# India's Nuclear Saga: From Peace to Power | In Our Defence, S02, Ep 12

An episode of [In Our Defence](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1617244439), 22 Feb 2024, 1 h 03 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/58777631/22_feb_24_iod_s2_ep_12_mix_feb_22_128.mp3

This week, host Dev Goswami and defence expert Shiv Aroor talk about India's nuclear setup. They dive into why India decided to go nuclear back in the 1980s and 1990s, explaining the concept of the nuclear triad. What does it mean, and why has it been so challenging to complete the submarine part of this triad? And why do we need submarines like the INS Arihant or INS Arighat to finish the triad? What exactly can India do with its nuclear weapons? And why is there so much secrecy surrounding these operations? Let's imagine for a moment: if a nuclear attack were to happen, what would it look like? And they ponder the paradoxical nature of the nuclear world. What is it? Tune in to find out more! Read Sandeep Unnithan's story on India's indigenous nuclear submarine project here. Produced by Anna Priyadarshini Sound mix by Kapil Dev Singh

## Transcript

[0:00] This is India Today podcasts. The third leg of this nuclear triad, as
[0:08] it's called, is the most important one and the one that India achieved last
[0:13] I was lucky enough to be one of the I think forty journalists during the
[0:17] up I th. It was either two thousand and eight or two thousand and
[0:19] nine who was flown down to Vishaka Putnam to a secret facility called the Shipbuilding
[0:25] Center. There was one PIB camera guy who took three photographs which have now
[0:29] become public where you can barely see anything. It has a picture of Gursharan
[0:33] Kor the wife of the then Prime Minister, breaking a coconut on the submarine
[0:37] and that was the Arihanth. The Arihanth used to be called for the longest
[0:41] time before it got its name Arihanth. And the name Arihanth was broken by
[0:45] India Today magazine by Sandy when you hear, my close friend and one of
[0:49] India's top defense journalists. But before that, for the longest time, it
[0:53] just had a working title of ATV, which was Advanced Technology Vessel. You
[0:57] know, which is your typical anodym vanilla name. India's now first policy is
[1:03] is hugely beneficial to India. It was a very meticulously thought through policy.
[1:08] It wasn't you know, just some random among kiasha type thing. Hello and
[1:14] welcome to Another Defense, a weekly podcast on all things well defense where I
[1:19] they've go Swami, your host, along with senior journalist Shivaru, break down
[1:23] the world of conflicts that range from the subtle to the brute. We bring
[1:27] you nuances and perspectives that will inform and at times provoke. This is in
[1:37] our Defense. Hello and welcome. It's been twelve episodes of Aara Defense is
[1:42] season two, and I just wondering I was talking to my producer Anna that
[1:46] you know, maybe a few listeners who listen to us on Apple podcast,
[1:49] Spotify or on our website don't know that we are also with a brun video.
[1:53] So in case you'd like to, you know, it's like over the
[1:55] weekend watch us in peace because the two of us. You can go to
[1:57] YouTube. You can go to the at a handle which is Inde today,
[2:00] and you'll see a podcast tab there. Just tap on the podcast tab and
[2:04] you'll find in a Defensive playlist you can watch this episode or you know,
[2:07] all the previous episodes that we recorded. Speaking of previous episodes SHIV. The
[2:12] last one got some quite some reactions, and I'm guessing you've got a lot
[2:15] of them from within the military. I can tell you it's I got a
[2:20] lot of bookkeets and break backs from the pilot community, from naval pilots as
[2:24] well as Air Force pilots. I can. I can assure you that it
[2:28] became a big mess hall conversation topic, you know, across units, and
[2:32] I'm still getting messages about that. But the one thing I can tell you
[2:37] is that everyone said that it was a nice substantive episode, you know,
[2:43] even that became a kind of big talking point. Everyone appreciated that we talked
[2:46] about something that usually isn't discussed in such detail because it's a sensitive issue.
[2:53] Also, you know, fans of Bippin Rabat who only saw the clip we
[2:57] put out, they were up in arms and like how can you And I
[3:00] said, yeah, please watch the whole episode. You will see what we
[3:04] were really talking about. So, yeah, it was it. You know,
[3:07] if podcasts can go viral, this one definitely dated, yes, exactly,
[3:10] and our listeners and you can we just go back to our previous episode
[3:13] and just check out what she was talking about. In case you haven't already
[3:16] heard it or watched it, you know. Before we move the topic of
[3:20] the day, I also want to go to a few comments that we got
[3:23] on our previous episode, and I want to kind of clear the air because
[3:27] it's a sort of a controversial topic. A few people, some of our
[3:30] listeners, some of our viewers, wanted us to talk about the so called
[3:34] failure. And for those listening to us again, I've made air quotes of
[3:38] this missile called R seventy three. It was displayed or used during the Yushakti
[3:43] air exercise that's going on, or that happened over the weekend, I think,
[3:46] or the weekend before. Nothing reported in mainstream media. There were some
[3:50] reports on social media, some handles I don't know what these handles were,
[3:53] but claiming that the missile was a failure because there were two platforms that were
[3:57] used to fire it, the Summer which is an anti aircraft system, and
[4:01] the thing just fightrojet. I'm not sure exactly what happened, but they've seen
[4:04] the clip of the announcer basically saying that it was a small drone and the
[4:09] missile flew very close and if it was a large aircraft, it would have
[4:11] hit, to which some people commented saying, oh nice, saved by the
[4:14] commentator. So again I don't know what happens. So you know, as
[4:16] you defend, you only someone who knows about this, just clear the air.
[4:19] What's it all? So so yeah, so so the R seventy three
[4:21] most definitely missed. You know, on this podcast, we don't mince our
[4:26] words, you know, no wooly explanations. We tell it straight. That
[4:30] missile which was fired by the jet definitely missed the target drone, which if
[4:34] you look at it technically, it's not really a big deal. If you
[4:38] ask the air force, you ask fighter pilots about a missile hitting a target.
[4:43] You know, the realistic and genuine answer to that is, in a
[4:46] war fighting scenario, you're not armed with just one missile. There will be,
[4:51] and very likely will be situations where missiles will miss their targets because targets
[4:57] have countermeasures, evasive options, cetera. So a missile hitting a target is
[5:01] not such a big deal. Not only does a single aircraft carry many missiles
[5:05] potentially, but you also have many aircraft in the air, so it's not
[5:09] like one aircraft, one missile, one target, and that set. If
[5:12] you fail, that's it. That's not how combat works. On the other
[5:15] hand, Vayushati was a firepower demonstration, so it was very much about spectacle.
[5:20] It was very much about, you know, visually showing you what these
[5:26] aircraft and these weapons can actually do. There is always the possibility of you
[5:30] know, a margin of error, the possibility of a missile missing. So
[5:34] I think it was just unfortunate for the air Force that in this particular set,
[5:39] that particular item, in what was otherwise a spectacularly you know, well
[5:44] executed firepowered demonstration, that the missile missed, and it became a talking point.
[5:47] The R seventy three is a Soviet era missile, that is, you
[5:53] know, a standard you know, sort of heat seeking missile that's there on
[5:58] all of our all a standard air to ay miss alabag your pardon, that's
[6:01] there on all of our nearly all of our U know, Russian aircraft.
[6:05] And therefore, you know, to use that one one incident to say that
[6:12] it was a failure, you know, one doesn't really know what happened.
