# Are India's Armed Forces Really 'Joint'? Has CDS Post Achieved Anything? | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 11

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 15 Feb 2024, 54 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/58695720/15_feb_24_iod_ep_11_128.mp3

In January 2020, General Bipin Rawat became the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Indian Armed Forces. However, his tenure was tragically cut short by a helicopter crash in December 2021. The position remained vacant for almost nine months until General Anil Chauhan took over. Why did it take so long to fill the CDS position after General Rawat's passing? Was there genuine effort to reach political consensus earlier? There were also concerns whether the CDS post was created solely for General Rawat, believed to be a favorite of the Modi government. Has the CDS role achieved anything substantial? What was the dream when the post was conceptualised and where do we stand now? Host Dev Goswami and defense expert Shiv Aroor delve into the history of the CDS position, tracing it back to the Kargil war. The Kargil review committee, formed in 1999, recommended the CDS position due to evident lack of coordination between the army and air force during the conflict. But, are India's armed forces truly 'joint' despite the creation of the CDS role in 2019? The duo also reflects on General Rawat's legacy, marked by controversies like his remarks classifying the Air Force as a 'support arm’, in an India Today interview. Does this hint at deeper divisions within the military? Examining progress towards synergy among the armed forces, they ponder whether India is truly advancing in jointmanship or still grappling with turf wars and egos, exemplified by debates over HAL Prachand helicopters. Listen in! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound mix by Nitin Rawat

## Transcript

[0:00] This is end here today podcasts. And the reason why it recommended, for
[0:08] instance, the creation of a Chief of Defense Staff post was the multiple instances
[0:13] seen in the Cargio War of a very troubling lack of cohesion between the army
[0:19] and the Air Force, specifically the three services who are anyway not very joint
[0:25] where it mattered. Saw this as a bit of a threat, but so
[0:29] far the CBS post hasn't achieved as much as perhaps four years ago it was
[0:36] hoped it would. You remember this he was speaking to God of Savanth.
[0:39] He gave an interview where he basically said that we should have the kind of
[0:43] theaterization and jointmanship where the Air Force will be a support armed. He called
[0:48] the Air Force, for God's sake, a support armed. Grew up,
[0:52] okay, and that is like walking up to the Chief of Air Staff and
[0:56] slapping It confirmed everyone's worst fears about General Bipin Robbert, the entire AFO said,
[1:00] Deka, yeah to naval fighter pilots think they're better and cooler than Air
[1:07] Force fighter. You know, I'm going to get killed from both sides for
[1:11] saying this, but yes they do, and yes they are Hello and welcome.
[1:18] To Another Defense, a weekly podcast on all things well defense where I
[1:23] They've go Swami, your host, along with senior journalist Shivarur, break down
[1:27] the world of conflicts that range from the subtle to the brutal. We bring
[1:32] you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at times provoke. This is in
[1:40] Our Defense. Hello, and welcome to the eleventh episode of Another Defense,
[1:44] the season two. It's been a very hectic week for Shive and I and
[1:49] you know, I think and almost at a heart attack a couple of hours
[1:52] ago when Siv once again messaged on our group that can be postponed for a
[1:57] few more hours, but she would put her foot down, saying no,
[2:00] hell no, not having this because the only battles that are being fought right
[2:02] now. And I'm wondering whether one of our future episodes is going to be
[2:06] election related because it's the only it's the only defense related topic that anyone is
[2:12] really talking about at this point. Everyone has forgotten defense. It's all about
[2:15] the elections now. But you know, we haven't forgotten about defense, which
[2:20] is why we are here, which is why Shiv did make the time out
[2:23] from his busy schedule and made sure that he was there for this recording.
[2:27] This week, you know, we'll go back go to a topic which actually
[2:30] also involves a lot of politics, to the topic of reforms within the military
[2:36] and specifically the post of the Chief of the Defense Staff. There are a
[2:39] lot, a lot of points I want to cover, but before we get
[2:43] to the realities, before we get to the present daycent situation, let's kind
[2:47] of go back to where this post came from. And I'd like shift to
[2:52] give us a perspective of where the recommendation Rosney came from. So the post
[2:55] was created in twenty nineteen pm do Remotus speech from the Red on Independence Day
[3:00] announced that the government with SRADA. A few months later, on twenty first
[3:06] December, General Bepin Rabat, who was then the Chief of the Army Staff,
[3:08] he was appointed as the Chief of Defense Staff. Lots of controversies there,
[3:13] but we'll get to that, you know later. And unfortunately, think
[3:16] around two years into his tenure he died in an unfortunate helicopter crash in Tamila.
[3:23] If not yes, uh and uh, then for a few months,
[3:25] not for a few months, I think nearly for a year. The post
[3:29] is away nine months in nine months. Yeah, and the current Chief of
[3:31] Defense Staff is most people won't even know, uh, General Unil Johann,
[3:37] who was previously the General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Eastern Command. He
[3:40] retired and he was brought out of retirement. Like I said, before we
[3:44] get to uh, the present day scenario, let's go back to Cargill ward
[3:49] because the recommendation comes from there. This mammoth page I don't know how many
[3:53] pages of super money and report one of several recommendations I think was briefly touched
[3:58] upon them previously. House and things that we're seeing today go back to back
[4:01] then. First, let's talk about what happened during the Cargile War that this
[4:05] committee felt the need to recommend the post in the first place. So,
[4:10] you know, the CDs and the Chief of Defense Staff issue live is an
[4:15] issue that's very close to my heart for multiple reasons, but also because the
[4:19] Subremannium Committee report also called the Cargill Review Committee, which was formed after the
[4:25] Cargile War of nineteen ninety nine, is when my career as a defense journalist
[4:30] actually began. It was in two thousand and four. You know, this
[4:32] Review Committee report had come out in I think two thousand and one, two
[4:35] thousand and two. So it was basically in the years after that report had
[4:39] come out that I started covering defense, and I can tell you at that
[4:42] time, the recommendations of the Cargill Review Committee, you know, were the
[4:47] big headline as far as defense correspondents were concern because they were all really new
[4:51] and exciting recommendations because it was it was the first modern, kind of unsparing
[4:59] take on how to improve the military, you know, how to optimize the
[5:02] military, how to shed the fat, how to integrate them better, how
[5:06] to convert the military you know, from a kind of legacy laggered a bunch
[5:14] of organizations into fighting fit lean mean organizations that are you know, primed for
[5:19] war and you know, not just sitting around in contonements and wasting their time.
