# Ep. 209 | Isaac Lee | CH-53 Weapons and Tactics Instructor

An episode of [Former Action Guys Podcast](https://invisiblenetwork.ai/podcast/1475060182), 9 Apr 2024, 1 h 41 min.

Audio: https://dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/api.spreaker.com/download/episode/59368995/isaac_lee_ch_53_pilot.mp3

Isaac Lee is back for round two of our conversation. We talk about his 3 other deployments to Iraq, working with the special operations task force, and some leadership lessons learned along the way. Support the show https://patreon.com/formeractionguys https://jcramergrpahics.com https://ANGLICOshop.com Isaac's site https://www.isaacglee.com/ 00:00:00 Intro 00:05:32 Smuggled Booze Causes a Problem 00:17:49 Alcohol Related Incidents 00:22:23 Preparing to Go Back to Iraq 00:26:04 Dignified Transfer of Remains 00:29:29 Asshole Marine 00:35:53 No Dwell Time for the Weary 00:40:58 All Officer's Meeting | Is the CO too Risky? 00:46:11 Flying in a Sandstorm at Night | When Pilots Quit 00:56:12 Operation Rawah 01:00:28 3rd Deployment to Iraq 01:06:03 Attending the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course 01:13:11 4th Deployment | Working with Task Force Operators 01:32:59 Special Operations MH-53 PAVE LOW

## Transcript

[0:00] I think the last podcast we ended after your first deployment to Iraq, is
[0:05] that correct? That is absolutely correct, and which you said after the first
[0:09] one, and you said in that one that you basically that one mission was
[0:13] the only like oh man, like fly by the seat of the pants kind
[0:16] of hair raising mission sort of. Yeah. I mean we had that very
[0:20] first insert in Oom Kassar lost the engine had a hard landing. It was
[0:24] dicey, and that was literally my first combat flight. But then, you
[0:28] know, immediately went back to the ship and uh, you know, started
[0:32] thinking about it, and I didn't want to overthink it, so immediately was
[0:35] like hounding the opso like, hey, I need to get back on the
[0:38] schedule right away, and he's like you sure. I was like yeah.
[0:42] So literally they gave me one day after that one, and then the next
[0:46] day I got tapped. They just put me on as a copilot actually with
[0:50] one of my peers, and we got tapped to go pick some people up
[0:53] and kuwait and take them up into really the middle of nowhere interacts set up
[0:57] in EPW camp and in the course of doing that flight, somehow and could
[1:04] we didn't know exactly how when it first happened, but we were unable to
[1:07] transfer fuel from one of our ox tanks into our main tanks, and that
[1:11] just basically meant we had a fuel problem. We had forty five hundred pounds
[1:15] of fuel we couldn't use. So we're doing the math and it started looking
[1:19] like we were going to cut it really close on getting this insert done and
[1:22] get back down to Kuwait to where the FARP was where we could get gas.
[1:26] And the short version is we ended up cutting it really damn close because
[1:30] it took a long time to get those guys unloaded in the zone. And
[1:34] the reason it took a long time to get them unloaded in the zone is
[1:36] because it was a team of interpreters. They only had like one or two
[1:38] marines with them, and so they weren't accustomed to getting off an aircraft.
[1:42] They didn't know where they were supposed to go, they didn't know what they
[1:46] were supposed to do, and it took us about thirty minutes to sort that
[1:49] out on the ground. But that thirty minutes ended up being kind of critical
[1:53] to our fuel state. So we're heading back to Kuwait and it was pretty
[1:57] dicey and we literally barely made it back into the fuel pits in Kuwait,
[2:02] just in the nick of time to pull it off. But as we were
[2:07] landed, we had a Right after we landed, we had an engine flame
[2:09] out. So that's how that's how close we came. So those are my
[2:14] first two combat flights and then and then my next one. Uh like two
[2:20] days later, the Marine Corps decided to move forward into Jalaba, which was
[2:23] a little airstrip we'd seize, not too far north of the Iraqi border.
[2:28] And I was just doing you know, standard assault support request mission, moving
[2:32] some containers up there with supplies and gear. And as I was I was
[2:38] setting my load down up there at Jalalaba, we lost an engine. So
[2:42] now I'm at jalva Ba, I got to get back to the ship.
[2:44] I'm down an engine. Thankfully, they already had a coc set up at
[2:47] Jalaba, so we had some communication back with the ship. So get in
[2:52] touch with my CEO, my commanding officer, and I was like, hey,
[2:54] sir, like I can I can one shot this thing back to the
[2:58] boat on two motors. If that's what you want me to do, I'm
[3:00] good with it. And that's what he wanted me to do. But it
[3:05] was funny because as soon as I got done with that conversation, there was
[3:07] a senior officer hanging out in that COC that had overheard it, and he
[3:13] started giving me the business and he's like, hey, Captain, if you
[3:15] take off with two engines, you know that's an ATOPS violation and I'm going
[3:20] to track you down and you're going to be in trouble. And I was
[3:23] like, hey, sir, I don't know what to tell you. This
[3:24] is what my CEO asked me to do. I'm going to make it happen.
[3:29] And so there was thankfully another lieutenant colonel in that in that COOC that
[3:32] they kind of stepped in and took care of me, and I got out
[3:36] of there and fired up two engines and got out of dodge. But those
[3:39] were my first three flights in Iraq, and they were all eventful for different
[3:44] reasons. After that, it kind of settled down some and you know,
[3:46] the war went really quick. It seemed like a couple of weeks and for
[3:51] the most part, all the real action was over. But we had another
[3:53] couple of interesting flights there, but it was it was a good introduction into
[3:59] combat flying and it was interesting because when that deployment was wrapping up, you
[4:03] know, bush landed on the carrier. We won, all that was getting
[4:08] you know, broadcast everywhere. But I just had this feeling like I don't
[4:12] think so. I remember, you know, flying out of Iraq the last
[4:15] time. There was a checkpoint on the Iraqi Quaiti border called Budweiser, and
[4:18] I remember flying over Budweiser and thinking like, I have a feeling I'm going
[4:23] to be back here. And sure enough, you know, we made the
[4:27] whole transit home and everyone was all excited and you know, flag waving and
[4:31] we won, et cetera. But our squadron was tapped to deploy again pretty
[4:38] quickly, like just a few months later, and because the war was supposedly
[4:43] over in that moment, they started the unit deployment program for Okinawa backup,
[4:47] so we were supposed to go back to Okinawa. And I was actually part
[4:50] of the advanced party for that deployment. And what ended up happening was we
[4:57] got home from Iraq in July. I think it was October that I turned
[5:00] around and took off again to go onto my next deployment. So I was
[5:02] only home for like, you know, three or four months, get to
[5:06] Okinawa at the advanced Party, start turning over aircraft, and sure enough,
[5:11] our committee officer calls from back here in the States and was like, Hey,
[5:13] the rest of the squadron is going to join you in Okinawa and then
[5:15] we're going to break down those aircraft and go back to Iraq. Which I
[5:19] was probably the least surprised person of anybody when that happened. So that's how
[5:25] we go again. Like here we go around two. I wanna, I
[5:30] wanna between that first and second deployment. You wrote in the book that on
[5:34] your way home you got in trouble. I know, you're supposed to be
[5:39] going to WTI and stuff like that, and then you had an incident,
[5:42] which did you want to explain what happened? Yeah? Absolutely, Essentially what
[5:47] happened was the day that was declared that we won the war, the day
[5:51] the Bush landed on the carrier I was on. We were on the navy
[5:55] ship that had taken us to Iraq and back, and there's pretty strict rules
[5:59] on navy about that you're not allowed to drink alcohol. But on that day,
[6:03] because it was a huge celebration, we had what's called a bear Day.
[6:06] Which means everyone gets a couple of beers, and I would tell you
[6:10] that is loosely enforced as far as how those are counted. But there were
[6:15] also several people being included that had, you know, some kind of a
[6:19] secret stash somewhere, And as the afternoon progressed, those secret stashes started making
[6:25] an appearance, and yours, truly, by virtue of luck or or something,
[6:30] happened to be one of a few that were identified as breaking the rules.
[6:35] And you know, in the very beginning, I was like, Ah,
[6:38] this can't possibly be that big of a deal. I mean, everybody,
[6:41] you know, not everybody. A lot of people were partaking, I'll
[6:45] say, but it did end up being kind of a big deal, and
[6:47] I was sweating it out there for a couple of weeks. But in the
[6:50] end, my only real punishment was that I stood a bunch of duty on
[6:55] the way home and I ended up not going to WTI after that deplain,
[7:00] which at the time felt like that took that pretty hard, because being becoming
[7:04] a WTI had been a goal of mine since I started in the squadron.
[7:09] But ironically, like most things, all of that ended up working out probably
[7:14] better for me than anything else could have. You know, For one,
[7:16] it was a great lesson to learn it as a young officer, which was
[7:21] good. I ended up getting a good call sign out of it. My
[7:25] call sign was whiskey for that incident. That's better than a lot. That's
[7:29] better than a lot of call signs. Really, that's probably the best thing
[7:31] that came out of it. But ultimately what it did is it reset me
[7:36] timeline wise in the squadron. It gave me the ability to ultimately do what
[7:42] amounted to a fourth deployment later and I ended up getting to go to WTI,
[7:45] et cetera. So that all shook out. But that had to be
[7:48] crushing though. I mean, you know you were going to go to w
[7:51] WTI later at the time, so it's easy to look back on and be
[7:55] like it all worked out, but I'm bet at the time when you lost
[7:58] that spot, that was crushing. And for those ones, can you explain
[8:01] what WTI is for those? Yeah? Absolutely? So. The Marine Corps
[8:05] has a Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron one MOTS one we call it.
[8:09] It's a you Arizona. That is the schoolhouse for all upper level aviation tactics
[8:16] and one of the things that MOTTS one does is twice a year they have
[8:18] a big course called the Weapons and Tactics Instructor's Course, and to attend that
[8:24] course as a student, you have to have basically every qualification other than the
[8:28] actual WTI qualification be nominated by your squadron and you go out there for this
[8:33] course. At the time, it was a six week course that was three
[8:35] weeks of academics and four weeks of flying. But it's essentially the Marine Corps
[8:41] version of top Gun for lack of a better way to put it. So
[8:45] going to that course have been a goal of mine for a long time.
[8:48] So getting to go out there becoming a squadron Weapons and Tactics structor is a
[8:52] big deal. You know, every peer group of pilots that check into a
[8:56] squadron, there's usually about a dozen or so maybe want typically one maybe two
[9:01] will achieve that qualification. So it was a big deal to have been you
[9:07] know, selected to go and definitely crushing that when I was told I was
[9:11] no longer going that first time. Yeah, that's a fleeting window, you
[9:15] know, I may you only may have one opportunity or in your career to
[9:18] even try and you kind of have to be the squadron golden boy to get
[9:22] all the flight hours, like when someone's looked out, like, hey,
[9:26] you're a WTI candidate. For those that don't know, there's so many qualifications
[9:30] that you can attain and that you have to obtain, and they all require
[9:33] flight hours, and that means time in the in the cockpit, and that
[9:35] can take away from other people's time that may not be you know, shooting
[9:39] for those those certain qualifications. So it's like a it's a big deal,
[9:43] absolutely, And I'd done a lot of stuff. I volunteered to do a
[9:46] lot of things to put myself in that position. You know, when I
[9:50] was a little bit younger, when I came home for my first deployment in
[9:54] Okanawa, I volunteered for anything that got me flag time, you know.
[9:58] So there were a couple occasions where we to ferry in aircraft to or from
[10:01] the East coast because our deeper level maintenance used to be out there, and
[10:05] I jumped on all of those and you know, you know, it worked
[10:09] out well for me that my peers at the time, no one really wanted
[10:13] to do it other than me, just because we'd been gone so much.
[10:16] We're about to leave again, you know, So I guess you could.
[10:20] That's indicative of where my priorities were at the time. But every time something
[10:24] like that came up, I was like, I'll do it. So I
[10:28] was always you know, racking up hours and able to get rolling on my
[10:31] qualifications, which helped a lot. Now later on you were a squadron COEO,
[10:37] did that did that event as a junior officer getting in trouble but knowing
[10:41] that they could have taken it much far? That could have been a care
[10:43] BRender, right there, could have Did that change the way you thought about
[10:48] like non judicial punishments and stuff like that you were doling out as a commanding
[10:52] officer? Absolutely, I would tell you, not only as a CEO,
[10:56] but from that that day forward, like it was a great example to me
[11:01] of there's a way to hold people accountable without ending them per se, right,
[11:07] And I was always cognizant of that. And also I would tell you
[11:11] later in my career, my observation was often it was our best marines that
[11:18] tend to get themselves into those situations, which is a whole other conversation,
[11:22] but there was definitely a linkage there that I saw and the best way I
[11:30] can describe that is to say, and this is totally my personal opinion,
[11:33] but it's something It's a conclusion that I came to later in my career was
[11:39] that there was often a connection between marines getting in trouble for a whole menagerie
[11:43] of things in their downtime, but also really being great marines. And a
[11:50] lot of times it was some of our best marines that were getting themselves hemmed
[11:54] up by whatever knucklehead decision they made on a Friday or Saturday night. But
[12:00] the more I thought about it, the more it also became obvious to me,
[12:03] or I thought of it this way, like the marines you most need
[12:07] on the darkest night are the same guys that are a little more likely than
[12:11] the others maybe to say, get in a bar fight on Saturday night,
[12:13] right, Like, and that's not an accident, Like, that's it's kind
[12:18] of who they are and how they're wired, which in some ways is a
[12:22] superpower and in other ways those are strings that are a detriment that they have
[12:26] to try to constantly combat within themselves. And I would definitely classify myself as
[12:31] a marine that was squarely in that group. Yeah, from the time I
[12:35] was a young officer and I was aware of it. We have well,
[12:39] I remember when I was at tenth Marines I believe it was at tenth Marines.
