# Balakot Strike & Abhinandan's Return: The Tense Two Days Recalled | In Our Defence, S2, Ep 06

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 11 Jan 2024, 1 h 09 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/58265102/11_jan_24_in_our_defence_11_jan_128.mp3

The 2019 Balakot airstrike was a significant military operation conducted by the Indian Air Force in response to the Pulwama terrorist attack. This marked the first time since the 1971 War that Indian aircraft had conducted an airstrike on Pakistani soil. The strike targeted a Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terror camp in Balakot, Pakistan. The Indian Mirage-2000 fighter pilots carried out the airstrike, aiming to eliminate terrorist threats. The following day, the Pakistan Air Force retaliated with a strike in the Rajouri sector of Jammu. In the ensuing aerial battle, India claimed to have shot down a Pakistani F-16 fighter aircraft while losing a MiG-21, with its Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman captured after ejecting over Pakistani-held territory. Later, he was repatriated. The aftermath of the airstrike saw controversies, including unverified news in the newsrooms and conflicting reports. The duo, Dev Goswami and Shiv Aroor recount their experiences covering the event. They discuss the preparations for the airstrike and the controversies surrounding the strike; for one, the Indian Air Force has confirmed "hitting targets," but there is no official estimation of casualties — if any — yet, and Pakistan's response, exploring claims that they intentionally missed targets in India to avoid escalating to an all-out war. Shiv Aroor and co-author Rahul Singh have also covered the detailed account of the Balakot airstrike, including planning, execution, and aftermath in their book 'India's Most Fearless.' Listen in as we bring you the inside and unearthed details of the two tense days! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound Mix by Kapil Dev Singh

## Transcript

[0:00] This is in Your Today Podcasts. I don't think the Pakistan establishment is lying
[0:10] when they say that they intentionally missed these establishments. The reason why they released
[0:16] bombs, the reason they didn't hit a military establishment is because that would have
[0:21] been a complete active war. The juiciest aspect day of what happened that night,
[0:27] the night that Abandan was captured is that Imran Khan and his PMO like
[0:33] frantically dialed the Indian High Commissioner and the Indian PMO. The Indian PMO refused
[0:38] to answer answer. I find that crazy, they just said, Barnakering,
[0:45] Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on all things well defense,
[0:50] where I They've go Swami, your host, along with senior journalist Shivarur,
[0:55] break down the world of conflicts that range from the subtle to the brute.
[0:59] We bring you new answers and perspectives that will inform and at times provoke.
[1:06] This is in Our Defense. Hello, want to welcome to the sixth
[1:15] episode of In Our Defenses, the season two a new season and for those
[1:19] watching us on YouTube and stuff listening to us on Spotify, Apple Podcast,
[1:22] you'd also see a new location for us to do our recording. Welcome shift,
[1:26] Welcome to the home actually of Interday, anastics podcast. This is actually
[1:30] the room from where the production team operates, and like any good podcast,
[1:34] we can do from anywhere. Yeah, next time we do from outside.
[1:37] That's been financially a lot of fun. So have you been? Have you
[1:40] a week? Good week? Good week? And I see that we've got
[1:42] a really good response to episode. People have been saying weapons, bay or
[1:48] grow and stuff. So I said, yeah, we've got to cover all
[1:51] of that stuff in our diffense. Yeah, you know, I just read
[1:53] some of the comments out from episodes. Episode is very very popular. People
[1:59] have been wearing the Apple and the Spotify and the webbling all over. I
[2:02] got it personally from a lot of people who didn't know that I was on
[2:07] that podcast. They just said it to be saying, here's a really great
[2:09] podcast on the stage. I said, that's me on the podcast. Yeah.
[2:13] So you know, the overall theme of the comments that we've gotten on
[2:15] the episode is basically that we did a very good job of breaking down complex
[2:19] issues and explaining it to to to the labor layperson. And that's actually what
[2:23] we end of you know, want to do with the effects. Uh,
[2:27] even whether we are covering wars or geopolitics or complicated stuff like you know,
[2:30] fighter jets, and you explained it the best compliment. Actually you know can
[2:34] break up, actually can break up and break down the whole competent history of
[2:38] indianet forces, missing squadrons and the and the way you talked about the whole
[2:43] development cycle of a fighter jet. I think that was really well received by
[2:46] We will do more of that, definitely more, and you know that should
[2:50] be also a hat tip to all our viewers and listeners, you know,
[2:53] leave us more comments because your comments one, you know, energize us,
[2:58] and second, they also give us some new ideas. So one person,
[3:00] for example, wanted us to do an episode on Marcos and Special Forces in
[3:04] the context of the Navy rescuing uh A ship that was supposed to be hijacked
[3:08] but it turned out later not to be hijacked. There wasn't time to be
[3:12] to hijack it, and the Marcos were the ones who kind of you know,
[3:15] uh boarded it, et cetera. We'll do that definitely. Special Forces
[3:19] definitely will do that. But this week we want to talk about the Balacodest
[3:23] right, the former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan Absaria. He's coming out
[3:30] of the new book. I think you interviewed him. Yes, that's right
[3:34] before. His book has already made the headlines for because of an excerpt that
[3:38] I think was sent out to agencies. And the excerpt talks about how Pakistan
[3:44] was worried that India was going to launch missiles at it in the aftermath of
[3:49] the balacotest, right because Pakistan had captured come under then being come under revenue
[3:54] in the dog for that happened the day after. Very interesting, I mean,
[3:59] we have to read the book to come out. Very interestingly, he
[4:00] has not denied that missiles were pointed at Pakistan. He's just said Pakistan believed
[4:05] so. But you know, because normally in the world of diplomacy you'd this
[4:10] something like this straight up denial. You know, they believed it, but
[4:12] we never did it. But very interesting. He did not denied. So
[4:15] we'll come to that aspect of it later. But first I want to get
[4:17] I want to talk a bit personal when it comes to the Balacote strike.
[4:21] And I don't know if our listeners or viewers will be interested, but you
[4:25] know, I think this can also give them sort of a peek into how
[4:28] US journalists function and how groups like in the Group works. It happened the
[4:32] end of the night. Yeah, Pakistan tried to steal a march over India
[4:36] by becoming the first one actually announced something like that had happened. If I
[4:40] remember correctly, it was a DGSPR who put out a tweet maybe I think
[4:44] six six thirteen in the morning that there was an attempt made by Indian fighter
[4:48] jets to kind of intrude into Pakistan territory. But it seem like an air
[4:51] intrusion. Yeah, but they were pushed off, that's all he treated.
[4:56] And then of course the hours later we had initially sourced based information. Then
[5:00] you had the Amy holding up press confidence I think around nine to ten in
[5:02] the morning, confirming that you know, Indian Air Force just had crossed over
[5:08] into they crossed the international boundary, not just not just the line of control
[5:13] which is which is a big deal, and bombed a terrorist hideout operated by
[5:15] the jes Mormon. What was it like for you, because you know,
[5:18] for me, I was asleep obviously, and the person who was the shift
[5:24] in charge who reposed me, he called me up and he's liked to be
[5:28] in office, right what happened? Like, dude, we've just bombed Pakistan.
[5:30] I was like, what are you saying? I just had a quick
[5:33] shark, quickly rushed to office and then you know, the rest of the
[5:36] day was just spent covering, like tanging out stories left front center. What
[5:41] was it like for you, because you also covered this field, you pray
[5:44] have pretty good sources. So when did you find out? And so how
[5:46] did you find out? So it was a crazy day. And what I
[5:48] can tell you is that I once I got into office that morning, I
[5:54] went back home forty eight hours later. Wow. So I was in the
[5:56] office for forty eight hours. If you remember, they've the Indian Conclave was
[6:00] also worn at that time, so you know, it was about to begin
[6:04] a couple of days later. So you know, we were in the thick
[6:06] of preparations for all all of those things and suddenly this thing lands on our
[6:11] head. Uh. And I was in the office and it was a you
[6:15] remember how it was. It was like a furious, uh, you know,
[6:17] assault of information from all sides. There were claims coming in from Pakistan,
[6:21] there was the me A press conference, there was a huge sort of
[6:26] tsunami of you know, unverifiable things being said on social media as always,
[6:31] so as journalists and you were doing the same thing. We were trying to
[6:35] piece together what the reality of it was because uh, you know, it's
[6:40] an old cliche, but you know, cliches are cliches because they're true.
[6:43] Which is that the first you know, the first sort of victim of war
[6:47] is truth. The fog of war that comes, you know, that that
[6:50] emerges whenever conflict breaks out. It's a very difficult thing to sort of penetrate.
