# Revisiting 26/11: The Missteps, Lessons, and Path Not Taken | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 13

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 29 Feb 2024, 49 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/58876560/29_feb_24_iod_s2_ep_13_mix_feb_29_128.mp3

This week, host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor delve into the harrowing events of November 26, 2008, when 10 Pakistani terrorists infiltrated south Mumbai via the sea, launching a series of devastating attacks. Recounting the gruesome assault orchestrated by the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which claimed 166 lives and left over 300 injured, Shiv shares his firsthand experience of being present outside the Trident-Oberoi on Marine Drive that fateful evening. The duo examines how this incident spotlighted glaring deficiencies in India's intelligence apparatus—highly-trained security forces, including the Mumbai Police, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), National Security Guard (NSG), and Marine Commandos (MARCOS). Was this India's 'Kargil moment'? Shiv argues it was ‘far worse’. They scrutinise the factors contributing to the failures, including questions about the ‘political will’ of the then UPA government to not respond aggressively, influenced by the geopolitical landscape, particularly the US-Pakistan relationship. What are the lessons learned and the evolution of India's security posture since the tragedy? And why Shiv advocates against labeling it solely as a ‘terrorist attack’, for a nuanced understanding of the attacks? Tune in to know! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound mix by Kapil Dev Singh

## Transcript

[0:00] This is end here today. Podcasts spend sixteen years, but when you revisit
[0:08] that site now, it would be like a security studies example of how not
[0:14] to handle a situation of that kind. And absolutely, in many ways for
[0:18] me, this was worse than Gargill. You know, not enough people have
[0:21] paid the price of their negligence, their criminal apathy, their complete lack of
[0:27] foresight that something like this was definitely waiting in the wings to happen. You
[0:32] reached there on the night of the inning, it happened. The energy reached
[0:35] to the nay before the early morning, I think, which just tells you
[0:39] the sheer lack of planning, like you said, that was in play during
[0:43] the Mumbay attacks. Another twenty six eleven can happen. It most definitely can
[0:48] happen. For God's sake, they're holding a press conference with their masks.
[0:52] When I saw that press conference, I was thinking, what are you guys
[0:54] doing here sitting and addressing journalists. You should be out there. The operation
[0:58] is still on. Many people make the mistake of thinking that Bulwama happened,
[1:02] and immediately you know, the governments are Cello strike them back, and you
[1:06] know, then Balakote happened. It's not like that. It doesn't work like
[1:08] that. This government had, you know, probably learned some lessons after twenty
[1:12] six eleven. Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on all
[1:19] things well defense, where I They've go Swami, your host, along with
[1:23] senior journalist Svarur, break down the world of conflicts that range from the subtle
[1:27] to the brute. We bring you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at
[1:33] times provoke. This is In Our Defense. Hello and welcome to the thirteenth
[1:42] episode of In Our Defense. How are you shift good? How is your
[1:45] week? It's been a rough week with everything that's been happening, but always
[1:49] time for In our Defense because clearly that's something that everyone's talking about progressively choosing
[1:56] more controversial topics. Actually, our clip from the from a couple of episodes
[2:00] ago about the fighter pilot controversy between naval fighter pilots and Air Force fider pilots
[2:06] are still going well, but it's still it's still being over. Yeah,
[2:08] yeah, it's on all the groups and you know, actually it was a
[2:12] reminder of it this week that I think we forgot one class of pilots to
[2:15] talk about. Test fighter pilots, four of whom have been announced as India's
[2:20] astronauts that will be part of the Gaganyan mission. And I'm guessing test fighter
[2:23] piloting is a completely different vall game altogether because you literally take the aircraft too.
[2:29] It's you know, limit. Oh absolutely, test pilots are you know,
[2:32] they're the cream of the crop and very few become test pilots. These
[2:38] are basically the guys who have been judged uh, you know, capable enough
[2:42] to be able to take aircraft beyond their means, to their absolute limits of
[2:46] their performance capabilities, which which is usually a very dangerous thing in terms of
[2:52] speed, in terms of g forces, in terms of uh, you know,
[2:55] turn rate, the altitude at which they fly at certain speeds. So
[3:00] these are these are the absolute the upper layer of the flying force that have
[3:05] been chosen for the Yeah, right, amazing team. Yeah, so what
[3:08] do we talk about this week? We'll talk about the Mumbai attacks twenty six
[3:13] eleven. A few comments on our last episode I think from our listeners and
[3:17] viewers actually wanted to ask to kind of, you know, talk about that
[3:20] operation, etcet cetera. And I thought it was a good topic because the
[3:23] way I see it. I see the Mumae attacks as sort of the Cargile
[3:27] movement for India's internal security. What Cargil did to in India's military apparatus,
[3:31] the setup that protects borders against Pakistan, China or any other foreign threat.
[3:38] That sort of that's what the Mumbai attacks did for the internal setup. But
[3:42] that it's the police, whether it's the NSG, whether it's you know,
[3:44] the intelligence agencies, intelligence sharing, et cetera, et cetera. Uh.
[3:49] Compared to Cargil, I think, and this is where you know you'll come
[3:52] in, But we'll come to that a bit later. I'll just give our
[3:53] listeners of viewers a beef over you what we'll target. Compared to Cargil,
[3:58] I think, as far whereas India's internal changes are concerned with respect to what
[4:02] happened post Mumbai attacks, it's much more visible. You know, for example,
[4:08] if you were to just like good for something tangible, the cops these
[4:11] days are visibly fitter, They carry visibly you know, modern looking weapons.
[4:16] The NSG back then, if you see it did not look like you know,
[4:19] your supreme force. The helmets were actually I think twenty years old and
[4:25] they seemed very the uniforms weren't in place, et cetera, et cetera.
[4:28] But now if you see the energy when it goes for its training, it
[4:30] seems are very modern, high tech fourth et cetera. I'm not sure if
[4:34] it's just visible cosmetic changes of or things have actually changed on the ground,
[4:39] But like I said, we'll get to that a bit later. First,
[4:41] I want to actually talk about the three days you were there on ground.
[4:44] Just before we began recording, were telling me that this was your I think,
[4:46] first year into television reporting and around five six years into reporting in general.
[4:50] Take us through it, you know. I remember I was what in
[4:54] Bombay is called junior college, which I think most of India doesn't understand.
