# Deep dive on India's nuclear submarines and why SSNs are need of the hour | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 22

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 2 May 2024, 53 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/59774184/02_may_24_iod_2_may_mix_128.mp3

In this episode, host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor delve into India's nuclear submarine program, discussing its limited fleet despite a vast coastline of 6700 km. Why does a country with such a significant maritime border suffer from "sea blindness"? The Indian Navy, the smallest among the three armed forces, seems disproportionally under-equipped given the strategic importance of its maritime domain. So, what factors contributed to this stagnation? India currently boasts only two nuclear submarines, INS Arihant and INS Arighat. But what sets nuclear submarines apart from their conventional and diesel-electric counterparts? Consider this a masterclass on the SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) and SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines).In February 2015, the Indian government approved the indigenous construction of six SSNs at the Ship Building Center (SBC) in Visakhapatnam. But we have yet to hear much about these projects since then. The absence of a nuclear-powered attack submarine in India's fleet has significant strategic implications. Why hasn't India yet commissioned one despite the urgency? Tune in! Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound mix by Sachin Dwivedi

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts. All in all, we have about fifteen submarines
[0:08] currently in service with US, which is about one third what we should have.
[0:13] Because of our history of land wars, the fact that all of our
[0:16] conflicts have been basically northward facing with China or Pakistan, it's easy to forget
[0:22] that India has a seven six hundred kilometer coastline and an enormous maritime domain to
[0:27] govern, which is called the Indian Ocean Region. For the longest time,
[0:30] India has been and I will say this straight, we've been sea blind.
[0:33] It's the reason, and I've said this before in another episode, that it's
[0:36] actually kind of mystifying to most India watchers that the Indian Navy is the smallest
[0:41] of our services, when it should at the very least be as big as
[0:45] the army. Where the hell are the submarines? Because in my research I
[0:48] found out that this project was approved by the Cabinet Committee Security in twenty fifteen,
[0:52] were twenty four, there is not any news item about where these submarines
[0:58] are. If things are not going well, let's not hear about it.
[1:00] Things are going well, you definitely don't want to hear about it because you
[1:02] don't want anyone to keep track of it, because there are enough countries that
[1:04] are interested in this particular program. What I can tell you for sure is
[1:07] that work has begun. Hello and welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast
[1:12] on all things well defense, where I they've Goswami, your host, along
[1:19] with senior journalist Svaru, break down the world of conflicts that range from the
[1:23] subtle to the brute. We bring you nuances and perspectives that will inform and
[1:27] at times provoke. This is in Our Defense. Hello and welcome to the
[1:36] twenty second episode of Our Defense. Yes, Shiv, I have a question
[1:41] for you. Is there any food in the world that you don't consider mediocre?
[1:45] You know, people have been asking me to start talking about the foods
[1:49] that I like, and they say that will be a shorter list, and
[1:51] I'm like, where's the fun in that? You know, everyone's talking about
[1:53] the food they like. You know, there's a bigger world in the food
[1:56] that I don't like. So, yeah, this is not going to end
[1:57] anytime soon. Some context for our listeners and your Shive runs this not threat
[2:02] per se, but every week or so, I think he puts out a
[2:06] tweet where he just like you know, describes one of the world's most mediocre
[2:08] foods and the most recent one. The reason I brought it up, the
[2:12] most recent one was Kandi, which is so it's close to your heart,
[2:16] so you take it personally. I'll be very honest, Ilan, I don't
[2:20] like candy and that much, but so I think a decent enough food that
[2:23] qualifies as to be called mediocre. But this is this is the emotional side
[2:28] of you defending your cuisine. Yeah. Right, let's talk about the world
[2:34] of defense, kand we to defense, Yes from Kandua defense. Yeah,
[2:37] let's do that. What we'll talk about this week we will talk about someone
[2:40] to do with the Navy. The Navy has got a new chief this week.
[2:44] I forgot his name. Yes you met him. Actually yesterday with recording
[2:50] is not Thursday actually for a change, Normally we're calling on Wednesdays and put
[2:53] the episode on Thursdays. So we're to talk about the Navy and specifically the
[2:59] Navy is Nucleus program. But before we do that, a short tangent kind
[3:04] of to do with somebody's actually about a missile launch that happened yesterday or the
[3:07] day before. If I'm not wrong, we didn't miss a sort an episode
[3:10] on missiles in a previous previous episode, and the DRDO launched what is known
[3:16] as a smart system, which is supersonic missile assisted torpedo release of topedo.
[3:23] It sounds very fancy, but the way I get it, it's basically a
[3:24] supersing mistyle that carries a torpedo too. What will location out in the ocean
[3:28] and then drops it from there and then that torpedo submerges and then I'm guessing
[3:30] hits the submarine. Sounds pretty cool, it's more about this, Yeah,
[3:34] No, it's an incredible test. This this weapon was actually tested for the
[3:37] first time a couple of years ago in twenty twenty two, and this is
[3:40] as far as the public is concerned, the second test. We don't know
[3:44] if there have been other tests in between. But this is an extremely unique
[3:47] weapon because, you know, when it comes to a torpedo, the way
[3:52] people usually understand a torpedo is it's a it's a weapon that's either fired you
[3:57] know, from a ship or a submarine or an air and it's basically,
[4:00] you know, swims towards its target and explode. So the target can be
[4:04] either a ship or a submarine. You know, typically torpedoes have not very
[4:10] long range because they're traveling inside water where it's difficult to maintain you know,
[4:14] targeting information, et cetera. And therefore, typically target torpedoes tend to be
[4:19] pretty short range munitions. Now, what the smart basically does is gives you
[4:25] an anti submarine on an anti ship kind of torpedo capability that can be launched
[4:30] from land, Which means that you're taking a torpedo which typically has a range
[4:36] of about twenty kilometers in this case, fitting it into a canister carried by
[4:43] a missile, a supersonic missile that is going to blast it to a distance
[4:48] about six hundred and fifty kilometers from land. So, if you're sitting on
[4:53] land on a coastal missile battery and you've got target information about and I'm speaking
[4:58] about a kind of you know, ideal scenario where everything works out, whether
[5:02] it's good, You've got the target information and everything. You're basically sitting on
[5:06] the coast with the missile switch in your hand, You launch that missile,
[5:10] it blasts off flies six hundred and fifty kilometers up to six hundred and threty
[5:15] kilometers out to sea. At the end of that flight, it drops the
[5:18] torpedo into the water. The torpedo then activates and then completes another twenty kilometers
[5:25] or so until it hits the target. So you've got a system where you
[5:28] can where you have an incredibly standoff range anti submarine slash anti ship torpedo weapon
[5:35] that negates many of the perceived disadvantages of engaging with the submarine or a ship
[5:41] from near quarters, which is usually the case when you're using a torpedo in
[5:45] the conventional way that it is used. What this gives you is long range
[5:49] ability. It gives you that standoff ability, the ability to pose a threat
[5:54] to enemy submarines and ships without having a ship or a submarine at sea.
