies so there's an
[51:36] almost magical synergy between these companies and the Navy, and it's the envy.
[51:42] Believe me, you asked a very good question, because it's the envy of
[51:45] the air Force and the army. Because here you've got this beautiful synergy between
[51:49] the two. The companies know exactly what the Navy wants because the Navy is
[51:52] kind of fully plugged into those companies. Hamarai Logez company may so they know
[51:57] what they're doing and we get everything on time. But because the Navy started
[52:01] doing this in the sixties and seventies, now that's become a culture. And
[52:06] because the Navy started doing this in the sixties and seventies, the quality of
[52:10] the products that was delivered by these companies has now become the talk of the
[52:14] town. We build a fabulous aircraft carrier. You know, our Project fifteen
[52:20] Project fifteen eight destroyers, the Deli Class and the you know, the Kolkata
[52:23] Class destroyers are among the best in the world. Because the Navy had the
[52:29] foresight to start doing it in the sixties and seventies, and we're seeing the
[52:31] fruits of that now because that's become culture. That's how you, like I
[52:36] said, it takes decades for that to become, you know, the culture
[52:39] of a country. So the beautiful irony in all of this is we can't
[52:45] build a rifle, but we build We build destroyers, we build frigates like
[52:52] the Project seventeen age ships are are absolutely the handsomest ships you've ever seen.
[52:58] And they're built like this in Mumbai. Right. So it's in terms of
[53:02] warship building the most complicated thing in defense, India has got it sorted.
[53:07] And that's because the Navy, by force of necessity, decided that it needed
[53:13] to change its ways. Forget about this import rubbish. We need to give
[53:15] it our own year and that has now become second nature to the name.
[53:20] I think the Navy then, perhaps is the perfect example of what perhaps should
[53:23] have been done overall. Yeah, be back in the sixties and seventies and
[53:27] did not really happen, because the fruits of that is what we've been missing
[53:30] today. I mean, I'm pretty sure back then, no one o of
[53:34] the thought that you know, forty to fifty years down the line and they
[53:36] would be able to make its own aircraft carrier, Yeah, no way,
[53:38] or you know, build its own nuclear submarine and attempt building a nuclear attack
[53:45] a submarine, which again, like you know you mentioned a very very fascinating
[53:49] piece of technology because and just I think you know, just in case our
[53:52] listeners and viewers are wondering why wes so fascinated, is that you know this
[53:54] basically theotically gives you the ability to stee under water forever. Yeah. I
[54:00] only reason you need to come up as for supplies and you know, change
[54:01] of proof for example, because the nuclear power Submary would be powered forever.
[54:05] Yeah. Uh No. Final couple of thoughts as we close this episode.
[54:09] Uh, you know, going forward from what you just said, this whole
[54:13] idea about navy embidding, et cetera. Perhaps that's something you know, other
[54:15] forces can take a take a look at as an example for something that perhaps
[54:20] might want to do. Uh. Two thoughts, two points to talk to
[54:22] for you to expand. Uh. One, where do you obviously see the
[54:28] ADMIN project in the next few years, because like you said, we are
[54:30] seeing every Republic day you see more and more of an equipment you said,
[54:35] but it will also take some up a few more years. So where do
[54:38] you see the outlook based on what's happening right now? Uh? And one
[54:44] very important question and interesting one for me and i'm is that what is the
[54:49] critical technology that we still don't possess. For example, right off the bat,
[54:52] I can think of an aircraft engine. They just might be you know,
[54:54] our own own fighter jet, but the engine is not ours. Similarly
[54:59] with the ions V grant that the ship is ours, but the engine that
[55:02] powers the ship is not ours. So do you think India needs to go
[55:07] down the path of investing in developing such engines? Because also remember that,
[55:10] like PMO said, we are in an era of peace and not war.