[4:58] It's basically eleventh and twelve call it junior college. I don't know why school
[5:00] basically, but I think I was in an outing to somewhere north of Bombay.
[5:05] I forgot where it was, near Wapi or somewhere in Gujarat. It
[5:10] was on my way back on that Ray night when that attacks happened and I
[5:13] got a frantic call for appearancy. Where you guys, I sit on the
[5:15] bus. We just kind of nearing home, et cetera, And they told
[5:18] me that some sort of shoot or had happened in Kolaba, and the first
[5:23] reports were it was a gang war between nou Deebrahim and I think short short
[5:28] Jan Yes. But then, of course the next three days all of us
[5:30] were glued to television sets watching it live on TV and you were on other
[5:34] reporters were there, so tell us what was it like for you when we
[5:39] would dispatch? Were you already in Bombay? So I arrived there on the
[5:42] twenty sixth night, the evening of twenty sixth, which means I was among
[5:45] the first to you know, reach there from Delhi. Of course, the
[5:47] Mumbai reporters were already on site. They'd been reporting it for a few hours,
[5:51] and like everyone else who was there, the initial the initial impression was
[5:58] that it was a gangland shootout, you know, between either D Company or
[6:01] any of the other many and you know this well, they've and I'm sure
[6:04] we'll do an episode on this as well, the gangsters of Mumbai. Yes,
[6:08] but you know that that initial misconception that this was a bunch of gangsters
[6:13] firing at each other evaporated pretty quickly, I think for a couple of hours.
[6:16] It was that. In fact, when I got the first call from
[6:18] office, it was that, you know, beyond standby because there's been a
[6:21] big shooting in Mumbai. And once it was clear that it was not a
[6:27] gangster shooting but something much much bigger, that's when I dashed down immediately.
[6:31] So I was there on the on the night, on the night of the
[6:34] evening that it began, and I was stationed right outside the Trident Oberoi on
[6:39] Marine Drive, where I'll never forget. I'll never forget that first impression.
[6:44] If I could just tell you about that, I'd pulled in, you know,
[6:46] in a taxi. Of course, there was like a huge, massive
[6:50] crowd of vehicles already there Obi vans. We used to do Obi vans plentifully
[6:55] in those days. There were fire engines, there were lots of cops,
[6:59] huge crowd of journalists obviously, and all my first I remember the first sound
[7:05] that I heard from the distance seeing the Trident Hotel, you know, was
[7:11] the clatter of AK forty seven, you know, the sound of the rifles
[7:15] echoing from inside the hotel was the first sound everyone could hear. And I
[7:18] think most journalists who reported on it, you know, just sort of got
[7:23] used to that sound because for three days, you know, the time was
[7:26] just punctuated by the sound of kalashnikov fire coming in from inside the hotel.
[7:30] And that's how hectic things really were. But I think, I think,
[7:34] and we'll come to the you know, the aftermath and you know, the
[7:36] lessons learned a little later. But it took a long time for the system
[7:41] to kick in, yes, and that was apparent on the ground. There
[7:44] was a great deal of chaos on the ground. You know, you had
[7:46] policemen and walkie talkies talking to each other. You had the Fire Service personnel
[7:51] with fire engines, you know, landing up and in some places blocking the
[7:55] path of you know, more capable forces who should have been rushed in a
[7:59] little earlier. There was a great deal of you know, confusion on the
[8:03] ground over over jurisdiction and what really to do. And this was actually an
[8:07] initial surprise. Of course, this surprise and shock would dramatically increase over the
[8:11] next few hours and days, but that initial impression that you know, a
[8:16] country or a city like Mumbai had been caught completely off guard. You know,
[8:20] the word the word off guard has become a cliche. But for me
[8:24] being caught off guard, you know, was a What happened that night was
[8:28] a textbook definition of that. There was no protocol, there was no literally
[8:35] nobody knew what to do next, nobody knew which person to call. Everyone
[8:39] was talking to each other figuring out, you know, okay, what do
[8:43] we do now? These guys are inside the hotel, so what next?
[8:46] Then? Obviously someone had the idea of calling in the NSG. As always
[8:50] the NSG, you know, as a result of a you know, a
[8:52] criminal lack of planning. The NSG was too far away. Then someone realized
[8:58] that the Marine commandos happened to be by in Mumbai. But the Marine Commandos
[9:01] were not, you know, fully ready for this kind of thing. So
[9:05] so that that particular night for me always and I have many photographs that I
[9:09] took, you know, from that night. I happened to have a brand
[9:13] new DSLR camera which I used to the fullest that night, and I have
[9:16] all those photographs and even now when I look at those photographs, I can
[9:20] tell you most of it is just images of personnel and people. There was
[9:24] there was zero sanitization. You had huge crowds of the public just standing around
[9:30] right outside the hotel, So it wasn't even like there was a you know,
[9:33] a cordon or a barrier. A few hours later, you know,
[9:37] someone wisely decided maybe we should sanitize the area and put up some barricades push
[9:41] the journalists back. So the you know, the lineup of journalists cameras became
[9:46] a kind of became a kind of artificial barrier around the hotel. It was
[9:52] insane. It was you know, when you look at it now, it's
[9:54] been sixteen years, but when you revisit that site now, it would be
[9:58] like a it would be like a security studies example of how not to handle
[10:07] a situation of that kind. And since you brought up the example of Cargill,
[10:11] absolutely, in many ways for me, this was worse than Gargill because
[10:15] this was you know, Cargill and the infiltrations happened in a kind of isolated
[10:20] landscape, you know, in the northern parts of Jamu and Kashmir. This
[10:24] was Mumbai. This was your this was your financial nerve center. You know,
[10:30] it had no business not being defended. This was a city that had
[10:33] been brought to its knees by terrorists, you know, at least twice in
[10:37] the past, including in nineteen ninety three, So there was no question of
[10:41] Mumbai having not learned its lessons or being unprepared for this kind of thing.
[10:46] So this was a you know, and sadly I'm I'll say this right at
[10:50] the start that you know, not enough people have paid the price of their
[10:54] negligence, their criminal apathy, their complete lack of force, that something like
[11:01] this was definitely waiting in the wings to happen. Mumbai was practically an invitation
[11:07] to the last caret. In my view, it's a good point you made.