[6:15] One will have to go into the actual details. But I wouldn't read that
[6:17] much into it, right, just quick check. So why Ushakti was held
[6:23] over the over Pokraun. Yeah, which is going to be closely linked to
[6:26] what we talk about, which is India's nuclear program. We briefly touched upon
[6:30] this, I think in the initial days of season two when we discussed the
[6:34] various conflicts facing the world is Delhamas Russia, Ukraine, India China standoff and
[6:40] the possibility of a nuclear nuclear war in the modern day and age. Will
[6:45] dwelve much deeper into those topics. But first let's take an overview of India's
[6:48] nuclear program. It began I think in the late late forties, so lately
[6:55] late forties, early fifties, with the launch of the Atomic Energy Commission under
[6:59] hum you Abba and I think the first nuclear test was done in nineteen seventy
[7:01] four s twenty five. Yeah. That was supposed to be a civilian demonstration
[7:05] of India being able to sort of, you know, create nuclear energy.
[7:10] And I think back then the idea was that we will be using this technology
[7:13] for energy needs and not really for military needs. That kind of changed,
[7:16] I think in the eighties and nineties. The shift, which is where I'd
[7:19] like you to focus on, the shift towards thinking of using nuclear power as
[7:25] a military asset, and I think in a nineteen ninety eight Operation Shakti,
[7:29] I think around five nuclear explosions were carried out in Pokron under a prime stuttle
[7:33] Berryvashpi, one of the crowning jewels of the BJP, so to speak.
[7:38] They keep bringing it up all the time that you know, we were the
[7:40] ones who kind of gave India a nuclear military power. And since then,
[7:44] you've had a range of equipment. You've had the NY Series one to five,
[7:47] I think all in Operation A six being developed. You have the K
[7:51] fifteen, K four and K five submarine missiles. You have the ari at
[7:58] the Aigath nuclear powered nuclear submarines. You have I think the Mirages and Jaguars
[8:03] which are able to launch nuclear missiles. And I'm also getting a fl yes
[8:07] modern which should be and a range of road transport vehicles basically that can carry
[8:11] and fire nuclear cells. Before I gues said, we'll get we'll be going
[8:15] to everything else. A brief overview of how did we go about developing this
[8:20] and why in the eighties and nineties did we feel the need to go nuclear
[8:26] military speaking, So you know, like we've discussed in many you know earlier
[8:28] episodes as well. I think in the eighties and nineties there was a geopolitical
[8:33] awakening in India that we were much bigger than we had initially imagined. This
[8:39] was not just a bigger country, but a country with far greater global potential.
[8:45] This is a country that was, you know, in some simplistic ways,
[8:48] a rising star in the global community, but also a country that was,
[8:52] you know, had fought a few wars, had an economy that had
[8:54] just been liberalized, you know, had you know, there were many economic
[9:01] hot points about India that were extremely promising, the beginnings of the IT boom,
[9:05] et cetera, all of those things. This predates what happened in the
[9:07] nineties, but it was it was something that foretold, uh, you know,
[9:13] the greatness that India would achieve later on. Very much as part of
[9:16] all of this in you know, in the nineties, obviously, there was
[9:20] a systemic realization Dave, that you know, a country like India faced with
[9:26] the challenges that it does an unpredictable neighbor in the west in the form of
[9:30] Pakistan, and even more unpredictable neighbor in the east in the form of China.
[9:33] Uh, you know, the entire aq Kan network, which has you
[9:39] know, the funnel dirty nuclear technology to India's enemies everywhere. You know,
[9:43] the sheer opacity of you know who holds what uh and you know whether it
[9:48] can fall into the wrong hands. All of that, you know, which
[9:52] now sounds very Hollywood, were real fears at that point of time. And
[9:58] the greatness of what happened was that uh uh that that the government under under
[10:03] Attal Bihari Vajpai with with that famous secrecy, well you know, practically nobody
[10:07] knew. There was one journalist who reported about it a day ahead. Uh,
[10:11] you know, conducted these tests because I think there was a there was
[10:16] a pan, a pan system realization that, uh, this is a country
[10:20] that needs to be able to protect itself, and it needs to be able
[10:24] to protect itself not just through conventional military power, which it has already used
[10:28] in a series of conflicts and wars already, but it needs to have deterrent
[10:33] power, which is to prevent conflict, uh, you know, prevent large
[10:37] scale uh you know, attacks on its territory basically debtor either Pakistan or China
[10:43] or basically these two countries, but any other country from even thinking about uh,
[10:48] you know, doing something to harm Indian sovereignty. Uh, and that's
[10:52] the reason. So the so so to get down to the nuts and bolts
[10:54] of a nuclear program, uh, you know, all nuclear programs are basically
[10:58] about to things. One of them is to figure out where your nuclear fuel
[11:05] is going to come from for your bomb. The second is to actually build
[11:07] a bomb, build a warhead. The third is to actually test that warhead.
[11:11] And these are not logical, consequential steps that all each of them highly
[11:16] specialized areas of nuclear science. So you you know, you may be a
[11:20] country that has a lot of uranium two thirty five or you know, whatever
[11:24] fuel they're going to use in the bomb, but you may not be able
[11:26] to enrich it. You may be able to enrich it, but you may
[11:30] not be able to you know, actually build a device. You may be
[11:33] able to build a device, but you may not be able to test it.
[11:35] So these are all extremely difficult things. But like you rightly pointed out,
[11:41] because India had started early in terms of you know, atomic energy,
[11:45] it had know how the entire legacy of Baba or Homi Baba and hundreds of
[11:50] other men and women scientists as part of India's you know, nuclear program.
[11:54] All of that amazingly sort of telescoped into the late nineties where India was able
[12:01] to successfully test I think five devices in Pokra. Pokron is a vast field
[12:05] firing range in the Thar Desert in Rajasthan and those were successful tests. So
[12:09] that proved that we had warheads that were capable of nuclear destruction. These are
[12:15] weapons of mass destruction. The good thing was the second challenge for any nuclear
[12:20] program was something that was already underway since since the late seventies early eighties,
[12:26] which is something you mentioned, which is India's delivery programs in the form of
[12:30] what was called the IGMDP or the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program under the Defense
[12:35] Research and Development Organization APG. Abdul Kalam before him, you know, many
[12:39] other scientists, the rocket boys as they were called, you know, they
[12:43] were building these highly reliable workhorse ballistic missile families like the AGNI, the Prithviy,
[12:48] etcetera. The Prithwe is conventional, but the AGNI has was initially,
[12:54] you know, developed not as a nuclear delivery platform. It was built as
[12:58] a normal conventional ballistic style platform, but aligned with India's nuclear ambitions. The
[13:03] missile program realized, to its great delight, that it did not need to
[13:09] waste time developing a completely separate family of delivery systems for what for for the
[13:15] warheads that had been tested, because the Agne series worked just fine in terms
[13:18] of weight, in terms of you know, tonnage, in terms of range,
[13:22] these things fit perfectly. And the beauty of the Agne series of missiles
[13:28] is the fact that they are modular, which meant that extending the range of
[13:33] Agne missiles meant, you know, just trapping on a couple of extra phases
[13:37] to the missiles as usual, simplifying it, but it didn't mean starting from
[13:43] scratch. So some of the Agne missiles are different from each other, but
[13:48] in general, the longer range missiles like the three four, the three five,
[13:52] than the six are all basically the same system with additional phases, et
[13:58] cetera, with better technolology. So that part was taken care of. So
[14:03] that was the land launched component of India's nuclear program. The second was the
[14:09] air launched which you mentioned, the miraj Is, the Jaguars, and the
[14:13] raffles. I'd actually broken the story about how India had stipulated during the its
[14:18] negotiations with France for the raffles that nuclear delivery has to be one of the
[14:24] capabilities. And this was very, very It was a touchy topic for obvious
[14:28] reasons because this is a government to government military deal. So as far as
[14:33] my information is concerned, France said, you know, you're already operating mirages
[14:37] and using them for nuclear delivery. That's not our concern. You're using them
[14:41] for your strategic you know, options, et cetera. So it's not something
[14:46] we need to contract. If you want to sling on nuclear weapons to your
[14:50] raffles, that's entirely up to you. You are the owners of the raphiles,
[14:54] so the rafiles are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, so that's your air
[14:56] delivered component. The third leg of this nuclear triad, as it's called,
[15:01] is the most important one and the one that India achieved last for understandable reasons,
[15:07] and that's because it's the most complicated and difficult to achieve because it involves
[15:11] a nuclear submarine platform which India did not have of its own, and they've
[15:18] I was lucky enough to be one of the one of the I think forty
[15:22] journalists during the upa th It was either two thousand and eight or two thousand
[15:24] and nine who was flown down to Vishaka Putnam to a secret facility called the
[15:31] Shipbuilding Center. No, this was the pre phone camera age anyway, but
[15:35] there were no cameras allowed anywhether there was one PIB camera guy who took three
[15:41] photographs which have now become public where you can barely see anything. Yeah,
[15:45] it has a picture of Gursharan or the wife of the then Prime minister breaking
[15:48] a coconut on the submarine. And that was the Arihant, India's first ballistic
[15:52] missile nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, which then entered service a few years later.