[6:56] So yes, you know, we are Indian journalists. We we we
[6:59] of course, you know, go by what the official word is, but
[7:01] we also have to look for ourselves independently into the claims being made because this
[7:06] was not a this was not a clean affair. What followed was, you
[7:11] know, had a lot of shades of gray in it. But the Balacode
[7:14] air strikes themselves, the very fact that Pakistan had tried to paint it right
[7:18] off the bat in a kind of very defensive manner as a air intrusion that
[7:23] they chased away. My journalist Antenna went up straight away saying, if they're
[7:29] being so defensive right off the bat, then z you know which means,
[7:33] you know, our guys have done something for sure. So that was a
[7:36] first indicator, and you know, you you saw how they panned out like
[7:41] I said it, you know, it rapidly became a you know, hu
[7:45] hua. But then again, the events of the following morning, you know,
[7:50] brought a completely new complexion to the whole thing, which we'll talk about
[7:54] and which is very very uh, which has a completely new layer to it
[7:59] from a ambassador Jebisaria's book, which we'll talk about, Dave. But yeah,
[8:03] it was. It was a furious two or three days, and I
[8:07] don't think anyone felt tired. I remember when I left office to go home
[8:11] finally at the end of that whole thing, And I remember having to go
[8:13] to the Conclive the next day after after Abinandon was finally sent back to India,
[8:18] I had to go to the conclict the next day to do a session
[8:20] on something where the entire topic had to change because of what had happened.
[8:24] So yeah, yeah, incredible, I mean, and I remember not feeling
[8:26] tired at all. Right, before we come to the dog fight, before
[8:30] we come to Abaria's book. Let's also not forget that you are somebody who
[8:35] along with one of your friends and fellow journalists, Rahul saying, have actually
[8:39] spoken to the pilots who were involved in the barcodesk like this was in your
[8:45] fails. Second yeah, second, second, I've read that book. You
[8:48] spoke to the pilots. You've described how they were up all night, you
[8:52] know, smoking cigarettes, waiting for the orders to come down because they were
[8:54] told that you know, something big is coming and you'll be the ones asked
[8:58] to do it, but just wait and stuff like that. So before we
[9:01] get to what actually happened and what happened the day after, etc. Can
[9:05] you just like recount briefly for us, you know, what you've reported in
[9:09] your book and what was it like for the pilots. So, I mean
[9:11] the pilots who were sort of selected for this job were among India's best Air
[9:16] Force pilots, all Indian Air Force pilots. You know. The great thing
[9:20] about the Indian Air Force is, you know, all pilots are trained for
[9:24] this kind of mission. Ultimately, you're not there for training flights. You're
[9:26] there for war. You're trained from the ground up to release bombs or missiles.
[9:31] You're there to harm your enemies, right, You're not there to for
[9:35] aerobatics and stuff like that. So let's be very clear. The Indian Air
[9:37] Force, you know, when they got their orders that this was the kind
[9:41] of mission that was going to be embarked upon, it was not a surprise
[9:45] to them. It was almost like, finally, we're doing what we're trained
[9:48] for it, you know, I mean, I'm not romanticizing war, because
[9:52] war is a dangerous and difficult thing and it always involves sending our forces into
[9:58] harm's way like we saw the next morning. But but but at the very
[10:03] at the very bottom line of such instructions is, you know, this is
[10:07] what we joined the Air Force for. This is what we've been trained for.
[10:09] This is the kind of thing that we you know, right from our
[10:11] academy days, to our training days, to our piloting days to our you
[10:15] know, advanced jet days. This is what it is. It's about,
[10:18] you know, showing force and hurting those who wish to hurt us. So
[10:24] it was a very elaborate I mean, like like I've written in the book,
[10:26] it was an extremely elaborate operation. It was an intelligence based operation.
[10:30] It wasn't you know. One likes to think of it as a kind of
[10:33] punitive strike against because of what happened in Polwarma. But what many people don't
[10:41] perhaps don't know they is that targets of this kind. It's not like after
[10:46] Pullwarma, we decided let's find a target and go and hit it. That's
[10:50] not how it works. You know, potential targets for attacks by Indian forces
[10:54] are maintained as part of a as part of a process all the time.
[10:58] So when they chose that, you know, that terror establishment on top of
[11:03] that hill Jaba top in Balacot, it's not like they just dreamt about it.
[11:07] The next day after after the Pulama attack. They knew that there was
[11:11] a target like that, They assessed all the different targets that they could potentially
[11:16] hit as a punative strike, and then they carried it out. But the
[11:20] pilots who did it were all Mirage two thousand pilots. But there were other
[11:24] aircraft in the air. Like we said, you know, many people wonder
[11:28] you know widened we use the Squoi is widened, we use this, widen,
[11:31] we use that. You know, it came down to taking a decision
[11:35] based on the kind of weapons systems you actually have. Also remember that the
[11:39] you know, Sokoi is a big, fat fighter paints a large target on
[11:43] radar's Mira two thousands are tiny, tiny little fighters, slightly harder to actually
[11:48] detect on radar, can fly a little lower, you know, are able
[11:52] to evade a little better perhaps, and they carry these standoff weapons which are
[11:58] capable of firing weapons deep into enemy territory in this in this case, the
[12:03] you know, the weapons that they finally used. Now, the the the
[12:07] entire plan had to be, had to had to play out in a kind
[12:11] of subterfugion. They knew that. Look, the worst thing anyone can do
[12:16] is to underestimate your enemy, right And no matter what anyone thinks of Pakistan
[12:22] and about their sponsorship of terror and the history and all that bad blood,
[12:26] they have one of the most professional air forces in the world and some of
[12:31] the finest pilots in the world. Not as good as ours, I'll say
[12:33] that straight off, but let me let me be very clear, they have
[12:37] some of the finest pilots in the world. There's there's there's no two ways
[12:41] about it. You can ask the Indian Air Force as well, and they
[12:43] will tell you the same thing, because that's that's that's professional respect soldier to
[12:48] soldier. It's not about you're from Pakistan or me from India. So the
[12:52] worst thing you can do is say, you know, because we've got this
[12:54] bad blood, they must be inferior to us. So obviously that didn't happen.
[12:58] The Indian Air Force knows exactly what they're up against. This is a
[13:01] professional force that already had its guard up after Pulwama. Pakistan already knew they're
[13:07] gonna blame us to come after US election. B Right, you never know
[13:09] what's going to happen, so they had their guard up. Anyway, say
[13:11] all of their I think it's the L Y eight they've got. They've got
[13:15] a system called the L Y eight. I could be wrong about the designation.
[13:18] These are Chinese surface to M missiles. All their F sixteen bases were
[13:24] on scramble alert, not even on high alerts. Scramble alert, which means
[13:26] like this minute, can those aircraft can take off for operations Sargoda and feses
[13:31] Laba, all these places. So India was basically sending its fighters to conduct
[13:37] an operation against a country that was on one hundred percent alertness, totally awake
[13:43] twenty four hours a day. Okay, and when they finally did it.
[13:46] Like you rightly pointed out, it happened, happened in darkness. It happened,
[13:50] you know, a little after midnight, the the Mirage two thousand fighters
[13:56] basically crossed over a village called Athumukamhi, which is right on the line of
[14:01] control in North Kashmir, into Pok and they very importantly, the fighters did
[14:07] not fly into Pakistani air space. They remained over Pok. So so that's
[14:13] that's a little titbit for you know, those who are interested that the fighters,
[14:18] we can say that they stayed in Indian territory because Pok is in there,
[14:22] right So the fighters stayed in Indian territory. They crossed the line of
[14:24] control went in a few kilometers, because you have to remember that a fighter
[14:30] covers large distances in a very short period of time, and these are small
[14:33] bits of land. So a Mirage two thousand crossing the line of control will
[14:37] easily cross Pok very very quickly. So what they needed to do, and
[14:41] the pilots relate this amazingly well, is that once they crossed, they immediately
[14:46] needed to acquire their target and send those bombs off. And then they had
[14:50] to turn around because because even in that darkness. They need to keep it
[14:54] slow, they need to keep it low, and then they need to turn
[14:56] back so that they don't you know, veer off who was their navigation and
[15:01] you know, head into some other area. And this was a pack of
[15:03] fighters all flying not very far from each other, each of them delivering their
[15:07] bombs. So but I think about a dozen dozen of those bombs were finally
[15:11] fired at fired into Balakot. So this was a standoff, UH standoff mission.
[15:18] As I've related in my book, that there was a there was a
[15:20] kind of subterfuge that was carried out by a pack of Uh Sukhoy fighters over
[15:26] Rajasthan near Gujarat, that that area, which made the Pakistan Air Force think
[15:33] that the attack was on be coming from that side from the south Southwestern Air
[15:37] Command and not from the north. And also I think a bunch moved towards
[15:39] rawal Pindi, so making them think that's correct. So they had they had
[15:43] an axis of fighters move, a pack of fighters sukhoi thirties I think,
[15:48] moving you know, in the kind of northwest direction from Rajasthan, which made
[15:52] them and they were fully armed, so and the raidars could tell and it
[15:56] made the Pakistani think that, oh, obviously they're using their sukhoys because it's
[15:58] their biggest and best fighter blah blah blah, and they're coming straight for us,
[16:03] and they're heading towards Bahawalpur, which is a Geshemomad headquarters city, and
[16:07] Sialkot and rawal Pindi, et cetera, et cetera, in that axis,
[16:11] and that's what the attack plan is. Whereas our guys were, you know,
[16:15] busy crossing over the line of control further north. These guys had absolutely
[16:19] no idea. They had absolutely no idea. And I'm not saying this with
[16:22] any sort of jingoism or anything. They I've seen the logs, I've seen
[16:27] the pilot some of the you know, the the reports and stuff, the
[16:30] operational reports, and there was not a single alert that went off when these
[16:34] guys crossed, which is crazy, which actually shows that the system completely failed.