[12:43] We had a guy who he got either Meritorious Corporal or Meritorious Sergeant.
[12:48] I can't remember which one. It was one month and then the next month
[12:52] he got a DUI and he requested a public MJP. So now they did
[12:58] this public MJP in front of the batal of this guy that the previous month
[13:01] had been getting meritoriously promoted. And he said he did it, you know,
[13:05] like, hey, I wanted people to see for my mistake and learn
[13:07] from it. And I was like, oh, you know, this was
[13:09] like I've never seen a public in JP before. I'd never even seen the
[13:11] GPS, I've never been in trouble, and I'm like, this is kind
[13:15] of crazy. And so it kind of takes to your you know what you're
[13:18] saying. They're your sentiment there that you know, the best guys are like
[13:22] they kind of live life on the edge, you know, and it's pretty
[13:26] easy to step over that line, it is, for sure. And you
[13:30] know, as as I would say, as my career progressed in the Marine
[13:33] Corps, the rules became a little more stringent to try to prevent those things.
[13:39] But certainly later in my career, especially as the CEO, you know,
[13:43] the Marines that ended up in my office because they had you know,
[13:46] misstepped more often than not. We're some of some of our better players,
[13:52] and I understood that and how they got themselves into that situation and why,
[13:56] and I always made an effort to try to help them understand that we would
[14:00] still hold them accountable. But I was definitely not somebody that was springloaded to
[14:05] throw the book at anybody, especially if it was a scenario like that,
[14:09] especially if it was a call it a first time issue. You know,
[14:11] repeat issues is kind of a different thing. But the first time, you
[14:16] know, I was, I would say A lot of Marines would probably say
[14:20] I was a little soft in that respect, but I was. I always
[14:24] thought of it as I was coming from a place of understanding and wanting to
[14:28] hold them accountable without you know, just totally making it a career end or
[14:33] for anybody. Was there a I mean during that time during the g WATT,
[14:37] was there any pressure on not like getting guys kicked out to commands because
[14:43] of like the need for people, not in particular, and I was certainly
[14:48] fortunate in that, you know, when I screwed up, it was at
[14:50] a time when those rules hadn't gotten this stringent yet. I mean, if
[14:56] I'd have done the same thing geez two three four years later, it might
[15:00] have been extremely detrimental for me. But at the time I don't specifically remember,
[15:07] say a desire or need to sort of let things slide. But at
[15:11] the time also we had, you know, the recruiters, like we're kicking
[15:16] people out of their offices because nine to eleven was still kind of fresh and
[15:20] everyone wanted to be in the Marine Corps and retention was good. We had
[15:24] a lot of people that wanted to be involved in those conflicts and what we're
[15:28] doing. Yeah, I remember the only reason I asked because I remember,
[15:31] and this is funny because I was just talking to a guy about this the
[15:33] other day. When I was a mechanic, there was a kid that joined
[15:39] and he had only been with us for like six months or something like that,
[15:41] and he super motivated, like seemed like a really good dude, and
[15:45] he popped for coke on a piss test and I was like, oh,
[15:48] you're out. Of here, dude. Yeah, and no they didn't.
[15:52] They did a company level JP. I think he got forty five forty five,
[15:56] which is for those that don't know, it's forty five days of restriction,
[15:58] meaning he has to live in the barracks, he can't really go anywhere
[16:02] from the barrack, go to work, come home kind of deal. And
[16:06] forty five days of extra duties around the compound like cleaning and mowing and shit.
[16:11] And in that period, that forty five forty five period when he was
[16:15] on restriction, which again we were all like, holy crap, I can't
[16:19] believe you didn't get kicked out, like especially for coke, you know,
[16:22] like that's crazy. And they what it was was what do they call that
[16:26] where they suspend your sentence or whatever, basically where hey, don't get in
[16:30] trouble again, but if you do, we're bringing this other stuff back up.
[16:34] And he got in trouble again while he was on restriction. There was
[16:40] a female when I was at the barracks or when I was at maintenance Battalion,
[16:44] they had restriction marines live in the duty hut, had a room to
[16:48] the side that was like a small squad bay that had bunks in it,
[16:52] and I think males and females had to hang out there during the day and
[16:56] then at night they separated him. But he got caught messing around with a
[16:59] female marine that was also on restriction and she was a sergeant. He was
[17:03] like a PFC and she was married. And so anyways, he got in
[17:07] trouble again and they started processing him to kick him out, which it takes
[17:11] a little bit, and in that process, this is a morbidly funny part
[17:17] of the story. During that process, he comes in one day and he's
[17:19] like, hey man, he's talking. He's like, hey, I got
[17:22] like a lump on my testicle, and I'm like what, Like, what
[17:26] are you telling me for? Dude, Like go to medical, you know.
[17:27] And that's like everybody's like, dude, go to medical, what are
[17:30] you talking about? Goes to medical. They're like, hey man, you
[17:32] might have testicular cancer. You need to go to the base hospital. Whatever.
[17:37] They determined they're gonna have to remove his testicle to do a biopsy and
[17:40] stuff like that. Remove the dude's testicle. It's not a it's not cancer.
[17:45] It was just a cyst. And then like the day after they took
[17:49] his testicle out, they gave him his ten day letter, so ten days
[17:52] later he was out of the Marine Corps. I was I was like,
[17:56] dude, you got kicked out and not taken. You know, it's like,
[18:00] don't do drugs while you're in the Marines, man, it can get
[18:03] square out there. Yeah, for sure. Yeah, drugs were always kind
[18:07] of a slam dunk or you know, Marine Corps most of what we saw
[18:10] were. But later it came to be known as alcohol related incidents. I
[18:12] don't remember the first time I heard that term. I think I was a
[18:15] pretty senior captain, maybe even a junior major. But it's probably good for
[18:19] me that that term didn't exist. But I was going to say, a
[18:22] younger captain in the book, you're pretty open about drinking quite a bit.
[18:26] Yeah. Well, I mean the way I wrote the book, I mean,
[18:30] and I made a decision going into it that I needed or it was
[18:33] important to me to be brutally honest about everything, just to really it was
[18:38] important to me to capture like a really accurate picture of what it was,
[18:41] no revisionist history, especially not with any temptation to make myself sound better,
[18:48] look better, et cetera. Like it is what it is. I did
[18:51] what I did. Some of that was good, some of it was not
[18:53] good. But you know, at that time in the squadron, that's just
[18:59] kind of how it us, you know. And it's it's easy to look
[19:02] back on it now and say like, ah, we shouldn't have done that,
[19:04] or it probably shouldn't have been that way, but it just was like
[19:08] that. That was the culture in the squadron. When I walked in the
[19:14] door and I was one hundred percent all about it. I was one of
[19:17] those like, yeah, this is great. It was the epitome of work
[19:22] hard, play hard all the time. Yeah. I don't think it's probably
[19:26] like that as much anymore, but it's still they definitely still have fun,
[19:30] Oh for sure. I think even when I when I was getting out,
[19:33] I think I even remember squadrons still having like a squadron vehicle, you know
[19:37] that. Yeah, you like for the d D had to drive all the
[19:40] drunk captains around, you know. Yeah, yeah, that's still a thing.
[19:44] I mean, there's still a lot of fun things that happened. It
[19:47] just you know, there things change over time. But and I think every
[19:52] generation of Marines looks back on, you know, looks at the current Marines
[19:55] it's just like, oh, back in our day, it was so much
[19:56] better. We had so much more latitude to do things. But we definitely
[20:02] did. But at the same time, I remember being, you know,
[20:03] a junior captain and the majors complaining about how much it sucked in because it
[20:08] used to be so much more fun when they were captain. So it wasn't
[20:12] anything new. It just slowly got more and more and more in the box
[20:18] over time. Well, I mean you look back, you look back and
[20:23] Vietnam. They were drinking beer in Vietnam, you know, they were all
[20:26] they had. They had their own like stash of beer and everything like that.
[20:30] It was and it was okay. I was delivered to them. Yeah,
[20:33] absolutely, And you are in trouble for stashing a bottle. You know.
[20:37] It's funny. I remember, guys. I remember the first time when
[20:41] I was in Iraq for my first apployment, a couple of the dudes got
[20:45] super drunk. Someone had gotten alcohol or something sent to them, and a
[20:48] couple of the dudes got super drunk, and I was just like, dude,
[20:51] this is like the worst place to be drunk, Like what do you
[20:53] And don't get me wrong, I wasn't in some shith holes and TQ,
[20:56] you know, living in like yeah, the they had like what do they
[21:00] call them, They're like quad cons but like containers basically. Yeah, And
[21:07] I'm like, this seems like the worst place to do this. And I
[21:08] had a family and shit, and I was like nah. I mean,
[21:11] I had gotten in trouble enough trying to get into the Marine Corps that I
[21:17] was like, I'm not risking anything. So I was like, I'm good
[21:19] guys. You know, you guys, drink it up. That's a And
[21:22] I saw that a couple of times, you know, on in Iraq when
[21:25] I was on ship. I didn't really see it in Afghanistan, although we
[21:27] did have a guy when I was with three six I got caught smoking weed
[21:32] with the Afghans, I believe, and I think they detained him as soon
[21:37] as we got home, kind of deal. You know. It was like,
[21:41] that's wild. Yeah, so some people will try to do it.
[21:45] I would also say, on that first deployment to oif it was such an
[21:48] unknown that none of us were as concerned about the rules as we should have
[21:52] been. I mean, you know, it's like we're going off to this
[21:55] giant war. Who knows how many of us are going to survive? Like,
[21:59] am I really that concerned about getting in trouble for some alcohol? Yeah,
[22:03] it's not like we were doing it in country or when we were flying
[22:06] or I mean we had everyone just kind of had this little stash for like
[22:08] what the war was over and that was the day of the war was supposedly
[22:11] over and we won and it was time to have our little party. And
[22:15] but you know, definitely great lesson learned. Learn did you now in your
[22:21] preparation? You know, you get told you said, while you're in Okinawa,
[22:25] like, hey, we're not doing the UDP anymore, the deployment Okanawo,
[22:27] We're going to go to Iraq. How long was it between that that
[22:32] period and when you went to Iraq? And what kind of like training could
[22:36] you do with the new pilots that hadn't been there yet. It was really
[22:38] difficult. So what had happened was because we got put back in the UDP
[22:42] rotation. Essentially what typically happens is you chop out a sokl mew here in
[22:48] San Diego, So twenty five percent of your squadron and four year aircraft or
[22:52] they're not going with you to begin with. And then the plan is as
[22:56] soon as you arrive in Okinawa, you chopping up twenty five percent of the
[23:00] squadron and four more aircraft over to the thirty first MEW which is based out
[23:03] of Okinawa, and the remaining fifty percent of the squadron we call a point
[23:08] five would stay there in Okinawa and just basically train and do for the most
[23:15] part, the same kind of stuff you do at home, which is what
[23:18] we've done on my very first deployment. But in this case we got tapped
[23:22] to take that point five to Iraq, and at the time I didn't really
[23:26] understand why, Like I wasn't surprised that we were going, but we had
[23:32] also been told that there was a full one point zero full squadron from Miramar
[23:37] that was going to go straight to Iraq and get there shortly after us,
[23:40] so there would be one and a half squadrons there. And later I came
[23:45] to understand that the idea was the Marine Corps was basically at that time we
[23:49] went back into space, establish all the fobs, get the lay down done,
[23:57] and so the Marine Corps wanted to have another essentially eight fifty three is
[24:02] in country to help with just the logistics of that, which made total sense.
[24:07] It definitely makes sense in retrospect, but at the time, you know,
[24:11] I was still kind of a mid level captain. I didn't totally understand
[24:14] that big picture. I don't know that, you know, anyone in our
[24:17] squadron did. It was just like, hey, you guys are going to
[24:18] break these planes down and go. But I got to Okinawa Advanced Party in
[24:22] October and our main body showed up, you know, a couple of weeks
[24:26] later, and then it was this It was this ridiculous, frustrating back and
[24:30] forth that went all the way through the holidays, like we're going, but
[24:33] we don't know when you know, First Marine Aircraft Wing is in charge of
[24:37] all the assets in Okinawa to deploy, to include the deployed units. They
[24:42] wanted us to do some pre deployment training exercise, which to us, we
[24:47] were like, what are you talking about. We're already on deployment. You
[24:49] know. It was just people were just creating boxes for us to check as
[24:55] a squadron my words, my opinion at the time as a cow and for
[25:00] these things. After a bunch of back and forth, shortly after the first
[25:03] of the year, we finally broke the aircraft down, put them on C
[25:07] five's and went back into Iraq. And at that point we ultimately settled into
[25:14] the main Marine Corps airbase that would remain the main Marine Corps base to the
[25:18] rest of the war. At Alisade, we were in the God I was
[25:25] just saying. We were the first wave of Marines to arrive at Alisade to
[25:27] take over from the Army who had been there for about a little over a
[25:30] year. I think at the time. Yeah, Alisade wasn't bad. I
[25:33] flew there. I mean I was there later on like oh nine. I
[25:37] flew there from TQ for like a week to get my eyes checked or something.
