# Decoding Present-Day Air Combat and How Air-to-Air Missiles are Gamechangers | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 20

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 18 Apr 2024, 51 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/59527767/18_apr_24_iod_18_april_mix_128.mp3

The Indian Air Force is preparing for a significant upgrade with the upcoming test of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)'s Astra Mark 2 air-to-air missile. This missile, capable of hitting targets up to 130 km away, is a game-changer for India's air combat capabilities. The DRDO has been developing these missiles since 2001 to engage distant targets effectively. In this episode, Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor discuss the importance of long-range missiles like Astra Mark 2 for modern air battles and why India needs them. They also reflect on the post-Balakot skirmish, which took place on 27 February 2019. India faced challenges in maintaining its position despite the Pakistan Air Force's (PAF) anticipated retaliation after the Balakot airstrike. The podcast analyses the dynamics of the skirmish and identifies the reasons that pinned India down. This and more in In Our Defence! Listen in! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound mix by Sachin Dwivedi

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts on February twenty seventh. You had your Sukhoys in
[0:08] the air, you had your Mirages in the air, you had your MiGs
[0:10] in the air. We've got a family of air to air missiles that could
[0:14] have been used. But those long range Amram shots being fired by F sixteen's
[0:20] pinned India down. And it's a shame because some might be a little alarmed
[0:23] that I'm saying this now. But the Air Chief of the day, a
[0:26] Chief Marshall bis Sanawaki himself said, don't you remember Dave when he said things
[0:30] would have been very different if the raphaile and the Meteor had been in service.
[0:33] What did he mean by that? What he meant was if we had
[0:36] that kind of reliable, long range missile, the effects of the Amram and
[0:40] the F sixteen would have been completely negated. I'm sure you've seen Top Gun,
[0:44] Maverick. Of course, it took the levels of great movie. Let
[0:47] me put a disclaimer here. I loved the movie, but that's also because
[0:50] I knew what to expect when I went to watch it, expecting to eat
[0:53] popcorn and enjoying myself, and I did pessa soon, but that last scene
[0:56] had me also cringing right with those Air eighteens, and I was like,
[1:00] what are these guys doing? Man? Hello and welcome to Another Defense,
[1:04] a weekly podcast on all things well defense where I they've go Swami, your
[1:10] host, along with senior journalist Shivar, break down the world of conflicts that
[1:15] range from the subtle to the brutal. We bring you nuances and perspectives that
[1:19] will inform and at times provoke. This is in our Defense. Hello and
[1:29] welcome to the twentieth episode of Another Defense. High shif. How are you
[1:32] all well? I hope very good? And now we're in the elections.
[1:36] Finally it's begun. You know this, elections always remind me about exams because
[1:42] the excruciating weight for exams is what wears everyone out. But once it begins,
[1:46] ends really quickly. So that's what I'm looking forward to. This cycle
[1:49] is going to take some while. I think there seven seven plays of seven
[1:53] months for polling before we get to results in our wonderful summer weather. Yeah,
[1:59] so that'll be fun and that's going to keep us occupied. But as
[2:01] usual, and you know, like we've said left, like Sheva said previously
[2:05] that you know our dedication to our podcast remains steadfast. We will yes,
[2:09] we will have as an episode come what made so this week? You know,
[2:15] what do you want to talk about? Do we want to talk?
[2:16] So we've talked about the future of air combat. We've talked about what a
[2:21] future war would look like. You know, do separate episodes one on the
[2:23] ANCA, sort of a futuristic airplane that India is currently developing, and one
[2:29] on the idea of modern war how it would be in maybe the next couple
[2:32] of decades. But when it comes to air combat, we haven't really focused
[2:37] on the present day what actually happens in a current modern conflict, especially considering
[2:44] that you have a raging conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the current digitel Palestine
[2:51] conflict that's going on, which is also seen a lot of air power being
[2:53] used. So we'll talk about the Russia ukrim are a bit because it's a
[2:57] very interesting question over there when it comes to air force and power I want
[3:00] to talk to you about. But in the Indian context, what we were
[3:04] to talk about is the idea of air to air missiles, the technology of
[3:09] air to air missiles rather and how the modern dog fight, the modern air
[3:15] combat is mostly beyond visual range. We have referred to this term previously one
[3:20] of our episodes when we discussed Balacote and the dog fight after that, which
[3:23] is also we will talk about briefly on this episode as well. Why are
[3:27] we talking about the Indian context? So the DRDO is planning to develop and
[3:31] tests. Sorry it's only a under development, but it's planning to test very
[3:35] soon. Astra too, which the Astra series is the Indian series of air
[3:38] to air missiles that are there on I think, if I'm not wrong,
[3:42] the tages, the Sukhoi and the MiGs. If I'm not wrong, Raphael
[3:46] I think has the European meteor missile. You can confirm that when you talk
[3:52] about all these missiles. So shift take us through this idea of air to
[3:57] air missiles, the idea of beyond visual range in the first place, what
[4:00] this tech is all about? Because when I was researching the evolution of air
[4:03] combat, it was quite funny that during World War One you had pilots fighting
[4:06] with pistols, yeah in the air, so that majority of you know,
[4:11] a plane and a pilot pulling out a pistol and then firing it before the
[4:14] event of machine guns on on airplanes, and then you had World War Two
[4:17] with bombings and dogfights, and you had the Cold War, which is when
[4:20] the idea of BVR and to air missiles came about. So tell us about
[4:25] this tech. What is the Austrassell and how does it compare to the usm
[4:29] RAM, the European Meteor, the other missiles out there in the world.
[4:31] So if we you know, if we go into the vintage air combat,
[4:34] you know, we'll have a full season of in our defense just on that.
[4:38] It's an absolutely fascinating topic and I'm sure at some point we'll go into
[4:41] it because remember the Indian Air Force has also also has a vintage history and
[4:46] it did go through an era when it flew byplanes and things like that,
[4:49] so they have their own taste with the you know, vintage air combat.
[4:53] But the reason why today's episode is about air combat is because, like you
[4:58] said, they've Defense Research and Development Organization, which is basically India's principal weapons
[5:03] developing agency, is about to test a very important weapons system called the Astra
[5:09] Mark two. Now the Astra To as we call it, is a basically
[5:15] set to be easily the most formidable air to AAR weapons system that India has
[5:19] ever developed. And that's not actually saying very much, because the Astra one
[5:25] is India's first air to air weapons system. India has never developed any air
[5:29] to wear missile before that. The reason for that is because India's air to
[5:33] wear weapons program has been you know, dominated by imports, mostly from Russia.