[5:59] And so it's very much a weapon that will give submarines and ships a sense
[6:04] of pause because it's another it's an additional threat apart from having to deal with
[6:09] you know, anti submarine ships and other submarines in the region. If you're
[6:12] a submarine commander, you got to think about, oh my god, what
[6:15] these guys have on land also that also threatens me. And at a huge
[6:18] distance. Six fifty kilometers is not a joke. It's a massive distance.
[6:21] So that's what this weapon was, and as far as I can tell,
[6:26] and as far as the DRDO have been sharing with us, it was a
[6:29] totally successful mission. The test also apparently took place at at its maximum range,
[6:36] which is incredible, so very exciting weapon. Right, So let's move
[6:41] on to the topic of submarines and especially India's nuclear submarine program, which actually
[6:46] brushes up into two different types of submarines, but we'll come to that a
[6:49] bit later. I first want to just shortly focus on just submarines itself to
[6:54] kind of give us a base on which we will have this episode. So
[6:58] it's doing some research and I see that India's summarine fleet is very very small.
[7:04] We have around sixteen two eighteen summarines, including two nuclear ballistic samarines.
[7:09] The US has the US, Russia, and China all have more than sixty
[7:12] each, US sixty eight, China has around that same number, Russia sixty.
[7:16] UK also has a very small number, around ten to twelve. But
[7:18] they have the ability to have a nuclear submarine out in the ocean and they've
[7:23] been at all times and they have a record for having that for the last
[7:27] fifty to fifty five years. If I'm not wrong, but any we will
[7:29] come to that later when we talk about nucleober sumarines. First, why is
[7:32] India's sumburine fleet so so so small? Because we have one of the largest
[7:36] coastlines in the world, and you know, I think our coastlin is bigger
[7:41] and longer than our land borders combined with Markusan and China. Could be wrong,
[7:45] but you know, you kind of get get my point. So for
[7:47] a country that has such a huge coastline that it has to defend, why
[7:51] is a sumbarine fleet so small? Well, they've the simple answer to that
[7:55] question is that is that it's been a cascading effect of missteps, lack of
[8:01] planning. You know, the the you know, the the huge constraints of
[8:05] India's defense procurement procedure, you know, hamhanded, hamhanded foresight in terms of
[8:11] what requirements will be in the next few decades. All of these, like
[8:16] so many of the things we've discussed in the past as well, have sort
[8:18] of compounded into a uh, you know, into a kind of problem that
[8:24] can't be resolved in a hurry. And we're talking about submarines, which are
[8:26] you know, which which unlike land vehicles or you know, aircraft take years
[8:31] and years and years to build they and to plan. UH. And so
[8:35] India has had a if you look at India's submarine program since the since the
[8:41] seventies and eighties, UH, it's it's been it's been one unfortunate crisis after
[8:46] the other. UH. Very quick backstory for the for our viewers who may
[8:50] not have a background as far as our submarine program is concerned. UH.
[8:54] The Indian Navy initially operated Soviet Foxtrot class submarines and number of them we never
[9:00] built any of course. UH. And these served India during the you know,
[9:05] during the seventies, right. The first the first, uh, the
[9:09] first submarines that India purchased of a kind of newer generation starting in the eighties
[9:13] and nineties were the Kilo class. Now the Kilo class is a Russian and
[9:18] we're not even talking about nuclear submarines yet they have to clarify, we're talking
[9:20] only about conventional submarines here, which is which is to say, diesel electric
[9:24] submarines. The Kilo class submarines which came into India, you know, we
[9:28] had about a dozen of those. Now I think we've got about seven of
[9:31] those because they're very Some of them are very old. Some of them have
[9:35] been retired the Sindu Dukshak blew up in that famous accident. One of them
[9:39] has been gifted to Mayanmar. One of them is in refit in Russia.
[9:43] So we have roughly about seven of those left. Then there are four German
[9:48] HTW Type two O nine submarines, four of which are currently in service.
[9:52] And the new s generation of submarines that we have are the Culvar or the
[9:56] Scorpy in the French Scorpion class submarines, six of which have been built,
[10:01] five of which already in service, and one is going to be joining service
[10:03] I think this year or next year. So all in all, we have
[10:07] about fifteen submarines currently in service with US, which is about one third what
[10:13] we should have. Incredible we have. You know, remember that India is
[10:16] a you know, because of our history of land wars and are kind of
[10:22] the fact that all of our conflicts have been basically northward facing with China or
[10:26] Pakistan. It's easy to forget that India has a seven six hundred kilometer coastline
[10:33] and an enormous maritime domain to govern, which is called the Indian Ocean.
[10:37] Region. For the longest time, India has been and I will say this
[10:41] straight, We've been sea blind. It's the reason and I've said this before
[10:43] in another episode, that it's an it's actually kind of mystifying to most India
[10:48] watchers that the Indian Navy is the smallest of our services, when it should
[10:54] at the very least be as big as the army, given how much you
[10:58] know, how much sea we operate in now, Fifteen submarines, conventional submarines,
[11:03] diesel electric submarines with none of the kind of capabilities a country like India
[11:09] needs for a submarine force, you know, are in our service right now,
[11:13] which is which is why you know, there's always been that famous saying
[11:18] about India submarine arm. It's that sinking feeling, but not in the way
[11:22] that they like, you know. And the thing about the thing about the
[11:26] submarine arm is the HDW submarine program hit a quote unquote scam. India was
[11:31] supposed to build more of those submarines that got stopped in its tracks because of
[11:35] a scam. And we all know how scams work in India. The only
[11:39] people who gain from scams, you know, are the middlemen and the commission
[11:41] agents. The armed forces always lose, you know, the companies never really
[11:48] you know, pay any you know, punitive damages to the country and nothing
[11:50] ever happens. So after India had invested billions of dollars into building a submarine
[11:56] production line in Mazagon and Mumba and you're from you know that it had to
[12:01] be kind of just wrapped up without after building just for Measley sub actually building
[12:05] two Measley submarines. Cut forward another you know, fifteen years. Fifteen years
[12:11] later the Scopin program came online, you know, by which time force levels
[12:16] of the Indian Navy were terribly, terribly small. Now remember that all through
[12:20] this time, the Indian Navy has managed to lease one nuclear powered attack submarine
[12:26] from Russia, the Chakra one. Then we had the Chakra to in twenty
[12:30] nineteen, we've signed a lease for Chakra THI, which will come maybe next
[12:33] year or the year after next. You know, these are all little piecemeal
[12:35] We're going to talk about our program a little while, but this is just
[12:39] symptomatic of how ad hoc, temporary, unplanned, scattered India's submarine acquisition program
[12:48] is concerned. Now. Sandi Bonithan, who used to be with Indian Ray
[12:52] magazine, and why consider a you know, the he's the Alpha and the
[12:56] Omega. To me, as far as submarine warfare is concerned, he's nobody
[13:00] knows more about him or was written more about submarine warfare in India than he'd
[13:03] has. And he actually talks about how the decade that we're in right now
[13:09] is called the lost decade for submarines. The reason for that is really scary.