[11:09] You know, when I was researching for this episode, I actually could
[11:13] not figure out how to structure the episode because the sheer mess I saw in
[11:16] front of me for those three days, you know, to illustrate what she
[11:18] was saying. Uh. There were also rivalries within Mumbey Police's stop officers.
[11:24] You know, I don't know, I don't know how much people know about
[11:26] this, but the Commission of Police was Hasenkafur. One of his top uh
[11:31] subordinates was Rakeish Maria, who was sent to the Mumba Police control room.
[11:35] There was the ATS chief Hyman Kark who was unfortunately shot dead by the terrorist.
[11:39] There's lots of controversy about his his death that why was he not wearing
[11:43] a bulletproof jacket or I think he was in It was substantar et cetera,
[11:46] et cetera. Like you said, the Marcos were initially called and I and
[11:48] I remember that press conference, by the way, the last mass press press
[11:52] con initial yea a few in the finitial few hours. But you know something
[11:56] struck me that you said right now that you reach there on the night of
[12:01] the evening. It happened the energy reached the nay before the early morning,
[12:05] I think, which is just like shocking. Like the reporter over there just
[12:07] dashes from his office in Deli reaches UH reaches, goes to Trentent the energy,
[12:13] which is not far away from Delhi. It's a man I think around
[12:16] thirty fortys from here. Yet they take around good six ten hours to reach
[12:20] reach the spot, which just tells you the shear, the sheer lack of
[12:24] planning, like you said, that was in play during during the Mumbai attacks.
[12:28] But then somehow we got UH we as in the energy got its act
[12:31] together. There was some some heroic efforts by the commandos. We lost two
[12:37] of them from the energy. There was major snutrition Uh and hol the Naresh
[12:43] if it got the name right now. Yeah, there was also the famous
[12:46] Mumba kop To Karamumble who lost his life during the attach capturing. Yes,
[12:54] because of which we were able to, you know, finally decipher the whole
[12:58] planning, Pakistani planning behind it. We also had managed to intercept communication between
[13:01] the terrorists and the handlers back then, back back in Pakistan, which kind
[13:05] of reminded me of Kargil because if I remember correctly doing Kargil also, I
[13:09] think the agencies had managed to intercept a communication between Pars Musharraf, who was
[13:13] then in Beijing, and one of his top generals back in Pakistan to substantiate
[13:18] this was actually a Pakistani operation. So take us through the sort of kind
[13:24] of order that prevailed the day after. I think the initial twelve bars were
[13:26] a complete mess, like you've described to us when you were there on ground.
[13:30] Uh. But then what happened the next two days that we finally managed
[13:33] a plas a terrorist out see. Yeah, So the best way to understand
[13:37] Mumbai twenty six eleven right off the bat day is to not treat it as
[13:41] a terrorist attack. This was this was a military style special forces, you
[13:46] know, deep penetration assault. These guys ajm Amirkasab and the other nine terrorists,
[13:52] they were not you know, when we call them terrorists, we think
[13:56] of them as you know, jihadis and stuff. These were These were special
[14:01] forces commanders. These were men who were trained by the Pakistan military to be
[14:05] soldiers. They were you know, they were military style. Uh. You
[14:09] know, there's no difference between UH, these men and UH special forces of
[14:15] either India and Pakistan, apart from the fact that these men were there to
[14:18] kill innocent people. Okay, there's no difference in terms of capability, in
[14:22] terms of how they were able to improvise, in terms of how they were
[14:26] able to you know, use what was in front of them to you know,
[14:30] meet their military objectives. So this was a you know, I I
[14:33] have always been an advocate of not calling this, uh, you know,
[14:37] a terrorist attack because in many ways that led Pakistan off the hook. This
[14:43] was a Pakistani military attack on India. These men were soldiers of the Pakistan
[14:48] military. Yes, of course, they were lash care Taiba and all the
[14:50] rest of it. They were not you know, they were not enlisted or
[14:54] commissioned men. As far as the Pakistani forge were concerned, but for all
[14:58] practical purposes they were the pakis Don special Forces. And the other method that
[15:03] I always you know, advocate and I forced people to employ. To understand
[15:09] twenty six eleven is to also remember that what these ten men achieved, Okay,
[15:13] let's put emotions aside for a moment, was a deeply successful mission.
[15:18] They achieved what they needed to achieve. This was a country, and this
[15:22] was a terrorist force and a military in Pakistan that was looking at Mumbai.
[15:26] It was looking at the city, you know. It conducted through David Coleman
[15:30] Hedley and all the rest of the apparatus that they had. It found all
[15:35] the cracks that India had. It knew that there were divisions within the Mumbai
[15:39] Police. It knew that they were competing interests. It knew that the Marine
[15:43] Police was nowhere to be seen. It knew that the Coast Guard had no
[15:46] real surveillance capability to speak of. It knew that there was a turf war
[15:50] between the Coast Guard and the Navy that could be manipulated. It knew that
[15:54] the you know, the political leadership of the time was you know, perhaps
[15:58] didn't play an emphasis on you know, closed security. Now, conventional security
[16:03] in the mountains, et cetera, yes, but closed security for your cities,
[16:07] et cetera. Was was was like a sleeping dog. So you know,
[16:10] why why disturb it? So? Uh, the the sense of chaos
[16:14] that was a parent right off the bat on that day, Uh, you
[16:18] know, basically basically put a tick mark on all of these things. It
[16:22] it kind of did a pole hole on everything, everything that had been done
[16:26] wrong by India as far as protecting. Uh, you know, a high
[16:30] value center like Mumbai was exposed in a matter of two or three hours.
[16:34] Let's come to the next day. Now. Uh. Now granted that,
[16:38] you know, me moving from Delhi to Mumbai is a far easier task than
[16:42] you know, a commando force moving from money. So you know, I'll
[16:45] grant them that it takes time for them to move, et cetera. But
[16:49] the fact is, nobody had even nobody had even thought of the NSG as
[16:55] a you know, an anti hijack anti uh. You know, a rapid
[16:59] reaction counter terror force, you know, should have a kind of distributed presence
[17:03] in the country precisely for this kind of scenario be able to you know,
[17:08] have lightning quick reactions right off the bat to be able to do something like
[17:11] this. Even when it comes to the Marcos Marine commandos, you know,
[17:15] why should it only be the NSC. The marine commandos are also uh you
[17:19] know, uh, you know, a storming, storming force. These are
[17:23] the guys trained to storm ships like they're doing right now. So well,
[17:26] uh, why can't they Why couldn't they have been employed to do uh,
[17:32] you know, storm these buildings and drive out these terrorists. Uh, simply
[17:36] because they were there were you know, there were turfs, there were jurisdictions.
