# 【哲學係咁傾】第二季 ep. 1 彼得辛格與效益主義 (英語討論)

An episode of [好青年荼毒室](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1588512726), 27 Feb 2025, 1 h 29 min.

Audio: https://anchor.fm/s/3f94b8a0/podcast/play/99112852/https%3A%2F%2Fd3ctxlq1ktw2nl.cloudfront.net%2Fstaging%2F2025-1-27%2Ff441eef1-6b51-dec5-f314-bd9929c2aaac.mp3

哲學家彼得・辛格（Peter Singer）是當代著名的效益主義者。效益主義認為，如果一個行為能夠帶來最大的快樂，該行為在道德上便是正確的。辛格按這個原則，提出各種巔覆常識的結論。例如，肉食工業是不道德的、我們有道德責任捐獻支持慈善工作等。效益主義以及這些結論，一直引來不少批評。今集我們邀請了辛格本人來和我們一起討論這些重要的道德課題。0:00 Introduction2:18 第一節 : 彼得辛格的哲學之路21:24 第二節 : 批評 - 效益主義是否要求過高？41:47 第三節 : 批評 - 效益主義以享樂主義為基礎是否合理？1:06:12 第四節 : 人權與動物權彼得・辛格教授的Lives Well Lived Podcast :https://www.petersinger.info/podcast好青年荼毒室Patreon會員計劃: https://www.patreon.com/corrupttheyouth課金：https://mercury.streamelements.com/tip/corrupttheyouthhk網頁: https://corrupttheyouth.net/網店: https://corrupttheyouth.squarespace.com/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/corrupttheyouthFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/corrupttheyouth#petersinger #philosophy #utilitarianism #哲學 #效益主義

## Transcript

[0:22] 大 家 好， 歡 迎 收 看 哲 學， 我 是 今 集 的 主 持 朱 銘 好 來 沒 見 了 我 們 之 後 是 這 樣， 希
[0:32] 望 大 家 多 多 支 持 啦。 我 們 都 終 於 決 定 要 從 啟 這 個 系 列 呢， 就
[0:36] 因 為 今 天 我 們 實 在 邀 請 了 一 位 非 常 重 量 的 嘉 賓， 就 不 得 不 呢， 今 天 一 定 要 跑
[0:44] 一 拍， 跟 大 家 聽 一 下 等 大 家。 重 拾 這 個 這 個 節 目 的 熱 情。
[0:50] 重 量 級 嘉 賓， 之 前 呢， 我 就 好 快 介 紹 我 們 今 天 一 起 的 主 持， 我 就 有 這 邊 的 青 南
[0:56] 啦， 好 feel 到 是 非 常 的 緊 張 欸， 大 家 記 得 有 這 邊 的 MK 啦。
[1:02] 錄 MK 老 師 麥 奇。 Hi I am man key yes。
[1:07] 幾 10 秒 就 是 這 一 集 最 後 講 廣 東 話 的 時 間 啦， 因 為 我 們 嘉 賓 是 不 是 講 廣 東 話 的
[1:15] 重 量 級 嘉 賓 是 非 常 的 榮 幸， 因 為 其 實 我 們 在 不 同 的 集 數 或 者 我 們 的 片 裡 面 都
[1:21] 提 及 到 不 少 次 這 個 名 字 的。 感 冒 在 加 班 就 是 Peter so today we
[1:27] have A really， really， truly special guest professor， singer
[1:30] and then professor singer， I think。
[1:34] Our audience know you already because we have mentioned your
[1:37] name， your philosophy many， many time in different episode。
[1:40] So IT is A truly pressure honor to have you here。
[1:44] So professor singer is like one of the most influential living
[1:48] philosophy of our day， so you make many major voices on
[1:53] different issues regarding like utilitarian and like animal
[1:57] ethics， bio ethics and also effective algorithm。
[2:00] So this is our true owner to have you here。
[2:04] Thank you so much。 Thank you G man。
[2:07] It's my pleasure to be here。 Yeah， Thank you。
[2:08] So what A milestone for US。 Okay？
[2:12] So we are so loving。 So last before we go， deep into
[2:16] utility and philosophy， Maybe we can begin with some weather
[2:20] personal story。 We want to know more about your
[2:23] personal journey to philosophy and also you to the terrorism。
[2:27] So may I ask， what is your motivation or your starting
[2:32] point of studying philosophy when and Why？
[2:35] In philosophy。 Well， I didn't know much about
[2:39] philosophy when I was applying to go to University。
[2:44] Philosophy was not taught in high schools in Australia at
[2:46] that time。 So there's A little bit that I
[2:49] knew about IT。 I got from the boyfriend of my
[2:52] sister。 I had A sister older than me and
[2:55] he had done some philosophy and somehow that we talked about IT。
[2:58] I'd also read Burton Russell's history of western philosophy，
[3:02] which was really the only philosophy book that I'd read，
[3:06] but IT seemed interesting。 I'd always been interested in A
[3:08] good argument and I was planning to study law because lawyers
[3:13] have to be good at arguing。 Money， and you can make A
[3:16] living。 From IT？
[3:17] That's right。 And so when I went， I applied
[3:22] for law。 I was accepted to study law， but
[3:27] I went to see A counselor who looked at my results for my
[3:31] final year of high school and he said， you know， you've done well
[3:34] in A number of humanity subjects you might consider combining the
[3:37] law degree with A Bachelor arts degree， which you can do。
[3:40] IT doesn't take IT takes one or two years longer depending。
[3:45] How long？ Whether you're doing honors arts
[3:47] degree or just an ordinary one。 And so I said， yeah， that sounds
[3:52] interesting。 I'm happy to do that。
[3:54] So what would I study in the arts degree？
[3:57] I'd done history at school and like that， so I said I'll do
[4:00] history， but then I wanted to do something else as well。
[4:03] So I decided to try the first year of philosophy course and I
[4:07] enjoyed that and I did well in IT。
[4:11] So I went on with philosophy and I became more interested in the
[4:16] philosophy than in the law subjects， which I was studying
[4:18] at the same time。 So there was A point at which
[4:22] I'd finished the philosophy degree。
[4:25] And got A first class on as result in IT， but I hadn't
[4:28] finished the law degree so I went to the law skill and and
[4:32] said in A philosophy is encouraging me to go on and do A
[4:35] master's degree in philosophy。 Can I postpone finishing the law
[4:39] degree？ And they said， sure， no problem
[4:41] you can postpone for。 Postpone or cancel at。
[4:44] The time IT was postponed because you just said I can earn
[4:48] some money as A lawyer and I didn't know I could earn some
[4:50] money as A philosopher。 And in fact， my father really
[4:54] dated that。 I well， something also not。
[4:57] My father said， you know， philosopher， how can you make A
[5:00] living as A philosopher？ But I did the master's degree。
[5:05] I got A scholarship to go to Oxford。
[5:07] I did the graduate degree。 By that time， I was interested
[5:10] in A career in philosophy and I never finished A law degree。
[5:14] You know， there are many different kind of philosophical
[5:17] question like metaphysic， like philosophy of my philosophy of
[5:21] language， and some are more practical。
[5:23] FX， which in which you are specialties。
[5:28] So my question is， are you concerned that about moral
[5:32] philosophy since you start doing philosophy or you are more like
[5:37] interested in all kind of philosophies instead？
[5:40] I was interested in the whole area philosophy at first。
[5:45] But when IT came to thinking about？
[5:49] Maybe I'm going to spend my life doing this。
[5:51] I didn't think that I could really feel good spending my
[5:54] life asking questions like， How do I know that I'm not dreaming
[5:58] now， right？ That didn't seem A very real
[6:02] concern。 IT was sort of an intellectual
[6:04] puzzle how I might know that。 But that and other questions of
[6:10] that kind。 They seemed A little bit too
[6:13] remote from ordinary life， and I like the idea that in ethics you
[6:18] can talk about issues that other people do talk about and
[6:23] hopefully you can add to the quality of the discussion by
[6:28] having some philosophy background。
[6:30] So that's Why by the final years of my philosophy。
[6:35] I was more interested in ethics and political philosophy than I
[6:41] was in metaphysics or epistomology or logic。
[6:44] But do you have A expectation that you want to make A real
[6:47] influence in the Real World while doing philosophy？
[6:51] When you start interested in effhics？
[6:56] Perhaps not at first， but gradually， as I've done some
[6:59] more ethics。 And also the other thing that I
[7:04] should say is I'm an undergraduate。
[7:06] In the nineteen sixties， IT was A decade of new student
[7:10] movements。 There was the war in Vietnam。
[7:13] Australia was an ally of the United States。
[7:16] We actually had troops in Vietnam fighting alongside the
[7:19] United States。 IT was possible that I was going
[7:23] to be conscripted to fight in Vietnam。
[7:27] That was A possibility given the age that I was， so I was
[7:31] interested in that issue and there was A lot of discussion in
[7:33] the universities about。 Is。
[7:35] This A just war。 What are the criteria for A just
[7:38] war？ And there was also the civil
[7:41] rights movement in America which spread to Australia as well。
[7:44] So that was another question with， you know， moral issues
[7:47] that were being raised by students and students were
[7:50] talking about Why aren't our courses more relevant to this，
[7:53] right？ Why， for Example， in ethics are
[7:56] we only analyzing the meanings of moral Words and asking
[8:00] whether their objective or subjective or emotive？
[8:04] Why aren't we asking？ These questions like， what are
[8:08] the criteria for A war to be？ Just what is the basis of human
[8:11] equality？ So I did think because of that
[8:15] time at which I was studying that， yeah， ethics might have
[8:19] something to do that's relevant to to our lives。
[8:23] And triggered IT by the social environment， the atmosphere so
[8:27] that you are more interested in ethics， which is more Down to FM
[8:31] relevant to the Real World。 Right， I think IT was probably A
[8:35] combination of my own temperament。
[8:37] And also what was going on at the time in social movements。
[8:41] In talking about ethics， I think you are one of the most famous
[8:45] utilitarian in the world， so may I ask further， when and Why you
[8:51] start to be A utilitarian？ Well， the first ethics course
[8:55] that I took was taught by。 A professor called HJ McCloskey。
[9:02] He's probably not heard of much today， but he was an
[9:06] intuitionist along the lines of WD Ross， so he thought。
[9:10] The right view of morality is that we intuit A number of
[9:15] primer faci duties like the duty of。
[9:18] Not nying， not killing something like that？
[9:20] Yeah。 Not lying that's right，
[9:22] veracity， gratitude。 If someone did something good to
[9:25] you， you had A duty to be grateful and to return the favor
[9:28] if the opportunity arose。 Reparation if you hound somebody
[9:33] you had A duty to make IT up to them。
[9:37] Beneficent so there was A duty of doing good， but IT was only
[9:40] one among several duties and non maleficence not harming people
[9:44] was another so and he actually was。
[9:48] I think the author of one of the at least at that time famous
[9:52] objections to utilitarianism。 The objection was based on the
[9:58] assumption that you are the Sheriff in A southern。
[10:02] Town at this time， the South was quite racist still。
[10:07] And in this town， A white woman says she's been raped by A black
[10:12] man and there's A mob of people who've gone out with guns and
[10:16] they've rounded up half A dozen black men and they're now about
[10:21] to Lynch them。 All as A sort of warning to the
[10:24] black community and so these six people are going to be。
[10:30] Killed， what can you do as Sheriff？
[10:32] Well， you can't stop them entirely from doing this， but if
[10:35] you say I've got evidence that this one is The One who did IT，
[10:41] then they will Lynch that one and let the others go， and
[10:46] McCloskey said。 Well， A utilitarian would have
[10:48] to do that。 A utilitarian would have to say，
[10:51] make false evidence， try to forge the evidence to show that
[10:55] one man was guilty。 So that only one person would
[10:58] die rather than six， so it's kind of A version of the trolley
[11:00] problem， as you can see， and McCloskey thought that this was