[5:24] I'm being very blunt, but this is basically what it was. Now,
[5:27] one of the chief recommendations of this committee, like you rightly said,
[5:30] Dave, was that the Indian military requires a presiding chief who lords over all
[5:39] three services, called the Chief of Defense Staff. Now the reason for this
[5:43] is, you know, like everything else in the Cargillary View Committee, it
[5:46] was it was noted after this Committee had gone through all the operational reports,
[5:50] you know, the plans, et cetera that went through, and Cargo was
[5:55] a very brief war. It lasted fifty days, right, But but there
[6:00] was some very painful lessons from Cargill because even though Cargill was a victory for
[6:03] India, we evicted the intruding Pakistan Army, the Indian Army lost over five
[6:10] hundred men. It was it was by no means a happy occasion as far
[6:14] as India was concerned, not just in terms of loss, but the implications
[6:17] in terms of intelligence failure, lack of preparations. But most glaringly the Cargill
[6:23] Review Committee they've and the reason why it recommended, for instance, the creation
[6:28] of a Chief of Defense Staff post was the multiple instances seen in the Cargill
[6:33] War of you know, a very troubling lack of cohesion between the Army and
[6:41] the Air Force specifically and the Navy to a smaller extent. The Navy of
[6:45] course wasn't directly involved in any way in the Cargill War, but we're talking
[6:47] more at this point in terms of the Army and the Air Force, and
[6:53] these were at multiple levels from the tactical unit level, to the use of
[6:59] armor, you know, armed helicopters, you know, too simple, too
[7:01] simple, inter service command and control issues, you know, will they go,
[7:05] will we go? You know that kind of thing. And during wartime
[7:09] such chains of command have to be absolutely seamless. There can't be tough battles.
[7:14] They can't be you know, Oh that's your job, not my job.
[7:16] Or we are the air force, we will do the air power bit.
[7:18] You look after your bit. And again I'm simplifying it, but I'm
[7:21] saying at the kind of granular tactical level, that's what it boiled down to.
[7:26] Plus a kind of inter service, uh, interservice distancing between each other,
[7:30] even at the top level over you know, who is supposed to plan
[7:33] better for these kinds of exigencies. And remember both the army and the Air
[7:36] Force were used extensively in the Cargill War as a result of which there was
[7:41] not only a lack of cohesion and in you know, and integration in operations.
[7:46] Uh. This had a telling effect even on how India executed the war,
[7:50] because you know, beyond the chest thumping of the you know, Operation
[7:56] Veja and the bravery of our incredible soldiers and air war years of the time,
[8:01] there were very very painful lessons to learn. You know, had integration
[8:05] been better, you know, perhaps the war wouldn't have lasted so long,
[8:09] perhaps we wouldn't have lost as many soldiers and officers as we did. And
[8:13] these are you know, any any any sane country will ask these difficult questions.
[8:18] Uh. And all of these were distilled down by case of Romanium,
[8:24] who is the father of doctor S. J. Shankar, our current External
[8:26] Fairs Minister. As a matter of fact, our viewers may not know that,
[8:28] uh is is that integration jointmanship. That's where the word jointmanship became a
[8:35] big buzzword in the Indian media, that the Indian armed forces were not joint
[8:41] enough. They you know, they they they ran at cross purposes at troubling
[8:45] times. There were competing interests, there were there were suboptimal overlaps of command
[8:50] and control issues into services, rivalries and you know, basically an unhealthy kind
[8:56] of existence with each other without making good use of each other. And a
[9:01] case of Bramanium, in his wisdom, had decided after the committee had sat
[9:03] on this that uh, you know, given that you're not going to be
[9:07] able to force the three services to you know, suddenly overnight, you know,
[9:13] adhere together, work together and back backslap each other as it were,
[9:16] metaphorically, and become one. You know, why not have a first among
[9:22] equals. Now, remember, around this time, there was already something called
[9:26] the After the Cargill War, there was something called the Chairman of the Chiefs
[9:31] of Staff Committee. Okay, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was
[9:35] basically one of the three chiefs, the senior most of them, was,
[9:39] by virtue of his seniority, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
[9:43] Now it had a kind of cosmetic a kind of cosmetic layer to it because
[9:48] he was the senior most, but it didn't really mean anything practically on the
[9:52] ground, because even if you're the senior most of the three chiefs, you
[9:56] don't have any bearing on what the other two services actually do. In the
[10:00] aftermath of the Cargill War, there was something called the Integrated Defense Staff that
[10:05] was set up. Now, all of these things Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
[10:07] Committee, Integrated Defense Staff, these were all kind of placeholder decisions that were
[10:11] taken by the governments that followed. Because the chief of Defense Staff position was
[10:18] a you know, was a political and military hot potato. If you look
[10:22] at all parliament answers since two thousand till the time a decision was taken by
[10:28] the Modi government, every single answer about the CDs recommendation is identically the same.
[10:35] It says we are working on political consensus. Political consensus has not been
[10:39] evolved on the issue of CDs and therefore discussions are on it, and they
[10:45] would just they just you know, tallowed the issue for two decades basically.
[10:48] Now the problem, the problem with the creation of the CDs was that the
[10:54] three services, who are anyway not very joint, you know, where it
[11:00] mattered, saw this as a bit of a threat. You know, if
[11:03] you've got a CDs over us, who is that CDs going to be?
[11:07] Where is that CDs going to come from? Is it going to be a
[11:09] rotational CDs? Because remember the recommendation had been made by the Supermanium Committee,
[11:13] but he did not listed the modalities of how the CDs will be selected,
[11:18] you know, will it be rotational, can it be from any of the
[11:20] services? What will be the tenure or what will be the terms of reference?
[11:24] What powers will they have? Will it be an operational role, will
[11:26] it be an administrative role. You know, what are their karas, et
[11:30] cetera. None of that was flushed out. It was just like, let's
[11:33] have one guy to oversee these three and try and bring them together like a
[11:37] kind of father figure for the three services, and to try and integrate them
[11:39] a little bit. So for twenty painful years, nothing, absolutely nothing happened.
[11:43] There was no political consensus. I actually wonder whether an effort was made
[11:48] for political consensus, because it doesn't appear to me that the politicians were even
[11:54] interested in going ahead with something like this because they thought the military is not
[11:58] interested in this, The military doesn't want CDs. The military saying, you
[12:01] know, we'll find the way we are, well, we'll do our integrations
[12:03] and try service command yev over all that, and you know, we'll work
[12:07] on jointmanship. So the military continuously gave whoever was in power at the time
[12:11] assurances that we will work on integration. But the ceris is not a it's
[12:16] not something that you know, we They of course never overtly or openly opposed
[12:22] it or anything like that. Nobody would be seen to be doing that.
[12:24] But the sense was, no, you know, we are the bosses.