[15:58] And now, like you said, the Arigat is the second submarine and
[16:02] there are many more that are going to be coming online. So to be
[16:06] very clear, the submarine leg of the Triad has been the most difficult one
[16:11] to achieve because, like I said, it involved building a submarine that's not
[16:14] only nuclear powered, but capable of staying you know, underwater and wielding brandishing
[16:19] these missiles for long periods of time, you know, potentially you know months
[16:23] or even years, you know, on sort of silent patrol in the seas.
[16:29] And therefore now we can say India's nuclear triad is complete. A nuclear
[16:33] program is complete in terms of the formulas, in terms of the policies,
[16:37] the you know, the famous no first use policy, which we mentioned a
[16:41] couple of episodes ago in terms of how Manohar Partica had once wondered why we
[16:48] had a no first use policy. You know, all those things then fell
[16:51] into place, and then by the you know, by the sort of the
[16:55] first decade of the new millennium, the two thousand, the first decade of
[16:59] the two thousands, everything has sort of fallen into place. The you know,
[17:02] the Strategic Forces Command, which we talked about in our last episode that
[17:04] became a reality postcar Gill, and then you had your Nuclear Command structure.
[17:10] So that's where things are at now. Yeah, just light say segway,
[17:12] because I'm guessing this area is going to keep coming up a lot more on
[17:17] in our defense pokraon. Yeah, what is it about this place in Rajasthan?
[17:21] That is just like you know, you're it's your thing for every firing
[17:23] test you want to do, whether it's a you know, and I think
[17:26] you even have a normal firing bombing range for example, etcetera. You've obviously
[17:30] been there. Tell us about this desert land. So the Thar Desert obviously
[17:34] is is optimal for weapons testing and ranging and firing because it's just a it's
[17:41] just a healthscape of an open area. It's a desert. There's no habitation,
[17:45] uh, you know, very little habitation is just on the fringes,
[17:48] and you've just got, uh, this fabulous open space to test even long
[17:53] range missiles, air to air missiles, drop bombs and things like that.
[17:57] So the third dessert is of course, if you're on Google Maps, it's
[18:00] huge, and it's big enough to actually have two large firing ranges. One
[18:04] of them is called the Pokern Field Firing Range. The other one is called
[18:08] the Mahajan Field Firing Range. They're both in the Thar Desert. I'm not
[18:12] sure about the comparison in terms of size, but they're both massive and they
[18:17] both provide the Army, Navy, air Force, whoever wants to use them,
[18:22] you know, a huge amount of flexibility in terms of which direction they
[18:25] want to fire, whether they want to you know, create bunkers and test
[18:30] devices, subterranean devices, like they did with the Shakti series in nineteen ninety
[18:36] eight Underwajpai to conduct the Vayu Shatti exercises where you've got aircraft flying at rapid
[18:41] speeds and dropping devices. So these are very very valuable field firing ranges.
[18:48] A lot of artillery testing also takes place here Before Balacote, the penetration charges
[18:55] of some of those bombs were tested in Pokron on concrete structures to test.
[19:00] You know, penetration devices are basically bombs which are fitted with fuses where the
[19:04] bomb doesn't hit on impact, it penetrates through the first resistance or twice.
[19:10] It can be programmed for that and explodes only after it gets in, so
[19:12] it doesn't necessarily just damage the building, but goes inside and kills whoever's inside.
[19:18] So that's what happened in the Balacote astiks as well. Those were tested
[19:21] in Pokrun. So in terms of field firing rangers, Pokern and Mahjan are
[19:26] extremely crucial. The Navy conducts a lot of its the firepower testing, etc.
[19:33] Obviously off the coast, so if the Navy has to test any of
[19:37] its naval weaponry, they do it either in the Bay of Bengal or in
[19:40] the Aurbiency right you know, ship and I was researching for this episode,
[19:44] and as you were describing the history of India's nuclear program, one thing struck
[19:48] me as quite different from every military program that we discussed so far on this
[19:52] on this podcast and that we will in the future, is that it is
[19:55] not deal with controversies at all. It just seems like this clockwork precession and
[20:00] that you took steps two steps and TikTok, TikTok, TikTok. You got
[20:03] what you wanted. You had the tomic test, You've had this series of
[20:06] you've had like five nuclear missiles, and this is and I literally grew up
[20:11] like it's I can recount because you know, nineteen ninety eight you've had the
[20:14] nuclear tests, and then you've started developing these missiles and like clockwork, you've
[20:18] got one, two, three, four, five, the six is coming
[20:19] up. You've got three name missiles for the navy, You've got to everything
[20:22] is just set. I could not find a single point of controversy, nothing
[20:26] about delays like we've discussed with that I fail and the fighter jet and the
[20:32] aircraft carrier, et cetera. Is that really the case or is it because
[20:34] it's a nuclear program, there's lots of secrets, does not get reported out
[20:38] in the media. That's a great question. I think you know, they've
[20:41] First of all, we should be thankful that there are no controversies or at
[20:45] least no known controversies as far as India's nuclear program, because remember, unlike
[20:49] China, Pakistan, North Korea, in this region, India is seen as
[20:53] a responsible nuclear power, you know, a country that has developed weapons for
[21:00] self defense and not to not as an aggressor, et cetera. So it's
[21:03] very important that you know, no part of this journey has been contentious or
[21:07] controversial. On the other hand, look within these nuclear programs, I'm sure
[21:12] there may have been issues and fights and uh, you know, controversies regarding
[21:18] priorities and delays, et cetera. But the beauty of the Indian nuclear program
[21:25] has always been that on all sides there has been a near total secrecy as
[21:32] far as how things are being executed, unlike you know, and I hate
[21:36] to compare us with Pakistan because it's not only an unfair comparison, but it's
[21:41] it would frankly discuss Indian nuclear scientists because the nuclear program in Pakistan was filled
[21:47] with people who had you know, who had a political slash religious slash anti
[21:52] india agenda. It was not driven by you know, the the ideals of
[21:57] self preservation and a rising economy and something to be protected. It was more
[22:03] about creating a more dangerous world, whereas India was about you know, acquiring
[22:07] weapons in order to actually create a more peaceful world because with these weapons,
[22:12] India would be keeping these other rogue nations in check because you know, like
[22:18] it or not, we're the only ones over here who have the power to
[22:21] do so. So I imagine there would have been controversies, you know,
[22:25] and I'd love to it someday, you know, see something about it.