[11:03] A knock Down objection to utilitarianism because obviously
[11:07] A Sheriff should not invent evidence。
[11:09] The Sheriff should be， should be honest and do their role。
[11:13] Even if that meant that more people died and I was not
[11:16] convinced by that， I thought， Gee， you know， if there's really
[11:20] Nothing the Sheriff can do to stop six people being。
[11:23] Lynched， at least five of whom are innocent。
[11:27] Except by telling A lie。 Well， that's what he should do
[11:33] so， so I thought， well， that's not A knockdown。
[11:36] Objection to utilitarianism。 What are the other objections
[11:39] that some people think are knocked Down objections？
[11:40] and I started looking at the literature and I didn't think
[11:44] any of the objections were really convincing。
[11:47] So then I began to think， well， Maybe there is something in this
[11:50] theory。 Okay， so it's like the classic
[11:53] scape goal objection to utilitarianism。
[11:57] I personally don't find IT locked Down argument， but at
[12:00] least I will recognize some appealing appeal of the
[12:04] arguments， so you never share our Intuition that the Sheriff
[12:07] shouldn't make up the evidence and kill one bad guy。
[12:11] You never have that intuation。 I never。
[12:13] Had that Intuition as an overriding Intuition。
[12:16] Okay， I did have。 I could understand the sort of
[12:21] the attraction of the view that， you know， there's something bad
[12:23] about。 Our government official， A law
[12:27] official in particular forging the evidence。
[12:30] I could see that often that might lead to very bad things
[12:34] happening， but II never thought that。
[12:36] That Intuition is just so powerful。
[12:39] That。 That's the end of。
[12:40] Utilitarianism that utilitarianism must be wrong。
[12:44] Actually want to ask how？ Do you start your journey into
[12:50] animal effects？ Because we can discuss utotarism
[12:54] in the next session， so I'm interested。
[12:57] For anywhere effects。 But I want to talk about his
[13:01] personal journey。 My personal journey to animal
[13:03] ethics， okay？ So that happened some years
[13:05] later because what I was just talking about was in the second
[13:09] year of my University degree。 That would have been sixty five。
[13:14] I completed the Bachelor of Arts degree。
[13:17] I completed the master's degree。 I got A scholarship to go to
[13:21] Oxford。 I went to Oxford in nineteen
[13:24] sixty nine and in nineteen seventy。
[13:27] I was in A class about freedom and responsibility taught by
[13:32] Jonathan Glover。 I don't know if you've mentioned
[13:34] Jonathan lover in this program， but he's A philosopher who。
[13:40] I really liked his his work and some of the things that he did
[13:43] were looking at。 Applied ethics is one of the
[13:47] early people to do that， he wrote A book called causing
[13:49] death and saving lives， which I think was really one of the very
[13:52] good early books in in ethics。 But this particular class that I
[13:58] was attending was on free will and responsibility。
[14:01] All right， you know the argument well， if determinism is true，
[14:05] there are no， there's no moral responsibility because
[14:07] Everything we do is determine。 And then there was A fairly
[14:11] small class， so plenty of time for discussion and in one of the
[14:16] classes I asked the question， I can't know， remember what the
[14:19] question was about， but IT started some threat of
[14:21] discussion。 And after the class was over， A
[14:25] Canadian student who was in the class， who I'd seen but never
[14:29] talked to came up to me and said， what did you think of
[14:33] lovers？ Answer to your view？
[14:35] and I said， well， I didn't really think that he fully
[14:38] answered my objection， and Richard said this was his。
[14:42] Turn。 Out his name was Richard kashen。
[14:44] Richard said， yeah， I think you may be right about that。
[14:48] Would you like to come and talk about this over lunch？
[14:51] So as Oxford students， we had A college to go to where we ate
[14:56] lunch and I went to baileyola college with Richard。
[15:02] And at that time， when you came in for lunch， there was one hot
[15:05] dish on the only alternative of the hot dish was A cold salad
[15:09] plate。 So Richard。
[15:13] Looked at the hot dish， which was spaghetti with A kind of
[15:16] brand source on top of IT and he said， is there meat in that
[15:19] source？ And he was told there was so he
[15:21] took the salad plate。 And I noticed that because IT
[15:26] was， you know， I was wondering what his problem was with me。
[15:29] There were no vegetarians who I knew， you know， nobody that I
[15:32] had met in my entire undergraduate studies， I think
[15:35] or my first year at Oxford was A vegetarian， IT just didn't
[15:38] happen really， and except perhaps for an Indian who was
[15:41] vegetarian for Hindu sort of reasons。
[15:45] So we finished the discussion about free will and
[15:47] responsibility， and then I said， so Why did you ask about the
[15:51] meat？ You know， don't you eat meat
[15:52] white or if？ If so， you know Why not？
[15:56] And Richard said something pretty simple， like I don't
[16:01] think it's right to treat animals the way they get treated
[16:04] to be turned into meat。 And I said， well， you know
[16:09] what's so wrong with IT？ Don't they。
[16:10] You know， they're out in the fields， they're grazing， they
[16:13] don't have any predators。 Yes， I know they get trucked to
[16:17] slaughter and killed， but that's only one bad day。
[16:20] And what seems A reasonably good life to me。
[16:23] And he said， no， you're wrong。 A lot of these animals that were
[16:26] eating。 Horrible life。
[16:29] Yeah， they have horrible lives， they're inside， they don't get
[16:31] to go outside at all or they don't。
[16:34] They don't get to go on on grass。
[16:35] They're very closely confined。 And you know， it's all just
[16:40] directed at producing the meat as cheaply as possible。
[16:45] I was A bit surprised because I really didn't know that。
[16:50] And Richard referred me to A book， the only book that was
[16:53] around about factory farming was called animal machines written
[16:56] by Ruth Harrison， and IT was A pioneering study of what was
[17:00] happening to farming， and IT quoted extensively from farming
[17:04] magazines， so IT wasn't just her personal opinion。
[17:07] SHE backed IT up by showing。 That this is what the official
[17:11] advice to farmers or the。 Commercial production advice to
[17:16] farmers was how to treat their animals how many chickens you
[17:19] can fit into A cage for egg laying hens how many？
[17:22] How densely you can pack the pigs into A shed？
[17:26] and I was surprised， pretty shocked。
[17:28] Yeah， I think shocked is the right word。
[17:31] Do I？ When I first look at the
[17:32] documentary about factory farm？ Right， yeah， yeah， well， I
[17:36] didn't know any documentaries then， but there were some photos
[17:40] in the book too actually， and they were pretty powerful。
[17:43] So you first become A utility and then become A vegan。
[17:46] Do you find IT is electoral development from your
[17:49] victoritarian principle to I think？
[17:51] IT， I think IT was to some extent。
[17:55] So when I started think， you know， after looking at Ruth
[17:59] Harrison's book， I started thinking about， well， is there
[18:02] perhaps something that still justifies US in treating animals
[18:05] in this way？ And I looked at various riders
[18:10] who did justify treating animals。
[18:12] They went very many actually， who even addressed the issue。
[18:16] But there were some， you know， Thomas Aquinas said， well， God
[18:20] has given US Dominion over the animals。
[18:22] Okay， well， I was not religious。 I was an atheist by this time。
[18:27] That wasn't going to persuade me across。
[18:30] Famously， descart said the animals are autometer than feel
[18:33] anything that was completely。 Uncenlausible I。
[18:35] Thought can't said we don't have duties to animals because
[18:39] they're not self conscious beings， but but。
[18:44] I thought， well， surely they're suffering matters even， you
[18:46] know， even if they're not self aware， so these all seem like
[18:48] excuses to going on to， to eating meat。
[18:53] And yes， and from utilitarianism IT flowed and in fact the early
[18:58] utilitarians did say that， you know， if animals feel pain and
[19:02] suffering。 That that counts in some way so，
[19:06] so I think the fact that I was A utilitarian made IT much easier
[19:10] for me to say， oh， this is wrong， we shouldn't be doing
[19:13] this then if I had been A County or something， you might have
[19:16] thought， well， you know， the greater manual County thinks
[19:18] it's because they're not self conscious。
[19:21] Maybe there's something in。 That days many content to argue
[19:26] for the vegan position as well from the understanding of
[19:29] morality。 Yeah。
[19:31] Yes， well， I certainly argue the factory farming is wrong and
[19:33] yes， it's been good to see。 Like Christine， coastguard。
[19:38] Opposed factory farming and where we treat animals and
[19:41] Martha nustburn from the aristotilian perspective，
[19:44] absolutely so， so it's different now， very different。
[19:47] But not only now there's A big philosophical literature on
[19:49] animal ethics， but there really wasn't anything at the time。
[19:52] There was you have to go back A long way。
[19:54] There'd been A big gap， you know？
[19:55] If you went back to the late nineteenth century。
[20:00] There was A work by A man called Henry salt， who was not A
[20:02] academic philosopher。 But sort of I guess， A general
[20:06] social reformer would be the best way to describe him。
[20:09] He wrote。 A book called animals writes in
[20:11] relation to social progress， in which he said that you know
[20:16] animals should have rights。 Basically， he said， if humans
[20:19] have rights， animals should have rights to。
[20:21] So there was some early work but and you can go right back to
[20:27] plutak and Roman times and porphrey。
[20:30] Helenistic Greek philosopher， they wrote about abstaining from
[20:34] flesh but， but there wasn't anything very much recently at
[20:39] that time。 Thank you。
[20:40] So I think we're just about out of time for this segment。
[20:43] So in the Lex segment in section， we will go deep into
[20:46] the idea of dutyarianism。 So see you next section。
[20:57] 的 節 目 好 沒 有 提 啊。 好 好 看 啊 媽。
[21:02] 媽 昨 天 的 節 目 免 費 的 喔， 知 不 知 道 我 們 要 做 點 什 麼？
[21:06] 咧， 我 不 知 道， 爸 爸。 如 果 你 不 知 道 我 說 你 知 啊， 我 們 不 如 家
[21:11] 有 Patriot 委 員， 每 個 月 小 小 的 月 灰 就 可 以 支 持 更 加 美 門 的 節 目 啦。
[21:18] 哇， 台 灣 的 火 車 去 買 國 好， 感 覺 偶 裝 打 多 的 極 啦。
[21:33] OK so， welcome back to our program so we have just A
[21:36] excellent discussion with your personal journey to philosophy，
[21:41] vegetarian and veganism。 So in this section we would like
[21:45] to go deep into the idea of utility， although I think most
[21:50] of our audience already heard of IT and have certain therefore
[21:54] understanding of IT that which you might to explain the basic
[21:58] idea of the mall theory of utilitarianism？