[13:13] They've by the end of this decade, India should ideally have had twenty
[13:18] seven submarines twenty seven conventional attack submarines by the end of this decade. And
[13:24] what will we have by the end of this decade, I think sixteen submarines,
[13:28] which is eleven less, eleven less than what you should actually be having.
[13:33] And the numbers are actually worse because some of the submarines we have right
[13:35] now by the end of the decade will be retired. So you have a
[13:41] really really troubling, you know, scenario as far as our conventional submarine fleet
[13:46] is concerned. Now, the follow on attempt by India to build more submarines
[13:50] because in the eighties and nineties it retired that we will have two big submarine
[13:56] production lines in the country. You've got another pro that is stuck for the
[14:01] last ten twelve years called Projects seventy five I India, where despite having a
[14:07] scoping class production line in Mazagon in Mumbai, you're still in the global market
[14:13] intending to hold this competitive tender between different competitors to build another production line.
[14:20] Now, one would imagine that it makes sense that if you already have a
[14:24] production line of a submarine into which you've sunk billions of dollars of taxpayers money
[14:30] into, build more of those submarines, improve upon them, add more you
[14:33] know, Indian systems to them, force the French to modify it even more
[14:37] to your demands, and you know, use that for your economy rather than
[14:41] waste even more money to build another production line. But then it becomes a
[14:45] whole Oh, it's a single tender. Why should it only be this company.
[14:48] Let's give other companies a chance? Which is, you know, which
[14:50] is theoretically that's that's that's a fair fair point as far as India as a
[14:56] you know, defense procurement procedure is concerned. But the fact remains that the
[15:00] only one who's lost in the end is the Navy. It's the reason why
[15:03] the Navy is saddled with fifteen subpar submarines. And I'm not saying I'm not
[15:09] saying these submarines are useless all they all do a good job. But these
[15:13] are apart from the Apart from the Scorpions, you know, which have entered
[15:16] service in the last few years, the Kilos and the HGW submarines are all
[15:20] you know, eighties seventies vintage submarines that have no business being in service as
[15:26] your frontline submarines anymore. They can be in your fleet, but they can't
[15:31] be the shining jewels of your submarine force. So it's an absolutely shameful situation,
[15:37] right And I think it gets even worse when you come to the subject
[15:41] of this episode, which is the nuclear submarine program, because right now,
[15:46] officially I think we have only two. There have been some rumors for the
[15:50] last couple of years, especially on social media, that the third nucleberlistic submarine
[15:54] is on its way. It has been launched there in the dockhead over there,
[15:58] some satellite imagery two c. That's how it's anyway, So we have
[16:00] the I S A Hunt officially commissioned I think somewhere in the late two thousands
[16:06] or early this last decade and never officially commissioned, actually secretly launched again.
[16:11] It took like you know, ostent expert in social media kind of see,
[16:14] oh my god, it's only out there in the year. But the POPULARIA
[16:17] reporting says, right now it's almost at the end of its sea trials and
[16:19] like you know, it'll be in proper service soon. The third one,
[16:22] like I said, it's kind of on its way. Before we get into
[16:25] the program itself, first a nerdy question, the technical difference between what is
[16:30] known as ssb N, which is submersible shape ballistic nuclear and SSN, which
[16:33] is sum marsiable ship nuclear. This is going to be the most exciting part
[16:37] of the SESSN. Actually we'll come to that because that's also part of the
[16:41] Project seventy five. But that's the alpha of seventy five. We come to
[16:45] that very interesting. But before we do that, the technical difference within these
[16:48] two and one more question, what makes an SSBN so stealthy? So you
[16:52] know, and like dumb it down for us, So you know, for
[16:56] example, with stealth airplanes, you know that they have sort of a material
[17:00] and sort of build that kind of you know, blocks it not blocks data,
[17:03] but evase data by being very flat, not having too many curves,
[17:06] not having too many sharp pages to not be seen on radar. But what
[17:10] makes a nuclear submarine source? Tell the under the water. Okay, so
[17:12] so first first, let me uh, you know, uh quickly quickly,
[17:18] just tell our listeners and viewers the difference between, uh, the submarines we
[17:22] have in service right now, which are called conventional submarines and nuclear submarines.
[17:26] And then I'll get to the differences between what you you know, what you're
[17:29] talking about, sspns and SSNs. Now the submarines that India has in service
[17:33] right now, and these are submarines that you know, when you think of
[17:37] a submarine, mostly you think of the submarines like these, like the Kilo
[17:41] class and the HGW that we're talking about. These are diesel electric submarines,
[17:45] which means which basically means that these are submarines where the propeller is basically driven
[17:52] by diesel engines and air breathing batteries. Now, uh, the constraint in
[17:57] these submarines is endurance. The reason is that submarines are their stealthiest when they
[18:03] are underwater. The minute they come to the surface. They become instantly visible
[18:08] to anyone who's watching, whether it is a satellite, whether it is a
[18:11] radar, whether it's an aircraft. They become instantly visible because there is nothing
[18:17] sticks out more like a saw from than a periscope, you know, amidst
[18:21] the waves. So the last thing a submarine wants to do is to surface
[18:25] when it's on operational patrol. Sadly, diesel electric submarines need to surface every
[18:30] now and then to suck in oxygen from the air in order to recharge their
[18:36] batteries and get their diesel engines to run, and that's when they can submerge
[18:38] again and you so it's almost like coming up, coming up for a breath.
[18:41] It's like a swimmer with a very long endurance six seven hours of endurance,
[18:45] but they still have to come up and breathe and then go back down.
[18:48] So that's a huge, you know, a drawback of conventional attack submarines.