[5:41] And also because the way in which India's air to air missiles have been
[5:46] acquired, like with so many other things, have been very piecemeal, unplanned,
[5:51] you know, small things being replaced by another, you know, no
[5:55] large scale, kind of integrated plan in terms of what India really wants to
[6:00] chief, so that that mess still kind of afflicts India's India's air to air
[6:05] power, but the Astra mark too, and I'll very quickly sort of dip
[6:10] into the kinds of technologies we're talking about now. Air to A missiles are
[6:14] broadly divided. There are many, you know, there are many fascinating categories
[6:17] and divisions into which air to a missiles fall. You know, whether it
[6:20] is from in terms of range, in terms of how they are guided,
[6:24] in termes, in terms of the kinds of seeking you know, seeker computers
[6:28] that they have on board to hit their targets. So are there are like
[6:30] literally twenty thirty different categories of air to missiles, But I will broadly,
[6:35] you know, for the purposes of this podcast, I will say that air
[6:40] to missiles are broadly you know, short range air to a missiles, which
[6:44] are you know, between between five hundred two meters to a kilometer up to
[6:49] about sixteen kilometers is largely classified as what we call within visual range. You
[6:56] know, it's your dog fight kind of range. Anything beyond that is either
[7:00] you know, medium range or beyond visual range, which extends to anything from
[7:03] twenty kilometers to up to you know, two hundred kilometers, and beyond,
[7:08] you know, is a large spectrum of beyond visual range, which basically means
[7:12] a range, you know, beyond which there is no visual contact between aircraft
[7:16] that you're trying to shoot down. Now, again, the short range missiles,
[7:23] the dog fight missiles as we as we understand them are are largely largely
[7:29] heat seeking missiles. These are missiles that are sort of fire and forget missiles,
[7:33] because these are missiles that you know, like the sidewinder and certain other
[7:39] missiles of that category, which are very very short range dog fighting missiles.
[7:43] These are basically missiles that have infrared sensors. They detect the heat of the
[7:47] enemy or the target aircraft and they kind of home in on that target and
[7:51] then they hit it. So these are these are these are basically fire and
[7:57] forget missiles, as they called, which basically means you fire it and the
[8:00] missile kind of homes in on the target by itself and then hits it.
[8:05] So those are your short range heat seeking missiles. Beyond that, on the
[8:09] beyond visual range kind of spectrum, you've got radar guided missiles, active radar
[8:16] guided missiles, passive radar guided missiles, semi active radar guided missiles. Now,
[8:20] I don't want to jam our listeners with too much of this info.
[8:24] If they if they're interested in knowing understanding more about these different kinds of guidance,
[8:28] they can look it up. There's good material on you know, on
[8:31] the internet. But suffice it to say that the Astra is an active radar
[8:35] guided missile, which basically means that once this missile is fired, it has
[8:43] a range. The Astra Mark two that's going to be tested for the first
[8:46] time, has a range I am told in excess of one hundred and fifty
[8:50] kilometers, which is huge. Now, to give you a bit of a
[8:52] perspective, the Astra Mark one is seventy plus kilometers, which means that it
[8:58] probably has a maximum range of about eighty to ninety kilometers. You're basically nearly
[9:05] doubling that figure to one hundred and sixty plus kilometers, which takes you into
[9:09] the league of some of the longest range missiles in the world at this point
[9:15] of time. Now, India has had beyond visual range missiles for a long
[9:20] time, but not all of them have been very, very capable missiles.
[9:24] Now we've had the Russian R seventy seven, we do have which is still
[9:30] in service. By the way, we have the Israeli Derby missile, which
[9:33] is also in service. It's also beyond visual range missile. We've got the
[9:37] Meteor like you mentioned now, which is the missile which has ranges in excess
[9:41] of two hundred kilometers. It's a very very long range missile. And now
[9:45] you've got the Astra that's coming in. Now. The Astra Mark two kind
[9:48] of gets somewhere into the league of the Meteor. Okay, not close,
[9:54] but into that kind of range capability. And the reason why it's really really
[10:00] important to have capable long range missiles. Is is contrary to what happened post
[10:07] Ballacote, even though that was a kind of very within visual range kind of
[10:11] fight. Uh, And contrary to what's happening in over Ukraine where you're you're
[10:15] actually seeing air combat. Uh. The future, the future battles that India
[10:20] sees for itself are you know, if it comes down to aircraft versus aircraft
[10:24] kind of battles, they are going to be beyond visual range. So to
[10:28] to to sort of distill the essence of that, it basically means that the
[10:33] air force which has the largest number of you know, high performance, high
[10:37] capability, beyond visual range missiles, missiles that are capable of going the distance.
[10:43] Uh, and you know, not not only going the distance and killing
[10:46] their targets, but for that air force to be able to detect targets at
[10:50] that range and successfully deliver and execute a kill at that range using those missiles.
[10:56] That's the air force that's going to have, uh, you know,
[10:58] the all the air power to and that. So this, this this test
[11:01] is very very important for indire Right while you were saying that, the short
[11:05] thought came into my mind sort of a tangent on the topic. But obviously
[11:11] these missiles are damn expensive. Yeah, the media definitely would be expensive.
[11:15] And thus to even you know it's indigenous and yet developing it ourselves, even
[11:18] that will be expensive. How does the force go about deciding of how many
[11:24] missiles do you want? And I know you cannot renal numbers out there,
[11:28] that those numbers will be classified, but what sort of strategy and planning and
[11:31] the thought process goes into mind when deciding, Okay, you have twenty six
[11:35] fighter jets which will be able to carry I'm guessing too a per per fighter,
[11:39] So how many do you want? Because you have to also calculate the
[11:43] possibility of you know, you having to use those missiles at some point,
[11:46] maybe during even the short skirmish, and the possibility obviously a full fledged conflict,
[11:50] a full tudged war where they will have to be used, maybe a
[11:54] very frequent, frequent trait. So one that and second, when you sign
[11:58] such for example, when you try to deal for the fl do you also
[12:01] have sort of a backup deal key in case we run out of the missiles,
[12:05] you'll give us more missiles. So absolutely, so you're right that these
[12:09] missiles like the Meteor et cetera are very very expensive. But what we need
[12:13] to remember very uh you know, constantly keep in mind about procuring high performance
[12:20] weapons systems like the Meteor and the Raphael, they are that the success of
[12:26] these weapons systems is in them never having to be used. You know,
[12:30] that is the success of them. The point of the Meteor and and I
[12:33] want our listeners to listen to this very carefully, The point of the Meteor
[12:37] is, or rather the success of the Meteor is that the fear of it
[12:43] being used is enough for the aggressor not to mess with India. Okay,
[12:48] Imagine I'm a Pakistani Air Force commander based commander, and I'm thinking of sending
[12:54] my F sixteens into the air very close to the LLOC or near the border.