[22:01] Absolutely。 It's very straightforward。
[22:05] Utilitarianism is A consequentialist theory。
[22:09] That means it's A theory that says the right action is The One
[22:12] that has the best consequences。 What？
[22:16] Is specific about utilitarianism is that by best consequences， IT
[22:21] essentially is talking about。 About well about。
[22:27] Happiness and its opposite suffering those are the relevant
[22:32] consequences that make an action good， at least for the classical
[22:35] version of utilitarianism。 There are somewhat other
[22:38] interpretations of what our well consistent。
[22:43] So IT might consist in the satisfaction of our preferences
[22:45] according to some views， preferences or our desires， but
[22:50] you can think of IT as the view that the right action is The One
[22:54] that does the most to improve well being for all of those
[22:59] affected by our actions。 Okay， thanks。
[23:01] So today we're going to try to challenge the idea of
[23:06] utilitarianism， although you find all of them are not really
[23:10] compelling so that you Stay in the camera of detailitarianism。
[23:13] So in this section we would like to like discuss one or two of
[23:17] them which is really famous。 So yeah。
[23:22] People often say vegetarianism is too demanding for them。
[23:27] I have two examples， one for cheap field action， another for
[23:32] live choice。 I would call IT first of all，
[23:36] let's say today I want to achieve myself and buy A couple
[23:39] of bubble tea， all right？ And then all right， I feel good
[23:43] about that。 But eitarian may。
[23:47] Say that I was doing something more。
[23:50] Why？ because I could say off the
[23:52] money and give IT to the charity and probably probably IT end up
[23:58] saving A life。 So actually buying A couple
[24:01] bubble tea is actually the wrong thing to do so。
[24:05] But for common people， they would say， wow， that's too
[24:08] demanding， so that's my trip field action Example， I have
[24:12] another which is I think。 More significant accurate
[24:17] because for many of US， we have so many so called live projects
[24:21] for each of US， right for you to be A philosopher， to be A public
[24:26] intellectual， right， but。 Let's say let me given
[24:30] hypothetical Example， right？ Linda wants to change her job
[24:35] from working as A high earning banker to let's say to A
[24:42] charity。 Officer officer， receiving only
[24:46] A humble income， right？ So normally we would think that
[24:50] or that's respectable actually， right？
[24:54] Reflect your own values， you try to be good instead of greedy
[24:59] banker， something like that， but we may place her but for
[25:03] unititarian they may say， wait， wait A minute， SHE could do
[25:07] something wrong because if you change her job well， actually he
[25:11] could Keep the high paying job instead of changing her job
[25:14] because when he。 Continues to work as A banker he
[25:19] could， he could actually donate A big chunk of her income
[25:22] toaturity again instead of。 And actually， IT could end up
[25:28] saving A lot of lots more people than。
[25:32] Working directly in tractable organization so again for
[25:36] utitarianism。 Should have A wrong life choice，
[25:42] but for most of US it's fine。 It's respectable。
[25:45] So again， these two examples may show that user is actually too
[25:49] demanding for common people。 OK， thanks for the examples。
[25:53] Let's let's take them in turn。 You said that instead of buying
[25:57] the bubble T， you could donate your charity and save A life。
[26:00] I don't know where you'll buy your bubble tea， but give well
[26:03] estimates。 IT takes four thousand five
[26:05] hundred US dollars to save A life by providing mosquito Nets
[26:09] for people who are otherwise at risk of getting bitten by
[26:13] mosquitoes and dying。 So your bubble tea is not going
[26:18] to make A lot of difference。 Of course， if you saved up， if
[26:20] you never bought bubble tea and you saved up for A couple of
[26:23] years， what what you might spend on bubble tea then Maybe you
[26:26] could save A life and Maybe A utility would say that would be
[26:30] A Better thing to do。 That's true。
[26:33] So let's ask， is that claim too demanding well？
[26:38] IT may just be it is I mean yes to say you shouldn't spend money
[26:42] on any little indulgences like bubble tea or you know， other
[26:46] larger items like you shouldn't upgrade your phone when the new
[26:50] iPhone comes out， you should donate that and that's A more
[26:53] substantial sum。 So it's true that that's AA very
[26:58] demanding ethic。 Now there's A few things to say
[27:01] about that。 IT might be that， given the
[27:05] world we're in in which you can afford to spend some money on
[27:11] bubble tea and perhaps you can afford to upgrade your phone
[27:14] whenever the new one comes out。 Whereas other people in this
[27:18] world are living on the equivalent of two dollars
[27:22] fifteen US per day， so less than A thousand US dollars per year。
[27:29] And they may not be able to satisfy their basic needs for
[27:32] adequate food shelter。 They may not be able to educate
[27:35] their Children， so perhaps it's just the fact that the world is
[27:38] so unequal。 And also， of course， that we now
[27:43] have the ability to transfer some resources from the wealthy
[27:47] nations to the poorer nations， and we have organizations that
[27:52] can effectively do that and can help people in those poor
[27:57] nations can。 Save their lives， restore their
[28:00] site。 Perform other basic necessary
[28:03] operations help them to start A business。
[28:07] Maybe it's just that fact about the world， which means that
[28:10] ethics has changed because now we have the opportunity to help
[28:14] strangers at A great distance， which for most of our
[28:17] evolutionary history we never had。
[28:19] So IT strikes US as very demanding。
[28:23] But that's just the objective situation we're in， so that's
[28:27] one thing I'd say about that。 Another thing I would say is。
[28:31] Utilitarianism utilitarians are not unrealistic about human
[28:37] nature。 All right， we do have an ethic
[28:39] which says you should do what has the best consequences， but
[28:43] we recognize that there are very few Saints in the world。
[28:47] You're probably not A Saint， so， you know， we're not going to
[28:51] really come Down very hard on you for your bubble tea。
[28:55] Because we're going to say， well， you know what？
[28:58] What do you do for people in poverty， right？
[29:00] Maybe， Maybe you already giving something quite significant to
[29:05] help people。 Maybe you're giving more than
[29:07] most people give， but you still have enough to have your bubble
[29:11] tea and enjoy IT。 So I think utilitarians would
[29:15] say， look， that's fine as long as you're giving something
[29:18] reasonably significant。 And perhaps if you become
[29:20] wealthier， you're going to give more。
[29:23] Then you're doing something to help people in need。
[29:27] You're perhaps also contributing to raising the standard of
[29:30] giving in your community because Maybe other people in your
[29:33] community give less than you do。 So then we're going to say， you
[29:37] know， it's。 It's great that you're giving
[29:38] something。 I hope that eventually you'll be
[29:40] able to give more， but it's A good thing。
[29:43] So what I'm doing here is I'm separating the question of。
[29:49] Are you doing exactly？ What utilitarianism would say
[29:52] you ought to do， which the answer is no。
[29:55] And I'm separating that question from the question。
[29:59] Should you be blamed for what you're doing？
[30:03] And for the for utilitarians the question， who should you， who
[30:06] should you blame and who should you prayers？
[30:11] Is。 Also A question that you answer
[30:12] by utilitarian principles， so you should blame people when
[30:16] it's useful to blame them when IT will lead to good
[30:18] consequences and you should praise them when IT will be
[30:21] useful to praise them。 So let's say。
[30:23] You're giving， I don't know， ten percent of your income to
[30:27] charities， but that still leaves you enough with to buy your
[30:31] bubble tea。 Then you're certainly going to
[30:33] get prize because most people in your community。
[30:36] And at your wealth level， don't give ten percent， we'll assume。
[30:41] So that's Why I think you can accept the idea。
[30:43] Yes， it's A demanding ethic。 If you were to follow IT in
[30:45] every respect but not following IT in every respect is something
[30:49] that we have to live with and we have to live with the fact that
[30:53] most people are going to be like that。
[30:57] OK， so then you had the Example of Linda， who's the banker
[31:00] earning A lot of money。 And。
[31:03] SHE wants to do something that perhaps SHE thinks is going to
[31:06] be more interesting for her。 SHE wants to go and work for
[31:10] charity。 It's not clear。
[31:13] That utilitarianism will say that she's wrong in doing that，
[31:16] IT will really depend A lot on the circumstances， so。
[31:21] One question is， as A banker？ Is SHE giving A lot to charity？
[31:27] How much is SHE giving to？ Is SHE giving to effective
[31:29] charities if SHE is？ That's good， but also how badly
[31:34] does the charity need somebody with her talents to work for
[31:39] them？ And how effective is the
[31:41] charity？ Some charities are highly
[31:44] effective。 I found it an organization
[31:47] called the life you can save， which recommends about twenty
[31:50] something。 Really effective charities
[31:53] helping people in poverty but to get to those twenty？
[31:56] We had to winnow through A much larger number of ones that are
[31:59] not very effective， but let's say that Linda has actually
[32:03] chosen one of the really effective charities and that SHE
[32:05] has the skills to make that charity even more effective。
[32:09] Then。 It's quite possible that SHE
[32:11] will do more good working for that charity。
[32:14] Than。 SHE would working as A banker，
[32:16] even if SHE had then quite A lot of money to give because Maybe
[32:20] the bottleneck with A char。 Is not that IT can't raise
[32:23] funds， but that IT doesn't have the talented staff to work for
[32:27] IT。 That's possible。
[32:30] But it's also。 Possible that the decision
[32:33] should go the other way。 IT could be that SHE has no
[32:35] particular skills that will help the charity。
[32:40] But she's able to earn A lot as A banker and she's able to
[32:45] resist the temptation to live in the same。
[32:49] High expense lifestyle as other bankers at her level you know
[32:52] who want to have the latest sports car or live in very flash
[32:57] penth apartments？ So。
[33:02] Yeah， SHE， IT could be that the best thing for her to do is to
[33:05] continue to work as A banker if SHE really hates being A banker，
[33:08] she's probably not going to be very successful at IT。
[33:11] You know？ That would be unusual and then
[33:13] Maybe it's Better for IT to do what SHE really would enjoy
[33:15] doing and she'll probably work harder at that and do more good