[18:55] There is a technology which we'll come into later called air independent propulsion,
[18:57] which is basically a kind of propulsion plug that goes into new generation diesel electric
[19:04] submarines that actually partially offsets the need to come up for air, which means
[19:10] that the supply of air happens while the submarine is actually underwater. There's a
[19:14] chemical process through which this oxygen is supplied to the engines without having to take
[19:18] it from the atmosphere. So it's called air independent propulsion. Those are there
[19:22] in some new generation submarines. We don't have that yet. Now it kind
[19:26] of gives it a kind of quasi nuclear ability, which is basically to say
[19:30] that it's underwater, it doesn't need to come up for air as often as
[19:33] if it did not have this plug. Now let me come to nuclear submarines.
[19:37] Remember the word endurance, very very carefully, because that is the touchstone
[19:41] of what you know differentiates a diesel electric submarine from a nuclear submarine. In
[19:47] a nuclear submarine, they've the propulsion system is driven by a nuclear reactor,
[19:53] not by a diesel engine, not by batteries, but literally a nuclear reactor,
[20:00] any miniaturized nuclear reactor on board the submarine is supplying all power for the
[20:06] turbine, for the propeller, for the electricity, everything. It's powered by
[20:08] a nuclear system. As everyone knows, nuclear energy is hugely efficient for the
[20:17] purposes that we're talking about, and crucially it basically completely negates the requirement of
[20:23] having to surface for oxygen. This propulsion system does not require oxygen from the
[20:30] atmosphere, which means that a submarine that's powered by a nuclear reactor nuclear submarine
[20:34] can theoretically stay underwater indefinitely, which means that if the nuclear core of its
[20:41] engine is able to propel that submarine for three years, which it actually can
[20:47] without being replenished, then that submarine crew can actually be under water for three
[20:49] years. They don't have to come up for air. So the only limiting
[20:52] factor for that submarine is food and human endurance. There So, to be
[21:00] very clear, just to summarize that difference. In a diesel electric submarine,
[21:03] the limiting factor is the requirement of oxygen. In a nuclear submarine, the
[21:07] limiting factor is human endurance and the requirement of food and supplies and stuff for
[21:12] which you have to surface. Right now that we've got that difference clear,
[21:17] now let's talk about the difference between ssbn's and SSNs. Now, now that
[21:21] sounds like word soup too many, so let me just clarify what that means.
[21:26] And SSBN is basically a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine and an SSN is
[21:32] a nuclear powered attack submarine can be a little confusing to those who are not
[21:37] familiar, but I'll give you a kind of metaphor to that makes it easy
[21:41] to differentiate between the two. Think of an SSBN, which is a nuclear
[21:45] powered ballistic missile submarine as a bomber. It's a bomber, and a nuclear
[21:49] power attack submarine is like a fighter aircraft. Okay. A bomber is not
[21:53] really a combat aircraft. It doesn't go into the fight. A bomber is
[21:59] there to do as a kind of last resort, you know, weapons system
[22:03] where the destruction is total. Okay, And we've said this very importantly in
[22:10] a previous episode as well. A nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine DAVE is not
[22:15] a weapon of war. It is a weapon of nuclear deterrents. It is
[22:19] not a conventional weapon. It is not counted among your arsenal for a conventional
[22:26] conflict or a battle, because, like we've said in our nuclear episode,
[22:30] which did very well, if your ballistic nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines are activated,
[22:36] it means the end of the world is possibly near. It means that
[22:40] the balloon has gone up to such a drastic extent that nuclear war is at
[22:42] your doorstep. That's what it means. So the whole point of having nuclear
[22:48] powered ballistic missile submarines is that you don't ever have to use them. My
[22:52] favorite conflict paradox is that the whole purpose of nuclear weapons is lost if you
[22:59] have to use them. Right now, huge difference between what I've just described
[23:03] as a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine and a nuclear powered attack submarine. Now,
[23:08] nuclear powered attack submarines are basically your your daily use sharks at see,
[23:15] very similar to your diesel electric submarines, same kinds of missions, but they've
[23:18] got much longer endurance. And these are your actual teeth. These are the
[23:22] submarines you actually need right now. The Indian Navy needs these submarines. They
[23:27] don't carry nuclear weapons. Let's let's let's very very clearly differentiate between the two.
[23:33] A nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines is carrying nuclear tipped missiles, but a
[23:38] nuclear powered attack submarine is carrying conventional weapons. Because it is your it is
[23:44] your daily bread submarine, which is out at sea in large numbers, capable
[23:48] of denying maritime domain to your enemies. It carries torpedoes, it carries land
[23:55] attack cruise missiles, it carries sea skimming anti ship missiles, it carries anti
[24:00] submarine weapons, extremely stealthy, moves really fast, that kind of thing.
[24:06] So they're very different the day of fighter aircraft, which you can use every
[24:10] day to establish your presence and scare the enemy. Your bilistic missile submarines are
[24:15] this huge, big fat fellow lumbering secretly somewhere. They don't need speed.
[24:22] They actually don't even need very much stealth because the reason for that is they
[24:26] are slow moving packed with nuclear weapons, and they don't they're not trying to
[24:32] evade anyone. If they get to a place, a hiding place somewhere,
[24:36] they don't move very much. When a ballistic missile submarine is on patrol,
[24:40] it may travel a far distance, but at a time where it needs to
[24:44] be used, it doesn't actually need to travel very far. It needs to
[24:48] stay submerged in one place from which it can launch its missiles. So there's
[24:52] actually no there's no great requirement for a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine to have
[24:59] a great amount of speed or agility and things like that. They do,
[25:03] but I'm saying they don't. There's no requirement. It's like a big lumbering
[25:06] truck containing missile. So that's the purpose of it. But your nuclear power
[25:10] attack submarines have to be like sharks, very agile, very fast, thirty
[25:12] knots, the ability to evade be completely silent at certain speeds, the ability
[25:19] to completely evade ships, sonars, the ability to move from one place to
[25:23] another really really fast, the ability to submerge quickly at very very short notice
[25:29] without any preparations, and have a nuclear powered reactor which means that they can
[25:33] stay underwater indefinitely. So they are you know, rear Admiral Raja Men and
[25:37] you know famous naval writer had described nuclear powered attack submarines as the ultimate arbiter
[25:45] of naval power, the ultimate arbiter of seapower, because because if you have
[25:49] these, it basically means you don't need many other things. You know,
[25:53] there's one controversial view that if you have enough nuclear powered attack submarines, you
[25:57] don't need aircraft carry, you don't need other kinds of things. You have
[26:03] enough of these, your c is safe. So that's what that's what the
[26:06] differences are. Right. Let's stay on nuclear powered ballistic missiles or your summonies
[26:11] for a bit before we move on to the curious case of the SSN a
[26:15] new program of India's uh so we have two right now. A few years
[26:19] ago, I think the Ari Hunt tested actually a ballistic missile from from the
[26:23] sea, and back then there was you know, wide jubilation that India's nuclear
[26:29] DRAD is complete. Now I won't say that that was misreporting, but I
[26:32] think saying nuclear DRAD is complete is sort of a misnomer because it is complete
[26:36] only when the Arian is out on patrol and the Arian like if you remember,
[26:40] we also had a famous accident because of which it was for many months
[26:44] in in a dog getting repaired. So to take the idea, that's why
[26:48] I mentioned UK at the beginning of this episode. Key. Even though it
[26:52] has only around ten to twelve submarines, I think it has four nuclear powered
[26:56] ballistic submarines, because of which what the Royal Navy claims is that there has
[27:03] been one nuclear powered ballistic submarine out in the sea at all times in the
[27:07] last fifty five to fifty seven years. What they do is essentially, when
[27:11] one has to come back, they send one another one out. So where
[27:15] do you see India's idea and dreams of actually getting their true nuclear rata.
