# China Threat Literally At Our Doorstep. Why India Should be Concerned | In Our Defence, Ep 10

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 8 Feb 2024, 48 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/58610216/08_feb_24_iod_s2_ep_10_mix_feb_8_128.mp3

Indian army chiefs have consistently emphasised the sensitivity of the India-China situation for the past four years. What is the current ground situation, and why is it unfavorable for India with the looming Chinese threat? Host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor delve into these questions in this episode. Numerous reports have been of Chinese "spy ships" in the Indian Ocean region. What defines these "spy ships," and why isn't India's response widely discussed in the media, considering other countries also deploy research vessels for strategic purposes? And why is there concern without specific laws prohibiting Chinese "research vessels" from conducting surveillance activities? Are there noticeable changes happening at the tactical level? One significant advantage India holds over China is its extensive knowledge of the Indian Ocean's geography, including depths, water intensity, and temperature, crucial for submarine warfare. But, China excels in submarine capabilities, posing a challenge for India. The duo also discusses reasons for the Indian establishment's shift from focusing on Pakistan to now China over the past decade or so. What does this denote, and how did India reach this point? Listen in! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound Mix by Kapil Dev Singh

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts, I would say, sadly, unlike India which
[0:08] is still to completely immerse itself in submarine warfare, the Chinese have done it.
[0:13] They've understood that the current, the past, the future of naval warfare
[0:17] has to be as far as submarines are concerned. It can't be with aircraft
[0:19] carriers. What most people don't know is that the bottom of the sea is
[0:23] actually more dramatic, more cavernous, with ravines and mountains and caves and things
[0:31] like that than land. These survey ships and these research ships are constantly providing
[0:36] this detailed, dynamic picture of the seabed, put together a grid referenced map
[0:40] of what the Indian Ocean actually looks like. One of the javans of the
[0:44] Indian side saying something on the lines of gold Cup that was in watching that
[0:49] as a layperson, I actually got very angry. I thought that if I
[0:52] was being pushed around like that, I would have definitely scorn a punch,
[0:56] and that punch would have led to something else than basic escalation. The entire
[0:59] gulf and clash started because someone threw a rot One rock was thrown and it
[1:03] hit Colonel Santoche Babu, the commanding officer of sixteen VR. Hello and welcome
[1:08] to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on all things well defense, where I
[1:15] They've go Swami, your host, along with senior journalist Svarur, break down
[1:19] the world of conflicts that range from the subtle to the brute. We bring
[1:23] you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at times provoke. This is in
[1:30] our defense. Hello and welcome tenth episode of Another Defense. Chev We've been
[1:37] doing this for two months and a half. Now, how are you liking
[1:40] your podcast experience? Is what I'll started. I'm totally loving it because it's
[1:44] opened up a completely new audience which I didn't know about before. So I
[1:48] keep getting messages all the time. And what I really love is I'm on
[1:52] many different defense groups. They've here, on abroad and recently on my Israel
[1:57] group Israel, you know, a group with war reporters and stuff. I
[2:00] saw two of our podcasts being circulated over so people are listening, people are
[2:06] watching nice, lovely. So what do we want to talk about this week?
[2:09] Nothing much is happening in the world of defense, and honestly speaking,
[2:13] I think nothing much will happen for the next few months or news by speaking
[2:16] because it's all good elections. Yeah, but let's talk about China. The
[2:22] first episode that we did, we kind of took an overview look at all
[2:28] the sort of confidicts that are happening in the world right now Israel, like
[2:31] you mentioned, Russia, Ukraine, and China. But let's dive a little
[2:36] bit deeper into China. I want to begin with like sort of a sort
[2:38] of a bigger picture on what's happening from somebody who obviously talks to people in
[2:44] the diffense establishment. Because something the Army chief recently given an interview, I
[2:47] think the annual interview that he that he gives out in which once again he
[2:51] said that the situation on the LS along with China is stable. But since
[2:55] theive I've been hearing this for a while now. Yeah, for lay people,
[3:01] it's like you ahah, yeah, the Gulban clash happened and it's all
[3:05] down undusting. But army chiefs, military chiefs have been constantly saying that the
[3:08] situation remains sensitive. Why do they say that and what's exactly going on right
[3:15] now? Before we go into wards, the reason why the army chiefs correctly
[3:19] say that the situation remains sensitive. They is because you've got the two world's
[3:23] largest armies who've masked upwards of fifty thousand troops on each side, within within
[3:31] visual distance of each other, still along a frontier in eastern l Duck.
[3:36] Still and these are these are not just troops, but these are these are
[3:39] you know, regiments with tanks, with artillery, with rocket systems, with
[3:44] radars, you know, basically war fighting, war fighting units that are primed
[3:49] and ready for assault and for defense. Right. So when they say it's
[3:54] when the army chief says it's stable but sensitive, it is actually stable because
[3:59] when you have two sort of equal forces applying towards each other, nothing moves
[4:03] and it becomes stable. Right. So that's the reason why he says it's
[4:06] stabled, and he's right. Since I think somewhere around early twenty twenty two,
[4:13] which is when the last disengagement happened at one of the friction points,
[4:16] I think it was Hot Springs or the Gogra post in eastern Ladakh things,
[4:23] there has been practically no movement there. And when I say no movement,
[4:27] I mean no offensive movement and either side no aggressive movements. But that doesn't
[4:31] mean that China hasn't been building up its capacity on that side, They've been
[4:36] building infrastructured a furious rate of Ironically, the story you'll never hear is how
[4:43] India is building infrastructured a furious rate as well. You know, as a
[4:46] result of the political climate, you'll constantly hear about how you know, China
[4:50] has taken territory. I'm sure we'll get into that in just a bit.