[16:40] The Pakistani system completely failed to detect where the actual attack was coming from.
[16:45] And you know, there are there are some who say, you know,
[16:47] the mirage could probably Mirajes could probably have crossed into Pakistan also, and
[16:49] these guys still wouldn't have known. But obviously that risk couldn't have been taken.
[16:53] But as you saw, we only got to know the names of the
[16:56] pilots much later when they won those awards. But you know, just just
[17:00] professional pilots doing their job. Most of them, you know, apart from
[17:03] the leader of the pack, who was a group captain, which is equivalent
[17:07] of colonel in the army, the rest didn't even know what their mission was
[17:11] until they were until they were at the base getting into their fighters. Then
[17:15] they were told obviously, it's not like you it's not a Hibi movie where
[17:18] you get into the air and then they tell you ham pakistanko jack bomb.
[17:22] It's not like that, obviously, but they were told like when they were
[17:25] at the base, there was a full briefing, you know, a full
[17:29] you know, pre mission briefing about what they were going to do and stuff,
[17:33] and then they went and they just did that job. The whole thing
[17:34] lasted like a you know, a couple of hours. The fighters didn't land
[17:37] back immediately in Gaualier. That that's another amazing part that we covered in the
[17:41] book, which is that the aircraft took off from Gaullier, they joined an
[17:47] exercise that was happening in central India around a Labad to make it seem to
[17:52] anyone who's watching that Mirages are participating in a exercise. There were other fighters
[17:56] in the air make twenty nine s b A. Then they came to our
[18:00] them poor in Punjab. There they did some stuff you know, for the
[18:03] for a between Pulwama and this day. Then they carried out some other training
[18:07] missions or there, and then from a base in Punjab is where they took
[18:11] off for the this this final mission. Then they stopped in swingother also I
[18:15] think if I remember correctly, and then they conducted this mission. So like
[18:19] literally nobody nobody knew. Most of the Air Force also probably didn't know that
[18:23] this was happening. Yeah, it's a lovely tidbit you just given us.
[18:26] And for people who are interested in or affairs military, that kind of gives
[18:30] you the sort of a look at what goes into planning a military operation.
[18:34] So obviously nobody in the Air Force knew, but I'm guessing the Air Force
[18:37] chief knew and the commander who was ordering these pilots and planes to go step
[18:42] for the world, so they have the larger picture in mind what's going on.
[18:45] But like you know, that's a nice tate bit you've given us.
[18:48] So let's move to the next day. We'll come back, we'll circle back
[18:52] to Ballacode because it's not over yet. There are several controversies also that have
[18:56] been linked to the air strike. We'll circle back to that after in a
[18:59] bit. But let's move to the day after. And I'm guessing a Massador
[19:03] Bisarias spending a lot of talking about in his book because a lot of it
[19:07] that happened the day after involved diplomacy at the highest levels. So the day
[19:11] after you had the Pakistani air force striking back, not surprising for people who
[19:15] covered defense like you, because it's a very uh it's an old military habit
[19:19] that if you're a hit, you just have to hit back for the mora
[19:22] all of your troops, as simple as that. It's find that you have
[19:26] audience exactly. So you don't want to accept that you know terrorists were killed
[19:30] there. You don't want to You want to say that the missiles were duds.
[19:32] You want to say it was a forest area, only trees were knock
[19:34] done and some person suffered something on his head. You might say that,
[19:37] but the fact remains that the Indian force was able to strike missiles into your
[19:41] terditory, so you have to respond, you have to strike back. So
[19:44] the PAKISTANISF was responded. They claimed to Handal. This is where I want
[19:48] you to kind of tell us whether you believe it, because I honestly don't
[19:52] know what to make of it. They claim to have intentionally missed targets in
[19:56] India. They said they had their gun sights pointed at sets of the planes,
[20:00] I mean not ground ground weapons pointed out some military installations in Jaman Kashmi,
[20:06] but they at the last from it decided not to hit them to avoid
[20:07] an escalation of sorts. India, which obviously wasn't high alert, scrambled their
[20:12] fighter jets. I think they included the Make twenty ones and the Sukhois among
[20:17] others. There was a dog fight, and we spoke about this in the
[20:21] last episode of how She said that dog flights in the modern day and DNA
[20:25] aren't like top gun. You have planes to let them. But these guys
[20:26] kind of got they saw the anem aircraft, both of them Pakistani air pilots
[20:30] or the Indian pilots and buyserles. Uh. What we've been told from the
[20:36] air forces that wingman was able to shoot down one F sixteen of the Pakistani
[20:40] Air Force. The Pakistani Air Forces never ever accepted there was F sixteen involved
[20:44] in the in the first place, because that's another story ago, the contract
[20:47] to the obligates, et cetera. However, he was shot down, he
[20:51] ejected, but landed in Pakistan Quipit Kushmi, from where initially there were some
[20:55] very disturbing visuals of him being beaten up by the locals who were there,
[20:59] and then a parent being rescued by the Pakistani Army being taken to a camp.
[21:03] Then you had a series of propaganda videos coming out from the from from
[21:07] Pakistan back channel. What we know is that there was high level diplomacy going
[21:11] on. The US's involved, SOUTHI Aribas involved, and I think a day
[21:15] or two later Imrankan in Parliament announced that is being sent back to India.
[21:19] There was this rumor back then as well that India had pointed seven to eight
[21:25] missiles towards Pakistan and had done it in a way for Pakistan to know that
[21:29] the missiles are pointed towards you. Yeah, nobody has confirmed that. And
[21:33] like I said, uh Massadabasaria while referring to that has not denied that,
[21:37] which I think is a big deal as well. Uh, several stands over
[21:41] here. First, like I said, tell us about the day of retaliation
[21:45] of the Pakistani Air Force. Second, tell us, uh what you think
[21:49] about the videos that came out. And also so like like you said that
[21:53] the Pakistani military is a professional military. The higher levels, the it might
[21:57] they might you know, be handed love a terrorists, but at the at
[22:00] the ground level, when it is you know, a major to major colonel
[22:03] to colonel wing come under there, they're professionals. So their treatment of our
[22:08] pilot. And finally this business of missiles being parted at Pakistan. So so
[22:15] to start off, Uh, this may be a bit of an unpopular view,
[22:18] but uh, like I love facts when it comes to the military.
[22:21] I prefer facts more than you know, confirmation bias. But you know,
[22:26] when the when the Pakistan Air Force retaliated the next day, like you rightly
[22:30] said, it was, it was, it had to be done. It.
[22:33] You know, you don't take a hit and then not act. You've
[22:36] got to do it because otherwise you'll be seen, as you know, just
[22:38] bending over and taking it. But I don't think the Pakistan establishment is lying
[22:45] when they say that they intentionally missed these establishments. I'll tell you why.
[22:49] The reason why is because their planes got pretty close. Their planes were near
[22:53] the line of control and hitting those establishments would not have been difficult. Okay,
[22:57] that's that's point number one. Point number two is the reason why they
[23:03] uh, you know, released bombs and didn't hit is because they wanted to
[23:07] send out a message saying we can strike you too. The reason they didn't
[23:11] hit a military establishment is because that would have been a complete active war.
[23:17] Okay. Definitely, what India had hit, the Indian Air Force had hit
[23:19] was a Jaba top J Mohmoed training facility, not a government facility, not
[23:26] a you know, not a Pakistan Army facility, not you know, not
[23:30] a department facility. Nothing. It was a J Mohmed private training facility for
[23:36] terrorists. It was nothing more than that. Even even if you want to
[23:40] cast doubts on what that establishment was, we can be certain that it wasn't
[23:44] a military facility. So it was not a military target. Right. So,
[23:48] if Pakistan had retaliated by hitting you know, the you know, something
[23:52] in Humpo or one of those depots or establishments that they got pretty near.
[23:57] Uh, Pakistan knew full well that it would have elicited a truly devastating reply
[24:06] from India. Okay, uh, And and you have to remember that it
[24:10] was Imran Khan in the saddle at this point of time. And we'll come
[24:12] to his you know, his uncertainty on his feet and the lack of the
[24:18] lack of confidence in taking decisions, which is there in Ambassador Bassaria's book.