[33:19] that way。 But IT is going to depend very
[33:21] much on the circumstances and once again， if she's working for
[33:25] the charity and doing good， we're not really going to blame
[33:28] her by saying， Oh yes， but you could have done even more good
[33:31] as A banker by don't own any salary because。
[33:33] We recognize that people want to do not only the most good but
[33:38] also something that they find intrinsically interesting to
[33:42] pursue。 Can I add on A follow up
[33:44] correction because your response， like distinguishing
[33:47] the Bing worth it's and the question of right and wrong。
[33:51] So my follow up question is like， do you also distinguish
[33:55] machine so called positive and negative duty？
[33:58] Because。 For most of most of US，
[34:00] according to our Intuition， we， we have to duty of not hurting，
[34:03] not killing people， not producing suffering， but many
[34:08] people feel like they do not have the duty of maximizing the
[34:11] happiness in the world， right？ So， do you find the two or they
[34:16] are just to。 The same so as A utilitarian。
[34:20] I don't see an intrinsic distinction between。
[34:26] The positive and the negative duties we put that as you know，
[34:29] the things that you do and the things that you refrain from
[34:33] doing or Amit doing。 You need to look at the
[34:36] consequences in both cases。 So， you know， you might be
[34:41] saying， you know， somebody might say， let's go back to Linda。
[34:44] SHE was earning A lot as A banker。
[34:47] SHE could have given IT away， but let's assume SHE didn't。
[34:52] So by A mission Children died of malaria who would not have died
[34:55] if SHE had donated to the against malaria Foundation and
[35:00] the Children had been sleeping under bed Nets。
[35:04] Now does that mean that SHE was under A duty to give？
[35:09] Well， I would say yes， is IT the same as the duty not to go and
[35:15] murder these Children？ Well， you know， not exactly。
[35:19] Even though the Children are dead both ways， I guess whether
[35:22] they die from malaria or die from being moted， but obviously，
[35:26] you know， to make the effort to go and murder somebody makes you
[35:30] A different type of person from A person who says， oh， you know，
[35:33] yes， I've got lots of money， but I want to go to some of these
[35:39] high brand luxury brand products I want to carry around。
[35:43] This very expensive handbag， so all of my friends can see how
[35:46] wealthy I am。 You know， that's。
[35:49] That's A failing， I think， but it's not the same as actually
[35:52] going to kill someone， so I think that's Why we would
[35:56] distinguish what we say to the agent again， you know， whether
[36:00] we condemn them for what they're doing or not， whether we praise
[36:03] them。 We the the distinction。
[36:07] You're asking about between positive and negative duties
[36:10] might well be relevant to how we assess the agent， but not
[36:12] relevant to how we assess the action。
[36:15] And I wanted to follow up on the idea of， like， the distinction
[36:19] between plain worthiness and whether the action is right or
[36:23] wrong。 So I think at least in my from
[36:27] my Intuition， I will tend to connect like the idea of playing
[36:32] wealthiness to the idea of super arocation。
[36:35] It's like if some action is super arrogatory。
[36:39] And you do it or not， you're not rain worthy。
[36:42] Whether you're doing IT or not。 So if under the utilitarian
[36:46] account， so not you're like Lynda， Maybe perhaps SHE stayed
[36:52] to be A banker。 Is utility maximizing， but SHE
[36:59] switched jobs to like charity or some other jobs。
[37:03] We will feel like。 I'm not sure how to say IT about
[37:06] this， like， because on one hand， like she's not doing the right
[37:10] action， according to utilitarian standard。
[37:14] But on the other hand， because。 I will tend to think utilitarian
[37:20] doesn't have the resources to distinguish between obligatory
[37:25] and super arrogatory， so IT seems like if the Lynda case
[37:29] she's like， we shouldn't blame her for switching her job to
[37:33] some jobs that less utility maximizing。
[37:37] So I'm not sure how to like continue the question。
[37:41] It's just like we shouldn't blame her。
[37:44] But she's not doing the right thing。
[37:45] It's not even。 Like， yeah， because she's wrong，
[37:49] and she's。 Paying birthy yeah， so you're
[37:52] right。 The utilitarian does not have
[37:54] this separate category of supererogatory actions because
[37:59] you always ought to do what to the best of your knowledge will
[38:04] will lead to the most good or another way of putting IT is to
[38:07] say you always ought to do the action with the highest expected
[38:10] value where expected value is the value of each outcome。
[38:16] Multiplied by the probability of achieving that goal， so。
[38:23] We wouldn't talk about supererogatory， but again， we
[38:27] might talk about。 Whether Linda has done more than
[38:35] you can expect of people or as much as one could expect of
[38:39] people in these circumstances or whether she's done something
[38:43] that falls below the standard of what people in her community and
[38:48] culture might do。 And IT sounds like in this case
[38:52] that the community would recognize。
[38:56] That it's important to people have A job that interests them
[39:01] intrinsically。 You're not really going to blame
[39:06] somebody for changing jobs， even if they can do slightly less
[39:10] good， as long as if they're still trying to do some good，
[39:14] you know， and。 SHE is going to be working for
[39:18] charity。 After all， she'll Maybe do less
[39:19] good than A banker， but。 It's not like she's stopped，
[39:23] stopped doing good at all。 She's still trying to do
[39:26] something to help people。 In greater need than SHE is。
[39:31] So again， I that's。 That's how I would draw that
[39:34] distinction。 I would just say you're not
[39:36] going to blame if what she's doing， but it's not because。
[39:41] Of the distinction between what's obligatory and what's
[39:43] subaruerogatory。 So can I describe your view as A
[39:46] lessening of the classical utilitarianisms requirement？
[39:51] Because usually， as we normally understand IT， classical
[39:55] utilitarianism holds that an action is right， even only if IT
[39:59] is like happiness or utility maximizing。
[40:03] So what you said seems to be。 Like。
[40:07] And actually this right is not because IT doesn't need to be
[40:10] utility maximizing。 But Peter didn't said that IT is
[40:14] not wrong。 It's still wrong。
[40:15] No。 Yeah。
[40:18] Don't want to bring her。 Maybe it's counter effective
[40:21] because from the iterative perspective you bring Linda， you
[40:25] won't make him make me curb doing more good。
[40:29] So IT isn't contradict to IT。 To the classic utility
[40:34] principal， it's still wrong because it's not in the center
[40:37] is not maximizing the good， but we just don't want to bring her。
[40:41] That's correct， it's not。 It's still not the right action。
[40:45] But it's， there's not。 There's no justification for
[40:49] blaming here unless blaming here is going to like to do some
[40:53] good。 Yeah， so， so I think in this
[40:57] section we have discussed on one of the most common objection to
[41:01] demanding to the utility， and in the next segment we will
[41:05] continue to talk about different objections to utilitarianism。
[41:17] 通 常 透 氣， 讓 你 無 孔 都 可 以 附 近。 均 遊 地 包 趕 你， 每 一 船 寄 庫。
[41:24] 腳 起 來 補 助 你 一 樣 除 了 各 種 T shirt， 還 有 外 套 tollback。
[41:32] 書 本 等 各 款 投 毒 式 的 產 品 除 了 香 港 本 地， 而 且 可 以 海 外 游 扣 天。
[41:40] 大 家 快 點 上 途 讀 失 望 店 選 購 啦。 Okay， welcome back to our show。
[41:56] So in the last segment we have discussed the two demanding
[42:00] objection in this section we were going to discuss。
[42:05] A objection particular to the classical utilitarian， which is
[42:09] the anti hindulistic idea， so introduced the objection to US。
[42:14] Yes because like for classical utilitarians like the only thing
[42:18] that has intrinsability， the only intrinsic value so say is
[42:22] happiness or pleasure， so IT strikes many people as。
[42:30] ERT because it's。 Too narrow too。
[42:31] Narrow， because apparently there are A lot of things other than
[42:35] pleasure or happiness understand， understood in this
[42:38] way to be like variable， for Example， we value friendship， we
[42:43] value beauty， we value truth and the reason Why we value those
[42:49] things are not because， like they brings US happiness like
[42:53] you can imagine， like writing A poem， the process of writing may
[42:57] be payingful and。 Like， although after finishing A
[43:01] poem， the poet may feel like happy pleasure。
[43:06] Please but。 We can assume that in A lot of
[43:10] cases， the pleasure that the poet gains is not enough to
[43:14] offset the suffering he had during the process of writing。
[43:18] I think like writing A philosophy paper may be the
[43:20] same， at least for me。 I'm sorry you suffer when you
[43:24] ride philosophy。 You were Happier。
[43:26] Not even pressure gain only paying。
[43:30] Like mom Instrumental like get A great finisher， call etcetera。
[43:34] But yeah， that's one cases and we can Maybe we can further
[43:38] assume in those cases that like those readers of the program may
[43:43] not like their happiness from reading the poem may not be
[43:46] enough to offset like the paying the suffering he has。
[43:51] During。 The process it's also related
[43:54] to。 A very old objection against
[43:58] usitarian classical eitarians， like。
[44:02] Philosopher would say， ban them， which is A classical utarian，
[44:07] all right back in。 Eighteen centuries。
[44:10] Late in thirty nineteen？ Yeah。
[44:14] Even older than that， all right？ They call his usitarian， some
[44:19] classical usitarian， some philosophy of pig， right？
[44:22] IT recommends A live to be pleasurable， rather than。
[44:30] Rather than studying philosophy， or。
[44:32] Too perceive of。 Beauty things like virtue beauty
[44:35] is it's not relevant。 What's relevant is only
[44:38] pleasure。 Yeah， yes， so some people find
[44:41] this like unsatisfactory at least like we have A lot。
[44:46] Of even for some classical like JS mu yeah， we find this kind of
[44:51] objection， philosophy or kind of reasonable and so。
[44:56] He tried to distinguished the quality of pressure。
[44:59] He distinguished higher and lower pleasures， yes。
[45:03] I don't think you can really do that and remain A hiddenist。
[45:05] I think that was A mistake that mill made。
[45:07] I think he was too conservative to eager to conform to the views
[45:13] of his contemporaries。 People like Thomas Carlisle， who
[45:16] I think use this philosophy of swine objection。
[45:21] And he he didn't want to seem to be anti intellectual。
[45:24] I think Benton was much more honest， you know， Benton had
[45:27] this famous saying regarding your poet。
[45:30] He said pushpin is as good as poetry。
[45:32] Pushpin was A game that you played in pubs in England rather
[45:35] simple game， but I think the the full quotation is quantities of