[4:53] They've but the situation is most certainly still sensitive because at this stage we are
[4:59] now four year into the world's biggest ever, the world's biggest military standoff,
[5:03] right, two nuclear countries masked with their armies against each other at the snow
[5:09] blown you know, super high altitudes of Ladakh. They've they've they've collided in
[5:14] in in Galvan. Uh. There have been clashes taking place on the Pangong
[5:18] Lake. Uh. You know that there have been some violent confrontations between the
[5:23] two sides, but no all out, all out you know, conflict has
[5:27] broken out, thank you know, thankfully for that between the two sides.
[5:30] However, that that possibility is never too far away when you've got huge regiments
[5:36] and large masses of h you know, uh, you know, men at
[5:41] arms massed against each other in this way, war is never going to be
[5:45] really far away. However, the good news, of course is that this
[5:48] this kind of this, this this kind of frozen situation as it were literally
[5:53] and metaphorically, uh, also means that India's India's whole attempt at getting things
[6:00] to move back to the pre May twenty twenty positions where China moves back its
[6:05] forces hasn't happened. They've basically said, we're at your doorstep and now we're
[6:10] going to build all this infrastructure and we're going to be here to stay.
[6:13] So this is their side of the line is of course, you know,
[6:16] China occupied Tibet, axit Chin, which is ours, et cetera, et
[6:19] cetera. But the fact remains that does this become the new normal? Does
[6:25] this become the new status quo? That's the bad part. And you know,
[6:28] here on in our defense on this podcast, we don't do any chest
[6:31] thumping. We lay down the facts as they are, and let me say
[6:34] it very very clearly. You know, the politicians and the parties may fight
[6:40] endlessly about whether territory has been lost or territory has been you know, recovered,
[6:45] et cetera. But the very fact, the very fact they've that China
[6:49] continues to sit on our doorstep in eastern Ladakh with increasing signs that it has
[6:58] no plans to leave, is in itself a bad situation for India. So
[7:01] whether it you know, whether it comes to territory or you know, whether
[7:05] it comes to the bean count of how many square kilometers has gone this side
[7:09] that side, because quite frankly, as a result of the differences in perception
[7:13] of the line of actual control, it's a bit of a meaningless exercise actually
[7:17] talking about which territory is where, because of the huge swords of territory that
[7:21] actually account for the no man's land post what happened in Galwan. But the
[7:27] fact that the Chinese are there, Let's make no mistake, this is not
[7:30] an equal situation by any measure. You know, we may have taught the
[7:33] Chinese a lesson in terms of showing them that we are no pushover and we
[7:38] will defend and that we can give them a very, very bloody nose like
[7:42] we did in Galwan, the fact is that it's they who are at our
[7:46] doorstep, not the other way around. And that's why it's a bad situation.
[7:48] Find that's a very very good explanation, I think actually, and to
[7:55] just give a bit of a context to our listeners than yours. You know,
[7:58] unlike the LOC, the l c IS does not exist technically speaking,
[8:03] the Yellow Sea. If you see maps of India in popular culture, you
[8:05] just google it, you'll see it. There's a line that you know,
[8:07] kind of goes around and the markets, what's Pakistan ka Kashmir and what's h
[8:13] within here? But the l S when it comes to the military engagements,
[8:18] no one agrees where the LC is. The Chinese say this is the LAC.
[8:20] The Indiens say this is LAC. And that is why what she've said
[8:24] right now that the difference in perception because of which you cannot do that counting
[8:28] of how many square kilometers of land have you lost, because you cannot just
[8:31] say you've lost that land because China says that's not ours, and India says
[8:33] that's yours. Exactly India, so that's us, And it's always been claim
[8:37] versus county because the two lines. Yeah, yeah, there was a point
[8:41] you touched upon. I was going to go into that later on, but
[8:43] actually, because you said that in the expansion earlier, I just want to
[8:48] go to that right now before we talk about other things, is about how
[8:52] in the popular media we never talk about what India is doing, and I
[8:56] want to talk about that in context of recent reports of Chinese so called spy
[9:01] ships. For listeners who are not watching us, I've just made air quotes
[9:05] spy ships being in and around the Indian Ocean. I'm very conflicted about this
[9:11] several strands of thoughts. But first off, what are spy ships? Because
[9:18] I mean, I'm pretty sure every country has some sort of a vehicle that
[9:22] goes around researching the ocean bed. I'm pretty sure India does, but we
[9:26] never talk about that. Yeah, why don't we do what that? And
[9:28] second, the laws don't like forbid China from having the spy ships or the
[9:35] research going around. So what's the big deal right to be made so the
[9:39] Chinese. You're right, nothing stops the Chinese from using such ships in open
[9:45] waters, international waters within India's economic zone. Obviously, that's a separate matter
[9:50] the Chinese. The problem with the Chinese, they've liked with most things,
[9:52] is that as far as they're strategic objectives, the military objectives are concerned,
[9:58] they are possibly the world's most untrustworthy country. Okay, if not the most
[10:03] untrustworthy country. Now, this is a country that serves its own purposes,
[10:07] so we can't fault them on that. They are, you know, they're
[10:09] following their national agenda and they're doing it actually in a pretty efficient and ruthless
[10:13] manner. So so credit to China for that. But they are a country
[10:18] that in this sort of thing in terms of espionage, in terms of deviously
[10:24] trying to sidestep international rules and regulations of the sea, et cetera. This
[10:31] is this is a country that does not follow the rules. It is extremely
[10:33] devious and unreliable and untrustworthy. Now, China has in the past sent hydrographic
[10:41] survey ships research vessels as they're so called, which I love that innocuous name,
[10:46] research vessels, you know, in and around the Andermancia. I remember,
[10:48] I remember there was a there was a there was an incident where a
[10:54] Chinese oceanographic research vessel had been spotted off the underm Islands. Now, the
[11:01] word spy ship is a little dodgy as far as I'm concerned, because the
[11:05] essence of anything that is doing any spying is that it is kind of invisible.
[11:09] You can't really see it. You don't know what it's doing. In
[11:11] this case, it's like this huge twenty ton ship, right, so it's
[11:16] not exactly invisible, it's right there, you know exactly what's going on.