[55:15] You also have to factor in the amount of money you are going to spend
[55:20] and developing such use piece of equipment and then what's the sales going to be
[55:23] for it to justify the capital you invested. So is it worth it to
[55:29] invest so much money in developing something or rather by these important piece of equipment
[55:35] and then with your own So your thoughts on that. So again, let's
[55:37] take the example of the aircraft engine, because that's the perfect example of you
[55:42] know, a core enabling defense technology that India does not possess of its own
[55:46] now. At a time, when India started developing its own aircraft engine called
[55:50] the Cavery at that time, you know, there were very few avenues of
[55:54] getting engine technology from abroad for aircraft and things like that, and therefore there
[56:00] was a need for India to develop its own engine. And it's always a
[56:02] good idea if you have your own engine, because an engine is a beautiful
[56:06] thing. If you have an aircraft engine, you could just build many aircraft
[56:09] around it, different kinds of aircraft. If you have a powerful enough engine,
[56:13] you can build a fighter. You can build, you know, an
[56:15] attack drone. You can build, you know, a small transport aircraft.
[56:19] There are many things you make it a twin engine, you know, configuration,
[56:22] you can build an even larger aircraft. So an engine becomes like the
[56:25] centerpiece of many things that you can do around it. We don't have that.
[56:30] The cavery was a failure. I'm being a little ruthless because ultimately,
[56:35] if you don't get the engine, then it was a failure. Yes,
[56:37] you may have developed many technologies around it, blah blah blah, but the
[56:40] cavery per se was a failure because it did not meet the requirements that were
[56:45] expected. No heads rolled, there was no accountability for cavery. The GTR
[56:52] was one of the most well funded the gas turbine Research establishment of the DRDU,
[56:57] one of the most well funded laboratories, one of the most high tech
[57:00] offices, luxurious place, and not one head is rolled for one of India's
[57:05] most expensive defense projects that has ended with nothing. So let me put that
[57:08] out there because I know that in our defense is listened to by everyone in
[57:13] the dr Do you and I want them to hear what the public needs to
[57:15] hear about that as well. So, but since the time that the Kaveri
[57:20] began being developed, they've you know, times have changed. You know,
[57:23] it's not that Cold War era anymore. India has you know, moved past
[57:28] that socialist sort of era. It's a different era now where where the question
[57:35] comes up over whether do we need to reinvent the wheel? There are countries
[57:39] that have perfected aero engine technology. You know, they've done all the testing,
[57:44] they've got it. We can just you know, get it from them,
[57:46] you know, without having to worry about anything. We can assemble it
[57:50] here like we are going to do now with the GEF FO one four with
[57:52] the US. So do we need to really spend money reinventing a technology that
[57:59] has been aften and perfected by you know, companies like ge and Rolls,
[58:04] Troyce and Sneckma and all these companies over years and years post war companies.
[58:08] That's an important question to ask. I personally still think that it would be
[58:12] good if India has its own engine, because that gives you a great degree
[58:15] of flexibility apart from the know how to produce something as complicated as a jet
[58:20] engine, and it's a terribly complicated piece of equipment. It's basically hell on
[58:24] the inside. It's like just breathing fire. Right now, India does not
[58:30] know whether it is going to build its own engine. It's been trying to
[58:34] think about whether it wants to do that or not. Could it be,
[58:37] you know, a joint venture between India and France. So all these all
[58:42] these permutations and combinations are happening right now. But to answer your initial question
[58:47] about, you know, what is the outlook going forward? What what are
[58:52] things going to look like? I personally think they've that India needs to prioritize
[58:58] what it wants to develop. Okay, we cannot develop everything. The first
[59:02] thing we need to make very clear is that to kind of remove any sentimentalism
[59:07] from this issue. Ki Nai Subcuchhumkoh Banana Subcuch yaha, banana quki. We
[59:14] can't trust the world and the world will screw us if we put too much
[59:17] dependence on them. Now, in one sense, yes, that is true.