[25:41] But it was like the movie theater I saw the Yeah, I saw
[25:45] the Wolverine Origin story movie and a theater there at Alisau. Yeah, Like
[25:53] it was crazy seeing how much stuff because it was an established base by the
[25:56] Iraqi's already, so it had all kinds of stuff in it already. I
[26:03] wanted to touch on, you know in the book you mentioned on your way
[26:06] there, you guys stopped off in Dover and you saw one of the dignified
[26:11] you know, transfer remain ceremonies. We'd always that like I would say it
[26:17] was. It was a moment for our first time deployers that hadn't gone to
[26:22] us or gone to Iraq with us the first time. And it was actually
[26:26] kind of random that we ended up there. The aircraft that we were on,
[26:29] the C five, had to divert to I think it was get a
[26:30] flap check, so we were all, you know, we got off the
[26:34] aircraft and we were kind of standing around. But at that point, you
[26:38] know, we had half a squadron and there were only a few of us,
[26:42] interestingly, that had been with the squadron when we went to Iraq the
[26:45] year prior, so everyone else was new. You know. We had we
[26:49] had a few majors that were new that hadn't you know, participated in flying
[26:53] in the war at that point. Our commanding officer had not participated in flying
[26:59] in the war at that point, and then we had all these young pilots
[27:03] that were on their first deployment. But I think really what that did was
[27:07] just kind of hammered home to everybody like, Hey, what we're about to
[27:11] go do is real and there are real consequences associated with this, and it
[27:15] was a very sobering moment I think for our young pilots, and I remember
[27:21] going straight into kind of big brother mentor mode as we were there at Dover
[27:26] to kind of help them, you know, move past that. But it
[27:29] was definitely a moment for them. I had a couple moments like that.
[27:33] Well. One I remember on my third deployment, we flew in to leather
[27:38] Neck and we got off the bird and we were kind of waiting on our
[27:41] bag, you know, we were like moving bags and stuff and waiting on
[27:44] our follow on transport and we were standing there and three metavac choppers took off,
[27:49] you know, from the flight line, and one of the lieutenants,
[27:52] this was his first deployment, he was like, oh, I wonder if
[27:56] they're going to go do some training or something like that. And I'm like,
[27:57] sir, training's over. Man. I was like, that's real.
[28:00] I was like, whatever's happening is real, you know. And then we
[28:03] got a rocket attack like an hour or two later on the base and I
[28:08] was just like, this is it, you know, And it was kind
[28:11] of the same kind of deal. You see. It's like, oh,
[28:14] it kind of clicks in people's minds like Okay, this is this is for
[28:18] real. And then a couple of days later, me and Mi I grab
[28:21] or maybe it was the next day, my corman. I was like,
[28:22] hey, man, let's go over to the squadrons. I had just gotten
[28:26] the tablet, you know, I was using PFIV or whatever the program was
[28:29] called at the time before before I don't even remember anymore, kill switch,
[28:36] and I went over to the SKID squadron to get the updated map data and
[28:41] bring myr I brought my corman so we could go and talk to the METAVAC
[28:45] pilots, also the pedro guys. And when we were walking over there,
[28:51] there was a mass caz coming in off of Shanook in the medical area,
[28:56] and I guess like a car bomb had gone off. And we sit there
[28:59] and watch them just off flowed like a bunch of people. And I was
[29:02] like, damn, dude, like here we go. Wow. And this
[29:03] was you know, and that was our moment, like here we go.
[29:07] And this was my foreman I was walking with. This was his third deployment
[29:11] and his third time to sing it. And I was like, dude,
[29:14] you know, like this is about to be crazy. So it's weird how
[29:17] those little moments really kind of make your mind, you know, a little
[29:21] something switches in your mind and you're like, all right, you know this
[29:23] is for real now? Definitely, it definitely does. Yeah, Now when
[29:30] you got to Iraq, was this the deployment that you took over from the
[29:33] army for when you guys got that. Yeah, So the Army had been
[29:37] on Alisad since we had seized it, or since the United States had seized
[29:41] it, and this was like the handoff to the Marine Corps where then it
[29:44] kind of became the Marine Corps logistical hub for the rest of the war.
[29:48] So it was really interesting turning over with them. And at the time there
[29:52] was a lot of debate about aviation tactics, specifically what altitude to fly at,
[29:56] because our survivability gear at that point wasn't great, and so we were
[30:02] countering the threat for the most part by flying low altitude, you know,
[30:04] terrain flat altitude two d below, and the Army had experimented some with raising
[30:11] their altitude really to avoid obstacles, because you're trading one threat for another,
[30:15] right like a manpad shot is less likely down low. But there were so
[30:21] many power lines that were painted the same color as the desert and all these
[30:23] other things that could get you that they had toyed around with going up I
[30:27] want to say, between three hundred and five hundred feet, and they had
[30:30] lost some aircraft and recently made a decision to come back down, so they're
[30:36] you know, to a lower altitude. So the Marine Corps was having the
[30:37] same debate kind of as we were taking over for them, what is the
[30:41] right altitude? And we ended up bumping it up to three hundred just a
[30:47] little bit to give ourselves a little more room for error. But to me
[30:51] at the time, I felt like two hundred three hundred there's very little difference
[30:55] between those two numbers on the light level night and a helicopter. I mean,
[31:00] maybe you bought yourself one more second, you know, from impact if
[31:03] you get disoriented, but not a lot. Yeah, low altitudes, low
[31:07] altitude. You talked about doing the turnover in the book, and I wanted
[31:11] to read this part because it was I was like, wow, that's crazy.
[31:15] So this is from the book. It says they had just lost another
[31:18] fifty eight and its crew the day prior. The effects of that were evident
[31:21] in their demeanor, but they were total professionals about helping us get snapped.
[31:23] In a couple of weeks before leaving Okinawa, I saw a quote from a
[31:27] Marine general in Stars and Stripes that essentially said the Marines wouldn't lose as many
[31:32] aircraft as the Army because we were going to do it different and our opening
[31:36] brief. An Army warrant officer read that quote and followed with good luck.
[31:40] I never felt like a bigger asshole for being a marine. Yeah, I'll
[31:42] never forget that. And I did. I felt like a total asshole.
[31:45] And you know, I didn't say it, but I remember when i'd read
[31:48] it, thinking like, h that's it, no matter what you think.
[31:53] I mean, it's just one of those things like we work so closely with
[31:56] the Army and sister services. It is what it is. Yeah, howde
[32:01] what they're doing? Yeah, I mean they're great. I mean they're just
[32:06] as good as anybody else. They're obviously doing the best they can, making
[32:09] the best decisions possible. And had really been doing some experimentation with well,
[32:14] what's the right answer we're going to be two hundred feet below to kind of
[32:16] the man pad threat and deal with the power lines and the other threats,
[32:21] or are we gonna go ahead and bump it up a little so we avoid
[32:22] power lines, but there was no right answer. There really wasn't. I
[32:28] mean, we didn't have the right answer either. Frankly, you know,
[32:30] everyone was kind of working through it simultaneously. But I remember when he that
[32:36] warnofser read that, I felt I just felt bad. And I also felt
[32:39] bad just because you know, I felt for them. I mean, I
[32:44] knew they just lost the aircraft the night prior, but they were so professional
[32:46] that they're still there giving us these briefs. They're trying to do a great
[32:50] turnover and they did, you know, and so I was really impressed with
[32:53] them, you know, but to hear him say that, it hurt a
[32:57] little. I felt I felt bad. Yeah, I mean you and you
[33:00] had seen that quote already. I wonder if there were other guys that hadn't
[33:04] seen that quote yet, and then he read it and they're like, what
[33:06] the you know, Like, I'm sure there were. Yeah, that's a
[33:09] That's one of those things where like it's it's a fun rivalry to like,
[33:13] you know, mess around with each other about being in different services and stuff
[33:16] like that. But man, to start unless you got like hard facts that
[33:21] someone messed something up to start questioning, like guys, you know, reasonings
[33:25] or whatever they did in combat that, you know, getting killed and stuff.
[33:30] You know, that's a bad look. That's a bad road to go
[33:31] down in that general. I don't know who it was, but man,
[33:35] what a what a dick for doing that, because I'm sure a lot of
[33:37] soldiers read that and were like, fuck this dude, you know. Yeah.
[33:42] And the truth is, I don't remember literally who it was either,
[33:45] but I wrote the quote down in my journals. I can't believe this guy
[33:47] said this because I felt bad just reading it. And then, you know,
[33:52] I mean, like I said, there's no right answer. Everyone's doing
[33:53] the best they can do. So what do you wanna do? Yeah?
[33:58] You know, what do you wanna do? Man? I means. So
[34:01] another thing I thought was interesting in the book, you talked about the establishing
[34:05] combat crews for deployment. A lot of people don't understand this. They see
[34:09] outside of the military, they see like aircraft with like a captain's name on
[34:13] it and whatever, yeah, and they think that that's their plane that they
[34:15] fly all the time. Can you kind of explain like the combat crew and
[34:19] also the artwork that you guys create, So we would we always had combat
[34:23] crews, but that didn't necessarily mean we flew together all the time or in
[34:29] those assigned aircraft, and a fifty three square in particular, what it really
[34:32] was was that combat crew, which was usually a pilot, co pilot,
[34:37] and a head you know, the primary crew chief were assigned to a specific
[34:40] aircraft and we had specific responsibilities for that aircraft where we'd go out and do
[34:45] inspections, clean the cabin, things like that. It just kind of gave
[34:50] everybody some ownership over an individual aircraft. And then you know, those are
[34:52] the ones they'd put our name on the side and the crew chief got to
[34:55] decide what door art went on the crew chiefs store, but in actual execution,
[35:00] more often than not, the crews were just whatever made sense for what
[35:05] was happening, and there was there was some rhymorison to that, but it
[35:08] was very rarely our combat cruise, at least in the fifty three community.
[35:13] Same with the aircraft. We flew it to whatever aircraft, you know,
[35:15] made sense for our Amenus department for us to fly. It was more common,
[35:20] I think, especially during OIF one and like the skid squadronts where like
[35:22] the Kobras and Hughey's they had like full divisions of combat crews of the same
[35:30] you know, eight pilots would be out there together as a flight of four
[35:34] every day, and that was really a lot of that was predicated on response
[35:38] time because they're familiar with each other. They know each other, they've briefed
[35:42] this stuff one hundred times, so they were able to move more quickly,
[35:45] react more quickly, and in a dynamic environment where they're out there in a
[35:49] gunfight, it was just orchestrated better because they were also familiar with one another.
[35:53] Yeah. Another another question before we get to you know, actions in
[35:59] Iraq is why why the quick turnaround for your squadron to deploy? I mean
[36:04] there's multiple fifty three squadrons. Yeah, Well, like why I didn't under
[36:08] really understand that at the beginning of the war, why there was a quick
[36:12] turnaround for these units to deploy and then come home and be you were home?
[36:15] I think you said five months and then went back. We got a
[36:17] not quite So basically what had happened was FORF one, we had two full
[36:22] fifty three squadrons there. I was in HMH four sixty five and HMH four
[36:27] sixty two was also there. HMH four sixty six had actually been deployed to
[36:31] Okinawa before OIF started and they extended them, so they ended up staying there
[36:37] for almost like around a year. The fourth fifty three squadron, the last
[36:42] one available at the time, was HMH three sixty one, and the decision
[36:46] was made at higher headquarters. Basically they'd farmed some of their pilots out to
[36:52] the other three squadrons. They just they weren't ready to go. They weren't
[36:54] in a situation where that squadron was formed up and ready. They'd kind of
[36:58] been the rear element back get mirror murmor while all this other stuff was going
[37:01] on. So really it was either going to be US in four sixty five
[37:07] or for sixty two that needed to go and deploy next, And for whatever
[37:10] reason we just drew the short straw or whatever and ended up being the first
[37:15] ones back out the door. So it was a very short stop at home
[37:19] before we went right back to Okinawa then ultimately Iraq. But you're talking about
[37:22] you're only talking about West coast squadrons, right, aren't there others? There's
[37:25] more squadrons on the east coast. Why didn't they get pulled in? Yeah,
[37:29] Well, at the time it was all, you know, one MEF
[37:31] out here on the West coast that was the lead effort there, and the
[37:36] East Coast had a MEW that participated in the initial invasion of Afghanistan, but
[37:40] they hadn't jumped in, and they also had a squadron NF one HMH four
[37:45] sixty four, but they had not jumped back into the rotation at that time,
[37:50] and it really stayed in all West Coast rotation from that point. I
[37:53] think I don't remember the year that ended, but it was all West Coast
[37:58] show the rest time I was in the fleet right two thousand and six,
[38:00] two thousand and seven, it was the four West Coast squadrons that were doing
[38:04] the Iraq rotations, and the East Coast actually got involved in the mission over
[38:09] in Djibouti, so they were doing deployments to Djibouti while the West Coast fifty
[38:14] three units were deploying to Iraq. Oh, which one would have been a
[38:16] better one have because unitions are like you get rolled into socom a lot,
[38:21] and yeah, this is with those guys, yeah for sure. But it
[38:23] was interesting because I had peers in my peer group on the East Coast who
[38:29] never deployed to Iraq and I went to Iraq three times, so it was
[38:31] just total happenstance of where you happen to be and wet squadron on what coast,
[38:37] what you ended up doing. That's crazy. Yeah, I don't get
[38:40] that. I feel like, I mean, why lock it? I mean
[38:45] I get one math for you know, first Marine Division is the is the
[38:49] headquarters unit in charge at the time. But when you're dogging dudes out five
[38:54] months five months between deployments, that's crazy. Yeah, you know, that's
[38:58] like, I don't know. It was well after that. I mean we
[39:00] got the quick turn and then it's settled in where the squadrons were all rotating
[39:07] on a more even cadence. But was it like one to one or did
[39:09] you have a little bit more? It ultimately got to where it was one
[39:14] to two. Okay. So I ended up being home, I want to
[39:16] say, for almost a year between the second and third trip to Iraq.