[12:28] You know, we don't need another boss over our head right now? Right?
[12:31] All that changed, like you rightly said in twenty nineteen when when General
[12:37] Bipin Rabat, having just retired as the Chief of the Army Staff, was
[12:41] appointed as the first first Chief of Defense stuff. He took over I think
[12:46] on the first of January twenty twenty, just before the COVID pandemic. And
[12:50] yeah, so so, I mean, we'll talk more about what the position
[12:54] of CIS has actually achieved. But yeah, this is this is the kind
[12:58] of long and slightly agonized saga of the CDs and why it was deemed necessary.
[13:03] I think everything with the Indian military seems always long and agonizing. Oh
[13:07] yes, reform without exception, without exception. Right, uh so again,
[13:11] like before we move on to what the CDs has achieved and what what Bippin
[13:16] Rabat in his office, General Pepin Rabat, the steps you wanted to bring,
[13:20] the reforms you wanted to bring. Where do they stand. We'll come
[13:22] to that later, But now I want to go to a slight segue.
[13:24] The controversial bit of the appointment of General Pippinaath himself. Announcement is made during
[13:31] the independence speech, then silence. No one knows what's happening. Uh.
[13:33] The assumption was that the Army would get the first I think though it was
[13:37] very well known that the first two cdss would be from the Indian Army because
[13:41] of just sheer numbers and because it's the largest military arm of your country.
[13:45] Uh. The assumption mostly was that, you know, General Pippin RaBaD would
[13:48] take over us the CDs, but he was getting closer to retirement. No
[13:50] announcement at all from the government. There was also a contender. I forgot
[13:54] his name. He was then the commander of the Northern Army. Uh,
[14:00] tender run something if I'm not wrong anyway, I think lots of speculation among
[14:03] journalists, you know, all the buzz on thirty first December, late evening.
[14:09] I remember because I was in office and it flashed in front of our
[14:11] system though of software used to flashing information. A blank paper. No letter
[14:16] had nothing, just says that, you know, General Bipin Raba his various
[14:20] medals, is appointed as the CDs until further notice. Yeah, it's not
[14:24] even a tenure, which led to a lot of criticism speculation that was this
[14:28] post created only for General Bepin Raba Because you have to remember that General Bepin
[14:33] Rabba was seen as somebody who was liked by the Mui government because in H
[14:37] I forgot when in twenty sixteen, when he took over as Chief of Army
[14:41] Staff, he superseded to senior officers, very rare. I think the only
[14:46] instance I could find of a supersession Indian army was under an in the Ragandhi.
[14:50] So he was seen as the government's favorite. So the questions were raised
[14:54] that, you know, maybe this post was made only for him. Back
[14:56] then, I did not believe that at all. I thought this was actually
[14:58] a revolution to remove because like you, I've been also hearing about the CDs
[15:01] thing since when I was growing up. I thought the more the government was,
[15:05] you know, had finan taken the plants that other governments had failed too
[15:09] great. But then unfortunately he dies and for nine months you have nothing on
[15:13] it, reinforcing the speculation, the criticism that this post was created only for
[15:18] General Pendra. But then the government didn't really want want to go to the
[15:22] degrities of the reforms, et cetera. And now you have sorry General Johan
[15:28] as the CDs, but he doesn't make a lot of noise. I'm guessing
[15:31] that could also be the personality, because I think General Rabbat was very you
[15:35] know, outgoing. I remember eurote a piece recently where you recounted how he
[15:39] was the one who could who actually made your first book happen by giving you
[15:43] access to the officers who were involved in surgical strikes against Pakistan. Uh.
[15:48] His firstality was such, I think, uh so, yeah, your take
[15:52] on this because this the way this all, all this has happened since.
[15:54] Unfortunate that has raised a lot of questions. Once again, look, there's
[15:58] no is no doubt in anyone's mind and and you know, nobody will beat
[16:03] around the bush on this issue that General Bipin Ravat was deep selected by the
[16:08] government. You know, they they spotted his character, his capability, his
[16:15] talent. Many other factors may have come into play, but you're right.
[16:18] Uh. The fact that General Bipin Rabath was appointed Chief of Army Staff over
[16:22] two senior officers Leeutnan General Praveen Bakshi and one more officer whose name I forget,
[16:27] who is the Southern Command chief at that time, it ruffled a lot
[16:30] of feathers. You know, when you when you when you uh, when
[16:34] you sort of sidestep the seniority principle in the arm in the armed forces,
[16:40] even though it is not a stipulated system of appointing. The appointment of the
[16:45] chiefs is entirely the political prerogative. The government has the full power to a
[16:49] point whoever they want as the chief of the Army Staff of the or the
[16:52] chief of the Air staff or the chief of naval stuff. But the legacy
[16:56] system has always been seniority. And it stands to rea that the seniority principle
[17:00] is a is a good one because you've come to that position by you know,
[17:06] a constant system of reviews every single year. And therefore, when you
[17:10] reach that position, obviously the system is enshured. The best, the creme
[17:14] de la creme, as it were, of the armed forces have reached that
[17:15] position. And therefore it stands to reason that the senior most becomes the chief
[17:19] if they you know, if you know, if they meet the criteria in
[17:22] terms of residual service, et cetera. So to sidestep that position is always
[17:29] a controversial situation. It happened once with General where there as far as Indra
[17:33] Gandhi was concerned. It happened on another occasion. If I if I remember
[17:40] correctly, I'm unable to recall where. And then finally were General Brippin Rabert
[17:44] in twenty sixteen. Now, the controversy of the of the decision aside,
[17:48] and you know, it was a political decision. There were many there was
[17:52] a lot of there was a lot of you know, heat within the army
[17:56] about this decision, et cetera. But at the end of the day,
[18:00] everyone had to fall in line because it's a decision. A decision is a
[18:02] decision, and there was nothing illegal about it. Now, let's also remember
[18:07] that it's it's not like General Bipin Rabat was undeserving of the position he was.