[11:22] Where the spying aspect comes into it is where you say the ship is actually
[11:26] a research vessel, but it's actually doing something else. Okay. Now,
[11:31] oceanographic surveys and research in the oceans may sound like a pretty routine kind of
[11:37] process, but it's actually not there. Okay. Hydrographic surveys of oceans are
[11:43] a very very crucial instrument of giving your military, especially your submarine forces,
[11:52] the ability to map the oceans, the ability to you know, I'll come
[11:56] to the mapping part in just a bit. Let's just get let's just handle
[12:00] the spy ship part. So what the Chinese have been doing for many,
[12:03] many years now is they've been sending these these survey missions, or these research
[12:07] vessel missions into the Indian Ocean. They are allowed to send their ships whenever
[12:11] they want to, they can in international waters. They've been doing so,
[12:16] they've sent one just now to the Maldives as well, so called research vessel.
[12:20] India has had a clear strategic setback as far as Maldese is concerned,
[12:24] you know, they want our military out from there, and the Chinese in
[12:26] that's their politics. It will go in cycles. I'm sure India will be
[12:30] back there very soon. But the fact is that these vessels that the Chinese
[12:35] send into the Indian Ocean, they spend a large amount of time, They're
[12:39] harvesting huge amounts of data about the seabed. The Indian Ocean is obviously a
[12:46] vast motion. Right What the Chinese don't have right now is what the Indian
[12:52] Navy and the Indian forces have, which is like a very good idea of
[12:56] what the Indian Ocean actually looks like, which means in terms of depths,
[12:58] which it means in terms of you know, water density. And I'll explain
[13:03] why these things are important in terms of water temperatures, how how these depths
[13:07] are actually changing as a result of climate change. Uh, these are hugely
[13:11] important, especially for a country like China, because they want to send their
[13:16] submarines into the Indian Ocean. They want control of the Indian Ocean, because
[13:20] the Indian Ocean has has been established as the as the world's chief sea lanes
[13:26] of communication for trade. It's where UH, you know, most countries,
[13:31] energy security depends because from the Middle East, West Asia, uh, you
[13:35] know, through the Swesst Canal going into the Mediterranean Sea. You know,
[13:37] from the Mediterranean Sea everything comes into the Persian Gulf and then into the Indian
[13:41] Ocean. So this is this is where it's at as far as trade and
[13:45] energy security is concerned. So therefore, China doesn't want anyone else to be
[13:50] able to control that, and they do believe that their hegemony they're challenged the
[13:54] United States. Uh, you know, superiority can only come if it has
[13:58] a handle over your trade and commerce and energy security and things like that.
[14:03] And it cannot do that unless it has total control over the Indian Ocean.
[14:07] And it cannot have total control over the Indian Ocean unless it knows the Indian
[14:11] Ocean And it cannot know the Indian Ocean unless it is able to send submarines
[14:16] into the Indian Ocean at will. And it cannot send submarines into the Indian
[14:20] Ocean at will, especially nuclear powered submarines, unless it has a very very
[14:26] detailed, you know, map of the Indian Ocean in terms of depth,
[14:31] in terms of you know, in terms of water density, in terms of
[14:33] water temperatures, you know, basically giving its submarine force. This this vast
[14:39] playground to play with. It's you know, one might think that, you
[14:43] know, oh you know, how difficult can it be? You just send
[14:46] submarines in. I'm sure the submarine commander already knows key card depth card depth,
[14:50] Nay, where the things are? You know, most people, I
[14:54] think I'd like to just for five seconds, they just go back into one
[14:58] little fundamental. Most people, I imagine, are tempted to think of the
[15:03] seabed as one kind of limitless flat surface, right, this one just one
[15:07] featureless flat surface with some gentle ups and downs. What most people don't know
[15:13] is that the bottom of the sea is actually more dramatic, more cavernous,
[15:20] with ravines and mountains and you know, caves and things like that than land.
[15:28] It's much more and it's constantly changing because of the ocean currents. Things
[15:33] are actually constantly changing. So the depth of one part of the sea may
[15:37] have been three thousand meters one year, and ten years later it maybe two
[15:41] thousand meters because the ground has you know, sedimented and come up whatever.
[15:46] So all those that's where hydrographic surveys actually come in. These survey ships and
[15:52] these research ships are constantly providing this detailed, dynamic picture of the seabed,
[15:58] and those are iceless pieces of information for a country like China, even a
[16:03] country like India, because it's giving you like this ever changing map that you're
[16:07] constantly updating on a yearly basis. That's why you need to keep sending these
[16:11] ships. And that's why those ships spend months at sea, because they're just
[16:15] trawling hundreds and thousands of kilometers of ocean getting all this data so they can
[16:19] put together a grid referenced map of what the Indian Ocean actually looks like.
[16:23] Once you've got that map, then you've got that power to send your submarines
[16:29] in. Then you know where you can send your submarines. Then you know
[16:32] the shortest distance between two points of ocean. You know for for your submarines.