[27:21] Are we also aiming for four sumbarines? Where is that project? And where
[27:25] is there? Where is the project at right? No ob basically, so
[27:27] you know the Irons I was among a small group of very lucky journalists who
[27:33] has taken all our phones, cameras, everything were taken away from us in
[27:37] July two thousand and nine and morn Sayingh was the Prime Minister and we were
[27:41] taken to the shipbuilding center in Mishaka, Putnam where it was for the first
[27:45] time that anyone outside the Advanced Technology Project was laying eyes on the Arihanth.
[27:53] Just a few months before that, Sandy had broken the news that it was
[27:56] called the Arihanth and we were all there, no pictures, no photographs.
[28:00] There are only only two photos actually exist off that occasion. One of them
[28:03] is of good shar and care breaking a coconut on the on the submarine.
[28:08] And I remember many of us, including me, we were making sketches of
[28:11] the submarine because nobody could take pictures, there were no cameras. We were
[28:15] doing a TV stand ups outside where nobody could see anything. So very secretive,
[28:18] but you know, actually an incredible, incredible uh sort of muscle flex
[28:23] by the UPA government at that time. You know, very unusual for a
[28:27] government to take a call to publicize the launch of a nuclear submarine, but
[28:32] they were obviously sending out, you know, a strategic message to the world,
[28:34] especially to China that you know, India has arrived in that sense now.
[28:38] But the thing to remember about the Ari Hunt, Dave, is that
[28:42] it is an operational submarine. There is no doubt about it. It's on
[28:45] patrol, et cetera. But the the the Ari Hunt was in every respect
[28:51] is basically intended to be a technology demonstrator. Remember it is basically it is
[28:56] citizen zero as far as our nuclear sub program is concerned. This is where
[29:02] all the learnings, mistakes, successes have manifested themselves. So there are many
[29:08] things that are right with this submarine. There are many things that are the
[29:11] result of you know, making errors and learning from them. Russia was involved
[29:17] in a big, big way. Remember so many in many ways, including
[29:22] not just including, but especially its size. It's quite a small ballistic missile
[29:27] submarine. Usually ballistic missile submarines are much larger. This is a I think,
[29:32] if I'm not mistaken, about six thousand tons, which makes it a
[29:36] kind of mini Boomer as they call they called boomers bilistic missile submarine. Having
[29:41] said that, you know, India doesn't have the luxury of you know,
[29:45] having a technology demonstrator and not it not being of operational utility. So let's
[29:49] make no mistake. The Arii Hunt is out at sea, it's operational,
[29:53] it's administered by the Strategic Forces Command, which we've talked about in the previous
[29:57] episode. So there's no doubt about the submarines that come after the Arianth is
[30:04] where this this this third leg of the nuclear triad will actually sort of come
[30:10] into its own uh. And that it's happening progressively. It's not something that
[30:14] you know, happens overnight. But the Arihant Uh, the long journey to
[30:18] the Ariant was necessary because a this is technology that nobody was going to give
[30:23] you, even the Russians didn't really give you. Uh, you know that
[30:26] the last mile of technologies was still still have had to be developed here in
[30:30] India. Uh. You know, I'm not negating what the Russians did.
[30:33] They did a huge amount for Orientth, but ultimately there were there were things
[30:37] that even they wouldn't share with India. The submarine that you mentioned Arigath,
[30:42] which you know, which has been a you know, a bit of a
[30:45] mystery boat for the last many years. Has it been commissioned, has it
[30:48] not been commissioned? Is it still on sea trials? Now, this is
[30:51] a very interesting, uh interesting boat, and it's designated as S three.
[30:56] You know, I love how the submarine program has all these mysterious names.
[31:00] S two was the Arianth. Now you've got the S three, which is
[31:02] the Arigath, which has been on SA trials for quite a few years now.
[31:07] And this particular submarine, whether or not it has been commissioned, A,
[31:11] we don't know, and B it doesn't really matter. And the reason
[31:14] for that is because it's a nuclear command asset, which means that you know,
[31:18] if push Kamsha is going to be used anyway, So that doesn't that
[31:21] doesn't bother us for the purposes of this podcast. But the Arigath is an
[31:26] important nuclear submarine because it is basically the Ari Hunt with all the you know,
[31:33] edges smoothed out, you know, many many learnings and issues kind of
[31:37] corrected, many things preempted that were seen in the Ari Hunt, et cetera.
[31:41] So it's a technologically weapons wise and in every other respect, a fast,
[31:45] superior nuclear power, new nuclear power ballistic missile submarine now follow and remember
[31:52] that the nuclear submarine program in India has a huge amount of involvement from Indian
[31:57] industry. Larsen and two Grow and other companies like that are deeply involved with
[32:02] this program, including the fabrication of the hull which takes place in Hazira and
[32:07] Gujarat and many others. So S three is your Arigath. Following the S
[32:13] three, you've got to improved. So the so the Arihant and the Arigath
[32:17] are the Arihant class submarines, two of them. Then you've got something called
[32:22] the S four and the S four Star. I know it's a little confusing,
[32:24] but you know, bear with me. The S four and the S
[32:28] four Star are two submarines which don't have a name yet, but you know,
[32:32] for the for the purposes of understanding, it's like an improved Arihanth class.
[32:37] They will be the same size as the Arianth more or less the same
[32:39] size, because you know, if you've got a proven hull, why would
[32:44] you tinker with it. You've got a proven hull. So the S four
[32:45] and S four Star will basically be two improved Arihanth class submarines, where the
[32:51] improvements will be in the reactor, in the propulsion system, the interiors,
[32:54] and the weapons weapon carrying capacity, so they will be far far improved technologically.