[24:22] But so I don't I don't think Pakistan is lying to anyone when they say
[24:26] that they intentionally missed and that they could have it. It was because it
[24:30] was out of fear. It was you know, you don't poke the beast
[24:33] that you've just hurt really badly. Okay, So that's point number one.
[24:37] Point number two is the twenty seventh of February, they I think we all
[24:41] remember, was a was not a particularly good day for India. It was
[24:44] a It was actually a really really mixed bag in many many ways. You
[24:49] know, we can paint the Abhinandan Berthaman episode anyway. We like you the
[24:56] heroic pilot. He did what he needed to do, but he was shot
[24:59] down. Okay, Now I'm not saying that you know, that's a bad
[25:02] thing to happen. I'm just saying that, you know, a pilot being
[25:06] shot down in enemy territory is the opposite of an optimal situation in a war.
[25:11] Point number two, everyone seems to forget the terrible friendly fire incident where
[25:17] our surface to MSLS shot down our own helicopter. Because of the fog of
[25:21] war, there was a massive breakdown in you know, the sensor to shoot
[25:25] a loop. There was total confusion over what that was on the radar.
[25:29] It was all it was an Indian Air Force ME seventeen helicopter taking off from
[25:32] Budgham just outside Shrineger and you had, you know, a total collapse of
[25:37] the of the you know, the targeting systems that exist in northern India.
[25:41] This was just as a dog fight was going about around that time, so
[25:45] there was panic and you know, it was a you know, the the
[25:48] firing was approved and you had that terrible incident where you know, that helicopter
[25:52] was shot down by our own missile. So you know, the Pakistani is
[25:56] still sort of poke fun about that situation. But people should go in,
[26:00] go out and read how many times Pakistan has actually done it done that to
[26:03] itself with Chinese missiles, you'll actually be surprised they've done it, like maybe
[26:07] like once every two three years. That happens during training, So they shouldn't
[26:11] be lecturing anyone. It's a there's nothing to laugh at. These are very
[26:15] very difficult, uh, you know military systems and equipment. You're actually looking
[26:21] at something on a radar. Yes, it was, it was. It
[26:23] was a breakdown in terms of protocol, technology, command and control. You
[26:27] can you know, people have been court martialed for if people have been thrown
[26:30] out of service for it from the Air Force. But all I can say
[26:33] is, and not to defend anyone, but I can say that it's easy
[26:37] to look at it from this perspective outside that loop for a person actually taking
[26:41] those decisions. It is literally looking at something on a radar screen thinking it
[26:45] might be a threat because you already know fighters on nearby, and having to
[26:48] take that call do I fire a missile, do not fire a missile.
[26:51] It's like it's it's a it's like a life and death video game, right.
[26:53] So so so that was a terrible stain on what happened the So so
[27:00] I've described to you the two things that I thought were the downsides of what
[27:03] happened. The big side is that India did all it's most of its fighting
[27:07] that day with mid twenty ones. Yeah, with tiny little mid twenty one
[27:12] bisons, you know, upgraded you know, half century old fighters. I
[27:18] mean the airframes were not half century old, but the design is, you
[27:22] know, with very capable radars, very capable missiles, and they were able
[27:26] to give you know, what we understand to be fairly advanced Pakistani fighters,
[27:30] most definitely F sixteen and most definitely JFS seventeen Chinese fighters, you know,
[27:36] a serious fight, okay, And yes were there were also you know Soukoi
[27:41] thirties in the air, you know, which had to dodge some missiles as
[27:45] we saw later, But it was the mid twenty ones actually which were the
[27:48] teeth of that operation. So the fact that abinandn Bertaman was able to shoot
[27:53] down what some people say as in F sixteen, I happened to think it
[27:57] may have been a JF seventeen, not an sixteen, because according to my
[28:02] information and my understanding, they have sixteen's actually didn't dare come anywhere near.
[28:06] They didn't want to send them close because of precisely this kind of fear,
[28:10] so they wanted to send the less expensive, slightly more you know, dispensable
[28:15] JAF seventeens into the frontal part of that fight. And I think it was
[28:19] a JF seventeen that was finally shot down by Abinandan before he was brought down.
[28:26] What happened after that? You know, the video is the propaganda videos.
[28:30] You know, this is Pakistan, Okay, this is Pakistan. This
[28:32] Pakistan occupied Kashmir. They kind of fell into their own trap. You know,
[28:38] they had a pilot. They could have shut up about it. They
[28:41] could have made sure no videos come out. They could have made sure that
[28:45] there was complete radio silence about Abinandan for a week, you know, putting
[28:51] a huge country like India completely in suspense, you know. But you know,
[28:55] but moronically, they started putting out their day and mind you, not
[29:00] just by locals. Even the army guys who captured him started putting out videos
[29:03] of him, which was there was a full inquiry about that because it was
[29:07] deemed later to be very damaging diplomatically to Pakistan that the military had behaved in
[29:14] such a juvenile and unprofessional manner. You had, you know, Major General
[29:19] Asia of the ISPR at that time, you know, accidentally talking about two
[29:25] pilots do pilots you know that famous you know, a bit of a four
[29:29] power where he basically admitted that another pilot had also been found, which was
[29:33] and then completely mentioning about it, no mention of it, because he got
[29:37] a huge dunda from Ooper saying, how can you admit that we've also lost
[29:41] a pilot? They've lost just one pilot. Where's the other pilot? So
[29:44] he got it royally, but of course he's made a comeback in his career.
[29:47] But yeah, that was a monumental mess up from Pakistan to mention two
[29:52] pilots. They would live to regret that one little comment because by this time
[29:57] they've you know, with with Abinan, the videos coming out and all this
[30:02] stuff happening. There was a full fledged as you saw propaganda claim versus counterclaim
[30:07] war you know, already taking place. Did missiles get fired? Did missiles
[30:11] not get fired? Is it really a mid twenty one? Is it something
[30:12] else? All manner of uh, you know, oscent and social media stuff
[30:18] was sort of you know, blazing on the Internet and on social media,
[30:22] so it was it was pretty crazy. If I could mention a little bit
[30:25] about Ambassador Bissaria's book, here's where his book. You know, so we
[30:29] know what happened in the air, largely because it's been reported. We know
[30:33] what is happening on the ground because that's also come out. I've said quite
[30:36] a bit of it about the operational aspect of it in my book. But
[30:38] where Ambassador our High Commissioner A. J. Bissaria's book comes in is the
[30:45] phone calls that began once uh Abhinandan was captured. And that is, to
[30:51] my mind fascinating because here you had Pakistan saying, whoa wait a minute,
[30:56] we've captured an Indian pilot. Now what we do? You know, they
[31:00] had no idea what to do, and inside the system the alarm bells had
[31:04] already started to ring about boss we you know, it's it's like holding this
[31:10] hot potato and you have to let it go quickly or somebody's gonna attack you.
[31:14] So in India, by that, you know, the chest thumping at
[31:17] Bigansa and they've got a pilot, let's attack them. All that rubbish was
[31:21] starting here on India, usually by people who never have to go to war.
[31:23] Yes, and uh and uh Abinandan was still there. People had gone
[31:29] to Abandon's father's house, Marshall Bertaman in Bengaluru. I think trying to get
[31:33] soundbites from him, and I remember him very calmly saying, he's my he's
[31:37] a he's a pilot, he knows what to do. He'll be fine.
[31:40] Don't worry. Why are you so worried. I'm not that it relaxed.
[31:42] You know, amazing, hats off to that family and uh and you saw
[31:48] how it turned out. But but the the the the juiciest aspect, Dave
[31:52] of what happened that night, the night that Abandon was captured is that Imran
[31:57] Khan and his PIMO like frantically dialed the Indian High Commissioner and the Indian PMO.
[32:04] The Indian PMO refused to answer. I find that crazy. They just
[32:07] said bath naikering, we will not talk you. Please come through our High
[32:12] commissioner. First of all, don't talk to us directly, come through our
[32:15] High Commissioner. Now all, there is always a hotline between Prime Ministers of
[32:19] India and Pakistan that didn't function. The PMO said, look, we're clear
[32:22] that you come through our High commission You have any message, you send it
[32:25] through the High Commissioner. So the poor Pakistan hig Commissioner, who had been
[32:29] summoned back to Pakistan, dialed his Indian counterpart, Ajabisaria, who was sitting
[32:31] in Delhi by this time, and said, by dec please Bath, you
[32:37] know, please facilitate this conversation between Imran and Modi. It's it's important.
[32:40] We want to resolve this situation and stuff. And Modi said you. The
[32:45] Modi's PMO basically told High Commissioner Bisaria, we will talk once Abinandan is back.