[18:11] He was totally uh you know, he was fully capable of performing that
[18:17] job. He was eligible for the job, Uh, there was so there
[18:19] was no question of him being randomly selected for it. He was as the
[18:23] vice chief, as the Eastern Command Chief. He had, you know,
[18:26] overseen India's famous Mayanmar surgical strike. He was the vice chief when the Uri
[18:33] surgical strikes happened under under General Delbi Singh Suha, the Army Chief of that
[18:37] time, and then he was made the Army chief. Now, I I
[18:42] my my sense is and I think most people share this sense, Dave that
[18:47] uh, the government. You know, General Bipin Rabbath was seen to be
[18:51] close to the government, Okay, in a military milieu where you know,
[18:56] there's a one armed distance between the armed forces and the military, Bipin Rabat
[19:00] was seen to be someone who was you know, had had a good rapper
[19:03] with Prime Minister Moody, a very good rapper with Doval, who was from
[19:07] the same state in Utra Khund. And we can go into a whole separate
[19:11] episode on all the conspiracy theories of the Utra Hun mafia and the Ministry of
[19:17] Defense, et cetera. But that's a separate issue altogether. But the fact
[19:19] is General Bippin Rabat was a highly capable, credible officer who had you know,
[19:26] who had cut his teeth in operations. He'd served in United Nations missions
[19:30] abroad as a brigadier, so he's a war fighting general. He knows what
[19:33] he's talking about. It's not like, you know, it was favoritism or
[19:37] nepotism or anything like that. And there will be those who will point fingers
[19:41] and say, yes, but you know he's from Utrakhund or yes he's from
[19:44] this particular regiment, etc. All of those things. You know, something
[19:48] of that kind can be said about virtually all senior appointments in the military.
[19:53] Let me tell you that's how it actually works. And if you think that,
[19:57] you know, gossip culture doesn't exist in the military as far as appointments
[20:02] are concerned, you'd be wrong. It's probably even more over there, okay.
[20:04] And it doesn't help that, you know, the seniority principle sidestep.
[20:08] So this became a hot potato. It became the biggest living room discussion in
[20:12] the Forge for months together. General Bipin Rabat being elevated over to other you
[20:18] know, senior senior generals as Chief of the Army Staff. General Bipin Rabat
[20:25] was there, you know, overseeing different kinds of operations in the aftermath of
[20:30] the ore surgical strike. He had already begun to you know, uh,
[20:37] sort of rise above his station, and not in a bad way. I
[20:40] mean, he already was presenting a kind of vision to the government in terms
[20:44] of how the armed forces can actually come together. So he was the chief
[20:48] of the Army Staff, but he was also uh uh you know, the
[20:51] army is the largest of the three forces. So in essence, the Army
[20:55] Chief is you know, is sort of rightly or wrongly seen as the first
[21:00] among equals, even though he may not be the senior, most right because
[21:03] he commands the largest force, the biggest responsibilities, rightly or wrongly, and
[21:07] therefore and his proximity to the government meant that they were they were listening to
[21:11] what he said. So he had a lot of good ideas in terms of
[21:15] you know, the you know, the now big buzzword, theaterization and things
[21:19] like that right from the get go. So I think that conversation had already
[21:23] sort of begun. And I think the government when it saw Bipin Rabert sort
[21:29] of evolving from you know, a chief like figure or just a military figure
[21:34] into a larger sort of manager of the armed forces, a person, I
[21:41] think the Modi government then realized this would be the time to bring the CDs
[21:45] to life, because now we finally see a man who fits that role.
[21:51] You know. All this while they were not even talking about the conversation for
[21:55] twenty years, or the decision making loop for twenty years is should be or
[21:59] should be in They were not even thinking about we'll do it when we find
[22:02] the right guy to do it. I think this government kind of flipped that
[22:04] question on its head. You know, it may have been thinking about it
[22:08] even since twenty fourteen, who knows, and they thought, well, we'll
[22:12] dust it off the shelf in the mod once we find achab Banda, then
[22:18] we will decide on appointing a CDs. And I think they saw that in
[22:22] whippin Rabat. And when that happened, you saw how fast the ball rolled
[22:26] August announcement jan first, twenty twenty thirty one December, like you said that
[22:30] your unsigned flash appears and first of January, the man is already the CDs.
[22:37] He took a thing. I was there. I was there at Vejetchok
[22:38] when he took over on in front of the Ministry of Defense. So so
[22:44] yeah, I think I think that's that's really how it actually worked. It
[22:48] was it was a deep selection the political powers that we saw in general Whippin
[22:55] Robert, someone who is capable of kind of expand being above being just a
[23:00] chief of the army staff and embracing that much larger role that the CIS could
[23:04] have. All right, Uh, we moved to the present now and what
[23:10] this post has achieved with the second seris being in place now, I think
[23:14] and now it's been around almost four years since we have this post. The
[23:19] challenges still that this post faces to bring the military's military arms together and whether
[23:26] there is any jointmanship within the military. But well, at that quick break
[23:33] pany pany pani joy so beautiful, so elegant, just looking like a wow
[23:42] eh began? Was that enough crunch for you? Because this crunch fest doesn't
[23:48] stop here. Yes, And if by watching such reals and viral videos you
[23:53] think your life is becoming mom then I cost them and me Anna will bring
[23:59] the most puke worthy, nauseating and repulsive trends on social media and well maybe
[24:06] enact some of them, but most of all discuss and seriously dissect these trends.
[24:11] So get ready to laugh, cringe and question humanity. Dropping soon on
[24:15] Spotify, Apple Podcasts and wherever you get your cringe, I mean audio entertainment
[24:22] from So let's talk cringe. Welcome back, Shave and I are discussing the
[24:32] legacy of the Chief of the Defense Staff post that was established just around four
[24:36] years ago and the larger question of reforms within the military joint panship within the
[24:40] different different military beings that it's the Army, Air Force or the Navy.
[24:44] Before we go to the rivalry's bid, I want to focus briefly on what
[24:48] the post has achieved. Ever for the two years that General was in office,
[24:52] and for the I forgot how many months or years General and Johan has
[24:56] been in office. Because it's also a very complicated post, right, because
[25:03] it's not as though the CDs is the Army Chief's boss technically speaking at all.
[25:07] The CDs won't it direct the armity to do something. But if and
[25:11] this is a topic we'll obviously get into, but if the whole idea of
[25:15] theritization would surface, then I think that would kind of become The CDs would
[25:18] be the one fighting the wars. The Army Chief would be the one giving
[25:22] the supplies in terms of whether it's manpower or other equipment, right, ensuring
[25:26] that all the equipment is well taken care of, Training gets done, these
[25:30] guys are well trained, et cetera. And when the needed rises, the
[25:33] unit is sent to a particular command whose bosses the local I'm guessing Seenum or
[25:38] whoever the officer could be from many of the services who reports to the CDs.