[45:39] pleasure being equal。 Pushpin is as good as poetry
[45:42] now， of course that's。 That's A caveat， which means you
[45:47] know， Maybe quantity is A pleasure in the long Run are not
[45:49] going to be equal Maybe。 Pushpin will get boring if you
[45:53] Keep playing IT every Friday night in the pub and eventually
[45:56] you want something more varied， you know？
[45:59] And poetry may bring you some greater pleasures so， but
[46:04] bentham's view would be， IT is whatever gives you greater
[46:07] pleasure。 So Bentham， I think is A true
[46:09] hedanist mill。 I think says that he's A
[46:13] hedonist， but。 Actually doesn't stick to IT
[46:15] when IT comes to the crunch。 Very few time。
[46:17] I first hurt of meal being A too conservative because most。
[46:22] Town people will praise him as A radical。
[46:24] They had to change the convention。
[46:26] Well in some respective course。 That's true and his great work
[46:29] on the subjection of women was A very radical and progressive
[46:32] work for the time。 But I think he really， you know，
[46:37] well， I can tell you IT。 Wasn't quite the right term， but
[46:40] conform wanting to conform to the intellectual Melia of his
[46:45] day。 I agree with saying。
[46:47] Visionary enough， is IT the right time？
[46:49] Not。 Revisionary enough， yes， that's
[46:51] right， yeah。 I believe IT because as I， as
[46:53] far as I know， jsmal actually even at some point defend
[46:58] colonalism， right， so。 He worked for the India Office。
[47:02] He was actually， he felt most of his working life。
[47:04] When compare IT to A ban from， he's much more， I think。
[47:09] Benton was more more revisionary in your term。
[47:11] Yeah， more already so。 What about the question， do you
[47:14] the question？ Yes， do you think it's too
[47:16] narrow set off the question。 It's interesting。
[47:19] Value。 Yeah， this objections succeed。
[47:21] Or how can utilitarian accommodate such objections
[47:25] like。 Well， the utilitarian。
[47:27] Will disagree with what the hedonistic utilitarian at least
[47:30] we'll disagree with what you said about these other things
[47:34] being intrinsically good， you know， utilitarians will
[47:37] generally say yes， you。 Know truth is good。
[47:40] What were your other examples？ Friendship， friendship is good
[47:43] beauty。 But。
[47:45] They will say。 They good because they
[47:49] contribute to happiness and I would say， you know， happiness
[47:53] in the broadest sense。 And that's the problem with the
[47:56] philosophy of pigs objection， right？
[48:00] For humans anyway， there are more ways to get pleasure than
[48:03] wallowing in the mud。 And I suppose more ways to get
[48:07] pleasure than having sex， which is another pleasure that
[48:09] presumably pigs have as well， but we also get pleasure for
[48:14] intellectual pursuits from。 I would think A poet would
[48:19] normally get pleasure from creating A poem that really
[48:22] works， that is A poem of high quality。
[48:26] Friendship is， I think， essential to A happy human life。
[48:31] You。 Know we we are social mammals。
[48:33] I think there's very few humans who couldn't really live and be
[48:36] happy with that loving and caring relationships with other
[48:40] humans。 So I think friendship has great
[48:44] value， but again I think it's Instrumental value。
[48:48] Beauty is an interesting Example because GE more at one stage
[48:54] made the objection to hedonism that he asked the reader to
[48:58] imagine two possible worlds， one of them the most beautiful world
[49:02] you can imagine。 You know， I guess you can think
[49:04] of。 Gorgeous mountains and lakes and
[49:07] spectacular views and the other， he says， I think just one heap
[49:11] of filth。 I don't quite know what he was
[49:12] imagining is filth， but anyway， you know very。
[49:16] Yeah， I guess you could think of IT as A Run Down building site
[49:19] or something like that。 I don't know， and Mills and
[49:21] sorry more said， even if there was nobody to appreciate the
[49:26] beauty of one or to be dismayed by the ugliness of the other，
[49:29] it's still Better that the beautiful world should exist
[49:33] than that the ugly world should exist， and that just doesn't
[49:37] strike me as true at all， right？ I think beauty is only A value
[49:41] if there are beings who can appreciate the beauty。
[49:44] And ugliness only matters if they're being so you can
[49:47] appreciate。 Or not appreciate that's the
[49:50] wrong word who are repelled by the uglyness。
[49:55] It's just have A follow up question， does IT mean like， if
[49:57] let's say II would be poet and considering rather write A poem，
[50:03] although？ 嗯， I would say just job your
[50:07] career。 OK， yes， that's the question I
[50:09] want to ask you because we。 There， you've got the iPad
[50:12] there， start scribbling some poetry。
[50:15] IT feels like when I considering where to write A poem or whether
[50:20] I become A poet， like I have to calculate the expected values of
[50:25] like the happiness I can bring US about of being A poet， and if
[50:29] I don't find IT worthy like expected value is much lower
[50:33] than I do something else。 It's sort of like kind of
[50:36] connected to the Linda Example we've talked about last session，
[50:40] but it's more about personal choice now。
[50:42] We are not like trying to do good to others。
[50:45] But it's trying to be A utilitarian。
[50:47] IT doesn't mean that we like just as the Linda case we need
[50:51] to like。 Just drop poetry and do
[50:54] something else， perhaps be A banker ETC。
[50:58] I think IT。 Would dependent how strong your
[51:03] desire to do poetry is， you know， if if you have this
[51:07] creative urge and you think I could be A poet and right
[51:12] worthwhile poems。 Maybe it's worth giving IT A
[51:17] try， right？ I don't know that I would
[51:19] abandon your lucrative career as A banker and that might be A bit
[51:23] risky， but you could try writing poems over the weekend or
[51:26] something and see whether you have some talent for writing
[51:28] poetry。 And if you did， Maybe you would
[51:32] eventually hope to move in in that direction。
[51:36] So it's， and I don't think it's A matter of trying to calculate。
[51:39] It's too hard， you know？ If you've never really written
[51:41] poetry， but you have the thought that you could， IT would be too
[51:43] hard to calculate whether you could be。
[51:48] A great poet who would write wonderful poems， so I think
[51:53] probably。 To some extent， we would say if
[51:57] it's really making you unhappy that you're not getting time to
[52:00] write poems and you want to write poems， then sure， you
[52:04] know， take A vacation from your job。
[52:06] Try writing some poems， see how IT works at and when you know
[52:10] how good you are。 As A poet， you'll be in A Better
[52:12] position to estimate whether perhaps you can contribute more
[52:16] to human well being by writing poems that you can as A banker，
[52:20] it's possible。 But， but you won't know Until
[52:23] You know how good you are。 So so can I can I further ask，
[52:28] so do you think it's really the case that Everything will be
[52:32] Instrumental value？ In order to get happiness so you
[52:37] can really disrect the intrinsic value of the value we normally
[52:42] think they are intenseically valuable like the presumpture，
[52:44] for Example。 So puts up truth like the
[52:49] mathematician in living in the alphary tower remote from the
[52:53] world。 Just want to provide some proof
[52:55] for some formula。 At the end of the day， they
[52:59] pursuit of mathematical truth will not make any difference in
[53:03] the Real World。 So we will just say that so they
[53:07] are doing something meaningless。 You say？
[53:11] That someone would feel offend that by comment， but。
[53:15] Maybe， but the question？ Comments are right， okay？
[53:21] And so， I mean， I think there were some there have。
[53:24] Been some mathematical truths that at the time they were
[53:27] discovered and people pursued them。
[53:30] One might have said that's completely pointless， you know？
[53:33] Yes， you've proved something， but it's irrelevant won't make
[53:35] any difference to anyone's life。 And then later on， somebody has
[53:38] come along with some applied problem and actually that
[53:42] mathematical truth proved to be essential for for an application
[53:48] which was greatly beneficial。 I can't think of examples at the
[53:53] moment， but I believe there are some such examples， so IT may be
[53:56] that it's worthwhile having people with great mathematical
[54:00] minds prove some things because some somewhere Down the line IT
[54:05] IT may become valuable and important。
[54:09] But if not。 Then yeah， I'm going to say，
[54:12] look。 We have this sense of things
[54:16] having intrinsic value， and Sometimes Maybe。
[54:20] It's A good。 Thing， Maybe， you know， go back
[54:22] to the Sheriff case。 Maybe it's A good thing that we
[54:24] have this Intuition。 That it's wrong for an officer
[54:27] of the law to fake evidence。 And it's good that we have that
[54:32] Intuition because otherwise too many law officers will be faking
[54:37] things just because you know， they think， oh， I know this
[54:40] guy's A bad person， but I can't really PIN the crime on him， but
[54:44] I'll fake something up and then we can lock him away for A few
[54:47] years and we don't want。 Police or prosecutors to be
[54:52] doing that so some。 It's it's A good。
[54:54] Thing that we may believe that these things are intrinsic
[54:57] value， but Maybe they're not。 And this of course， does pose an
[55:02] interesting issue for utilitarians， because if IT is
[55:06] good that we believe some things are intrinsic value like justice
[55:09] or truth or whatever。 And here I am on this podcast
[55:12] now telling your viewers that it's not， Maybe I shouldn't be
[55:15] doing this right？ Maybe。
[55:16] I government houses comes again。 That's right。
[55:20] That's what Bernard Williams called。
[55:23] He he objected to sidgwick， who I think is actually the greatest
[55:26] of the utilitarian philosophers we've talked about Bentham， and
[55:29] we've talked about mill。 I think Henry sedwick is A much
[55:32] Better philosopher than either bent them or meal， not perhaps
[55:35] as creative and you know， wide wide interest has Bentham and
[55:40] didn't write A great essay on Liberty like mildid。
[55:44] Or on the position of women， but you know A very careful，
[55:49] accurate velocity， systematic philosopher。
[55:53] That's right， and he did talk explicitly about this idea of
[55:57] esoteric morality。 That is the idea that Sometimes
[56:01] IT might be right on utilitarian grounds。
[56:05] Not to say publicly what we know is the right thing to do， and
[56:09] Bernard Williams calling this famous phrase government has
[56:12] morality thinking of the Europeans in their white painted
[56:18] government has building somewhere in the colonies
[56:20] telling， saying， well really？ We ought to do this because
[56:24] it'll be for the benefit of US and the British Empire， but we
