# India scoring BrahMos export orders. But what took so long? | IOD, S02, Ep 53

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 20 Jan 2025, 57 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/63765367/20_jan_25_iod_20_jan_128.mp3

Have you ever wondered why it took India nearly two decades to start exporting the excellent BrahMos missile system, despite its induction into the Indian military in the mid-2000s? What were the reasons behind this delay, and how has India now finally started to capitalize on the export potential of this advanced missile system? The BrahMos missile is a game-changer in the world of defense technology, with its medium-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile capabilities making it an attractive option for countries looking to enhance their defense systems. But what makes it so special, and why are countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam lining up to get their hands on it? Host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor discuss this and more as they uncover the ugly truths of India’s efforts to export the BrahMos. Produced by Garvit Srivastava Sound Mix by Nitin Rawat

## Transcript

[0:00] Speaker 1: This is India Today Podcasts.
[0:05] Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on
[0:08] Speaker 2: all things well defense, where I they've Goswami, your host,
[0:13] Speaker 2: along with senior journalist Shivarur, break down the world of
[0:16] Speaker 2: conflicts that range from the subtle to the brute. We
[0:20] Speaker 2: bring you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at
[0:23] Speaker 2: times provoke.
[0:27] Speaker 1: This is in Our Defense.
[0:30] Speaker 2: Hello and welcome. This is the fifty third episode of
[0:32] Speaker 2: In Our Defense. Hi Shif, how are.
[0:33] Speaker 3: You good and gearing up for Aero India. Oh?
[0:37] Speaker 1: Yes, it's happening here very soon.
[0:39] Speaker 3: And I hear that this year we're going to have
[0:41] Speaker 3: a lot of subject matter to talk about. And by
[0:44] Speaker 3: the way, you know, a good nugget to share with
[0:46] Speaker 3: our viewers now is that many of our episodes are
[0:49] Speaker 3: doing the rounds on you know, Aero India groups right now,
[0:52] Speaker 3: so you know, people are looking at those in terms
[0:54] Speaker 3: of what are the things to look out for at
[0:56] Speaker 3: Aero India. So I promised all of them that we'll
[0:59] Speaker 3: do speciales during the show.
[1:00] Speaker 1: Is definitely will yeah.
[1:03] Speaker 2: And I mean considering the topic of our last last episode,
[1:06] Speaker 2: I mean I think you mentioned that you know, you've
[1:09] Speaker 2: gotten some really interesting. I would say feedback from people
[1:13] Speaker 2: within the military and the arm force.
[1:15] Speaker 3: Huge, because you know, it was a controversial issue. It's
[1:18] Speaker 3: one that has created a lot of divisions, you know,
[1:22] Speaker 3: within both the serving and the veteran community. And I
[1:24] Speaker 3: got so many messages from you know, former chiefs taking
[1:28] Speaker 3: both sides, some defending HL, some saying, oh my god,
[1:32] Speaker 3: you haven't even scratched the surface. And it's a very
[1:36] Speaker 3: very divisive issue, which is, you know, which is the
[1:38] Speaker 3: reason they when you know, when we when people sort
[1:42] Speaker 3: of lash out at us in comments and some which
[1:44] Speaker 3: I welcome always, which we welcome always, you know, the
[1:48] Speaker 3: truth herts that's the problem, you know. But the thing is,
[1:51] Speaker 3: what all we're doing on this podcast is shining a
[1:53] Speaker 3: light at you know, some uncomfortable issues which most people
[1:57] Speaker 3: don't want to talk about and in the hope that
[1:59] Speaker 3: it will make things But we're not here, you know,
[2:02] Speaker 3: like like shit posters. We're actually trying to make things better.
[2:05] Speaker 3: So hopefully that will.
[2:06] Speaker 1: And I think we'll do some of that on this
[2:08] Speaker 1: episode as well.
[2:09] Speaker 2: Though this episode, I think the topic of it at
[2:11] Speaker 2: least I won't really classify as one of our episodes
[2:15] Speaker 2: where we really you know, go after a particular organization
[2:19] Speaker 2: or topic or subject matter and you know, go on
[2:22] Speaker 2: you on your famous rands, because this is a topic
[2:24] Speaker 2: that we both have loved talking about. I think one
[2:27] Speaker 2: of our previous episodes you talked about how it gives
[2:29] Speaker 2: you sort of warm, fuzzy feeling the inside them exactly. Yeah,
[2:33] Speaker 2: one of our best I think, yeah, one of our
[2:35] Speaker 2: best episodes in terms of the traction we got online from.
[2:38] Speaker 1: Our viewers and our listeners.
[2:40] Speaker 2: So though we've done a couple of episodes, actually one
[2:42] Speaker 2: specifically on the Brummos program, how it kind of took
[2:45] Speaker 2: shape and how it almost like without many controversies, like
[2:49] Speaker 2: clockwork precisions, just you know, one thing led to the
[2:51] Speaker 2: other and then you have this fantastic crop of missiles
[2:54] Speaker 2: with your military. And we did another episode on India's
[2:57] Speaker 2: larger cruise miss program, but obviously Brumbo did come up
[3:00] Speaker 2: in that as well. What we'll talk about on this
[3:03] Speaker 2: episode is something that we never talk about when it
[3:07] Speaker 2: comes to India's military. Actually we only talk about the
[3:09] Speaker 2: opposite exports. We only talk about imports. Imports, imports, you know,
[3:13] Speaker 2: because that's what the Indian military mostly does. It imports
[3:16] Speaker 2: defense equipment, but with Brumos, India has managed to find
[3:20] Speaker 2: and I'm surprised why India has managed to find this
[3:23] Speaker 2: one piece of equipment that it has already exported and
[3:26] Speaker 2: that for which it has many more people who are interested.
[3:29] Speaker 2: So last year, India exported three batteries of the Brumos
[3:32] Speaker 2: missile system to the Philippines. The deal was struck a
[3:35] Speaker 2: couple of years, a year and a half away, I think,
[3:38] Speaker 2: in twenty twenty three for three seventy five million dollars.
[3:42] Speaker 2: And recently we've heard that the talks with Indonesia for
[3:46] Speaker 2: a deal of around four to fifty million dollars is
[3:50] Speaker 2: in the final stages and probably will be announced when
[3:53] Speaker 2: the Indonesian Head of state comes to India very soon.
[3:56] Speaker 2: So before we get into why are we talking about
[4:01] Speaker 2: exporting Brumos, like, you know, a system that was inducted
[4:05] Speaker 2: in your in your military in two thousand and five,
[4:08] Speaker 2: which I think is going to be very interesting, I
[4:10] Speaker 2: want first year assessment of why should we be tom
[4:13] Speaker 2: tomming India being able to export this missile system.
[4:16] Speaker 3: Well, you know you answered that question a little bit
[4:20] Speaker 3: in your question itself, which is that you know when
[4:23] Speaker 3: you said that you know, for once, we're not talking
[4:25] Speaker 3: about imports, we're talking about exports. So for a country
[4:29] Speaker 3: that continues to, you know, have the notoriety of being
[4:33] Speaker 3: the world's largest importer of weapons, any export is you know,
[4:38] Speaker 3: a breath of fresh air. It's like a cool wind
[4:40] Speaker 3: on a summer's day. It's it's something to be celebrated,
[4:43] Speaker 3: it's something to be welcomed, and it is something to
[4:46] Speaker 3: be learned from so that we can do more. A
[4:49] Speaker 3: weapon export is a very very difficult thing to achieve,
[4:53] Speaker 3: and you know, viewers who've been and listeners who've been
[4:56] Speaker 3: watching or listening to in our defense know that, you know,
[4:58] Speaker 3: we have taken a scat help and really torn through
[5:01] Speaker 3: India's procurement process, and so we know exactly how difficult
[5:05] Speaker 3: it is to sell stuff that we make here in
[5:08] Speaker 3: another country. Because we are so burdened by the pressures
[5:12] Speaker 3: of having to import equipment to meet our military's needs,
[5:16] Speaker 3: Exporting has been so far from our reality as a
[5:19] Speaker 3: nation that to see deals like these taking place now,
[5:23] Speaker 3: and we'll talk about the other countries that are buying
[5:25] Speaker 3: these things, is there's something almost magical about it and unthinkable.
[5:29] Speaker 3: And I can tell you that when I started covering defense.
[5:31] Speaker 3: When I started covering you know, the Brumos program, like
[5:34] Speaker 3: I often say, has been sort of co terminus with
[5:36] Speaker 3: my career. Two thousand and four is when I started
[5:38] Speaker 3: covering defense. Two thousand and five is when the Brumos
[5:41] Speaker 3: started entering service with the Indian military, and I've been
[5:43] Speaker 3: tracking it periodically with a great deal of regularity ever since.
[5:47] Speaker 3: I've known all of the CEOs who've been part of
[5:50] Speaker 3: the Brumos program since then, interacted with the scientists engineers,
[5:55] Speaker 3: both on the Russian and the Indian side, very very regularly.
[5:58] Speaker 3: So I have, you know, had had I've had a
[6:01] Speaker 3: sort of reasonable, almost kind of running understanding of the program,
[6:05] Speaker 3: you know, since its inception so too. And also and
[6:08] Speaker 3: we're going to get into some of the more you know,
[6:11] Speaker 3: sort of uncomfortable truths about why we're celebrating this export
[6:15] Speaker 3: in just a moment. But it's a very very big
[6:17] Speaker 3: day because for literally the entire lifespan of this program, managers, CEOs, diplomats,
[6:26] Speaker 3: officers within the Ministry of Defense have been fighting the
[6:29] Speaker 3: system to permit the export of this missile to other countries.
[6:33] Speaker 3: You know, letters have been written, and I'm going to
[6:35] Speaker 3: be very honest on today's show, and I'm going to
[6:37] Speaker 3: actually read out from some on record communications within the
[6:40] Speaker 3: military from that time, you know, off, you know, a
[6:44] Speaker 3: sort of policy paralysis that took place. And you know,
[6:47] Speaker 3: I'm not here to bash one government visa the other.