[17:40] Can the Marcos do this? My sense is, you know, in
[17:42] a country under attack, you use what is necessary. In Mumbai, you
[17:48] don't have the NSG anywhere nearby, And I, as a defense correspondent,
[17:51] was wondering your entire you know, your huge Marcos force is here. Didn't
[17:56] anyone think of war gaming a situation where the Marcos are the first responders for
[18:02] a situation of this kind. You've got amazing trained commandos sitting in Kolaba,
[18:07] in Kolaba, not in Navii, Mumbai, not in Aliba, not somewhere
[18:11] else. Right there in damn Kolaba. They're sitting there. That's their training
[18:15] area and nothing happens until the next day. And what is the priority for
[18:19] these guys? They hold a press conference. For God's sake, they're holding
[18:23] a press conference with their masks. Whose idea was it to hold a press
[18:26] conference? When I saw that press conference, I was thinking, what are
[18:30] you guys doing here sitting and addressing journalists. You should be out there.
[18:33] The operation is still on, you know. So there was this sense of
[18:37] shock and dismay even on day two day, because even by then things had
[18:42] not really kicked into action. And obviously by then, you know, the
[18:48] balloon had gone up as far as the political system was concerned, and they
[18:51] realized that, you know, holy hell, this is not some small thing.
[18:55] This is huge. You know. By this time, Vejai Salaskar,
[19:00] him and kark Ashok Camte and many others were were already dead. Tukara Momble
[19:06] would die the next day. Uh to two days later that operation would take
[19:10] place. Uh and uh then you had the NSC finally arrive, and I
[19:15] happened to be you know, there was almost a kind of celebratory atmosphere when
[19:18] bus loads of NSG guys rolled into Nariman House. So I was, you
[19:22] know, Mumbai, well, you're a mom by boy, so you know
[19:26] that all these places were practically within a short jog of each other. You
[19:30] had you had the Taj, you had the Trident Oberoi, and you had
[19:33] Nariman House, the Kabard House where the three hostage sites that had taken place.
[19:38] So I had started at the Trident, and then I'd moved to the
[19:41] Taj, and then the next evening I was at Nariman House and still not
[19:45] gone to hotel, still not slept. By the way, were twenty four
[19:48] hours on the road covering the story, and we see these two buses.
[19:52] Me and Gorosavans were there, by the way, many other India Day reporters
[19:56] were also. The Abishek Bala who used to do in our defense was also
[19:59] there. And we see these two bus loads of energy guys, uh,
[20:03] you know, just roll into that little lane leading up to Nariman House and
[20:07] there was like a public sort of celebration. The operation is still on.
[20:11] You can hear you can hear rifle clatter, there are grenades being thrown towards
[20:17] each other. But the energy guys have finally arrived and there was a sense
[20:19] that ah, you know, Commando Loga and you know, and then of
[20:23] course, it took a while for it to get over the next day there
[20:26] was that infamous helicopter you know helicopter thing, which I'll talk about in a
[20:30] bit. And yeah, so so even day two was you know, a
[20:34] certain sense of response ordered did kick in, but it was forced by you
[20:40] know, a terribly wasteful first twenty four hours when when I imagine most of
[20:44] the damage was already done. You know, by then maybe one hundred people
[20:48] had already been killed and all all through this chaos, the handlers, as
[20:52] we would later see from Pakistan, were monitoring everything. They had a beautiful,
[20:57] high definition kind of sense of everything that was going on in real time.
[21:03] So that was that was you know what the real problem was. It
[21:06] was it was not until maybe day three or day four that finally each man
[21:11] and woman on the ground knew what they were doing, knew what they had
[21:14] to do, right, uh, looking a bit not I wouldn't say lessons
[21:18] learned from the from from from the attack, but how have things changed compared
[21:23] to where we were in the initial few hours, initial initial couple of days
[21:29] of the attack in terms of everything, And you know, like I said
[21:32] at the beginning of this episode, this This is a very broad ended topic
[21:36] the Mumae attacks because everything failed at every level, so there was the lack
[21:38] of coordination, you know. Our one of our former colleagues written a book
[21:44] about this in which he recounts this one episode that is just that just infuriates
[21:48] me is that apparently the energy guys had suited up and cleared up at the
[21:52] Mumbai Airport not to waste time, and they were taken to the various various
[21:56] attack centers in buses, in best buses, Mombi Ziconic red buses. So
[22:00] they had left their harsacks back at the airport, which had food supplies for
[22:03] them. They were supposed to be transported by the police to the respective site
[22:07] so that they could then be you know, consumed by them. Apparently someone
[22:10] forgot about that and these guys had to salvage fruits and drinking water from the
[22:15] Taj Hotel as they were carrying out the operation, which just strikes me as
[22:18] idiotic at the next level, I mean, how does that happen that the
[22:22] prime commander force it is trying to liberate your city from the grips of terrorists,
[22:26] does not even have their own food with them, So anyway, that's
[22:29] that's an aside. But yeah, so the lack of coordination, the lack
[22:33] of the bureaucratic brigamole that you know, no one was taking a decision,
[22:38] and the weaponry. You know, you have those famous visuals of the Shivaji
[22:42] Terminus building where Asmulkasa was there firing at the commuters and you had I think
[22:47] two cops with bold Tax rifles hiding behind a plastic chair, not able to
[22:52] take him on simply because you know they had bold Tax point zero three or
[22:55] three rifles and he had an AK forty seven. So, like I said
[22:59] at the beginning of this, there have been some visible changes. You've had
[23:02] a lot of heavy duty weaponry been given to the Mumbay Police. They had
[23:04] some boats also been given to them. You've had then, as you also,
[23:07] I think changes the equipment, et cetera. That's one aspect, the
[23:11] weaponry attacked earth, et cetera. And the coordination of different agency where that
[23:15] it's the intelligence agency, et cetera. How has that changed in the last
[23:18] fifteen years. So you know you're right when you say that, you know
[23:21] the the changes from post Cargill visibly post twenty six eleven the latter is much
[23:27] more visible. The visibility of those changes is more, like you said,
[23:30] uh, you know, there are more sensors. There are armored cars,
[23:33] for example in Mumbai, you can see the Mahindra armored cars with the police
[23:37] and the anti terror you know, anti terra services you've got, You've got,
[23:44] you know, much better weaponry for both the NSC and the Mumbai Police.