[22:27] But the amazing part about India's nuclear program is not one scientist, not one
[22:33] officer, not one not one man or woman who's been directly or indirectly associated
[22:41] with our nuclear program. Many have written books, many written books, many
[22:45] have done interviews, but none of them have come out with anything, you
[22:48] know, that would give anyone an insight into did something go wrong? Because
[22:53] because all of them are completely and amazingly aware of how the smallest bits of
[22:59] information can provide, uh, you know, to the right ears intelligence about
[23:03] where the gaps may be, what technology we may not actually have. You
[23:07] know, whether India actually did have a particular piece of technology at one point
[23:11] of time. It can give them, you know, timeline intelligence, which
[23:15] is very important in a development journey of a weapons system. So all of
[23:18] these things are very admirable admirable about India's program. I remember the the just
[23:26] a small example, which is that the the the Arihant, which is India's
[23:30] nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine UH used to be called for the longest time before
[23:36] it got its name uh Arihant. And the name Arihant was broken by India
[23:40] Today magazine by Sandy and he was here, my close friend and one of
[23:42] India's top defense journalists. But before that, for the longest time, it
[23:47] just had a working title of a TV, which was Advanced Technology Vessel,
[23:52] you know, which is your typical, anodyne vanilla name UH. And you
[23:56] know, I used to I used to love thinking, you know, they're
[23:56] calling it a TV, which is like the most most plain Jain name for
[24:02] something that is probably the most awesome thing that the Indian establishment has ever built.
[24:07] And that was the kind of culture that our nuclear program was really about.
[24:12] There was also a great deal of practicality in India's nuclear program, which
[24:17] was that we're not going to be able to do this entirely ourselves. Yes,
[24:19] we're going to be able to build you know, some of the core
[24:23] technologies, but we are going to need help. We didn't need help as
[24:26] far as the AUGNI systems were concerned, We didn't need help as far as
[24:30] the delivery systems were concerned. But for the submarine, we couldn't have done
[24:34] it without the Russians. That has to be said. Now, the arihant
[24:37] itself even now and earlier, especially in the two thousands, if you took
[24:45] a flight to Wishaka, Putnam, the airport would be full of Russians all
[24:48] the time. There would be Russians everywhere. You would see Russians everywhere in
[24:52] the contonment area because there were so many Russian engineers and scientists were constantly flying
[24:56] in to be part of the ATV program which and became ARI Hunt. So
[25:02] that's another great thing about the nuclear program, which is that India was very
[25:06] practical about it. India was absolutely sure that this was something that it needed
[25:10] to do itself. But when it realized that it was not going to be
[25:14] able to meet certain core technologies in a timely fashion, it did not hesitate
[25:18] to enlist Russia support, and Russia, let's face it was the only country
[25:22] that was going to be able to share those technologies with you. Now,
[25:26] of course, India has independently mastered many of those technologies dependent on Russia for
[25:32] which is why Arighath and many of the follow on submarines. They're building a
[25:36] class of nuclear powered attack submarines. Also, there's something called the S three
[25:41] or the S five, if I'm not mistaken. We did a show on
[25:44] that recently, which is a much larger billistic missile submarine that's being built by
[25:48] India as well. So now India is on its kind. It's an autopilot
[25:53] mode as far as the submarine program is concerned. But as far as controversies
[25:57] go, yeah, few and far between. I don't think anybody really knows
[26:02] what really happened. We all of US journalists used to. You know,
[26:06] there was a particular admiral from the Navy who had headed the ATV program.
[26:11] Famously, his name was Admiral Gunesh, and even after his retirement, I
[26:17] remember journalists trying to harangue him and pursue him and try and get some Jews
[26:22] from him about you know, what was going on, what it was like,
[26:25] and that that code of professionalism in the nuclear program never never evaporated,
[26:30] which is a which is something that really deserves a plus. Yeah, it
[26:33] does. In fact, you know, just to give an example of what
[26:37] she was talking about. Till this date, I think there are only three
[26:41] or four stock images of an Aria. Yeah, I know that for a
[26:45] fact, because whenever we need to cover something to do with nucleus amnies,
[26:48] we try to find the latest footballe we just cannot find a photo. And
[26:52] I think in fact, there is not a single photo of Arica out there.
[26:56] And also in fact, I think ans Aricath was never formally announced the
[27:00] announcer. It was I think some innocuous Twitter handle that did some satellite image.
[27:04] Oh there was some something over there like a few months ago. Now
[27:07] it's not there. Now it's over there. Oh that means Aria has moved
[27:10] out to say. Yeah, so India has never formally said that is out
[27:14] there. Arian was launched with much fanfare because it was obviously, you know,
[27:18] a crowning sort of a glory movement for for India that completed the nuclear
[27:22] triad. Like you, like you said, which will will come back to
[27:26] but after a quick break, pany pany pany, so beautiful, so elegant,
[27:38] just looking like a wow eh began. Was that enough crunch for you?
[27:45] Because this crunch fest doesn't stop here. Yes. And if by watching
[27:48] such reals and vild videos you think your life is becoming mom then I cost
[27:53] them and me Anna will bring the most puke worthy, nauseating and repulsive trends
[28:00] on social media and well maybe enact some of them, but most of all
[28:06] discuss and seriously dissect these trends. So get ready to laugh, cringe and
[28:11] question humanity. Dropping soon on Spotify, Apple Podcasts and wherever you get your
[28:17] cringe, I mean audio entertainment from So let's talk cringe. Welcome back,
[28:29] Shive and I are discussing India's nuclear program. Shiv, I want to go
[28:33] to the buzzword nuclear triad or it's been there for quite a while, just
[28:38] like you know, break it down for us, what is it? Why
[28:41] is it important? And the importance of having a submarine to complete it,
[28:45] and like you know, why is it that a nuclear submarine like the Arian
[28:49] then it's cousin or sister sorry and as Arica, why is it so important?
[28:55] And also briefly about the fact that when Aya Saaran was launched, people
[29:00] incorrectly said that India had completed the nuclear triade because people forgot that when the
[29:03] summite would be maintenance, you would not actually have the triad. Right,
[29:07] So for you to be able to try have a triad, you need to
[29:08] ensure that one nuclear submarine is constantly out there. Just take us through this
[29:12] buzzword nuclear triad. Word means and why is it so important? YEA,
[29:15] so nuclear triad, you know, like the like the phrase implies, it's
[29:18] a it's basically three elements of any cogent and you know, effective nuclear deterrent
[29:26] system, which is that you've got you know, like I explained in our
[29:29] first interaction, which is that you've got a land based nuclear weapon launch capability,
[29:34] which is in the form of your ballistic missiles. Then you've got the
[29:37] air launched capability, which is basically a fighter aircraft or combat aircraft of another
[29:44] kind carrying nuclear weapons and launching them into enemy territory. And then you've got
[29:48] the third third leg, which is your sea leg. So it's basically land,
[29:52] sea, and air. That's what that's what the triad is all about.
[29:55] In the most simplistic sense, the reason why they've the sea legs,
[30:00] the submarine leg is the most crucial is because the submarine leg, if you
[30:04] look at it in the context of a nuclear exchange or a military exchange between
[30:08] two countries, that's the one leg that is most invulnerable. That's where that's
[30:14] where you can really hide your nuclear weapons. If you're hiding your you know,
[30:18] land based systems, as a result of satellite imagery, as a result
[30:23] of you know, other kinds of intelligence, your enemy is going to know
[30:26] where your nuclear weapons are as far as your air delivered delivered nuclear weapons are
[30:33] concerned. Similarly, your enemy already knows where your runways are, where your
[30:37] airfields are, and they probably have a rough sense of where your nuclear depots
[30:42] are, where your nuclear weapons systems are stored. So I'm not saying they
[30:47] know, but I'm saying that in the event of an exchange, Uh,
[30:49] these are identifiable targets. Your enemy can identify where your missiles are coming from
[30:56] or where your aircraft are taking off from. Therefore, those are visible,
[31:00] recognizable, quantifiable targets that can be destroyed, you know, by counteractions.