[6:49] Speaker 3: You know, all governments have have ups and downs, but
[6:53] Speaker 3: under the sort of latter part of the upa government,
[6:56] Speaker 3: the kind of policy paralysis that plagued the system that time,
[7:00] Speaker 3: the national security system at that time, among much else,
[7:03] Speaker 3: meant that the Brumos kind of hit a roadblock despite
[7:06] Speaker 3: having literally a queue of customers who are waiting to
[7:09] Speaker 3: you know, either be briefed to the system or literally
[7:12] Speaker 3: put money down and say we need this system now.
[7:14] Speaker 3: And the amount of time that has elapsed from then
[7:17] Speaker 3: till now, we're talking about a decade and a half.
[7:20] Speaker 3: They've and we've missed the bus in many many respects.
[7:23] Speaker 3: We've missed, you know, valuable export chances. We've missed the
[7:27] Speaker 3: ability to supply these missiles to you know, countries which
[7:31] Speaker 3: are strategically important to us. We have permitted countries like
[7:35] Speaker 3: China and Russia to move in and fill that vacuum.
[7:38] Speaker 3: You know, we've been late reactors. We've allowed policy paralysis,
[7:42] Speaker 3: specifically on the BRUMOS to mean that, you know, a credible,
[7:47] Speaker 3: proven operational weapons system with the Indian military for nearly
[7:50] Speaker 3: two decades now is only now starting to score those
[7:54] Speaker 3: export orders. So twenty years after it was inducted into
[7:57] Speaker 3: the Indian military, now we're talking about Philip Means. And
[8:00] Speaker 3: now the Indonesian deal that we're going to talk about
[8:03] Speaker 3: right now is coming up. So it's a huge, huge thing.
[8:07] Speaker 3: I don't think any other country has, you know, shot
[8:11] Speaker 3: itself in the foot in quite the dramatic fashion that
[8:14] Speaker 3: India has as far as the BRUMOS is concerned. By
[8:17] Speaker 3: this time. In my personal view, the BRUMOS should have
[8:21] Speaker 3: been operational with at least six or seven nations, and
[8:24] Speaker 3: it's operational with only one one other than India. So
[8:28] Speaker 3: there's a great deal of tragedy behind this amazing big.
[8:31] Speaker 2: Right, And we'll get right to that. Actually, because this
[8:35] Speaker 2: thought did actually strike me when the news of India
[8:38] Speaker 2: delivering those three batteries to the Philippines that came up
[8:42] Speaker 2: sometime a couple of months ago, a few months ago,
[8:44] Speaker 2: and I thought of it even back then because with
[8:46] Speaker 2: the benefit of having the conversation with you on the Brumos.
[8:49] Speaker 2: They will have a link in the show notes. It
[8:50] Speaker 2: kind of struck me that this is that one piece
[8:53] Speaker 2: of military equipment where at least on the developmental side
[8:56] Speaker 2: and in terms of the capabilities and in terms of
[8:58] Speaker 2: satisfying your customers, which are the Indiana me Airport Navy,
[9:01] Speaker 2: you haven't gone wrong at all. Things can be said
[9:03] Speaker 2: about set about and we have on this episode we've
[9:06] Speaker 2: talked about the Zune tank and things that went wrong
[9:08] Speaker 2: with it that they just fighter jet, and things that
[9:10] Speaker 2: went wrong with in initially but with Drummos, and like
[9:13] Speaker 2: that episode shows, there was not really even a single
[9:16] Speaker 2: instance or an incident where you could say, oh hey,
[9:18] Speaker 2: you kind of falted over your Yeah. So my point then,
[9:21] Speaker 2: when India Russia came together, you know Brummos like you know,
[9:24] Speaker 2: most people would know I is named apt in India
[9:26] Speaker 2: and moscowa both rivers Moscow and Russia, and set up
[9:29] Speaker 2: this joint venture, set up set up this firm. I'm
[9:32] Speaker 2: pretty sure there must have been some idea that you know,
[9:35] Speaker 2: if we succeed, obviously you will fulfill the Indian military's needs,
[9:40] Speaker 2: but we also kind of get customers and you know,
[9:42] Speaker 2: explore it to other countries and make more money out
[9:44] Speaker 2: of it and kind of you know, get that money
[9:46] Speaker 2: for more development, that sort of stuff like that. Two
[9:48] Speaker 2: thousand and five, like you said, were the first inductions
[9:50] Speaker 2: of the missile into into India's military, and the deliveries
[9:54] Speaker 2: happened in twenty twenty four.
[9:56] Speaker 1: So what's gone on for so long?
[9:59] Speaker 3: So, you know, nothing tells a story like certain hard facts.
[10:03] Speaker 3: So I'm going to read out from a couple of
[10:06] Speaker 3: letters that were accessed by journalist Ashi sh Singh to
[10:10] Speaker 3: a friend of mine is a well known journalist. He
[10:13] Speaker 3: had put this out a couple of years ago to
[10:15] Speaker 3: illustrate the policy paralysis that plagued specifically the Brumos program,
[10:21] Speaker 3: you know, a decade ago. And then I'm going to
[10:22] Speaker 3: also quote from an interview that I had done in
[10:24] Speaker 3: two thousand and eight. Two thousand and eight, they've with
[10:26] Speaker 3: doctor Sivadanu pill who was then the CEO of Bromos Corporation,
[10:31] Speaker 3: the joint venture Bromos Corporation. Okay, so here are the facts.
[10:35] Speaker 3: India exported the Brumos, like you said, for the first
[10:38] Speaker 3: time in twenty twenty three, started supplying them in twenty
[10:41] Speaker 3: twenty four. The first customer was the Philippines, right, so, okay,
[10:46] Speaker 3: bear Philippines in mind. Now, the year was twenty twenty
[10:49] Speaker 3: four when the missiles reached Philippines. I'm quoting from an
[10:52] Speaker 3: April twenty fourteen letter, which means ten years ago, okay,
[10:56] Speaker 3: just before the government changed. Where you have a external
[10:59] Speaker 3: Affairs minute bureaucrat writing to someone in Brumos Corporation saying,
[11:04] Speaker 3: dear mister so and so, we've come to learn that
[11:06] Speaker 3: a team from Brumos Aerospace team is visiting Philippines. We
[11:09] Speaker 3: seem to have no papers regarding political clearance for this visit.
[11:13] Speaker 3: The team is requested to not go before taking clearance
[11:16] Speaker 3: from MAA, and you are requested to contact MAA for
[11:19] Speaker 3: consultations regarding this visit before the team departs. Now, on
[11:22] Speaker 3: the face of it, nothing wrong with this, nothing wrong
[11:24] Speaker 3: with this letter. This is this is fully compliant with
[11:27] Speaker 3: the you know protocols. Anytime a national security related team
[11:31] Speaker 3: or a weapons related team goes anywhay, political clearance is required.
[11:35] Speaker 3: So there's nothing seemingly wrong with this. But the background
[11:38] Speaker 3: of this letter, what was happening around this letter were
[11:41] Speaker 3: teams from the from Brummos Corporation, literally breaking down the
[11:45] Speaker 3: doors of both the External Affairs Ministry and the Defense Ministry,
[11:49] Speaker 3: saying could you please hurry up and give us these
[11:52] Speaker 3: clearances so that we can go and at least talk
[11:55] Speaker 3: about the Brumos Ultimately, Ultimately, Brummos Corporation does not sell
[11:59] Speaker 3: the missiles. The Indian government that exports the missiles. So
[12:02] Speaker 3: even if I want to, I even if I talk
[12:04] Speaker 3: to you know, all my customers, I'm not going to
[12:07] Speaker 3: be able to sell them the missile unless I have
[12:09] Speaker 3: my full export clearance from you guys. So why are
[12:11] Speaker 3: you so skittish about us talking to other countries? This
[12:14] Speaker 3: letter shows that they were not allowed to even visit
[12:16] Speaker 3: other countries, you know, without all this red tape to
[12:20] Speaker 3: talk about it. And I'll come to the reasons for
[12:21] Speaker 3: that later. Now we've talked about the first customer, which
[12:24] Speaker 3: is Philippines. The second customer is a potential customer that's
[12:27] Speaker 3: coming up is Indonesia. India Today's Defense correspondent, Schiavani Sharma
[12:31] Speaker 3: has filed a report saying that a deal worth four
[12:33] Speaker 3: hundred and fifty million more than the Philippines deal is
[12:36] Speaker 3: now on the table and it's about to be concluded
[12:38] Speaker 3: with Indonesia. It's an even bigger deal, greater implications. We'll
[12:42] Speaker 3: come to the China aspect and why this is happening later,
[12:44] Speaker 3: but now now keep in your mind, Indonesia, this gets
[12:48] Speaker 3: you know, buckle on your seat belts because this gets
[12:51] Speaker 3: really really interesting. This is a letter in twenty ten,
[12:54] Speaker 3: which means fifteen years ago. Fifteen years ago, okay. This
[12:58] Speaker 3: is a message from within the Ministry of Defense. Again
[13:02] Speaker 3: once it is addressed to the Brumos people, it says.