[33:01] Speaking to the Arihant, then you've got this very interesting and mysterious submarine
[33:07] called the S five. Now your Arihanth and your improved arihan So we've got
[33:12] S two Arihant, You've got S three, which is Arigath. You've got
[33:15] S four and S four Star, which are the improved Arihanth class. Then
[33:19] you've got an S five, which, unlike the above four, which are
[33:22] about six thousand ton submarines, this one is a big fat submarine, fourteen
[33:28] thousand done submarine, more than double the size, which means that this is
[33:31] this becomes your first true to life, you know, right sized ballistic missile
[33:38] submarine of the kind comparable with you know with the United States and the you
[33:44] know, the Russian ballistic missile submarines. Here you've got the size that speaks
[33:47] of the kind of nuclear deterrent mission that you're aiming at. So I'm not
[33:52] going to say that we have to wait till S five until we have the
[33:55] nuclear triad because if you look at it theoretically, they the ari Hunt currently
[34:01] comes armed with the K fifteen missile, which is which is which is again
[34:06] a technology demonstrator. It's a ballistic missile system with a very modest range of
[34:10] about seven hundred and fifty to eight hundred kilometers. The K four has also
[34:14] been tested from the Aria Hunt which has a range of about I think three
[34:17] thousand kilometers. And then there's the K five which is going to be tested
[34:22] later on and we love to see how that actually goes. So theoretically speaking,
[34:25] and for the purposes of this discussion, the nuclear triad is not complete.
[34:31] But the third leg exists, which means that India has a sea borne,
[34:36] a submarine launched nuclear missile capability. We have that capability right now,
[34:40] but to realize its full potential, you still need to have a large sized
[34:45] ballistic missile submarine nuclear powered with your K four K five missiles fully operationally ready,
[34:52] not under development, not under testing. You're not under you know,
[34:54] let's see where this goes. Like six or ten of them loaded into that
[34:59] submarine all times, ready for ready for doomsday. So that is when your
[35:04] nuclear tride will be complete. But do we have the capability right now?
[35:08] Yes? Yes, right interesting. We will move on to the sssns or
[35:14] the nuclear power attack submarines and the curious case of them not existing in India
[35:19] asgmentary right now part after a quick break, Pany pany pani joy so beautiful,
[35:30] so elegant, just looking like a wow eh bang? Was that enough
[35:37] crunch for you? Because this crunch fest doesn't stop here. Yes, And
[35:42] if by watching such reals and viral videos you think your life is becoming moem,
[35:46] then I cost them and me Anna will bring the most fuke worthy,
[35:52] nauseating and repulsive friends on social media and will maybe enact some of them,
[35:58] but most of all discs us and seriously dissect these trends. So get ready
[36:02] to laugh, cringe and question humanity. Dropping soon on Spotify, Apple Podcasts
[36:08] and wherever you get your cringe I mean audio entertainment problem. So let's talk
[36:15] cringe. Welcome back, Shave and I are discussing India's nuclear summarine project projects.
[36:27] We just discussed one, the ballistic missile submarine portion of it, which
[36:30] is basically a submarine nuclear powered submarine that is able to fire ballistic missiles that
[36:37] can cause doomsday essentially end of Kingdom come, etcetera. I want to talk
[36:43] about the ss ns, the other nuclear powered summaries that you explain the difference
[36:47] between you two before the break, which are, like you said, you're
[36:51] prime your te these are the ones that you need to have right now.
[36:54] One explain this paradox to me because for me as a layperson, for me,
[36:59] N s BN or something like seems like a it seems like a massive
[37:04] technological investment. It's called ADCE technology vehicle as well. So how is it
[37:07] that you have a nuclear powered ballistic submarine but you don't have a nuclear power
[37:13] attack submarine? So first, right to the bad let's talk about that.
[37:16] And second, where the hell are the submarines? Because in my research I
[37:20] found out that this project was approved by the Cabinet committing Security in twenty fifteen.
[37:23] We are in twenty twenty four. There is not any news item about
[37:30] where these submarines are, whether they even being built right now? Is there
[37:32] some loopint is there some ideas, et cetera, et cetera. So what
[37:36] is this project and where is it? So, so you know you've hit
[37:37] the nail on the head with that question. There which is that. And
[37:40] this has been a running joke for you know observers of india submarine program,
[37:45] which is that this is probably the only first country that has built a far
[37:50] more complicated nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine and still hasn't built a nuclear powered attack
[37:57] submarine. So it's actually you know, gone about this in the in the
[38:00] reverse because not to say that nuclear power attack submarines are simple. They're not
[38:06] extremely complex, but one would have imagined that a country with India's pressing you
[38:10] know, naval warfare needs would have invested you know, more time and a
[38:15] sort of accelerated pace towards ssn's as they called. Now please remember, and
[38:22] I'm repeating this again that nuclear power attack submarines are your sharks, they are
[38:27] your fighter aircraft, they are your Roti Kaprama Khan as far as naval warfare
[38:31] is concerned, or they should be. And the shame is that we don't
[38:36] have them in any large measure. We've had them in a very ad hoc
[38:38] manner, and that too by Lee's from Russia. In the eighties we had
[38:42] a Charlie class submarine, I think the Chakra one. Then we had the
[38:45] Chakra two, which was in a Kola two class submarine, you know,
[38:47] which faced an accident. Now we're going to get a third one, you
[38:51] know, in the next few years. We'd signed a deal for that in
[38:53] I think in twenty seventeen, twenty eighteen that the year may be wrong,
[38:58] but basically that now having one leased nuclear powered attack submarine, which is not
[39:04] even yours, it's not your tech, it's constantly monitored by the Russians is
[39:10] a is a very suboptimal way of uh, you know, arming yourself with
[39:15] that capability. And I don't think anyone thought that it was a permanent solution.
[39:20] Uh So it has always the need for India having its own credible fleet
[39:25] of indigenously built nuclear power attack submarines has been felt for a very long time.