[16:40] You can judge where things are so deep that you can send your submarines
[16:41] safely for a longer period of time. These are really important as far as
[16:45] submarine warfare is concerned, and I would say sadly, unlike India which has
[16:51] which is still to completely immerse itself in submarine warfare, the Chinese have done
[16:56] it. They've understood that the future of the current, the past, the
[17:00] future of naval warfare has to be as far as submarines are concerned. It
[17:03] can't be with aircraft carriers lovely. I mean, I think that's and I
[17:07] please cut that because I think that's a crash course for anybody who wants to
[17:11] understand what do these so called spy or like ship said, that's a sort
[17:15] of a dobre but like you know, research vehicles, reasearchships do in the
[17:19] ocean. Coming to the part about do we have them and do we also
[17:23] do similar kind of research or are we still are we likeing behind on so
[17:27] we do. We've always had pretty powerful survey vessels. We definitely need more,
[17:34] but we do have our own hydrographic survey vessels which conduct the precise same
[17:40] kind of thing that the Chinese do. The Chinese are just doing it much
[17:44] more aggressively and more surreptitiously. That's the problem. They're in your backyard doing
[17:48] it. It's like India sending survey vessels into the South China. See,
[17:52] it's pretty much like that. There's one point that I wanted to add to
[17:56] what the Chinese do, which is that they may send survey vessels to conduct
[18:00] hydrographic surveys. And let me let me say right at the outset that conducting
[18:06] these depth surveys and these hydrographic surveys is not illegal. They're allowed to do
[18:11] that. They're totally allowed to do that. The reason why all of this
[18:12] becomes problematic is, like I said, this is an unreliable and untrustworthy country,
[18:18] which means that these ships which are presumably or you know, they are
[18:23] stated to be hydrographic survey vessels, also have sensors on board which are conducting
[18:29] electromagnetic espionage, which means they'll sail near the Undermann Islands and you know,
[18:34] soak up electromagnetic intelligence about what the coastal radars are on the Indian side,
[18:41] they look at the you know, travel very close to the mainland or near
[18:45] luxury that weep and find out whether there are any sensors there, what the
[18:48] Navy has over there, using other kinds of underwater sensors to see whether India
[18:53] has underwater sensors in someplace. So apart from conducting this sort of innocuous mission
[19:00] of hydrographic survey and research, it's also kind of soaking up electromagnetic data,
[19:07] which is you know, communications, electric signals, radar bandwids, things of
[19:11] a very strategic nature, which gives them a picture of how well defended are
[19:17] these islands. You know, what kind of radars actually exist there. Those
[19:21] are the kinds of devious espionage related activities that these ships also do, which
[19:27] is the reason why India doesn't allow them near the islands. You know,
[19:32] that kind of makes me remember this one question and one thought I've had for
[19:37] a long time now, especially since I began hosting this, uh this this
[19:41] podcast off in our defense. Uh, why does China do all of this?
[19:45] I mean, yeah, there are certain reasons for it do it for
[19:48] its strategic ambitions, the US, et cetera, et cetera. But I'm
[19:52] talking purely in the context of India. We'll come back to the l C
[19:56] in a bit. But when, whether it's the LC or whether it is
[20:00] sending in spy ships that kind of spy on like you said, coast radars
[20:03] and ne and demands. There was I think an episode I forgot to when
[20:07] a few months ago when they sent us a so called spy ship during a
[20:11] time in India was supposed to conduct a missile test because there is no time
[20:15] issue for that for those tests, and the test was actually postponed because Indians
[20:18] knew that, you know, the ship was there capus only because I don't
[20:23] see is there a largest strategic objective? Is my question? Basically, like
[20:27] with the Indian Ocean, like you argued, I get that point, but
[20:30] with India, I just do not get what China is doing, why it's
[20:34] doing, whether it's at the LC or whether it's in them. So it's
[20:38] definitely not just about only it's most definitely a strategic objective for China. Let's
[20:44] let's not make any mistake about that. And the reason is because in the
[20:48] region they've China sees India is the only real threat. China sees India's as
[20:55] an emerging power. India is everything that China is not in good ways and
[20:59] bad and therefore China sees India, which is now you know, close to
[21:03] the United States, et cetera, as as a strategic, military, economic,
[21:10] and other cultural, you know, opponent, and therefore they need to
[21:15] try and contain India. So there is something called the string of Pearl strategy
[21:18] the Chinese, I don't know who it was, who gave it the name
[21:22] String of Pearls, but it is basically an Indian Ocean strategy where China will
[21:27] try and create as many access points and basis of its own in the Indian
[21:32] Ocean to try and encircle India and kind of create strategic pressure on India.
[21:37] They've done it with Maldives. The Chinese have a base on Coco Island which
[21:41] is operated by Mayamar just north of the Andermans. You know, they've tried
[21:47] for Guadar in the Arabian Sea in Pakistan is a Chinese base. So this
[21:52] String of Pearl strategy has has kind of ebbed and flowed with varying degrees of
[21:57] success for many, many years. But let's make no mistake. This is
[22:02] this is about hegemony. China does not share power. They don't like sharing
[22:07] power. They don't like sharing who calls the shots. You know, when
[22:11] we say two Asian giants, they hate that idea. They hate the idea
[22:15] of the tiger and the elephant. They're like, what nonsense is this.
[22:18] There's only the tiger, there's no elephant. So the tiger has to destroy
[22:22] the elephant, it has to debilitate the elephant. India cannot be seen to
[22:26] be anywhere close to an equal power. That's also that's also the reason why
[22:30] China doesn't even speak to India, speak about India in equal terms. They
[22:33] see themselves as on power the United States rather than India, which may be
[22:37] a fair comparison in terms of what their objectives are, but in terms of
[22:41] strength, in terms of what China is trying to do, you know,
[22:47] India is that kind of India is that counterforce. That's the reason why the
[22:52] United States, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, all of these,
[22:56] all of these countries and continents see India as that kind of counterweight to China
[23:02] because of China's unchecked tries over so many decades. It is India that is
[23:07] keeping China in check. It's India that is that you know, geographic as
[23:11] well as strategic kind of bulwark against against China. And China sees that that's
[23:15] the reason why they want control of the Indian Ocean. They hate the fact
[23:19] that India is so geographically located that it basically oversees the entire Indian Ocean shipping
[23:26] lanes of communication, energy, you know, the fuel lines of communication,
[23:29] et cetera. And it doesn't want that. It says that, you know,
[23:33] China's strategic future is going to depend on China having leverage on trade lines,
[23:38] on the shipping lines of commerce. And if it doesn't have control over
[23:42] that, if a democracy like India, you know, which is close to
[23:45] the United States has control over those, then you know, we can't pull
[23:49] the levers. You know, what's the point if we can't pull the levers
[23:53] of something that can actually cripple these countries. Right, So, so that's
[23:56] the reason why China needs to be in the Indians. That's the reason why
[24:00] they need to be there. All right, Very interesting, and we'll now
[24:03] move back to the land, to the LC and what the current standard is
[24:08] all about. But after a quick break, pany pany, pany joy so
[24:18] beautiful, so elegant, just looking like a wow eh bang? Was that
[24:25] enough crunch for you? Because this cringe fest doesn't stop here. Yes,
[24:30] And if by watching such reals and viral videos you think your life is becoming
[24:33] moem, then I cost them and me Anna will bring the most puke worthy,
[24:40] nauseating and repulsive trends on social media and well maybe enact some of them,
[24:45] but most of all, discuss and seriously dissect these trends, So get
[24:51] ready to laugh, cringe and question humanity dropping soon on Spotify, Apple Podcasts
[24:56] and wherever you get your cringe, I mean audio entertainment from So let's talk
[25:03] range. Welcome back. We're talking about India's stand up with China, whether
[25:12] it's a LS or what's going on in the notion which has been kind of
[25:17] going for a while now, actually because I remember reading about this even when
[25:19] I was growing up. But let's go back to the LC for a bit.