[39:21] But you know, during that time, I was you know, went to
[39:23] WTI, I was on training deaths, so even then I wasn't home much.
[39:29] That's the hard part about getting those like advanced certifications and stuff like that,
[39:32] is the training to get ready for it. You're gone a lot,
[39:37] and then once you get it, you're like, ah, I've achieved this,
[39:39] you know, WTI or whatever, and now it's like, hey,
[39:43] WTI, we need you on this training exercise because you're the expert. Come
[39:46] on, yeah, you know, And I felt that as a Jaytack evaluator,
[39:51] you know, for a little while I was, I was gone so
[39:53] much. I was away from home for sure, more than I was at
[39:57] home. I'm talking like two sometimes two to three weeks a month gone to
[40:02] different training ops and field ops and stuff like that, because that's the job.
[40:07] But I loved it, you know, absolutely, Yeah, I did
[40:10] too, but it was certainly a trade off. I mean for those roughly
[40:15] three years I was in Iraq, I think I figured it out one point
[40:16] in time, and I had literally been home for like six out of thirty
[40:21] six months. Like by the time you did all the math and that's included
[40:24] the training, detachments and everything else. Yeah, it was it was a
[40:28] crazy three years. Yeah, People forget about the training part because that's like,
[40:31] if you go on a mute, you have seven months of training for
[40:35] the MEW and those include yeah, three times on ship that are a couple
[40:37] of weeks each, you know, and field ops and everything else. It's
[40:40] like it's just being tapped for a deployment means you're about to be gone a
[40:45] lot, even when you haven't left yet. Definitely, Yeah, it was
[40:49] a tough turn. Now when you guys were when you guys were in Iraq,
[40:54] you guys were running a lot of missions and you know, doing stuff.
[40:59] In the book you had to part where you talked about that there was
[41:00] a all officers meeting? Is that an official thing where you guys came you
[41:06] guys came together to I guess people complained about the they thought the CEO was
[41:12] dangerous or whatever they did. How was that even was the present for this
[41:15] meeting? It was not. He was not so our CEO on that deployment.
[41:21] Actually really like I personally really liked him, but he he was kind
[41:25] of one of those classic marines. It was that we were talking about before
[41:30] guy's a good pilot went hard. It was a little bit of a liberty
[41:32] risk, if you will. And he had actually been part of the the
[41:39] me that had done the initial invasion into Afghanistan a few years prior so this
[41:45] is we're talking about, and experienced a pretty salty guy. But it was
[41:50] a combination of things in my opinion. You know, we're a point five,
[41:52] so it's half a squadron. Most of the pilots in the squadron are
[41:57] in Iraqar and combat for the first time, and we've got the CEO that
[42:00] was he was pushing hard. He was pushing really hard, and it was
[42:05] making some people uncomfortable. So all officers meeting is a pretty standard thing.
[42:10] We call them an AOM when we you know, for the most part,
[42:13] their administrative in nature, and we do them, you know, once a
[42:15] week, once every other week, just to talk about whatever needed to get
[42:19] information got passed. But in that specific case, what had happened was a
[42:22] couple of our younger pilots had gone to complain to our flight surgeon, who
[42:27] didn't talk to our executive officer, who's the number two guy in charge.
[42:29] So it was our EXO who rounded everybody up and the ready room for a
[42:34] kind of an improv to AOM was like, okay, what's the problem,
[42:37] Like, you know, what are your complaints? And a few of you
[42:39] know, a few of the pilots, junior pilots spoke up and said they
[42:44] had some concerns feel like we were pushing too hard. Well, it was
[42:50] just stuff like weather calls, right, you got borderline weather sometimes do you
[42:54] go do you not go? And our CEO at the time was definitely someone
[42:59] that was like, you go, and we had pilots that weren't comfortable with
[43:02] that. And then that's not knocking anybody. Everybody's box is a little bit
[43:07] different size, and there's things some pilots are comfortable with and others aren't quite
[43:12] there yet, and sometimes that's just a function of experience. But he was
[43:17] really pushing us to fly as many hours as we could. He wanted us
[43:22] to, you know, not be turning around because the weather might get bad.
[43:27] And to be honest with you, it really didn't phaze me too much
[43:31] because I was I had a similar aggressive style, especially as an aviator.
[43:37] The only thing I kind of had our time with sometimes at the time as
[43:40] a young captain from where I was sitting was I understood the maintenance department and
[43:44] how that worked, and I knew if we flew too many hours, it
[43:47] was going to be really difficult for the mats department to keep up. And
[43:51] that's just the math problem. But that was the only thing that made me
[43:55] a little bit concerned. But he was a character, and you know,
[44:00] it made some folks uncomfortable, and so we had a conversation and but XO
[44:05] was an awesome guy and he did a great job with that, and I
[44:07] think from that point forward it was like, okay, I think, you
[44:10] know, everyone got to say their piece, and then we kind of moved
[44:13] on. Is that a that's not a Marine Corps wide kind of thing,
[44:16] right, this all officers meeting or is that just yeah, all the squadrons
[44:22] do them at least for sure. Yeah, it's it's a pretty routine thing
[44:25] to get all the officers together. And for the most part, again it's
[44:29] like administrative nature, and every department gets up and says, hey, here's
[44:31] what's going on whatever, you know, things everyone needs to know. That
[44:35] one in particular in Iraq was impromptu. That's not for that reason. I
[44:39] mean that seems crazy, right your borderline mute me over here? I remember,
[44:45] yeah, And actually it really me personally, and I talked about in
[44:49] the book, like I just didn't say anything, but I certainly wasn't of
[44:52] that same opinion. You know, I felt like, hey, we're here
[44:55] to support the Marines. In the ground, and sometimes that means we have
[44:58] to push it, like you know, play win, like whatever those guys
[45:00] need, that's what we're here to support. So I'm certainly not gonna be
[45:06] one to be making borterline safety calls. If the Marines out there that were
[45:09] supposed to be supporting needs something, I'm going And in fairness, I was
[45:15] probably similar to the COO we had at the time, one of those guys
[45:17] that would would push it for sure, but I was I was comfortable doing
[45:23] that. Why would they go to the flight surgeon? Why would multiple people
[45:25] go to the flight Was it just a trusted person within the command or was
[45:29] it basically yeah, trusted, nonpartisan. You know, he's not he's on
[45:35] the team, but kind of a pilot, but not the same as I
[45:38] say, that seems like a kind of a weird angle to tack, like
[45:42] go to the flight surgeony it was and at the time, our flight surgeon
[45:45] he was actually an awesome guy, like one of my favorite flights was just
[45:47] a great dude, and so he had a good rapport with everybody, and
[45:51] I think that was part of it too. You know, he was someone
[45:52] they trusted and he had to go to report with them, and and you
[45:55] know, he didn't go to the EXO like, oh, we have this
[45:58] huge problem. It was more of a ACER just so you know, this
[46:01] is something that's that's getting talked about a little bit. And the X of
[46:05] the EXO call D really just to kind of squash it, like, hey,
[46:07] we're all here, let's get on board and just do what we're here
[46:10] to do. Now. Was it before or after that meeting that you got
[46:15] caught in like a sandstorm as you were flying? It was not too long
[46:19] after that, and it was it was randomly. I was with our commanding
[46:23] officer, so in different aircraft, so he had a young copilot in his
[46:28] aircraft. I had a young copilot in mine. Out on just a routine
[46:30] night flight, and we had gone down to TQ, which you're familiar with,
[46:36] not too far from Alisade, and we were like running supplies basically back
[46:38] and forth from Alisade to TQ, and we were heading back towards Alasade and
[46:45] the copilot I was flying with, I was like, hey, let me
[46:49] take the controls for a minute. And I was just going to demo something
[46:52] for him, and like right like seconds after I took the controls, it
[46:55] was like everything went haywire, and our committing officer was in front of us
[47:00] and what we call the DASH one position, so I was flying formation off
[47:04] of him. But as soon as it happened, I wasn't sure for the
[47:07] first couple of seconds what had happened, because all of a sudden we just
[47:10] could see nothing. The gauges are going haywire, the aircraft's bouncing all over
[47:15] the place, you know. I'm looking at my radar altimeter and it's just
[47:19] like doing this like between three hundred feet one hundred feet, and I pretty
[47:24] quickly figured out, like, oh wow, we ran into a hot boob,
[47:28] which are those basically giant Iraqi sandstorms that would kick up. It's basically
[47:34] just like a wall of dirt. But because it was nighttime and low light
[47:37] level, which means there was no moon whatsoever to illuminate, we never saw
[47:42] it coming, you know, and flying low light is difficult under any circumstances.
[47:45] But hitting that hot boob was It was dicey, and I ended up
[47:52] just getting real close to the CEO who was in Dash one. I just
[47:55] tightened up the form as much as I could. I was probably a rotor
[48:00] maybe a hair less where we typically fly more like two to three, you
[48:05] know, in a tight parade position, and just stayed with him. And
[48:09] you know, if you looked at our track over the ground afterwards, I'm
[48:13] sure it looked like a roller coaster because it was climbing, descending, turning,
[48:15] just really fighting through. It took us about fifteen minutes to get back
[48:19] to Alasade, and at the time, that fifteen minutes to me felt like
[48:22] it was two hours. But the copal that I was flying with was definitely
[48:25] he did a great job of giving me talkies and stuff, but it definitely
[48:30] scared the hell out of him. Yeah, sure, he said. He
[48:31] requested a transfer out not too long after that. Yeah, it was not
[48:36] too long after that. He actually elected to not fly. And right after
[48:40] the flight he said that to me, He's like, I'm never doing that
[48:44] again. And that was like kind of just you know, yeah, I
[48:46] don't really want to do that again either, and he's like, no,
[48:50] I'm never flying one of these again. And I knew he was freaked out,
[48:54] and I understood. You know, he was a young guy. He
[48:58] was barely qualified to be on the flight, you know, at the time,
[49:00] and it had been a bit of a white knuckle event. But he
[49:06] ultimately decided not too long after that that, yeah, he was going to
[49:09] change his military occupational specialty and do something else when we got home, and
[49:14] he ended up not flying for the rest of the deployment. I think he
[49:17] flew like a couple more times after that one flight, I can't remember exactly,
[49:21] but then he stopped and we got home. He did he went through
[49:23] with it. How does that How does that affect you on a deployment?
[49:29] I mean, now you're down a pilot, right, I mean it did.
[49:32] I mean it was a little tight, but we had a little bit
[49:35] of wiggle room based on our tasking and you need pilots every day on the
[49:38] schedule to do other things like fill duty slots and things like that. So
[49:43] he was he stayed extremely helpful. Great dude. You know, he did
[49:47] what we needed him to do to help the team. He just didn't want
[49:51] to get back out there, specifically at night again anytime soon. And you
[49:54] know, that was the say the first time. It wasn't the first time
[49:59] I'd seen that, so just or well, I would say that not the
[50:02] first time I'd seen someone on a flight that just was too much and they
[50:07] just got overwhelmed and was like, holy shit, like I don't know if
[50:10] I can do this. Yeah, it happens, and it especially happens to
[50:15] pilots who are younger, more junior. You know, you get into a
[50:17] situation that's extremely hairy and walk away from it. It has an effect on
[50:22] people that, especially that very first time you realize like wow, like that
[50:30] we could have died, and maybe we should have. It's kind of a
[50:34] miracle that we didn't like. When someone processes that for the first time,
[50:38] it's just impossible to know how it's going to affect them and how they're going
[50:42] to react. If a pilot decides to, you know, give up flying,
[50:46] how hard is that of a transfer out into anothers It's actually pretty straightforward
[50:52] when it happens. I saw it a few times over my career, and
[50:57] they just end up, you know, they reach out to the monitor and
[50:59] let new and there's a paperwork drill that happens, and the monitor finds,
[51:04] you know, another military occupation, especially for them, that makes sense,
[51:07] and they go take off and do that, and in a lot of cases
[51:10] it ends up working out okay for them, especially if they make the decision
[51:15] fairly early. In their career. Do they still wear their flight wings after
[51:19] that? Aviator wings? If I remember correctly, there's a process in which
[51:25] they determine whether that's a yes or no, and most more often than not,
[51:30] though they are still allowed to wear their wings. I feel like I
[51:32] remember working with a guy briefly that had aviator wings, but someone told me
[51:39] that he was. I was like, how why is he over here?