[13:06] Speaker 3: The Second India Indonesia Defense Cooperation Meeting was held in
[13:12] Speaker 3: New Delhi during seventeenth to eighteenth June twenty ten. During
[13:15] Speaker 3: the visit to New Delhi, the Indonesian delegation was also
[13:19] Speaker 3: programmed to visit Brumos Aerospace office in New Delhi for discussions. However,
[13:23] Speaker 3: the Brumos Aerospace was requested to put off the visit
[13:26] Speaker 3: since a final view is yet to be taken on
[13:28] Speaker 3: export of Brumos missiles. Although the Indonesian side did not
[13:31] Speaker 3: raise the matter during the meeting, the feedback on this
[13:34] Speaker 3: has been that we may have mistakenly given the wrong
[13:37] Speaker 3: signals to Indonesia about our willingness to sell the missiles
[13:40] Speaker 3: to them since Brumos missiles were shown aboard ships visiting
[13:44] Speaker 3: Indonesia Wow, and there have also been discussions between them
[13:47] Speaker 3: and Brumos Aerospace in this regard. Having regard to the
[13:50] Speaker 3: position above, it is requested that no discussions on export
[13:54] Speaker 3: of Brumos missiles be pursued with foreign countries till the
[13:57] Speaker 3: general issue of missile exports is decided. This has the
[14:01] Speaker 3: approval of rmrm Is Daksha Mantrea Defense Minister. So I
[14:04] Speaker 3: have a whole file of these, believe me. So I
[14:07] Speaker 3: have taken the example of the existing debut customer of
[14:11] Speaker 3: the Brumos, and I've read out a letter that came
[14:13] Speaker 3: in twenty fourteen, nine years before that export happened, where
[14:16] Speaker 3: they were saying, by Philippines Majao Patanie Key, whether we
[14:20] Speaker 3: can sell them the missiles or not. The second letter
[14:22] Speaker 3: is fifteen years ago where they've said, hello, excuse me,
[14:27] Speaker 3: please don't show any willingness because we don't have any
[14:29] Speaker 3: policy on whether we can export these missiles or not.
[14:31] Speaker 3: So it was a paralysis of an almost ludicrous kind. Now,
[14:36] Speaker 3: a logical person or a reasonable person would argue back saying,
[14:39] Speaker 3: you know, why are you casting aspersions on what the
[14:42] Speaker 3: government of the day's reasons were. There may have been
[14:44] Speaker 3: many reasons and there are many things to consider. A. Obviously,
[14:48] Speaker 3: you can't export without a proper policy. B there may
[14:51] Speaker 3: have been some geopolitical reasons why you did not want to.
[14:54] Speaker 3: The UPA government of the day was very reluctant to
[14:58] Speaker 3: you know, bear its teeth at China. Export the brumos
[15:00] Speaker 3: to these countries would have been seen as a belligerent
[15:03] Speaker 3: move as far as China is concerned. You hear the
[15:05] Speaker 3: BJP government of today constantly say the up government was
[15:09] Speaker 3: very timid when it came to China. They never made
[15:12] Speaker 3: any bold moves against China, et cetera. I don't want
[15:15] Speaker 3: to get into that political tutum mema, but these letters
[15:18] Speaker 3: suggest that the Indian system, the Indian national security system,
[15:22] Speaker 3: was extremely timid or reluctant to provide clarity on the
[15:27] Speaker 3: export of sensitive weapon systems to countries, especially if the
[15:32] Speaker 3: that said export had a China implication. And if you
[15:34] Speaker 3: export any weapon to a country like Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam,
[15:38] Speaker 3: the only country it implies anything with is China. Because
[15:42] Speaker 3: all of these countries have territorial pungas with China, right.
[15:45] Speaker 3: So therefore you had a situation where for the better
[15:50] Speaker 3: half of a dec and a half and a half
[15:52] Speaker 3: Brumos was sort of sitting and watching customer after customer,
[15:58] Speaker 3: country after country have its military requirements serviced by someone else.
[16:03] Speaker 3: You would have China or in some perverse cases, even Russia,
[16:07] Speaker 3: even though the Bromos is an Indo Russian missile. Where
[16:10] Speaker 3: the Bramos was being offered to another country, Russia would
[16:13] Speaker 3: swoop in from the back door and offer them some
[16:14] Speaker 3: other missile and say, yay lel Ina Inda. Policy paralysis.
[16:19] Speaker 3: You've had situations like that, believe me. So it's a
[16:22] Speaker 3: it's a very tragic tale. And the policy paralysis was
[16:27] Speaker 3: most definitely political in nature. It was also there was
[16:31] Speaker 3: also a national security element to it because India had
[16:33] Speaker 3: never exported weapons before that, so there was a sense
[16:37] Speaker 3: of feeling around in the dark. There was no confidence,
[16:40] Speaker 3: There was no confidence in the system to you know,
[16:42] Speaker 3: to export systems. There was a kind of systemic timidity
[16:46] Speaker 3: and reluctance to be seen as a country that exports
[16:48] Speaker 3: weapons because India's has always stood for peace India's always
[16:52] Speaker 3: stood for non proliferation. India has always stood for, you know,
[16:57] Speaker 3: as opposed to China and Pakistan and North Korea, you know,
[17:00] Speaker 3: a country that is not involved in, you know, in
[17:02] Speaker 3: disturbing the you know, strategic balance in the region, et cetera,
[17:06] Speaker 3: et cetera. But the rise of China has been taking
[17:09] Speaker 3: place while you've been twiddling your thumbs and wondering whether
[17:12] Speaker 3: to allow your poor Brumos team to visit Philippines. You know,
[17:16] Speaker 3: while Indonesia has been visiting your ships, looking at the
[17:18] Speaker 3: Brumos being impressed by it. You've left fifteen years past
[17:22] Speaker 3: and allowed all those territorial disputes to become what they
[17:25] Speaker 3: are today, larger than life. They've become existential issues for
[17:28] Speaker 3: countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, and therefore the essence of
[17:34] Speaker 3: the Brumos in many ways has missed the train. You know,
[17:37] Speaker 3: we welcome, we welcome the Philippines deal, the Indonesia deal
[17:41] Speaker 3: is excellent. Hopefully this will open doors for you know,
[17:44] Speaker 3: the deals that have been stuck for many years with
[17:46] Speaker 3: Vietnam and others. But a capability that comes too late
[17:49] Speaker 3: in some ways is useless. You know, I'm not saying
[17:52] Speaker 3: that China, you know, has occupied all these territories and
[17:55] Speaker 3: nobody can do anything about it. Now, that's not true
[17:57] Speaker 3: at all, But I'm just saying that. Imagine if this
[17:59] Speaker 3: had been done fifteen years ago. Just imagine all the
[18:02] Speaker 3: strategic permutations, both in the Indian Ocean, both in the Himalayas,
[18:06] Speaker 3: both in Ladakh elsewhere, if the great game in Southeast
[18:10] Speaker 3: Asia was played with a much greater degree of confidence,
[18:14] Speaker 3: with a greater degree of self assuredness, which India simply
[18:16] Speaker 3: did not have. And that has changed. And lest anyone
[18:19] Speaker 3: think that I'm only bashing the UPA government, please remember
[18:23] Speaker 3: that under this government, it has taken a decade for
[18:25] Speaker 3: them to do this. This government came to power in
[18:28] Speaker 3: twenty fourteen. Twenty twenty three is when the missile deal
[18:32] Speaker 3: with Philippines happened. So if anyone thinks that I'm only
[18:35] Speaker 3: pointing a finger at the UPA, this government has also
[18:37] Speaker 3: taken its own sweet time, in fact equal time, ten years,
[18:41] Speaker 3: nine years to get to that point where they've started,
[18:44] Speaker 3: you know, putting out those missiles. Now we can also
[18:46] Speaker 3: sit here and say that the twenty twenty standoff in
[18:48] Speaker 3: Ladakh is what has changed things suddenly now that China
[18:52] Speaker 3: centricity as far as India's national security perspective is, what
[18:55] Speaker 3: has you know given us this confidence and this ability
[19:00] Speaker 3: to take these tough decisions as far as China is concerned.
[19:02] Speaker 3: But the fact of the matter is that in many
[19:04] Speaker 3: ways India has missed the train. And I'll quote something
[19:07] Speaker 3: that doctor savatanuple this is an on record interview, this
[19:10] Speaker 3: is not off the record, had told me in two
[19:12] Speaker 3: thousand and eight. He said, just remember this is two
[19:13] Speaker 3: thousand and eight, so you know how many years ago
[19:15] Speaker 3: that is. I am clear which country we will supply first,
[19:18] Speaker 3: how many numbers when, et cetera. He was confident that
[19:21] Speaker 3: he was going to get clearance to export. I am
[19:24] Speaker 3: just waiting for the clearance and clear cut instruction to
[19:27] Speaker 3: proceed with the final discussions. My opinion is if we
[19:30] Speaker 3: are not smart to export now, we will lose the market.
[19:33] Speaker 3: The world will not wait for India. Competitors are already
[19:36] Speaker 3: looking to make products that match ours. Two thousand and eight.
[19:39] Speaker 2: Wow, that's quite quite the story you've told us, right,
[19:43] Speaker 2: because I think a lot of this, I mean most
[19:45] Speaker 2: of it. I mean it's been reported, Like you said,
[19:47] Speaker 2: this is an interview that you've done yourself and you
[19:50] Speaker 2: have it out there. The other two memoirs that would
[19:53] Speaker 2: access were done by one of your one of your friends,
[19:55] Speaker 2: so it's probably out there, but no one really talks
[19:57] Speaker 2: about it that much. So it's quite it's a good
[19:59] Speaker 2: top and good timing that we chose to talk about
[20:03] Speaker 2: this topic. But just to sort of sort of extend
[20:06] Speaker 2: the point on when you said about China, the China
[20:09] Speaker 2: standoff may have kind of, you know, pushed the government
[20:12] Speaker 2: into sort of exploring this this avenue of exporting bramos
[20:15] Speaker 2: to these countries. If you remember when we talked about China,
[20:18] Speaker 2: we've always talked about how China. The twenty twenty standoff
[20:21] Speaker 2: is sort of when the Indian military took this very
[20:25] Speaker 2: major shift in its approach and its organization capabilities and
[20:29] Speaker 2: how it is placed along the lc VI, the lc
[20:33] Speaker 2: against Pakistan, that was a straight trigger. However, like we've
[20:36] Speaker 2: discussed several times that military analysts, military veterans and people
[20:42] Speaker 2: within the military was serving back then had long warned that,
[20:46] Speaker 2: you know, it is China that we should be focusing on.