[25:25] So the twentieth round of the Core Commander Level meet post, the standoff
[25:30] that began around four years ago, we'll finish four years in May this year,
[25:33] happened in on tenth Oftober. Actually it happened between ninth and tenth of
[25:37] Totober. The BB press release which tells me that it began on ninth and
[25:41] on tenth, which also tells me went for a long time. Before we
[25:45] get into the strategic and the diplomatic part of it, I won't actually get
[25:49] into what these meetings are all about because while I was researching, I also
[25:53] fished out a very old photo of yours that you've posted I don't know how
[25:57] many years ago, but I think this yes, this was a meeting of
[26:02] two thousand and six where you were being nicely hugged by a Chinese soldier or
[26:06] the office, I'm not sure, holding a bottle of let's not mention what
[26:10] in your hand, with some packets of again, let's not mention what on
[26:12] the table. But one, what was it all about? Second? What
[26:17] are the things like? So this was in two thousand and six, and
[26:19] it's still one of my greatest memories. And we were very lucky to be
[26:23] able to do that. You know, two thousand and six was not not
[26:26] only a long time ago, but a very innocent time where India and China
[26:32] were not at each other's throats in this way at least. So this was
[26:37] this was an unnatural podes. This was that picture's actually taken in Tibet,
[26:40] Okay. But this was a place called Tawang, which everyone knows. Ta
[26:45] Wang in narunatural Podes is a is now a pretty restive place between India and
[26:49] China. And this was a border meeting taking place between Indian and an Indian
[26:56] and a Chinese unit which was in a place called Bumla, which is right
[26:59] on the Indo Tibetan border. So that picture is taken inside the Chinese tent,
[27:03] which is about about four kilometers into the Tibetan side. So we'd gotten
[27:08] into their trucks and we'd gone over and after Basically at these meetings, I
[27:14] don't know if those meat it happens the same way now, But in those
[27:18] days and two and seven, these meetings were pretty formalities, right. They
[27:22] would get together over in a conference room. They would exchange information about,
[27:27] you know, any any violations or any patrols staying too long, etc.
[27:33] And all done in a very genial, kind of jovial atmosphere. And once
[27:37] that was done, they both sides would go to this large officers tent,
[27:41] this kind of mess tent, and then the alcohol would flow, and gifts
[27:45] would be exchanged and food would be eaten, and there would be about two
[27:49] three hours of merrymaking and everyone would hug each other and then they would leave.
[27:53] Difficult to imagine that kind of thing happening right now because they're too busy
[27:57] beating the hell out of each other, right, But but at that time,
[28:00] yeah, that that's exactly what happened, and it was a it was
[28:03] a rare, wonderful experience, and that was that of the Chinese officer hugging
[28:07] me in that picture. Uh, and uh, it was amazing. But
[28:11] but coming to the you know, coming to the kind of India China border,
[28:15] you know, border meetings that are taking place now, especially in light
[28:18] of what's happened in eastern Ladakh. They happen in Chushul, and I've actually
[28:22] been to that border hut and it's a it's a it's it's it's a beautiful
[28:27] place, of course, it's a this is a pretty, you know,
[28:33] a very desolate part of Ladak. It's in a flat land called the Spangoor
[28:37] Gap where this where this takes place. And uh, these meetings, like
[28:41] you said, tend to be quite complicated and long. I can tell you
[28:45] of these twenty meetings, some have been very very short also because because tempers
[28:51] have been extremely high, Uh, there hasn't been much to exchange, because
[28:55] there's been no you know, movement since the previous meeting. And therefore the
[28:59] two sides would meet for about half an hour, kind of yell at each
[29:00] other, exchange some information, and then depart. And there have been meetings
[29:04] that have gone on for like fourteen fifteen sixteen hours, you know, with
[29:07] a meal in between and stuff. So now a lot of people, you
[29:11] know, I want to say something about these meetings. They a lot of
[29:15] people say, what's the point of these meetings? Yeah, you know,
[29:18] what the hell is the point of twenty rounds of meetings if nothing is changing.
[29:21] Let me just say that the very fact that the two sides still have
[29:25] meetings is a good thing. That's a victory in itself, because if two
[29:30] countries with the ability to destroy the world and who are actually masked against each
[29:37] other and that stopped talking, that's that's a reason to start wanting. Because
[29:41] when communication stops, that's when that's when you know, the fighting begins.