[59:22] You do, you know, don't put your major war fighting stuff and
[59:25] depend on other countries for that your submarines or your aircraft carriers and things like
[59:30] that, but for engines and you know, other support equipment. You've got
[59:35] good friends. You've got good friends like France, You've got good friends like
[59:37] Israel. You've got you know, the United States has screwed you before when
[59:40] it comes to the tages, but you know you're getting an engine from them.
[59:45] Do you really want to waste national resources now doing your own version of
[59:51] a far better product that's going to come from the outside in a fairly reliable
[59:54] sort of configuration. So those are questions to think about. Having said all
[59:59] of this, I think the roadmap and the way ahead for self reliance is
[1:00:05] is is a few ruthless decisions every single year. Every single year, there
[1:00:09] needs to be two or three ruthless decisions, like for example, a couple
[1:00:14] of years ago, the ruthless decisions were a C two nine to five deal
[1:00:16] will go to Tata, not to AHL, and it will be L and
[1:00:20] T that will build a canine self propelled tractor utillery guns and not any of
[1:00:25] your Bara movers and all these other Sarkari companies. So if we have two
[1:00:34] or three such hard decisions where the government says no, we will not get
[1:00:38] a Sarkari company to do this, We will give this to a startup company,
[1:00:43] or will or the next one hundred thousand rifles will only be built by
[1:00:46] the private sector. Incrementally, it will add up to a very big thing.
[1:00:51] Nothing is going to change overnight. I would hazard to say, perhaps
[1:00:54] even in our lifetime we will not see any big dramatic shift, but in
[1:00:59] the generation that follows, maybe India will be the third biggest importer of weapons.
[1:01:06] We're never going to stop importing stuff. Okay, that that's going to
[1:01:07] take a century to change. But I'm just saying that if these incremental steps,
[1:01:15] which are which which require political risks, which require a certain degree of
[1:01:20] madness, also because of how entrenched we are with the imports, can be
[1:01:23] taken every month, every year with the you know, import negative lists,
[1:01:29] with a guarantee that half your budget will only be spent on indigenous equipment or
[1:01:34] made in India equipment. These hard decisions will all add up to something substantial
[1:01:37] in the foreseeable future. That's how I see nothing big is going to happen
[1:01:42] overnight. Yeah, nice thought to end this episode on on And I think
[1:01:45] you've given us a very good sense of overview of one, like, you
[1:01:51] know, a practical view of just it's not just as simple as keybold they're
[1:01:54] making India and Jelo. There are lots of pulsion pressures involved, like Shiv
[1:02:00] explained very beautifully on this on this episode, so as always, learned a
[1:02:05] lot. Uh and I hope some of these decisions that you're talking about do
[1:02:07] get do get taken. I mean, the example of the air is a
[1:02:12] very good one, so you know, the vivid description of you know what
[1:02:15] ha is doing at the mod also a very good But I'm very sure of
[1:02:19] how they're gonna react to it and the listening. They get angry at me
[1:02:22] like every few months, so they can take it. They're big boys,
[1:02:25] right, So thanks you once again. Fantastic episode. Thanks to our viewers
[1:02:30] and listeners who've been tuning in, who've been leaving us a lot of comments.
[1:02:34] We really enjoy reading them. Uh, And I think we've actually covered
[1:02:37] some of the topics that people wanted us to talk about on on on this
[1:02:40] episode because there was a talk about you know, do talk about the Carver
[1:02:44] engine, what happened to it altogether? And do talk about the missing rifle,
[1:02:47] the Indian Indian rifle. So I think we've covered some some of the
[1:02:51] feedback that had come in over the last couple of weeks, you know,
[1:02:54] and please, you know, keep giving us feedback and labor comment to us
[1:02:58] on YouTube before watching us on on on video. If you're listening to us
[1:03:01] on Apple podcast of Spotify, can what'sappas are WhatsApp number is eighty five double
[1:03:05] eight nine, double six, double nine six. A special thanks is always
[1:03:07] to op Produce Seranu addretioning. That's it for this week's defense. Doores for
[1:03:12] more tune in next week. Will then, stay safe and do not cross
[1:03:14] any boundaries for the passport by

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