[23:47] You've got a better, you know, better optimization of the marine police.
[23:52] A most crucial thing that a lot of people miss is there is a
[23:56] very clear separation of duties, separation of responsibilities, both in terms of area
[24:00] and in terms of capability between your Marine Police, Navy Coast Guard, you
[24:06] know, the Mumbai Police personnel who are on the coast themselves, not at
[24:11] sea. Equipment has vastly improved, you know. But like but like almost
[24:17] everything in India, and we've seen a fine example of that post the Chinese
[24:21] standoff in eastern Ladakh. Is we react to everything there is, you know,
[24:26] the culture of being proactive to prevent something like this, you know,
[24:30] simply doesn't exist in this country. And I'm going to get a lot of
[24:33] brick paths for saying this. But whether it is our security culture, whether
[24:37] it is our military culture, whether it is our you know, national security
[24:41] culture, working to train, working to wargame, you know, working towards
[24:48] a worst case scenario. Absolute worst case scenario simply doesn't exist in our blood.
[24:52] It doesn't exist in our military culture. We are reactive. Someone will
[24:56] invade, then you'll attack them. Someone will infiltrate, then you'll attack them.
[25:00] Someone will hit your city, then you'll change all your systems. You
[25:02] know, our country's history, sadly is replete with that. I can say
[25:07] that in terms of culture, certain things are changing because we are a country
[25:11] that is constantly in conflict, whether it is naxialism, whether it is internal
[25:15] terror, whether it is external terror, whether it is external threats from China
[25:19] and Pakistan. But to be able to one of the examples that is commonly
[25:25] cited day when you've read this extensively, when it comes to twenty six eleven
[25:29] and India's you know, lack of preparedness and how you know, so many
[25:33] things that do fail simultaneously for such an attack to happen. You know,
[25:36] people usually take the example of Israel. The irony now is nobody can any
[25:41] longer take the example of Israel, because Israel got twenty six eleven in the
[25:45] worst possible way, you know, on October the seventh last year. You
[25:48] know, all of those things and this is the way the world works,
[25:52] all of those things that made Israel this shining example of alertness and way awareness,
[26:00] and you know, it's absolute impregnable. You know the nature of how
[26:07] Israel is so impregnable, and how none of Israel's enemies can move without the
[26:11] Mozart knowing about it lying in pieces, It's lying in tatters now in Israel
[26:15] will spend the next five generations recovering that reputation, if it does at all.
[26:19] So you know, anybody taking Israel's example now sadly, you know,
[26:23] can't take that example anymore because what happened on October the seventh is very much,
[26:29] very much like what happened on twenty six eleven, but far worse.
[26:33] Because Israel had that reputation of preparing for the worst. It's already a country
[26:37] that you know, invests so much in defense and national security, so they're
[26:41] twenty six eleven or October seven is far worse than ours. The problem with
[26:45] twenty six eleven here in India is you had all these visible changes, you
[26:49] know, better subsurface patrolling, all kinds of censors, greater coordination between the
[26:56] services, etc. But you know, weaponry and stuff is only going to
[27:00] get you so far. Ultimately, it's going to be about preparedness, and
[27:03] preparedness comes from logistics, It comes from training, it comes from it comes
[27:07] from the drudgery of constant, constant wargaming and exercising your forces. You know,
[27:15] you have to you have to sweat in peace so you don't bleed in
[27:21] war. Is you know, is a great cliche that we hear very often,
[27:23] but it is so true. You have to train for the worst possible
[27:27] scenario. And the what infuriates me and has infuriated security personnel you know everywhere,
[27:34] is that. How is it possible that India hadn't wargamed something as obvious
[27:41] as Mumbai being attacked from the city, You know, how is it possible
[27:45] that this was not wargamed? You had Marcos there, You've got the NST,
[27:48] You've got the Marine police. How is it possible that there was no
[27:52] blueprint for this kind of thing. It's not like Mumbai was some you know,
[27:56] random obscure city in the desert. It's your financial nerve center. It
[28:00] is obvious that they're going to try and attack it. It's obvious that they're
[28:03] going to try and paralyze it, because attacking Mumbai doesn't just mean killing people.
[28:07] It means it's going to have an economic kind of tremors across the country.
[28:12] And this had simply not been done. So and you know, one
[28:17] government can be blamed about it. It's a it's the political system that has
[28:21] failed. The entire system failed on twenty six eleven in my view. So
[28:25] you know, you can buy you can buy drones, you can you can
[28:29] kid yourself into thinking, oh now I have satellite maps and nobody can do
[28:33] anything to me. But I'm telling you right now, and I'm I'm and
[28:37] I'm saying this very very you know, with a sense of responsibility as well.
[28:41] Another twenty six eleven can happen. It most definitely can happen. It's
[28:47] a question of your enemies who are sleepless training every day, training every day
[28:52] to find out where your cracks are. All they do all that Pakistan and
[28:56] its forces probably are doing right now. They obviously pray op if I do
[29:00] other things. But we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking that China and Pakistan aren't
[29:03] simply waiting to figure out where your cracks are. See if those cracks are
[29:07] consistent, See how unaware you are about those gaps, and then to deploy
[29:12] forces to manipulate those cracks and make you bleed for it. So another twenty
[29:17] six eleven? Can it happen? One hundred percent? It can happen.
[29:19] It can one hundred percent happen If you don't infuse in your country a culture
[29:25] of the worst will happen. Unless I keep training for it, it will
[29:30] happen. That's quite a solid point you made. I think there. We
[29:33] will move now to Obviously this was going to be out of this episode,
[29:38] the politically loaded topic of what India did after twenty six eleven. But we'll
[29:44] do that after a quick break. Pany pany Pani namatay oopen the jogi,
[29:53] so beautiful, so elegant, just looking like a wow eh, Bengon.