[51:40] You know, like, what's he doing over here? And yeah, I
[51:43] think this is when I was a mechanic and someone was like, yeah,
[51:45] he was a pilot and he quit. I'm like what and They're like yeah,
[51:49] it's like a thing, and I'm like, oh shit, Like that's
[51:52] yeah, I mean, I get it. I wouldn't want some dude flying
[51:54] me that doesn't want to be there, So yeah, one hundred percent,
[51:57] I mean, and that's really the thing that makes a decision, Like,
[52:00] if you're not one hundred percent certain that's what you want to be doing,
[52:04] you probably shouldn't be doing it. So I never knocked those guys at all.
[52:09] It's a personal decision for everybody, for certain, and lord knows,
[52:15] it's crazy as hell sometimes out there. Yeah, I just happened to be
[52:19] one of those weirdo's that not only did I not mind it, I kind
[52:22] of liked it, Like all that crazy shit was like I was good with
[52:25] it. But I'd go out there every night if they let me. I
[52:29] can make this happen. It's finn. Yeah, it was all about it.
[52:32] Yeah. I mean you kind of have to be in some situations,
[52:35] man, when you're talking about flying in combat. You know, especially if
[52:38] you're on like on missions where you're doing hot ELS's or something like that,
[52:43] when you're flying in and you know you're going to be getting shot at it.
[52:46] I mean, aircraft are such big targets. It's like every time you
[52:51] come into what could be a potentially you know, hot elsy or an actual
[52:54] one that where there's active engagements happening, I mean that's so dangerous for the
[52:59] aircrew, the pilots and the crew chiefs and stuff. Yeah. Yeah,
[53:02] there's just so many things that can go wrong under the best of circumstances.
[53:07] But you know, tossing the enemy, terrain, obstacles, the weather,
[53:09] a million parts all made by the lottest bitter, all those things get a
[53:14] vote. Yeah, and there's a ton of shit that can go wrong on
[53:16] any given day. And often does. So it takes it takes a certain
[53:22] mentality to be okay with that and to navigate that and and be fine going
[53:28] out there over and over and doing it. But you definitely get yourself into,
[53:32] you know, want to call it a call it a combat mindset where
[53:36] you kind of have to believe you're ten feet tall and bulletproof to go do
[53:38] that stuff night after night, and you know you're fighting against the law of
[53:44] averages, you know for sure. And I will tell you I freely admit
[53:49] this, like I was fairly certain for a long time, like, you
[53:52] know, one of these days, I'm probably going to be a half second
[53:54] too slow, And for whatever reason, I was strangely okay with that.
[54:00] It was just sort of this fate that I'd accepted for, you know,
[54:02] the life that I'd chosen for myself. But I was aware of it,
[54:07] but I didn't spend a lot of time thinking about it or himming and hawing
[54:10] about it, and I definitely never worried about it. It was just sort
[54:13] of this accepted reality, like if you're going to live in this world and
[54:15] do this super dangerous job, for lack of a way to put it,
[54:19] like you need to understand that that can obviously happen and be able to go
[54:23] do the job anyway. Yeah, I mean, at least and something of
[54:29] man, at least it'd be almost instant and something like that probably, you
[54:31] know, like when you're crashing a hee or something. God, I don't
[54:36] even want to think about it. That sucks. I remember I never thought
[54:38] about flying, ever having issues with it until I was on a We talked
[54:43] about it last episode when I was fifty three flying from San Clement to Island
[54:45] and it lost like the hydraulic stabilization or whatever and was flopping all over the
[54:51] place, and I'm like, what the fuck are we doing? And then
[54:54] after that, every time I got on a bird, I was like,
[54:57] man, I hope this one doesn't mess up. And then we had an
[54:59] oscar go in the water when I was on the eleventh MEW and the crew
[55:02] chief passed away. I remember that one too. Yeah, it's like,
[55:07] dude, when chill like that happens, you're like, damn, man like
[55:09] it just I think we talked about in the last episode, and I've talked
[55:13] about it on a lot of episodes, But it's a reminder about how dangerous
[55:16] a job is, even when you're doing in your own mind, you're doing
[55:21] something that's routine. You know what I'm saying like this is this is an
[55:24] administrative movement, this is a whatever makes it sound very mundane, but if
[55:29] you're like moving an aircraft, at any point that thing could go down and
[55:32] a fifty three is like fifty pounds, So the auto rotation is probably not
[55:38] the greatest and something like that, it's not. It really is a and
[55:44] you know in a combat environment too, of fifty three and we were well
[55:46] aware of it as a salt sport guys. It's a strategic target because the
[55:50] enemy assumes that you got twenty plus marines in the back of that thing,
[55:53] and if they can take it down, and that's a huge strategic win,
[55:57] especially when you're fighting an insurgency. So you know you're a target every time
[56:01] you're out there doing anything you're doing. And then those are the things can
[56:05] get you to But it was a ridiculous way to live for a long time,
[56:10] for sure. Can you tell us about I think on that depotment you
[56:13] did Operawa as well. Correct. Yeah, they're towards the end, which
[56:16] is cool because up until that point, for the first I would say several
[56:21] weeks of the deployment, the Marine Corps as a whole was really just re
[56:24] establishing themselves in the battle space, setting up forward operating bases. So a
[56:30] lot of what we were doing was just moving gear and people around and getting
[56:32] those set up. So people were getting frustrated for sure, like as in
[56:38] our squadron, you know, the stuff started coming up like, well,
[56:42] what are we even doing here? We're just moving shit around, Like when
[56:45] are we going to do something real? So it was good. It was
[56:50] towards the tail end of that deployment that essentially the logistical laid down was settling
[56:54] and almost complete, and so then we started doing operations and for that one
[57:00] we got paired up with the other one point zero squadron that was that was
[57:02] there at the time next door to us was HIMH four sixty six, So
[57:07] we flew a mixed division, so flight of four two from US two from
[57:09] them, and I ended up getting tapped to lead that. But it was
[57:14] it was really cool for the squadron because it was a big named operation and
[57:17] it was really the one the one that we did for that deployment, which,
[57:24] knowing what happened later, seems ridiculous that we were excited about one real
[57:29] name top. But that was just the very beginning of the Marine Corps really
[57:34] getting settled and starting to fight the insurgency. So it was a fun one
[57:37] to fly. It was neat, Yeah, I mean people got to remember
[57:40] that that's after the you know, the country's been taken over. Now they
[57:45] got to establish where are we best fit, you know, for like putting
[57:49] troops here for whatever reason. I'm sure there was a lot of like wrangling
[57:52] at the political level of like different assets in different places and stuff like that,
[57:58] and then actions on the ground on what needed to be placed where,
[58:00] you know, I mean because people I remember too, I know in Afghanistan,
[58:05] we really were always concerned about putting fobs ford operating bases and combat outposts
[58:12] and maintaining them within like the golden hour of you know, of care.
[58:15] So I mean, if someone gets injured, we can have a helo to
[58:19] them and then being metavac within that our time frame and so that those kind
[58:23] of decisions you have to make, and so they were that's what was going
[58:28] on, right, They were just settling like final locations for different bases and
[58:31] where we can best you know, support areas from from whatever. That's kind
[58:36] of a weird time to be there, right, because it is kind of
[58:37] a transition period from from an invasion force to a nation building or whatever kind
[58:44] of force. Yeah, and you know when we were the first time,
[58:45] we're fighting the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard, and then we come back
[58:50] for this one. We're setting up and we're going to be fighting this insurgency,
[58:53] if you will, which as a country was something we've done before,
[58:57] but it had been a while. So just as a force, you know,
[59:00] all the generals up on high had come home and we're dusting off the
[59:06] Vietnam Aria tactics and researching, hey, how do we do this again,
[59:09] and just really starting to form the plan for the way forward. And so
[59:15] there was those first few months in Iraq where that hadn't quite trickled all the
[59:17] way back down to us yet, but it did. So they're at the
[59:20] tail end of that deployment, was like, Okay, here's how we're going
[59:22] to go about this. Now. Did the air threats differ much from your
[59:25] first deployment to your second deployment? Well, just I would say all the
[59:30] call it the big stuff was really no longer an issue, you know,
[59:32] and the initial OIF to deployment there were twenty three tech forwards and all kinds
[59:38] of other forms of Triple A and bigger things that were out there in the
[59:42] battle space, And thankfully our buddies and the covers for the most part took
[59:46] care of those things. So by the time we got back the second time
[59:51] in Iraq, it really just it was for most part small arms, manpads,
[59:55] you know, you know, shoulder fired man port bowl air defense and
[1:00:00] things like that. So that was really what we were concerned with contending with
[1:00:04] that second time around. Yeah, Now, I mean were you was there,
[1:00:08] Did you guys have any aircraft that had taken shots from like small arms
[1:00:12] or anything? Did you ever come back and count the mortals? Very very
[1:00:15] little in that second trip to Iraq? But the third one we went on
[1:00:21] was a lot more lively. So it was which I think was just the
[1:00:24] nature of the deployments in the mission and what we were doing at the time.
[1:00:28] Now, I believe in the book you said when you guys went to
[1:00:30] that third deployment, you relieved a marine squadron that had lost correct, Yeah,
[1:00:37] so one of our sister squadrons was there in the rotation ahead of us,
[1:00:42] and it was getting towards the tail end of their deployment in January,
[1:00:46] and we were supposed to head out there in March. But you know,
[1:00:52] it's it was tough line low light level out there. You know, it's
[1:00:55] hard to pick up a horizon low light level, and I myself often would
[1:01:00] get you know, you get vertigo, you get what's called the leans where
[1:01:02] you feel like you're in a turn but you're not. It used to commonly
[1:01:07] happen just coming off the runway. It outside like almost every single time those
[1:01:09] first few seconds. It would kind of take your body a few seconds to
[1:01:13] adjust. But they had a flight of two aircraft that was heading out to
[1:01:19] a fob called Korean Village crappy night. You know, a lot of dust
[1:01:23] in the air, hot boobs kicking up, and you know, so there's
[1:01:29] no horizon, and they had what's called a controlled flight into a terrain incident
[1:01:32] where they just literally flew the aircraft into the ground because they became disoriented and
[1:01:39] lost thirty one total marines in that mishap with everyone in the back. So
[1:01:45] it was a huge blow to the Marine Corps, to the community, obviously
[1:01:50] to that squadron and all of those families that were affected. But for our
[1:01:54] unit, again, we were the guys you know, that were in the
[1:01:57] shoot to go next, and that was a very sobering thing for us,
[1:02:02] you know. And the aircraft commander of that aircraft was actually a friend of
[1:02:07] mine, a pretty good friend of mine. Randomly. We'd gone to college
[1:02:13] together, and we didn't know each other in college. We figured that out
[1:02:15] in flight school and he had started out in our squadron, so he was
[1:02:19] in our squadron on my first deployment and then cross decked over to HMH three
[1:02:22] sixty one and ended up there obviously in that squadron for that deployment, and
[1:02:29] we lost that crew that night. Yeah, that sucks, man, That's
[1:02:32] I mean, it's such a sanitized way of saying it, the controlled flight
[1:02:37] into terrain. Anytime I hear someone say that, it's like so such a
[1:02:40] weird phrase to hear, you know, it is it is. It's such
[1:02:45] a bureaucratic way of saying they crashed, and it's like, man like,
[1:02:50] yeah, and you know, we felt terrible for those guys, and they
[1:02:52] didn't fly at night for a little while after that. You know, higher
[1:02:55] headquarters just scaled back their night tasking. They had just started flying it,
[1:03:00] and I had to look again a little bit right before we got there and
[1:03:02] took over a couple months later there in early March, but I remember being
[1:03:07] there turning over with them, and you know, we all know each other.
[1:03:10] The flight line of Mirrormar are small, and all the pilots, especially
[1:03:14] in the squadrons, know one another, and you got a lot of friends
[1:03:15] in the other squadron. So it was I felt bad turning over for them.
[1:03:21] I mean, you could tell that that had hit their unit really hard.
[1:03:23] Understandably the challenge I think for us and for me because by that point
[1:03:29] I was the senior captain and the squadron I was a WTI was just trying
[1:03:34] to help all of our younger pilots not be too affected by that, because
[1:03:37] I knew, like, hey, we're going to have to get back on
[1:03:38] this horse, and we're going to need to get out there at night,
[1:03:40] and that's what we're here to do. And at that point, the Marine
[1:03:45] Corps and everybody really had figured out this is how we're fighting an insurgency.
[1:03:50] So it was a lot more kinetic. There were going to be a lot
[1:03:52] more named operations. It was going to be a very busy deployment for us,
[1:03:54] so kind of getting everyone to shake that off, if you will,
[1:03:59] and settle in for for our unit was a little bit of a challenge also.