[56:28] won't tell the natives what we're doing。
[56:31] And even if they're really objectively thinking it's the
[56:33] best for Everybody， including for the local people， we don't
[56:38] want to really tell them because they won't be。
[56:40] Able to understand IT， you know they're not as sophisticated in
[56:43] intellectuals like we are， and they won't be able to understand
[56:46] IT。 So yes， I mean， there can be an
[56:48] abusive as esetary morality， but。
[56:52] I have defended Cedric on this in the book the point of view of
[56:56] the universe， which I coauthored with catagina de lazarik， A
[57:00] Polish philosopher。 and I think I think you， it's
[57:05] actually hard to deny that Sometimes that is the right
[57:08] position to to do well。 One thing that's different，
[57:11] though， is that sidwick made this statement in A five hundred
[57:14] page work of philosophy， which very few。
[57:18] People were going to read or the people who were going to read，
[57:20] we're going to be people who would appreciate the point， you
[57:23] know？ Now we talk about in the podcast
[57:25] and I'm sure your audience is also very sophisticated， but you
[57:29] know， we we do have wider audiences than Cedric ever did，
[57:33] and so that there's A bit more of A paradox in talking about
[57:36] these things。 Put IT in this way， so Why we
[57:39] believe that pursuit of truth perceability is intensically
[57:43] valuable because at the end is consequently beneficial？
[57:47] Better that we should believe。 That we have to make them to
[57:50] believe that they are intrinsically valuable， but
[57:53] actually they are not。 Is IT okay？
[57:57] Okay。 So should I continue on another
[57:59] projection on the hidden system？ Like， which is the very well
[58:03] known experienced machine objection that's just like， use
[58:07] A couple of minutes。 No one minute to explain to the
[58:10] I will do that。 So like suppose there is an
[58:13] experience simulating machine which can simulate any
[58:18] experience you would like to have so you can simulate like
[58:22] whatever you find pleasant。 Okay， whatever you make you
[58:25] happy and it's interesting that this machine has A special
[58:31] feature which is。 When people get into the
[58:34] machine， they forget that they are in the machine， that what
[58:37] they are experiencing is not real。
[58:40] So we chainnam and like standing in front of the machine，
[58:44] confronting A choice now whether to get into the machine for the
[58:48] rest of my life， like if I get into the machine or of all
[58:54] Everything I want to have。 Will， I can experience IT like
[58:59] Maybe I want to be A well known philosophers。
[59:01] I make contributions like to philosophy， Maybe just as like
[59:06] Peter， yeah， and definitely in the Real World， let's assume I
[59:13] hope it's not the case that I won't be able to do that and I
[59:17] won't like the utility or the happiness that I can bring
[59:21] about。 By staying in the Real World is
[59:24] not as high as the utility I can bring about when I decide to go
[59:29] into the machine。 So in this case， utilitarianism
[59:33] seems will say that yes， like chingdam used to go into the
[59:37] machine because it's the best outcome we can have for the
[59:42] well， okay and but it's A bit。 Surprising because we normally
[59:49] will think like， oh， that's not real， you're just having
[59:52] experience without really having those achievements like you。
[59:56] You are in the machine。 You have your experience like to
[59:59] become A very famous philosopher， but you're not
[1:00:02] really A very famous philosopher like。
[1:00:04] IT seems like this suggestion suggests what is really
[1:00:08] important。 What is really valuable is not
[1:00:10] the pleasure， not the experience， but the achievement
[1:00:13] itself。 So that constitute an objection
[1:00:15] to utilitarianism。 Yes， IT does。
[1:00:20] IT is an objection specifically to hedonistic utilitarianism。
[1:00:24] I think because with preference utilitarianism， you can say，
[1:00:27] well， it's my preference is to be living in the Real World and
[1:00:31] to know that I'm living in the Real World。
[1:00:34] I don't think I also don't think it's A knockdown。
[1:00:36] Objection to hedanism。 There's A number of reasons why
[1:00:42] I say that， but let me just take up one thing in in your Example，
[1:00:46] you were suggesting that the pleasure that you would get by
[1:00:50] going into the machine would be greater than the pleasure or the
[1:00:55] suffering you can relieve， not only for you， but for Everybody
[1:01:00] in the Real World， right？ Because if not， then A
[1:01:02] utilitarian will say， well， it's wrong to get in the machine
[1:01:05] because you're just an egoistic hedonist。
[1:01:07] You're just thinking of yourself， if you get in the
[1:01:09] machine， whereas if you don't。 The machine， you're A universal
[1:01:13] hedonist， which is what utilitarians are， that is you
[1:01:15] want to maximize pleasure and minimize pain for everyone。
[1:01:20] Yeah， yeah， yeah， I think actually we can try sort of
[1:01:23] universalizing the Example like this time， the choice is not
[1:01:27] just I whether I myself go into the machine， but whether we
[1:01:30] should build the machine， assume that's affordable， right in
[1:01:34] affordable course so that everyone can enter into the
[1:01:36] machine just like matrix movies like everyone in the machine
[1:01:40] like so that like。 Everyone can experience like the
[1:01:44] happy experience that there is no suffering anymore in the in
[1:01:46] the world。 How about？
[1:01:48] Animal suffering so all the animals go into the machine as
[1:01:51] well and really just just， you know， imagine that they're
[1:01:54] eating the wonderful food or something， or。
[1:01:57] Yeah， we can， or if not at least， like if all people get
[1:02:02] into those machines like we can relieve A lot of animal
[1:02:05] suffering right now。 Well， I guess， at least at least
[1:02:08] the humans will stop inflicting the immense amount of suffering
[1:02:11] that they're now inflicting animals， yes， but of course
[1:02:13] there is also animal suffering in nature， which we're not
[1:02:16] relieving， but then we're not relieving IT at the moment
[1:02:19] anyway。 Maybe One Day we could。
[1:02:21] Yeah， so。 I think I'm still going to bite
[1:02:25] the bullet and say if in fact， the machine is like this and if
[1:02:28] IT can produce more pleasure for Everybody and less pain and
[1:02:34] suffering for Everybody。 That would be A good thing to do
[1:02:38] to go into the machine， and this is also something that lazar
[1:02:43] erratic and I discuss in the point of view of the universe，
[1:02:46] and we cite there the suggestion that IT may be that the reason
[1:02:52] that we're reluctant to go in the machine is status quo bias。
[1:02:57] So psychologists have demonstrated that we are biased
[1:03:01] towards maintaining the situation we're in now， unless
[1:03:04] of course it's really intolerable， but in general
[1:03:06] we're biased。 Maintaining the situation now
[1:03:09] rather than moving to A different situation， which we're
[1:03:14] not familiar with， even if sort of the prospects of that
[1:03:17] situation are moving the changes positive and there's somebody
[1:03:23] called Felix de brigad who did A study to try and test that， and
[1:03:29] he asked two different questions， one is， you know， you
[1:03:31] describe the experience machine as you just described IT， and
[1:03:34] you ask people， would you go into the experience machine or
[1:03:37] not？ And。
[1:03:40] Most of them say no and then you ask them A different question，
[1:03:44] you say， as IT happens， you are now in the experience machine，
[1:03:48] and you know， like in the matrix you have this， you can wake up
[1:03:51] and you have this moment。 You can take the red or the Blue
[1:03:54] pill， and if you take one of those pills， you'll go back into
[1:03:58] the experience machine。 And if you take the other pill，
[1:04:02] you'll wake up and you'll no longer be in the experience
[1:04:05] machine， right？ And so the life that you know
[1:04:08] that you thought was the Real World， but it's actually part of
[1:04:11] the experience machine， you know， the people that you love
[1:04:14] and care for。 The the job that you have all of
[1:04:18] those things where you live。 May completely change when you
[1:04:23] leave the experience machine， would you leave IT？
[1:04:26] And that does significantly affect the number of people who
[1:04:30] reject the experience machine。 Because now that you tell people
[1:04:33] that the life they're having is the experience machine， more of
[1:04:37] them are willing to Stay， you know， whether it's more more
[1:04:40] than half is another question of the study。
[1:04:42] Didn't have A really big sample， but I've asked that question A
[1:04:46] couple of times。 I asked IT in in Beijing，
[1:04:49] actually， in one of the talks that I gave， and there was
[1:04:51] definitely A significant increase in The Show of hands
[1:04:54] when when you asked the question the second time。
[1:04:58] So， so I think the response is like， Why people refuse
[1:05:01] intuitive to go into the machine？
[1:05:04] Not because you know， this Hinduism is wrong just because
[1:05:08] they have the tendency or bias toward settical codes。
[1:05:12] So I think this is one of the response to the experiment
[1:05:15] machine from the point of view of A hinder。
[1:05:18] Yes， so I think this segment come to the end， so we have
[1:05:23] discussed。 The objection and respond about
[1:05:25] hindulistic utility。 So in the Lex segment， we will
[1:05:29] continue our philosophical discussion。
[1:05:39] Kelvin pouna 喂， 你 們 這 一 段 廣 告， 好 煩 喔。
[1:05:43] Calvin 明 白 的 不 中 意。 囉。
[1:05:50] Time 去 囉， 你 會 不 斷 地 見 到 我 的 by the way， 因 為 我 們 又 沒 有 budget， 又
[1:05:57] 沒 講 過 這 段 就 我 們 唯 一 的 廣 告 Kelvin， 我 們 一 個 的 建 議 給 你 不 中 意
[1:06:04] 的 買 了 我 們 這 段。 時 間 去。
[1:06:07] 得 不 得。 我 不 OK。
[1:06:21] Welcome back to our show。 So last section we discussed
[1:06:25] that the idea whether happiness or pressure is the only thing
[1:06:29] that intrinsically matter to US。 So in the lock segment we will
[1:06:33] move to another objection， another dimension or implication
[1:06:37] of deteritarian， which concern human rights and animal right
[1:06:41] so？ With manki introduce the
[1:06:43] objection to US all。 Right， let's start with human
[1:06:45] rights。 For Example， all right now。
[1:06:50] There are A lot of place in the world fighting walls， right？
[1:06:53] So， but let's say let's say we are writing A just war， all
[1:06:57] right？ Just， for Example， right？
[1:06:58] And we capture some factors from the other side， and normally we
[1:07:04] would say that they got their human rights as well， so that we
[1:07:08] should torture that we shouldn't torture the capture soldiers and
[1:07:14] but from。 An uitarian point of view，
[1:07:17] actually， there may be lots of reasons for doing that， because
[1:07:21] if you torture A soldier from the other side fighting and