[20:48] Speaker 2: They had been trying to convince governments, ministers from ministers
[20:51] Speaker 2: that focus Yahan, it finally happened because of the standoff.
[20:56] Speaker 2: Was there something similar happening with Bramos as well? Like
[20:58] Speaker 2: that there were the people within the system trying to
[21:00] Speaker 2: convince the governments that, you know, do this expoort, it
[21:03] Speaker 2: will benefit you in the future, not this in terms
[21:06] Speaker 2: of money.
[21:06] Speaker 1: I mean, so this is not about money like you've
[21:08] Speaker 1: been talking about it.
[21:09] Speaker 2: This is about the strategic impact that deals like this have.
[21:12] Speaker 2: And we get into the back part in a short
[21:15] Speaker 2: while as well. But was that not happening or was
[21:17] Speaker 2: that happening and the.
[21:18] Speaker 1: Government still was clueless about what to do.
[21:20] Speaker 3: You know, I don't wish to sound unduly harsh, but
[21:25] Speaker 3: there is a thing called strategic stupidity. There is a
[21:28] Speaker 3: thing called strategic myopia. There is a thing called inertia,
[21:32] Speaker 3: strategic inertia, and all of these most definitely plagued the
[21:36] Speaker 3: latter half of the UPA government for various political reasons.
[21:39] Speaker 3: I don't think they were I don't think the UPA
[21:42] Speaker 3: government was in some way lesser in terms of its
[21:44] Speaker 3: understanding of the world, but it most certainly was much
[21:48] Speaker 3: more reluctant to take hard steps in doing things. There
[21:52] Speaker 3: is no doubt at all that the world has changed
[21:55] Speaker 3: dramatically between that government and this government. Many things have happened.
[21:59] Speaker 3: There has been the COVID, there's a standoff, there is
[22:01] Speaker 3: the Great Game in the Indo Pacific. There is the
[22:04] Speaker 3: huge coming together together of India and the United States,
[22:07] Speaker 3: which actually started happening under the UPA, and one moan saying, uh,
[22:11] Speaker 3: there is you know, there are all these territorial issues
[22:13] Speaker 3: that are happening in Southeast Asia, which the Bromos is
[22:15] Speaker 3: now part of. So much has changed, there's no doubt
[22:18] Speaker 3: about it. But but I have shown you you know
[22:21] Speaker 3: when you ask, you know what this paralysis was really
[22:24] Speaker 3: all about, and you know what was wrong with the
[22:26] Speaker 3: system at that time. I have literally quoted just two letters,
[22:29] Speaker 3: just two letters that are reflective of the of the
[22:34] Speaker 3: kind of chronic unwillingness to take a difficult decision as
[22:37] Speaker 3: far as this is concerned. Imagine how many more letters
[22:40] Speaker 3: there are they've Imagine how many more files there must be.
[22:43] Speaker 3: This is just Philippines and Indonesia and only one one letter.
[22:46] Speaker 3: The must be so many more. There is a there
[22:49] Speaker 3: is a famous letter by a foreign secretary. I won't
[22:51] Speaker 3: take his or her name, where she's written a three
[22:53] Speaker 3: page letter to the Brumos Ceo saying I'm paraphrasing here,
[22:57] Speaker 3: but she's basically practically chastised him, saying, listen, you need
[23:01] Speaker 3: to chill. You know we've gotten we get letters from
[23:04] Speaker 3: you every fortnight. But until we have a comprehensive export policy,
[23:09] Speaker 3: which we don't have currently, can you please stop sending
[23:11] Speaker 3: us letters. Okay, it's not going to happen, you know, permission,
[23:14] Speaker 3: naime ilega, So stop sending these letters. Okay, I'm of
[23:18] Speaker 3: course oversimplifying it. It's a very polite letter, but basically saying,
[23:21] Speaker 3: by policy, permission, case is it there? So doctor sivasan
[23:25] Speaker 3: upile the bramos CEOs, he's asking me saying, so, my
[23:30] Speaker 3: my thought, respectfully back to the government was how long
[23:34] Speaker 3: does it take to make a damn policy? I've been
[23:36] Speaker 3: asking you this for ten years. How long does it
[23:38] Speaker 3: make to take, you know, take to make a policy.
[23:40] Speaker 3: It's a you know, there there were certain restrictive regimes
[23:43] Speaker 3: is MTCR and a few other things that meant that
[23:46] Speaker 3: export was a little tricky for India, and that MTCR
[23:50] Speaker 3: issue was resolved much much later. But here was a
[23:53] Speaker 3: the Brumos range definitely complied with those restrictions at that time.
[23:57] Speaker 3: But but here was a CEO who was practically tring
[24:00] Speaker 3: his hair out, he didn't have much air on his head, uh,
[24:03] Speaker 3: in order to get clarity. He was not even asking
[24:06] Speaker 3: After a point of time, the CEO's successive CEOs of
[24:09] Speaker 3: Drummos were not even asking for permission to export. They
[24:12] Speaker 3: were practically saying, just give us clarity whether you know,
[24:15] Speaker 3: should I send my people there to other countries or not?
[24:17] Speaker 3: Should I send my teams to participate in these shows
[24:20] Speaker 3: or not you know? Or should I just wait around
[24:22] Speaker 3: for Indian orders and then you whenever you tell me,
[24:25] Speaker 3: then I'll start doing it. Because because Drummos by itself
[24:28] Speaker 3: was a corporation, they were not a circurry agency. It
[24:30] Speaker 3: was an indoor Russian joint venture, profit driven, looking for customers, proactive,
[24:35] Speaker 3: which is everything that the Indian system is not u
[24:38] Speaker 3: And therefore it was enormously frustrating for Drummos to be
[24:42] Speaker 3: sitting here and watching active customers come up, look at
[24:45] Speaker 3: their brochures, look at their ships, visit their ships, visit
[24:48] Speaker 3: their facilities. See see the weapon and an excellent weapon,
[24:53] Speaker 3: you know, and not even a weapon in development, an excellent,
[24:55] Speaker 3: proven operational inducted weapon and having to disappoint them by saying, listen,
[25:00] Speaker 3: you know, we'd love to sell it to you, but
[25:01] Speaker 3: you know, malikne permission in India. So it became like
[25:05] Speaker 3: that for a very very long time. And sure, the
[25:08] Speaker 3: truth is that much changed between the two governments in
[25:12] Speaker 3: terms of, you know, the geopolitical situation. You know, much
[25:16] Speaker 3: of the policy work. We may have to credit the
[25:18] Speaker 3: UPA government for at least beginning the policy work towards
[25:22] Speaker 3: creating some kind of a basis for exports, though I
[25:26] Speaker 3: very much doubt it because this letter is twenty fourteen
[25:28] Speaker 3: April twenty fourteen. They lost power in what May or June.
[25:32] Speaker 3: So therefore this this doesn't sound very positive. It looks
[25:35] Speaker 3: like until the last last days of the UPA government
[25:38] Speaker 3: they were like no, no, expert, naoga nikom. So I'm
[25:42] Speaker 3: only left with the option of saying that it was
[25:45] Speaker 3: under this government that something culturally changed from that strategic vision.
[25:50] Speaker 3: Gone was the timidity of thinking of export. You know
[25:54] Speaker 3: that that whole socialist kind of strategic peacenik mindset that
[25:58] Speaker 3: has you know, that has infected Indian governments since independence. Well, no,
[26:03] Speaker 3: we're peaceful, peaceful, peaceful, peaceful. You know, you can be
[26:06] Speaker 3: peaceful and yet ensure peace in the region. You know,
[26:10] Speaker 3: exporting weapons doesn't necessarily mean you are you're a violent country,
[26:15] Speaker 3: because weapons, after all, are about deterans. Where India sends
[26:18] Speaker 3: the Brumos out to Philippines and Indonesia, now India is
[26:22] Speaker 3: not saber rattling. India is literally saying we don't want
[26:25] Speaker 3: these weapons to ever be used, so there will lie
[26:28] Speaker 3: the peace. We talk about deterents so much on this show. Right,
[26:30] Speaker 3: the whole point of the Bromos in the hands of
[26:32] Speaker 3: countries like Indonesia and Philippines, to simplify it further, is
[26:37] Speaker 3: to get China to behave in certain respects. Right, So
[26:41] Speaker 3: the point is not to be belligerent or violent at all.
[26:43] Speaker 3: But that understanding has fundamentally shifted. Now there is a
[26:47] Speaker 3: greater there's greater strategic foresight. There is let less coyness
[26:52] Speaker 3: shyness about you know, there's nothing dirty about exporting weapons,
[26:57] Speaker 3: especially when it is in national self interest for a
[27:00] Speaker 3: country like India. You know, it's not some it's not
[27:02] Speaker 3: some horrible thing. You know, Oh my god, you're now
[27:05] Speaker 3: a country that exports weapons you know, the land of
[27:07] Speaker 3: Gandhi is exporting weapons. What have we come to? You
[27:10] Speaker 3: know that that bullshit is out of the window, right,
[27:12] Speaker 3: So those are I mean, those are hypocrisies which have
[27:16] Speaker 3: been thankfully the winds of change have taken them away.
[27:19] Speaker 3: What has also changed is the speed with which decisions
[27:22] Speaker 3: are taking place. So even though the Modi government has
[27:25] Speaker 3: taken nine years, you know, to conclude a deal with Philippines,
[27:29] Speaker 3: which we know from this letter, Philippines was interested in
[27:32] Speaker 3: it from that time, from at least nine years ago,
[27:34] Speaker 3: if not earlier. Credits should be given for that. Credit
[27:37] Speaker 3: should be given that you know, a customer who first
[27:41] Speaker 3: expressed interest nine years ago. You've still been able to
[27:43] Speaker 3: close a deal with that country. That's commendable and it's
[27:46] Speaker 3: credit to India's Foreign Services, the Ministry of Defense, the government,
[27:49] Speaker 3: whatever it is. But the Indonesian deal now that's coming up,
[27:52] Speaker 3: shows that there is aggression. You've just done one deal.