[32:52] There's no conversation before that. It will the channel will not be opened
[32:57] at all. So this was conveyed to him, and obviously the Pakistan Army
[33:04] by this time was the alarm bells were clanging because the ISI by this time
[33:09] had been briefed by the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK. And
[33:16] a bit of a bit of it I've reported in my book also, but
[33:19] it's fleshed out amazingly by Ambassad Bisaria where he says that the Indian war machine
[33:24] is completely ready right now, Okay, emotions are high. The political establishment
[33:30] has basically told the armed forces to be ready for anything. And you know,
[33:35] you know, nine missiles sound sexy. We don't know it could have
[33:37] been hundred missiles. We don't know that are all manner of weapons, you
[33:40] know, close to the border. And you know, one when one thinks
[33:44] of nine missiles they've you know, in your mind, you think you of
[33:47] these nine missiles lined up in a battery near the line of control. It's
[33:51] not like that these are missiles that may be somewhere, you know, in
[33:53] Upi or Rajasthan or Punjab or something far away. Because these are long range
[33:57] missiles right there, maybe like six hundred and seven hundred thousand kilometer range missile.
[34:00] So so what missiles those were that were ready? I can only conjecture.
[34:05] Could they be ugly missiles? Were they talking about a nuclear strike?
[34:07] Were they talking about a you know, preemptive kind of surface to surface strike.
[34:13] You know, all those things are only a matter of conjecture. But
[34:15] but what is definitely true is that that when when Abinandan was finally sent back
[34:22] across the water border a short time thereafter, it was definitely not a piece
[34:28] gesture. Now, it's it's one thing for journalists to say it, or
[34:31] experts to say it, or politicians to say and Kudaradhya and stuff, but
[34:36] a High Commissioner by his very nature is a very subtle, subtle kind of
[34:39] roles. You know, you don't make big claims, you don't speak in
[34:45] you know, in extremes. You're very measured in your analysis of everything,
[34:49] especially if you were in the hot seat. And he says, there's no
[34:52] question that the Pakistani establishment was spooked. You had MPs saying, you know,
[34:57] a payer company l again and things like that, because not just because
[35:01] of rumors, but even within the Pakistani establishment there was this kind of operational
[35:07] certainty, a very scary kind of operational certainty that time is running out and
[35:13] if we don't release Abinandan, these guys are not gonna wait. They will
[35:16] attack in some form or the other, whether it is nine missiles, whether
[35:20] it is more aircraft, whether it is you know, some kind of attack
[35:23] from c The Navy was on operational alert also, they had no idea the
[35:28] threat was like three sixty degrees. So and you had an inexperienced prime minister,
[35:32] not a wartime prime minister, you know, like Navasharif or Musharraf or
[35:37] whoever. Uh, and he just he just buckled. He said, the
[35:42] fact that Abinandan was repatriated so soon day after he was captured is just testimony
[35:49] to the fact that these guys completely crumbled. Uh, not only because of
[35:52] the messaging from India. They panicked because Morey said, we will not talk
[35:55] to the UK, and US embassy diplomats had basically convinced you guys saying,
[36:00] look, we're talking to India, but there's only so much we can do.
[36:04] Release the damn pilot asap. Otherwise, don't look at us, okay,
[36:08] because we can't control India right now. You guys have messed up,
[36:13] okay, And if you don't release it right now, don't come complaining to
[36:16] us. And that's when it happened, right, Very interesting And I think
[36:21] that book will be read by a lot me definitely, and I'll just read
[36:27] for a copy to come out as soon as possible. We'll continue more on
[36:30] this, but after a quick break. Eat eggs, no eat fiber,
[36:38] sleep, no take short naps, don't listen to others, no serve others.
[36:44] Do you ever feel like you're drowning in a pool of advice? This
[36:49] is Sonalia Charge, a health journalist for the last ten years, who is
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[36:58] in the podcast healthware as we learn about health from a completely new perspective where
[37:04] investing in yourself is not a task but simple, satisfying and joyful. Full
[37:09] episodes are available on Apple, Google, Spotify, and the India Today podcast
[37:15] website. Tune in now, welcome back. Shive and I are discussing the
[37:27] twenty nineteen Bala Quote strike that was launched by the Indian military in response to
[37:31] the fourteen attack in which FORTYCRPA FOR soldiers had died. We are talking about
[37:38] the strike in context of an upcoming book by the then High Commissioners to Islama
[37:44] bad from India A. Jabsaria, And I'm guessing he's going to be recounting
[37:47] a lot about what happened back doors, the back channel talks a diplomat,
[37:52] the diplomatic interactions between the wayst India Pakistan, and I'm also guessing Saudio's in
[38:00] but I'm not sure if he talks about that in his book. So we'll
[38:01] wait for the book to come out and to see what more information there is
[38:06] about Quote strike. Let's go back to the military setup. Tell me something.
[38:12] You know, you obviously were in touch with your sources and you have
[38:15] a lot of people you know, people like guessing friendly within the Air Force,
[38:20] the Navy, the Army, et cetera. What was the mood like
[38:23] when the dog fight happened, and initially there was by the way, we
[38:27] found out that they had actually captured him. I think by three four pm.
[38:30] Initial reporting from our reporters for people like you, colleague God of Sabath,
[38:36] was that the Air Force cannot figure out where's that one pilot. Air
[38:39] Force did release a statement saying that yeah, there was a dog fight and
[38:44] one pilot did not return to base. We are trying to figure out what
[38:46] happened. That's it. The morning earlier there was that horrendous shootdown of the
[38:52] butt gum of the helicopter and butt gum, which also initially we did not
[38:55] know what happened because speculation was maybe to Sparkistan because again like go for lots
[39:00] of confusion that we even be on the desk, but just completely confused at
[39:04] times, you know, cursing people like you, like someone near a copy
[39:09] lik sm But that happens in newsrooms anyway. At three four pm, whenever,
[39:15] General then Asikafu of the Pakistani Intelligence Services sorry Pakistani military spoke spokesperson came
[39:22] on air in on Pakistani channels and said he one, we've captured him two
[39:27] like you said there are two pilots and that we've captured two Hamarak hospital man.
[39:32] No one knows by the way anyway. Uh. And he also had
[39:37] this one sentence early like he was being Hindi that you know subaik as a
[39:42] helicopter crash, a Marco involvement Thani, which is when I'm guessing it started
[39:45] dawning. And I remember the mood in the newsroom just completely went silent when
[39:51] we heard him say those words that we have h Indian pilot in the custody.
[39:54] Uh. I could sense that in the building as well. Uh.
[39:59] What was it like within the military establishment. I'm guessing they must have figured
[40:02] out by them that he must have rejected. Not sure if he's dead or
[40:06] a life, not sure if it's capture or not. Or maybe they had
[40:08] some information because they also have hotlines by them. Yeah, I think the
[40:12] military d GMOs of both the both the armies have a hotland they can you
[40:15] know, call each other whenever they want to. So was there some conversation
[40:19] happening between the militaries. Did they have some more information? Did they also
[40:21] find out when as food came came on air and what was the initial reaction
[40:27] and feeling like within the military. So see, the military works in a
[40:31] very different way they from from the civilians set up. Okay, uh,
[40:36] these are men and women who are you know, again not to I'm not
[40:39] trying to sort of romanticize it, but these are literally people who are built
[40:45] from the ground up, or at least study from the ground up, and
[40:46] trained from the ground up for life and death, scary, surprising, unexpected
[40:52] situations. And you know, a pilot behind enemy lines is a scenario that
[40:59] they train for. It's not like it's a oh my god, they've captured
[41:02] a pilot kind of thing. Of course, they're human. It's a it's
[41:05] a it's a totally non optimal situation. It's something that you'd never want to
[41:10] have to see. But it's not like it's something that's landing on you completely
[41:15] out of the blue. And especially when you've got Make twenty ones and sokoys.
[41:20] You know, dog fighting across the line of control in a visual range
[41:23] combat. In our last episode, we talked about how dog fighting is rare
[41:28] in the modern battlefield, but twenty seventh February twenty nineteen is testimony to the
[41:31] fact that a dog fight can happen between two nuclear powers, right, and
[41:37] the very fact that these were fighters that could where the pilots could visually see
[41:43] each other from their cockpits meant that it was dangerously close and therefore the possibility
[41:49] of a you know, a pilot being shot down beyond beyond behind enemy lines
[41:53] was was a was like a very very high possibility, not even a you
[41:59] know, like host risk. It was a definite possibility because it was a
[42:02] kinetic operation. You're firing missiles, you're firing your guns. You know,
[42:07] you're you're you've got fighters flying like, you know, barely kilometers away from
[42:12] each other. You're able to see each other on the radars. They're like
[42:15] practically together. So so so let's get that out of the way. It
[42:19] was not like a you know, it was not like an OMG situation for
[42:22] the for the Indian Air Force, Uh, they were not happy at all
[42:25] because you know, when something like that happens, you immediately have to completely
[42:30] recalibrate your approach. Now the fighting stops, you've got to figure out how
[42:32] to get your man back. Yes, there are hotlines that are local level
[42:37] hotlines. I am told that none of those actually function that day because there
[42:43] was lack of clarity, even on the Pakistani side, because remember an landed
[42:46] on the in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, captured by locals, handed over to the
[42:52] beaten up badly and then handed over to the Pakistan Army. Uh So,
[42:57] so that exchange of information didn't really happen. But the way the Indian Air
[43:01] Force and the Indian military system got to know was pretty early actually, because
[43:06] they've got their own human intelligence in pok so they got to know. The
[43:09] intelligence agencies had gotten to know and the Air Force had gotten to know fairly
[43:15] early that yeah, our guy has survived and he's on that side for sure.