[1:04:02] Man, you keep walking into these deployments right after squaders are losing helos,
[1:04:06] and it's just like you're on a bad foot, Like it feels like
[1:04:10] you're starting like, all right, guys, morale's low starting off. Let's
[1:04:13] kind of you know, Yeah, it was a you know, just by
[1:04:17] virtue of luck, if you will, that I was in the unit I
[1:04:20] was in in HMH four to sixty five, and we did those three deployments
[1:04:24] in succession, and by that third one, the only guys left in the
[1:04:28] only piles left in the squadron that had also been there for the first one
[1:04:30] for me and one of my really good friends, Dave Payne, and we
[1:04:34] were the only two captains in the squadron that were on our fourth deployment,
[1:04:39] which was highly unusual at the time. You know, before all the war
[1:04:43] started, it was rare for a captain to do three deployments. No one
[1:04:46] had done four. So we were doing a fourth deployment third and Row to
[1:04:50] Iraq. But at that point we were pretty seasoned. I mean we've essentially
[1:04:54] been over there fighting and flying for shit a couple of years almost, so
[1:05:00] we were ready to go. And we had some really strong, you know,
[1:05:02] younger pilots in our squadron. CEO he was getting the aircraft, and
[1:05:06] we had some pretty solid majors. So we had a good team going into
[1:05:10] that one in two thousand and five. And you guys basically went right into
[1:05:14] night flying, right you said, the last squadron had not been so you
[1:05:15] guys rolled right into it. Yeah, they started flying a little bit again
[1:05:19] at night. But as soon as we took the mission, you know,
[1:05:23] a higher headquarters, I'd gone up and talked to him, you know,
[1:05:25] as a squad on WTI, I was really the primary liaison and there was
[1:05:28] a major up there on staff, awesome guy Bullwinkled Glasgow retired as a colonel
[1:05:33] years later, but he was a major at the time, and he was
[1:05:36] like he just asked me, He's like, hey, you guys ready to
[1:05:39] go? And I was like, yes, sir, just let's know what
[1:05:41] you ate, like full tasking, Let's get on it. And you know,
[1:05:45] we started scheduling you know, normal day crew, night crew, and
[1:05:47] right out of the gate started doing named operations and inserts at night and extracts
[1:05:54] and done ended up being a really busy, really interesting deployment. Yeah for
[1:06:01] sure. Now I want to acknowledge you said there that you were the squadron
[1:06:04] WTI, So you did get to go back to the course I did.
[1:06:08] How does that can you walk as? I mean, you don't have to
[1:06:11] go in depth about the course or anything, because you already kind of explained
[1:06:14] it. But how how did you feel coming away from that kind of training,
[1:06:17] especially knowing you're rolling right into a deployment. Yeah? One and two?
[1:06:20] How did your responsibilities within the squadron change? Now is a WTI?
[1:06:25] It was great. You know, that had been my goal for a long
[1:06:27] time, and like I said earlier, that it worked out say better for
[1:06:30] me that I didn't go when I was supposed to originally, because I did
[1:06:34] one more deployment prior to going. By the time I went, I'd already
[1:06:40] done three deployments. I was cruising past twelve hundred flight hours, Like I
[1:06:44] was a very experienced captain to be showing up as a student at WTI you
[1:06:50] know, I at least had a few hundred more hours and more more deployment
[1:06:54] than most people who come in there for the course, so I was very
[1:06:57] well prepared for it, and the course went very well for me, which
[1:07:00] really kind of set up a bunch of stuff that happened for me later.
[1:07:04] But going back to the squadron, I felt just very comfortable in my role,
[1:07:10] and as the squadron WTI, you're really responsible for being what's called the
[1:07:14] pilot training officer, So the overall training of the squadron is your responsibility.
[1:07:18] You're the primary person building the training plan. Granted you're working for an operations
[1:07:23] officer who's a major who's senior to you, but it's really your job,
[1:07:27] you know, to make sure that stuff's right, and then anything that's tactical
[1:07:30] that comes up in nature. You're not necessarily flying all of those yourself,
[1:07:34] but you're ensuring that you have the right mix of crews and the crews are
[1:07:38] capable, and you're doing a lot of them yourself. So it was you're
[1:07:42] kind of the way I always describe with people as the squadron WTI captain is
[1:07:45] like your quarterback in the squadron. That he's that guy. And that's really
[1:07:50] the expectation. Now when you went to school, you know, you said
[1:07:54] you had hundreds of flight hours more than a lot of the guys. When
[1:07:58] you come with that much more experience, are the instructors expecting that much more
[1:08:01] from you? A little bit? It was actually a very interesting time to
[1:08:06] go to WTI because I wasn't alone like the other students in my class.
[1:08:13] At least in the fifty three students that went through the class were all similar.
[1:08:17] We had all deployed the combat at least once, if not twice.
[1:08:20] We all had a few more hours than what had traditionally been typical for WTI.
[1:08:27] But the really interesting aspect of it was the instructors there at WTI,
[1:08:31] at Mott's One are really considered to be the best of the best, Like
[1:08:34] in the entire community. It's you know, invitation only to go there and
[1:08:39] be an instructor. But by virtue of the fact that most of them were
[1:08:44] already there when the war started, they actually had less combat experience than the
[1:08:47] students did in that class, and that created a very interesting dynamic at times
[1:08:55] in that class. And you know, we weren't like overtly about it maybe
[1:09:00] a couple of times, but there were a couple of times in the class
[1:09:03] where it got a little testy and a debrief you know, or one of
[1:09:06] the instructors would say something and one of the students would pop off and be
[1:09:11] like, well, in combat, we do it this way in the real
[1:09:14] world. Yeah, stuff like that. So it definitely got a little tens
[1:09:19] at times, but that was just a byproduct of what was happening in the
[1:09:24] Marine Corps as a whole. Really, everybody's timing, yeah, I mean,
[1:09:27] it's my understanding that those that the instructors at WTI are like eating up
[1:09:33] debriefs when there's like combat situations going on and stuff like that, because they
[1:09:36] have to be the guys that know everything, right, So yep, they're
[1:09:42] pretty well informed of what you guys are doing in country, right, one
[1:09:45] hundred percent. I mean they were. Every single one of them was a
[1:09:48] rock star. I think every single one of them went on to be a
[1:09:51] commanding officer. I mean, they were great dudes. It was just virtue
[1:09:56] of timing, you know. When a couple of them had gotten to DUF
[1:09:59] one, they'd all for the most part, augmented squadrons. No F one
[1:10:01] and at least got a few flights in. But you know, smart ass
[1:10:04] younger captains. We were like, hey, we're roading dog. You know,
[1:10:08] we did a couple of full deployments over there. What are you guys
[1:10:11] talking about? You can imagine reading I can imagine a nerd back in my
[1:10:16] day. Yeah, it was just it was a really interesting time to go
[1:10:21] through. But the class went well. I mean, it's an ass kicker.
[1:10:25] I'm not gonna lie that. Six weeks is intense and I was glad
[1:10:28] to get it done, but it went well for me. I've always heard
[1:10:30] that. I've always heard it's for all students because what people may not know
[1:10:34] is when it's going on, it's a huge exercise and it's like all the
[1:10:39] fifty three pilot WTI students, the Cobras, hugeies. They bring it on
[1:10:43] one sixtieth guy as a as A they trade it or bring him in for
[1:10:46] I don't know whatever. Yep, they have ground element guys out there.
[1:10:50] You know there's already guys. It's a whole thing and they do these massive
[1:10:54] exercises. Yeah, and they do training that you can't do in other places,
[1:10:58] like they'll let guys fire and closer than they normally would in normal training
[1:11:01] exercises. Yeah, and so the way it's set up is kind of crawl
[1:11:05] walk run, But once the flight phase starts, you know, for the
[1:11:08] first week it's just the fifty three students flying together. The second week is
[1:11:12] all the rotor wing guys doing these big rotaru wing missions together. So you
[1:11:15] got the cobras, the hues at the time. The forty six is mixed
[1:11:17] in later Dosprey's obviously, and then the last week you go into what's called
[1:11:23] FINEX and then there's a whole fixed wing division in the building too, and
[1:11:26] now everybody's playing. And then you got the ground development. They bring in
[1:11:30] all these assets, like there's enemy MiGs, real ones, enemy you know,
[1:11:35] Russian hind helicopters flying in these missions as adversaries, plus all of the
[1:11:41] other ground threats, like everything is present in this training exercise like it is.
[1:11:47] It's pretty awesome to see it all come together and participate in it.
[1:11:50] Yeah, I'm jealous man, always one of the go as a jaytach.
[1:11:54] The guys I knew as a jaytech that went were like, dude, it's
[1:11:57] a next level of like fires planning and stuff like that, Like it's yeah,
[1:12:00] you know, a major course on it is integrating everything because a lot
[1:12:05] of times the reality is is a lot of your training is in theory.
[1:12:11] If we had fifty threes here, here's how we would do the insert,
[1:12:14] if we had this element and that in that situation, everything's there and every
[1:12:18] piece of it's being utilized, and you as the expert in your field,
[1:12:23] your individual whatever is expected to show up and you know, shine, yeah,
[1:12:28] yeah. And essentially, the way the Marine Corps is designed is every
[1:12:31] squadron is supposed to have at least one captain Company Great WTI per detachment.
[1:12:38] So you know, if you kick out of me detachment, you got to
[1:12:40] have a WT there. You got to have one with your main body whatever.
[1:12:43] So it's still not a lot of guys get to go, but it's
[1:12:45] so that you have that expertise available in every unit in country. And then
[1:12:49] obviously you always have you know, a major two kicking around who is a
[1:12:53] WTI and on occasion a commanding officer. But for that unit at that time
[1:13:00] when we deployed in two thousand and five, one of our majors was also
[1:13:02] had gone through the course, but I was the only Company Great officer that
[1:13:05] had technically gone through the course. So I was it was a busy deployment
[1:13:10] for me for sure. So let's talk about that that next deployment. This
[1:13:14] is your fourth I believe, right, yeah, third to Iraq. Fourth
[1:13:15] employment. When you mentioned in the book working the task force, guys came
[1:13:20] over to engage and see see what your capabilities were before putting up an official
[1:13:28] request. And I will say that that is more common than people made that
[1:13:31] have never done anything like that than they realize, because they're not going to
[1:13:34] waste the time of putting up a request or something for something they can't get,
[1:13:39] and they might as well just call you and be like, hey,
[1:13:41] is this even possible before we try. Yeah, that's awesome that you were
[1:13:45] available and may you know you were able to work with those guys. Can
[1:13:46] you kind of explain what they were wanting and you know how you guys were
[1:13:50] utilized when they would do ops. Absolutely, So I love talking about working
[1:13:56] with those guys. At the time, it was like the coolest thing that
[1:13:59] it ever had happened, you know, as far as I was concerned as
[1:14:00] a captain. So there was a task force that had been put together at
[1:14:05] the time and their mission was, frankly, to hunt down Zarcali, who
[1:14:11] was the leading out Kaida in Iraq and was our number one target. And
[1:14:15] they were stationed on Alasade with us, but it took us a couple of
[1:14:18] weeks to kind of figure out who they were. They had their own little
[1:14:20] compound, they sort of wore uniforms or pieces of uniforms. We'd see them
[1:14:27] in the chow hall with like hockey helmet song with MVG mounts on them.
[1:14:30] Whoever they were, they were obviously, you know, soft, and they
[1:14:33] were special. We knew that. And the Task Force one sixtieth, which
[1:14:39] is the only you know, aviation element that's organic to socom all you know,
[1:14:44] Army officer Warrant officer pilots considered to be the best helicopter pilots in the
[1:14:48] world and have earned that for certain. So they had some of their Blackhawks
[1:14:54] and little Birds parked out right in front of their compound. But we noticed
[1:14:59] right away that their Siege forty sevens were mysteriously absent. They didn't have any
[1:15:03] heavy lift. And it's really because at the time that one sixtieth was still
[1:15:10] so busy in Afghanistan with their forty sevens that they just they couldn't cover down
[1:15:15] on all the requirements, so they didn't have them there in country. So
[1:15:18] a couple of weeks into our deployment, these guys come into our squadron spaces.
[1:15:23] Two of them came over and it just happened to be my buddy Dave
[1:15:26] Pain and I, you know, Apolllo Pain were in our op shop that
[1:15:30] day. Neither of us were flying for whatever reason. These two guys come
[1:15:33] walking in and we don't really know who they are. We just know that
[1:15:38] they're doing something special. And I can't even remember how they introduced themselves,
[1:15:42] but it was, you know, like hey on Brick and this is Todd,
[1:15:45] So whoever they were, you know, we know, like these guys
[1:15:48] are, they're legit. But they were basically just asking us for a feasibility
[1:15:54] support for the reason you stated. They want to know if we could basically
[1:15:58] provide assault support a lift for them because they didn't have their forty sevens in
[1:16:01] country that were organic. And you know, it was just at the time
[1:16:06] David and I were just a couple of captains making handshake deals that weren't really
[1:16:11] ours to make. But of course we were like, yeah, man,
[1:16:13] we can work with you guys. What do you guys need And they immediately
[1:16:16] told us like, well, we've got these vehicles and we want to know
[1:16:18] if we can internal them. So right away we're like, well, go
[1:16:20] get the vehicles and come over and let's check it out. So like ten
[1:16:26] minutes later they pull up on our flight line and the first ve vehicles are
[1:16:29] pretty standard, you know about like Toyota Highlux trucks. Those were a no
[1:16:31] brainer. They had these mad Max looking doom buggies that were pretty cool.