[27:55] Speaker 3: Now you're pushing through another deal after Indonesia. You do
[27:57] Speaker 3: know that Malaysia, Vietnam, you know, Brizil, certain other countries
[28:01] Speaker 3: are also in the in the you know, in the
[28:03] Speaker 3: waiting room waiting for this for these weapons as well,
[28:07] Speaker 3: So there's a there seems to be more systemic efficiency,
[28:12] Speaker 3: a greater sort of professionalization of things where clarity is
[28:16] Speaker 3: also given. There may be countries that are coming to
[28:18] Speaker 3: India and asking for certain weapons, and a clear sort
[28:20] Speaker 3: of message is being given to those countries, perhaps saying listen,
[28:23] Speaker 3: we can't supply those weapons to you right now for
[28:25] Speaker 3: various reasons. But no country is left hanging for fifteen years.
[28:29] Speaker 3: No country is left is told hamay off is meyajah
[28:31] Speaker 3: and then told, oh, sorry, we can't show you this weapon.
[28:33] Speaker 3: That kind of ridiculous systemic confusion, ambiguity, nebulousness. As far
[28:38] Speaker 3: as you know, decision making is concerned, that's gone out
[28:40] Speaker 3: of the window, which I think is a very very
[28:42] Speaker 3: welcome change.
[28:43] Speaker 2: Right, we'll talk more on the top topic, especially the
[28:46] Speaker 2: geobotical aspect of deals.
[28:48] Speaker 4: Like these, But quick back, do you sometimes get frustrated
[28:58] Speaker 4: choosing what to eat for diabetes is management while stopping
[29:01] Speaker 4: yourself from eating that chocolate pudding is good?
[29:05] Speaker 3: But is it really enough?
[29:08] Speaker 4: This month, Health Wealth will be doing a special podcast
[29:11] Speaker 4: on World Diabetes Day, which is the fourteenth of November.
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[29:38] Speaker 2: Welcome back, shiven I discussing the promost missile system and
[29:41] Speaker 2: not the system person actually the fact that India has
[29:44] Speaker 2: landed had landed in order to supply it to the
[29:48] Speaker 2: Philippines a couple of years ago. Supplies went out last year,
[29:52] Speaker 2: and a deal with Indonesia is sort of on the
[29:54] Speaker 2: definitely on the table, and it's in the final stages
[29:56] Speaker 2: and it's expected to be signed very very soon.
[29:59] Speaker 1: In the first half, you you've you've.
[30:00] Speaker 2: Told us about the policy paralysis, the fact that you
[30:04] Speaker 2: did not have sort of an export policy, export control
[30:06] Speaker 2: policy that you know, allowed you to give Dramos the
[30:09] Speaker 2: okay to even go to present a PPT by the way,
[30:12] Speaker 2: you know, like you said in that letter, it was
[30:14] Speaker 2: just like ya milk the khakiang and then you tell
[30:17] Speaker 2: us if we can sell or not. But so before
[30:21] Speaker 2: we talk about the geopolgical aspects of UH deals like these,
[30:25] Speaker 2: I want to actually talk about this technical aspect of
[30:28] Speaker 2: export and export policy, because this is something Actually I've
[30:32] Speaker 2: tried to wrap my head around when we did reporting
[30:35] Speaker 2: around the Baralacot astrag because that is the first time
[30:37] Speaker 2: I think we not first time it was reported, but
[30:40] Speaker 2: it became widely known that the US had told Pakistans
[30:44] Speaker 2: in its agreement for F sixteen that you cannot use
[30:46] Speaker 2: them sorry against India, And to me that struck a
[30:49] Speaker 2: bit odd by Mira Pessa Ma right, Like.
[30:53] Speaker 1: If I'm buying a car, I can do whatever.
[30:54] Speaker 2: I want with it, accept really obviously, but it's my car,
[30:57] Speaker 2: it's my property. How will how can you decide us? So,
[31:04] Speaker 2: but I'm you know.
[31:05] Speaker 1: It's for people who closely for the world of defense.
[31:08] Speaker 2: It might sound ridiculous I'm saying that, but it's a
[31:10] Speaker 2: very very sort of you know, established thing in the
[31:12] Speaker 2: world of defense exports. So because India rarely gets the
[31:16] Speaker 2: chance to be an exporter, I want to understand what
[31:19] Speaker 2: goes into making an export policy and what would be
[31:24] Speaker 2: India's export policy, like whom do you sell to, what
[31:27] Speaker 2: sort of restrictions do you have on them? And very
[31:30] Speaker 2: very crucially, how do you safeguard this tech that you
[31:33] Speaker 2: have developed and the IP rights for which you own.
[31:36] Speaker 3: So you know, any defense deal they've you know, whether
[31:40] Speaker 3: US importing something or now US exporting stuff is not
[31:43] Speaker 3: a purely commercial deal at all. I mean that is
[31:46] Speaker 3: the obvious thing, but I need to say it because
[31:48] Speaker 3: many people need to understand that it's not purely commercial.
[31:51] Speaker 3: These are very very high value deals, as we've just
[31:54] Speaker 3: spoken about. The deals with Philippines and Indonesia at three
[31:58] Speaker 3: seventy five and four fifty million are actually compared to
[32:01] Speaker 3: how big defense deals can actually get. But having said that,
[32:04] Speaker 3: all defense deals are basically political decisions. Uh, they meet
[32:09] Speaker 3: a you know, a certain capability for the receiving military
[32:13] Speaker 3: towards political ends. After all, the military is there to
[32:16] Speaker 3: either guard the sovereignty of a country or wage war
[32:20] Speaker 3: or you know, or you know, execute certain missions against
[32:24] Speaker 3: or within another country. And therefore all defense deals are political.
[32:28] Speaker 3: You know, when you sell weapons to another country, Uh,
[32:31] Speaker 3: it is it is a loud political message. It's there
[32:34] Speaker 3: is There's not going to be anything ambiguous about it.
[32:37] Speaker 3: India is selling weapons to Armenia as it has been
[32:41] Speaker 3: doing for the last few years, including artillery guns, pinaka
[32:45] Speaker 3: rocket systems, et cetera. Is not a purely commissioned commercial
[32:49] Speaker 3: deal because, uh, it means you are supplying a country
[32:52] Speaker 3: that is at war with Azerbaijan. When you're selling Bramos
[32:55] Speaker 3: missiles to the Philippines, uh the obvious message. Any idiot
[33:00] Speaker 3: will tell you that it's because the Philippines needs these
[33:03] Speaker 3: missiles as a deterrent against an aggressive China in the
[33:07] Speaker 3: South China Sea. When we when the deal with the
[33:09] Speaker 3: Indonesia comes to fruition, it is going to be obvious
[33:12] Speaker 3: to everyone as it is even now that Indonesia, being
[33:15] Speaker 3: an archipelagic nation with hundreds of islands and a huge
[33:20] Speaker 3: you know, oceanic maritime Exclusive Economic Zone, has a vast,
[33:26] Speaker 3: you know amount of territory in the oceans to protect
[33:28] Speaker 3: against a China you know, between the Malacca Strait and elsewhere,
[33:32] Speaker 3: and therefore it needs this kind of deterrent capability to
[33:34] Speaker 3: keep China in check. So in any deal that you see,
[33:39] Speaker 3: you know what who those weapons are pointed at. When
[33:42] Speaker 3: you know, when Russia supplies S four hundreds to India,
[33:45] Speaker 3: it is clear to the world that those four hundreds
[33:47] Speaker 3: are basically against largely a Chinese threat and to a
[33:50] Speaker 3: smaller extent, a Pakistani threat. So the adversaries of a
[33:53] Speaker 3: country make you know that deal pretty obvious. Now, what
[33:57] Speaker 3: goes into an export export Paul, which is at the
[34:01] Speaker 3: core of this episode, is that it's complicated. It is
[34:05] Speaker 3: a combination of military capability, foreign policy. India's a country
[34:11] Speaker 3: strategic objectives. Since we're in India, I'm talking about India,
[34:14] Speaker 3: our strategic objectives with other countries, and what our long
[34:17] Speaker 3: term regional or international goals really are. Because, like I said,
[34:20] Speaker 3: a defense deal is you know, when we send our
[34:24] Speaker 3: Bromos to Philippines or Indonesia, believe me, we're keeping an
[34:27] Speaker 3: eye on those missiles at all times to see what's
[34:30] Speaker 3: being done with them. So you know, we may not
[34:32] Speaker 3: be restricting how Indonesia or the Philippines use the Bromos missiles,
[34:38] Speaker 3: but you know, like the US does with the F sixteens,
[34:40] Speaker 3: and that's a whole new episode, but you better believe
[34:44] Speaker 3: that we are keeping tabs on what's happening with those systems.
[34:47] Speaker 3: So you know, that's one of the ironies. We've sold
[34:50] Speaker 3: it to them. It's their weapon, it's their missile, it's
[34:52] Speaker 3: under their military, but we're still still keeping track of
[34:55] Speaker 3: those weapons because in many ways, those weapons are an
[34:59] Speaker 3: extension of oureign policy. Yes, it is our foreign policy
[35:02] Speaker 3: that has facilitated the supply of those weapons. So it's
[35:05] Speaker 3: the long arm of foreign policy that still connects those
[35:08] Speaker 3: weapons back to us here in Delhi. So that is important.