[31:06] But when you are talking about a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine that's lurking anywhere
[31:12] between eighty and two hundred meters below the surface of the sea, moving very
[31:18] very slowly. These are these are not These are platforms that are not built
[31:22] for speed. They are built to lurk in total secrecy. They're almost completely
[31:26] noiseless. They're not trying to get from one place to another like attack submarines.
[31:32] They are literally they're like silent sentinels of the deep, simply existing until
[31:37] they're called upon to do their you know, terrible job. And therefore who
[31:44] knows where they are? It could be lurking somewhere in the Bay of Bengal,
[31:48] or it could be lurking somewhere near Maldives. It could be lurking in
[31:51] the South Indian Ocean. It could be lurking somewhere near Australia. Who knows,
[31:55] because it's a nuclear submarine and we're not telling people where we're going.
[31:59] So even now, how does anybody know where Arihanto Arigata. They could be
[32:02] anywhere. They could potentially literally be anywhere in any part of the world's oceans.
[32:07] Now, obviously they're not going to be they're not going to be venturing
[32:13] you know, ridiculously far away, because the potential targets for a nuclear strike
[32:19] or counterstrike in India's case are, let's be realistic about it, there are
[32:23] two countries that we can potentially attack an event of hostility, and those are
[32:28] the two countries we've just named Pakistan in China. So, given the kinds
[32:32] of weapons that have already been tested, which is the K fifteen, which
[32:37] is a fairly short range weapon, which is about seven hundred and fifty kilometer
[32:43] range weapon, The K four is a three thousand kilometer range weapon. The
[32:47] K five is your sort of intercontinental range five thousand kilometer range weapon, which
[32:52] I understand is being tested or about to be tested. So these are kinds
[32:57] of dynamics that come into play for this kind of thing. But the but
[33:00] the point about why the subsurface or the under sea nuclear element is the most
[33:07] important is because there might be hell happening on Earth above the sea surface.
[33:14] Two countries may be destroying each other, but the country that has a subsurface
[33:19] nuclear capability still gets to have that last word, or still gets to preempt
[33:23] total destruction by destroying that other country first, because they they can destroy your
[33:29] airfields, they can destroy your cities they can destroy. And I'm just painting
[33:32] a kind of doomsday scenario. I'm not saying this is how it lappened,
[33:36] but but the likelihood of them knowing where your Arihant and Arigat are is almost
[33:42] zero. It's almost completely zero because it's difficult. It's it's difficult even to
[33:47] know where ships are, so imagine, you know. And this comes back
[33:52] to submarine warfare, which is the reason why submarines, you know, try
[33:55] not to surface, because you surface, that's an intelligence uh you know,
[34:00] blip that goes out. And these are submarines that are built to stay submerged
[34:05] literally indefinitely. And these are big unlike the submarines that we've we've been talking
[34:08] about, like our Scorpions and our Kilo classes. These are big, beefy
[34:13] submarines that have much more space, you know, are more comfortable, you
[34:17] know, because they're not they're not fighting machines. These are these are these
[34:22] are machines of mass destruction. You know. If these you know, again,
[34:25] Crimson Tide comes to mind once again, which is that if these if
[34:29] the submarine commander of Arihant is called upon to do his work, then it's
[34:34] goodbye to all of us. Okay. Uh, the famous quote in that
[34:37] movie which is that in the nuclear world, the real enemy is war itself,
[34:42] which is the truth because nobody wins in nuclear war. So so so
[34:45] that's so that really explains to you the kind of dynamic as far as all
[34:50] these elements are concerned. But the submarine element is crucial simply because it's out
[34:53] of sight, cannot be detected, cannot be tracked, Nobody knows where it's
[34:59] it's it's at. You might know where an ugly is going to hit you
[35:00] from, you might know where a rafile is going to take off from,
[35:04] but you'll never know where an Arihan's going to fire at you. Very very
[35:07] nice pay to illustrate that explanation. Uh, that's more a bit to the
[35:13] safety and the structures around India's nuclear program. And by the way, I
[35:19] think, and I might complain, but on this episode it's kind of end
[35:21] up looking more like me interviewing Shift. But the subject is such, you
[35:25] know, the subject is so secretive that you know, even I don't have
[35:29] a lot of knowledge about it. And he was this is you know,
[35:31] two decades of experience covering the defense will definitely have a lot more information.
[35:35] So sorry and about that, but you know, please bear with that.
[35:37] But I think the answer he is giving up very very you know, informative.
[35:40] So that's that. Yeah. So moving to the safety structure, the
[35:45] command structure of India's nuclear program. I I have some overview of it that
[35:49] you have the Strategic Forces Command headed by I'm guessing a left hand general level
[35:52] of three star office leased officer who reports not to the respective service chief,
[35:57] but I mean they do in some way or the other. But the operation
[36:00] reporting is to the government directly through the Cabinet Secretary, which is basically the
[36:02] PMO. Uh there is I think that I forgot the name for it,
[36:07] the CSS or something, the NSS, I'm sorry forgot, which includes the
[36:12] Prime Minister, the National Security Advisor, and a few others. I think
[36:15] the atoltion involves the military, the National Security Council, which has all CES
[36:19] then s S. That's the prime authority who has the power to order order
[36:25] a nuclear attack, whether it's through land, air, or the sea.
[36:30] Obviously, I mean you won't know you even if you do, you might
[36:32] not be able to give us the whole exact scenario of how a nuclear strike
[36:37] would be carried out, if it would be carried out, But obviously it's
[36:39] a nerd question that everyone would want to know about, right, So if
[36:43] it were to happen, what would it look like? And in a second,
[36:46] just like a slight tangent, I just remembered a controversy actually about the
[36:50] nuclear program, not exactly about the nuclear problem, but look tangential controversy because
[36:54] it knows the promos which on paper is not a nuclear missile, but there's
[36:59] a lot of speculation on Internet that it is nuclear capable, Like if you
[37:02] wanted to, you could attach a nuclear warhead to it. And you know,
[37:06] if I think about it, it makes sense. It's just like a
[37:07] warhead, right, A nuclear warlet is more or less like a normal ward
[37:10] in terms of shape, size of etcetera. So missile that can carry a
[37:14] war it can obviously carry a nuclear wart What am I talking about? The
[37:16] controversy a few months back, at think around a year there was a misfiring
[37:21] Yeah, two years ago, misfiring that you know, sadly speaking, we
[37:24] had icon our face because you just not want to be seen as a country
[37:29] that can end up accidentally firing a ballistic missile into a foreign country that happened
[37:34] to Pakistan. So yeah, just like thought of that randomly, were talking
[37:36] about safety structures, come on there, et cetera. So yeah, that's
[37:38] what I want to discuss with you. So about this, So since you
[37:42] brought up the Brummos thing, Yeah, we India definitely had egg on its
[37:45] face. It was a strategic embarrassment, you know, because it was apparently
[37:50] a missile being maintained and accidentally got activated and it landed somewhere in Pakistan.
[37:55] But we may have had egg on our face, and officers in India were
[38:00] punished and court marshaled for it. But in my view, and I'm not
[38:04] being facetious about this, there was even greater egg on Pakistan's face because they
[38:07] had no idea about this missile. This missile came and landed somewhere in the
[38:10] hinterland of Pakistan and they didn't even really know about it until it was a
[38:15] kind of reported, which means their radars, their air defense, all their
[38:21] tracking you know, tracking systems, etc. Had absolutely no clue that,
[38:25] you know, the country that they've sworn to destroy has fired a supersonic cruise
[38:30] missile straight into your territory. And you had absolutely no clue about it,
[38:35] so it actually made them look way worse than for us. It looked terrible,
[38:39] It was like unprofessional incompetence. For them, it looked like, oh
[38:43] my god, what have you spent all this money on if you can't even
[38:45] detect a missile. Let's put that part aside. But you're right, it
[38:49] does show that there are concerns as far as military equipment safety is concerned.