[25:42] Complicated because it's not to happen we don't know exactly know how it will
[25:45] happen. So take us to this and also the second part of being the
[25:49] chief guy who will ensure like a common procurement for all the militaries because you
[25:55] know this one thought that struck me when I was doing my research, like
[25:59] why is there a need for the Army and the Air Force both to buy
[26:03] press and the helicopters. Yeah, I can get the Navy having a helicopter
[26:06] division. I can get the Navy having fighters because the Navy operates through a
[26:10] different terrain. They operate over water, so they need officers and sailors who
[26:14] know how to live on a ship, you know, surviving water. But
[26:18] when you're launching assets from planted into air, attacking a target, why do
[26:22] you need the army to also have an aviation wing. The CIS, I'm
[26:26] guessing, was supposed to sort of synergize all of this with the theater coverts,
[26:30] et cetera. So yes, shift, take us through what the CDs
[26:33] cup post does today, what the dream was, and where do we stand
[26:37] with what the dream was. Well, I'll start with the bad news.
[26:40] The bad news is that the CDs post and this isn't the fault of either
[26:45] the CDs or the system. Like with all things in the Indian military and
[26:49] Indian political system, it's a combination of many factors. But so far the
[26:53] CDs post hasn't achieved as much is perhaps four years ago it was hoped it
[27:03] would. Now that the very tragic death of General Bippin Rabat in many ways,
[27:07] you know, was a huge speed bump, because General Bippin Rabert was
[27:11] a very energetic. He was a doer, right, He was a guy
[27:15] who got things done. You know, he had that energy about him to
[27:18] not only did he have ideas, but he the government had kind of empowered
[27:22] him with the you know, with the with the powers to go ahead and
[27:26] do what he you know, what he thought up as good ideas and theaterization,
[27:32] like I said, was you know, it wasn't General Bipin Rabbert's idea.
[27:37] It was an idea that had come many, many years before, but
[27:38] it appealed to him, as you know, the this would be the big
[27:44] ticket sort of the very reason for a CDs. You know, if a
[27:48] CDs is to justify his position, it would be if he made theaterization a
[27:53] reality. Now I'll come to the I'll come to the modalities of theatization in
[27:57] just a bit and where we are as far as that is concerned. But
[28:00] just to add to your point, which is a very important one and bears
[28:04] repeating over and over again, the CDs, the Chief of Defense Staff is
[28:08] not the boss of the Army chief, the Navy chief, and the Air
[28:11] chief. They do not report to him. The Chief of Defense Staff doesn't
[28:15] have an operational role as far as military operations or military intelligence or things like
[28:21] that are concerned. So actual fighting, war fighting defense issues, the CDs
[28:25] actually has nothing to do with those. The Chief of Defense Staff is a
[28:29] kind of, like I said, a kind of a kind of higher boss
[28:33] of the larger future forward higher defense reforms role. A person who's looking,
[28:41] who's got this big drone eye view of the armed forces and is constantly looking
[28:45] for ways to make them more cohesive, more optimal, to make them more
[28:51] lethal, you know, to save more money by being more optimized, and
[28:56] to therefore create a kind of much more agile war machine, you know,
[29:00] rather than the kind of legacy laggard systems that we are used to. The
[29:06] Indian Army is one point one million strong and in in general Bipin Rabt's famous
[29:11] words, he would have liked to see the army, you know, come
[29:15] down to half that size, okay, And that raised a lot of eyebrows
[29:18] from believe you me, it raised a lot of eyebrows. But his,
[29:22] his his, his kind of value systems as it were, as far as
[29:27] the military was concerned, is that you can't sustain such a large military force.
[29:32] It needs to be you know, in this age of technology and automation.
[29:36] You know, manpower, woman power needs to be brought down. You
[29:38] need to optimize in big ways so that you're much more agile. Now comes
[29:42] the issue of theaterization. Now, theaterization became kind of synonymous with CDs because
[29:48] because theaterization was seen as the the kind of visible, quantifiable reform that a
[29:56] chief of Defense staff can execute for the armed force. Now, let me
[30:00] simplify the reason for this for our listeners. One is a the Indian armed
[30:07] forces currently have single service commands. Apart from two commands which are trive service
[30:11] commands, all our other commands right now of the military are all single service
[30:15] commands. The Air Force and the Army have seven single service commands each.
[30:19] So like for example, the Air Force has the Western Air Command, Eastern
[30:23] Air Command, Central Air Command, Southwestern Air Command, Southern Air Command,
[30:26] Training Command, and things like that. The Army, the Army has the
[30:32] Western, Western Army Command, Northern Army Command, Eastern Army Command and things
[30:36] like that. The Navy has three commands, which is Eastern, Western,
[30:38] and Southern. Now, in the aftermath of Cargill, you know, when
[30:45] jointmanship and tri service integration became the big the big shadow over the armed forces,
[30:51] two new commands came up. One was called the Anderman and Nicobar Command,
[30:55] which is a tri service command, and the other was this Strategic Forces
[30:57] Command, which is basically India's nuclear command. It's not a military command,
[31:02] it's a nuclear command, it's a it's a strategy it's basically for strategic deterans.
[31:06] So there's no military aspect to it apart from the fact that it is
[31:10] headed by a military officer. He deposed to the government and not to the
[31:14] cabinet secretariat and to the government. Right. So, currently India has two
[31:18] tri services commands and it has seventeen seventeen single service commands nothing else right now.
[31:27] Now, the object of theaterization is to say that look, having these
[31:33] single service commands only reinforces the sense of separation between all your forces. You
[31:38] know, what is the point of having separate air force commands and separate army
[31:44] commands in kind of similar areas of the country. Shouldn't we be having something
[31:49] called theater commands? Now, what does theater mean? Theater means. Theater
[31:53] basically means one large specific block of territory. Now, the the idea and
[32:00] the rational behind a theater command is that make your military or optimize your military
[32:07] in such a way that it is theater specific, not air force specific,
[32:12] or navy specific or army specific. Now, under the theaterization push, instead
[32:16] of having instead of the focus being having all these seventeen different single service commands,
[32:22] we will basically have three theater commands. You will have a Pakistan specific
[32:28] theater command which will be headquartered in Jaipur. You will have a China specific
[32:32] theater command which will be located in Lucknow, headquartered in Lucknow. And you
[32:37] will have a maritime theater command which takes care of all your ocean territories,
[32:43] which will be headquartered in Karwar, which is in coastal Karnata. So these
[32:46] are the three theater commands that were Motamta decided by the CDs at the CDs
[32:52] level that we will work towards them. Under the CDs, certain certain functional
[32:58] commands were also thought of, which could be true service, like an air
[33:00] defense command, a special forces command, a cyber security or a cyber attacker,
[33:06] you know, a cyber army command, that kind of thing, you
[33:07] know, which which works only on AI and cyber you know, cyber threats,
[33:13] et cetera. Now, those are in various levels of progress right now.