[29:48] Mistakes can happen. That's when mistakes can happen. That's when information can go
[29:52] wrong. That's when people can you know, either side can can misjudge the
[29:59] activities of the other side. Wrong calls can be taken, and these can
[30:03] easily trigger either conflict over So it's a good thing that the two sides are
[30:07] talking. I can imagine the public view that it's kind of frustrating that after
[30:11] twenty rounds of talks, what are you achieving? But I can tell you
[30:15] at the tactical level, which is tactical is the opposite of strategic. At
[30:18] the very small unit level, things have been changing fairly steadily. Okay,
[30:23] there have been troop pullbacks from all the friction points. There have been you
[30:29] know, disengagements in terms of troops moving back to create no man's land,
[30:33] you know, buffer zones in most of those places where the actual confrontations were
[30:37] taking place to such an extent that now and remember the first point I made
[30:42] there, which is that nothing has changed on the ground in terms of China
[30:47] being at your door stepaneset the doc They're still there in huge numbers, but
[30:49] the actual friction points where the confrontations could have taken place, they've moved back
[30:53] from there. Both sides have moved back from there. So there's no immediate,
[30:59] you know, possibility of a huge conflagration. Having said that, there
[31:03] are two historic, two historic areas of dispute between India and China which still
[31:11] continue to exist as problems, and these pre date the May escalation. And
[31:17] these are the Depsang Plains in the north part of Ladakh and the dem Chalk
[31:21] area in the south part of Ladakh. There was a video that was put
[31:23] out recently by the Congress Party showing some shepherds being confronted by Chinese soldiers and
[31:32] you know that kind of thing. Now, that's a very very common,
[31:34] very very common occurrence in the demp Chalk area, which is in South Ladakh,
[31:40] because southeastern Ladak, because like I said, the line of actual control
[31:45] disputed areas. You know, they cover large swaths of territory. It's not
[31:49] one line beyond which it's theirs and beyond which it's ours. It's not like
[31:53] that. Those perception differences do create these things. And the Chinese have been
[31:59] known to be, you know, try to create facts on the ground.
[32:01] They'll try and come and scare your people. They'll they'll throw their wrappers here
[32:06] and there. They'll leave their equipment here and there. See see, because
[32:10] our equipment is here, because we stay here, we operate from here,
[32:14] we live here. So that is that is standard operating procedure for the Chinese.
[32:16] That's the kind of thing that they actually do. Uh, you know,
[32:20] to get it. But uh, But as far as but as far
[32:23] as these meetings between the Indian and Chinese side actually resulting in in things becoming
[32:30] a little bit more stable, they've definitely done their job. Okay, very
[32:32] good inside actually, because you know what you mentioned. Yeah, a lot
[32:36] of people do question is the point of these because when you see the statements
[32:38] that come after these meetings, they're very boiler plate. There's nothing new about
[32:42] it, Like you know, both says agreed to, like you know,
[32:44] kind of follow that. Yeah, exactly exactly. But you mentioned one point
[32:49] about tactical level UH engagement, and I just want to go to go to
[32:53] a big bit of a segway. If you remember, there was this video
[32:57] that went viral think around and a half years ago of a confrontation between Indian
[33:02] troops and Chinese Chinese troops where I think the major who was leading the contingent
[33:07] was being pushed and I think the viral movement actually was one of the javans
[33:13] of the Indian side saying something on the lines of gold Cup that was in.
[33:17] Yeah, that went battle. But you know, watching that as a
[33:22] layperson, I actually got very angry. I thought that if I was being
[33:25] pushed around like that, I would have definitely sworn a punch, and that
[33:29] punch would have led to something else, and then something else and something else,
[33:32] and basic escalation. So if you've spoken to younger officers dvance the ground,
[33:37] how do they manage such confrontations, because honestly, that video was quite
[33:44] both. That's a very good question. And I actually actually have spoken to
[33:47] several young officers, including officers who were not only involved in the fight that
[33:53] you're talking about in Sikkim, but also the famous fight on the banks of
[33:57] the Pegong Lake, oh, that one which involved the you know, the
[34:00] Comeau regiment. So I I've spoken to officers and soldiers of all of those
[34:05] famous viral vehicles. Uh. And you know, it's it's it's it seems
[34:09] like a trivial thing to say, but look, these are men who are
[34:15] conducting sensitive patrols on hostile or semi hostile territory. Uh. They are trained
[34:23] to hold their peace until absolutely provoked. These are high altitude areas. It's
[34:30] cold as drudgery, it's it's a it's it's a desolate healthscape of a place
[34:35] to operate in for months or years together. So these so, these are
[34:38] these are men who are obviously very very well trained, And these are men
[34:42] who are trained in lethal damage. They have access to weapons, they've got
[34:46] access to their own training and their own bodies, and they can they can
[34:50] really they can hurt you if they want to and the other side can do
[34:53] right. So when such confrontations happen, Believe me when I say that,
[34:59] most certainly Indian soldiers, and I imagine you know, I'm not trying to
[35:01] put down Chinese soldiers. I'm sure they're trained in the same manner, which
[35:05] is that try not to let this escalate, Try not to let that first
[35:09] punch go, Try not to, you know, let anything happen that can
[35:15] be interpreted as an act of belligeran's because once that chain reaction of aggression starts,
[35:22] it's not going to end as a parking lot brawl like at a gourgau
[35:24] nightclub. It's going to end with both sides going back to their camps,
[35:29] coming back with weapons possibly and blood flowing in the snow. Okay, it
[35:32] can easily, that can easily happen. So therefore, the kind of restraint
[35:37] that these guys need to have to not let things escalate is huge now each
[35:44] and every time. And I can and I'm not saying this because I'm Indian,
[35:47] but because I've seen the reports, I've seen the videos, I've seen,
[35:51] I've spoken to the people, I can say that each and every time
[35:53] that such a fight has happened. The provocation has always come from the Chinese
[36:00] side. The provocations can come in three ways. They've a they've come into
[36:04] your territory and are refusing to go back. Now, if if if fifty
[36:09] Chinese soldiers come into your camp, into your camp and refuse to go back,
[36:14] are you going to sit there and let them sit there? Or are
[36:15] you going to, you know, let a few punches fly right A that
[36:21] B When petrols cross each other, shouting slogans at each other, waving flags
[36:24] at each other, you know, that whole that whole war display and battle
[36:29] display and much is more is all totally normal, totally normal. But if
[36:34] someone throws a rock, then you've got a problem. Galvan, by the
[36:37] way, the entire Galvan clash started because someone threw a rock. One rock
[36:43] was thrown and it hit Colonel Santosh Babu, the commanding officer of sixteen BR
[36:46] and that's what led to that huge blood letting that took place. So,
[36:50] which is why I'm saying that that one punch, one guy loses his school.