[38:53] Now to quickly differentiate between, you know, a nuclear attack and military attack,
[39:00] because these are two very different things. You know, I'm sure our
[39:04] listeners already know, but it bears repeating that, you know, nuclear power
[39:07] is not military power. You know, military power is very much in the
[39:12] realm of conventional in terms of in terms of defending, in terms of you
[39:17] know, holding ground, in terms of you know, you know, fighting,
[39:22] or you know, effecting or executing military objectives in a small place.
[39:29] Nuclear weapons, by their very very nature are mass destructive. They have a
[39:34] strategic effect, and the very purpose of the true success of nuclear weapons is
[39:39] if they never need to be used. Right, the whole point of nuclear
[39:43] weapons is that their presence is enough to prevent conflict. So if nuclear weapons
[39:51] begin being used, then they've already failed to do their primary job, which
[39:54] is to prevent conflict. Right. So that's the amazing nuclear paradox of the
[40:00] nuclear world, which is that, you know, the moment you hit that
[40:02] launch button, those weapons have basically announced their entire failure, that they have
[40:07] proven to be completely pointless by preventing, you know, a mass destructive war
[40:13] for the world. Now, the question you ask, which is, you
[40:15] know, how does it all work if there's a nuclear attack? Now,
[40:17] this has always been a very tantalizing question. The answer, you know,
[40:22] the answer is exciting, but it's also not that exciting. You know,
[40:27] like like everything in this world, you know, there is a mundane layer
[40:30] to everything. You know. One would love to imagine that a guy in
[40:34] his suit is running with a briefcase through a dark you know, corridor with
[40:37] intermittent lights, you know, and it's banging on a door, and he
[40:42] needs to get one person's approval, then another person's approval, and then you
[40:45] know, three people have to say the same code word in unison and only
[40:49] then a missile can be launched. You know, I would love it for
[40:52] it to be something like that, but unfortunately, these things are all,
[40:55] you know, are ultimately about executive decisions. Uh. You know, the
[41:01] President of India is the supreme commander of the armed forces. So there is
[41:05] a presidential element as far as uh, the use of nuclear power is concerned.
[41:09] But like with most things to do the president, it's a it's a
[41:13] formality kind of thing. The use of nuclear weapons is an executive decision by
[41:17] the government. Uh. The National Security Council has to obviously unanimously approve the
[41:23] use of nuclear weapons. So this involves the National Security the Prime Minister obviously,
[41:29] the National Security Advisor, the Defense Minister, uh you know, of
[41:32] the intelligence chiefs, the service chiefs, the Strategic Forces commander, all of
[41:37] them are aligned. But the decision is finally the Prime Ministers as the as
[41:40] the executive of the country, he decides on whether nuclear weapons can and will
[41:45] be used. Remember no first use policy, so the only time, as
[41:50] per are stipulated and legislated policy is that India cannot fire a nuclear I shouldn't
[41:59] say cannot, but will not fire a nuclear weapon until an enemy nuclear weapon
[42:02] has landed on our territory. Now, now we don't know if that can
[42:07] actually change, but once you know, look at it like this, once
[42:13] a nuclear weapon lands on our territory in some scenario, then it triggers a
[42:20] very very rapid chain of command where the strategic forces command, the National Security
[42:24] Council and the military a line in a pre pre prescribed way. This is
[42:30] already already known. It's not like if anclear missile lands, nobody will know
[42:34] what to do. It's not like that. There's a very very clear chain
[42:37] of command and a chain of approvals that will be required that happen very very
[42:42] quickly, digitally obviously encrypted, where India will respond. And now, since
[42:47] a scenario of this kind has never happened and is hopefully unlikely to ever happen,
[42:52] nobody knows what India's response time will be. Will it be a matter
[42:57] of a few minutes, Will it be a matter of a few hours,
[43:00] Will it be less than an hour? There has always been very tantalizing speculation
[43:04] about what this will be. Now, I, in my fantasy world,
[43:07] like to think it would be like ten fifteen minutes maximum, because because why
[43:10] would you wait for longer if someone's attacked you with a nuclear weapon? Right,
[43:15] But obviously you have to first judge whether it was a nuclear weapon.
[43:19] You know, you have to know what the impact is because you also remember
[43:22] have to commit resources into protecting your people, guarding your cities, so all
[43:28] of those things will also be triggered. So remember that when if, and
[43:31] when India is hit by a nuclear weapon, it's not just about hitting back,
[43:36] it's also about preserving your country. You have to safeguard your cities,
[43:39] figure out, you know, how many people you can save, the NBC,
[43:46] the nuclear biological chemical response that will be there at the attack site,
[43:52] and then the response as far as the country is concerned. So yeah,
[43:54] the fun answer is that there will be this. You know, an attack
[43:59] will trigger this, you know, crazy never before kind of system, which
[44:02] I should tell you is wargamed every single year. It's war gamed all the
[44:07] time because it's it's part of the system, you know, the Strategic Forces
[44:09] Command, It's it's raised on their throats. It's the very purpose of its
[44:15] existence is that it never needs to be activated. Okay, everyone will pray
[44:20] that the SFC never needs to be activated, but what do they do in
[44:23] the meantime? Practice practice, And that's what they do, right. I
[44:28] think that should give every nerd out there the answer that we're looking for and
[44:35] just to like you know, build on that point. There's also always this
[44:37] speculation whenever you have the premise of traveling and the photos of their PG guys
[44:40] with him. I love this question. Yeah, people like you know,
[44:44] nuclear football, nuclear football, because that's what a briefcase of the US president
[44:46] is called a nuclear football, which actually does, by the way, contain
[44:50] apparently the nuclear launch coordes for the US nuclear system. There's no such thing.
[44:57] I'm sure there is some kind of a system. Remember that the Prime
[45:00] Minister travels in not just a completely integrated cavalcade which has the capacity to become
[45:08] a minipmo for all practical purposes, including ordering strategic or conventional uh you know
[45:15] actions. So that is definitely that may not be in the form of a
[45:19] football or a briefcase, but that capability is there, including in his aircraft.
[45:22] Wherever he travels. He's always you know, there's a there's a redundancy
[45:27] that allows the Prime Minister to execute all of the things that may be required
[45:30] of him, including defending the country. But those famous little briefcases you see
[45:37] carried by the by the Special Protection Group the SPG officers are actually fold out
[45:44] ballistic shields. Those are basically for the close protection of the Prime Minister and
[45:50] you know a guy like Naridra Modi who loves going out into the crowd,
[45:53] stepping out of his car, you know, and being with the people.