[12:58] I know for fact that if I get my aircraft into the air,
[13:01] and if India gets triggered enough to put its raffles into the air, my
[13:07] F sixteens are going to be toasted. Anything I put into the air is
[13:09] going to be toast. Because I know for a fact that nothing I have
[13:13] in my arsenal, including my am rams. And I'll come to Amrams in
[13:16] just a bit because they were a game changer for Pakistan after Balakote. But
[13:20] even with my am rams and other weapon systems that I have, nothing comes
[13:24] close to the kind of range and capability that the Meteor has. And therefore
[13:28] I'm taking a huge risk by you know, escalating using air power. And
[13:35] therefore that thought alone will make me think twice about putting my aircraft into the
[13:39] air, you know, show of strength against the Indian Air Force. And
[13:43] that is the success of the media. So that the Meteor is six and
[13:46] this this is a principle that I feel largely applies to any weapon system.
[13:50] The whole idea is deterans. The whole idea is like, don't you dare
[13:54] make me use this weapon because you want to regret it and you know what
[13:58] this weapon can do. That's the that's the essence of deterance, right.
[14:01] The deterance is like, let's not go there. Let's not go there.
[14:05] Is deterance. Right. So while we're procur your question is a very good
[14:07] one. So while procuring the meteor, obviously you anyway have a hard limit
[14:13] in terms of budget. You don't have an unlimited budget to buy huge numbers
[14:16] of these, but you certainly have an understanding in terms of how many of
[14:20] these missiles you will use in a kind of worst case scenario, or how
[14:22] many of these missiles you will need in a kind of medium case scenario.
[14:26] How many of these missiles you'll probably need for a kind of deterrent scenario in
[14:31] case there's an escalation like the post ballacote skirmission and that kind of thing.
[14:33] How many missiles would you normally need to fire. The raffle can carry more
[14:37] than two, so so those those are all factors that go into it,
[14:41] and it's it's not a difficult decision. Remember that in air forces and militaries
[14:48] across the world, the real weapon is a spreadsheet, it's not the meteora.
[14:54] So they are governed not by the range of the meteor, but by
[14:58] kidnap. So those are those are very easy objectives to meet for the air
[15:03] force. They know we can't be spending all our money on the meteor because
[15:07] we don't need only meteor. The meteor is like your silver bullet, right,
[15:11] You're not going to use your drum muster in every little air combat.
[15:16] You've got other cheaper, more capable missiles that will do the job with even
[15:20] greater effect. There will be missions where using the meteor actually makes no sense
[15:24] at all because you're not talking about those kinds of ranges. You might be
[15:26] facing a lesser enemy who doesn't have that kind of weapon system, So why
[15:31] waste a meteor in that respect? So yeah, so the so so figuring
[15:35] out how many to buy, et cetera. Is the least of the Air
[15:37] Force as work is they know how to do this. In fact, that's
[15:41] one of the reasons for our listeners we're talking about this topic in the first
[15:45] place as well, because we've spent quite a few episodes talking about fighter jets
[15:48] and the development of fighter jets, but we keep forgetting that fighter jet if
[15:52] the other weaponry, they're nothing. What you do with the fighters that if
[15:54] you don't have the missiles and et on them. So let's talk about that
[15:58] fame dog fight. We again, we've touched upon this topic, but we
[16:03] focus mostly on the baralacote A strike itself, which also why they they used
[16:06] a very harm like a high text sort of a system where in fact understand
[16:10] that correctly, just sort of trivia for our listeners and viewers is that the
[16:14] bombs who are basically what are known as Dad bombs. They were not smart
[16:18] basically, but they were fitted with a kit that was known as Pie munition
[16:22] kit developed by by Israel, which is famous for being highly precise. It
[16:27] essentially makes a small hole in the roof of a building and then explodes inside
[16:32] the building, sort of ensuring the explosion is limited to that particular structure.
[16:37] And I think also the missiles were fired while the mirages were in Indian as
[16:41] in they were over Pokay and not in Pakistani technical base, and they who
[16:48] were there, they release the bombs, The bombs navigate themselves to the to
[16:52] the targets, and then we know what happened. We've talked about this in
[16:55] a previous episode. I want to come to the next day when, like
[16:57] you were saying, Pakistan did send across. We're not sure. They claimed
[17:00] they did not, but there is speculation that there was. There were some
[17:04] sixties involved, definitely Chinese fighter jets that they sent across or into Indian territory.
[17:10] We sent up our MiGs and Sukoy's and then a dog fight happened.
[17:14] What happened? You must have spoken to the pilots what happened and tell us
[17:17] about that dog fight. In the context of what we're talking about today.
[17:19] So so you know, Pakistan's credibility on that day is very very low.
[17:25] Now we all know, and we've spoken about this in a previous episode Dave
[17:27] about the raging kind of claim versus counterclaim war that had broken out over that
[17:33] day. I don't want to get into that because it kind of hits a
[17:36] dead end. There are a certain amount of things that we can safely assume.
[17:41] And since we, in our defense believe in you know, speaking naked
[17:45] facts without any embellishments, let's first speak of what all we know about what
[17:49] happened that day. We know for a fact that a Make twenty one was
[17:52] shot down, we know for a fact that Abirandan was captured. We know
[17:57] for a fact that Pakistan on F sixteen's were involved in that operation. And
[18:03] it's important to say this because Pakistan has denied the use of F sixteen's,
[18:07] and the wreckage of an Amram missile, which was displayed at that famous press
[18:12] conference, is proof that F sixteens were used, because no other aircraft in
[18:17] Pakistan's inventory uses those fighters. We have not seen an F sixteen wreckage in
[18:22] Pakistan, and Pakistan denies that anything was shot down on their side, even
[18:29] though the Indian Air Force has said they've seen an enemy aircraft track disappearing on
[18:33] radar. That is the Air Force's proof of a loss. My own internal
[18:38] understanding and inquiries within the within the force and within you know, agencies that
[18:45] deal with these sorts of things suggest and I've been taken to task for saying
[18:49] this before, but I will say it again, is that it was not
[18:52] an F sixteen that was shot down. It was a JF, it was
[18:53] a it was a Chinese fighter that was shot down, and not an F
[18:56] sixteen. But then, like I said, it's kind of pointless to continue
[19:00] saying this because because your time has passed, and if they could hide it,
[19:04] then they can most certainly hide it now. So let's not get into
[19:08] that. That doesn't really make a difference. Like we said in our previous
[19:11] episode, the intent of Balacote was about imposing a sense of restlessness and fear
[19:18] in Pakistan, and that was not eroded by what happened on February twenty seventh.