[1:07:26] unjust war， then you could deter。
[1:07:31] Other soldiers from fighting the unjust war， and IT could
[1:07:35] actually。 IT may actually bring an end to
[1:07:38] the world， because when especially when they want our
[1:07:41] soldier but normally all right， normally we would say that in
[1:07:46] order to retain our humanity or in order to just avoid。
[1:07:51] Committing world crime we should respect their rights as well。
[1:07:55] We should not。 We should never torture。
[1:07:59] The soldier， even though they are actually fighting from the
[1:08:03] other side。 So I think the objection is like
[1:08:06] there are A lot of hypothetical or actual scenario in which you
[1:08:12] torture or violate the human rate， but by doing that you can
[1:08:16] maximize the happiness so you bring about the best consequence
[1:08:21] like the Tory problems so you can push the fat man off the
[1:08:25] bridge and then。 Make IT as A roblog to save the
[1:08:29] five people， all those cases pointing to the same innovation，
[1:08:34] which is human being。 We got more right and morat
[1:08:37] tissue respect our Mor right and we shouldn't be treated as A
[1:08:41] means。 We are A being with dignity。
[1:08:44] So what do you think about this？ Well， I think it's very good
[1:08:48] that we have conventions about protecting rights and preventing
[1:08:53] war crimes， I think。 It's been hard work to try to
[1:08:56] get conventions between nations which establish some rules of
[1:09:01] war and rule out certain things as crimes。
[1:09:03] and I think that is probably saved an immense amount of
[1:09:06] suffering。 So I would not likely discard
[1:09:12] those， but I。 Can。
[1:09:15] Certainly again， imagine at least hypothetical circumstances
[1:09:18] in which you would do more good。 The problem is though，
[1:09:24] especially in A war situation， you've always got to think if if
[1:09:27] you start torturing your captive， you know prisoners of
[1:09:31] war， then the other side is going to do that to to your
[1:09:34] soldiers as well。 So I think you don't want to do
[1:09:37] something that will create A breakdown in those
[1:09:39] circumstances。 For me， the more plausible
[1:09:43] hypothetical about torture is the the terrorist who has
[1:09:46] planted the nuclear bomb in A big city。
[1:09:48] And the only way you can get him to tell you where the bomb is is
[1:09:52] by torturing him， and if you don't torture him， then the bomb
[1:09:56] will go off in A few hours and you can't evacuate the city such
[1:09:59] A big city in that time。 So perhaps millions of people
[1:10:03] will die， so I don't think these human rights are absolute and in
[1:10:08] those imaginary circumstances anyway。
[1:10:13] I would say we justified in violating them， but I would not
[1:10:16] really want to just regard the conventions of human rights as
[1:10:22] as something that's meaningless or that we can lightly push
[1:10:26] aside。 Again， it's like the government
[1:10:29] of utilitarian， so we have to tell the people we have to
[1:10:32] respect the right。 Yes， we should certainly tell
[1:10:34] the officers。 I mean， look， we saw we saw this
[1:10:37] very plainly in Iraq， right when the US was revealed that the US
[1:10:42] were torturing prisoners in Abu grave， the the prison that they
[1:10:46] set up。 And and you know， there was no
[1:10:50] real evidence that incredibly valuable information was coming
[1:10:53] out。 I think when you get prisoners
[1:10:56] and you get prison guards who are in power over them，
[1:10:59] Sometimes those prison guards have A sadistic streak， or they
[1:11:02] like to just， you know， harm these people， they start to see
[1:11:07] them as subhuman， and I think that's， that's A terrible thing
[1:11:11] and IT will happen。 IT definitely will happen if we
[1:11:13] don't have。 Strict rules against torture，
[1:11:17] which？ You。
[1:11:18] Would only want to violate if you were absolutely sure that
[1:11:23] this was the only way to prevent some real disaster。
[1:11:26] So what about the fat man version of the Tory problem？
[1:11:29] Because the fat man will be A Better candidate because he's
[1:11:32] innocent compared with the terrorist or the soldier might
[1:11:36] be being Murphy。 So will you also say that okay，
[1:11:40] we can。 We should push him off the
[1:11:42] bridge to save the five people。 This case I would， and it's
[1:11:48] interesting， I think that， you know， there's two versions of
[1:11:51] the trolley problem。 There's the version where you're
[1:11:52] standing by A switch and the only way to save the five is to
[1:11:56] throw the switch and the trolley will Run Down the side branch
[1:11:59] line and kill one。 And most people think that's。
[1:12:02] Okay， you should throw the Switcher， at least it's
[1:12:04] permissible to throw the switch。 And yet the the fat man case is
[1:12:08] just the same， except that instead of throwing A switch，
[1:12:12] you have to actually push him off this bridge and。
[1:12:15] And Josh green， who started our his career in philosophy but
[1:12:19] then became A。 Professor of psychology。
[1:12:22] Has done research that suggests that we have this intuitive
[1:12:26] response to hands on violence and that's an evolved response
[1:12:30] because for， you know， hundreds of thousands of years we could
[1:12:34] harm other people by this hands on violence。
[1:12:37] And so we evolved this response to say no， that's bad， whereas
[1:12:42] we didn't have the possibility of killing people by throwing A
[1:12:46] switch that's very recent， and so that isn't an involved
[1:12:50] response。 And I think that's A plausible
[1:12:52] explanation for。 What's otherwise rather puzzling
[1:12:55] Why people are prepared to say yes， it's permissible to throw
[1:12:58] the switch， but no， it's not permissible to push the the
[1:13:02] heavy person off the bridge。 You try to explain your way？
[1:13:06] The I explained， yeah， because I'm not。
[1:13:10] I'm not really moved by these intuitions。
[1:13:11] I think there are many people are too prone to accept the
[1:13:16] instinctive reactions and those instinctive reactions Maybe
[1:13:20] evolved responses like this one that are no longer。
[1:13:22] Really applicable to the present world， or they may be result of
[1:13:27] culture or religion or early education。
[1:13:30] I don't think they're very reliable guide to what we really
[1:13:34] ought to do。 So if we。
[1:13:35] To the issue of animal effects。 Do you think human being in
[1:13:39] general should be given any special more status or more
[1:13:43] right compared with the animal because they're just sent him
[1:13:47] being like US？ Well， let me put IT this way。
[1:13:51] If you think that all human beings irrespective of their
[1:13:56] capacities， have rights。 That no non animals have。
[1:14:01] I think it's very difficult to justify that because after all，
[1:14:06] there are some non human animals whose capacities to talk or to
[1:14:10] reason。 To be self aware to be A moral
[1:14:14] agent。 Superior of those of some human
[1:14:18] beings who infants， for Example， none of US had those capacities
[1:14:21] when we were infants， Maybe people with profound
[1:14:23] intellectual disabilities， but the idea that all of these
[1:14:27] humans are somehow morally superior in status。
[1:14:31] To any non animal， whether it's A chimpanzee or an elephant or A
[1:14:35] dog or A pig， or A chicken or A fish。
[1:14:39] I don't see， you know， that just seems to me speciesism。
[1:14:42] IT just seems to be doing the same as what racious do when
[1:14:45] they say yes， all white people have A status that is superior
[1:14:49] to that of all black people。 And， you know， people actually
[1:14:53] did think that in when， during the time of the slavery， they
[1:14:58] seem to think that so I think we're doing something similar
[1:15:01] between species。 I want to follow up A question
[1:15:05] regarding like human rights and animal rights， because。
[1:15:10] Like I'm not sure is your point of view is seems like we can
[1:15:16] have human rights as fiction， A useful fiction， A uitarian rice
[1:15:21] for Ordinary People。 But what about animal rights？
[1:15:26] Because I think， like more theoretically sensitive people
[1:15:31] may sense A difference between advocating annual rights and
[1:15:35] just advocating animal welfare。 So some people may say， like
[1:15:39] animals don't。 I'm not sure what they will say
[1:15:42] about A human case。 Maybe human rights is like， it's
[1:15:45] not really there too， but there is no animal rice。
[1:15:48] What we care about is actually annual welfare so that when we
[1:15:53] can be sure that healing this chicken and eat IT will not
[1:15:58] cause like immense suffering or to the extent that we like the
[1:16:03] pleasure we have by eating them， being outweighed by the
[1:16:07] suffering inflicted in that case， no right for the chicken，
[1:16:11] so we。 Just cue IT in eighty eight just
[1:16:15] like that。 So if your response to human
[1:16:17] rights as A fiction is A good one， so isn't IT like we can say
[1:16:22] the same thing about animal rice？
[1:16:24] We actually A utilitarian should advocate annual rise and not
[1:16:28] just animal welfare。 So， I mean， I don't， as we've
[1:16:36] been saying， I think that rights are A useful convention
[1:16:38] Sometimes， but I don't ground my ethics on the idea of rights
[1:16:43] and。 And when IT comes to animals
[1:16:46] again， I don't grant my view about the moral status of
[1:16:49] animals on this notion of rights I granted on the principle of
[1:16:53] equal consideration of similar interests， which I think is。
[1:16:57] A utilitarian principle， you give the same way to pain to as
[1:17:02] in one person as you give to pain in another person and you
[1:17:06] give the same way to pain in A non human animal as you give to
[1:17:10] A similar kind of pain in A in A human being。
[1:17:14] Should we have A sort of fiction of animal rights？
[1:17:18] I don't know。 I mean， I think it's。
[1:17:20] It's probably less useful because it's just because it's
[1:17:23] it's harder to convince people， at least at this stage that
[1:17:25] there are rights。 Maybe at some point society will
[1:17:30] change and we will want to talk about rights。
[1:17:33] I did join something called the great A project which suggested
[1:17:37] that we should attribute rights to life， Liberty and protection
[1:17:41] from torture to great apes。 That was an attempt to sort of
[1:17:45] make the argument again。 Why should all humans have these
[1:17:49] rights？ But even our closest relatives，
[1:17:52] the chimpanzees and gorillas and orangutangs， should not have
[1:17:55] these rights very basic rights。 So I'm not in principal opposed
[1:18:01] to the idea of declarations of rights for animals， but I Do
[1:18:05] think there's this sort of simpler principle that people
[1:18:08] can more easily understand。 And incidentally， in the case
[1:18:12] you mentioned of the chicken。 Talking about equal
[1:18:16] consideration of interest， I think it's easier to see。