[43:20] So even while the even while there was this uncertainty in the real world
[43:25] about Okay, there's a guy missing and we have no idea where he is
[43:30] in the system, they knew in the system. They knew. They just
[43:31] needed to figure It's not like you know, you know about it and then
[43:35] you release that information, right, It never works like that. This is
[43:37] the military. It's a live operational situation, so you can't just confirm harm
[43:42] missing a in case, you know, pa it's not doesn't work like that.
[43:46] So when it was finally confirmed, like you said, in the late
[43:51] afternoon, that he'd been captured, yeah, it was a shock to many
[43:54] of us, right because because the emotional mood of this story, you know,
[44:00] journalistically and non journalistically, was you know, amn, Grmeg, who's
[44:04] Kemara? And then we've defended against their fighters but they've got a pilot now,
[44:08] you know, now the narrative completely changes. You know, they've got
[44:12] they're holding the advantage now and stuff. So emotionally speaking, that's what it
[44:15] was. But things immediately kicked into force. The Indian operational machine, the
[44:22] war machine, would have you know, I don't know, I don't know
[44:25] precisely how it would have happened, but it would have very clinically sort of
[44:30] clicked into its next gear, which is, okay, now what do we
[44:34] do? You know, the military does not have the luxury to sit around
[44:37] and you know, have the you know, have the time to figure out.
[44:43] Okay, Cello, let's you know, let's take this whiteboard and draw
[44:45] some charts and draw some things and you know, you know, make it
[44:50] look really glamorous about what our next step is going to be and where our
[44:52] aviators and you know, you know, sip some beer and thing. They've
[44:57] got to They've got a man on the other side by your you know,
[45:00] your sworn enemy, a country that you've fought like five wars with, right
[45:04] so, so they didn't have the luxury of time at all. So the
[45:07] air force was fully ready. I can tell you. I can tell you
[45:10] for a fact that the air force was completely primed and ready for another air
[45:14] assault. This is something we already know. I've written it in my book.
[45:16] They were ready for another air attack. This was conveyed to the government
[45:21] as well, that you know, if this is necessary, We're ready to,
[45:25] you know, for another kind of punitive attack to show Pakistan that we
[45:29] mean business. If you don't release our pilot, we will continue to attack
[45:31] you. Missile squadrons like High Commissioner Bisaria's book suggests, would have been definitely
[45:37] true. I have no idea where the number nine comes from. Maybe maybe
[45:42] the Pakistani has had some intelligence on our side. They certainly have molds on
[45:45] our side telling them about you know, maybe some maybe some missiles had been
[45:50] primed that day, you know, and primed basically means fueled and ready for
[45:53] the for firing possible that they had some kind of information saying that Boss five,
[46:00] Prithvi's or Agniz or whatever, most missiles you know, have been primed
[46:05] and ready and they're going to attack us. So all of these things would
[46:07] have definitely happened on that particular day. But as far as the Air Force
[46:13] is concerned, they knew fairly early that their pilot had fallen into enemy hands.
[46:17] They it was clear to them. But we have to remember that in
[46:22] a situation like this, it's not just the Air Force, right, it's
[46:24] the Air Force, it's the Army, it's military intelligence, it's the National
[46:28] Security Advisor's Office, it's the PMO, you know, for god's sake,
[46:31] they're like, fully, it's the country at war. It's not the Air
[46:34] Force fighting this little video game battle somewhere in Kashmir. It's the entire country
[46:38] that's at war or in battle with your own people against another country. So
[46:45] they they knew fairly early. I of course, have a some pretty uncharitable
[46:51] views about the manner in which the Air Force carried out it's claim versus counterclaim
[46:55] campaign. I think they lost a bit of that momentum by, you know,
[47:00] constantly trying to answer things that Pakistani trolls and the pakistan I spr were
[47:06] constantly bringing up. They didn't need to. I think they you know,
[47:09] it was almost like the Pakistan Pakistani side along with their so called ostin experts
[47:15] and there you know, Western journalists who love siding with Pakistan because Pakistan buys
[47:21] all their you know, equipment and F sixteens and stuff, and it obviously
[47:24] makes the US look bad if F sixteens have been shot down. So you
[47:29] had this, this this emerging narrative that uh this was this was advantage Pakistan
[47:35] and disadvantage India, and India had failed badly on that particular day, so
[47:38] that that part is again something that that you know, made that day pretty
[47:44] bad. Overall, it's a mixed bag for India. Yeah, right,
[47:47] A good point you made. It was the last of for your your answer
[47:51] and actually wanted to focus on that the like as you close this episode,
[47:55] the controversial aspect of the Balakot test track and happened the day after, because
[48:01] you know, I think if you don't do that, there are a lot
[48:04] of comments on our YouTube video or you know, or WhatsApp will be like,
[48:07] you know, but you didn't. I think We're going to get a
[48:09] lot of comments this time for telling too much truth on this episode. Was
[48:13] like that, So let's get to that. So day one, on the
[48:16] day of the strike, you had source based information and you know, I'll
[48:21] just like clear this to all our listeners and youers. This was sent to
[48:25] every media company in India. This was not just India Group, everybody.
[48:30] You had source based information that three hundred and three fifty have been killed.
[48:34] Later, it turned up, by the way, that claim has never ever
[48:37] ever killed this date officially been acknowledged by either the NBA or even the Air
[48:42] Force. The Air Force litter in the day when it was asked the Air
[48:44] Force cheap and yes this multiple times at multiple press conferences. My job is
[48:47] not to go there and count bodies. My job is to carry out the
[48:51] mission, which is to bomb up place that has identified cund bodies. So
[48:54] I did I think, if you want to count bodies, send somebody to
[48:58] contbodies, right, so think So the initial information, source based information that
[49:01] came to a lot of all the media houses was that three three fifty to
[49:06] terrorists have been Later it turned out that what that perhaps was based on was
[49:09] actually interced estimate of that being the number of mobile devices that were operational in
[49:15] the area at that time, and that led to an estimate that this probably
[49:19] made me the number of people training at the terrorist camp over there. One
[49:23] Second, which is what Pakistan and Major General Asia Food has kept saying that
[49:29] it was just some trees that India. He even took I think a delegation
[49:32] of Western journalists to the area. I think it was three four five days
[49:37] later after that, but but not to the actual site, not to the
[49:39] actual side. Yeah. I wrote an article about that as well. So
[49:42] One, it happened four or five days later, not the very next day,
[49:45] if you wanted to prove. Second, even though they were given a
[49:51] tour, they were given a tour from the bottom of the hilltop because I
[49:54] remember seeing Al Jazeera BBC photos and I was like, by this is not
[49:58] a tour. It had been taken to some place. Have you been told
[50:00] who the bombing? See nothing there? You could see a wall there.
[50:06] Pretty you didn't take them to the compound two point number three, which I
[50:10] think you've already spoken about. But again, because we're talking about the condos
[50:14] aspects of Balla Chorest, what happened the day after the claim versus counterclaim of
[50:19] did we shoot on A sixteen or not? You had I think it was
[50:22] all the Vice chiefs Army and Avian Air Force coming together at a naming press
[50:25] conference displaying some parts of what they said was an AMBRAGM missile which they claimed
[50:30] only the F sixteen can can carry and shoot. Did not really strike me
[50:36] as much because I'm like, you know, they could have modified the Chinese
[50:39] jet if they wanted. I'm not sure you can best place to answer that,
[50:44] but yeah, I agree with the last part of what you said before
[50:45] I before I began right now is that I think, uh, and we've
[50:50] improved a lot since then, but I think India did lose out on the
[50:52] communication strategy on both the days you had as if Foot tweeting at six in
[50:59] the morning, yet THEA took around I think a good four or five hours
[51:01] to issue a statement. Yeah. Uh. Then you had this source bage
[51:07] information cropping up from god knows where no verification of it, which again,
[51:10] you know, it just looks bad because you've carried out a successful strike.
[51:14] You don't want to be caught with something that you don't want to be caught
[51:16] because then your claim of you know, actually striking it. And when the
[51:20] Pakistan is saying that, you know, hey, you just truck some tree
[51:22] tops just boisoned into a complete mess. So the communication strategy went for am
[51:27] vest is what I feel. Do you agree with that and the points I
[51:30] said, wol you have to No, I completely agree, And the Air
[51:34] Force has actually not been very happy with me when I've said this in the
[51:37] past, and I said it on my shows also that the communication strategy kind
[51:40] of crumbled. I don't really blame them for it. They've because like I
[51:44] said, it's it's easy to judge when you're not in the hot seat.