[1:16:35] Those were easy. And then they had this crazy, like shady Caprice cop
[1:16:40] car that sounded like a race car. So we checked that out and determined
[1:16:45] we could get that in the aircraft too. That's crazy that that fits in
[1:16:48] the aircraft. By the way, when I read that book, I was
[1:16:50] like, what it barely fits in the aircraft. Yeah. Well, It's
[1:16:55] interesting about this whole story that I'm telling is I had to send the manuscript
[1:16:59] for this book to the gone to the Office of the Department of Defense off
[1:17:01] some pre publication review, and there's definitely some details that they had me removed.
[1:17:06] Nothing that like really impacted the story, but they had me removed some
[1:17:10] details about these guys because they were that special and what they were doing at
[1:17:14] the time was you know, that big of a deal. But yeah,
[1:17:18] that Caprice cop car ft in there just barely. You couldn't open the doors
[1:17:23] once you were in there, so whoever was inside of it was staying inside
[1:17:26] of it throughout the duration of the ride and of fifty three. But it
[1:17:28] worked and so from there we you know, we both had to go put
[1:17:31] in official requests and like on our end, one of the things we had
[1:17:35] to get was those loads certified to carry. But our higher headquarters was great.
[1:17:41] They helped us do that. The Task Force guys put in the request.
[1:17:44] You know, there was some red tape there obviously for a little bit,
[1:17:46] and the Marine Corps ultimately, what they asked us to do was what
[1:17:49] amounted to some practice missions with them where we'd load their vehicles, do a
[1:17:54] couple of laps in the pattern at the base land and had load the vehicles
[1:17:57] and also played around with some different forms of it, you know, terminal
[1:18:00] guidance that those guys had available to sparkle landing zones for us. But once
[1:18:05] we got that sorted out, then we started working with them and it was
[1:18:09] so fun because you know, it was basically helping out with missions that would
[1:18:13] typically be one sixtieth guys nightstalkers flying and instead we had you know, Marine
[1:18:18] Corps fifty three squadron out there playing with those guys. It was was great.
[1:18:21] Yeah, that's an awesome time that's was there. Like I imagine some
[1:18:27] of the red tape was bringing out like load masters or something to figure out
[1:18:30] how to like strap these things down when they're in the hels and like how
[1:18:33] do you can actually even carry them? No, Like, we we figured
[1:18:38] that out pretty quick, and we still had some some pretty sharp guys in
[1:18:41] our unit that were able to help. So, but it was really had
[1:18:44] to do with approval authority and how the requests were going to work and if
[1:18:48] the Marine Corps was going to, say, be willing to carve out sorties
[1:18:53] that would have otherwise gone to call it our normal stuff support the organic marine
[1:18:57] units there. Yeah, and then your standard you know, safety factor of
[1:19:01] make sure these vehicles can get in and out safely, et cetera. So
[1:19:04] we basically just had to check some boxes and do you know, prove that
[1:19:09] what we were talking about conceptually was doable, and then it was off to
[1:19:13] the races. Once we got that part ten, we and that's the way
[1:19:16] it works. I mean people may not. It's funny you said, captain
[1:19:19] making deals that you're probably Yeah. That made me laugh because that made me
[1:19:24] so when I was on my eleventh viewed apployment. On my second one,
[1:19:30] I was the watch officer and I was the fires guy in the l Fox
[1:19:33] and I got a phone call and it was like, Hey, this is
[1:19:39] Tom what they task force. I'm wondering if you guys could support And he
[1:19:44] was the same thing. He was like, what's the feasibility of this?
[1:19:45] He's like, we're trying to get some artillery support in here because they're getting
[1:19:49] ready to do that major push against ISIS in like Syria and stuff. And
[1:19:55] he's like, you think you could, uh, we could get like one
[1:19:58] or two guns and maybe pull them behind like dump trucks. And I'm like
[1:20:00] what. I'm like, I mean, yeah, you could. I don't
[1:20:04] know if we can allow it. I mean I don't know what the yeah,
[1:20:08] And I and I got with my captain, Captain Burton at the time,
[1:20:12] he's I think he's a major now and he made he did all the
[1:20:16] you know, back channel deals and stuff. I think he might have been
[1:20:19] ashore. He went ashore right after. And that's how we ended up with
[1:20:23] marine artillery in Syria, and we ended up sending like a few guns and
[1:20:28] like almost I think a whole battery maybe to Syria, and they ended up
[1:20:30] doing fire support that whole time. And then we left and another marine unit
[1:20:36] came in and that was pretty That was on the news because they had shot
[1:20:42] out their barrels. They had shot so many rounds that they had to get
[1:20:45] new barrels for some of the howitzers. And there was also I wish the
[1:20:50] the combat camera made this sick video one of the probably first drone videos that
[1:20:56] they were making with combat camera of them shooting in artillery and people were like,
[1:21:00] oh, we got marine artillery and Syria and it's like yeah, but
[1:21:04] would you saying that made me remind me reminded me of that where it was
[1:21:08] a phone called it was like, hey, what do you think? And
[1:21:11] we kind of hashed over some details. I kind of gave him like a
[1:21:15] big picture of what could happen and what couldn't happen for sure, and then
[1:21:18] that's after that, It's when I went to my Captain and the OPSO and
[1:21:23] was like, Hey, this guy named Tom called he's the task Force,
[1:21:27] and that's literally how it is. Hey it's Bob. This is Bob,
[1:21:30] and you're like, hey, Bob. Totally. Yeah. I loved working
[1:21:33] with those guys, and it really just escalated from there all the way up
[1:21:36] until we ended up doing Operation Matador with them, which was really a huge
[1:21:41] one. It was it was fun to end up getting a fly as well.
[1:21:44] Can you talk about any of the operations you did with those guys,
[1:21:45] like, give us some like how your roles in it? Yeah, I
[1:21:49] mean a lot of it was what they were doing was it was a lot
[1:21:54] of you know, what we call raids, and it was really all based
[1:21:57] on because they had this primary target was really trying to catch people that could
[1:22:00] help them figure out where he was going to be and ultimately catch him.
[1:22:04] So for the most part, we're just flying raids where they're trying to go
[1:22:08] get a guy, and so, you know, they'd show up on our
[1:22:11] flight line with you know, their Toyota hih Lux trucks with I mean,
[1:22:14] it sometimes just looked like someone had just dumped a pile of guns and AMMO
[1:22:17] in the back there's no rhyme or reason to it. You know, homemade
[1:22:21] homemade ladders out of two by fours Zodiac boats strapped to the bed of the
[1:22:26] truck and we go insert them. Yeah, we go insert them, usually
[1:22:30] with a little bit of standoff from the actual target, and then they take
[1:22:34] off in their vehicles and boats and do whatever they needed to do to get
[1:22:36] across the river and go try to grab this person. But it was ultimately
[1:22:42] one of the raids that our squadron flew with them, and it was my
[1:22:45] buddy Dave Payne actually that flew it. But they went and snatched a target
[1:22:49] that ultimately ended up providing the intel that led to Operation Matador, which was
[1:22:56] all about, you know, trying to get the leader valcated. There thenumber
[1:23:00] one target in Iraq, and so going into Operation Matador felt like to us
[1:23:05] at the time, like this it was this huge thing, like it was
[1:23:10] like we're finally going to get this dude and the Marine Corps playing in it,
[1:23:13] right. So, but the truth is all they'd really asked for from
[1:23:16] us initially was two fifty threes to put a blocking force of marines basically on
[1:23:24] the on the Syrium border, kind of on the northwest corner of town,
[1:23:28] and typical Marine Corps fashion, that ballooned into a battalion insert, and you
[1:23:33] know, as a young captain, I remember thinking like, oh, here
[1:23:36] we go, Like we just we got to get every marine in this damn
[1:23:39] desert involved in this mission to say we were involved in it. So we
[1:23:43] spent a few days planning this battalion insert. It was ridiculous. Meanwhile,
[1:23:48] the one sixtieth guys who were there, the you know, the Blackhawk guys,
[1:23:51] the little birds were like, look, man, we're going to make
[1:23:54] a ros around the city and just stay the hot out of our way,
[1:23:59] which is easy. We're like, okay, got it, got it,
[1:24:01] Yeah, no sweat, We'll stay out of your way for what they were
[1:24:04] doing. But you know, eventually cooler heads prevailed. It went back down
[1:24:09] to flight of just two fifty threes and ended up being my buddy Dave who
[1:24:13] flew it, and it was super cool. But I remember at the time
[1:24:15] thinking like, this is like the biggest, craziest, most exciting mission I'll
[1:24:20] ever be a part of as a fifty three guy. It was. It
[1:24:23] was neat that same kind of thing happened when we brought this this artillery thing
[1:24:28] up on the mute. I put it up. I go, hey,
[1:24:30] Opso this is what they're looking for. Two cannons, a minimal skeleton crew
[1:24:35] to run them, and they'll secure dump trucks to pull. And everybody was
[1:24:44] on ship, and everybody wanted to get off ship, and the BLT commander
[1:24:48] wanted to go ashore as well, and it became like he refused to do
[1:24:54] anything unless at least a company of marines went of his guys with kat and
[1:24:59] all this stuff. And then so I went from like wanting two guns to
[1:25:01] like ballooning up like you said, to a full battery reinforced with like you
[1:25:05] know, all it was hundreds of guys and if you're an officer listening to
[1:25:11] this, you don't know. They were so close to losing that mission because
[1:25:14] they were like, dude, what you guys want all this shit? Like
[1:25:16] we're trying to have a minimal footprint. You come in, shoot some artillery
[1:25:21] and that's it. And it yeah, and these guys were talking about wanting
[1:25:25] to go on patrols and do all this stuff, and it was like,
[1:25:28] dude, that's not you're trying to create missions out of this thing. They're
[1:25:31] gifting us this mission and you're about to fuck it away. Yeah, so
[1:25:36] something to consider if you're an officer and that comes across your desk sometime.
[1:25:40] Yeah, and I get it. I mean everyone wants to play right.
[1:25:43] Yeah, it definitely got a little ridiculous there for a few days, but
[1:25:45] then we got it back in the box and went executed. It was good.
[1:25:47] Yeah, No, that's cool. Anytime you work with like the Task
[1:25:50] Force guys, it's like, man, it's like these guys get to do
[1:25:55] whatever. You know. It's like it's like, we got to do a
[1:25:58] couple of things with them on ship, and I remember working work just doing
[1:26:01] different stuff with them and working with their jatak and being like, man,
[1:26:04] you guys got all the stuff, Like you guys, what capability don't you
[1:26:09] have? You know, It's like they do they get so they're so well
[1:26:12] taken care of. But I mean they're rock stars, you know what.
[1:26:14] I mean, they get for a reason. I mean they're they're the best.
[1:26:19] They're underpaid professional athletes is what they basically. Yeah, they're incredible.
[1:26:25] The stuff they can do is incredible. There was always fun working with them.
[1:26:28] A lot of those dudes are on I mean if if you've never worked
[1:26:31] around special operations people. A lot of those dudes athletically are on like collegiate
[1:26:36] professional level, if not close to Olympic level athletes. I remember my neighbor
[1:26:42] was a marsok operator and he would wake up at like four in the morning
[1:26:46] and he would be out there biking in his garage. He had the setup
[1:26:49] so he could bike in his garage. He'd bike forever for like a while,
[1:26:54] and then he'd go run for miles and come back and bike more.
[1:26:57] And he would do these iron Man the ultra marathon stuff, and I'm like,
[1:27:01] dude, you're a maniac. Like that's yeah, but you had you
[1:27:04] kind of have to be to be at that level, as you know he's
[1:27:08] wanted to be at. So yep, that's for sure. That's always cool.
[1:27:13] Though. I was when you were saying that you were supporting them,
[1:27:16] I assumed that you would be either dropping dudes off and way off set from
[1:27:21] the actual target, or dropping off dudes in a blocking position, because obviously
[1:27:26] we're not bringing in fifty three to fast rope dudes on top of run.
[1:27:30] Yeah, if we're doing that, things may have gone wrong. Yeah,
[1:27:31] it's gone horribly wrong. If we've gone to that for sure, Yeah,
[1:27:35] it means fun. I mean, how often were you working with them compared
[1:27:40] to your conventional missions that you still have to take care of. We were
[1:27:44] still working with them regularly, so I would say it was almost once twice
[1:27:47] a week we were doing something in support of them. But what was what
[1:27:51] was really cool was up to that point, as fifty three squadrons, we
[1:27:55] hadn't done a lot of named operations, you know, if one totally different
[1:27:59] fight conventional force like we talked about in in of two. We only really
[1:28:02] did that one at the end and Rahwa. But as we took over,
[1:28:06] this got going. Things got gone with the task force. I don't know
[1:28:12] exactly how this worked, but just we started getting more and more requests.
[1:28:15] My assumption was always that kind of the word got out of like, hey,
[1:28:18] these fifty three guys over here are okay, you know, they know
[1:28:20] what they're doing, they're good to work with. And so we started getting
[1:28:25] other requests from like adjacent units, you know, army units for inserts,
[1:28:29] and of course we're supporting all the Marines in country, and so it got
[1:28:32] busy to where we got on this pace where we were doing two three named
[1:28:36] ops a week, which was for us at the time, seemed wild.