[19:22] Coming to February twenty seventh, you know, Pakistan's so called retaliatory attack.
[19:27] Again, we've got to be very honest with ourselves about what happened that
[19:30] day, because, you know, beyond the beyond the exhilaration of oh my
[19:37] god, an a combat confrontation taking place February twenty seven, then you and
[19:41] I have been very honest on this podcast about feb twenty seventh. It was
[19:45] not a good day for India. In fact, it was a terrible day
[19:48] for India because not only was our pilot shot down on in enemy territory,
[19:52] a helicopter also went down because of an accidental you know, wrong targeting friendly
[19:59] fire helicopter in Badgham near Shrinagar. But beyond that, there were there were
[20:03] there were larger lessons to learn which pertained to our topic of the day,
[20:07] which is air to air missiles. Now, just a little bit, just
[20:10] a little flashback to give us a listeners some context as to why I'm talking
[20:15] about air to air missiles in the context of February twenty seven. Starting from
[20:19] the nineteen sixty five war. The nineteen sixty five war was the first quote
[20:23] unquote high tech war that was fought between India and Pakistan. It was also
[20:29] the first air force you know, air air battle that was fought between India
[20:33] and Pakistan d've uh and in that India was completely outmatched in terms of tech.
[20:40] India had you know, Mistiers and Hunters and aircraft of that kind,
[20:45] Gnats and things like that, medium performance aircraft, whereas the whereas Pakistan had
[20:52] top of the line American jets like the staff Fighter and Super Saber and things
[20:56] like that, you know, really really frontline cutting edge aircraft with good weapons
[21:02] systems and stuff. Now, the nineteen sixty five war was a huge wake
[21:06] up call for India. It realized that Pakistan, as a smaller country,
[21:11] is able to able to keep the heat on India in an air battle because
[21:15] it's able to get better technology from the United States. This is a time
[21:19] of you know, India, Russia, Pakistan with the United States. Now,
[21:23] after the sixty five war, India very rapidly decided that it needs to
[21:29] completely change its policy as far as tech and no matter what happens, no
[21:32] matter what the cost, it has to have a air power technology edge visity
[21:37] Pakistan. Now, that air power edge began to be seen during the nineteen
[21:42] seventy one war when we had mid twenty one's and other kinds of aircraft that
[21:47] came into play. Mostly the mid twenty one and certain other upgrades to existing
[21:52] aircraft, and that carried forward quite well for a long time. For the
[21:56] next two to two and a half decades, India insisted, despite its various
[22:00] problems in procurement, et cetera, when it came to aircraft and missiles,
[22:04] air to ay missiles, especially, India maintained you know, a slight edge
[22:10] over Pakistan, which it believed was necessary in case the balloon goes up,
[22:14] if if it comes to a confrontation, an aerial battle, confrontation, that
[22:18] little edge will save us. That little edge will make sure that we win
[22:21] the battle. And they were right about it, except that India fell into
[22:26] its own ways, old ways of uh, piecemeal procurement, unplanned procurement,
[22:32] staggered acquisition. Uh, you know, no integrated you know, holistic plan
[22:37] in terms of uh, you know, predicting obsolescence of missiles and you know,
[22:41] for you know, for planning replacement of old aging systems. As a
[22:47] result of which uh uh, the the air to air missile category kind of
[22:52] uh, you know, kind of got old, it kind of got obsolete.
[22:56] It wasn't paid enough attention because for a long time they weren't there was
[23:00] no air battle, even Postcargil. Even in Cargil, there was no air
[23:03] battle. There were no aircraft not confronting each other during the Cargill War.
[23:07] So Pakistan, by in the two thousands, early two thousands until twenty ten
[23:15] was quietly trying to turn the tables on India on this specific, specific element
[23:21] of air power and the game changing technology that they got. I think two
[23:26] thousand and eight twenty ten were A sixteens that were armed with Amram missiles.
[23:30] Now the Amra missile is also called the AIM one twenty is a beyond visual
[23:36] range you know, radar guided, a very very capable air to air missile.
[23:40] It's the industry standard as far as the United States is concerned. And
[23:45] you know it's a missile that's responsible for a lot of air to air kills
[23:48] across combat theaters. So this was a formidable missile that came into Pakistan's hands,
[23:56] and that edge that India had, you know, either had or tried
[24:00] to have visa vie Pakistan was lost completely. It was lost completely thanks just
[24:04] to the F sixteens and the and the Amram missiles because India a did not
[24:11] it's not and it was it wasn't about range. India may have had missiles
[24:14] that had the same kind of range, but it's not just about range.
[24:18] The missile needs to be able to hit the target at that range. It
[24:21] needs to be able to be accurately guided till that target. So it's not
[24:23] just about oh, he's got a seventy kilometer range missile. I've got a
[24:26] one thirty kilometer arrange missile, so I'm safe. It's not. The am
[24:32] Ram was a much higher quality, formidably higher performance, you know, devastatingly
[24:37] accurate and reliable air to air missile at its stated range. India had similar
[24:44] missiles from Russia which were not not as capable, not as reliable, you
[24:48] know, not as formidable in terms of executing target destruction at those ranges,
[24:53] and therefore, you know, you know, aircraft to aircraft there was no
[24:57] match. Suddenly they had sixt with Amrams, and we were left with pretty
[25:03] much nothing that could match that kind of capability. And that's the reason,
[25:07] coming back to February twenty seventh, twenty nineteen, they've that's the reason why
[25:11] India in many ways was outmatched. Now, these are harsh realities and harsh
[25:17] truths, and once again. You know, in every episode we get taken
[25:21] to task online, but that's because we tell the truth. So I don't
[25:23] mind about that. On February twenty seventh, you had your Sukhoys in the
[25:26] air, you had your Mirages in the air, you had your MiGs in
[25:30] the air. We've got a you know, family of air to air missiles
[25:33] that could have been used. But those long range long range AMRAM shots being
[25:40] fired by F sixteen's pinned India down. They pinned India down because we did
[25:45] not have anything of similar reliability for those long range missile shots to put a
[25:52] similar kind of air power pressure on Pakistani fighters. As a result of which
[25:57] when they missed their F six and they lied about the use of F sixteens,
[26:00] remember that, because they wanted it to make it look like, no,
[26:03] we've not used sixteens, because America doesn't, like you know, doesn't
[26:07] want Pakistan to use sixteens against India because India is their friend and ally and
[26:11] customer, et cetera, et cetera. But Pakistan did use those missiles,
[26:14] and that's one of the reasons why the dynamic of that of that confrontation was
[26:19] very, very different. It's an uncomfortable truth, but it's the truth.