[39:31] But I think the fact that the Arihant program had sucked up so many
[39:35] resources and energy because a decision had been taken by the political powers that be
[39:38] that a ballistic missile submarine is our priority as a nuclear power. We need
[39:43] to have that. Uh And uh you know, we can we can sit
[39:46] here and discuss still Kingdom come whether it was a good decision or a bad
[39:49] decision. But the ironic truth also is that having figured out the difficult end
[39:57] of nuclear submarines, there is a suggestion that now executing a nuclear power attack
[40:01] summering might be a little bit easier. And I'm not saying it will be
[40:06] hundreds of things can still go wrong, but it might be a little simpler
[40:09] because you've it's like your matchpaper bus English. It's like that, you know,
[40:15] it's like you finished the tough thing and now this will be a little
[40:16] simpler. The truth of the matter is many lessons that India should have learned
[40:23] about placing priority on its submarine arm have got lost in the politics of should
[40:30] we go for another aircraft carrier, you know, should we have a third
[40:34] aircraft carrier. No, let's not do that, Let's have submarines. So
[40:37] then you change your mind later, Andy t care because we've spent so much
[40:39] money building this aircraft carrier. How can we build only one? We should
[40:43] build a second one. So all these cross purposing lobbies and views and you
[40:49] know, doctrines are clashing inside the Navy and the you know, and the
[40:52] national security establishment you know has taken its toll on you know, decision making
[41:00] clarity. As far as something as basic as nuclear power attack submarines are concerned.
[41:04] You know, the problem is Indian decision makers over decades have looked at
[41:09] nuclear powered attack submarines as a luxury, as a luxury, as like,
[41:14] oh, nuclear power attack submarines, you know, these are the these are
[41:17] the you know, the these are luxury items, you know, not your
[41:21] everyday items. The truth is they're not. The truth is they're not.
[41:24] China has them. The United States has an entirely nuclear powered submarine force.
[41:30] Entirely. They don't have they don't have conventional submarines. They only have nuclear
[41:36] power attack submarines and bili sigmacile submarines. So when we do that beam count
[41:42] which you did at the top of the show, when you said the US
[41:45] has this many, China has this many, we have this many. Look
[41:46] at the number of nuclear power attack submarines that these countries have and we don't
[41:51] even have one, not even even the one that we had on lease is
[41:53] gone. Okay, so we are stuck with fifteen, you know, struggling
[42:00] diesel electric submarines. Not all of them are struggling. Some of them a
[42:02] new generation, like the Scorpions. But the point I'm trying to make is
[42:07] if you don't have high endurance nuclear powered attack submarines, you are dead in
[42:13] the water. I mean literally. It's a bad situation to be in for
[42:16] a country like India at a time when China is aggressively probing the Indian Ocean,
[42:22] and no other instrument of conflict, no other instrument of naval warfare,
[42:28] provides you the kind of sea denial ocean denial capability that a submarine does.
[42:32] An aircraft carrier doesn't do that. An aircraft carrier is about force projection.
[42:37] But you go to somebody else's waters and you project power to them. A
[42:40] submarine is sitting and hiding in your waters, signaling to the enemy that don't
[42:45] you dare think of coming anywhere close. It's defensive and if necessary, can
[42:50] be offensive if you need to use it that way. But you were to
[42:52] think about the signaling of these two things. So is India a power projecting
[42:57] force or is it about making sure that nobody can come into its domain?
[43:00] It can be both things, but there has to be a sense of priority
[43:04] because we don't have infinite budgets. Now to answer your question about whether where
[43:08] the hell is this program? Now? It doesn't have a name yet.
[43:13] They lovingly called India's sharks, but there is. In twenty nineteen, it
[43:19] was reported here on India Today that the Cabinet Committee on Security had basically signed
[43:23] off finally on a ninety six thousand crore RUPEED deal to build six Indian made
[43:32] Indian made nuclear powered attack submarines. Now, just to show you an India
[43:37] map of where all things are happening as far as this program a concerned.
[43:43] In Delhi is where the program is administered from the Advanced Technology Vessel Program for
[43:49] the Arihunt et cetera. That's where the headquarters is. Guru Gram has the
[43:52] design bureau for this submarine. Hazira and Gujrat is where the hull is built
[43:58] and fabricated by last night. And two Buru Mumbai is where the Baba Atomic
[44:02] Research Center is. That's where the reactor design takes place and where the Indian
[44:07] nuclear powered attack submarines will have improved nuclear reactor. Kulpakam is where the reactor
[44:13] will actually be built in Tamil Nadu and Vishaka Putnam is where the entire final
[44:19] integration and trials will take place. So basically you're talking about Deaili Hariana Maharashtra,
[44:25] Tamil, Nadu, and and Pradesh. This is your geographical stretch of
[44:30] where these submarines will be built. Now clearance has been accorded to the submarine,
[44:34] the submin class. I wouldn't I wouldn't feel too bad about not reading
[44:38] any news articles about progress, because that's the way they like it. You
[44:44] know, once once a submarine program begins, not hearing about it is actually
[44:47] good news. Because these are nuclear submarine programs. You know, if things
[44:52] are not going well, let's not hear about it. Things are going well,
[44:54] you definitely don't want to hear about it because you don't want anyone to
[44:57] keep track of it because there are enough countries that are intro still in this
[45:00] particular program. What I can tell you for sure is that work has begun.
[45:04] Engineering teams, the design teams, et cetera. Have been moving at
[45:08] full speed since project sanction a few years ago. Uh, and things are
[45:13] things are moving right. Very good point in the middle of your answer where
[45:17] you talked about the clashing interests between whether you should have some marines, so
[45:22] whether you should have another aircraft carrier, because that was something actually I want
[45:23] to talk about on this episode anyway. Uh so, Yeah, if you
[45:28] look at the numbers, so you have a plan of four ssvns or two
[45:31] are kind of in service. You spoke about one more the S five,
[45:36] which would be something even bigger than this. You have a plan of six
[45:38] sessns like you said right now. Uh, and you have two aircraft carriers
[45:44] right now, one bought and one made on your own, and the Navy
[45:50] has said that they will most likely be placing for one more speak, one
[45:53] more Indian made aircraft carrier. The Navy, I imagine, is a very
[45:59] uh expensive business to operate, because I thank all of these sound like big
[46:02] investments. These are like and guessink any naval equipment is going to be a
[46:07] damn expensive and like like, let's say the Army Air Force also expensive,
[46:09] but only when it comes to your fighter jets, right, But with Navy,
[46:13] I think almost anything that the Navy would want would be damn expensive.
[46:15] So let's not talk about the civilian setup right now. Let's talk about the
[46:19] government or the different interests over there. Let's talk purely about the Navy.