[35:11] Speaker 3: Now I'll take an example of Brumos because as I
[35:15] Speaker 3: described in my last answer, there was simply and frankly
[35:19] Speaker 3: and admittedly a complete lack of an export policy for weapons,
[35:22] Speaker 3: particularly the Bromos. The reason why Brumos kept coming up
[35:26] Speaker 3: in these discussions is because probably because there was no
[35:28] Speaker 3: other weapon that anybody was interested in. Most countries coming
[35:31] Speaker 3: to India were interested in the Brumos. You know, the
[35:33] Speaker 3: Tajes wasn't ready. Many of the other weapons systems that
[35:36] Speaker 3: we see right now being exported to Armenia and other
[35:38] Speaker 3: countries were simply not you know, at a stage of
[35:41] Speaker 3: maturity where they could be exported. And therefore the Brumos
[35:43] Speaker 3: was ready, operational, inducted, and therefore everybody wanted it. Plus
[35:47] Speaker 3: it was an advanced capability. Again, I shall quote from
[35:49] Speaker 3: my article in two thousand and eight where Brumos Corporation,
[35:53] Speaker 3: at a time when India had no almost no export policy,
[35:57] Speaker 3: was doing the work of the government. Brummos by itself
[36:00] Speaker 3: created a white paper saying that here is an export
[36:03] Speaker 3: policy you can consider for the Brumos. Since you guys
[36:06] Speaker 3: are sitting on your asses and not and have written
[36:10] Speaker 3: us letters saying export policy in Ana, export policy, in
[36:12] Speaker 3: Ana export policy in a cello hull, we will do
[36:16] Speaker 3: your job for you and we will come up with
[36:18] Speaker 3: a sort of mini a diet export policy in which
[36:21] Speaker 3: you can flesh out using your resources. So what happened
[36:25] Speaker 3: was a supervisory council comprising members of both the Indian
[36:28] Speaker 3: and Russian governments was set up. Yeah, they had your
[36:30] Speaker 3: DRDO Chief Secretary Defense Finance, joined secretary from the External
[36:34] Speaker 3: Affairs Ministry, et cetera, and corresponding people from the Russian side.
[36:38] Speaker 3: And these two sides created a list of categories of
[36:41] Speaker 3: countries that could be that could be exported the Brumos
[36:45] Speaker 3: could be exported to. Category one listed the principal customers
[36:48] Speaker 3: India and Russia. These are the countries that Brumos can
[36:51] Speaker 3: be exported to the paper that Brummos supplied. Category two
[36:54] Speaker 3: listed Egypt, Chile, South Africa and Brazil, which were classified
[36:58] Speaker 3: as friendly countries identify by both Russia and India. Okay.
[37:02] Speaker 3: Category three included Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East. Basically,
[37:06] Speaker 3: the brief here was to start discussions, but don't commit.
[37:09] Speaker 3: You can talk to them, but don't commit Indonesia, Malaysia
[37:12] Speaker 3: and the Middle East. I won't say what is common
[37:13] Speaker 3: between them, but that is obvious. There there was a
[37:16] Speaker 3: bit of a reluctance from the government itself upa government
[37:19] Speaker 3: imagine ironic saying talk but don't commit yet. We don't
[37:24] Speaker 3: know yet whether we can supply to those countries. Okay
[37:27] Speaker 3: and Category four shipbuilding nations where brumos could discuss weapon
[37:31] Speaker 3: integration packages for their final warship products. This document was
[37:35] Speaker 3: presented to the Cabinet Committee on Security almost two years ago.
[37:40] Speaker 3: According to my article, my article is written in two
[37:42] Speaker 3: thousand and eight, so two years ago means two thousand
[37:44] Speaker 3: and six. Two thousand and six is when this mini
[37:47] Speaker 3: expert policy was given to the Ministry of Defense. Till now,
[37:50] Speaker 3: that is at the time of the writing of this
[37:51] Speaker 3: article two thousand and eight. Till now, there has been
[37:53] Speaker 3: no response. There is nothing official on which countries ramos
[37:56] Speaker 3: can be sold to. Defense Minister ak Anthony in two
[37:59] Speaker 3: thousand and eight has now ordered the Bromo CEO to give
[38:02] Speaker 3: him a fresh paper through DRDO on the country's plan
[38:05] Speaker 3: basically a proposal on the original proposal submitted to the
[38:10] Speaker 3: Cabinet Committee on Security. And now the Bramo CEO is
[38:13] Speaker 3: still working on this document and will submit it shortly.
[38:15] Speaker 3: So it's like two years after supplying the whole thing,
[38:20] Speaker 3: the government the mood has basically come to and saying,
[38:22] Speaker 3: can you give me another report now and report on
[38:25] Speaker 3: that original report and see the feasibility of executing that.
[38:28] Speaker 3: It is infuriating. It's infuriating. Now. You know people from
[38:32] Speaker 3: that time will I'm sure in their WhatsApp groups turn
[38:34] Speaker 3: out and say, how can you even begin to understand
[38:37] Speaker 3: the complexities of weapons export? I acknowledge all that there
[38:41] Speaker 3: must have been geopolitical, diplomatic and other you know things.
[38:45] Speaker 3: You know, this is not a This is not a
[38:47] Speaker 3: three Musketeer story where you do everything impulsively and it's
[38:50] Speaker 3: got checking a missile day though on go. But yeah,
[38:53] Speaker 3: and all that stuff. It doesn't work like that. There
[38:55] Speaker 3: are systems, there are protocols. The question is why did
[38:58] Speaker 3: it take so long to build those season protocols, which
[39:01] Speaker 3: answers your question if Brumos of course, Brumos's remit is
[39:05] Speaker 3: not foreign policy. It is not strategic policy. Your damn
[39:08] Speaker 3: job is to build the damn missile and deliver it
[39:10] Speaker 3: to the customers. But so desperate were they and frustrated
[39:14] Speaker 3: by the fact that there was this almost plague like
[39:17] Speaker 3: paralysis over clarity on how to export the missile, they
[39:20] Speaker 3: were saying, we will create the policy for you, which
[39:22] Speaker 3: is what they did, and that has started coming to fruition,
[39:25] Speaker 3: and I think that is what has changed.
[39:27] Speaker 1: Yeah, man, that's crazy.
[39:28] Speaker 2: I mean, you have a new print key. Just built
[39:31] Speaker 2: on this. This is the building block. I'm giving a
[39:33] Speaker 2: foundation stone, and just built on.
[39:34] Speaker 3: This policy was I think, if I remember correctly, I
[39:37] Speaker 3: had a copy of it many years ago, the policy
[39:40] Speaker 3: that Brumos, the white paper that Brumos supplied to the
[39:43] Speaker 3: Ministry of Defense was about eighty pages long. I had
[39:46] Speaker 3: a redacted version of it because much of it was classified.
[39:48] Speaker 3: It was a very very detailed study that was supplied
[39:52] Speaker 3: saying that for your consideration, you change whatever you want,
[39:55] Speaker 3: but this can be the starting they happen right.
[39:58] Speaker 2: Moving on on the similar tangent, I might end up
[40:03] Speaker 2: looking sounding as though you know somebody who just does
[40:06] Speaker 2: not just does not understand geopolitics at all.
[40:09] Speaker 1: But I still want to ask you this because the idea.
[40:12] Speaker 2: Of you exporting a missile system or any a piece
[40:16] Speaker 2: of defense equipment to a country and that being part
[40:19] Speaker 2: of your foreign policy is very abstract to me. For example,
[40:23] Speaker 2: you said, you know, you know, these missiles be pointed
[40:25] Speaker 2: towards or against China, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, et etcetera. They
[40:30] Speaker 2: can get missiles, you know. It's not as though Bramos
[40:32] Speaker 2: is the only missile in the world. There are many
[40:35] Speaker 2: companies who make missiles. So if they want, if they
[40:38] Speaker 2: feel need, they can obviously buy a missile or two
[40:40] Speaker 2: from somewhere and you know, have them positioned. So your
[40:42] Speaker 2: goal of having some sort of you know, missile pointed
[40:45] Speaker 2: towards China in a country that is friendly because of
[40:47] Speaker 2: your other diplomatic diplomatic negotiations, that is sort of fulfilled.
[40:53] Speaker 2: So how does like just breaking down to us, how
[40:56] Speaker 2: does having your piece of military equipment exported to our
[40:59] Speaker 2: country and being placed on their soil give you diplomatic
[41:02] Speaker 2: heft and give an advantage against let's say China.
[41:05] Speaker 1: In this case.
[41:05] Speaker 3: So very good question. So the reason for that is
[41:09] Speaker 3: if you boil down the great game that is being
[41:12] Speaker 3: played in the Indian Ocean Indo Pacific right now. You know,
[41:15] Speaker 3: in our part of the world's south and far east,
[41:19] Speaker 3: the two Asian giants are only two. There are only
[41:21] Speaker 3: two Asian giants, you know, vying for strategic space in Asia.
[41:26] Speaker 3: One of those countries is okay sharing strategic space with
[41:29] Speaker 3: the other. One of those countries is not okay sharing
[41:31] Speaker 3: strategic space with the other. I don't need to say
[41:33] Speaker 3: which is which. Now, all of the countries in Southeast Asia,
[41:37] Speaker 3: you know, want a peaceful existence because they exist in
[41:40] Speaker 3: a very very important part of the world. All the
[41:44] Speaker 3: strategic sea lanes of communication that emerge from the Persian Gulf,
[41:47] Speaker 3: you know, energy, oil, roots, shipping routes, they all pass
[41:51] Speaker 3: through those countries the Malacca Strait, then to Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thaigland,
[41:55] Speaker 3: all those countries, and then they go out into the
[41:57] Speaker 3: Pacific South China Sea and into the Pacific to all
[42:00] Speaker 3: the other countries. Now, these countries have come under increasing
[42:04] Speaker 3: strategic pressure to you know, choose a side. Okay, there
[42:09] Speaker 3: is a there is pressure to choose a side. Choosing
[42:11] Speaker 3: a side is like you know, nobody wants to choose
[42:13] Speaker 3: a side. No country wants to choose a side, because
[42:15] Speaker 3: there's something very black and white about it. But all
[42:19] Speaker 3: of these countries, or I should say most of these countries,
[42:21] Speaker 3: including Philippines, Indonesia, very notably Vietnam, have been facing an
[42:26] Speaker 3: increasingly belligerent China in the South China Sea and in
[42:30] Speaker 3: the you know, the oceanic domains of that area where
[42:33] Speaker 3: China has been testing them territorially over and over and
[42:37] Speaker 3: over again. It has been testing them, you know, with
[42:40] Speaker 3: research vessels, with warships, with quote unquote fishing boats, with submarines,
[42:45] Speaker 3: whatever it is. It has been you know, playing the
[42:48] Speaker 3: long game and testing the testing the preparedness of all
[42:52] Speaker 3: these countries because China, as we've said so many times
[42:55] Speaker 3: in previous episodes, has an almost insatiable appetite as far
[42:59] Speaker 3: as territory oriel uh you know, strategic presence is concerned.