[26:22] It's the truth. Now, none of this means that Abinan and Wertaman did
[26:26] not you know, was not gallant, and it didn't do something really brave
[26:33] and didn't shoot down a Chinese fighter. This doesn't mean any of those things.
[26:37] I'm just saying that India was at a significant disadvantage on that particular day
[26:41] because we didn't have anything that that could take on something like an Amram from
[26:47] an F sixteen. And it's a shame because because even the Air chief of
[26:51] that time, and you know, some might be a little alarmed that I'm
[26:53] saying this now, But the Air Chief of the day, a Chief Marshall
[26:57] Bi Sanawaki himself said, don't you remember they've when he said things would have
[27:02] been very different if the raphile and the meteor had been in service. What
[27:04] did he mean by that? That's exactly what he meant. What he meant
[27:07] was if we had that kind of reliable, long range missile, the effects
[27:14] of the Amram and the F sixteen would have been completely negated and we would
[27:18] have had the edge, we would have had the leverage, we would have
[27:19] had all we would have been holding all the strings on that particular day,
[27:23] but we didn't because we didn't have a reliable counter weapon as far as the
[27:27] AMRAM was concerned. So, you know, there are many different I don't
[27:32] want to oversimplify it's because of the Amram that it turned out like that.
[27:36] I'm just saying that the Amram has become the centerpiece of many of the things
[27:41] that India has done wrong over the years. We've we've failed to maintain you
[27:47] know, airpower supremacy in terms of aircraft numbers. That's why we have squadrons
[27:51] depleting. We've failed to maintain weapons supremacy in terms of missiles, which is
[27:56] why for a whole decade, our friendly neighbors, I've had mrms and we've
[28:00] had nothing, or we've just got you know, piecemeal. You know,
[28:03] let's get ten twenty Derbies. Let's get ten twenty R seventy seven from Russia.
[28:07] Let's get ten twenty something else from somewhere else. Meanwhile, let's also
[28:11] develop the ASTRA. You know, no integrated plan. You don't have an
[28:15] integrated plan. You should have two missiles, you should have two missile types,
[28:18] one short range, one long range, and just go big with it.
[28:21] But you've got again this kind of museum inventory of missiles like you do
[28:26] of aircraft, and therefore there's no focused approach in terms of a kind of
[28:30] rationalized you know, standardized weapons approach, and all that manifested on February twenty
[28:36] seventh. In my way, I'm guessing all that can change if the mark
[28:40] to get successfully tested in a few months and gets inducted on the mean air
[28:44] force. We'll talk a bit more about present day air tech. What to
[28:49] present day fighters look feel like a butter a quick break, pany pany pany,
[29:02] so beautiful, so elegant, just looking like a wow eh bang?
[29:07] Was that enough cringe for you? Because this cringe fest doesn't stop here.
[29:12] Yes, And if by watching such reals and vile videos you think your life
[29:17] is becoming moem, then I cost them and me Anna will bring the most
[29:22] puke worthy, nauseating and repulsive trends on social media and well maybe enact some
[29:29] of them, but most of all discuss and seriously dissect these trends. So
[29:33] get ready to laugh, cringe and question humanity. Dropping soon on Spotify,
[29:40] Apple Podcasts and wherever you get your cringe, I mean audio entertainment from so
[29:45] let's talk cringe. Welcome back. Shave and I are talking about what air
[29:56] combat looks like in the present day, so not so much about the pos
[30:00] not so much of the future, which we can normally keep talking about on
[30:02] this on this podcast, but day we're talking just about today basically. Uh
[30:07] So, we've discussed air to our missiles. We've discussed the India's legacy of
[30:11] shortfall when it comes to awear missiles in terms of adequate technology, if not
[30:15] numbers, and how the Barlor Coode dog fight was perhaps a perfect example of
[30:21] that. Shave explained that very vividly just before the break, and you know,
[30:25] I'll tell you just as an aside, I'm quite surprised with the level
[30:30] of interest even I've been able to have on this episode, because initially I
[30:33] did not think air to our missiles would be this bigger deal. But you've
[30:36] just explained in the first of this episode just why these such as such a
[30:40] huge, yeah, hugely for air force across the world, and why then
[30:44] needs to have a very capable air to our missile which it currently does not
[30:48] except the Meteria. But that's in small numbers in which I'm guessing it can
[30:49] only be used by the jet tell us shif what does a modern day cockpit
[30:55] look like? Modern as in present day? You've flown the theaters? Sure
[31:00] which other Air Force Indian Air Force jets you you've flown or something similar in
[31:04] during your several I wouldn't say missions, but assignments. Yeah, that's a
[31:08] better word for a journalist. What does a modern day cockpit look like?
[31:12] What does a modern day pilot do? How many buttons are there? And
[31:15] you know, there's also this fascinating tech. And then when I was researching
[31:18] all these air to air missiles, there's some tech also about a missile that
[31:22] is fired and then also controlled when it's going towards target to make like,
[31:26] you know, last minute maneuver so that it actually hits the target. I'm
[31:30] not sure if it's controlled by the pilot in the cockpit or maybe someone on
[31:33] the ground. Similarly, you had once discussed the idea of fighter jet shooting
[31:38] or at least carrying drones with them, which are also operated by the pilot.