[33:17] But the theaterization push met with multiple roadblocks, multiple roadblocks for ironically,
[33:25] the very reason why it was being pushed, which is that there were inter
[33:30] services suspicions. You know, under this new regime of theater, will one
[33:36] become more powerful than the other? You know, should we say yes now
[33:40] or weight and watch? Armed forces love to wait and watch. They love
[33:45] it. They don't want to commit to anything before they know everything because because
[33:47] the smallest of decisions at the political level change, you know, decades of
[33:53] legacy structures in the armed forces. So nobody wants to say, hal,
[33:58] let's do this. Uh. And and the view of General Bippin Ravath within
[34:01] the military had already become Maverick Gadmi. Okay, he's going to go ahead
[34:07] and take decisions that will suit the army and they will not suit the Air
[34:10] Force. Then General Bippin Rabath already enjoying this reputation of being a you know,
[34:16] a bit of a you know, a maverick, a guy who can
[34:20] take sort of rushed, you know, sometimes reckless decisions, which he was,
[34:23] which is not the kind of man he was at all, but he
[34:25] was seen to be like that by the other forces. Uh said something in
[34:30] an India Today interview that just it was like it was like launching a nuclear
[34:34] attack on the other forces. You remember this. He was speaking to God
[34:37] of Savanth. He gave an interview where he basically said that we should have
[34:42] the kind of theaterization and jointmanship where the air Force will be a support armed.
[34:46] He called the Air Force, for God's sake, a support arm.
[34:51] Grew up, okay, And that is like walking up to the Chief of
[34:54] Air Staff and slapping okay, or lining up all your pilots and slapping them
[34:59] one by one. It's like it's as humiliating as that calling the Air Force,
[35:02] for God's sake, the air force has won you wars and calling it
[35:07] a support arm. So the and me, being the person with all the
[35:12] luck in the world, was interviewing the Chief of Air Stuff right after Godrev
[35:15] interviewed General Bipin Rabat. Okay, this was part of a seminar and I
[35:19] had to interview a Chief Marshall Rakish Badoria right after that. Now, thankfully
[35:24] for me and credit to achieve. Badoria he's a very sober, nice,
[35:30] kind of you know, unemotional kind of person, very straight talker, and
[35:35] unlike General who you know, energetic and he gets emotional and things like that.
[35:39] Badoria was the opposite. He said, He said, yes, yes,
[35:42] I heard what General Bippin Rabbat said, and this, that and the
[35:45] other. You see, you know, these are conversations that will continue.
[35:49] And he he totally played the story down and kind of saved me and saved
[35:52] the situation because I didn't want it, you know, as someone on India
[35:57] today, I didn't want it to seem like we are making the chiefs fight,
[36:00] right, We're making the CDs and the a chief fight and stuff like
[36:02] that, you know, anti nationals and all that. So we kind of
[36:07] did that. But that interview lit a really big file and it confirmed everyone's
[36:13] worst fears. About General Bipin Rabat, the entire air Force, said dekha
[36:19] is Amka Max. He wants to subjugate the air Force. He wants to
[36:22] make the Air Force a second class service. So it it in many ways
[36:27] kind of uh, you know, confirmed people's prejudices against General Bipin Rabat and
[36:30] stuff. Obviously what he meant, in my view was a little more complicated
[36:36] and layered and nuanced than just a second class. It wasn't that he meant
[36:40] it in a different way, but his words like kind of were nuclear,
[36:44] right. So, and this was many months before his his his death,
[36:49] so this caused this, I can tell you this interview caused a big speed
[36:53] bump already in the theaterization process because it kind of quantified and placed on record
[37:00] what was going on in his mind as far as what the end game of
[37:04] theaterization was likely to look like. And so there were issues and the government
[37:09] was also very clear that we're not going to rush through or push through theaterization
[37:14] without absolute consensus because we can't be playing around with this. This is your
[37:19] this, this is ultimately your war fighting saman, this is your war fighting
[37:22] machine. So failure is not an option. We have to get it right
[37:27] the first time, and therefore it kind of went into the back burner.
[37:30] When General Rabat died in that helicopter crash, everything came to an absolute standstill.
[37:36] Because this was a man who kind of embodied the embodied the entire impulse
[37:42] of theaterization in his in his kind of brain, in his mind, in
[37:47] his thought process, in his work. That theaterization was alive in him.
[37:52] Everyone else was just executing what he was saying. So the kind of fountain
[37:57] head of theaterization was finally was suddenly, you know, silenced. He was
[38:02] gone, and there was complete shock. There was shocked because it was like
[38:06] a suddenly like a black hole, you know, theaterization was in sight.
[38:09] But then the guy who was like the lynchpin, the guy who was driving
[38:13] the whole thing, was gone, and you couldn't do anything about it.
[38:15] You know, how do we start again? And that explains theve why it
[38:20] took so long for the government to appoint the next CDs, because even the
[38:23] government was like, you know, we haven't even been sort of monitoring what's
[38:29] going on, right, you know, we we had entrusted this all to
[38:31] General Bipin Rabbat. He'd been you know, he was riding the horse.
[38:36] He was riding the theaterization horse. So now we don't know what to do.
[38:39] So the government was had a bit of a loss and that explains the
[38:43] nine months it took to appoint a different person. And as you can see,
[38:45] they had to they had to change the rules to bring an office out
[38:47] of retirement. There was a lot of buzz whether you know, one of
[38:51] the current chiefs would become the CDs. All of those things happened, and
[38:53] now we've even retired officers possible to you know, go from being a left
[38:58] nan general to a four star. You know, the doors have been opened
[39:02] very widely. But as a last point to give you a sense of where
[39:07] things are at as far as theaterization is concerned. In August last year,
[39:09] in twenty twenty three, and this was the last time something significant happened,
[39:15] was something called the ISO Bill was passed. In the look in the Rajaport.
[39:20] This is the Inter Services Organization Command, Control and Discipline Bill of twenty
[39:25] twenty three. Sounds very fancy, but it's actually very very kind of nuts
[39:29] and bolts bill, which basically means that in try services organizations, you know,
[39:34] the Army, Navy, and Air Force each function under what are called
[39:37] the Navy Act, the Army Act, and the Air Force Act, which
[39:38] are a separate and non overlapping set of rules. Now, in a tri
[39:43] service organization, before this bill was passed, if I was a Navy operational
[39:50] commander of a tri service organization, I have very limited administrative command and disciplinary
[39:55] power over officers or people in my organization. Well not from my service.
[40:00] So I can do that with the Navy guys in my organization. But if
[40:04] an Air Force, Orn Army guy is there. Can you imagine how silly
[40:07] this sounds that in a try service organization, as the operational commander, I
[40:12] don't have those powers. So a scene from the Yes Minister twenty twenty three.