[45:58] So that's why those have become much more visible now because basically, if in
[46:02] the in the in the event that there is some kind of an attack or
[46:07] if bullets fly, God forbid of something like that, these shields basically fold
[46:12] out to the full length of the human body and and they're made of kevlar
[46:15] and carbon fiber, et cetera. And they're basically bulletproof shields which are used
[46:20] to sort of create a fortress around the protectee in this case, the Prime
[46:23] Minister, and therefore protect him from any kind of incoming fire. So it's
[46:28] not a nuclear football. It's just a flame, no electronics involved. It's
[46:31] just a ballistic shield. It's also pretty cool, by the way, it's
[46:34] very cool. It's very cool, yeah, right, and it's heavy,
[46:37] of course it must be. That reminds me. I think we should do
[46:38] a special episode on SPID We will, we should, yes, uh right,
[46:44] So as we bring this episode too close, we've discussed the history,
[46:46] we've discussed where we are at in terms of current capabilities, what's there for
[46:51] us in the future. Two tangents over there, one in terms of the
[46:53] equipment that we're about to get. You mentioned we mentioned talked about Arianntharika Ari
[46:58] Hunter by the way, always was a post to be a demonstrative sort of
[47:00] piece of technology. Not really, I mean, of course it's meant to
[47:04] be used in the season, but remember when it was launched, the government
[47:07] had said, this is to demonstrate that we are capable enough of building a
[47:12] nuclear nuclear summary, like Shiv mentioned, with some Russian help. And in
[47:15] fact, you know you mentioned that he had written a piece in the magazine
[47:19] in seventy If I'm not wrong, we'll have a link to that in the
[47:22] show notes. It's a fantastic pause. It's old now, I'm sure,
[47:25] but still it gives you a very good overview of nuclear or India's nucleus.
[47:30] Nobody is written more or better or in greater depth about India's nuclear submarine program
[47:36] than Sandi in India today. Yeah, yeah, in which he talks about
[47:38] you know what Shift said about Russian help. Basically, I think Russians kind
[47:42] of helped Indians figure out how to make the nuclear actors small enough to fitter
[47:46] obviously limited space, right, So anyway, so yeah, so we've got
[47:51] Garigath, We've got I think two or three more coming up a similar class,
[47:54] but like Shiv mentioned, larger in size. We've got the Agni six
[48:00] development. If I'm not wrong, I think a few testes have happened.
[48:02] There was also an Ugly pe if I'm not wrong, and launched a test
[48:06] launched a few few years ago. So yeah, in terms of equipment,
[48:08] what are we getting. What advancements do happen in the field of nuclear technology
[48:13] or do you think this is done? You know us and Bombanaya. That's
[48:15] it, fat boy? What would is called? I forgot the name.
[48:19] Uh, that's the technology that we are there in the last fifty years,
[48:22] or other advancements happening. So with missiles, say, obviously there is strike
[48:25] range capability. Ugly six will fly much much farther away, But the core
[48:30] essence is nuclear technology. That's it. Ho. Yeah, No, it's
[48:32] definitely not. It's it's it's definitely an evolving technology because because the the of
[48:39] one main reason they which is the paradigm of something called a tactical nuke.
[48:45] Now, a tactical nuk about this so, and it's a good thing you
[48:47] brought it up, because the era of tactical nukes has completely changed the game.
[48:52] A tactical nuke unlike uh, you know, the nuclear weapon in the
[48:57] in the sense that we think of it is not not like a you know,
[49:00] a huge world destroying weapon of mass destruction that will destroy an entire country.
[49:07] Tactical nuke is a small nuclear warhead, short range weapon system, you
[49:14] know, fired into your enemy country to create a limited amount of damage.
[49:17] But it's still nuclear damage. It's it's heavy duty damage, but it's it's
[49:22] limited in terms of it not having like a it's not a WMD. Now
[49:27] when you when you're talking about that level of nuclear technology, it brings an
[49:32] entire new paradigm of threat, which is that, so if someone fires a
[49:37] tactical nuke into India, do I still respond by destroying that country or do
[49:43] I need to calibrate that as well and have my own tactical nukes. You
[49:46] brought up the possibility of the Brumos carrying you know, a nuclear warhead.
[49:51] You know, the conventional wisdom on that would be, why would I need
[49:53] a nuclear warhead on a three hundred kilometer range missile. You know, when
[49:58] I have you know, thousand and five thousand and six thousand range missiles,
[50:01] and that is exactly for this reason. Theoretically you can easily sling on,
[50:06] you know, a tactical nuclear warhead to a bromos. Now, if India
[50:10] sort of embraces the possibility of tactical nukes being used in future battles that don't
[50:16] become all out nuclear exchanges, then you know, then we're talking about an
[50:22] entirely new nuclear age. Princeton University did a simulation of how the Russia Ukraine
[50:30] conflict could become a global nuclear war, and amazingly, it began with Russia
[50:36] firing tactical nukes at NATO targets in places like Poland and elsewhere as a result
[50:44] of these countries, you know, sending aircraft or other equipment into Ukraine,
[50:50] so they not a large scale but tactical nukes. So and in response,
[50:54] these NATO countries respond with tactical nukes. There's a gradual escalation. Then Russia,
[51:00] which is the more unpredictable of the lot, fires a weapon of mass
[51:06] destruction at one of these countries because it believes that a bigger attack is coming
[51:09] and then it's a frightening simulation that begins between Russia and Ukraine and then ends
[51:15] in you know, Trident long range ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads, the most
[51:22] the most destructive weapons of all time being launched by the United States into Russia
[51:27] and Russia firing them back into the United States and basically destroying them. So
[51:31] so tactical nukes is where it could easily begin. Since we are on the
[51:37] topies of titles and kind of forgot to talk about them. Does Pakistan have
[51:40] them yet? Because the way I see it, India would want to develop
[51:45] or invest in developing them if either Pakistan or China is seen to be going
[51:49] towards that part. Do either of them have Look, you know, with
[51:52] Pakistan and China, the I'm sure our intelligence agencies know. But the conventional
[51:57] wisdom as far as these countries are concerned is that go with the assumptions that
[52:01] they either have it or they going to get it. That's the conventional wisdom
[52:06] as far as these two countries concerned, because they will do whatever they can
[52:08] in terms of weaponry to acquire increased leverage against you. They will try and
[52:15] get what you don't have India currently has the Brummos, which is a supersonic
[52:19] cruise missile travels at four and a half times the speed of sound. Neither
[52:22] Pakistan nor China have that. To beat that kind of capability, I'm just
[52:27] taking as an example, they will try need to try and come up with
[52:30] some other kind of capability. I'm not saying tactical nukes is a response to
[52:35] that, but what I mean in terms of a kind of multi layered arms
[52:37] race, capability race, they will need to try and get that kind of
[52:42] leverage. So the conventional wisdom as far as India's you know, intelligence strategy
[52:46] of what China and Pakistan has is either they have it or they're going to
[52:51] try and get it. That's it. Right as we close this episode,
[52:54] one last point in thought about the worry of nuclear preferision from Pakististan, and
[53:00] it's a serious concern in my head. You know, this is not a
[53:05] moment of Pakistan bashing for me. I just like you know, we've been
[53:08] covering Pakistan for a while on the desk, on the online desk because of
[53:12] events that have happened in the recent couple of years. I Ran Khan being
[53:15] in jail, the recent elections full of controversies. You have the country literally
[53:21] begging different agencies for money, because of which it has had to crack down
[53:25] on terrorism to show that you know, we are, you know, on
[53:29] the same page as use please give us money, because of which there have
[53:31] been internal conflicts. Now there are groups fighting amongst each other within Pakistan.
[53:35] There is friction between the military establishment and the terior groups over there. Seriously,
[53:39] speaking for Indian intelligence agencies, discussions between agencies within India and with agencies
[53:45] of the West. Has this topic in your knowledge ever come up of the
[53:50] risk of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, because I think for
[53:54] me as a lay person, as a journalist who observes this from the desk
[53:59] in New Delhi, it looks like a valid threat. No, it's been.