[30:00] Was that enough crunch for you? Because this cringe fest doesn't stop here.
[30:04] Yes, And if by watching such reals and viral videos you think your life
[30:08] is becoming moemo, then I cost them and me Anna will bring the most
[30:15] puke worthy, nauseating and repulsive trends on social media and well maybe enact some
[30:22] of them, but most of all discuss and seriously dissect these trends. So
[30:26] get ready to laugh, cringe and question humanity. Dropping soon on Spotify,
[30:32] Apple Podcasts and wherever you get your cringe, I mean audio entertainment from So
[30:38] let's talk cringe. Welcome back, Shave and I are revisiting the twenty six
[30:48] eleven attacks of Mumbai. We've spent the first half of this of this episode
[30:52] talking about everything that went wrong, what has been kind of done in the
[30:57] aftermath to fix things. It was not convinced that we still have fixed things.
[31:02] Also come back to that later as we end this episode. For a
[31:06] quick small point that I want to talk to you about. But let's move
[31:08] to the very big political hot topic of why India did not react twenty six
[31:15] eleven. There's no two ways to go about it. You have to mention
[31:18] the parties in power. It was a upa government. You have the Indie
[31:22] government right now. The Indie government itself says that, you know, after
[31:26] the Wodi attacks, we did surgical strikes. What did you do during the
[31:30] Mumbaer attacks, after the the after Thelma attack, we launched air strikes into
[31:36] Pakistan and Balacourt. What did you do after the twenty six eleven attacks.
[31:40] I want your thoughts on whether it was just a matter of fill power,
[31:44] because the way I see it, there was also you also have to think
[31:48] about the geopolitical situation back then. This was a time when the US was
[31:52] heavily invested in Pakistan because its operations in Afghanistan were very much alive twenty sixteen,
[32:00] twenty nineteen, during the during the Uri attack and the and the Puma
[32:04] attack, you had the US kind of getting frustrated with Pakistan and on the
[32:08] words of pulling out from Afghanistan. So for the US, the Pakistan was
[32:12] no longer a key stategic acid, which was not the case in two thousand
[32:15] and eight. I've also read somewhere I forget where, but I've also read
[32:20] that the intelligence agencies back then Raw especially had said that they don't have assets
[32:23] on the ground in Pakistan to help support any kind of attack, whether it's
[32:28] over to covert, whether it's you know, convention in terms of of a
[32:30] military attack, or whether it's an air stroik or sort of a covert operation.
[32:35] I think the Cold start doctrine that the Indian Army has supposed to have
[32:38] after Operation Parakhraam was still also in formation of formation something. But basically the
[32:44] military also was not very confident. You can confirm deny this, but this
[32:47] is what I've read, Mota mota. The military also was not very confident
[32:51] of launching an immediate attack on Pakistan. The Air force i think, had
[32:54] said that, you know, we may be able to range some targets over
[32:59] there, but again the or the IB had said that, again, we
[33:00] don't have someone to help you on the ground like we did during the Barlacode
[33:04] strike, which ship has written a bodern this book, that we hadn't had
[33:07] someone over there who could you know, pinpoint where to lodge those attacks.
[33:10] So tell us about this picture. Is it just a matter of that,
[33:14] you know, in di did not have the will power, the government of
[33:15] that they did not have the willpower, or also was it that the geoparty
[33:19] situation did not support such such a counter offensive and the strategic assets of India
[33:25] at that time but not in place, which also was then a big failing
[33:29] for us. You know, I'm very glad you asked this question there because
[33:31] this is an annual viral moment. You know, as far as the willpower
[33:36] question is concerned, that in twenty six eleven, post twenty six eleven,
[33:38] India did not did not show willpower under the UPA government, and post you
[33:45] know, post Pulama, India showed similar and post Pulama and Uri, et
[33:49] cetera, there was willpower shown. Now, those two things are, on
[33:52] the face of it, factually correct, but like you rightly pointed out,
[33:57] it's not that simple. It's it's far more complicated than that. An air
[34:00] strike, punitive strikes, you know, retaliatory action are not video game decisions.
[34:07] These are real world decisions. So it's easy to say there was no
[34:10] willpower in one and there was willpower in the other. But it's not that
[34:14] simple. So and allow me to clarify on this one. Post twenty six
[34:17] eleven, like you rightly pointed out, not only were there geopolitical risks of
[34:22] a retaliation owing to the United States and Pakistan, and there was huge pressure
[34:28] from the United States on India at this point of time to not strike because
[34:32] with over one hundred and sixty people dead, you know, the world,
[34:37] no country in the world would have blinked. And I if India had hit
[34:40] back at Pakistan. You know, the the India had the you know,
[34:46] the moral upper ground, it had the security upper ground, it had the
[34:51] emotional heft of the world. This was a grieving country that had been struck
[34:54] for no fault of its own, unprovoked, et cetera. You know,
[34:59] in its city, the innocence had been killed. So no country on Earth
[35:04] would have, you know, lifted a finger if India had conducted retaliatory attacks.
[35:08] So everything was on India's side at that time, and yet it didn't
[35:13] happen. And that's principally in my view, for two or three reasons.
[35:16] One of them obviously American pressure, not something too simply dismissed, because America
[35:22] was an emerging ally of India as well at this time, and that United
[35:27] States had its own geopolitical interests in Pakistan, in the f Pak region.
[35:31] You know, one can you know, it's easy for one to say,
[35:35] oh, but this is our country, we should have taken our own decision.
[35:37] Doesn't work like that in international relations. That's number one. Number two,
[35:42] you had a very decisive air force chief at that time, you know,
[35:45] ironically, the only air force chief who was not a fighter pilot,
[35:49] Air Chief Marshall Fali Hoomi major helicopter pilot with Chakra great Man retired lives in
[35:54] Bengaluru now and his interview to me in twenty nineteen post the Balakot strikes at
[36:00] the Indire Day Conclave goes viral every single year on the twenty six to eleven
[36:04] anniversary, saying see what he said? What he basically told me was he
[36:07] said something very simple. He said, look, willpower has been shown this
[36:12] time. Political decisiveness was shown post you know in the Ballacote air strikes,
[36:17] which was not there at that time. Now, he didn't say it in
[36:21] a rude way. He wasn't saying, oh the mon moonsiing government was not
[36:23] politically decisive. He wasn't saying it like that. What he was basically indicating
[36:28] is that there was a prevarication. There were there were there were many considerations
[36:32] that came on to the table and there was a lack of clarity over whether
[36:37] a punitive strike was the right thing to do. You know, would it
[36:39] would it trigger a full scale war between the two sides, et cetera.