[31:41] So what does a modern day pilot do? And isn't this too much
[31:45] that you're also like bloody flying at the speed of sound, So while doing
[31:48] that, you're doing with all these things out what is it like? It's
[31:51] it's incredible. The modern the modern cockpit, the smart cockpit of you know,
[31:56] today's you know, fourth generation fifth general fighters are incredible because the pilot
[32:01] is not just you know, flying the plane is just one small part of
[32:06] the whole thing. In fact, the whole the whole idea of modern cockpit
[32:09] design from a paradigm of air power and how effective one single fighter jet can
[32:15] be is to is to kind of relieve the pilot of the mundane tasks of
[32:21] flying, you know, make the aircraft intelligent enough to conduct all the the
[32:25] usual tasks of flying beyond just your autopilot and things like that, but to
[32:30] allow the pilot to really be a war fighter, you know, to be
[32:34] a warrior and not you know, not plane chelala. You know that that
[32:37] that that whole that that changed quite it's not a new concept happening since the
[32:42] seventies. But the idea is to make the pilot a much more effective,
[32:46] uh, you know, an aggressive kind of you know, a sort of
[32:51] vehicle of damage and destruction rather than someone who's just flying an aircraft in the
[32:54] air. Now, pilots have all kinds of things in the pit that make
[33:00] their job a whole lot easier because modern fighters are smart. They've got incredible
[33:06] flight computers that are capable of making the aircraft almost completely autonomous give leaving the
[33:12] pilot only to do the real work, which is you know, mission and
[33:16] you know, detection and using sensors and weapons and things like that. Now
[33:22] you've got all of our viewers will know largely what a cockpit looks like.
[33:25] You've got a whole bunch of screens in front of you, a lot of
[33:29] information popping out from all over the place. You've got lots of switches and
[33:31] dials and things like that. You've also got smart helmets. Now you've got
[33:36] helmets, you know, helmet mounted sites and smart helmets that pilots wear these
[33:39] days, where all of that information is being beamed, you know, through
[33:44] computers, onto your helmet, which basically means that you don't even need to
[33:46] look down. You know, earlier there to be there used to be something
[33:52] called head down work, which is now you look down at your screens and
[33:54] do the work and then you fly the plane. Now now a pilot doesn't
[33:58] even need to look at his you know, his displays or screens because all
[34:01] that information that he or she needs is is there on that helmet or the
[34:06] head up display or whatever it is. So it's very very smart. You
[34:08] know, you know what weapons you have, you know what your sensors are
[34:13] looking at you. You've been able to program all your sensors to alert you
[34:16] in case it detects a certain thing. Uh, you know what your radar
[34:20] sensitivity is, what your infrared search and trackers are, all your it's it's
[34:24] an incredible integrated kind of experience. And it's and it's and it's. Uh,
[34:30] it's intimidating because one would think that this puts a lot of load on
[34:35] the pilot, and it does. But one of the challenges of modern aircraft
[34:37] design and cockpit design is to reduce the load on the on the pilot,
[34:42] you know, remove things from the screens that the pilot doesn't need to see.
[34:45] You know, how do you how do you make your you know,
[34:49] flat screen displays and the helmet so smart that it intuitively as per the mission
[34:54] or as per the moment in that mission, only gives the pilot what he
[34:59] or she needs to see at that particular point of time. So these are
[35:01] all AI tech you know, sort of prerogatives that are coming into play right
[35:07] now. But the cockpit itself is an evolving is an evolving part of all
[35:13] the aircraft, and it's an incredible thing now. The Astra the TAGES cockpit
[35:16] is also very modern cockpit, comparable to some of the best in the world.
[35:21] It needs to go, it needs to get better because it's an existing
[35:23] kind of cockpit, but it will become much much better in the Amcor and
[35:27] the Tages Mark two and things like that. I've flown a range of fitles,
[35:30] so I've seen a whole bunch of cockpits. I've I've seen the RAPHI
[35:35] cockpit, I've seen the gripp And cockpit. Ha's seen the mid thirty five
[35:37] cockpit. I've seen the sixteen cockpit, the F eighteen cockpit as well.
[35:40] So yeah, these are so these are all sort of comparable. These cockpits
[35:45] are largely comparable in terms of what they you know, what they demand from
[35:50] the pilot and what they give the pilot for their war fighting. So but
[35:52] but there's a long way to go in terms of cockpits. Yeah. Not
[35:55] the point about air combat that I want to discuss on this episode. It's
[36:00] not really offense it's defense. Because I got a bit confused, and this
[36:04] is a very small point, so I didn't know. I knew we could
[36:06] not do a separate episode on it altogether, but I think this is a
[36:08] good time to talk about it. Can you just like take us through the
[36:12] different kinds of missile defense systems you have, because you have the ballistic missile
[36:15] defense systems, then you also have surface to air missile system which are also
[36:20] kind of defense systems. Yeah, India, for example, I just researched,
[36:22] has broadly three big classes. You have the three air defense, you
[36:25] have the Summer air defense, and you have the Russian S four hundred air
[36:29] defense. What are these different systems, how do they work and how?
[36:32] Yeah, basically that what are these different stems? So, and you know,
[36:36] an anti missile system is a different animal from an air defense system.
[36:43] Now, when you think of an air defense system, you're thinking of surface
[36:45] to air missiles. Right now, surface to air missiles are categorized by their
[36:52] capability and their range. Now let me just list for you and then then
[36:54] our viewers and you will understand what our air defense systems look like. We've
[36:59] got the Akash air defense system, We've got the Spider air defense system,
[37:04] which is an Israeli system. We've got the S Fondred air defense system.
[37:07] Now, the S four hundred is an air defense system which carries two different
[37:12] kinds of missiles capable of hitting enemy aircraft, drones, helicopters and also slow
[37:20] moving cruise missiles at pretty long ranges. Now, the reason why the S
[37:24] Fondred is a very capable system is because it has a very very high detection
[37:28] range and it has a very high, very high kill range in terms of
[37:34] how far the target is before it can be detected and you know and engaged.