[51:46] Everything is easy to analyze, you know, when you're not the one with
[51:52] you know, a nation's reputation on your shoulders, it's easy to pass judgment.
[51:58] So I don't really fault anyone. And to be frank, you know,
[52:01] the Air Force Publicity Department at that time, the people there are really
[52:06] fine officers, all of them very close friends of mine. Now many of
[52:08] them retired and you know, top class officers and men, so I wouldn't
[52:14] fault them on being unprofessional at any point. I think owing to the situation,
[52:22] the fog of war, the pressures you know the kind of heat that
[52:27] was generated on social media and the Western press. The fact that, you
[52:31] know, a dogfight isn't something that happens every day. It hasn't happened for
[52:36] a long time. Right, The last time a dogfight happened between India and
[52:40] Pakistan was in nineteen seventy one. And therefore, given all these factors,
[52:45] I think there wasn't a clear sort of pre prepared protocol in terms of how
[52:52] to handle such a situation. Now putting down very clearly that everything looks great
[52:59] in hindsight, right, you know, review mirror clarity is twenty twenty,
[53:04] et cetera, et cetera, all those caveats aside, I agree with you
[53:07] completely there. I think the way to have done this was to have simply
[53:14] spoken through actions. You went in, you fired bombs at them, you
[53:19] hit a target. The skirmish happened. Abinanan came back, and there should
[53:23] have been complete radio silence after that, because I can tell you that once
[53:30] Abinandan had come back, the every I don't even need to describe it,
[53:35] because I think every Indian felt the same way. It was that, Wow,
[53:37] India managed to get this guy back in twenty four hours, or thirty
[53:40] six hours? Yep, how did that happen? Okay? High Commissioner Jbsaria
[53:45] has confirmed that it was because Pakistan was quick. But that was actually the
[53:50] sentiment in India as well. We made them send our pilot back in thirty
[53:53] six hours. That's how scared they are, That's how chicken they are.
[53:57] That was the sentiment in India. That's was that whole muzzle booth. India
[54:00] sentiment carried on, you know, during the elections also, So that was
[54:05] that was one aspect of it. But you saw, how was there in
[54:08] F sixteen? Was there not an F sixteen? Then they brought that missile
[54:12] cup part and they displayed it out outside South Block and I was there.
[54:15] Then they put out a wax battle you know, battlefield imagery of the where
[54:21] the aircraft were and stuff. Then they put out then they called a select
[54:24] group of journalists including me, and I was in the Chief's office to show
[54:29] pictures of the holes made by the missiles on that building itself. And I
[54:32] remember telling the Chief, I said, I'm glad you haven't released these pictures
[54:37] because who do you need to prove anything to? Who do you need to
[54:40] prove anything to? You're a professional air force. You know, you guys
[54:45] know this stuff better than me. You don't need to have your people out
[54:47] there rebutting everything that's there on social media, you know, countering everything that
[54:53] some oscent handle says or some Western you know, defense journalist says. Know
[54:58] all the f sixteens have been accounted for. You say, nine, Amram
[55:00] Milga, why are you? Why are you being led by the other side's
[55:06] narrative. You've hit them with missiles. The world knows you've hit them with
[55:09] missiles. Those who don't think you hit them with missiles are never going to
[55:14] believe you, Okay, including people on the inside who asked for sabooth et
[55:16] cetera. And you know you got your pilot back in thirty six hours and
[55:22] you've shot down one of their planes. Those who are going to believe you
[55:25] are going to believe you. What proof are you What proof are you trying
[55:30] to Who are you trying to convince, Who are you trying to get onto
[55:34] your side to believe this? You're being dragged down to Pakistan's propaganda level,
[55:38] where claim and counterclaim function as a you know, as an instrument for your
[55:44] domestic audience. The things that they had been saying were strictly for their domestic
[55:47] audience because they had because Pakistan was looking historically stupid. They'd been penetrated and
[55:54] attacked by Indian Air Force fighters for the first time since nineteen seventy one.
[55:59] They were looking unprepared, weak, you know, completely off guard, and
[56:06] they needed to justify it to themselves, alleviate their sense of incompetence, and
[56:12] tell their people that, look, we're not that bad. We're not that
[56:14] bad. That should have been the starting line of any you know, conversation
[56:19] that India had, but we got just bogged down in you know nine,
[56:22] This tale is from a Pakistani missile and no, look at this map,
[56:27] see these how close they got. And I remember looking at that as a
[56:30] journalist and thinking, oh my god. I mean I have to report this
[56:31] stuff, but this is this is silly, you know. I mean,
[56:36] put me in charge for likea Kwana, I'll tell them what to do.
[56:37] I mean, they know better than me. I would never presume to be
[56:40] better than them at this, but you know, in just in terms of
[56:44] communication and handling the fallout of an operational situation, I thought it was a
[56:49] royal mess. I ideally do what I still do, and I'm going to
[56:52] get a lot of hate for this. They believe me, even from the
[56:53] guys who retired. They're all fabulous guys, and I think even many of
[56:58] them, realistically, because they're professional, would look back on that episode and
[57:01] say, hey, yeah, maybe we should have just reined it in a
[57:05] little bit, you know, let the narrative play out at the end of
[57:07] the day. Once it does settles, it's still going to be our claim
[57:09] versus their claim. And everybody knows how people view Pakistan. Okay, there's
[57:14] no there's no comparison. Why would we play that game, get dragged down
[57:17] to their level of tutum mem and then end up looking like, you know,
[57:22] you know, they've painted us into a corner. So so yeah,
[57:25] I think the I've said a lot of I mean, I've criticized the Air
[57:30] Force a lot as far as the communication is concerned. One of the great
[57:34] things that they've done is Abandon has never spoken yes, okay, fabulous of
[57:39] the Air Force. Okay. My fear was it's going to become a maler.
[57:45] There will be there will be a you know, Aban some melan,
[57:50] there will be a press conference, He'll be on their recruitment posters. They'll
[57:53] make a big hoo out of it, and stuff they gave quietly, gave
[57:57] him a I think, a chuk, I think, and they edited.
[58:00] He was promoted in some bass. You keep hearing stories now and then it's
[58:05] cat promotion is based Mayo's based may That's fine, that's cool, that's cool.
[58:09] He just kind of blended back into the air, of course, but
[58:13] none of that. I was certain they're going to go to town with this
[58:16] guy hero pilot. Ye, none of that stuff happened. They were quiet
[58:21] about it. They were professional barth saying, this is a is a pilot,
[58:23] he's doing his job. He's back. Come true. That's it.
[58:28] So I think, like I said, it was a mixed bag. It's
[58:30] very easy to see the whole Balacote and a skirmish episode as black and white.
[58:37] It's not none of And I think all of the things we've discussed so
[58:39] far, they've proved that the shades of gray always overwhelmed the blacks and whites
[58:45] in military operations, and if anyone sees them as anything else, then that's
[58:49] a big mistake. And I think shades of gray is what you'll keep seeing
[58:52] on this on this podcast. Because like you said, all matters defense are
[58:57] always shades of gray, right, just like you know on the last point,
[59:01] and just look forward from Balaco and just to like, you know,
[59:05] just to end your point, I think the communications has improved a lot since
[59:10] then. You saw it with the poon civilian that's boiler ted statement cocoperaate with
[59:15] the prove. You've also seen some of the nice proper candabvities that have come
[59:20] out from India with respect the standard for China, and you know, no
[59:23] statements on it, but just the videos. It's smartly put out there just
[59:28] to like, you know, make a point. And so I think they've
[59:30] learned from you know, they had the Air Force and the military had a
[59:34] full uh sort of uh you know, introspection about their communication strategy post Ballachod.
[59:38] I can tell you they've uh and to their immense credit to the leadership
[59:44] as well as the you know, the staff manning all of these departments,
[59:49] they've learned their lesson in a super way. So whether it is the Ladda
[59:53] standoff, whether it is Galvan, whether it is the you know, the
[59:57] the bodies of Galvan, et cetera, they they handle that brilliantly. The
[1:00:00] world. The world knows that India is telling the truth. As far as
[1:00:05] what happened in Galwan is concerned, nobody believes China, right, nobody believes
[1:00:08] China. Go onto the internet forget about even if you want to go beyond
[1:00:12] facts and look just at perception and narrative. Absolutely nobody believes that for Chinese
[1:00:17] guys died in Galwan because it's it's ridiculous and it's untrue. Right, So,
[1:00:22] so communication as far as Galwan is concerned, communication, as far as
[1:00:27] as Poonch is concerned. Many of the things that have happened since also it's
[1:00:31] it's it's they've they've learned that you need to know when to when to speak.