[46:24] The naval leadership over the years. Do you think there's also a clash of
[46:28] competing interest within the Navy because the way I see it, I would imagine
[46:31] it would be the name is responsibility to figure out a doctrine and give it
[46:36] to the government. Keep hi, this is what we want. This is
[46:37] the money you can give us. Okay a Humphrey, figure out content because
[46:43] to me right now it sounds like still no one has an idea of what
[46:45] do you want to prioritest Do you want one more aircraft care or do you
[46:47] want to convert random a Nicoba command into sort of sort of a studio aircraft
[46:51] carre or do you want more nuclear powered attack submarines? So is it possible
[46:54] that within the Navy there's confusion about which way to go because of which they
[46:58] are not able to give that one clear pitch to the government, which then
[47:00] leads to more confusion. You know. See it's natural for you know,
[47:04] there to be interest groups within any military service. That's natural because uh,
[47:09] you know, in any military there will be voices that will advocate, you
[47:14] know, aircraft carriers are the way to go, and some will say no,
[47:16] it has to be submarines because submarines are the instruments of the future in
[47:20] terms of seed denial. UH. India, the Indian navy. The Indian
[47:22] government definitely got caught up in a a in a kind of whirlpool of uh,
[47:29] you know, suggestions from all sides, not just internally but also externally.
[47:31] The US was also publishing these studies about China's maritime power. Or now
[47:36] they have aircraft carriers, but they'll soon have this capability as well. Oh,
[47:40] now they've unveiled an anti you know, a carrier killer missile, which
[47:44] basically kind of offsets the power of power projection of an aircraft carrier group.
[47:49] So all of these things were kind of whirling around in naval headquarters and the
[47:52] Ministry of Defense. Uh Maneuver Parker was the Defense Minister at that time.
[47:58] I remember when this whole issue was at it speak, when it became a
[48:01] situation of whether it should be either or you know, can we do we
[48:06] have the luxury of having another aircraft carrier and also investing in submarines. You
[48:09] don't, because, like you said, these are insanely prohibitively expensive pieces of
[48:14] equipment. So uh, you know, even doctrially, it doesn't make sense
[48:17] to go in for everything. You know, how how how thinly are you
[48:22] going to stretch your resources in terms of maintaining such disparate you know, offensive
[48:27] assets. The fact is China India also looks at the United States and says,
[48:30] here, you've got an example of a country that has a large submarine
[48:35] force but also has a huge carrier force. You know, they've proven that
[48:39] the success of a blue water navy means having a mix of both. But
[48:44] are you a country that has the same kinds of resources or responsibilities or you
[48:47] know, intentions as the United States. No, you don't, you really
[48:50] don't. You're not You're not a You're not a country that you know,
[48:53] intends to project power in the same way that the United States does. So
[48:58] taking that is a bad example. But but having said that, when General
[49:02] Bipin Rabat was the Chief of Defense Staff, things came even more to a
[49:07] head where he kind of very dismissively said, you know, aircraft car a
[49:09] third aircraft carriact on nei yoga. You know, he was he was a
[49:13] moffat in that way, you know, saying sort of treating these sensitive issues
[49:19] of you know, what the forces need, you know, like a drawing
[49:22] room canvas conversation, which was not a bad thing, that was his style,
[49:25] but it ended up rufling a lot of feathers, sings aircraft carrier nail
[49:30] submy in Illini. So that caused also quite a bit of turbulence, h
[49:35] you know, within the system. Even now, even now, like you
[49:37] said, now it's been decided we'll get another aircraft carrier, which leads to
[49:39] the question about then, what happens to our submarine arm? You know,
[49:43] does that mean that the submarine arm is high and dry? Uh? You
[49:45] know what happens to the SSN uh you know program? Because the SSN program,
[49:51] like and I repeat this again, it's nuclear powered, but it's not
[49:54] a deterrent force. It's not. These are submarines for your use right now.
[50:00] These are not ballistic missile submarines to be used in case of a nuclear
[50:04] provocation. These are submarines that are going to use every day where you're going
[50:06] to use that endurance in order to keep them at sea practically indefinitely. So
[50:10] that's where that question comes. So the short answer to your question is absolutely
[50:15] there has been a lack of clarity, and I wouldn't blame the Navy entirely
[50:20] for this because see, ultimately the forces don't take those level decisions are not
[50:23] taken by the Navy. They're taken by the political leadership. And I would
[50:29] say that there has been a confusion over the last couple of decades over doctrinally
[50:34] which way to go. It's not like I say today that aircraft carrier will
[50:37] chose aircraft carriers and then tomorrow it's executed. These decisions have to be taken
[50:40] fifteen years in advance, because you have to design the damn thing. Then
[50:44] you've got to build it, then you've got executed, then you've got to
[50:46] assimilate it. Then you've got to and remember it's not these not like.
[50:51] These are not pistols where you buy a pistol, you shoot it at range
[50:53] for a couple of days and you're done. An aircraft carrier once it or
[50:57] a submarine once it's inducted, especially a new asset, it it takes months
[51:00] slash years to make it operational and completely battle ready to do all its missions.
[51:07] It takes a long time. Are these are insanely unimaginably complicated pieces of
[51:12] equipment. So it's not like you got it Tello manual, but it's ready,
[51:15] let's take it out and do what it takes. It doesn't work like
[51:19] that takes a long time. So that so the Navy not only doesn't have
[51:22] the luxury of budget and cost, which is which you're right about, also
[51:25] doesn't have the luxury of time, which is also the reason why the Navy
[51:30] insists on made in India. It insists on a misable bar. It's not
[51:32] out of the goodness of its heart. It's because you are Mujburi. I
[51:37] would rather have my problems here in India than face them abroad. So it's
[51:42] there have been issues. Hopefully there will be clarity soon. Yeah, hopefully.
[51:45] I think that's a good point on which to end this episode. And
[51:49] yeah, it's a good point also about these piece of equipment take a long
[51:52] time. And you know, I think a point that illustrates that is,
[51:54] by the time India will get around to having like a true blue sort of
[51:59] a bullist take nuclear power publistic submarine, countries like the US and UK will
[52:05] already have retired their first generation variants that come up with the new classes.
[52:08] Both of the countries are currently on the i think the fag end of developing
[52:12] a fresh class of first generation realistic submarine. So that's that. So let's
[52:16] see where this is n program goes and let's hope to see a good photo
[52:22] for and some Indian made Sis submarine sometimes in the near future. Thanks to
[52:27] you once again, great chat, fun chat, and to our listeners and
[52:30] you was this idea actually was pitched by a viewer to us on one of
[52:35] our previous episodes, the last wa if I'm not wrong, So if you
[52:37] also have any ideas, if you have any questions that you want US answers
[52:40] to, if you have any topic that you think we should discuss two,
[52:43] let us know in the comments on YouTube, or you can also WhatsApp us.
[52:45] Our WhatsApp number is eight five double eight nine, double six, double
[52:47] nine six. That's it for this week's defense. Does for more tune in
[52:51] next week. Till then, stay safe and not crossing the boundaries your passport

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