[37:38] The Akash and you know, certain other air defense systems that we have
[37:43] are slightly shorter range, so they're used right at the end. They're kind
[37:46] of almost like terminal defense systems. Now, an anti ballistic missile or an
[37:51] anti missile system is a completely different thing. These are also surface to air
[37:55] missiles, but these are missiles designed to kill other missiles, which means that
[38:00] the technology and the engineering and the design that goes into an anti missile system
[38:07] is a completely It goes into new realms of rocket science because here you've got
[38:15] a layered system. Let's take India's you know, since you mentioned the PRI
[38:21] three Air Defense and the Advanced Air Defense System. These are two missiles which
[38:23] are part of a layered ballistic missile defense system, which basically means that depending
[38:30] on what kind of enemy ballistic missile is fired at you, one of these
[38:36] missiles will basically be launched to engage and hit that missile. I remember,
[38:40] you're launching a missile to hit a missile, not an aircraft. Hitting an
[38:45] aircraft is a completely different thing. For that you have the S four hundred
[38:47] or the Akhash or the Spider and things like that. But to hit a
[38:52] missile which has a you know, a different kind of speed, a different
[38:54] kind of energy, a different kind of trajectory, has a warhead, you
[38:59] know, the kind of kinetic technology you need is very very different. Now,
[39:04] there are two kinds of engagement in an anti ballistic missile system. This
[39:07] endo atmospheric, which is which is you're hitting the missile after it has re
[39:13] entered the atmosphere. There's exo atmospheric, which is a very very high altitude
[39:17] kind of interception, and this is for long range ballistic missiles. So so
[39:21] India has a you know, it's it's a work in progress anti ballistic missile
[39:25] system that is that is being kind of rolled out in different layers, but
[39:30] it's it's it's important not to see an anti ballistic missile system as one system.
[39:37] It's a it's a bunch of different missiles of different ranges and capabilities designed
[39:42] to, you know, integratedly look at the threat and decide which one is
[39:45] best to go and engage that particular weapon. The akash and the s fonded
[39:50] single systems right capable of hitting aircraft, helicopters, drones. That kind of
[39:53] thing A very interesting let's uh though, as the final thought, move to
[39:58] a theater of war or where all these systems are kind of being used.
[40:01] Your air to air missiles, your surface to air missiles, your ballistic missile
[40:06] shields. The Russia Ukraine conflict. This is also once again a thought that
[40:09] I've always mean you to discuss with you, but does not make for a
[40:12] larger episode, so I had been saving it. I think this is the
[40:14] perfect episode to talk about this. I want to actually go back to the
[40:16] start of the war, because this question still today till this date, remains
[40:22] in a shouted mystery, is where the hell was the Russian Air force in
[40:24] the initial few months of the war, there was so much speculation back then.
[40:28] I remember Abish Malanai in the season one of this of this podcast discussed
[40:31] that at length he had his own theories, but it was still the fog
[40:35] of warist was still there, so even he was not very sure of what
[40:37] exactly was going on. Now we have the benefit of the hindsight. You've
[40:43] report on the war extensively, You've you've been reading about it, and you
[40:45] also have your twenty years of experience to kind of give you insight. The
[40:50] reason I asked that because as an Indian I would be a bit concerned because
[40:53] that was one of the few theories early on that the Russians weren't very confident
[40:57] of the air force because they were a bit like high age aging air force.
[41:00] I'm not sure if they will hold up against Ukraine's comparatively modern equipment,
[41:06] which is of course being supported by NATO. Yes, for me, someone
[41:09] from India whose air force is predominantly Russian, that was a bit of a
[41:14] wady back then. So I don't know if I should still be worried,
[41:16] And you're not the only one. So anyway, I want your before you
[41:21] tell us what's been happening in over the Russian and Ukraine airspace of the last
[41:23] let's say, the last couple of months. Can you go back to the
[41:27] start of the war and give us your theory on where the hell was there?
[41:30] Look, see, the Russian objective in Ukraine, you know, was
[41:35] to completely sort of cut the country into and to establish territorial dominance over the
[41:40] eastern Donbass region and to kind of bring Ukraine to its knees using conventional power.
[41:47] You know, we heard all the saber rattling that Russia did as far
[41:51] as nuclear weapons were concerned, but that never happened, thankfully. But they
[41:54] you know, they brought a huge amount of conventional weaponry to bear. Now
[41:58] the question you're asking is about why air power wasn't used. Now, Russia's
[42:01] strategy wasn't to take over Ukraine because Ukraine, you know, as most people
[42:07] would have known by now, is a huge country. It's not a small
[42:09] country. It's a massive country. Now, of course, Russia is way
[42:13] way bigger. But I'm just saying that it was never Russia's objective to take
[42:15] over the entire country. It was to it was to uh, you know,
[42:20] occupy large parts of Ukraine completely divide one part of it and established territorial
[42:25] Russian dominance, which is the eastern bit, which they have in fact successfully
[42:30] done. But the reason why airpower in my view, was not used.
[42:34] And remember the early days day that you if you remember the conversations that were
[42:39] happening in our coverage of Ukraine was Ukraine wondering where that air power is going
[42:45] to come from for itself. They were saying, you know, we're expecting
[42:47] air attacks from Russia. Uh, you know, but and that's why we
[42:51] need these six teams or these f eighteens, which NATO, you know country
[42:54] is going to give us these air force. You know, if NATO doesn't
[42:58] impose a no fly zone, we're going to be doomed because Russia has got
[43:00] a huge air fors They're going to bring their fighters. You remember that whole
[43:04] no fly zone while a Tamasha that was running around that time. Now,
[43:07] in my view, the Russians didn't. Of course they used some air power,
[43:13] but most of their air power, as it were, was in the
[43:15] form of missiles. They were using long range missiles, you know, to
[43:20] basically do the same job that combat aircraft would have done. Now there was
[43:24] no air power in Ukraine fighting back. Okay, there were no fighters fighting
[43:30] back in Ukraine. That was one of the reasons why the Russians did not
[43:35] feel the need to send air power in because they were what fighter aircraft and
[43:39] bombers could do. They were achieving that using pretty accurate missile systems. Point
[43:45] number two is Russia was watching very closely whether a no fly zone is imposed.
[43:50] If a no fly zone was imposed, it basically meant that NATO was
[43:53] willing to escalate from its end and not only impose a no fly zone,
[43:59] but signal that it probably would supply fighter aircraft, et cetera to Ukraine.
[44:02] There was all this talk of training Ukrainian pilots, Poland or Germany sending in
[44:07] their you know, fighter aircraft. Sad, none of that stuff happened in
[44:13] the In the two years since the war began in Ukraine, not a single
[44:16] fighter aircraft has come in from NATO to these guys, apart from some training
[44:22] that has taken place. All this talk has happened. But what did happen
[44:24] for Ukraine right from the start was this absolute flood of anti aircraft weaponry.
[44:30] And uh, the the great thing about NATO is unlike unlike a lot of
[44:37] Russian military equipment NATO equipment is in terms of quality, it's no questions.
[44:43] They've got they've got, They've got by far the best equipment. Uh.