[40:15] They passed that bill for God's sake, And we've had try services organizations
[40:20] for for like fifteen, sixteen, seventeen years. Okay, So it's it's
[40:23] bizarre, it's it's it's it's it. I mean, I don't even know.
[40:27] I feel like crying sometimes thinking about it. But crying solves nothing in
[40:30] Indian defense, okay, because you just have to wait or you will cry
[40:34] some more. So this bill has been passed now and with this bill,
[40:37] the kind of contours have been now set for theaterization abit nuts and bolts issue
[40:44] hoge Hecki. Operational commanders of try services organizations have administrative command, controlled disciplinary
[40:51] powers over all the men and women under their operational command. And therefore now
[40:57] we can move towards that kind of theaterization. When that theaterization happens, nobody
[41:00] knows the contours have been set. The plans are there because General Bipin Rabas
[41:05] had done pretty detailed studies. It commissioned very detailed studies. But the question
[41:09] now is in terms of the political will to go ahead and execute them.
[41:15] The reason why things have become difficult is in the aftermath of the CIS being
[41:21] formed. Remember that just five months after the General Bipin rav took over a
[41:25] CDs, the standoff with China began. Okay, Now, when you have
[41:29] an operational, live, operational war warfront scenario, you know, taking large
[41:35] reform decisions in your military become exponentially more difficult because your military is already committed,
[41:40] you know, towards an operational front that is Eastern Ladak in this case,
[41:45] and therefore you can't be taking drastic, large scale you know, structural
[41:51] and reform decisions, because because those parts are not going to be able to
[41:54] move and shift according to what your new designs are going to be, and
[41:58] so therefore things are a little stuck as far as theaterization is concerned. So
[42:02] we'll have to see how that moves forward. Just to close this thought,
[42:06] because you brought up the excellent example of the prechant, and you know,
[42:09] the issue of attack helicopters is is kind of emblematic of the absolutely ridiculous,
[42:19] ridiculous levels of lack of jointmanship, lack of optimization and armed forces. This
[42:25] war between the air force and the army over who should control simple attack helicopters
[42:32] has been running for two decades now or more, and it is an example
[42:38] of how the simplest of things, you know, can be for such a
[42:45] long time fall prey to turf battles, egos and things like that. Now,
[42:51] technically speaking, technically speaking, attack helicopters should be the preserve of the
[42:54] army because attack helicopters are not instruments of air power. They are battlefield battlefield
[43:00] machines. Because they fly low, they fly close to the troops. You
[43:06] know, they're therefore close air support. They're not fighter jets or bombers,
[43:09] which are you know, projecting air power. Airpower is a very different thing.
[43:13] A helicopter or attack helicopter is a battlefield system, which is why in
[43:16] the United States they're attack helicopters. All their apatches are part of the US
[43:21] Army. They're not part of the US Air Force. The US Air Force
[43:23] is bombers and stealth and you know long range air power projection. Now,
[43:29] the old Soviet attack helicopters that used to be part of the Indian Army had
[43:34] Indian Air Force pilots flying them because the Indian Air Force pilots said, no,
[43:37] let them be with the army, but we'll fly them. Now you've
[43:39] got the pre Chund that's being bought by both the army and the air Force
[43:44] because the government still hasn't taken a decision on putting its foot down and saying
[43:49] no, all attack helicopters will from now on be only part of the army.
[43:52] Take a decision one way or the other. It should be with the
[43:54] army. But you know, if you're unable to decide on that, take
[43:58] a decision and give it all to the air Force, then you know,
[44:00] let it be optimized in that sense, Let one service control attack helicopters.
[44:07] Before this, you had the Apache helicopters, twenty two of which have been
[44:09] supplied to the Indian Air Force. But now six are being built for the
[44:13] army. Why what is the point of this? Six is a ridiculously measly
[44:17] number. You're going to be situating them or locating them somewhere else. All
[44:22] that additional expense of having to maintain them in a separate location when the Air
[44:27] Force already knows how to maintain them is, you know, is a kind
[44:30] of burning and crying example of you know what of jointmanship at its worst.
[44:38] You know, if you can't get something as basic as the utilization of armed
[44:43] helicopters right, how are you going to integrate at the larger theater level?
[44:46] Is one of the scares. The good news, and since I started with
[44:50] bad news, I'll end with the good news, is that most officers believe
[44:52] that that the armed for the armed helicopter issue has been a legacy issue which
[44:58] has many layers to it. But theaterization will work because the armed forces don't
[45:02] have a choice. It's shrinking budgets and you know, thankfully it's the spreadsheet
[45:07] that finally, you know, dictates what the armed forces must do, which
[45:12] shrinking budgets, they have no choice but to unite because they don't have the
[45:15] luxury anymore, saying Drone, you know internity tanks ch nobody has that choice
[45:23] anymore. All procurements going forward will have to be joint procurement plans, and
[45:29] therefore theaterization is an imperative. It will happen, It has to happen.
[45:32] It's a nice positive note on which you went answer. And as we bring
[45:37] this episode to a close, I want to just like briefly talk about the
[45:42] personal rivalry and mu it personal as a man to man rival personal rivalries between
[45:45] the three three forces, and how would that impact jointness, How would that
[45:50] impact you know, serving in the same command, Like you mentioned that bill
[45:52] that was that that has been brought in. But at the personal level,
[45:58] you know, you apart from let's say the guys who you've come from the
[46:00] NBA. Look, they've spent maybe three years together, but you've spent your
[46:06] entire career in a particular four So the suspicion that for example, Air Force
[46:08] had for because that that guy had spent his entire livelihood, sorry life in
[46:15] one particular military arm How does that person then understand in the other services view
[46:22] the needs and the requirements of let's see the Navy or let's see the air
[46:25] force. Uh, you know, I think also made another controversial statement with
[46:30] respect to the Navy when he said they should not get a third aircraft they
[46:32] can use and nicobar allens as a aircraft. How do you integrate the personal
[46:37] the officers from the different arms at the personal level? Now? See,
[46:40] the thing is, uh, the three chiefs very often are from the same
[46:45] batch. And like with the last two batches of chiefs we've seen there from
[46:49] the same you know course, and they knew each other, they were friends
[46:52] in the academy together. It's rare when that actually happens, but when it
[46:55] does happen, it really helps. Uh. And imagine going to the academy
[47:00] together and then rising to be chiefs together. Right, that's that must be
[47:02] like one for the history books. But yeah, that personal equation is is
[47:07] very necessary. It's important to remember that. You know. While it's tempting
[47:10] to see General Bipin Rabats having spent his entire life, as you know,
[47:14] in the army and rising up to be the chief of the Army staff that
[47:16] he, you know, what can he possibly know about what's happening in the
[47:20] Air Force. That's not necessarily true because right through service, starting from the
[47:23] NDA, where you're mixing with people who are going to go to all different
[47:28] arms, and you're getting exposure to all different arms. Right from the academy
[47:31] level, right through your service, there are you know, joint exercises happening.