[43:02] Speaker 3: And we are facing the same thing in the Indian
[43:04] Speaker 3: Ocean region Indian Ocean right now. So when these countries
[43:07] Speaker 3: have been under pressure to quote unquote choose a side,
[43:10] Speaker 3: which nobody wants to actually do, India is the most
[43:13] Speaker 3: stable of the two countries, India is most certainly unlike
[43:17] Speaker 3: China in terms of territorial appetite. UH India has a
[43:22] Speaker 3: blue water navy in terms of sending its ships out,
[43:25] Speaker 3: but it has zero territorial conflicts with any country apart
[43:30] Speaker 3: from China and Pakistan. UH India does not UH India
[43:34] Speaker 3: does not UH desire maritime domains of other countries. UH India.
[43:39] Speaker 3: India has friendly maritime relations with its immediate neighbors. There
[43:43] Speaker 3: are there are small frictions here and there, which Sri Lanka,
[43:46] Speaker 3: but apart from those, there are no major disputes of
[43:49] Speaker 3: any kind that India has with any other country, and
[43:52] Speaker 3: therefore India is seen as a stabilizing factor. India is
[43:55] Speaker 3: seen as a reliable partner. India is seen as a
[43:57] Speaker 3: net security provider in the region as far as not
[44:01] Speaker 3: just military security is concerned, but humanitarian relief after the tsunami,
[44:05] Speaker 3: you know what happened after that. All of those things
[44:07] Speaker 3: are concerned, and therefore India is basically just seen as
[44:10] Speaker 3: a as a much more uh you know, long term,
[44:13] Speaker 3: long term, predictable, sustainable sort of security provider and friend
[44:19] Speaker 3: in the region than China. All of these countries view
[44:21] Speaker 3: China with suspicion, not only because of the territorial issues,
[44:25] Speaker 3: but also because China is unpredictable. China's long term intentions
[44:29] Speaker 3: have always been ambiguous, and nobody can really tell what
[44:33] Speaker 3: are they after? What the hell are they after? You know,
[44:35] Speaker 3: Is it just hegemonic, Is it territorial? Is it something else?
[44:39] Speaker 3: Is it to teach the US a lesson? Is it
[44:41] Speaker 3: only about signaling? Is it about mind games? There's this,
[44:44] Speaker 3: and they love that ambiguity. They revel in the world
[44:48] Speaker 3: not knowing what the hell's going on in China. They
[44:50] Speaker 3: love that. So in that scenario, these countries have made
[44:54] Speaker 3: a choice. They've made a difficult choice, especially because they're
[44:57] Speaker 3: right there in the shadow of China to to you know,
[45:00] Speaker 3: to make these important and sensitive connections with India and
[45:04] Speaker 3: exporting a missile is bloody hell the most sensitive decision
[45:07] Speaker 3: you can make, because that that is blood for blood.
[45:09] Speaker 3: That is like a that's weaponry, right, that's that's something
[45:12] Speaker 3: that can hurt China, that can hurt Chinese ships. It
[45:16] Speaker 3: gives Chinese commanding officers of ships, you know, something to
[45:19] Speaker 3: think about when they send their ships out, et cetera.
[45:21] Speaker 3: So therefore it's a it's a it's a it's a
[45:23] Speaker 3: belligerent move. But India has always held that the intention
[45:28] Speaker 3: is not for these missiles to be used. The whole
[45:29] Speaker 3: ideas for these missiles not to be used in order
[45:32] Speaker 3: to create strategic balance and allow these countries like Philippines
[45:35] Speaker 3: and Indonesia, which are much smaller than China, much less equipped,
[45:38] Speaker 3: much smaller militaries, you know, much smaller GDPs, et cetera,
[45:41] Speaker 3: to at least feel a sense of security, a small
[45:43] Speaker 3: sense of security. Nobody is saying that, you know, a
[45:46] Speaker 3: handful of batteries of Brumos missiles is going to solve
[45:49] Speaker 3: all your strategic slash military issues as far as China
[45:52] Speaker 3: is concerned. But these are all pieces of the larger
[45:55] Speaker 3: you know, preparedness puzzle as it were. And therefore India
[45:58] Speaker 3: being the provider to these countries means that our foreign
[46:02] Speaker 3: policy has achieved a sense of maturity. You know, it
[46:05] Speaker 3: is no longer going to be one dog barking and
[46:08] Speaker 3: the other dog just sitting and not doing anything about it.
[46:11] Speaker 3: It's no longer going to be you know, the dragon
[46:14] Speaker 3: breathing fire and the elephant, you know, timidly sitting in
[46:17] Speaker 3: a corner. India sees the strategic value in establishing its presence,
[46:22] Speaker 3: in having its echo in other countries, in having its
[46:26] Speaker 3: foreign policy reflect in the actions being taken by countries
[46:29] Speaker 3: like Philippines, Thaigland and Vietnam soon Malaysia now Indonesia as well.
[46:33] Speaker 3: It sees great value in that because it knows that
[46:36] Speaker 3: ultimately these relationships in Asia are going to be about
[46:41] Speaker 3: strategic stability. You know, the value of deterance is of
[46:47] Speaker 3: enormous importance when it comes to China, because there can
[46:50] Speaker 3: be no assurances as far as China is concerned. We've
[46:53] Speaker 3: done an entire episode on the issue of trust. None
[46:56] Speaker 3: of this is dependent on trust. It has to be
[46:59] Speaker 3: based on mutual security, mutual deterance. You know, the fact
[47:04] Speaker 3: that there is a balance in the region and therefore
[47:06] Speaker 3: everyone can not have to look over their shoulder and
[47:08] Speaker 3: carry on with their real work instead of worrying about
[47:11] Speaker 3: what's going to happen. And that's where India comes into.
[47:13] Speaker 2: The pitch, right final point to when this show on
[47:17] Speaker 2: sort of taking a broad view of India's ability to
[47:20] Speaker 2: export in general. For one thing, I mean, what's Brahmos's competition,
[47:25] Speaker 2: by the way, in the global missile market.
[47:27] Speaker 1: Who does brummos compete against.
[47:30] Speaker 2: What other countries do you see brumos being potential customers of?
[47:34] Speaker 2: And apart from brumos, what other weapon platforms India is
[47:40] Speaker 2: developing has developed?
[47:41] Speaker 1: Where you see potential, where you hear chatter, where you you.
[47:44] Speaker 2: Know, you know you're in conversations with people within the
[47:46] Speaker 2: government or the military or those or DRDO, et cetera.
[47:50] Speaker 2: Have you heard talks about Okay, this is something we
[47:52] Speaker 2: might consider exporting, etcetera. So where do we stand in
[47:54] Speaker 2: terms of okay, have you entered the export market with ramos?
[47:57] Speaker 2: Like you said, very very rightly, So these are very like,
[48:00] Speaker 2: you know, miniscual deals when you look at the actual
[48:02] Speaker 2: deals that we and then just look at the deals
[48:05] Speaker 2: that India are signs for imports. I mean, I'll give
[48:07] Speaker 2: you an estimation of the size of those deals. So
[48:10] Speaker 2: maybe five, ten, fifteen, twenty years down the line, where
[48:13] Speaker 2: do you see India standing as an exporter of defense equipment?
[48:16] Speaker 3: So I'll answer your first question first, which is the
[48:18] Speaker 3: you know, what are the other products that are similar
[48:20] Speaker 3: to the bromos and what does the brumos compete with?
[48:23] Speaker 3: And that's a very good question because the Bromos is
[48:26] Speaker 3: actually quite unique in its capabilities. There are one or
[48:31] Speaker 3: two systems like it, and you know, not surprisingly they
[48:34] Speaker 3: are Russian, the Onyx. We've seen them being used the
[48:36] Speaker 3: Yakon slash. Onyx is a is a is a missile
[48:40] Speaker 3: that of which the Bromos is actually a derivative. We've
[48:43] Speaker 3: seen that being used in Ukraine. It's also a supersonic
[48:46] Speaker 3: cruise missile. The China, I forget the name, but the
[48:50] Speaker 3: Chinese have a have a sort of comparable missile system,
[48:54] Speaker 3: you know, like the Bromos. Not not quite the same
[48:56] Speaker 3: kind of capability, but something that's large comparable.
[49:01] Speaker 2: Uh.
[49:01] Speaker 3: There are of course many subsonic cruise missile systems and
[49:05] Speaker 3: anti ship missiles that you know, companies like MBDA and
[49:09] Speaker 3: others do build. You know, there are ship launched and
[49:13] Speaker 3: submarine launched sea skimming anti ship missiles which both Russia,
[49:17] Speaker 3: Europe and the United States all you know, all build.
[49:21] Speaker 3: So therefore there are there are all these different options.
[49:23] Speaker 3: So if you're looking for a kind of precise kind
[49:25] Speaker 3: of competition, it isn't really that. But what makes the
[49:29] Speaker 3: Brumos unique is that it you know, by virtue of
[49:32] Speaker 3: its incredible speed and its guidance system, it's difficult to
[49:35] Speaker 3: detect and shoot down and therefore, you know, before you've
[49:39] Speaker 3: even had time to react, it's impacted your impacted the target.