[44:46] And you suddenly had a you know, a battered military and a battered nation
[44:52] that was suddenly flooded with very very high performance anti air and air defense equipment
[44:58] apart from anti tank which they used very effectively. So you had a suboptimal
[45:04] airpower threat from Russia because most of the air power was coming through missiles,
[45:08] through attack helicopters and things like that, and you had this arsenal of fantastic
[45:13] weapons that are designed to bring down jets and aircrafts and things like that with
[45:16] nothing to fire them at. And Russia realized, okay, so it was
[45:21] a good idea not to put our fighters in. By which time, you
[45:24] know, many of their objectives had been met, many of them hadn't been
[45:28] met. It had become a kind of grinding, you know, war of
[45:31] attrition of damage where you know, Russia was also getting frustrated. Ukraine was
[45:36] like beyond damaged. And that's the reason why I feel, you know,
[45:40] Putin made that decision not to bring air power in right at the start,
[45:45] because let's remember it may have actually been a good decision because Ukraine caught Russia
[45:51] off guard in many many ways. So many of their their helicopters and transport
[45:54] aircraft and so many things have been shot down three A wax have been shot
[45:59] down so far, uh and stuff. So I think it was a I
[46:01] think it was a calculated tactical move not to bring in sort of conventional air
[46:07] power right at the start. And I'm guessing what you said just underlines your
[46:10] earlier, earlier message even that's that was more about air to wear missiles,
[46:15] but the fact that if you have such capable equipment, whether it's your air
[46:20] to wear missiles or there's a surface to wear missile systems like needles, then
[46:22] the whole that the determins that they provide is what is useful at that end
[46:27] of the day and their actual use. Right. So we'll end it there,
[46:31] But a trivia question before before we go away. Uh, we were
[46:36] talking about air to wear combat. We're talking about air to wear missiles,
[46:37] dogfights, et cetera. Almost every fighter movie I've seen has this typical uh
[46:45] sequence of events when it comes to air to where missile firing, which is
[46:49] that you have this pilot struggling to find that play on is the log the
[46:53] green the green for that thing to turn green? And this I have tone
[46:59] and then they hit them as silent. It just goes and then you know,
[47:00] sometimes it hits something. There's flares. Sometimes you have pilots going towards
[47:05] the mountain and then then just upstairs and then the miss going into the mountain,
[47:10] and you have this I don't know how many number of bullets flying in
[47:14] form of machine and that I'm always wondered by bullets because machine guns are fast
[47:21] in onement. I don't know how many hundreds of bullets should be fired,
[47:23] So they just keep firing for god knows how long, as though they have
[47:27] some invisible amounts of bullets on board. How accurate are these sequences when it
[47:32] comes to actual air to air combat, when it comes to modern day and
[47:37] second personal favorite, your personal favorite air force movie of all time? Okay,
[47:43] so you know, I think I think obviously air combat movies are a
[47:46] whole lot of massala. Okay, there's no way in hell that much ammunition
[47:52] exists in an aircraft. Uh, There's there's no way in hell that missions
[47:55] last that long in the air, you know. And I'm sure you've seen
[48:00] Top Gun Maverick. Of course, I mean it took. It took the
[48:04] levels of great movie. Let me let me let me put a disclaimer here.
[48:07] I loved the movie, but that's also because I knew what to expect
[48:10] when I went to watch it. I wasn't going there expecting to see a
[48:13] documentary. I went expecting to eat popcorn and enjoying myself. And I did
[48:17] right, but the but that last scene had me also cringing right with those
[48:22] air eighteens, and I was like, what are these guys doing? Man?
[48:27] But like I said, it was fabulous. So no, so that
[48:30] there are no let me say this, really, there are no fighter aircraft
[48:34] movies that have depicted any anything close to realism. And I don't blame them
[48:37] for it, because because you know, much as we like to think is
[48:42] air combat is just terribly exciting things. Most of air power is a very
[48:45] mundane kind of work. You know, you know where when confrontations happen,
[48:51] obviously there's a lot of adrenaline and things like that, but it's very difficult
[48:53] to capture what actually happens. And even in air combat, confrontations they've it's
[48:58] not like you're always constantly in their sights. And you know those World War
[49:01] two style Dorog dog fights and you know, chasing each other loop the loop
[49:06] and you know, oh, I've got a lock and stuff like that.
[49:09] Those are probably very very brief sort of moments in the in the modern kind
[49:13] of context. But uh, my favorite movie, my fair favorite air combat
[49:17] movie would still have to be Top Gun. It's not an air Force movie
[49:21] with the Navy movie. If I call it an air Force movie, I'll
[49:22] be killed. But yeah, the Navy movie. But yeah, I mean,
[49:27] you can't do better than that. You know, Top Gun kind of
[49:30] laid the template for the you know, the machismo of the fighter pilot and
[49:36] you know air power and that whole that whole kind of Cold War you know,
[49:40] that delicious Cold War ethic. You can't do better than that. I
[49:45] know for a fact that that many movies have been made on air power,
[49:50] you know, which contain uh, fabulous depictions of things at the risk of
[49:54] you know, pushing Top Gun aside. Is a movie called Behind Enemy Lines,
[50:00] Yes, with Owen Wilson. Now the movie is on an Air Force
[50:02] movie, but there is this fabulous sequence of a fighter aircraft being chased by
[50:08] a surface to M missiles, and it's a long sequence of that pilot using
[50:13] evasive maneuvers to try and rid himself for the aircraft, and finally he has
[50:16] to eject into enemy territory. I recommend to our viewers go watch that movie
[50:22] just for that sequence. The movie itself is pretty pretty crappy, but that
[50:23] sequence is amazing. Yeah, and a good save back there when you said
[50:27] top movie, because you've already managed to piss off air force pilots in our
[50:30] previous episode, not twice, not twice, So yeah, right. I
[50:35] think we ended there a great chat to Shive once again quite surprised with just
[50:39] how you were able to explain the importance of air to air missiles and what
[50:45] the upcoming as from our two will do for Danian Air Force. So great,
[50:47] Thanks Shift, Thanks to our listeners and yours as always and always thanks
[50:52] to our producer and are additioning. That's it for this week's defense. Does
[50:54] for more tune in next week. He'll then stay safe and not crossing the
[50:58] boundaries. We got passport all by

Shows are listed from Apple Podcasts' charts and directory, and Podcast Index where it is used. Every show and episode belongs to its publisher and plays from the publisher's own feed; this site hosts none of them.