[36:44] You know, which were which were concerns which were later kind of exposed after
[36:49] the Ballacote strikes. But not only were their geopolitical concerns, Dave, but
[36:54] there were also there were also logistical issues. Like you pointed out, they
[37:00] were not adequate assets on the ground, according to Sandy, and this is
[37:04] truly appalling in my view if this is true. But Sandayan says that when
[37:07] the target lists were provided, you know, by the Indian intelligence agencies,
[37:14] it was found that some of those targets were actually on Indian territory. Wow,
[37:16] you know, and this this is a this is a this is a
[37:20] scandalous thing. Nobody's written about it. But Sandayan, is one of India's
[37:23] most respected and credible journalists, said this way recently at a lidfest and I
[37:28] heard him say it. So you know, if if, if that could
[37:30] be the case, then then your then your system is not ready for this
[37:35] kind of thing. Then you know, the credibility of all your target packages,
[37:37] et cetera is called into questions. So you had a situation where you
[37:43] had a decisive air chief, a decisive air force saying you give me the
[37:46] targets and it's my job to go and do it. I'm fully ready,
[37:50] I've got bombs, I've got pilots, I've got planes, and we've got
[37:53] the training and the skill because this is all we do. We wargame for
[37:55] this all the time. So give me the word and I'll fly my boys
[37:59] in and we'll get this. There were no female fighter pilots at that time.
[38:01] That's why I said boys, just to clarify, so now it would
[38:05] be boys angles, right, Okay, So so it was a confused system,
[38:12] a ready force, no credible or not enough let me say, credible
[38:17] intelligence or targets, assets on the ground didn't exist, and this overwhelming shadow
[38:22] of geopolitical force on you from the outside in the form of you know,
[38:27] the United States. And that's the decision. That's the reason why that decision
[38:30] wasn't taken. Can we can paint that as lack of will power? We
[38:35] can paint that as cowardice. We'll leave that to the politicians and in our
[38:38] defense we talk about the security situation. Now, let's come to what happened
[38:43] a post uri in post twenty nineteen. Now many people make the mistake they've
[38:47] of saying, of thinking that happened, and immediately, you know, the
[38:52] governments at Cello strike them back, and you know, then Balakote happened.
[38:55] It's not like that. It doesn't work like that. This government had,
[38:59] you know, probably learned some lessons after twenty six eleven. Everyone learns lessons
[39:02] from each other. You know, we have to look at politics and security
[39:06] as a as a journey of continuity. You know, are we sitting here
[39:09] and thinking that the Modi government and the BJP did not learn political lessons from
[39:15] how the Monmancy government you know, was viewed after twenty six eleven, they
[39:19] must have learned that, Okay, you know, we need clarity post a
[39:22] terror attack. And starting twenty fourteen, and it's not like starting twenty fourteen,
[39:28] a certain there was a certain shift in india security posture where it was
[39:32] already decided at the National Security Council level that India would have total clarity post
[39:39] a terror attack and there would be punitive retaliatory action no matter what. And
[39:45] this government and this could be any government. You know, let's not make
[39:47] this about BJP Congress because it is not. And I am a firm believer
[39:51] in how national security must be above politics always. But this government had decided,
[39:55] perhaps learning lessons from earlier, that that it is in imperative for this
[40:00] country to have an absolutely unified and clear, you know, you know,
[40:07] an unambiguous response after a terror attack, a large scale terror attack of every
[40:10] kind. So when Uri happened, you had the surgical strikes, you had,
[40:15] you had the Uri strikes in the Lipa Valley, et cetera. After
[40:19] Pullma happened, you had Balacote, and the number of days between attack and
[40:23] response was like seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven days nothing,
[40:27] you know, very very small gap between that. What that tells you is
[40:30] that the system was ready for it. The system is already primed and ready
[40:35] for it. You know, nobody on Earth can sit here and say that
[40:37] after Pullara happened, then they decided concert target. They came by you know,
[40:43] Lao intelligence agent, Cophonekoke can't pay BOM, it doesn't work like that.
[40:49] They already have target package is a very very detailed target solutions that exist,
[40:55] just like Pakistan has on us, just like China has on us.
[40:59] We've got targets we you know, it's just a question of activating. Is
[41:02] target to activate? And like I've written in my book, Bahawalpur, Muzafarabad,
[41:07] you know, Chakoti and a couple of other places were existing targets,
[41:12] but the government had decided, no, we will not hit targets in uh
[41:15] p Ok, we will only hit targets in Pakistan. So Babalpur and uh
[41:21] and Balacote were the two you know, narrowed down targets and then they decided
[41:24] to do it. So h So, all I'm trying to say is that,
[41:29] uh, you know, willpower is the easy answer for this kind of
[41:31] thing, but I think learning lessons and creating a culture where you're going to
[41:37] create you you're going to set a precedent with that country. Uh is is
[41:42] is something to speak for and in both in the both the case of Uri
[41:45] as well as Balakote, it didn't trigger an all out war. So Pakistan's
[41:49] bluff was definitely called out. So I think that's that that that really is
[41:52] the reality of it. It's not about willpower versus lack of willpower. It
[41:57] was situations training for it and you know, being ready to deliver a clear
[42:01] response. That's an excellent answer, I think. And I think this should
[42:05] be you know, clipped separately, Anna and saved for posturity because whenever the
[42:09] annual viral moment happens, like Shift says, I think happened. Yeah,
[42:14] but people should really listen to this, this this clarity, the clear,
[42:17] clear cut answer that you've just given right now. And you know, I
[42:21] just thought of the other example. We should not forget that twenty fifteen strikes
[42:23] in manmar as well, which parts of the It is part of the same
[42:27] sort of you know, determination like you like you, like you said,
[42:30] uh, you know, like the one last ending thought as you bring this
[42:35] episode to a close, it's something that you mentioned just before the break,
[42:37] which I said it will circle back to about war giving an exercise something when
[42:40] I was, you know, looking at the Mumbai attacks overall, what struck
[42:45] me was if you look at certain things in isolation. So you look at
[42:47] the NSG operation isolation, you look at the capture of along the Coolaba Cousbay
[42:52] in isolation. You look at the fact that the intelligence agencies are who apparently
[42:58] had failed to give you intelligence before the attack, somehow managed to interserpt communications
[43:00] from the get go, like it happened also in Kargill, like they were
[43:05] accused of not being able to get information about the infiltrators climbing up the mountains
[43:09] during the winter season, but somehow they managed to intercept communications of the Pakistani
[43:14] army chiefs from China. From China, it's a big deal. So somehow
[43:16] you seem to get your act together in isolation. But when it's a larger
[43:21] picture, when you have your agencies involved together, that's when the picture kind
[43:23] of gets, you know, muddled up a bit. So do you think
[43:28] that the synergy at the higher levels between different forces, between civil and setup,
[43:31] military setup, et cetera, it obviously was a problem back then,
[43:36] is still a problem or has there a lot of progress been done on that.