[1:00:37] It's important to put out information quickly, so it doesn't seem that you're
[1:00:39] being silent, but but you know, hold on to your information and always
[1:00:45] remember that in such a situation where things are shape shifting, where people can
[1:00:50] make claims against you, and you're and you're dealing with countries like Pakistan and
[1:00:52] China which are past masters in propaganda, sometimes not saying something is your greatest
[1:01:00] strength and greatest power, and they've done it brilliantly. As far as some
[1:01:04] of these things are concerned, but it's important to you know, to sort
[1:01:08] of get ahead of the story and make sure that you aren't it doesn't look
[1:01:13] like you're holding things back. And I can tell you through my career as
[1:01:15] a journalist, the general default impulse of the military has been to not say
[1:01:22] anything first and only speak when it's way way too late, you know.
[1:01:29] So there was this famous episode in the Navy. I don't know if you
[1:01:32] remember it called the war Room Leak. This was way back in the two
[1:01:37] thousands. You must have been a student then. I was just starting my
[1:01:39] career, and it was basically a bunch of officers who had stolen commercial data
[1:01:45] from the Navy, from the Navy's operations room at Naval Headquarters, and they've
[1:01:50] taken it on pen drives. It was basically the information detailing what the name
[1:01:55] Navy requires from the industry in terms of where and stuff and the commercial aspects,
[1:02:00] which is which is classified information. Now, that led to a kind
[1:02:06] of total silence in the Navy, and that became a kind of inflection point
[1:02:09] in terms of communication. Uh. It became a learning for the Navy in
[1:02:14] terms of how how staying silent is the worst thing you can do. They
[1:02:17] should have come out made a statement said these guys being investigated, they might
[1:02:22] be court martial, et cetera, et cetera. But they went completely silent,
[1:02:23] which made the you know, entire journalist community the country, whoever was
[1:02:30] reporting it, think that the Navy is guilty, the leadership is guilty,
[1:02:32] etcetera, etcetera. They're hiding something. So yeah, so it's it's it's
[1:02:36] a it's a learning process. Like you said, great videos, you know,
[1:02:38] good, you know, good slick promotional material that's now coming out from
[1:02:43] the Indian Air Force and Navy. And I can tell you of someone who's
[1:02:45] been covering defense for twenty twenty years now, it's sometimes difficult to believe that
[1:02:51] they finally realized the power of social media, the power of communications. It's
[1:02:55] a good thing to see. Yes, absolutely, all right, So file
[1:03:00] thought, and just to take the Ballacote strike a bit forward. So you
[1:03:05] obviously had the abrogation of three seven zero months after the Barocod strike a couple
[1:03:10] of years ago. You had the reiteration of the cease fire again a mystery
[1:03:15] to me why it had to be reiterated and what prompted in the first but
[1:03:19] that's a different tangent, will perhaps do separate epistoone that sometime sometime in the
[1:03:22] future. What I'm getting at basically is what did we at the highest level,
[1:03:27] what did we achieve with the Ballacod strike. Well, in terms of
[1:03:30] the situation along the yelloc, would you link it to the reiteration of the
[1:03:35] ceasefire which has one formerly it's one thing to reiterate it, second to actually
[1:03:39] do it on the ground. Like you know, it's a fact that since
[1:03:42] the reiteration, not a lot of seas fi vialations have happened, which has
[1:03:45] helped us immensely focus on the LAC problem with China, keeping our minds up.
[1:03:51] I'm not saying that it is not attention to a Pakistan, but it
[1:03:52] is. Your resources aren't like constantly know shelling each other and you know,
[1:03:55] constantly caught up with that. Would you link it to the Ballacod strike or
[1:04:00] would you think that was just like a limited military operation that served its purpose
[1:04:02] and did not really have a larger impact on those No. No, definitely
[1:04:05] not a limited thing because also because they've getting bogged down in terms of how
[1:04:13] many terrorists got killed in Ballacote et cetera. Is completely the wrong way to
[1:04:17] look at it, you know, you know that source based information that had
[1:04:20] come out and everyone getting obsessed with it and people asking for proof was to
[1:04:24] miss the big picture, which is precisely what you're asking, which is that
[1:04:28] this was not a Balacote was not an attack on a terrorist establishment. It
[1:04:33] was an attack on a country's confidence. It was an attack on a country's
[1:04:41] sense of peace. It was an attack on a country's sense of we are
[1:04:46] safe. It was an attack on the country's RESTful sleep. It was an
[1:04:50] attack on Pakistan's you know, assurance that attacks can't happen of this kind.
[1:04:57] So in that sense, the Balllacote astisk not an attack on a terrorist establishment
[1:05:01] on a hill. It was a strategic attack. It was not a tactical
[1:05:05] strike on terrors. It was an attack on a nation to tell them that
[1:05:10] if push comes to shove, we will come in and attack you. And
[1:05:14] in that sense, the echoes and the vibrations of Balacote are prevalent even now
[1:05:19] because what Uri in twenty sixteen and Balacote in twenty nineteen basically told Pakistan is
[1:05:26] that here is a country that is willing to go up that ladder of escalation
[1:05:32] when it is provoked, and that kind of a lesson is not something you
[1:05:36] can convey through diplomacy or through shutting off trade or shutting off in dust water.
[1:05:43] All those things can put pressure in a country, But when you apply
[1:05:46] aggressive military power on another country's territory, that is basically telling them that that
[1:05:54] you we will do this, we will do this. This is like the
[1:05:58] you're basically doing the last result thing, right, and so if you do
[1:06:01] it, we will attack you. Now, Pakistan can choose to ignore the
[1:06:06] continuing threat of the possibility of an Indian attack and say na in a pizenacreing
[1:06:12] it because now we're ready, or they can realize that, you know shit,
[1:06:15] twenty sixteen, they attacked us. Twenty nineteen also they attacked us,
[1:06:20] so who is to say they can't attack us again. So I think it's
[1:06:24] probably best if we rained in our terrorists a little bit. And Ajbisaria's book
[1:06:29] actually talks about how the ISYESI, had tipped off India about some possible terror
[1:06:32] attacks by al Kaeda to try and show their you know, commitment towards bettering
[1:06:39] themselves because the system was completely convinced after Bala coute that. Okay, here
[1:06:43] is a country we can no longer mess with at that level. If we
[1:06:46] mess with them, they are going to hit us. The disadvantage not I
[1:06:49] wouldn't say disadvantage, but the pressure now on India, of course they is
[1:06:53] that after Uri and after Bala Coat. Now if there's a big terror attack,
[1:06:57] if India doesn't attack Pakistan, people raised question. Right, So now
[1:07:00] we've set that basic template. Now KI attack, then we'll have to enter
[1:07:08] and hit them. So so we've also set that template. So Pakistan knows
[1:07:11] that there's a because of their political system, because of how the public views
[1:07:15] the government, they will be under pressure to attack us anyway, whether they
[1:07:19] want to attack or not. Right, So, so it's it's a it's
[1:07:23] a. It's that that is called the strategic effect, and that is the
[1:07:26] real value of Balakurd. Who cares if three hundred jobless Yadis jihadis have been
[1:07:30] killed on a hill somewhere. Forget that. Nobody cares about those guys.
[1:07:33] They're planning to kill Indians anyway, that doesn't matter. The military has no
[1:07:40] has absolutely no benefit from dead three hundred or two hundred or hundred dead bodies.
[1:07:45] They don't care about that, you know, that's that's something for the
[1:07:46] government of Pakistan to care about. What they care about is that the next
[1:07:51] time Pakistan wants to do something like this, they'll think once, twice,
[1:07:55] thrice, four times before sponsoring an attack like Pulwama or whatever else. But
[1:08:00] handquote anything you want, and that that second thought, that hesitation, that
[1:08:05] reluctance, you know, that self doubt, that is the effect of Ballacote.
[1:08:11] Great Shift, Thanks lovely chat. And you know, just a confession,
[1:08:15] I've always been wanting to discuss this subject with you, because, like
[1:08:18] I said, you are one of the few people FU journalists who've been able
[1:08:23] to actually interact with not just the Baralacourt pirates by the way, also the
[1:08:28] officers and the soldiers involved in the Uri or sorry, the surgical T twenty
[1:08:31] sixteen surgicals right and the unit members of the twenties soldiers killed in the in
[1:08:38] the crash. So maybe we'll also talk about those episodes sometimes sometimes Oh yeah,
[1:08:42] we can do one on Galvan and we can do one on Muri.
[1:08:44] Definitely much to speak about it. So great. Thanks to Shift once again,
[1:08:47] and thanks to our listeners and viewers once again, you leave us comments.
[1:08:51] You know we love to get your feedback and know what you think of
[1:08:55] our discussions and if you have any ideas, if you have any topics that
[1:08:58] you want us to discuss. Thanks as always to Lovely Producer and Ampty additioning.
[1:09:00] That's it for this week's defense does for more tune in next week.
[1:09:03] They'll then stay safe and do not cross any bounded to that passport

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