[36:54] One you know, guy decides to pick up a rock and throw it
[36:58] at the other. And these are I mean, these are humans these are
[37:00] These are young men, you know, young red blooded men with tempers and
[37:05] anger and hormones and you know, much ismo and wanting to settle scores and
[37:09] and and are trained to see that the other side as their as their rivals,
[37:13] as their enemy, and the guys who are trying to kill them,
[37:15] and who are living and breathing on the other side of that mountain, you
[37:19] know, wanting to see their demise. So so their blood is always up
[37:22] anyway. So imagine it's easy to throw punch, it's easy to fight,
[37:27] it's easy to you know, get bashed up. It's easy to go into
[37:29] a brawl. It's one hundred times more difficult to have a confrontation where a
[37:34] punch is not thrown at all. So so these are these are difficult situations.
[37:37] And I can tell you that each and every one of the times that
[37:40] these have happened, sensible, mature Indian soldiers and officers have calmed the situation,
[37:47] sent the Chinese back. And it's not like it's not like prs sent
[37:51] them back. We thrash them and send them back like in the Tawang video
[37:53] or the second videos, beaten black and blue and thrown out. But but
[37:58] spoken to all of a sudden, if you tried again, this is what
[38:00] will happened to you. So don't try this again. So that's what these
[38:02] videos are about. In fact, in one of the videos you can actually
[38:05] see after the thrashing. Yeah, you can actually gave shanti. Basically,
[38:12] you've had your You've thrown your bunches, We've thrown up punches. I've got
[38:15] broken teeth. You've got broken teeth. Now please go right. So coming
[38:19] back to the standard itself as we end this episode, two things. One,
[38:23] how did we not? I won't say how did we get get here?
[38:27] But I want your perspective of how the Indian establishment's response towards China has
[38:32] evolved in the last let's say, fifteen years, so to speak. Because
[38:37] I'll give you I'll tell you why I'm asking this. When I was growing
[38:40] up, I had Pakistan was all the game. Okay, Pakistan was always
[38:45] the big news. Pakistan was the number one enemy, etcetera. Yet there
[38:49] was this very undercurrent of retired journals talking about how industry be focusing more on
[38:54] China. Today. It's been a year and a half I've been hosting this
[38:57] podcast. Now it's all about China. Now, so from Pakistan to China,
[39:02] how did the establishments I'm saying established by I'm not saying just the military,
[39:06] because I think the military has been aware for a while now that China
[39:08] is actually the threat to focus on. But the government's response changed. And
[39:15] second, the big question, I don't if there's an answers that where do
[39:19] you see this going forward? Because it's been four and a half four years
[39:21] now, what's going to happen? So you're absolutely right, there's been a
[39:25] sort of systemic shift away from Pakistan. Even during all my early years as
[39:31] a defense correspondent, it has been mostly about Pakistan, very little about China.
[39:36] That has changed dramatically in say the last ten twelve years. Now.
[39:40] The hyphenation that India has had the obsession with Pakistan the whole, you know,
[39:45] the historic context with Pakistan because of partition, etc. Has meant that
[39:52] it was difficult for India to look away from Pakistan. And let's remember that
[39:55] you fought one war with China, but you fought four wars with Pakistan.
[39:59] So it's understandable that you know, India sees Pakistan, has seen historically Pakistan
[40:05] as its main adversary. Now starting from the early nineties, they've this this
[40:09] slowly began to change because India, our post liberalization, had taken on a
[40:15] very very different path. It had, you know, it's it's you know,
[40:20] animal instincts as it were, were being realized. It was becoming an
[40:22] economic powerhouse. Uh, it had this massive diaspora that was going out there.
[40:29] Uh, this is a country that you know, was coming into its
[40:31] own in terms of a big, modern military. And therefore there was this,
[40:36] to put it very simply, you know, a rapid realization that you
[40:38] know, what are we doing obsessing with these pictures, you know, like
[40:40] Pakistan there they've got to be poking us with the you know, terrorism and
[40:45] stuff. But the possibility of a big war is not there with Pakistan anymore.
[40:50] Cargian of course changed that that perception, but and kept put India on
[40:54] guard. But but the but India's basic, basic perception that a war with
[41:00] Pakistan again is unlikely has largely held true, apart from Operation Parakhram when we
[41:06] almost came to a war. The reason for this also is because China,
[41:09] because Pakistan has been kind of eaten inside out by its own contradictions, its
[41:14] own nonsense, which has snowballed into what we're seeing right now. You know,
[41:19] Pakistan has elections going on right now, which is which is which is
[41:22] one of the biggest jokes really, I mean, the world is laughing,
[41:25] even Pakistanis are laughing about this election, right But but it's a serious business
[41:30] because this is a country that's right next to us. You know, whoever's
[41:34] going to lead, whether it's a Nava Sharif with the blessings of the Pakistan
[41:37] Army, means that you know, there are many who believe that if that
[41:40] is actually what happens in Pakistan, it could be the first real shot at
[41:45] peace between India and Pakistan because Nava Sharif wants his name in the history books
[41:50] in terms of being a you know, peace winner with India, et cetera.