[47:37] There's a lot of joint training that takes place. There's a lot of
[47:42] you know, at the tactical unit sort of levels, there are lots of
[47:44] exchanges that take place. There are courses that happen, you know, higher
[47:46] command and you know, midterm courses that take place, or officers where they're
[47:52] completely mixing with officers of the Navy and Air Force, et cetera. So
[47:55] that kind of cross pollination is taking place. In fact, one of the
[48:00] decisions which I missed out on, that the CDs has taken is also about
[48:04] a kind of lower level system of cross posting of officers between the three services,
[48:08] so they get they get to spend time as young officers in their other
[48:14] things, which answers your questions. So it's it's been kind of formalized now.
[48:16] Key. Earlier it only used to happen during joint exercises or seminars or
[48:22] courses. But now you will get to actually serve a tenure as an Army
[48:25] officer in the Air Force or an Air Force officer in the Army. You
[48:29] will see some cosmetic changes also. They have like, you know, common
[48:31] uniforms, you know, common battlefield you know, combat fatigues, et cetera.
[48:37] All of these things are meant to kind of downplay the differences between the
[48:40] forces and to emphasize commonality, you know, unity of purpose, the fact
[48:47] that you're all one fighting machine, and things like that. So, yeah,
[48:51] the the personalities of the three chiefs most certainly helps, but it's not
[48:55] like, you know, it's not as if you know, one person's misgivings
[49:00] about another, if any can affect systems. Because these are men who are
[49:07] you know, sitting in offices that have a large number of checks and balances.
[49:10] You know, they control huge organizations that are you know, unfathomable for
[49:16] most of us. Imagine commanding a you know, an organization one point one
[49:21] million strong. You being the presiding commander of an organization of one point one
[49:25] million people, so it's it's unimaginable. So the responsibilities are huge. A
[49:30] lot rests on the kind of dynamic that you enjoy with your with your you
[49:35] know, fellow chiefs, et cetera. But I think the structures that have
[49:38] been put in place, and especially the structures that will happen going forward with
[49:43] theaterization, I think will in many many ways sort of soften some of the
[49:49] edges, blur out some of those differences that have existed in the past,
[49:53] because suspicion between the armed forces of who is going to be the first among
[49:57] equals, who is the bigger one is going to take a long time to
[50:00] get over it. You know. Even now when we see our international you
[50:06] know, joint exercises, et cetera, there's a great emphasis on it.
[50:09] China in twenty sixteen converted all its single service commands into four, i think
[50:15] five or six theater commands. It's the Western theater Command that we are fighting
[50:20] with the in La Dak right now. So it's not like China had had
[50:24] this bright idea of theaterization long back and we are late to the table.
[50:28] They just did it in twenty sixteen. Their advantage is that they're able to
[50:31] do it much faster because they don't have the and we've said this so many
[50:36] times on in our defense. They don't have the inconveniences of democracy and you
[50:39] know, clearances and oh this army chief doesn't like this issue and stuff like
[50:45] one instruction it has to be implemented. So China has those advantages and they've
[50:52] implemented twenty sixteen, it was it was announced. By twenty eighteen they had
[50:55] all their theater commands up and running fully functional. So if China can do
[51:00] it, there is no reason why India can't do it. We're just going
[51:04] through the motions and the failure is not an option kind of phase right now.
[51:07] You know. One small last trivia question on the topic of rivalry is
[51:12] simple, one sentence answer. I think you must have met both of them.
[51:16] Do naval fighter pilots think they're better and cooler than Air Force fighter mites.
[51:21] You know, I'm going to get killed from both sides for saying this,
[51:23] but yes they do, and yes they are. Okay, because my
[51:30] apology to all my Air Force pilot friends, because you know, you guys
[51:32] are rock stars. But but look, there's no there's no two ways around
[51:37] this Navy fighter pilots fly over the sea. Yes, okay, so that's
[51:40] badass anyway. Secondly, carrier pilots, Navy pilots who are landing on carriers
[51:46] are landing on a carrier deck. It's a tiny little runway the size of
[51:51] a matchbox, which they are looking at visually and landing. They've got to
[51:54] land on it while it's pitching and rolling on a rough sea. So they're
[52:00] landing on a runway that's literally moving in front of them, not staying steady.
[52:05] U. They've got to be able to land sometimes in very very rough
[52:08] weather when things are moving dramatically. Uh. And they've got, you know,
[52:15] very few chances to get it right. They've got limited fuel on their
[52:20] aircraft, so it's not like, oh, I've missed the ship, so
[52:22] let me go back to land and land. If they don't, they've got
[52:24] to punch out of their aircraft. And the and the amazing beauty of an
[52:28] aircraft carrier. And this is a small little factoid for our listeners, which
[52:31] is that, unlike landing on land, when you when you slow down and
[52:37] land and you put the brakes on just before you touch down on a carrier
[52:39] deck, you actually increase speed to maximum because if you miss the arrest a
[52:45] wire, you need enough power to take off again. So it's it's it's
[52:47] counterintuitive and kind of suicidal, but yeah, Navy fighter pilots are absolutely the
[52:53] greatest. I will I will say this at the risk of losing all my
[52:55] air force streams. But yes, let's see how there is point to you
[53:00] after this episode is released this week. Great, thanks Shiv. I think
[53:04] to kind of sum it up what Shive has described for us as that big
[53:07] Bang reform. Yes, it took very long. Yes. Uh. When
[53:12] General Bipinabath was in office, things were happening at a franktic speed. But
[53:15] his unfortunate death and some of the suspicions that he pulled out have slowed things
[53:20] down. But things are still happening, slowly, steadily happening, and we'll
[53:23] keep a watch on in our defense and we'll track and discuss the latest developments
[53:28] as in when they happen. Thanks Shift once again, it's a lovely episode,
[53:31] a great discussion, and I knew it would be a great chat and
[53:34] fund chat. I was waiting for you for a discussion on this. Thanks
[53:37] as always to our producer and you know and to our listeners and you us.
[53:42] Do leave us feedback, Do leave us comment, Do leave us ratings.
[53:44] If you're watching us on a you know YouTube, lever comment on the
[53:46] on the on the comment section. If you're listening to us on Apple Podcasts
[53:50] or Spotify, peace, leave us a rating. That's it for this week's
[53:52] defense. Does for more, tune in next week. Till then, stay
[53:54] safe and not cross any boundaries to the passport

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