[54:01] It's been a valid threat for a very long time, you know,
[54:05] ever since Pakistan's and I repeat this point, you know the the the dirty
[54:09] nuclear and I mean dirty in the nuclear sense, you know, the dirty
[54:15] manner in which, uh you know, nuclear trade was conducted by Pakistan under
[54:19] the famous a Q Khan network network where you know where illicit nuclear technologies and
[54:27] uh know how we're you know traded, traded illegally between Pakistan, China and
[54:34] North Korea, et cetera. UH is something that India has had on its
[54:37] radar for a very long time. So india suspicions that nuclear weapons or nuclear
[54:45] capabilities would fall into the wrong hands are hardly unfounded. Those are very real
[54:50] threats. And like you said, with a country that is in free fall
[54:52] politically, economically and otherwise, you know, the fears of structures they're breaking
[54:59] down are are very real. Uh. Add to that the point that these
[55:05] terror groups are not some you know, random farun wearing jihadi's sitting in caves
[55:08] in mountains, but very much aligned with your military, trained by the military,
[55:15] uh, you know, functioning almost like militaries in cities in Pakistan.
[55:20] And this is not an exaggeration. You know, outfits like the Jash and
[55:22] the h and the Lashka are basically quasi military organizations. Who is to say
[55:30] that they are not being trained in how to use nuclear weapons. I'm not
[55:34] making a comic book point. I'm just saying that, you know, all
[55:37] of this has to go into India's own matrix of UH. You know,
[55:40] threat scenario, you know, any any country's intelligence scenario matrix probably reads at
[55:46] some level like a comic book, like a Drove Undo comic book, and
[55:51] you know, has many far fetched things about it. But those are the
[55:55] responsibilities of a country to account for every possibility. And for a country like
[56:00] Pakistan, which uses terror as state policy, which has been the kind of
[56:05] fountain head of many global terrorists, including Osama bin La, then let's never
[56:09] forget you know, the possibility of such tech falling into the hands of powerful
[56:15] terrorists is is not some fantasy scenario and therefore it's very much within India's threat
[56:22] perspective and how it sees things, all right. One last quick point,
[56:25] just your personal thoughts on this. We kind of discussed this in a previous
[56:30] episodes, so I don't want to welve into it completely. The so called
[56:35] no first use policy one I've always wondered CAF for ackpathise and like, is
[56:38] it it's not leally binding? Like if you violate the no first use policy,
[56:42] no one's going to take you to the ICJ or like the Supreme Court
[56:45] of India. Like, oh my god, you had the no first use
[56:45] policy, but you lost in you device on your own, So what's the
[56:50] point of having this no first use policy or is it just sort of like
[56:53] you know, India wanting to be seen as a responsible power, which,
[56:57] like we've discussed on several episodes now, it is being regardless of whether you
[57:00] have a no first use policy or not. Yet you've had ministers huh Manuel
[57:06] Partica you talked about in a previous episode, rather not saying I think three
[57:09] four years ago when the stand up with China was going on, made innocuous
[57:13] not inocuous. Actually you made a statement at some event somewhere where he basically
[57:16] said that, you know, India's no first use policy depends on the circumstances,
[57:21] basically on something on the lines of kid can change with circumstances. But
[57:24] then he also I think, gave a clarification later on, and I think
[57:27] the me when it was asked in the press confidence of a couple of weeks.
[57:30] It stays your personal thoughts, what's the point of having something like this?
[57:34] Does it so uce any purpose? And on a serious note, has
[57:37] there ever, in your knowledge been a serious discussion within the government, whether
[57:42] it's the UPA or the NBA, of actually tinkering with the no first use
[57:45] Okay, So, so first, to be very very clear India's no first
[57:49] policy is uh, you know, is is hugely beneficial to India. It
[57:53] was a very it was a very meticulously thought through policy. It wasn't,
[57:59] you know, just some random among kiyasha type thing, you know. In
[58:02] a in a in a world where India happens to be the only nuclear power
[58:07] with a stated official no first use policy makes India enormously unique in many ways.
[58:15] And uh. On the one hand, it basically sends out the signal
[58:20] that India has invested in nuclear technology, delivery systems and testing only for defense
[58:29] and terans and not for aggression, and not for the destruction of another country
[58:35] unless threatened to do so. Point number two, in a in a region
[58:39] where u which is world famous for dirty nuclear tech thanks to the axis of
[58:45] Pakistan, China and North Korea, having a stated no first use policy,
[58:51] uh, you know, separates us from that, from that, from that
[58:54] horrible axis and highlights the fact that India is a responsible nuclear power. Point
[59:00] number three. India has basically by stating that it has a no first use
[59:06] policy, is also differentiating itself in general from the rest of the world,
[59:10] not just from your Pakistan, China and North Korea. Which we happen to
[59:15] have around us, but in general, from the rest of the world,
[59:17] this is India saying, you know, we would have loved not to have
[59:21] nuclear weapons, you know, as a you know, and I don't mean
[59:24] this in a cliche way, but you know, the land of Gandhi,
[59:27] and we heard so much about the Land of Gandhi after the nuclear test ninety
[59:30] eight. You know, how can the land of Gandhi have nuclear weapons?
[59:34] But I think culturally and systemically speaking, India also believes, as you know,
[59:39] not just the land of Gandhi because that is cliche, but as a
[59:44] country that is genuinely a peaceful country with no territorial or extra territorial ambitions of
[59:51] any kind beyond protecting what is its own, it is forced to get these
[59:55] weapons in order to preserve its territory and preserve sovereignty. So, you know,
[1:00:00] Manhard Barker may have, you know, flippantly questioned the no first use
[1:00:06] policy. I have, in my mind also wondered why. But the more
[1:00:09] you think about it, the more you consider it, it is one of
[1:00:13] the most elegant policies that India's strategic culture has ever embraced. And I don't
[1:00:19] believe it will or should actually ever change. Because also remember which is the
[1:00:22] second part of what you said. You know, A, who's going to
[1:00:27] drag anyone to court if something like this happens, if we violate our own
[1:00:30] policy. B. You know, if nuclear weapons are flying between two or
[1:00:35] more countries, who's going to care about the International Court of Justice? C
[1:00:39] Is there going to be anything to live for if nuclear exchanges actually happened between
[1:00:45] two countries like India and China, or India and Pakistan or whoever. You
[1:00:49] know. So it's it comes back to that nuclear paradox that many of the
[1:00:52] things we are thinking about now, considering about now, worrying about now will
[1:00:58] cease to matter if nuclear weapons are flying. Yeah, because we'll all be
[1:01:00] dead. That's quite quite the note, cheerful note. Yeah, on which
[1:01:06] we we end this episode before we go quick trivia, you know, researching.
[1:01:09] So we have the nuclear triad, we have the agony, we have
[1:01:14] the prithe why don't we have the jail? Yo and Akash like, you
[1:01:16] know, just finish it. I think you should speak to someone in the
[1:01:20] names you mean, yeah, the name see, because the names have already
[1:01:22] been taken. That's the reason oh so uh not the value. Actually,
[1:01:27] the akash is a surface to a missile. Yeah, but I think I
[1:01:30] could. I could talk to them about the others. Like for example,
[1:01:34] the K fifteen missile is called Sagarika. It's an unofficial name. They still
[1:01:37] go with K fifteen, but for a long time it had the working title
[1:01:40] of Sagarika. The K for case sands for kalamb By the way, I
[1:01:46] have no idea what it's called, but hopefully they'll come up with some some
[1:01:50] cool name. Right. Thanks shift, great topic of discussion, great insights
[1:01:57] as always, Thanks a lot for this discussion, and thanks to our viewers
[1:02:02] and listeners once again. You know, leave us comments like you did with
[1:02:06] the previous episode, because of which we actually got something to talk about on
[1:02:09] this episode. So we'd love to hear from you. We'd love to you
[1:02:13] know, know what you think about our discussions, and if you have anything
[1:02:15] that you want us to discuss, do drop us a message. You know,
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[1:02:29] producer and Assisie. That's it for this week's defense doors for more tune in
[1:02:31] next week. Will then, stay safe and do not prost any boundaries with
[1:02:35] us, but by

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