[1:18:19] That if you consider the interests of A chicken at all，
[1:18:22] then particularly A factory farm chicken who's lived its entire
[1:18:26] life in miserable， crowded conditions。
[1:18:30] Has A much greater interest in not living that life at all。
[1:18:33] Then you have in in the meal that you might get out of the
[1:18:36] chicken。 But I want to make A follow up
[1:18:41] question because I think at some point an animal rights。
[1:18:46] Are forced to compare human rights to animal rights， for
[1:18:52] Example， in some medical research we actually queue some
[1:18:56] Maybe trampancy or Maybe some grid。
[1:18:59] Probably not chimpanzees anymore， generally not used
[1:19:01] other。 Kinds of memos。
[1:19:04] Certainly other memos。 Yes， in order to well， do the
[1:19:09] mechanical research in order to save more human lives。
[1:19:13] And I have heard that you think at some point is acceptable， but
[1:19:19] but that。 'S really offense animal rights
[1:19:23] advocates because for them。 Well， if you， if it's not okay，
[1:19:26] if it's not， if it's unacceptable for US to do this
[1:19:31] kind of research on human。 Children， Why we should， Why we
[1:19:37] could ever。 Do this thing to animals， do
[1:19:41] this thing to those mammals that IT seems like for for them， or
[1:19:46] Maybe simply another philosopher Tom Rick and， or especially as
[1:19:52] yeah。 Yes， yes so Tom Regan was A was
[1:19:55] A friend of mine， but we certainly differed on on this
[1:19:58] point。 I mean， we were agreed on the
[1:20:00] criticism of speciesism。 We agreed that the moral status
[1:20:03] of animals is。 Should be much higher。
[1:20:06] Than IT is in the world today。 But， but he was an absolute
[1:20:11] abolitionist about animal experiments。
[1:20:13] He thought animal experiments not justified， even if。
[1:20:19] They， you know well to save lives， A large number of lives，
[1:20:24] and it's just A small number of experiments。
[1:20:26] He thought IT was wrong as A utilitarian。
[1:20:28] I can't say that。 And I don't want to say that。
[1:20:32] I think you can justify some experiments。
[1:20:35] You try to minimize all the harm that you inflict on animals。
[1:20:39] You use the smallest number that you can to get valid scientific
[1:20:43] results。 You make their lives as
[1:20:45] comfortable as possible outside the actual experiment， but if。
[1:20:50] This experiment is going to save thousands or tens of thousands
[1:20:54] of lives on A small number of animals。
[1:20:58] Under those circumstances， I would have to say that that's。
[1:21:01] A justifiable thing to do？ But do you think in this
[1:21:05] circumstances IT really difficult to calculate the
[1:21:08] expected value because。 We just like the person of
[1:21:13] mathematical truth， they may be useful in the future， but the
[1:21:17] experiment on long human animal you can。
[1:21:20] It's really difficult to judge to calculate expected value。
[1:21:25] So how can we decide whether we should do those things on the
[1:21:28] red or other memos now？ I want to add like A concern
[1:21:32] because some people may think that like the progress of
[1:21:36] science like of research is proceeded just in this way
[1:21:41] because， like in A lot of cases， if we are considering like
[1:21:44] physics that we invest A lot of resources， money to do A lot of
[1:21:49] experiments， I Maybe most of them are useless at the end。
[1:21:53] But。 Just like our papers， and。
[1:21:56] Of your article， but my be is very small portion of them。
[1:21:59] But we just。 We only waste our time and the
[1:22:02] effort of getting them published， but we don't inflict
[1:22:06] suffering on。 Just on ourselves。
[1:22:10] But yeah， but if， like physics is proceeded in this way and
[1:22:15] that's the only path to A real breakthrough， so Why not like A
[1:22:20] research on like medical experiment like like new
[1:22:24] medicines？ For some， like previously
[1:22:27] uncurable diseases can be proceeded in this way， so some
[1:22:31] people may argue in this case。 It's the kind of like
[1:22:36] calculating and the expect value， but at least IT justifies
[1:22:40] some of our experiments， no matter how。
[1:22:44] Inhumant IT is， IT seems to animals。
[1:22:48] IT doesn't justify them， no matter how inhumane they seem，
[1:22:52] unless somehow you just cannot do this work and make IT more
[1:22:57] Humane， right？ Because always the question is。
[1:23:02] Are you minimizing the suffering of the animal as far as
[1:23:04] possible， compatible with getting useful results？
[1:23:08] And generally speaking， I think that you know we don't make
[1:23:13] serious efforts to minimize research。
[1:23:17] In fact， you know， one of the papers that I gave one of the
[1:23:20] talks I gave in the two of of China。
[1:23:23] I talked about the fact that in China to obtain blood for
[1:23:27] medical research。 There's A horrible procedure
[1:23:30] called eye in nucleation， which is done on mice， and basically
[1:23:34] you squeeze the eyeball out of The Mass that fully conscious
[1:23:38] mass and take blood from behind IT and you more or less drain
[1:23:43] The Mass of blood with The Mass then dies。
[1:23:44] But it's not an Easter ties to do this and this is not done
[1:23:49] elsewhere。 I presume it's not done in Hong
[1:23:51] Kong， you know it's it's it's done in mainland China， as far
[1:23:55] as I know， only there。 And there's just no effort，
[1:23:59] really， to minimize the suffering of the animal that
[1:24:02] goes on there。 So so this is the real problem
[1:24:05] that that there isn't enough effort made to reduce the pain
[1:24:09] and suffering of animals because they're just not candid
[1:24:12] sufficiently in terms of their status。
[1:24:15] So in， Speaking of reducing the suffering of the long human
[1:24:19] animals， I have one last question， I'm curious about your
[1:24:23] view about suffering in the natural world？
[1:24:25] So you mentioned in our show and also Yesterday talk the
[1:24:30] suffering of the wildlife in the lecture world。
[1:24:33] So I read the paper from job laman in New York times。
[1:24:37] He said that he as A utilitarian support the idea that we should
[1:24:41] genetically。 Modify the wildlife into
[1:24:46] something else which do not admit， so they turn the carnival
[1:24:52] to the herbapho。 So what actually I make A video
[1:24:57] in this on this YouTube channel years before to introduce the
[1:25:01] article and all the comment on the video。
[1:25:04] Fake Oh no talent are all crazy people。
[1:25:08] So what do you think？ Should we also be deals？
[1:25:10] The lecture suffering of the wild life？
[1:25:13] Well， I mean， there's some natural suffering of wildlife
[1:25:15] that we can reduce。 For Example， we can have bird
[1:25:18] friendly glass so that birds don't crash into the Windows of
[1:25:21] our buildings and kill themselves。
[1:25:23] That's reducing wildlife suffering。
[1:25:25] But I don't think that we can at present transform predators into
[1:25:30] herbivores and and obviously the many people who value
[1:25:34] biodiversity in the preservation of A natural ecology， and I
[1:25:38] don't think the animal movement should get into A headlong
[1:25:41] conflict with them when there's so much human inflicted in
[1:25:44] suffering on animals， particularly in factory farming
[1:25:47] that really we should deal with first。
[1:25:51] The other point is that it's not only predators and carnivores
[1:25:55] that cause suffering in nature， it's also the method of
[1:25:59] reproduction that has evolved in many species of producing
[1:26:02] hundreds or even thousands of offspring each year， of which on
[1:26:07] average only two are going to survive to maturity because
[1:26:10] otherwise the species would be multiplying hugely and the
[1:26:14] others die， and many of them Maybe die from starvation or。
[1:26:19] You know， they're tadpoles living in A pond that dries up
[1:26:22] in the summer when there's no rain and they just die， so
[1:26:25] nature is pretty cruel。 And。
[1:26:30] Perhaps at some stage in the distant future， we'll find ways
[1:26:32] of making IT less painful for animals， but as you say， that's
[1:26:37] not A priority for me at present。
[1:26:39] But you theoretical believe that the LTRO software is just
[1:26:42] carrying the same more weight with the artificial suffering of
[1:26:47] the long human。 Annual？
[1:26:48] It's yes， it's。 Suffering， I mean， again，
[1:26:50] there's no agent to blame for the suffering of nature。
[1:26:53] Evolution is not an agent and we were not created by A divine
[1:26:56] creator who said all this suffering in motion， whereas
[1:27:00] there are agents to blame for the suffering of animals in
[1:27:03] factory farms。 But the suffering itself is just
[1:27:07] as bad， whether it's caused by A human or whether it's caused by
[1:27:10] nature。 It's the degree of suffering
[1:27:12] that matters， not because or how IT was caused。
[1:27:15] Thank you。 So I think we come into the end
[1:27:18] of today， so Thank you so much for sharing your view on
[1:27:22] different kind of issue。 Like animal， we learn A lot and
[1:27:27] I think on those if you Maybe we may agree or disagree， but I
[1:27:31] think your work we might。 As one important thing is that
[1:27:34] philosophy。 Abstract ideas， IT is really
[1:27:38] relevant to our world。 To our live。
[1:27:41] We can gain from your insight to rethink our more responsibility。
[1:27:45] And how can we make the world A Better place to live？
[1:27:48] So at the end， I know that Peter singer has also got A broadcast
[1:27:53] right。 So would you mind to introduce
[1:27:55] to our audience peter's broadcast？
[1:27:58] Thank you very much。 Yes， I Do A podcast called lives
[1:28:02] well lived。 I do it together with the。
[1:28:05] Woman， I mentioned who's been Co。
[1:28:06] A couple of my books kasha de lazari and you can find lives
[1:28:11] well lived wherever you get your podcast， Spotify， Apple
[1:28:14] podcasts， just Google IT and you'll find IT。
[1:28:18] We've had A lot of really interesting guests that we've
[1:28:21] interviewed people like youval harari， Jane Goodall， Daniel
[1:28:26] carnaman。 Neil de grasse Tyson， if you're
[1:28:30] interested in the universe and what he has to say about ethics，
[1:28:33] we're talking about what IT is to live well and that's
[1:28:35] obviously relevant to the questions about hedonism that
[1:28:38] you've been asking me。 And also practical， I think so
[1:28:43] it's。 It's A combination of of
[1:28:45] philosophy， practical philosophy and different views from
[1:28:49] different people relevant to how we live well。
[1:28:52] Thank you so much， Peter， so it's A really honor today to
[1:28:58] explore your view on different issues， so I feel excellent
[1:29:02] today。 So I have done。
[1:29:04] We have done our jobs， so let's Keep your eye on our show。
[1:29:09] We will be continuing doing philosophy so see you next time。
[1:29:13] Thank you Peter。 Thanks very much。
[1:29:14] Thank you man frankong。 Thank you all。

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