[1:28:42] And I remember thinking at the time like, no fifty three squadrons ever done
[1:28:45] named ops at this pace, and no one probably ever will again. And
[1:28:48] by the time the deployment ended, we were at sixty eight. And I
[1:28:51] know that because I was tracking them as a squadron WTI as we were doing
[1:28:56] them and making sure we're the right crews and all that stuff, and flew
[1:29:00] a lot of them personally throughout that. So we did sixty eight and I
[1:29:05] remember thinking like, no one's ever going to beat that number. This was
[1:29:09] just like this bizarre moment in time where the task Force guys were here,
[1:29:14] their forty sevens weren't. I'm sure they'll finish, you know, get some
[1:29:16] bandwidth back in Afghanistan soon and they'll be out here and that'll kind of be
[1:29:19] the end of that. A little did I know that a few years later
[1:29:24] I would completely adjust my perspective again. But at the time I remember thinking
[1:29:29] like that was it, that was the pinnacle, and it felt like the
[1:29:32] coolest thing I'd ever been a part of, and it was just an awesome
[1:29:34] way for me to wrap up that, you know, for my fourth deployment,
[1:29:39] third to Iraq, I was a squadron WTI we did all these cool
[1:29:41] things. Was it was a great feeling professionally for sure. I mean,
[1:29:45] had you guys shit the bed on that that may have been the most at
[1:29:47] a fifty three squadron, you know that. Yeah, doing going and working
[1:29:51] with those dudes and working with anybody really and doing a really good job puts
[1:29:57] that in their mind for later on and they go, hey, those fifty
[1:30:00] three guys are actually kind of legit. I worked with them on the last
[1:30:02] deployment. Yeah, let's bring them in on this thing too, if they're
[1:30:05] available. Yep. You know. So it's key for people to remember that,
[1:30:09] like people are always watching, and if you do a shitty job,
[1:30:12] they understand that. And if you're not getting missions later on, maybe it's
[1:30:15] because part of it might be because you know how you kind of carried yourself
[1:30:19] on those previous missions one hundred percent, And every individual squadron that's deployed during
[1:30:26] their time is representing that for the community at large, right, because whatever
[1:30:30] happens reflects on the whole community, and the fifty threes in general get a
[1:30:34] reputation if you will good or bad based on what happened, So it was
[1:30:39] awesome to be part of that. Oh, you fly an aircraft called a
[1:30:42] shitter, so I mean, yeah, you're starting like in a negative one
[1:30:45] already. People are like, wait, is this thing going to crash on
[1:30:47] me? Well, like we talked about last time, you know, flying
[1:30:49] a seal support period is never going to be considered cool or exciting or anything.
[1:30:54] So getting to start doing some of that stuff and doing it well was
[1:30:57] was pretty awesome. How did that? How did work? In? Would
[1:31:00] those dudes so much affect your assault support mission that you're supposed to be doing
[1:31:04] while you're in Iraq? We were able. We were still able to do
[1:31:08] it. I mean because we actually, like all fifty three squads in combat,
[1:31:12] we had a twenty four hour rotation going, so we had cruise flying
[1:31:14] during the day in crease flane at night. So most of the standard asrs
[1:31:17] we always called it haul and acid trash what was happening during the day,
[1:31:21] So we were still able to cover down on all that. The competition,
[1:31:25] if you will, was really between them and the other Organic Marine Corps units
[1:31:29] for the night missions because most of the named ops would happen at night.
[1:31:32] And when I say night, you know you'd come in at nine o'clock or
[1:31:36] no, you know, twenty one to twenty two hundred, fly all night
[1:31:39] until the sun comes up, and a lot of these raids and stuff would
[1:31:42] happen right around two am three am, So whoever was on the night page
[1:31:45] was typically doing the named operations and that was really the only trade off for
[1:31:49] the Marine Corps. I'm sure a couple of times they ended up prioritizing the
[1:31:53] task force over something else the Marine Corps was trying to do organically. Now,
[1:31:57] did you have like set pilots that would work with the task force or
[1:32:00] everybody got in on it? Well, it was really just it's crew composition.
[1:32:05] But we had our most qualified pilots, I would say, were the
[1:32:09] ones that were primarily working with them and executing the flights. So you know,
[1:32:14] you have all your calls I think we talked about last time. But
[1:32:16] up at the top is obviously your Weapons and Tactics instructors, and then the
[1:32:20] one just below that is Night Systems Instructors. So guys here are Night Systems
[1:32:25] instructors, but haven't gone through the WTI course, but they're pretty damn close
[1:32:29] to being similar In some cases there's probably the guys who never went to together
[1:32:33] are better than a WTI that are night systems instructors. But we had enough
[1:32:38] of those in the unit that that's really who did it. So for the
[1:32:41] most part, it was our majors, our commanding officer, and then you
[1:32:45] know me and my buddy Dave and like one or two other captains that were
[1:32:48] night systems instructors that were doing the majority of this stuff. That's awesome on
[1:32:53] the night crew. Now there is an opportunity, there is an opportunity for
[1:32:59] I know, Cobra guys can can possibly get a slot at the one sixtieth.
[1:33:03] Is there any way for a fifty three pilot to move over there and
[1:33:05] get a rotation through? No, But at the time there, back then,
[1:33:11] there was an exchange store available with the twentieth Special Operation Squadron, which
[1:33:15] was an Air Force Pavelow fifty three Special Ops contingent that did deploy and do
[1:33:21] a lot of stuff with the one sixtieth, and so we had a single
[1:33:27] Marine fifty three pilot that was always doing exchange or the twentieth Special Operation Squadron.
[1:33:32] And because of what happened on our deployment in two thousand and five,
[1:33:36] myself and I mentioned him before, my buddy Dave Payne and I Apallo.
[1:33:40] We were at the senior captains and we were doing all of the most of
[1:33:44] the interfacing with the task force, whether we were finding the mission or not.
[1:33:46] We were kind of the primary points of contact. But at the conclusion
[1:33:50] of that deployment, Dave actually applied for and got selected to go do that
[1:33:55] twentieth Special Operation Squadron Exchange Tour. So when we left, you know,
[1:34:00] after that last deployment, came home and we're wrapping up our timement Squadron.
[1:34:02] That's what he went and did, and he was great, So you know,
[1:34:05] he really enjoyed that, and he went and did several of the short
[1:34:11] deployments with the operators in the twentieth soos, is there a big difference between
[1:34:15] the fifty three you flew and then the ones that they use. Yeah,
[1:34:18] for sure. A Pavlow was just the older variant, not quite as powerful,
[1:34:25] but has a lot more technology on it, or had a lot more
[1:34:29] technology on it. Was my understanding. I never flew a Pavlo, but
[1:34:32] you know, everything I know about it was just my buddy Dave telling me
[1:34:35] about it later, but definitely a slightly different machine, but pretty cool when
[1:34:42] they had a really cool mission as well. I forgot to even had that
[1:34:44] squadron that there was another special operation squadron like that. Yeah, and they
[1:34:47] had it for a while and then I don't remember the year that they folded
[1:34:50] it up. Dave might actually been the last one. I don't remember if
[1:34:54] there was one more guy that did that exchange to her after him or not.
[1:34:57] But I think, you know, we got home in late two thousand
[1:35:00] and five, the fall of five, I think it was spring of six
[1:35:03] where he went out there for about three years, So somewhere in the around
[1:35:06] two thousand and nine ten, I think is when they shift our unit down.
[1:35:11] Were they I mean, were they mainly used to like reinforce the one
[1:35:14] sixtieth or did they have something completely like completely different mission. Honestly at the
[1:35:17] time, didn't have a good enough understanding to say for certain. I do
[1:35:23] know that that towards the end of that two thousand and five deployment they showed
[1:35:28] up, and when they did, we thought, Okay, we're probably done
[1:35:32] supporting these guys because the payloads are here now and literally like I think it
[1:35:38] was the next week the crash the pavlo do with those guys. Yeah,
[1:35:45] like the payloat showed up and promptly, promptly crashed an aircraft and our squadron
[1:35:49] actually got tapped to go recover that aircraft external like external lift it and get
[1:35:55] it out of there. And so it was actually commanding officer that flew it.
[1:36:00] I was very involved in the planning for it, which came in handy
[1:36:03] later. But we put together plan form, you know, we had the
[1:36:05] math and everything dialed in to go extremely lift. It executed right at sunrise,
[1:36:12] which cold the time of the day, which helps with the lift,
[1:36:14] and we got it out of there. But because they promptly showed up and
[1:36:17] then crashed in aircraft, we stayed in business working with the taskbars because I
[1:36:23] want to say, they only had two or three aircraft that they brought.
[1:36:26] Do you know what happened, like what brought it down? It wasn't bad,
[1:36:30] like there was no loss of life or anything on that one. It
[1:36:32] was just your your classic hard landing where the you know, the gear got
[1:36:35] all jacked up and the aircraft wasn't flyable and you know, broken enough reminiscent
[1:36:41] of your first deployment. Yeah, it's similar, a little a little worse
[1:36:45] than it had to actually be recovered and they couldn't fly it away. But
[1:36:47] yeah, so they all walked away, but the aircraft was broken enough that
[1:36:51] it needed a recovery. That's rough. You're kind of looking at them like,
[1:36:55] huh first week huh. Yeah, yeah, they show up there like
[1:36:59] all right, nerds were here. Yeah, it's like get back to moving
[1:37:01] mail. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, we went and bailed them out and
[1:37:05] kept on trucking. It was good. That's crazy. Yeah, I've never
[1:37:10] I've never seen one. I don't think i've ever seen one in person.
[1:37:12] I wonder because it's like saying, like, you know, there's if you've
[1:37:15] seen a forty seven, there's a big difference between that and a one sixty.
[1:37:18] It's forty seven, yeah, for sure, And the same with the
[1:37:23] what do they call the sixty that's a special operations one, the DAP,
[1:37:28] Yeah, the Direct Action Penetrator. Yep. Yeah, there's a huge difference
[1:37:31] between that and your normal sixty. So for sure, man, that's cool
[1:37:35] stuff though. It was. It was a cool deployment. Yeah, I
[1:37:40] mean, that's what you want you know, you want to walk away from
[1:37:42] him and be like, yeah, it was cool, Like we got to
[1:37:43] do some cool stuff. You know, if people that if you are there
[1:37:45] and you're a conventional force and special operations guys ask you to help them out,
[1:37:50] it makes you feel like, oh, hell, yeah, man,
[1:37:53] I'm good at what I'm doing, you know, because they value my support,
[1:37:57] my input, my whatever here. Yeah, it was great for unit
[1:38:00] as a whole. I mean, so it was awesome, you know,
[1:38:02] for me to be in the position I was as a squadron WTI to be
[1:38:05] able to help facilitate that, you know, kind of for all of us.
[1:38:09] But it made for a really cool deployment. It was action packed and
[1:38:13] exciting and we're right there working with these super secret Task Force guys the whole
[1:38:16] time, and it was good. It was also just good for the community,
[1:38:19] the whole fifty three community to have a unit that was able to do
[1:38:23] that and do well. For sure, Now, when you were like planning
[1:38:27] operations with these guys, is was it different than what you're used to because
[1:38:30] it's more of a joint environment now or well, I would say it was
[1:38:34] different than what I was used to and because of how damn efficient they were,
[1:38:39] and I really loved it. I mean with them, it was like
[1:38:43] it was very simple. They would say like, here's what you need to
[1:38:45] know. We just drop us off right here at this time. That was
[1:38:50] pretty much, chick, can you do that? Yeah? And then we
[1:38:54] didn't. They never really briefed us on their ground scheme of maneuver too much,
[1:38:58] which was different. So typically you're planning with Marines, you have to
[1:39:01] ask the aviator totally or at least have a good understanding the ground scheme maneuver,
[1:39:04] and everything you're doing is in support of that. Well, the task
[1:39:08] force guys kept it super simple for us. They're like, we need you
[1:39:10] to inserts here at this time, and then we need to be able to
[1:39:13] pick us up here at this time, you know, or be ready to
[1:39:15] and then we kind of figured it out from there and do our own routing
[1:39:18] and stuff. But it was actually very efficient working with them, And for
[1:39:24] sure, the one time we made it inefficient and we tried to turn it
[1:39:27] into an Italian insert, they were like, you know what, we're not
[1:39:29] doing this, so we're gonna put a rose around what we're doing and you
[1:39:31] guys stay out. Yeah, that's what happens. People want to get involved,
[1:39:35] you know, yeah, totally. It was great working with them.
[1:39:40] Yeah, fun. Well, dude, this has been great. This is
[1:39:43] our second conversation. You know, people can hear more about your you know
[1:39:45] you still this is we haven't even gone all the way through your career yet.
[1:39:49] Yeah, your book will be out today when this releases. Hangar four
[1:39:54] on probably everywhere, right Amazon, Well yeah, Amazon, Barnes, Andnoble
[1:39:58] dot com. Those are the easiest place to grab it. But you can
[1:40:00] also just take a look at my website. It's Isaacchele dot com. And
[1:40:04] all the social links are up there. I've got buttons on there that'll take
[1:40:08] you the links to buy the book. So yeah, I'll put the link
[1:40:11] to your side of the show description. People can check that out. Social
[1:40:15] media, yep, Instagram is Isaac g Lee Writer and then Facebook is just
[1:40:21] Isaac che Lee. Yeah, check him out. Check myself out former Action
[1:40:25] Guys, Former Action News on Instagram, and my website is Jacromographics dot com.
[1:40:30] Man, I really appreciate it. Round two. I think the really
[1:40:31] good conversation of course. Yeah, it's fun. I love coming on and
[1:40:35] chatting with you. It goes back quick

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