[43:38] No, there's definitely been a lot of progress, you know, in
[43:42] terms of streamlining, in terms of optimizing. Optimizing is a word that you'll
[43:45] use see very often when it comes to you know, especially twenty six eleven.
[43:51] That has happened in a very big way logistically, you know, the
[43:54] manner in which our intelligence agencies are using tech and infusing that with our kind
[44:00] of sensor to shoot a loop response loop. It's much much smaller, much
[44:02] tighter, more efficient, more optimized now for sure. But the problem,
[44:07] once again circling back to my initial argument, Dave, is that it has
[44:09] been reactive. What is the point of all of this stuff coming together after
[44:14] the damage is done. What is the point of you know? And I
[44:17] produced a show and anchored a show called you know, the twenty six eleven
[44:22] Tapes, which is still there on YouTube right now, and it has all
[44:23] the audio communications between the terrorists and the and their handlers sitting in Karachi or
[44:29] whatever. And my sense is, so, wait a minute, we had
[44:32] these phone taps, but these phone taps came you know, came out much
[44:37] later. Were we not reacting to these phone taps? You know, what
[44:40] is the point? You know in the moment? Why was this? Why
[44:45] was this not actionable intelligence? Another word, another buzzword you'll hear very often,
[44:49] which is real time actionable data. There is a there was and still
[44:54] is a huge need to kind of throne down our agencies, you know,
[44:59] make them much more targeted, focused on specific things, you know, not
[45:02] doing the kind of wooly you know nonsense that many of our agencies, including
[45:07] the NTR, or including the IB and RAW you know, probably continue to
[45:10] do. They need to be they need to be murderously focused. You know,
[45:15] national security involves killing people. Let's be very clear about that. Okay.
[45:20] You know, we may we may be a country that wishes no harm
[45:22] on others. We may be a country that wishes no you know, has
[45:27] no territorial aspirations on anybody else's country. But these agencies have to and I'm
[45:34] sure they have now in many ways. But their their business is killing their
[45:38] business is killing India's enemies. Let's let's not be godly about this, okay.
[45:44] So they've got to be absolutely one hundred percent, you know, thinking
[45:50] like terrorists. They have to be thinking like you know, these people who
[45:53] want to harm us. So if it comes down to, you know,
[45:58] doing a dirty job to make sure that one hundred Indians are not killed in
[46:01] the next attack, bloody well do it. That's you've you've been mandated with
[46:07] precisely that kind of work. Getting your hands dirty is a necessary ingredient in
[46:12] this line of work, and that's how it's going to be done. So
[46:15] there's all these silly tough wars and you know Arabo satellite picture, ne a
[46:21] Amare Pass. That's you know, no Indian is going to accept that this
[46:24] is probably the last generation where that Chelta Hay attitude will will be allowed.
[46:29] The next generation that comes in, which will turn eighteen before the next election,
[46:31] they're going to say what nonsense. We don't want this rubbish. We
[46:35] want to We want to like a nice, peaceful country here. So so
[46:39] to answer your question, the focus of all these agencies making them smaller,
[46:44] making them tighter, you know, optimizing the use of technology, you know,
[46:50] making sure that not even the smallest penetration is acceptable. These are going
[46:53] to be imperatives going forward. And now, God help us, we're entering
[46:58] a paradigm of AI, deep fake and cyber attacks, of a kind of
[47:04] paradigm that you know is frankly terrifying to people even in the business. So
[47:09] so you know, if India is going to sort of sit back and say
[47:13] no, where the peace lovers and stuff? Then, like I said,
[47:15] to finish that thought, twenty six eleven is wharing to happen again. I
[47:19] think we'll end the episode on that point, on that cheerful point. Cheerful
[47:22] point, Yeah right, cheerful. So again, fantastic insights helps that you
[47:28] were there on ground. You know, you saw it happen in front of
[47:30] your eyes, and you know before the comment a keyboard warriors start, you
[47:35] know, you know, cursing us in the comments on YouTube or wherever.
[47:37] I'd just like to also briefly mention we won't need to discuss it. Briefly
[47:40] mentioned the media also had to learn lots from twenty six eleven, the media
[47:45] rightfully was accused of, you know, actually helping the handlers in Pakistan see
[47:49] live visuals of what is going on, not as though we had you know,
[47:52] cameras inside the hotel. But yeah, media persons were outside and it
[47:54] was basically a live steam which is from where I think media has now learned
[47:59] whenever there's a live operator, you would delay visuals. Yeah. So yeah,
[48:02] lots to learn for lots of agencies, including the media. Like Ship
[48:06] explained, you know, things have been signed kind of streamline. We have
[48:09] sort of gotteracked together. But unless you practice, practice, practice war game,
[48:15] like Schiff said, you know, you probably won't be able to prevent
[48:17] another six seven attack. And I hope it doesn't come to that. But
[48:21] like you said, cheerful point. Let's end that episode on that point.
[48:23] Thanks Shift once again as always, Thanks as always to our producer as well
[48:27] and Tadani. That's it for this week's defense to us for more tune in
[48:30] next week. Till then, stay safe and do not cross any boundaries that passport

Shows are listed from Apple Podcasts' charts and directory, and Podcast Index where it is used. Every show and episode belongs to its publisher and plays from the publisher's own feed; this site hosts none of them.