[49:43] Speaker 3: And that's that's its main sort of usp. But the
[49:46] Speaker 3: reason why the Bromos program is also exciting is because
[49:50] Speaker 3: the Bromos too, is going to be a hypersonic system
[49:53] Speaker 3: that's been in development for a for a while now,
[49:56] Speaker 3: and I think that the time taken to sort of
[49:59] Speaker 3: get it to maturity is reflective of the complexity of
[50:02] Speaker 3: the you know, technologies involved. And we've done an episode
[50:05] Speaker 3: on hypersonics before this where we've explained some of those
[50:08] Speaker 3: complexities in detail. Uh. But but the Bramos is, you know,
[50:13] Speaker 3: has sort of has flexed very very well because it's
[50:17] Speaker 3: a it's a it's a true try service weapon.
[50:20] Speaker 1: Uh.
[50:20] Speaker 3: It's it's it's fully operational and in service with many
[50:24] Speaker 3: many warships of the Indian Navy. Uh. You know, there
[50:27] Speaker 3: are many Indian Bromos regiments with the Army land based
[50:30] Speaker 3: UH regiments, there are it's. It's there with the Air Force,
[50:34] Speaker 3: it's there on the sou thirty. You know, there have
[50:36] Speaker 3: been plans to make a sort of Brumos Mini or
[50:38] Speaker 3: a Bromos M, which is a kind of miniaturized version
[50:41] Speaker 3: of the missile so it can fit on the actual
[50:43] Speaker 3: wings and not on the you know, belly hard point
[50:46] Speaker 3: of the soup. Uh. So there are all these things
[50:48] Speaker 3: that are happening, and uh, you know, hopefully we'll see
[50:52] Speaker 3: truition in some of them now apart from the Brumos.
[50:55] Speaker 3: And that's you know, that's a that's a tantalizing to
[51:00] Speaker 3: look at, because uh, let's look at the things that
[51:03] Speaker 3: we've exported uh so far the promos. Obviously, we've exported
[51:10] Speaker 3: private sector artillery guns from Baratford, the Khaliani Group, Uh,
[51:15] Speaker 3: their their artillery guns have been exported to countries like
[51:18] Speaker 3: Armenia and certain other customers. India's Pinnaka guided rocket system
[51:26] Speaker 3: multiple rocket system has also been exported to uh to
[51:29] Speaker 3: that country. Uh. Many many, many different kinds of electronics,
[51:34] Speaker 3: from radars to missile warning systems to uh, you know,
[51:38] Speaker 3: uh electronic warfare jammer systems, et cetera, have been exported
[51:42] Speaker 3: to many different air forces in the world. Uh. Uh.
[51:45] Speaker 3: The the Malaysian Air Force has wanted you know, certain
[51:49] Speaker 3: equipment for the SOO thirty from India, which we've been
[51:52] Speaker 3: exporting to them. So there are all these things, but
[51:55] Speaker 3: uh uh, some of the things that are being pitched
[51:59] Speaker 3: to foreign customers include the Drove helicopter. Drove had had
[52:05] Speaker 3: a very unfortunate and uh sort of needlessly bad time
[52:10] Speaker 3: with its biggest export customer, which was Ecuador many years
[52:13] Speaker 3: ago when they grounded all the helicopters and they canceled
[52:16] Speaker 3: that deal because many of them crashed for various reasons.
[52:20] Speaker 3: The Drove is having problems even now. They grounded right
[52:22] Speaker 3: now in India, which is sad uh, and they won't
[52:25] Speaker 3: likely won't be flying during the Republic Day parade. But
[52:29] Speaker 3: the Drove continues to be a you know, an important
[52:32] Speaker 3: export item as it were, though the current sort of
[52:36] Speaker 3: cloud around it might affect that a little bit. The
[52:38] Speaker 3: TAGS is being seen as a very very credible exportable aircraft,
[52:44] Speaker 3: the HTT forty trainer aircraft. I don't see why it
[52:49] Speaker 3: can't be a you know, very very good, low cost
[52:51] Speaker 3: recreational aircraft slash trainer. You know, if HL plays it right.
[52:57] Speaker 3: The hl's knew light utility helicopter which is coming up,
[53:01] Speaker 3: would be a fabulous helicopter once it you know, finishes
[53:05] Speaker 3: all its certifications, could do could do it? UH, the
[53:08] Speaker 3: the the Tata DRDO Kestrel, the eight wheeler amphibious vehicle
[53:14] Speaker 3: which is now in Ladakh. You know, we're getting the
[53:17] Speaker 3: Striker from the United States. We've done an episode on
[53:19] Speaker 3: that which we shouldn't because the WAP is so good.
[53:22] Speaker 3: That is a fabulous UH export item in my view.
[53:26] Speaker 3: Those rava will be an amazing export item in my
[53:29] Speaker 3: view once it is uh you know, proven and inducted
[53:32] Speaker 3: UH and UH Indian radars you know, and we will
[53:35] Speaker 3: do a full episode on this because Indian radars, sonars UH.
[53:40] Speaker 3: You know, sensor systems have always been really really good,
[53:43] Speaker 3: really really top notch ground based systems UH. And those
[53:48] Speaker 3: have have been exported in small quantities here and there,
[53:51] Speaker 3: but there have been no big sort of deal. So
[53:53] Speaker 3: India is still not seen as a kind of technology
[53:56] Speaker 3: provider for UH, you know these things like for exams
[54:00] Speaker 3: sample many of India's warships. The main MFTAR radars Israeli
[54:05] Speaker 3: system UH israel s coripsidered the past master when it
[54:08] Speaker 3: comes to aircraft and you know, ship based radars. So
[54:12] Speaker 3: India needs to find that niche what is that niche
[54:14] Speaker 3: going to be. We don't know just yet. You know,
[54:17] Speaker 3: supplying people with artillery guns and and you know, multi
[54:21] Speaker 3: rocket systems and aircraft and helicopters is all very well.
[54:24] Speaker 3: It's very competitive. It's difficult, but I think the time
[54:27] Speaker 3: has come now for India to get into a much
[54:29] Speaker 3: more forward future ready kind of uh you know, capability
[54:33] Speaker 3: where India is not necessarily jostling for space and actually
[54:38] Speaker 3: leverages our own uh, you know, capabilities, swarm technology, drones AI, uh,
[54:44] Speaker 3: you know, uh, software powered military systems and combat systems. Uh.
[54:50] Speaker 3: I think there's a there's a there's a there's a
[54:52] Speaker 3: sort of launch pad opportunity right now before the world
[54:56] Speaker 3: changes again.
[54:57] Speaker 1: Uh.
[54:57] Speaker 3: And you know, neural network technology in uh. You know,
[55:02] Speaker 3: we've touched upon this when we talked about loyal wing
[55:04] Speaker 3: man droves and manned unman teaming. The United States is
[55:08] Speaker 3: by far the big daddy of that technology or the
[55:12] Speaker 3: big Mama of that technology. But but I think there's
[55:14] Speaker 3: a there's a great opportunity for India to get into that.
[55:17] Speaker 3: And once that happens, you penetrate basically every potential customer
[55:21] Speaker 3: there is on Earth. If you build or invent something
[55:24] Speaker 3: that nobody else has, and I think, uh, looking at
[55:27] Speaker 3: the startup ecosystem that's there right now, you know they
[55:30] Speaker 3: don't need to worry about what the US is doing.
[55:32] Speaker 3: They can do it sitting in telling Karnataka wherever it
[55:36] Speaker 3: is and still you know, swim with the sharks.
[55:38] Speaker 2: It's a fantastic point actually, you know, talking about how
[55:41] Speaker 2: you should leverage what you're best at and sort of
[55:43] Speaker 2: basically not a monopoly pose it, but like be the
[55:46] Speaker 2: go to person like India.
[55:50] Speaker 3: And don't share it with anyone for lower money.
[55:53] Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly.
[55:54] Speaker 2: I love how you mentioned tags in that list of
[55:57] Speaker 2: you know, potential export items and I just thought that
[56:00] Speaker 2: your friends in the Air Force will be like by.
[56:03] Speaker 1: To export.
[56:05] Speaker 3: But they just has competed in intenders with in Malaysia
[56:10] Speaker 3: in I think it was Kuwait or somewhere else there
[56:12] Speaker 3: there there have been actual contests whether they just is competed.
[56:16] Speaker 3: So that's the reason why I mentioned it. But yeah, yeah,
[56:18] Speaker 3: the Air Force will be like bye please thanks Shiver.
[56:21] Speaker 2: A fantastic episode, and I loved the information that you
[56:25] Speaker 2: were able to give us on this on this podcast
[56:27] Speaker 2: because I think, like I mentioned, it's been reported but
[56:30] Speaker 2: not widely known and I think it's something that, like
[56:32] Speaker 2: you said, we use this as a platform to sort
[56:35] Speaker 2: of sort of shine the light on things that are
[56:37] Speaker 2: quite ugly when it comes to India's military set up,
[56:40] Speaker 2: even though there are lots of things that are very good,
[56:41] Speaker 2: which is the missile itself. So thanks once again, Shift,
[56:45] Speaker 2: and thanks as always to our viewers and listeners keep
[56:47] Speaker 2: commenting me.
[56:47] Speaker 1: We love the comments that we give us, Like.
[56:49] Speaker 2: Shifts at the at the beginning of this episode, you know,
[56:51] Speaker 2: some of the some of you also tend to, you know,
[56:54] Speaker 2: sometimes slash out at us, which is completely fine, But
[56:56] Speaker 2: I've also noticed that a lot of you actually get
[56:58] Speaker 2: into a sort of a very health these sort of.
[57:00] Speaker 1: Debate in the comments section. We love reading.
[57:04] Speaker 2: That's it for this week's defense does for more tune
[57:07] Speaker 2: in next week. Will then stay safe and not cross
[57:09] Speaker 2: any boundary to the passport

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