[41:52] All that is, all that is fine, but it's become a kind
[41:57] of side show as far as India's strategic vision is concerned, because now we
[42:01] see that we are in the big league. You know, India was always
[42:07] in the big league, there was. It was just a question of a
[42:09] mindset change. Once India realized, I think in the nineties post liberalization,
[42:15] that you know, we aren't just some random third world country. You know,
[42:17] we're not We're not among the rest. You know, we are not
[42:23] only a first among equals in Asia, but we are a country that the
[42:28] rest of the world is going to be looking at and depending on for what
[42:30] goes on in this part of the world. And because China is exactly the
[42:35] opposite of us, that kind of responsibility is going to be us in a
[42:38] in a greater way. And that brings me to what you said, which
[42:42] is there that India rapidly realized that it isn't Pakistan which is imploding in front
[42:46] of our eyes, it's China. And China wants our ocean, they want
[42:52] territory, they want our states, they want a Nades, they want Lada,
[42:55] they want everything. So the military aspect of it became very very real
[43:01] starting from the early two thousands. We'd already fought a huge war, a
[43:05] humiliating war with China in nineteen sixty two. So it's not like India did
[43:08] not see China as a strategic threats. That's why that would be very silly
[43:12] to say India has always seen China as a strategic threat. But what you
[43:15] said is really right, which is systemically there was this hyphenation with Pakistan.
[43:21] It was always India Pakistan. Even the world saw it as India Pakistan.
[43:24] They couldn't these two countries couldn't be separated from each other. Now for the
[43:29] last fifteen twenty years, that hyphenation is completely evaporated, and now it's about
[43:34] India and China, or China versus India. That has taken a long time
[43:39] to you know, become a real thing. Even in some of the smallest
[43:44] things, we see the remnants of the lack of strategic vision as far as
[43:47] China as concerned on this. Once this standoff began in eastern Ladakh, you
[43:52] saw how the military went scrambling for emergency procurements of this that of rifles,
[43:59] high altitude equipment, mountaineering equipment, special shoes, special drones. I think
[44:06] light mountain tanks ridiculous. I mean, are you are you really saying that
[44:10] you were not prepared for a Himalayan conflict with a country like China. So
[44:15] you know, these are these are all reminders and kind of alarming indicators that
[44:21] in many ways India has not kind of embraced its new strategic reality as far
[44:27] as China as concerned. And hopefully that will change, but you know,
[44:30] a country like India, it takes more than a generation for things to change
[44:35] in terms of vision, in terms of the system. So we have to
[44:37] see where that goes. To answer your question about where this is headed now,
[44:42] uh, and we've said this once before on this program, on this
[44:45] podcast, which is that the militaries of both sides have done what they need
[44:47] to do. They uh, the only thing they can do now is destroy
[44:52] each other and destroy both countries and I And the good news, of course,
[44:55] is that that neither side is has the stomach for neither neither side has
[45:01] the stomach for war. The world certainly doesn't have the stomach for war.
[45:05] What would war actually achieve? Right, So there's to put it very simply,
[45:09] the possibility of a of a you know, confrontation between the two sides
[45:13] is extremely remote. Having said that, the fact that you've got two very
[45:19] well armed armies massed against each other in easter n the dak is not is
[45:22] not a good thing for India and China. It's not a good thing for
[45:25] the world either. It's dangerous. The world is going to see that as
[45:28] a kind of time bomb. It could go off at any time. Therefore,
[45:31] the the the path ahead has to be political. It has to be
[45:36] it will it will need to be Moodi shigen ping, or a summit or
[45:40] or a diplomatic you know, a diplomatic solution to the India China thing,
[45:45] probably a probably a broader discussion on the border dispute, because these little you
[45:52] know, small small disengagement and stuff, they're not going to make much of
[45:55] a difference. We can, we can tom tom them and trumpet them saying
[45:59] they, oh, disengagement piece has returned. That's rubbish. They're still sitting
[46:02] there in big numbers. Let no one fool you about the Chinese threat having
[46:07] evaporated. It's still very much there right at your doorstep. So so you
[46:13] know, the soldiers have done what they need to do. They're literally guarding
[46:16] our frontiers. They said that we've held, we've held a territory. Now
[46:21] the NTAs need to go and figure this out. So that's what's next,
[46:23] right, So I think long story short, what she was saying that this
[46:27] now moves from and in our Defense topic to a Guita's World Topic, which
[46:30] is a podcast hosted by a producer Rana with our colleague Guita where they discussed
[46:35] the promise and world affairs because that's where the solution will be fought and not
[46:40] on defense. Basically, we'll lend this there. But you know, before
[46:45] we do that, not point per se, but one of the things that
[46:47] you mentioned the in your previous answer just tuck me. We should once in
[46:52] an episode discuss about the fabled Mountain Core of the Indian Army, because you
[46:55] talked about right now just how kind unprepared completely but like you know, kind
[47:00] of like grasping for straws when it came to the channel thread. So we'll
[47:05] talk about the Mountain Code that was supposed to be set up and something started
[47:08] in there. I don't know what happened. Oh, it's a great tale
[47:10] of Yeah, I think you'll have some planning on that. Oh it's the
[47:15] Mountain Core will be a completely separate episode, I assure you, because it
[47:21] is symptomatic of all that is wrong with Indian military planning, the stamina it
[47:29] takes to actually see a good idea to the finish. Uh, you know,
[47:34] the problems with not being optimal in how you you know, how you
[47:37] deploy your forces and what you're actually planning for. So yeah, absolutely I
[47:40] agree with you Mountain Core. Maybe two episodes right, so we'll do very
[47:45] soon. And in case you want us talk about anything else, just you
[47:49] know, let us know. You can drop a comment if you're watching us
[47:52] on YouTube, and if you're listening to us on Apple Podcast or Spotify,
[47:54] do leave us a rating. We just love to hear from you. Thanks
[47:58] as always to our produce runner understanding, Thanks chif. Great episode, had
[48:01] a fun discussion. That's it for this week's defense. Does for more tuned
[48:05] in next week. Till then, stay safe and not cross any boundaries their
[48:07] passport. Okay,

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